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IMMANUEL  KANT’S 


Critique  of  Pure  Reason 


In  Commemoration  of  tlje  Centenarg  of  it® 
jfiret  publication 


TRANSLATED  INTO  ENGLISH 
BY 

F.  MAX  MULLER 


SECOND  EDITION,  REVISED 


Nefo  gorfe 

THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

LONDON  : MACMILLAN  & CO.,  LTD. 
1922 


All  rights  reservid 


Copyright,  1*96, 

By  THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY. 


First  edition  printed  1881.  Reprinted  with  alterations,  1896 


ma 

Hilo  SF 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


PAGB 


Dedication xiii 

Table  of  Contents  to  First  Edition xv 

Preface  to  First  Edition  ........  xvii 

Translator's  Preface  .........  xxvii 

Translator’s  Preface  to  Second  Edition lxxxi 

Introduction  ..........  1-12 

I.  The  Idea  of  Transcendental  Philosophy  1 

II.  Division  of  Transcendental  Philosophy  . . . . ic 


I 


. The  Elements  of  Transcendentalism 
First  Part.  Transcendental  /Esthetic 

First  Section.  Of  Space 

Second  Section.  Of  Time 

General  Observations  on  Transcendental  /Esthetic  . 
Second  Part.  Transcendental  Logic  .... 
Introduction.  The  Idea  of  a Transcendental  Logic  . 

I.  Of  Logic  in  General  ....... 

II.  Of  Transcendental  Logic 

III.  Of  the  Division  of  General  Logic  into  Analytic  and 

Dialectic  ........ 

IV.  Of  the  Division  of  Transcendental  Logic  into  Tran- 

scendental Analytic  and  Dialectic  . . . . 


15-39 

15-39 

18 

24 

34 

40-5 1 -j 
40'^ 
40 
44 

46 

49 


First  Division.  Transcendental  Analytic  . . . 52-237 

Book  I.  Analytic  of  Concepts 54-106 


Chapter  I.  Method  of  Discovering  all  Pure  Concepts 

of  the  Understanding.  ......  55 

Section  1.  Of  the  Logical  Use  of  the  Understanding 

in  General  ........  56 


v 


vi  Table  of  Contents 

PAGE 

(Book  I.  Chapter  I.) 

Section  2.  Of  the  Logical  Function  of  the  Under- 


standing in  Judgments 58 

Section  3.  Of  the  Pure  Concepts  of  the  Understand- 

1 , 

ihg, 'Or  of  the  Categories 63 

Chapter  II.  Of  the  Deduction  of  the  Pure  Concepts  of 

the  Understanding  .......  70 

Section  1.  Of  the  Principles  of  a Transcendental 

Deduction  in  General  ......  70 

Section  2.  Of  the  a priori  Grounds  for  the  Possibil- 
ity of  Experience  . . . . . . .79 

1.  Of  the  Synthesis  of  Apprehension  in  Intuition  . 82 

2.  Of  the  Synthesis  of  Reproduction  in  Imagination  83 

3.  Of  the  Synthesis  of  Recognition  in  Concepts  . 85 

4.  Preliminary  Explanation  of  the  Possibility  of  the 

Categories  as  Knowledge  a priori  ...  91 

Section  3.  Of  the  Relation  of  the  Understanding  to 
Objects  in  General,  and  the  Possibility  of  Know- 
ing them  a priori . . . ..  . -94 

Summary  Representation  of  the  Correctness,  and  of 
the  Only  Possibility  of  this  Deduction  of  the  Pure 
Concepts  of  the  Understanding  . . . .105 


Book  II.  Analytic  of  Principles  ....  107-237 

Introduction.  Of  the  Transcendental  Faculty  of  Judg- 
ment in  General 108 

Chapter  1.  Of  the  Schematism  of  the  Pure  Concepts  of 

the  Understanding 112 

Chapter  II.  System  of  all  Principles  of  the  Pure  Under- 
standing   12 1 

Section  1.  Of  the  Highest  Principle  of  all  Analytical 

Judgments  . . . . . . . 123 

Section  2.  Of  the  Highest  Principle  of  all  Synthetical 

Judgments 126 


Tab  ho f Contents  vii 

PAGE 

(Book  II.  Chapter  II.) 

Section  3.  Systematical  Representation  of  all  Syn- 
thetical Principles  of  the  Pure  Understanding  . 129 

1.  Axioms  of  Intuition  ......  133 

2.  Anticipations  of  Perception 136 

3.  Analogies  of  Experience  . . . . 144 

First  Analogy.  Principle  of  Permanence  . 149 

Second  Analogy.  Principle  of  Production  . 155 

Third  Analogy.  Principle  of  Community  . 172 

4.  The  Postulates  of  Empirical  Thought  in  General  178 

Chapter  III.  On  the  Ground  of  Distinction  of  all  Sub- 
jects into  Phenomena  and  Noumena  . . 192 

Appendix.  Of  the  Amphiboly  of  Reflective  Concepts, 
owing  to  the  Confusion  of  the  Empirical  with  the 
Transcendental  Use  of  the  Understanding  . .212 

Second  Division.  Transcendental  Dialectic  . . . 238  -564 

Introduction 238 

1.  Of  transcendental  Appearance  (Illusion)  . . . 238 

2.  Of  Pure  Reason  as  the  seat  of  Transcendental  Illu- 

sion . . . . . . . . . 242 

A.  Of  Reason  in  General 242 

B.  Of  the  Logical  Use  of  Reason  ....  246 

C.  Of  the  Pure  Use  of  Reason  ....  247 

Book  I.  Of  the  Concepts  of  Pure  Reason  . . 252-274 

Section  1.  Of  Ideas  in  General  . . . . 254 

Section  2.  Of  Transcendental  Ideas  ....  261 

Section  3.  System  of  Transcendental  Ideas  . . 270 

Book  II.  Of  the  Dialectical  Conclusions  of  Pure  Reason  275-564 
Chapter  I.  Of  the  Paralogisms  of  Pure  Reason  . . 278 

First  Paralogism.  Of  Substantiality  ,1  284 

Second  Paralogism.  Of  Simplicity  . . 286 

Third  Paralogism.  Of  Personality  ....  294 

Fourth  Paralogism.  Of  Ideality 298 


Table  of  Contents 


viii 

(Book  II.  Chapter  I.) 

Consideration  on  the  Whole  of  Pure  Psychology,  as 

affected  by  these  Paralogisms  ....  308 

Chapter  II.  The  Antinomy  of  Pure  Reason  . . . 328 

Section  1.  System  of  Cosmological  Ideas  . . . 330 

Section  2.  Antithetic  of  Pure  Reason  . . . 339 

First  Conflict  of  the  Transcendental  Ideas  . . 344 

Second  Conflict 352 

Third  Conflict  . 362 

Fourth  Conflict  .......  370 

Section  3.  Of  the  Interest  of  Reason  in  these  Con- 
flicts   -379 

Section  4.  Of  the  Transcendental  Problems  of  Pure 
Reason,  and  the  Absolute  Necessity  of  their 
Solution  ........  389 

Section  5.  Sceptical  Representation  of  the  Cosmolog- 
ical Questions  in  the  Four  Transcendental  Ideas  . 396 

Section  6.  Transcendental  Idealism  as  the  Key  to  the 

Solution  of  Cosmological  Dialectic  . . . 400 

Section  7.  Critical  Decision  of  the  Cosmological 

Conflict  of  Reason  with  itself  ....  405 

Section  8.  The  Regulative  Principle  of  Pure  Reason 

with  Regard  to  the  Cosmological  Ideas  . . 413 

Section  9.  Of  the  Empirical  Use  of  the  Regulative 
Principle  of  Reason  with  Regard  to  all  Cosmolog- 
ical Ideas 419 

I.  Solution  of  the  Cosmological  Idea  of  the  Total- 

ity of  the  Composition  of  Phenomena  in  an 
Universe  .......  420 

II.  Solution  of  the  Cosmological  Idea  of  the  Total- 

ity of  the  Division  of  a Whole  given  in  Intu- 
ition   425 


Table  of  Contents 


IX 


(Book  II.  Chapter  II.  Section  9.) 

Concluding  Remarks  on  the  Solution  of  the 
Transcendental-mathematical  Ideas,  and  Pre- 
liminary Remark  for  the  Solution  of  the 
Transcendental-dynamical  Ideas  . 

III.  Solution  of  the  Cosmological  Ideas  with  Regard 

to  the  Totality  of  the  Derivation  of  Cosmical 
Events  from  their  Causes  .... 
Possibility  of  a Causality  through  Freedom,  in  Har- 
mony with  the  Universal  Law  of  Necessity  . 
Explanation  of  the  Cosmological  Idea  of  Freedom 
in  Connection  with  the  General  Necessity  of 
Nature  ........ 

IV.  Solution  of  the  Cosmological  Idea  of  the  Total- 

ity of  the  Dependence  of  Phenomena,  with 
Regard  to  their  Existence  in  General  . 

Chapter  III.  The  Ideal  of  Pure  Reason 

Section  1.  Of  the  Ideal  in  General  .... 

Section  2.  Of  the  Transcendental  Ideal 
Section  3.  Of  the  Arguments  of  Speculative  Reason 
in  Proof  of  the  Existence  of  a Supreme  Being 
Section  4.  Of  the  Impossibility  of  an  Ontological 
Proof  of  the  Existence  of  God  .... 

Section  5.  Of  the  Impossibility  of  a Cosmological 
Proof  of  the  Existence  of  God  .... 

Discovery  and  Explanation  of  the  Dialectical  Illusion 
in  all  Transcendental  Proofs  of  the  Existence  of 
a Necessary  Being  ...... 

Section  6.  Of  the  Impossibility  of  the  Physico-theo- 

logical  Proof 

Section  7.  Criticism  of  all  Theology  based  on  Spec- 
ulative Principles  of  Reason 


428 


432 


436 


439 


45  2 

459 

459 

462 

47i 

477 

486 


495 


499 


508 


X 


Table  of  Contents 


PAGE 


(Book  II.  Chapter  III.  Section  7.) 

Appendix  to  the  Transcendental  Dialectic.  Of  the 

Regulative  Use  of  the  Ideas  of  Pure  Reason  . 516 

Of  the  Ultimate  Aim  of  the  Natural  Dialectic  of 

Human  Reason  .......  537 

II.  Method  of  Transcendentalism  ....  565-686 

Chapter  I.  The  Discipline  of  Pure  Reason  . . . 569 

Section  1.  The  Discipline  of  Pure  Reason  in  its  Dog- 
matical Use  .........  572 

Section  2.  The  Discipline  of  Pure  Reason  in  its  Polem- 
ical Use  .........  593 

The  Impossibility  of  a Sceptical  Satisfaction  of  Pure 

Reason  in  Conflict  with  itself  .....  608 

Section  3.  The  Discipline  of  Pure  Reason  with  Regard 

to  Hypotheses  . . . . . . . .617 

Section  4.  The  Discipline  of  Pure  Reason  with  Regard 

to  its  Proofs 627 

Chapter  II.  The  Canon  of  Pure  Reason  ....  638 

Section  1 Of  the  Ultimate  Aim  of  the  Pure  Use  of 

our  Reason  ........  640 

Section  2.  Of  the  Ideal  of  the  Summum  Bonum  as 

determining  the  Ultimate  Aim  of  Pure  Reason  . 645 

Section  3.  Of  Trowing,  Knowing,  and  Believing  . . 657 

Chapter  III.  The  Architectonic  of  Pure  Reason  . . 667 

Chapter  IV.  The  History  of  Pure  Reason  . . . 683 


Supplements 


687-808 


TO  HIS  EXCELLENCY 
THE  ROYAL  MINISTER  OF  STATE 
BARON  VON  ZEDLITZ 


DEDICATION 


Sir, 

To  further,  so  far  as  in  us  lies,  the  growth  of  the  sciences 
is  to  work  in  your  Excellency’s  own  interest,  your  own  interest 
being  intimately  connected  with  them,  not  only  through  the 
exalted  position  of  a patron  of  science,  but  through  the  far  more 
intimate  relation  of  a lover  and  enlightened  judge.  For  that 
reason  I avail  myself  of  the  only  means  within  my  power  of 
proving  my  gratitude  for  the  gracious  confidence  w ith  which  your 
Excellency  honours  me,  as  if  I too  could  help  toward  your  noble 
work. 

[Whoever  delights  in  a speculative  life  finds  with  moderate 
wishes  the  approval  of  an  enlightened  and  kind  judge  a powerful 
incentive  to  studies  the  results  of  which  are  great,  but  remote,  and 
therefore  entirely  ignored  by  vulgar  eyes.] 

To  you,  as  such  a judge,  and  to  your  kind  attention  I now  sub- 
mit this  book,  placing  all  other  concerns  of  my  literary  future 
under  your  special  protection,  and  remaining  with  profound 
respect 1 

Your  Excellency’s 

Most  obedient  Servant, 

IMMANUEL  KANT. 

KONIGSBERG,  March  29,  1781. 

1 The  second  paragraph  is  left  out  and  the  last  sentence  slightly  altered  in  the 
Second  Edition.  • 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  TO  THE 


FIRST  EDITION1 


Introduction i (i) 

I.  ELEMENTS  OF  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 


PART  I.  Transcendental  /Esthetic 

. 

17 

09) 

Section  I.  Of  Space 

. 

20 

(22) 

Section  II.  Of  Time 

. 

27 

(3°) 

PART  II.  Transcendental  Logic  . 

. 

44 

(5°) 

Division  I.  Transcendental  Analytic  in 
with  their  chapters  and  sections 

two  books, 

56 

(64) 

Division  II.  Transcendental  Dialectic  in  two  books, 


with  their  chapters  and  sections  ....  254  (293) 

II.  METHOD  OF  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

Chapter  I.  The  Discipline  of  Pure  Reason  . . 607  (708) 

Chapter  II.  The  Canon  of  Pure  Reason  . . 682  (795) 

Chapter  III.  The  Architectonic  of  Pure  Reason  . 714  (832) 

Chapter  IV.  The  History  of  Pure  Reason  . . 731  (852) 


1 Instead  of  this  simple  Table  of  Contents,  later  editions  have  a much  fuller 
one  (Supplement  III),  which,  as  Rosenkranz  observes,  obscures  rather  than 
illustrates  the  articulation  of  the  book. 


XV 


; : . - 


• • 


. ...  . - 


■•••  i'i 


PREFACE1 


Our  reason  (Vernunft)  has  this  peculiar  fate  that,  with 
reference  to  one  class  of  its  knowledge,  it  is  always 
troubled  with  questions  which  cannot  be  ignored,  because 
they  spring  from  the  very  nature  of  reason,  and  which 
cannot  be  answered,  because  they  transcend  the  powers 
of  human  reason. 

Nor  is  human  reason  to  be  blamed  for  this.  It  begins 
with  principles  which,  in  the  course  of  experience,  it  must 
follow,  and  which  are  sufficiently  confirmed  by  experience. 
With  these  again,  according  to  the  necessities  of  its  nature, 
it  rises  higher  and  higher  to  more  remote  conditions.  But 
when  it  perceives  that  in  this  way  its  work  remains  for 
ever  incomplete,  because  the  questions  never  cease,  it 
finds  itself  constrained  to  take  refuge  in  principles  which 
exceed  every  possible  experimental  application,  and  never- 
theless seem  so  unobjectionable  that  even  ordinary  com- 
mon sense  agrees  with  them.  Thus,  however,  reason 
becomes  involved  in  darkness  and  contradictions,  from 
which,  no  doubt,  it  may  conclude  that  errors  must  be 
lurking  somewhere,  but  without  being  able  to  discover 
them,  because  the  principles  which  it  follows  transcend 
all  the  limits  of  experience  and  therefore  withdraw  them- 

1 This  preface  is  left  out  in  later  editions,  and  replaced  by  a new  preface; 
see  Supplement  II,  page  688. 

xvii 


xviii  Preface 

selves  from  all  experimental  tests.  It  is  the  battle-field 
of  these  endless  controversies  which  is  called  Metaphysic. 

There  was  a time  when  Metaphysic  held  a royal  place 
among  all  the  sciences,  and,  if  the  will  were  taken  for  the 
deed,  the  exceeding  importance  of  her  subject  might  well 
have  secured  to  her  that  place  of  honour.  At  present  it 
is  the  fashion  to  despise  Metaphysic,  and  the  poor  matron, 
forlorn  and  forsaken,  complains  like  Hecuba,  Modo  max- 
ima rerum,  tot  generis  natisque  potens — nunc  trahor  exnl, 
inops  (Ovid,  Metam.  xiii.  508). 

At  first  the  rule  of  Metaphysic,  under  the  dominion  of 
the  dogmatists,  was  despotic.  But  as  the  laws  still  bore 
the  traces  of  an  old  barbarism,  intestine  wars  and  complete 
anarchy  broke  out,  and  the  sceptics,  a kind  of  nomads, 
despising  all  settled  culture  of  the  land,  broke  up  from 
time  to  time  all  civil  society.  Fortunately  their  number 
was  small,  and  they  could  not  prevent  the  old  settlers 
from  returning  to  cultivate  the  ground  afresh,  though 
without  any  fixed  plan  or  agreement.  Not  long  ago  one 
might  have  thought,  indeed,  that  all  these  quarrels  were 
to  have  been  settled  and  the  legitimacy  of  her  claims 
decided  once  for  all  through  a certain  physiology  of  the 
human  understanding,  the  work  of  the  celebrated  Locke. 
But,  though  the  descent  of  that  royal  pretender,  traced 
back  as  it  had  been  to  the  lowest  mob  of  common  ex- 
perience, ought  to  have  rendered  her  claims  very  sus- 
picious, yet,  as  that  genealogy  turned  out  to  be  in  reality 
a false  invention,  the  old  queen  (Metaphysic)  continued  to 
maintain  her  claims,  everything  fell  back  into  the  old 
rotten  dogmatism,  and  the  contempt  from  which  metaphy- 
sical science  was  to  have  been  rescued,  remained  the  same 
as  ever.  At  present,  after  everything  has  been  tried,  so 


Preface 


xix 


they  say,  and  tried  in  vain,  there  reign  in  philosophy 
weariness  and  complete  indifferentism,  the  mother  of  chaos 
and  night  in  all  sciences  but,  at  the  same  time,  the  spring 
or,  at  least,  the  prelude  of  their  near  reform  and  of  a new 
light,  after  an  ill-applied  study  has  rendered  them  dark, 
confused,  and  useless. 

It  is  in  vain  to  assume  a kind  of  artificial  indifferentism 
in  respect  to  enquiries  the  object  of  which  cannot  be  in- 
different to  human  nature.  Nay,  those  pretended  indif- 
ferentists  (however  they  may  try  to  disguise  themselves 
by  changing  scholastic  terminology  into  popular  language), 
if  they  think  at  all,  fall  'back  inevitably  into  those  very 
metaphysical  dogmas  which  they  profess  to  despise. 
Nevertheless  this  indifferentism,  showing  itself  in  the 
very  midst  of  the  most  flourishing  state  of  all  sciences, 
and  affecting  those  very  sciences  the  teachings  of  which, 
if  they  could  be  had,  would  be  the  last  to  be  surrendered,  is 
a phenomenon  well  worthy  of  our  attention  and  considera- 
tion. It  is  clearly  the  result,  not  of  the  carelessness,  but 
of  the  matured  judgment 1 of  our  age,  which  will  no 
longer  rest  satisfied  with  the  mere  appearance  of  know- 

1 We  often  hear  complaints  against  the  shallowness  of  thought  in  our  own 
time,  and  the  decay  of  sound  knowledge.  But  I do  not  see  that  sciences 
which  rest  on  a solid  foundation,  such  as  mathematics,  physics,  etc.,  deserve 
this  reproach  in  the  least.  On  the  contrary,  they  maintain  their  old  reputa- 
tion of  solidity,  and  with  regard  to  physics,  even  surpass  it.  The  same  spirit 
would  manifest  itself  in  other  branches  of  knowledge,  if  only  their  principles 
had  first  been  properly  determined.  Till  that  is  done,  indifferentism  and 
doubt,  and  ultimately  severe  criticism,  are  rather  signs  of  honest  thought. 
Our  age  is,  in  every  sense  of  the  word,  the  age  of  criticism,  and  everything 
must  submit  to  it.  Religion,  on  the  strength  of  its  sanctity,  and  law,  on  the 
strength  of  its  majesty,  try  to  withdraw  themselves  from  it;  but  by  so  doing 
they  arouse  just  suspicions,  and  cannot  claim  that  sincere  respect  which 
reason  pays  to  those  only  who  have  been  able  to  stand  its  free  and  open 
examination. 


XX 


Preface 


ledge.  It  is,  at  the  same  time,  a powerful  appeal  to 
reason  to  undertake  anew  the  most  difficult  of  its  duties, 
namely,  self-knowledge,  and  to  institute  a court  of  appeal 
which  should  protect  the  just  rights  of  reason,  but  dismiss 
all  groundless  claims,  and  should  do  this  not  by  means  of 
irresponsible  decrees,  but  according  to  the  eternal  and 
unalterable  laws  of  reason.  This  court  of  appeal  is  no 
other  than  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason. 

I do  not  mean  by  this  a criticism  of  books  and  systems, 
but  of  the  faculty  of  reason  in  general,  touching  that 
whole  class  of  knowledge  which  it  may  strive  after,  un- 
assisted by  experience.  This  must  decide  the  question  of 
the  possibility  or  impossibility  of  metaphysic  in  general, 
and  the  determination  of  its  sources,  its  extent,  and  its 
limits  — and  all  this  according  to  fixed  principles. 

This,  the  only  way  that  was  left,  I have  followed, 
and  I flatter  myself  that  I have  thus  removed  all  those 
errors  which  have  hitherto  brought  reason,  whenever  it  was 
unassisted  by  experience,  into  conflict  with  itself.  I have 
not  evaded  its  questions  by  pleading  the  insufficiency  of 
human  reason,  but  I have  classified  them  according  to 
principles,  and,  after  showing  the  point  where  reason 
begins  to  misunderstand  itself,  solved  them  satisfactorily. 
It  is  true  that  the  answer  of  those  questions  is  not  such  as 
a dogma-enamoured  curiosity  might  wish  for,  for  such  curi- 
osity could  not  have  been  satisfied  except  by  juggling 
tricks  in  which  I am  no  adept.  But  this  was  not  the 
intention  of  the  natural  destiny  of  our  reason,  and  it 
became  the  duty  of  philosophy  to  remove  the  deception 
which  arose  from  a false  interpretation,  even  though 
many  a vaunted  and  cherished  dream  should  vanish  at 
the  same  time.  In  this  work  I have  chiefly  aimed  at 


Preface 


xxi 


completeness,  and  I venture  to  maintain  that  there  ought 
not  to  be  one  single  metaphysical  problem  that  has  not 
been  solved  here,  or  to  the  solution  of  which  the  key  at 
least  has  not  been  supplied.  In  fact  Pure  Reason  is  so 
perfect  a unity  that,  if  its  principle  should  prove  insuffi- 
cient to  answer  any  one  of  the  many  questions  started  by 
its  very  nature,  one  might  throw  it  away  altogether,  as 
insufficient  to  answer  the  other  questions  with  perfect 
certainty. 

While  I am  saying  this  I fancy  I observe  in  the  face 
of  my  readers  an  expression  of  indignation,  mixed  with 
contempt,  at  pretensions  apparently  so  self-glorious  and 
extravagant ; and  yet  they  are  in  reality  far  more  moder- 
ate than  those  made  by  the  writer  of  the  commonest  essay 
professing  to  prove  the  simple  nature  of  the  soul  or  the 
necessity  of  a first  beginning  of  the  world.  For,  while  he 
pretends  to  extend  human  knowledge  beyond  the  limits 
of  all  possible  experience,  I confess  most  humbly  that  this 
is  entirely  beyond  my  power.  I mean  only  to  treat  of 
reason  and  its  pure  thinking,  a knowledge  of  which  is  not 
very  far  to  seek,  considering  that  it  is  to  be  found  within 
myself.  Common  logic  gives  an  instance  how  all  the 
simple  acts  of  reason  can  be  enumerated  completely  and 
systematically.  Only  between  the  common  logic  and  my 
work  there  is  this  difference,  that  my  question  is, — what 
can  we  hope  to  achieve  with  reason,  when  all  the  material 
and  assistance  of  experience  is  taken  away  ? 

So  much  with  regard  to  the  completeness  in  our  laying 
hold  of  every  single  object,  and  the  thoroughness  in  our 
laying  hold  of  all  objects,  as  the  material  of  our  critical  en- 
quiries — a completeness  and  thoroughness  determined,  not 
by  a casual  idea,  but  by  the  nature  of  our  knowledge  itself 


XXII 


Preface 


Besides  this,  certainty  and  clearness  with  regard  to 
form  are  two  essential  demands  that  may  very  properly 
be  addressed  to  an  author  who  ventures  on  so  slippery  an 
undertaking. 

First,  with  regard  to  certainty,  I have  pronounced  judg- 
ment against  myself  by  saying  that  in  this  kind  of  enquiries 
it  is  in  no  way  permissible  to  propound  mere  opinions,  and 
that  everything  looking  like  a hypothesis  is  counterband, 
that  must  not  be  offered  for  sale  at  however  low  a price, 
but  must,  as  soon  as  it  has  been  discovered,  be  confiscated. 
For  every  kind  of  knowledge  which  professes  to  be  cer- 
tain a priori , proclaims  itself  that  it  means  to  be  taken  for 
absolutely  necessary.  And  this  applies,  therefore,  still 
more  to  a definition  of  all  pure  knowledge  a priori,  which 
is  to  be  the  measure,  and  therefore  also  an  example,  of  all 
apodictic  philosophical  certainty.  Whether  I have  ful- 
filled what  I have  here  undertaken  to  do,  must  be  left  to 
the  judgment  of  the  reader  ; for  it  only  behoves  the  author 
to  propound  his  arguments,  and  not  to  determine  before- 
hand the  effect  which  they  ought  to  produce  on  his  judges. 
But,  in  order  to  prevent  any  unnecessary  weakening  of 
those  arguments,  he  may  be  allowed  to  point  out  himself 
certain  passages  which,  though  they  refer  to  collateral 
objects  only,  might  occasion  some  mistrust,  and  thus  to 
counteract  in  time  the  influence  which  the  least  hesitation 
of  the  reader  in  respect  to  these  minor  points  might  exer- 
cise with  regard  to  the  principal  object. 

I know  of  no  enquiries  which  are  more  important  for 
determining  that  faculty  which  we  call  understanding 
(Verstand),  and  for  fixing  its  rules  and  its  limits,  than 
those  in  the  Second  Chapter  of  my  Transcendental  Ana- 
lytic’ under  the  title  of  ‘Deduction  of  the  Pure  Concepts 


Preface  xxiii 

of  the  Understanding.’  They  have  given  me  the  greatest 
but,  I hope,  not  altogether  useless  trouble.  This  enquiry, 
which  rests  on  a deep  foundation,  has  two  sides.  The 
one  refers  to  the  objects  of  the  pure  understanding,  and 
is  intended  to  show  and  explain  the  objective  value  of  its 
concepts  a priori.  It  is,  therefore,  of  essential  importance 
for  my  purposes.  The  other  is  intended  to  enquire  into 
the  pure  understanding  itself,  its  possibility,  and  the 
powers  of  knowledge  on  which  it  rests,  therefore  its  sub- 
jective character;  a subject  which,  though  important  for 
my  principal  object,  yet  forms  no  essential  part  of  it,  be- 
cause my  principal  problem  is  and  remains,  What  and 
how  much  may  understanding  (Verstand)  and  reason  (Ver- 
nunft)  know  without  all  experience  ? and  not,  How  is  the 
faculty  of  thought  possible  ? The  latter  would  be  an  en- 
quiry into  a cause  of  a given  effect ; it  would,  therefore, 
be  of  the  nature  of  an  hypothesis  (though,  as  I shall  show 
elsewhere,  this  is  not  quite  so) ; and  it  might  seem  as  if  I 
had  here  allowed  myself  to  propound  a mere  opinion,  leav- 
ing the  reader  free  to  hold  another  opinion  also.  I there- 
fore warn  the  reader,  in  case  my  subjective  deduction 
should  not  produce  that  complete  conviction  which  I ex- 
pect, that  the  objective  deduction,  in  which  I am  here 
chiefly  concerned,  must  still  retain  its  full  strength.  For 
this,  what  has  been  said  on  pp.  82,  83  (92,  93)  may  possi- 
bly by  itself  be  sufficient. 

Secondly,  as  to  clearness,  the  reader  has  a right  to 
demand  not  only  what  may  be  called  logical  or  discursive 
clearness,  which  is  based  on  concepts,  but  also  what  may 
be  called  aesthetic  or  intuitive  clearness  produced  by  intui- 
tions, i.e.  by  examples  and  concrete  illustrations.  With 
regard  to  the  former  I have  made  ample  provision.  That 


XXIV 


Preface 


arose  from  the  very  nature  of  my  purpose,  but  it  became 
at  the  same  time  the  reason  why  I could  not  fully  satisfy 
the  latter,  if  not  absolute,  yet  very  just  claim.  Nearly 
through  the  whole  of  my  work  I have  felt  doubtful  what 
to  do.  Examples  and  illustrations  seemed  always  to  be 
necessary,  and  therefore  found  their  way  into  the  first 
sketch  of  my  work.  But  I soon  perceived  the  magnitude 
of  my  task  and  the  number  of  objects  I should  have  to 
treat ; and,  when  I saw  that  even  in  their  driest  scholastic 
form  they  would  considerably  swell  my  book,  I did  not 
consider  it  expedient  to  extend  it  still  further  through 
examples  and  illustrations  required  for  popular  purposes 
only.  This  work  can  never  satisfy  the  popular  taste,  and 
the  few  who  know,  do  not  require  that  help  which,  though 
it  is  always  welcome,  yet  might  here  have  defeated  its  very 
purpose.  The  Abbe  Terrasson  1 writes  indeed  that,  if  we 
measured  the  greatness  of  a book,  not  by  the  number  of 
its  pages,  but  by  the  time  we  require  for  mastering  it, 
many  a book  might  be  said  to  be  much  shorter,  if  it  were 
not  so  short.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  if  we  ask  how  a 
complicated,  yet  in  principle  coherent  whole  of  specula- 
tive thought  can  best  be  rendered  intelligible,  we  might  be 
equally  justified  in  saying  that  many  a book  would  have 
been  more  intelligible,  if  it  had  not  tried  to  be  so  very 
intelligible.  For  the  helps  to  clearness,  though  they  may 
be  missed 2 with  regard  to  details,  often  distract  with  re- 
gard to  the  whole.  The  reader  does  not  arrive  quickly 
enough  at  a survey  of  the  whole,  because  the  bright  col- 


1 Terrasson,  Philosophie  nach  ihrem  allgemeinen  Einflusse  auf  alle  Gegen- 
stande  des  Geistes  und  der  Sitten,  Berlin,  1762,  p.  117. 

2 Rosenkranz  and  others  change  fehlen  into  helfen,  without  necessity,  I 
think. 


Preface 


xxv 


ours  of  illustrations  hide  and  distort  the  articulation  and 
concatenation  of  the  whole  system,  which,  after  all,  if  we 
want  to  judge  of  its  unity  and  sufficiency,  are  more  im- 
portant than  anything  else. 

Surely  it  should  be  an  attraction  to  the  reader  if  he  is 
asked  to  join  his  own  efforts  with  those  of  the  author  in 
order  to  carry  out  a great  and  important  work,  according 
to  the  plan  here  proposed,  in  a complete  and  lasting  man- 
ner. Metaphysic,  according  to  the  definitions  here  given, 
is  the  only  one  of  all  sciences  which,  through  a small  but 
united  effort,  may  count  on  such  completeness  in  a short 
time,  so  that  nothing  will  remain  for  posterity  but  to 
arrange  everything  according  to  its  own  views  for  didactic 
purposes,  without  being  able  to  add  anything  to  the  sub- 
ject itself.  For  it  is  in  reality  nothing  but  an  inventory 
of  all  our  possessions  acquired  through  Pure  Reason, 
systematically  arranged.  Nothing  can  escape  us,  because 
whatever  reason  produces  entirely  out  of  itself,  cannot 
hide  itself,  but  is  brought  to  light  by  reason  itself,  so  soon 
as  the  common  principle  has  been  discovered.  This  abso- 
lute completeness  is  rendered  not  only  possible,  but  neces- 
sary, through  the  perfect  unity  of  this  kind  of  knowledge, 
all  derived  from  pure  concepts,  without  any  influence  from 
experience,  or  from  special  intuitions  leading  to  a definite 
kind  of  experience,  that  might  serve  to  enlarge  and  in- 
crease it.  Tecam  habita  et  noris  quani  sit  tibi  carta  stipel- 
lex  (Persius,  Sat.  iv.  52). 

Such  a system  of  pure  (speculative)  reason  I hope 
myself  to  produce  under  the  title  of  ‘ Metaphysic  of 
Nature.’  It  will  not  be  half  so  large,  yet  infinitely  richer 
than  this  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  which  has,  first  of  all, 
to  discover  its  source,  nay,  the  conditions  of  its  possibility, 


XXVI 


Preface 


in  fact,  to  clear  and  level  a soil  quite  overgrown  with 
weeds.  Here  I expect  from  my  readers  the  patience  and 
impartiality  of  a judge,  there  the  goodwill  and  aid  of  a 
fellow-worker.  For  however  completely  all  the  principles 
of  the  system  have  been  propounded  in  my  Critique,  the 
completeness  of  the  whole  system  requires  also  that  no 
derivative  concepts  should  be  omitted,  such  as  cannot  be 
found  out  by  an  estimate  a priori , but  have  to  be  dis- 
covered step  by  step.  There  the  synthesis  of  concepts 
has  been  exhausted,  here  it  will  be  requisite  to  do  the 
same  for  their  analysis,  a task  which  is  easy  and  an 
amusement  rather  than  a labour. 

I have  only  a few  words  to  add  with  respect  to  the 
printing  of  my  book.  As  the  beginning  had  been  delayed, 
I was  not  able  to  see  the  clean  sheets  of  more  than  about 
half  of  it.  I now  find  some  misprints,  though  they  do  not 
spoil  the  sense,  except  on  p.  379,  line  4 from  below,  where 
specific  should  be  used  instead  of  sceptic.  The  antinomy 
of  pure  reason  from  p.  425  to  p.  461  has  been  arranged  in 
a tabular  form,  so  that  all  that  belongs  to  the  thesis  stands 
on  the  left,  what  belongs  to  the  antithesis  on  the  right 
side.  I did  this  in  order  that  thesis  and  antithesis  might 
be  more  easily  compared. 


TRANSLATOR’S  PREFACE 


Why  I thought  I might  translate  Kant’s  Critique 

‘ But  how  can  you  waste  your  time  on  a translation  of 
Kant' s Critik  der  reinen  Vernunft  ? ’ This  question,  which 
has  been  addressed  to  me  by  several  friends,  I think  I 
shall  best  be  able  to  answer  in  a preface  to  that  translation 
itself.  And  I shall  try  to  answer  it  point  by  point. 

First,  then,  with  regard  to  myself.  Why  should  I waste 
my  time  on  a translation  of  Kant’s  Critik  der  reinen  Ver- 
nunft ? — that  is,  Were  there  not  other  persons  more  fitted 
for  that  task,  or  more  specially  called  upon  to  under- 
take it  ? 

It  would  be  the  height  of  presumption  on  my  part  to 
imagine  that  there  were  not  many  scholars  who  could  have 
performed  such  a task  as  well  as  myself,  or  far  better.  All 
I can  say  is,  that  for  nearly  thirty  years  I have  been  wait- 
ing for  some  one  really  qualified,  who  would  be  willing  to 
execute  such  a task,  and  have  waited  in  vain.  What  I feel 
convinced  of  is  that  an  adequate  translation  of  Kant  must 
be  the  work  of  a German  scholar.  That  conviction  was 
deeply  impressed  on  my  mind  when  reading,  now  many 
years  ago,  Kant’s  great  work  with  a small  class  of  young 
students  at  Oxford  — among  whom  I may  mention  the 
names  of  Appleton,  Nettleship,  and  Wallace.  Kant’s 
style  is  careless  and  involved,  and  no  wonder  that  it 

xxvii 


xxviii  Translator' s Preface 

should  be  so,  if  we  consider  that  he  wrote  down  the  whole 
of  the  Critique  in  not  quite  five  months.  Now,  beside  the 
thread  of  the  argument  itself,  the  safest  thread  through 
the  mazes  of  his  sentences  must  be  looked  for  in  his  ad- 
verbs and  particles.  They,  and  they  only,  indicate  clearly 
the  true  articulation  of  his  thoughts,  and  they  alone  im- 
part to  his  phrases  that  peculiar  intonation  which  tells 
those  who  are  accustomed  to  that  bye-play  of  language, 
what  the  author  has  really  in  his  mind,  and  what  he  wants 
to  express,  if  only  he  could  find  the  right  way  to  do  it. 

When  reading  and  critically  interpreting  Kant’s  text,  I 
sometimes  compared  other  translations,  particularly  the 
English  translations  by  Haywood  and  Meiklejohn,1  and 
excellent  as,  in  most  places,  I found  their  renderings,  par- 
ticularly the  latter,  I generally  observed  that,  when  the 
thread  was  lost,  it  was  owing  to  a neglect  of  particles  and 
adverbs,  though  sometimes  also  to  a want  of  appreciation 
of  the  real,  and  not  simply  the  dictionary  meaning,  of  Ger- 
man words.  It  is  not  my  intention  to  write  here  a criticism 
of  previous  translations ; on  the  contrary,  I should  prefer 
to  express  my  obligation  to  them  for  several  useful  sugges- 
tions which  I have  received  from  them  in  the  course  of 
what  I know  to  be  a most  arduous  task.  But  in  order  to 
give  an  idea  of  what  I mean  by  the  danger  arising  from  a 
neglect  of  adverbs  and  particles  in  German,  I shall  men- 
tion at  least  a few  of  the  passages  of  which  I am  thinking. 

On  p.  395  (484),  Kant  says  : Da  also  selbst  die  Anflo sung 

1 I discovered  too  late  that  Professor  Mahaffy,  in  his  translation  of  Kuno 
Fischer’s  work  on  Kant  (Longmans,  1866),  has  given  some  excellent  speci- 
mens of  what  a translation  of  Kant  ought  to  be.  Had  I known  of  them  in 
time,  I should  have  asked  to  be  allowed  to  incorporate  them  in  my  own 
translation. 


Translator' s Preface 


XXIX 


dieser  Aufgaben  niemals  in  der  Erfahrung  vorkommen 
kann.  This  means,  ‘ As  therefore  even  the  solution  of 
these  problems  can  never  occur  in  experience,’  i.e.  as, 
taking  experience  as  it  is,  we  have  no  right  even  to  start 
such  a problem,  much  less  to  ask  for  its  solution.  Here 
the  particle  also  implies  that  the  writer,  after  what  he  has 
said  before,  feels  justified  in  taking  the  thing  for  granted. 
But  if  we  translate,  ‘ Although,  therefore,  the  solution  of 
these  problems  is  unattainable  through  experience,’  we 
completely  change  the  drift  of  Kant’s  reasoning.  He 
wants  to  take  away  that  very  excuse  that  there  exists 
only  some  uncertainty  in  the  solution  of  these  problems, 
by  showing  that  the  problems  themselves  can  really  never 
arise,  and  therefore  do  not  require  a solution  at  all.  Kant 
repeats  the  same  statement  in  the  same  page  with  still 
greater  emphasis,  when  he  says : Die  dogmatische  Auflo- 
sung  ist  also  nicht  etwa  ungewiss,  sondern  umnoglich , i.e. 
‘ Hence  the  dogmatical  solution  is  not,  as  you  imagine, 
uncertain,  but  it  is  impossible.’ 

On  p.  396  (485),  the  syntactical  structure  of  the  sen- 
tence, as  well  as  the  intention  of  the  writer,  does  not  allow 
of  our  changing  the  words  so  ist  es  kliiglich  gehandelt , into 
a question.  It  is  the  particle  so  which  requires  the  trans- 
position of  the  pronoun  (ist  es  instead  of  es  ist),  not  the 
interrogative  character  of  the  whole  sentence. 

On  p.  401  (492),  wenn  cannot  be  rendered  by  although, 
which  is  wenn  auch  in  German.  Wenn  beide  nach  empi- 
rischen  Gesetzen  in  einer  Erfahrung  richtig  und  durchgangig 
zusammenhangen  means,  ‘ If  both  have  a proper  and  thor- 
ough coherence  in  an  experience,  according  to  empirical 
laws’;  and  not,  ‘Although  both  have,’  etc. 

Sollen  is  often  used  in  German  to  express  what,  accord- 


OCX 


Translator' s Preface 


ing  to  the  opinion  of  certain  people,  is  meant  to  be.  Thus 
Kant,  on  p.  461  (570),  speaks  of  the  ideals  which  painters 
have  in  their  minds,  and  die  ein  nicht  mitzutheilendes 
Schattenbild  Hirer  Producte  oder  auch  Beurtheilungen  sein 
sollen,  that  is,  ‘ which,  according  to  the  artists’  professions, 
are  a kind  of  vague  shadows  only  of  their  creations  and 
criticisms,  which  cannot  be  communicated.’  All  this  is 
lost,  if  we  translate,  ‘ which  can  serve  neither  as  a model 
for  production,  nor  as  a standard  for  appreciation.’  It 
may  come  to  that  in  the  end,  but  it  is  certainly  not  the 
way  in  which  Kant  arrives  at  that  conclusion. 

On  p.  503  (625),  den  einzigmoglichen  Bcweisgrund 
( wofern  iiberall  nur  ein  spcculativer  Beweis  statt  findet ) 
is  not  incorrectly  rendered  by  ‘ the  only  possible  ground 
of  proof  (possessed  by  speculative  reason)’;  yet  we  lose 
the  thought  implied  by  Kant’s  way  of  expression,  viz.  that 
the  possibility  of  such  a speculative  proof  is  very  doubtful. 

The  same  applies  to  an  expression  which  occurs  on 
p.  549  (684),  ein  solches  Schema , als  ob  es  tin  wirkliches 
Wesen  ware.  Kant  speaks  of  a schema  which  is  con- 
ceived to  be  real,  but  is  not  so,  and  this  implied  meaning 
is  blurred  if  we  translate  ‘ a schema,  which  requires  us  to 
regard  this  ideal  thing  as  an  actual  existence.’ 

On  p.  572  (712),  Kant  writes:  Mcthoden , die  zwar  sonst 
der  Vernunft,  aber  nur  nicht  hier  wol  anpassen. 

This  has  been  translated : ‘ The  methods  which  are 
originated  by  reason,  but  which  are  out  of  place  in  this 
sphere.’ 

This  is  not  entirely  wrong,  but  it  blurs  the  exact  features 
of  the  sentence.  What  is  really  meant  is:  ‘Methods  which- 
are  suitable  to  reason  in  other  spheres,  only,  I believe,  not 
here.’  It  is  curious  to  observe,  that  Kant,  careless  as  he 


Translator's  Preface 


xxxi 


was  in  the  revision  of  his  text,  struck  out  wol  in  the  Sec- 
ond Edition,  because  he  may  have  wished  to  remove  even 
that  slight  shade  of  hesitation  which  is  conveyed  by  that 
particle.  Possibly,  however,  wol  may  refer  to  anpassen , 
i.e.  pulchre  convenire,  the  limitation  remaining  much  the 
same  in  either  case. 

Dock  is  a particle  that  may  be  translated  in  many 
different  ways,  but  it  can  never  be  translated  by  there- 
fore. Thus  when  Kant  writes  (Suppl.  XIV.  § 17,  note, 
p.  748),  folglich  die  Einheit  des  Bewnsstseyns,  als  syn- 
thetisch , aber  dock  urspriinglich  angetroffen  wird,  he  means 
to  convey  an  opposition  between  synthetical  and  primitive, 
i.e.  synthetical,  and  yet  primitive.  To  say  ‘ nevertheless 
synthetical,  and  therefore  primitive,’  conveys  the  very 
opposite. 

It  may  be  easily  understood  that  in  a metaphysical  argu- 
ment it  must  cause  serious  inconvenience,  if  the  particle 
not  is  either  omitted  where  Kant  has  it,  or  added  where 
Kant  has  it  not.  It  is  of  less  consequence  if  not  is  omitted 
in  such  a passage  as,  for  instance,  where  Kant  says  in  the 
preface  to  the  Second  Edition  (p.  704),  that  the  obscurities 
of  the  first  have  given  rise  to  misconceptions  ‘ without  his 
fault,’  instead  of  ‘not  without  his  fault.’  But  the  matter 
becomes  more  serious  in  other  places. 

Thus  (Supplement  XIV.  § 26,  p.  762)  Kant  says,  ohm 
diese  Tauglichkeit,  which  means,  ‘ unless  the  categories 
were  adequate  for  that  purpose,’  but  not  ‘ if  the  categories 
were  adequate.’  Again  (Supplement  XVIb.,  p.  771),  Kant 
agrees  that  space  and  time  cayinot  be  perceived  by  them- 
selves, but  not,  that  they  can  be  thus  perceived.  And  it 
must  disturb  even  an  attentive  reader  when,  on  p.  203 
(248),  he  reads  that  ‘the  categories  must  be  employed 


xxxii  Translator  s Preface 

empirically,  and  cannot  be  employed  transcendentally,' 
while  Kant  writes  : Da  sie  nicht  von  empirischem,  Gebrauch 
sein  sollen,  und  von  transcendentalem  nicht  sein  konnen. 

As  regards  single  words,  there  are  many  in  German 
which,  taken  in  their  dictionary  meaning,  seem  to  yield 
a tolerable  sense,  but  which  throw  a much  brighter  light 
on  a whole  sentence,  if  they  are  understood  in  their  more 
special  idiomatic  application. 

Thus  vorriicken , no  doubt,  may  mean  ‘ to  place  before,’ 
but  Jemandem  etivas  vorriicken,  means  ‘ to  reproach  some- 
body with  something.’  Hence  (p.  705)  die  der  rationalen 
Psychologie  vorgeriickten  Paralogismen  does  not  mean 
‘ the  paralogisms  which  immediately  precede  the  Rational 
Psychology,’  but  ‘the  paralogisms  with  which  Rational 
Psychology  has  been  reproached.’ 

On  p.  386  (472),  nachhangen  cannot  be  rendered  by 
‘ to  append.’  Er  erlaabt  der  Vernunft  idealischen  Erkld- 
rungen  der  Natur  nachzuhdngen  means  ‘ he  allows  reason 
to  indulge  in  ideal  explanations  of  nature,’  but  not  ‘ to 
append  idealistic  explanations  of  natural  phenomena.’ 

On  p.  627  (781),  als  ob  er  die  bejahende  Parthei  ergriffen 
hatte,  does  not  mean  ‘ to  attack  the  position,’  but  ‘ to  adopt 
the  position  of  the  assenting  party.’ 

On  p.  679  (847),  Wie  kann  ich  erwarten  does  not  mean 
‘ How  can  I desire  ? ’ but  ‘ How  can  I expect  ? ’ which 
may  seem  to  be  not  very  different,  but  nevertheless  gives 
a wrong  turn  to  a whole  argument. 

I have  quoted  these  few  passages,  chiefly  in  order  to 
show  what  I mean  by  the  advantages  which  a German  has 
in  translating  Kant,  as  compared  with  any  other  translator 
who  has  derived  his  knowledge  of  the  language  from 
grammars  and  dictionaries  only.  An  accurate  and  scholar- 


Translator' s Preface  xxxiii 

like  knowledge  of  German  would,  no  doubt,  suffice  for  the 
translation  of  historical  or  scientific  works.  But  in  order 
to  find  our  way  through  the  intricate  mazes  of  metaphysi- 
cal arguments,  a quick  perception  of  what  is  meant  by  the 
sign-posts,  I mean  the  adverbs  and  particles,  and  a natural 
feeling  for  idiomatic  ways  of  speech,  seem  to  me  almost 
indispensable. 

On  the  other  hand,  I am  fully  conscious  of  the  advan- 
tages which  English  translators  possess  by  their. more 
perfect  command  of  the  language  into  which  foreign 
thought  has  to  be  converted.  Here  I at  once  declare  my 
own  inferiority ; nay,  I confess  that  in  rendering  Kant’s 
arguments  in  English  I have  thought  far  less  of  elegance, 
smoothness,  or  rhythm,  than  of  accuracy  and  clearness. 
What  I have  attempted  to  do  is  to  give  an  honest,  and,  as 
far  as  possible,  a literal  translation,  and,  before  all,  a trans- 
lation that  will  construe  ; and  I venture  to  say  that  even 
to  a German  student  of  Kant  this  English  translation  will 
prove  in  many  places  more  intelligible  than  the  German 
original.  It  is  difficult  to  translate  the  hymns  of  the  Veda 
and  the  strains  of  the  Upanishads,  the  odes  of  Pindar  and 
the  verses  of  Lucretius ; but  I doubt  whether  the  difficulty 
of  turning  Kant’s  metaphysical  German  into  intelligible 
and  construable  English  is  less.  Nor  do  I wish  my  readers 
to  believe  that  I have  never  failed  in  making  Kant’s  sen- 
tences intelligible.  There  are  a few  sentences  in  Kant’s 
Critique  which  I have  not  been  able  to  construe  to  my 
own  satisfaction,  and  where  none  of  the  friends  whom  I 
consulted  could  help  me.  Here  all  I could  do  was  to  give 
a literal  rendering,  hoping  that  future  editors  may  succeed 
in  amending  the  text,  and  extracting  from  it  a more  intel- 
ligible sense. 


xxxiv 


Translator ' s Preface 


Why  I thought  I ought  to  translate  Kant’s  Critique 

But  my  friends  in  blaming  me  for  wasting  my  time  on 
a translation  of  Kant’s  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  gave  me 
to  understand  that,  though  I might  not  be  quite  unfit,  I 
was  certainly  not  specially  called  upon  to  undertake  such 
a work.  It  is  true,  no  doubt,  that  no  one  could  have 
blamed  me  for  not  translating  Kant,  but  I should  have 
blamed  myself ; in  fact,  I have  blamed  myself  for  many 
years  for  not  doing  a work  which  I felt  must  be  done 
sooner  or  later.  Year  after  year  I hoped  I should  find 
leisure  to  carry  out  the  long-cherished  plan,  and  when  at 
last  the  Centenary  of  the  publication  of  Kant’s  Critik  der 
reinen  Vernunft  drew  near,  I thought  I was  in  honour 
bound  not  to  delay  any  longer  this  tribute  to  the  memory 
of  the  greatest  philosopher  of  modern  times.  Kant’s 
Critique  has  been  my  constant  companion  through  life. 
It  drove  me  to  despair  when  I first  attempted  to  read  it,  a 
mere  school-boy.  During  my  university  days  I worked 
hard  at  it  under  Weisse,  Lotze,  and  Drobisch,  at  Leipzig, 
and  my  first  literary  attempts  in  philosophy,  now  just  forty 
years  old,  were  essays  on  Kant’s  Critique.  Having  once 
learnt  from  Kant  what  man  can  and  what  he  cannot  know, 
my  plan  of  life  was  very  simple,  namely,  to  learn,  so  far 
as  literature,  tradition,  and  language  allow  us  to  do  so,  how 
man  came  to  believe  that  he  could  know  so  much  more 
than  he  ever  can  know  in  religion,  in  mythology,  and  in 
philosophy.  This  required  special  studies  in  the  field  of 
the  most  ancient  languages  and  literatures.  But  though 
these  more  special  studies  drew  me  away  for  many  years 
towards  distant  times  and  distant  countries,  whatever 
purpose  or  method  there  may  have  been  in  the  work  of 
my  life  was  due  to  my  beginning  life  with  Kant. 


Translator' s Preface 


xxxv 


Even  at  Oxford,  whether  I had  to  lecture  on  German 
literature  or  on  the  Science  of  Language,  I have  often,  in 
season  and  out  of  season,  been  preaching  Kant ; and 
nothing  I have  missed  so  much,  when  wishing  to  come  to 
an  understanding  on  the  great  problems  of  life  with  some 
of  my  philosophical  friends  in  England,  than  the  common 
ground  which  is  supplied  by  Kant  for  the  proper  discus- 
sion of  every  one  of  them.  We  need  not  be  blind  wor- 
shippers of  Kant,  but  if  for  the  solution  of  philosophical 
problems  we  are  to  take  any  well-defined  stand,  we  must, 
in  this  century  of  ours,  take  our  stand  on  Kant.  Kant’s 
language,  and  by  language  I mean  more  than  mere  words, 
has  become  the  Lingua  franca  of  modern  philosophy,  and 
not  to  be  able  to  speak  it,  is  like  studying  ancient  philoso- 
phy, without  being  able  to  speak  Aristotle,  or  modern 
philosophy,  without  being  able  to  speak  Descartes.  What 
Rosenkranz,  the  greatest  among  Hegel’s  disciples,  said  in 
1838,  is  almost  as  true  to-day  as  it  was  then:  Englander , 
Franzosen  und  Italiener  miissen,  wenn  sie  vorwarts  wollen, 
denselben  Schritt  thun , den  Kant  schon  1781  machte.  Nur 
so  konnen  sie  sick  von  ihrer  dernialigen  schlechten  Meta- 
physik  und  den  aus  einer  solchen  sick  ergebenden  schlechten 
Consequenzen  befreien. 

It  is  hardly  necessary  at  the  present  day  to  produce  any 
arguments  in  support  of  such  a view.  The  number  of 
books  on  Kant’s  philosophy,  published  during  the  last 
century  in  almost  every  language  of  the  world,1  speaks  for 
itself.  There  is  no  single  philosopher  of  any  note,  even 
among  those  who  are  decidedly  opposed  to  Kant,  who  has 

1 During  the  first  ten  years  after  the  appearance  of  the  Critique,  three 
hundred  publications  have  been  counted  for  and  against  Kant’s  philosophy. 
See  Vaihinger,  Kommentar,  I.,  p.  9. 


XXXVI 


Translator  s Preface 


not  acknowledged  his  pre-eminence  among  modern  phi- 
losophers.  The  great  systems  of  Fichte,  Schelling,  Hegel, 
Herbart,  and  Schopenhauer  branched  off  from  Kant,  and 
now,  after  a century  has  passed  away,  people  begin  to  see 
that  those  systems  were  indeed  mighty  branches,  but  that 
the  leading  shoot  of  philosophy  was  and  is  still  — Kant. 
No  truer  word  has  lately  been  spoken  than  what,  I believe, 
was  first  said  by  Professor  Weisse,1  in  the  Philosophical 
Society  at  Leipzig,  of  which  I was  then  a member,  and 
was  again  more  strongly  enforced  by  my  friend  and  former 
colleague,  Professor  Liebmann  of  Strassburg,  that,  if  phi- 
losophy wishes  to  go  forward,  it  must  go  back  to  Kant. 
II  faut  reculer,  pour  mieux  sauter.  Lange,  in  his  History 
of  Materialism,  calls  Kant  the  Copernicus  of  modern 
philosophy  ; aye,  Kant  himself  was  so  fully  conscious  of 
the  decentralising  character  of  his  system  that  he  did  not 
hesitate  to  compare  his  work  with  that  of  Copernicus.2 
But  if  Kant  was  right  in  his  estimate  of  his  own  philos- 
ophy, it  cannot  be  denied  that,  with  but  few,  though 
memorable  exceptions,  philosophy  in  England  is  still 
Ante-Kantian  or  Ante-Copernican.  How  little  Kant  is 
read  by  those  who  ought  to  read  him,  or  how  little  he  is 
understood  by  those  who  venture  to  criticise  him,  I never 
felt  so  keenly  as  when,  in  a controversy  which  I had  some 
time  ago  with  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer,  I was  told  that  space 
could  not  be  an  a priori  intuition,  because  we  may  hear 
church-bells,  without  knowing  where  the  belfry  stands. 
Two  philosophers,  who  both  have  read  Kant’s  Critique, 
may  differ  from  each  other  diametrically,  but  they  will  at 
least  understand  each  other.  They  will  not  fire  at  each 

1 See  Julius  Walter,  Zum  Gedachtniss-  Kant’s,  p.  28. 

2 See  Supplement  II,  p.  693. 


Translate))'’ s Preface  xxxvii 

other  like  some  of  the  German  students  who,  for  fear  of 
killing  their  adversary,  fire  their  pistols  at  right  angles, 
thus  endangering  the  life  of  their  seconds  rather  than  that 
of  their  adversaries. 

This  will  explain  why,  for  a long  time,  I have  felt  per- 
sonally called  upon  to  place  the  classical  work  of  Kant 
within  the  reach  of  all  philosophical  readers  in  England, 
so  that  no  one  could  say  any  longer  that  he  could  not  con- 
strue it.  I thought  for  a time  that  Professor  Caird’s  excel- 
lent work,  On  the  Philosophy  of  Kant,  had  relieved  me 
of  this  duty.  And,  no  doubt,  that  work  has  told,  and  has 
opened  the  eyes  of  many  people  in  England  and  in  America 
to  the  fact  that,  whatever  we  may  think  of  all  the  out- 
works of  Kant’s  philosophy,  there  is  in  it  a central  thought 
which  forms  a real  rest  and  an  entrenched  ground  in  the 
onward  march  of  the  human  intellect. 

But  it  is  a right  sentiment  after  all,  that  it  is  better  to 
read  a book  than  to  read  about  it,  and  that,  as  my  friend 
Stanley  used  to  preach  again  and  again,  we  should  never 
judge  of  a book  unless  we  have  read  the  whole  of  it 
ourselves.  I therefore  pledged  myself  to  finish  a new 
translation  of  Kant’s  Critique  as  my  contribution  to  the 
celebration  of  its  centenary;  and  though  it  has  taken  more 
time  and  more  labour  than  I imagined,  I do  not  think  my 
time  or  my  labour  will  have  been  wasted,  if  only  people  in 
England,  and  in  America  too,  will  now  read  the  book  that 
is  a hundred  years  old,  and  yet  as  young  and  fresh  as 
ever. 

So  far  I have  spoken  of  myself,  and  more  perhaps  than 
a wise  man  at  my  time  of  life  ought  to  do.  But  I have 
still  to  say  a few  words  to  explain  why  I think  that, 
if  the  time  which  I have  bestowed  on  this  undertaking  has 


xxxviii  Translator  s Preface 

not  been  wasted,  others  also,  and  not  philosophers  by  pro- 
fession only,  will  find  that  I have  not  wasted  their  time  by 
inducing  them  at  the  present  time  to  read  Kant’s  master- 
work  in  a faithful  English  rendering. 

Why  a study  of  Kant’s  Critique  seemed  necessary 
at  present 

It  is  curious  that  in  these  days  the  idea  of  develop- 
ment, which  was  first  elaborated  by  the  students  of  phi- 
losophy, language,  and  religion,  and  afterwards  applied 
with  such  brilliant  success  to  the  study  of  nature  also, 
should  receive  so  little  favour  from  the  very  sciences  which 
first  gave  birth  to  it.  Long  before  we  heard  of  evolution 
in  nature,  we  read  of  the  dialectical  evolution  of  thought, 
and  its  realisation  in  history  and  nature.  The  history  of 
philosophy  was  then  understood  to  represent  the  continu- 
ous development  of  philosophical  thought,  and  the  chief 
object  of  the  historian  was  to  show  the  necessity  with 
which  one  stage  of  philosophical  thought  led  to  another. 
This  idea  of  rational  development,  which  forms  a far 
broader  and  safer  basis  than  that  of  natural  development, 
is  the  vital  principle  in  the  study  of  the  human  mind,  quite 
as  much,  if  not  more,  than  in  the  study  of  nature.  A 
study  of  language,  of  mythology,  of  religion,  and  philos- 
ophy, which  does  not  rest  on  the  principle  of  development, 
does  not  deserve  the  name  of  a science.  The  chief  inter- 
est which  these  sciences  possess,  is  not  that  they  show  us 
isolated  and  barren  facts,  but  that  they  show  us  their 
origin  and  growth,  and  explain  to  us  how  what  is,  was  the 
necessary  result  of  what  was.  In  drawing  the  stemma  of 
languages,  mythological  formations,  religious  beliefs,  and 


Translator' s Preface  xxxix 

philosophical  ideas,  science  may  go  wrong,  and  often  has 
gone  wrong.  So  have  students  of  nature  in  drawing  thei: 
stemmata  of  plants,  and  animals,  and  human  beings.  But 
the  principle  remains  true,  for  all  that.  In  spite  of  all 
that  seems  to  be  accidental  or  arbitrary,  there  is  a natural 
and  intelligible  growth  in  what  we  call  the  creations  of  the 
human  mind,  quite  as  much  as  in  what  we  call  the  works 
of  nature.  The  one  expression,  it  may  be  said,  is  as 
mythological  as  the  other,  because  the  category  of  sub- 
stance cannot  apply  to  either  nature  or  mind.  Both,  how- 
ever, express  facts  which  must  be  explained ; nay,  it  is  the 
chief  object  of  science  to  explain  them,  and  to  explain 
them  genetically.  Is  Aristotle  possible  or  intelligible 
without  Plato  ? Is  Spinoza  possible  or  intelligible  with- 
out Descartes  ? Is  Hume  possible  or  intelligible  without 
Berkeley  ? Is  Kant  possible  or  intelligible  without  Hume  ? 
These  are  broad  questions,  and  admit  of  one  answer  only. 
But  if  we  have  once  seen  how  the  broad  stream  of  thought 
follows  its  natural  bent,  flows  onward,  and  never  backward, 
we  shall  understand  that  it  is  as  much  the  duty  of  the 
science  of  thought  to  trace  the  unbroken  course  of  phi- 
losophy from  Thales  to  Kant,  as  it  is  the  duty  of  natural 
science  to  trace  the  continuous  development  of  the  single 
cell  to  the  complicated  organism  of  an  animal  body,  or 
the  possible  metamorphosis  of  the  Hipparion  into  the 
Hippos. 

What  I wanted,  therefore,  as  an  introduction  to  my 
translation  of  Kant’s  Critique,  was  a pedigree  of  philo- 
sophical thought,  showing  Kant’s  ancestors  and  Kant’s 
descent.  Here,  too,  Professor  Caird’s  work  seemed  to 
me  at  one  time  to  have  done  exactly  what  I wished  to  see 
done,  Valuable,  however,  as  Professor  Caird’s  work  is  on 


xl 


Translator' s Preface 


all  sides  acknowledged  to  be,  I thought  that  an  even  more 
complete  list  of  Kantian  ancestors  might  and  should  be 
given,  and  (what  weighed  even  more  with  me)  that  these 
ancestors  should  be  made  to  speak  to  us  more  in  their  own 
words  than  Professor  Caird  has  allowed  them  to  do. 

At  my  time  of  life,  and  in  the  midst  of  urgent  work, 
I felt  quite  unequal  to  that  task,  and  I therefore  applied 
to  Professor  Noire,  who,  more  than  any  other  philosopher 
I know,  seemed  to  me  qualified  to  carry  out  that  idea. 
Kant’s  philosophy,  and  more  particularly  the  antecedents 
of  Kant’s  philosophy,  had  been  his  favourite  study  for  life, 
and  no  one,  as  I happened  to  know,  possessed  better  ma- 
terials than  he  did  for  giving,  in  a short  compass,  the 
ipsissima  verba  by  which  each  of  Kant’s  ancestors  had 
made  and  marked  his  place  in  the  history  of  thought. 
Professor  Noire  readily  complied  with  my  request,  and 
supplied  a treatise  which  I hope  will  fully  accomplish  what 
I had  in  view.  The  translation  was  entrusted  by  him  to 
one  of  the  most  distinguished  translators  of  philosophical 
works  in  England,  and  though  the  exactness  and  grace- 
fulness peculiar  to  Professor  Noire’s  German  style  could 
hardly  have  full  justice  done  to  them  in  an  English  ren- 
dering, particularly  as  the  constant  introduction  of  the 
verba  ipsissima  of  various  authors  cannot  but  disturb  the 
unity  of  the  diction,  I hope  that  many  of  my  English 
readers  will  feel  the  same  gratitude  to  him  which  I have 
here  to  express  for  his  kind  and  ready  help.1 

If,  then,  while  making  allowance  for  differences  of  opin- 
ion on  smaller  points,  we  have  convinced  ourselves  that 
Kant  is  the  last  scion  of  that  noble  family  of  thinkers 

1 This  introduction  is  now  left  out,  but  will,  I hope,  be  published  as  a 
separate  work. 


Translator' s Preface 


xli 


which  Professor  Noire  has  drawn  for  us  with  the  hand  of 
a master,  what  follows  ? Does  it  follow  that  we  should 
all  and  on  all  points  become  Kantians,  that  we  should 
simply  learn  his  philosophy,  and  be  thankful  that  we  know 
now  all  that  can  be  known  about  the  Freedom  of  the  Will, 
the  Immortality  of  the  Soul,  and  the  Existence  of  God  ? 
Far  from  it.  No  one  would  protest  more  strongly  than 
Kant  himself  against  what  he  so  well  calls  ‘ learning  phi- 
losophy,’ as  opposed  to  ‘being  a philosopher.’  All  I con- 
tend for  is  that,  in  our  own  modern  philosophy,  the  work 
done  once  for  all  by  Kant  should  be  as  little  ignored  as 
the  work  done  by  Hume,  Leibniz,  Berkeley,  Locke,  Spi- 
noza, and  Descartes.  I do  not  deny  the  historical  impor- 
tance of  the  Post-Kantian  systems  of  philosophy,  whether 
of  Fichte,  Schelling,  Hegel,  Herbart,  or  Schopenhauer  in 
Germany,  of  Cousin  in  France,  or  of  Mill  in  England. 
But  most  of  these  philosophers  recognised  Kant  as  their 
spiritual  father.1  Even  Comte,  ignorant  as  he  was  of 
German  and  German  philosophy,  expressed  his  satisfac- 
tion and  pride  when  he  discovered  how  near  he  had, 
though  unconsciously,  approached  to  Kant’s  philosophy.2 

1 Julius  Walter,  Zum  Gedachtniss  Kant’s,  p.  27. 

2 ‘J’ai  lu  et  relu  avec  un  plaisir  infini  le  petit  traite  de  Kant  (Idee  zu  einer 
allgemeinen  Geschichte  in  weltbiirgerlicher  Absicht,  1784);  il  est  prodigieux 
pour  l’epoque,  et  meme,  si  je  l’avais  connu  six  ou  sept  ans  plus  tot,  il  m’aurait 
epargne  de  la  peine.  Je  suis  charme  que  vous  l’ayez  traduit,  il  peut  tres- 
efficacement  contribuer  k preparer  les  esprits  h la  philosophic  positive.  La 
conception  generate  ou  au  moins  la  methode  y est  encore  metaphysique,  mais 
les  details  montrent  h chaque  instant  l’esprit  positif.  J’avais  toujours  regarde 
Kant  non-seulement  comme  une  tres-forte  t£te,  mais  comme  le  metaphysicien 
le  plus  rapproche  de  la  philosophic  positive.  . . . Pour  moi,  je  ne  me  trouve 
jusqu’h  present,  apres  cette  lecture,  d’autre  valeur  que  celle  d’avoir  systematise 
et  arrete  la  conception  ebauchee  par  Kant  h mon  insu,  ce  que  je  dois  surtout  k 
L’education  scientifique;  et.meme  le  pas  le  plus  positif  et  le  plus  distinct  que 
j’ai  fait  apres  lui,  me  semble  seulement  d’avoir  decouvert  la  loi  du  passage  des 


xlii 


Translator' s Preface 


Some  years  ago  I pointed  out  that,  as  far  as,  amid  the 
varying  aspects  of  his  philosophical  writings,  it  was  possi 
ble  to  judge,  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  also,  in  what  he  calls 
his  Transfigured  Realism,  was  not  very  far  from  Kant’s 
fundamental  position.  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer,  however,  has 
repudiated  what  I thought  the  highest  compliment  that 
could  be  paid  to  any  writer  on  philosophy,  and  I gladly 
leave  it  to  others  to  judge. 

But  although,  whether  consciously  or  unconsciously,  all 
truly  important  philosophers  have,  since  the  publication  of 
the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  been  more  or  less  under  the 
spell  of  Kant,  and  indirectly  of  Hume  and  Berkeley  also, 
this  does  not  mean  that  they  have  not  asserted  their  right 
of  reopening  questions  which  seemed  to  be  solved  and 
settled  by  those  heroes  in  the  history  of  human  thought. 
Only,  if  any  of  these  old  problems  are  to  be  taken  up 
again,  they  ought  at  least  to  be  taken  up  where  they  were 
last  left.  Unless  that  is  done,  philosophy  will  become  a 
mere  amusement,  and  will  in  no  wise  mark  the  deep  ves- 
tiges in  the  historical  progress  of  the  human  intellect. 
There  are  anachronisms  in  philosophy,  quite  as  much  as 
in  other  sciences,  and  the  spirit  in  which  certain  philo- 
sophical problems  have  of  late  been  treated,  both  in  Eng- 
land and  in  Germany,  is  really  no  better  than  a revival  of 
the  Ptolemaic  system  would  be  in  astronomy.  No  wonder, 
therefore,  that  in  both  countries  we  should  meet  with  con- 


idees  humaines  par  les  trois  etats  theologique,  metaphysique,  et  scientifique, 
loi  qui  me  semble  Stre  la  base  du  travail  dont  Kant  a conseille  l’execution. 
Je  rends  grice  aujourd’hui  it  mon  defaut  d’erudition;  car  si  mon  travail,  tel 
qu’il  est  maintenant,  avait  ete  precede  chez  moi  par  l’etude  du  traite  de  Kant, 
il  aurait,  k mes  propres  yeux,  beaucoup  perdu  de  sa  valeur.’  See  Auguste 
Comte,  par  E.  Littre,  Paris,  1864,  p.  154;  Lettre  de  Comte  £ M.  d’Eichthal^ 
10  Dec.  1824.  - * 


Translator  s Preface 


xliii 


stant  complaints  about  this  state  of  philosophical  anarchy. 
Mr.  Challis,  in  one  of  the  last  numbers  of  the  Contemporary 
Review  (November,  1881),  writes:  ‘It  is  another  familiar 
fact,  a much  more  important  one,  that  the  present  state 
of  philosophy  is  exactly  parallel  to  the  present  state  of 
theology,  — a chaos  of  conflicting  schools,  each  able  to 
edify  itself  without  convincing  any  other,  every  one  re- 
garding all  the  rest,  not  as  witnesses  against  itself,  but  as 
food  for  dialectical  powder  and  shot.  The  impartial  by- 
stander sees  no  sign  that  we  are  now  nearer  to  agreement 
than  in  the  days  of  Varro,  though  the  enthusiast  of  a 
school  expects  the  world  to  be  all,  some  day,  of  his  opinion, 
just  as  the  enthusiast  of  a sect  believes  vaguely  in  an  ulti- 
mate triumph  of  his  faith.’ 

Exactly  the  same  complaint  reaches  us  from  the  very 
country  where  Kant’s  voice  was  once  so  powerful  and 
respected,  then  was  silenced  for  a time,  and  now  begins 
to  be  invoked  again  for  the  purpose  of  restoring  order 
where  all  seems  confusion.  ‘Since  the  year  1840,’  writes 
Dr.  Vaihinger,  ‘there  has  been  hopeless  philosophical  an- 
archy in  Germany.  There  were  the  disciples  of  Schelling, 
Hegel,  Herbart,  and  Schopenhauer,  and,  by  their  side, 
the  founders  and  defenders  of  many  unknown  systems  of 
philosophy.  Then  followed  the  so-called  Real-Idealists,  or 
Ideal-Realists,  who  distilled  a philosophical  theism  out  of 
the  pantheism  of  greater  thinkers,  and,  as  their  antipodes, 
the  Materialists,  who  on  the  new  discoveries  of  natural 
science  founded  the  saddest,  shallowest,  and  emptiest  sys- 
tem of  philosophy.’ 1 

In  England  and  America,  even  more  than  in  Germany, 
I believe  that  a study  of  Kant  holds  out  the  best  hope  of 

1 Vaihinger,  Zum  Jubilaum  von  Kant’s  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft,  p.  11. 


xliv 


Translator' s Preface 


a philosophical  rejuvenescence.  In  Germany  a return  to 
Kant  has  brought  about  a kind  of  Renaissance ; in  Eng- 
land and  America  Kant’s  philosophy,  if  once  thoroughly 
understood,  will  constitute,  I hope,  a new  birth.  No  doubt 
there  are  and  there  have  been  in  every  country  of  Europe 
some  few  honest  students  who  perfectly  understood  Kant’s 
real  position  in  the  onward  march  of  human  thought. 
But  to  the  most  fertile  writers  on  philosophy,  and  to  the 
general  public  at  large,  which  derives  its  ideas  of  philoso- 
phy from  them,  Kant’s  philosophy  has  not  only  been  a 
terra  incognita , but  the  very  antipodes  of  what  it  really  is. 
Mr.  Watson,  in  his  instructive  work,  ‘ Kant  and  his  Eng- 
lish Critics,’  is  perfectly  right  when  he  says  that,  till  very 
lately,  Kant  was  regarded  as  a benighted  a priori  philoso- 
pher of  the  dogmatic  type,  afflicted  with  the  hallucination 
that  the  most  important  part  of  our  knowledge  con- 
sists of  innate  ideas,  lying  in  the  depths  of  consciousness, 
and  being  capable  of  being  brought  to  the  light  by  pure 
introspection.’  That  Kant  was  the  legitimate  successor 
of  Hume  on  one  side,  and  of  Berkeley  on  the  other,  was 
hardly  conceived  as  possible.  And  thus  it  has  happened 
that  English  philosophy,  in  spite  of  the  large  number  of 
profound  thinkers  and  brilliant  writers  who  have  served  in 
its  ranks  during  the  last  hundred  years,  has  not  yet  risen 
above  the  level  of  Locke  and  Hume.  No  one  can  admire 
more  than  I do  the  dashing  style  in  which  some  of  the 
most  popular  writers  of  our  time  have  ridden  up  to  the 
very  muzzles  of  the  old  philosophical  problems,  but  if  I 
imagine  Kant  looking  back  from  his  elevated  position  on 
those  fierce  and  hopeless  onslaughts,  I can  almost  hear 
him  say  what  was  said  by  a French  general  at  Balaclava: 
C'est  magnifiqne , — mats  ce  n est  pas  la  guerre.  Quite 


Translator' s Preface 


xlv 


true  it  is  that  but  for  Hume,  and  but  for  Berkeley,  Kant 
would  never  have  been,  and  philosophy  would  never  have 
reached  the  heights  which  he  occupies.  But,  after  Kant, 
Hume  and  Berkeley  have  both  an  historical  significance 
only.  They  represent  a position  which  has  been  con- 
quered and  fortified,  and  has  now  been  deliberately  left 
behind. 

Professor  Noire,  when  he  had  written  for  this  work  the 
antecedents  of  Kant’s  philosophy,  sent  me  another  most 
valuable  contribution,  containing  a full  analysis  of  that 
philosophy,  considered  not  only  as  the  continuation,  but 
as  the  fulfilment  of  all  other  philosophical  systems,  and 
more  particularly  of  the  systems  of  Berkeley  and  Hume. 
For  that  work  it  was  unfortunately  impossible  to  find 
room  in  these  volumes ; but  I still  hope  that  it  will  not 
be  withheld,  in  German  at  least,  from  those  who,  both  in 
England  and  Germany,  have  learnt  to  appreciate  Pro- 
fessor Noire’s  accurate  and  luminous  statements.  Leav- 
ing therefore  the  task  of  tracing  minutely  the  intimate 
relation  between  Kant  and  his  predecessors  to  the  more 
experienced  hand  of  my  friend,  I shall  here  be  satisfied 
with  pointing  out  in  the  broadest  way  the  connection,  and, 
at  the  same  time,  the  diametrical  opposition  between  Kant 
and  those  two  great  heroes  of  speculative  thought,  Berke- 
ley and  Hume. 

Berkeley  holds  that  all  knowledge  that  seems  to  come 
to  us  from  without  through  the  senses  or  through  experi- 
ence is  mere  illusion,  and  that  truth  exists  in  the  ideas  of 
the  pure  understanding  and  of  reason  only. 

Kant  proves  that  all  knowledge  that  comes  to  us  from 
pure  understanding  and  from  pure  reason  only  is  mere 
illusion,  and  that  truth  is  impossible  without  experience. 


xlvi 


Translator' s Preface 


Hume  holds  that  true  causality  is  impossible,  whether 
in  experience  or  beyond  experience. 

Kant  proves  that  experience  itself  is  impossible  without 
the  category  of  causality,  and,  of  course,  without  several 
other  categories  also  which  Hume  had  overlooked,  though 
they  possess  exactly  the  same  character  as  the  concept  of 
causality.1  The  gist  of  Kant’s  philosophy,  as  opposed  to 
that  of  Hume,  can  be  expressed  in  one  line : That  without 
which  experience  is  impossible,  cannot  be  the  result  of 
experience,  though  it  must  never  be  applied  beyond  the 
limits  of  possible  experience. 

Such  broad  statements  and  counter-statements  may  seem 
to  destroy  the  finer  shades  of  philosophical  thought,  yet  in 
the  end  even  the  most  complicated  and  elaborate  systems 
of  philosophy  rest  on  such  broad  foundations ; and  what 
we  carry  about  with  us  of  Plato  or  Aristotle,  of  Descartes 
or  Leibniz,  consists  in  the  end  of  little  more  than  a few 
simple  outlines  of  the  grand  structures  of  their  philo- 
sophical thoughts.  And  in  that  respect  no  system  admits 
of  being  traced  :n  simpler  and  broader  outlines  than  that 
of  Kant.  Voluminous  and  complicated  it  is,  and  yet  Kant 
himself  traces  in  a few  lines  the  outcome  of  it,  when  he 
says  (Critique,  p.  666  (830)) : ‘ But  it  will  be  said,  is  this 
really  all  that  pure  reason  can  achieve,  in  opening  pros- 
pects beyond  the  limits  of  experience  ? Nothing  more 
than  two  articles  of  faith  ? Surely  even  the  ordinary  un- 
derstanding could  have  achieved  as  much  without  taking 
counsel  of  philosophers ! 

1 This  is  Kant’s  statement,  though  it  is  not  quite  accurate.  See  Adamson, 
On  the  Philosophy  of  Kant,  p.  202.  That  Kant  knew  Hume’s  Treatise  on 
Human  Nature  seems  to  follow  from  Hamann’s  Metakritik  fiber  den  Purismus 
der  reinen  Vernunft,  p.  3,  note. 


Translator' s Preface 


xlvii 


‘ I shall  not  here  dwell  on  the  benefits,’  he  answers, 
which,  by  the  laborious  efforts  of  its  criticism,  philosophy 
has  conferred  on  human  reason,  granting  even  that  in  the 
end  they  should  turn  out  to  be  merely  negative.  On  this 
point  something  will  have  to  be  said  in  the  next  section. 
But,  I ask,  do  you  really  require  that  knowledge,  which 
concerns  all  men,  should  go  beyond  the  common  under- 
standing, and  should  be  revealed  to  you  by  philosophers 
only  ? The  very  thing  which  you  find  fault  with  is  the 
best  confirmation  of  the  correctness  of  our  previous  asser- 
tions, since  it  reveals  to  us,  what  we  could  not  have  grasped 
before,  namely,  that  in  matters  which  concern  all  men 
without  distinction,  nature  cannot  be  accused  of  any  par- 
tial distribution  of  her  gifts ; and  that,  with  regard  to  the 
essential  interests  of  human  nature,  the  highest  philosophy 
can  achieve  no  more  than  that  guidance  which  nature  has 
vouchsafed  even  to  the  meanest  understanding.’ 

I hope  that  the  time  will  come  when  Kant’s  works,  and 
more  particularly  his  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  will  be  read, 
not  only  by  the  philosopher  by  profession,  but  by  everybody 
who  has  once  seen  that  there  are  problems  in  this  life  of 
ours  the  solution  of  which  alone  makes  life  worth  living. 
These  problems,  as  Kant  so  often  tells  us,  are  all  the 
making  of  reason,  and  what  reason  has  made,  reason  is 
able  to  unmake.  These  problems  represent  in  fact  the 
mythology  of  philosophy,  that  is,  the  influence  of  dying 
or  dead  language  on  the  living  thought  of  each  succes- 
sive age ; and  an  age  which  has  found  the  key  to  the 
ancient  mythology  of  religion,  will  know  where  to  look  for 
the  key  that  is  to  unlock  the  mythology  of  pure  reason. 
Kant  has  shown  us  what  can  and  what  cannot  be  known 
by  man.  What  remains  to  be  done,  even  after  Kant,  is  to 


xlviii 


Translator' s Preface 


show  how  man  came  to  believe  that  he  could  know  so 
much  more  than  he  can  know,  and  this  will  have  to  be 
shown  by  a Critique  of  Language.1 

How  strange  it  is  that  Kant’s  great  contemporary,  ‘the 
Magus  of  the  North,’  should  have  seen  this  at  once,  and 
that  for  a whole  century  his  thought  has  remained  dor- 
mant. ‘ Language,’  Hamann  writes,  ‘ is  not  only  the  foun- 
dation for  the  whole  faculty  of  thinking,  but  the  central 
point  also  from  which  proceeds  the  misunderstanding  of 
reason  by  herself.’  And  again: 2 ‘The  question  with  me 
is  not,  What  is  Reason  ? but,  What  is  Language  ? And 
here  I suspect  is  the  ground  of  all  paralogisms  and  anti- 
nomies with  which  Reason  has  been  charged.’  And  again  : 
‘ Hence  I feel  almost  inclined  to  believe  that  our  whole 
philosophy  consists  more  of  language  than  of  reason,  and 
the  misunderstanding  of  numberless  words,  the  prosopo- 
poeias of  the  most  arbitrary  abstraction,  the  antithesis  tj}? 
yJrevScovvfiov  jimo-ecos  ; nay,  the  commonest  figures  of  speech 
of  the  sensus  communis  have  produced  a whole  world  of 
problems,  which  can  no  more  be  raised  than  solved.  What 
we  want  is  a Grammar  of  Reason.' 

That  Kant’s  Critique  will  ever  become  a popular  book, 
in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  word,  is  impossible ; but  that 

1 What  I mean  by  this,  may  be  seen  in  the  last  Lecture  of  the  Second 
Series  of  my  Lectures  on  the  Science  of  Language,  delivered  in  1867  (ed.  1880, 
Vol.  II.,  pp.  612  seq.);  in  my  article  On  the  Origin  of  Reason,  Contemporary 
Review , February,  1878  ; my  Lectures  on  Mr.  Darwin’s  Philosophy  of  Lan- 
guage, Fraser's  Magazine , May,  1873  ; also  in  Professor  Noire’s  works,  Der 
Ursprung  der  Sprache,  1877  ; and  Max  Muller  and  the  Philosophy  of  Lan- 
guage (Longmans,  1879).  One  important  problem,  in  the  solution  of  which 
I differ  from  Kant,  or  rather  give  a new  application  to  Kant’s  own  principles, 
has  been  fully  treated  in  my  Hibbert  Lectures,  1878,  pp.  30  seq.  All  this  may 
now  be  seen  more  fully  treated  in  my  Science  of  Thought,  1887. 

2 Gildemeister,  Hamann’s  Leben  und  Schriften,  Vol.  III.,  p.  71. 


T ranslator's  Preface 


xlix 


it  will  for  ever  occupy  a place  in  the  small  tourist’s  library 
which  every  thoughtful  traveller  across  this  short  life’s 
journey  will  keep  by  his  side,  I have  no  doubt.  Kant,  it 
must  be  admitted,  was  a bad  writer,  but  so  was  Aristotle, 
so  was  Descartes,  so  was  Liebniz,  so  was  Hegel ; and,  after 
a time,  as  in  climbing  a mountain,  the  very  roughness  of 
the  road  becomes  an  attraction  to  the  traveller.  Besides, 
though  Kant  is  a bad  builder,  he  is  not  a bad  architect, 
and  there  will  be  few  patient  readers  of  the  Critique  who 
will  fail  to  understand  Goethe’s  expression  that  on  reading 
Kant,  or  rather,  I should  say,  on  reading  Kant  again  and 
again,  we  feel  like  stepping  into  a lighted  room.  I have 
tried  hard,  very  hard,  to  remove  some  of  the  darkness 
which  has  hitherto  shrouded  Kant’s  masterwork  from 
English  readers,  and  though  I know  how  often  I have 
failed  to  satisfy  myself,  I still  hope  I shall  not  have  laboured 
quite  in  vain.  Englishmen  who,  in  the  turmoil  of  this  cen- 
tury, found  leisure  and  mental  vigour  enough  to  study  once 
more  the  thoughts  of  Plato,  and  perceiving  their  bearing 
on  the  thoughts  of  our  age,  may  well  brace  themselves  to 
the  harder  work  of  discovering  in  Kant  the  solution  of 
many  of  the  oldest  problems  of  our  race,  problems  which, 
with  most  of  us,  are  still  the  problems  of  yesterday  and  of 
to-day.  I am  well  aware  that  for  Kant  there  is  neither 
the  prestige  of  a name,  such  as  Plato,  nor  the  cunning  of 
a translator,  such  as  Jowett.  But  a thinker  who  in  Ger- 
many could  make  himself  listened  to  during  the  philosophi- 
cal apathy  of  the  Wolfian  age,  who  from  his  Ultima  Thule 
of  Konigsberg  could  spring  forward  to  grasp  the  rudder 
of  a vessel,  cast  away  as  unseaworthy  by  no  less  a captain 
than  Hume,  and  who  has  stood  at  the  helm  for  more  than 
a century,  trusted  by  all  whose  trust  was  worth  having, 


Translator' s Preface 


\ 

will  surely  find  in  England,  too,  patient  listeners,  even 
though  they  might  shrink,  as  yet,  from  embarking  in  his 
good  ship  in  their  passage  across  the  ocean  of  life. 

Kant’s  Metaphysic  in  relation  to  Physical  Science 

We  live  in  an  age  of  physical  discovery,  and  of  complete 
philosophical  prostration,  and  thus  only  can  we  account 
for  the  fact  that  physical  science,  and,  more  particularly, 
physiology,  should  actually  have  grasped  at  the  sceptre  of 
philosophy.  Nothing,  I believe,  could  be  more  disastrous 
to  both  sciences. 

No  one  who  knows  my  writings  will  suspect  me  of 
undervaluing  the  progress  which  physical  studies  have 
made  in  our  time,  or  of  ignoring  the  light  which  they 
have  shed  on  many  of  the  darkest  problems  of  the  mind. 
Only  let  us  not  unnecessarily  move  the  old  landmarks  of 
human  knowledge.  There  always  has  been,  and  there 
always  must  be,  a line  of  demarcation  between  physical 
and  metaphysical  investigations,  and  though  the  former 
can  illustrate  the  latter,  they  can  never  take  their  place. 
Nothing  can  be  more  interesting,  for  instance,  than  recent 
researches  into  the  exact  processes  of  sensuous  perception. 
Optics  and  Acoustics  have  carried  us  deep  into  the  inner 
workings  of  our  bodily  senses,  and  have  enabled  us  to 
understand  what  we  call  colours  and  sounds,  as  vibrations, 
definite  in  number,  carried  on  from  the  outer  organs 
through  vibrating  media  to  the  brain  and  the  inmost  centre 
of  all  nervous  activity.  Such  observations  have,  no  doubt, 
made  it  more  intelligible,  even  to  the  commonest  under- 
standing, what  metaphysicians  mean  when  they  call  all 
secondary  qualities  subjective,  and  deny  that  anything  can 


Translator' s Preface 


li 


be,  for  instance,  green  or  sweet,  anywhere  but  in  the 
perceiving  subject.  But  the  idea  that  these  physical  and 
physiological  researches  have  brought  us  one  inch  nearer  to 
the  real  centre  of  subjective  perception,  that  any  movement 
of  matter  could  in  any  way  explain  the  simplest  sensuous 
perception,  or  that  behind  the  membranes  and  nerves  we 
should  ever  catch  hold  of  what  we  call  the  soul,  or  the  I, 
or  the  self,  need  only  to  be  stated  to  betray  its  utter  folly. 
That  men  like  Helmholtz  and  Du  Bois-Reymond  should 
find  Kant’s  metaphysical  platform  best  adapted  for  sup- 
porting their  physical  theories  is  natural  enough.  But 
how  can  any  one  who  weighs  his  words  say  that  the 
modern  physiology  of  the  senses  has  in  any  way  supple- 
mented or  improved  Kant’s  theory  of  knowledge  ? 1 As 
well  might  we  say  that  spectrum  analysis  has  improved 
our  logic,  or  the  electric  light  supplemented  our  geometry. 
‘ Empirical  psychology,’  as  Kant  says,  ‘ must  be  entirely 
banished  from  metaphysic,  and  is  excluded  from  it  by  it? 
very  idea.’  2 

Metaphysical  truth  is  wider  than  physical  truth,  and 
the  new  discoveries  of  physical  observers,  if  they  are  to 
be  more  than  merely  contingent  truths,  must  find  their 
appointed  place  and  natural  refuge  within  the  immoveable 
limits  traced  by  the  metaphysician.  It  was  an  unfortunate 
accident  that  gave  to  what  ought  to  have  been  called  pro- 
physical, the  name  of  metaphysical  science,  for  it  is  only 
after  having  mastered  the  principles  of  metaphysic  that 
the  student  of  nature  can  begin  his  work  in  the  right  spirit, 
knowing  the  horizon  of  human  knowledge,  and  guided  by 
principles  as  unchangeable  as  the  polestar.  It  would  be 

1 See  Noire,  in  Die  Gegenwart,  June  23,  1881. 

2 Critique,  p.  680  (848). 


lii 


Translator' s Preface 


childish  to  make  this  a question  of  rank  or  precedence 
it  is  simply  a question  of  work  and  order. 

It  may  require,  for  instance,  a greater  effort,  and  display 
more  brilliant  mental  qualities,  to  show  that  nature  con- 
tains no  traces  of  repeated  acts  of  special  creation,  than 
to  prove  that  such  a theory  would  make  all  unity  of  experi- 
ence, and  consequently  all  science,  impossible.  But  what 
are  all  the  negative  arguments  of  the  mere  observer  with- 
out the  solid  foundation  supplied  by  the  metaphysician  ? 
And  with  how  much  more  of  tranquil  assurance  would 
the  geologist  pursue  his  observations  and  develop  his  con- 
clusions, if  he  just  remembered  these  few  lines  of  Kant : 

‘ When  such  an  arising  is  looked  upon  as  the  effect  of  a 
foreign  cause,  it  is  called  creatio7t.  This  can  never  be 
admitted  as  an  event  among  phenomena,  because  its  very 
possibility  would  destroy  unity  of  experience.’ 1 

What  can  have  been  more  delightful  to  the  unprejudiced 
observer  than  the  gradual  diminution  of  the  enormous 
number  of  what  were  called,  by  students  of  nature  who 
had  never  troubled  their  heads  about  the  true  meaning  of 
these  terms,  genera  and  species  ? But  when  the  true 
meaning,  and  thereby  the  true  origin,  of  genera  and  species 
was  to  be  determined,  is  it  not  strange  that  not  one  word 
should  ever  have  been  said  on  the  subjective  character  of 
these  terms  ? Whatever  else  a genus  or  species  may  be, 
surely  they  are,  first  of  all,  concepts  of  the  understanding, 
and,  without  these  concepts,  whatever  nature  might  pre- 
sent to  us,  nothing  would  ever  be  to  us  a genus  or  a species. 

Genus  and  species,  in  that  restricted  sense,  as  applied  to 
organic  beings,  represent  only  one  side  of  that  funda- 
mental process  on  which  all  thought  is  founded,  namely, 
1 Critique,  p.  1 68  (206). 


Translator' s Preface 


liii 


the  conception  of  the  General  and  the  Special.  Here, 
again,  a few  pages  of  Kant 1 would  have  shown  that  the 
first  thing  to  be  explained  is  the  process  by  which  we  con- 
ceive the  genus  or  the  general,  and  that  the  only  adequate 
explanation  of  it  is  what  Kant  calls  its  transcendental 
deduction,  i.e.  the  proof  that,  without  it,  experience  itself 
would  be  impossible  ; and  that  therefore,  so  far  from  being 
a concept  abstracted  from  experience,  it  is  a sine  qua  non 
of  experience  itself. 

If  this  is  once  clearly  understood,  it  will  be  equally 
understood  that,  as  we  are  the  makers  of  all  concepts,  we 
are  also  the  makers  of  genera  and  species , and  that  long 
before  logicians  came  to  define  and  deface  these  terms, 
they  were  what  we  now  are  anxious  to  make  them  again, 
terms  for  objects  which  have  either  a common  origin  or 
a common  form.  Long  before  Aristotle  forced  the  terms 
yevos  and  elBos  to  assume  a subordinate  relation  to  each 
other,  language,  or  the  historical  logic  of  the  human  race, 
had  formed  these  terms,  and  meant  them  to  be  not  subordi- 
nate, but  co-ordinate. 

Genos  meant  kin,  and  the  first  genos  was  the  gens  or  the 
family,  comprehending  individuals  that  could  claim  a com- 
mon ancestor,  though  differing  in  appearance  as  much  as 
a grandfather  and  a babe.  Eidos  or  species,  on  the  con- 
trary, meant  appearance  or  form,  and  the  first  eidos  was 
probably  the  troop  of  warriors,  comprehending  individuals 
of  uniform  appearance,  nothing  being  asserted  as  to  their 
common  origin.  This  was  the  historic  or  prehistoric  be- 
ginning of  these  two  fundamental  categories  of  thought 
— and  what  has  the  theory  of  evolution  really  done  for 
them  ? It  has  safely  brought  them  back  to  their  original 

' ' 1 Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  p.  524  (pp.  652  seq'.)’.  ‘ : : . ?\ 


liv 


Translator's  Preface 


meaning.  It  has  shown  us  that  we  can  hold  together,  or 
comprehend,  or  conceive,  or  classify,  or  generalise  or  speak 
in  two  ways,  and  in  two  ways  only  — either  by  common 
descent  (genealogically),  or  by  common  appearance  (mor- 
phologically). Difference  of  form  is  nothing,  if  we  classify 
genealogically,  and  difference  of  descent  is  nothing,  if  we 
classify  morphologically.  What  the  theory  of  evolution  is 
doing  for  us  is  what  is  done  by  every  genealogist,  aye,  what 
was  done  in  ancient  time  by  every  paterfamilias,  namely, 
to  show  by  facts  that  certain  individuals,  however  different 
from  each  other  in  form  and  appearance,  had  a common 
ancestor,  and  belonged  therefore  to  the  same  family  or 
kin.  In  every  case  where  such  proof  has  been  given,  we 
gain  in  reality  a more  correct  general  concept,  i.e.  we  are 
able  to  think  and  to  speak  better.  The  process  is  the 
same,  whether  we  trace  the  Bourbons  and  Valois  back  to 
Hugo  Capet,  or  whether  we  derive  the  Hippos  and  the 
Hipparion  from  a common  ancestor.  In  both  cases  we 
are  dealing  with  facts  and  with  facts  only.  Let  it  be 
established  that  there  is  no  missing  link  between  them,  or 
between  man  and  monkey,  and  we  shall  simply  have  gained 
a new  concept,  as  we  should  gain  a new  concept  by  estab- 
lishing the  unbroken  continuity  of  the  Apostolic  succes- 
sion. Only  let  us  see  clearly  that  in  physical  and  historical 
researches,  too,  we  are  dealing  with  facts,  and  with  facts 
only,  which  cannot  excite  any  passion,  and  that  the  wider 
issues  as  to  the  origin  of  genera  and  species  belong  to  a 
different  sphere  of  human  knowledge,  and  after  having 
been  debated  for  centuries,  have  been  determined  once 
for  all  by  Kant’s  Critique  of  Pure  Reason. 

If  one  remembers  the  dust-clouds  of  words  that  were 
raised  when  the  question  of  the  origin  of  species  was 


Translator' s Preface 


lv 


mooted  once  more  in  our  days,  it  is  truly  refreshing  to 
read  a few  of  Kant’s  calm  pages  on  that  subject,  written 
one  hundred  years  ago.  ‘ Reason,’ 1 he  writes,  ‘ prepares 
the  field  for  the  understanding, 

‘ ist.  Through  the  principle  of  homogeneousness  of  the 
manifold  as  arranged  under  higher  genera  ; 

‘ 2ndly.  Through  the  principle  of  the  variety  of  the 
homogeneous  in  lower  species  ; to  which, 

‘ 3rdly,  it  adds  a law  of  affinity  of  all  concepts,  which 
requires  a continual  transition  from  every  species  to  every 
other  species,  by  a gradual  increase  of  diversity.  We  may 
call  these  the  principles  of  homogeneousness , of  specification , 
and  of  continuity  of  forms.’ 

And  with  reference  to  the  practical  application  of  these 
metaphysical  principles  to  the  study  of  nature,  he  writes 
again  with  true  philosophical  insight:2  ‘ I often  see  even 
intelligent  men  quarrelling  with  each  other  about  the  char- 
acteristic distinctions  of  men,  animals,  or  plants,  nay,  even 
of  minerals,  the  one  admitting  the  existence  of  certain 
national  characteristics,  founded  on  descent,  or  decided 
and  inherited  differences  of  families,  races,  etc.,  while 
others  insist  that  nature  has  made  the  same  provision  for 
all,  and  that  all  differences  are  due  to  accidental  environ- 
ment. But  they  need  only  consider  the  peculiar  character 
of  the  matter,  in  order  to  understand  that  it  is  far  too 
deeply  hidden  for  both  of  them  to  enable  them  to  speak 
from  any  real  insight  into  the  nature  of  the  object.  It 
is  nothing  but  the  twofold  interest  of  reason,  one  party 
cherishing  the  one,  another  party  the  other,  or  pretending 
to  do  so.  But  this  difference  of  the  two  maxims  of  mani- 
foldness and  unity  in  nature,  may  easily  be  adjusted, 
1 Critique,  p.  528  (657).  2 Ibid.  p.  536  (667). 


Translator' s Preface 


Ivi 

though  as  long  as  they  are  taken  for  objective  know- 
ledge they  cause  not  only  disputes,  but  actually  create 
impediments  which  hinder  the  progress  of  truth,  until  a 
means  is  found  of  reconciling  the  contradictory  interests, 
and  thus  giving  satisfaction  to  reason. 

‘ The  same  applies  to  the  assertion  or  denial  of  the 
famous  law  of  the  continuous  scale  of  created  beings,  first 
advanced  by  Leibniz,  and  so  cleverly  trimmed  up  by 
Bonnet.  It  is  nothing  but  a carrying  out  of  the  principle 
of  affinity  resting  on  the  interest  of  reason,  for  neither 
observation,  nor  insight  into  the  constitution  of  nature 
could  ever  have  supplied  it  as  an  objective  assertion.  The 
steps  of  such  a ladder,  as  far  as  they  can  be  supplied  by 
experience,  are  far  too  wide  apart  from  each  other,  and 
the  so-called  small  differences  are  often  in  nature  itself 
such  wide  gaps,  that  no  value  can  be  attached  to  such 
observations  as  revealing  the  intentions  of  nature,  particu- 
larly as  it  must  always  be  easy  to  discover  certain  simi- 
larities and  approximations  in  the  great  variety  of  things. 
The  method,  on  the  contrary,  of  looking  for  order  in 
nature,  according  to  such  a principle,  and  the  maxim  of 
admitting  such  order  (though  it  may  be  uncertain  where 
and  how  far)  as  existing  in  nature  in  general,  is  certainly 
a legitimate  and  excellent  regulative  principle  of  reason, 
only  that,  as  such,  it  goes  far  beyond  where  experience  or 
observation  could  follow  it.  It  only  indicates  the'  way 
which  leads  to  systematical  unity,  but  does  not  determine 
anything  beyond.’ 

I know,  of  course,  what  some  of  my  philosophical 
friends  will  say.  ‘You  speak  of  thoughts,’  they  will  say, 

‘ we  speak  of  facts,  You  begin  with  the  general,  we  begin 
with  the  particular.  You  trust  to  reason,  we  trust  to  our 


Translator  s Preface 


lvii 


senses.’  Let  me  quote  in  reply  one  of  the  most  positive 
of  positive  philosophers,  one  who  trusts  to  the  senses,  who 
begins  with  the  particular,  and  who  speaks  of  facts.  Con- 
dillac in  his  famous  Essai  sur  l’Origine  des  Connaissances 
humaines,  writes : ‘ Soit  que  nous  nous  elevions,  pour 
parler  metaphoriquement,  jusque  dans  les  cieux,  soit  que 
nous  descendions  dans  les  abimes,  nous  ne  sortons  pas  de 
nous-memes ; et  ce  n’est  jamais  que  notre  pensee  que  nous 
apercevons.’  This  was  written  in  1746. 

And  what  applies  to  these,  applies  to  almost  all  other 
problems  of  the  day.  Instead  of  being  discussed  by  them- 
selves, and  with  a heat  and  haste  as  if  they  had  never  been 
discussed  before,  they  should  be  brought  back  to  the 
broader  ground  from  which  they  naturally  arise,  and  be 
treated  by  the  light  of  true  philosophy  and  the  experience 
gained  in  former  ages.  There  is  a solid  ground  formed 
by  the  thoughts  of  those  who  came  before  us,  a kind  of 
intellectual  humus  on  which  we  ourselves  must  learn  to 
march  on  cautiously,  yet  safely,  without  needing  those 
high  stilts  which  seem  to  lift  our  modern  philosophers 
above  the  level  of  Locke,  and  Hume,  and  Kant,  and  prom- 
ise to  enable  them  to  advance  across  the  unknown  and  the 
unknowable  with  wider  strides  than  were  ever  attempted 
by  such  men  as  Faraday,  or  Lyell,  or  Darwin,  but  which 
invariably  fall  away  when  they  are  most  needed,  and  leave 
our  bold  speculators  to  retrace  their  steps  as  best  they 
can. 

Kant’s  Philosophy  as  judged  by  History 

If  my  translation  of  Kant  were  intended  for  a few  pro- 
fessional philosophers  only,  I should  not  feel  bound  to 
produce  any  credentials  in  his  favour.  But  the  few  true 


Iviii 


Translator' s Preface 


students  of  philosophy  in  England  do  not  want  a transla 
tion.  They  would  as  little  attempt  to  study  Kant,  without 
knowing  German,  as  to  study  Plato,  without  knowing 
Greek.  What  I want,  and  what  I hope  for  is  that  that 
large  class  of  men  and  women  whose  thoughts,  consciously 
or  unconsciously,  are  still  rooted  in  the  philosophy  of  the 
last  century,  and  who  still  draw  their  intellectual  nutri- 
ment from  the  philosophical  soil  left  by  Locke  and  Hume, 
should  know  that  there  is  a greater  than  Locke  or  Hume, 
though  himself  the  avowed  pupil  and  the  truest  admirer 
of  those  powerful  teachers.  Kant  is  not  a man  that  re- 
quires testimonials ; we  might  as  well  require  testimonials 
of  Plato  or  Spinoza.  But  to  the  English  reader  it  may  be 
of  interest  to  hear  at  least  a few  of  the  utterances  of  the 
great  men  whose  merit  it  is  to  have  discovered  Kant,  a 
discovery  that  may  well  be  called  the  discovery  of  a new 
world. 

What  Goethe  said  of  Kant,  we  have  mentioned  before. 
Schiller,  after  having  declared  that  he  was  determined  to 
master  Kant’s  Critique,  and  if  it  were  to  cost  him  the 
whole  of  his  life,  says  : ‘ The  fundamental  ideas  of  Kant’s 
ideal  philosophy  will  remain  a treasure  for  ever,  and  for 
their  sake  alone  we  ought  to  be  grateful  to  have  been  born 
in  this  age.’ 

Strange  it  is  to  see  how  orthodox  theologians,  from 
mere  laziness,  it  would  seem,  in  mastering  Kant’s  doc- 
trines, raised  at  once  a clamour  against  the  man  who 
proved  to  be  their  best  friend,  but  whose  last  years  of  life 
they  must  needs  embitter.  One  of  the  most  religious 
and  most  honest  of  Kant’s  contemporaries,  however,  Jung 
Stilling,  whose  name  is  well  known  in  England  also, 
quickly  perceived  the  true  bearing  of  the  Critique  of  Pure 


Translator' s Preface 


lix 


Reason.  In  a letter,  dated  March  i,  1789,  Jung  Stilling 
writes  to  Kant : ‘ You  are  a great,  a very  great  instrument 
in  the  hand  of  God.  I do  not  flatter,  — but  your  philoso- 
phy will  work  a far  greater,  far  more  general,  and  far 
more  blessed  revolution  than  Luther’s  Reform.  As  soon 
as  one  has  well  comprehended  the  Critique  of  Reason,  one 
sees  that  no  refutation  of  it  is  possible.  Your  philosophy 
must  therefore  be  eternal  and  unchangeable,  and  its  benefi- 
cent effects  will  bring  back  the  religion  of  Jesus  to  its 
original  purity,  when  its  only  purpose  was  — holiness.’ 
Fichte,  no  mean  philosopher  himself,  and  on  many 
points  the  antagonist  of  Kant,  writes  : ‘ Kant’s  philosophy 
will  in  time  overshadow  the  whole  human  race,  and  call 
to  life  a new,  more  noble,  and  more  worthy  generation.’ 
Jean  Paul  Friedrich  Richter  speaks  of  Kant  ‘not  only 
as  a light  of  the  world,  but  as  a whole  solar  system  in 
one.’ 

With  more  suppressed,  yet  no  less  powerful  apprecia- 
tion Wilhelm  von  Humboldt  writes  of  him  : ‘ Some  things 
which  he  demolished  will  never  rise  again ; some  things 
which  he  founded  will  never  perish  again.  A reform  such 
as  he  carried  through  is  rare  in  the  history  of  philosophy.’ 
Schopenhauer,  the  most  fearless  critic  of  Kant’s  Cri- 
tique, calls  it  ‘the  highest  achievement  of  human  reflec- 
tion.’ What  he  has  written  of  Kant  is  indispensable 
indeed  to  every  student  of  the  Critique,  and  I dqeply 
regret  that  I could  not  have  added  to  my  translation  of 
Kant  a translation  of  Schopenhauer’s  critical  remarks. 

I must  add,  however,  one  paragraph  : ‘ Never,’  Schopen- 
hauer writes  in  his  Parerga  (1,  183),  ‘never  will  a philoso- 
pher, without  an  independent,  zealous,  and  often  repeated 
study  of  the  principal  works  of  Kant,  gain  any  idea  of  this 


lx 


Translator' s Preface 


most  important  of  all  philosophical  phenomena.  Kant  is, 
I believe,  the  most  philosophical  head  that  nature  has  ever 
produced.  To  think  with  him  and  according  to  his  man- 
ner is  something  that  cannot  be  compared  to  anything 
else,  for  he  possessed  such  an  amount  of  clear  and  quite 
peculiar  thoughtfulness  as  has  never  been  granted  to  any 
other  mortal.  We  are  enabled  to  enjoy  this  with  him,  if, 
initiated  by  patient  and  serious  study,  we  succeed,  while 
reading  the  profoundest  chapters  of  the  Critique  of  Pure 
Reason,  in  forgetting  ourselves  and  thinking  really  with 
Kant’s  own  head,  thus  being  lifted  high  above  ourselves. 
If  we  go  once  more  through  the  Principles  of  Pure  Reason, 
and,  more  particularly,  the  Analogies  of  Experience,  and 
enter  into  the  deep  thought  of  the  synthetical  unity  of 
apperception,  we  feel  as  if  lifted  miraculously  and  carried 
away  out  of  the  dreamy  existence  in  which  we  are  here 
lost,  and  as  if  holding  in  our  hands  the  very  elements  out 
of  which  that  dream  consists.’ 

If,  in  conclusion,  we  look  at  some  of  the  historians  of 
modern  philosophy,  we  find  Erdmann,  though  a follower 
of  Hegel,  speaking  of  Kant  as  ‘the  Atlas  that  supports 
the  whole  of  German  philosophy.’ 

Fortlage,  the  Nestor  of  German  philosophers,1  who 
wrote  what  he  calls  a Genetic  History  of  Philosophy  since 
Kant,  speaks  of  him  in  the  following  terms : ‘ In  one  word, 
Kant’s  system  is  the  gate  through  which  everything  that 
has  stirred  the  philosophical  world  since  his  time,  comes 
and  goes.  It  is  the  Universal  Exchange  where  all  circu- 
lating ideas  flow  together  before  they  vanish  again  in 
distant  places.  It  is  the  London  of  philosophy,  sending 
its  ships  into  every  part  of  the  world,  and  after  a time 
1 He  died  November,  1881. 


Translator  s Preface 


lxi 


receiving  them  back.  There  is  no  place  in  the  whole 
globe  of  human  thought  which  it  has  not  visited,  explored, 
and  colonised.’ 

In  more  homely  language  Professor  Caird  expresses 
much  the  same  idea  of  Kant’s  philosophy,  when  he  says 
(p.  1 20):  ‘So  much  has  Kant’s  fertile  idea  changed  the 
aspect  of  the  intellectual  world,  that  there  is  not  a single 
problem  of  philosophy  that  does  not  meet  us  with  a new 
face ; and  it  is  perhaps  not  unfair  to  say,  that  the  specula- 
tions of  all  those  who  have  not  learned  the  lesson  of  Kant, 
are  beside  the  point.’ 

Dr.  Vaihinger,  who  has  devoted  his  life  to  the  study  of 
Kant,  and  is  now  bringing  out  a commentary  in  four 
volumes  on  his  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,1  sums  up  his 
estimate  in  the  following  words  : ‘ The  Critique  is  a work 
to  which,  whether  we  look  to  the  grandeur  of  conception, 
or  the  accuracy  of  thought,  or  the  weight  of  ideas,  or  the 
power  of  language,  few  only  can  be  compared  — possibly 
Plato’s  Republic,  Aristotle’s  Metaphysics,  Spinoza’s  Ethics 
— none,  if  we  consider  their  lasting  effect,  their  penetrating 
and  far-reaching  influence,  their  wealth  of  thought,  and 
their  variety  of  suggestions.’  2 

Nearly  the  same  judgment  is  repeated  by  Vacherot,3 
who  speaks  of  the  Critique  as  ‘ un  livre  immortel,  comme 
l’Organum  de  Bacon  et  le  Discours  de  la  Methode  de  Des- 
cartes,’ while  Professor  Noire,  with  his  wider  sympathies 
for  every  sphere  of  intellectual  activity,  counts  six  books, 
in  the  literature  of  modern  Europe,  as  the  peers  of  Kant’s 

1 Commentar  zu  Kant’s  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft,  zum  hundertjahrigen 
Jubilaum  derselben,  herausgegeben  von  Dr.  H.  Vaihinger.  Stuttgart,  1881. 

2 Zum  Jubilaum  von  Kant’s  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft,  von  H.  Vaihinger, 
Separatabdruck  aus  der  Wochenschrift  Itn  neuen  Reich,  1881,  No.  23,  p.  14. 

3 Revue  des  deux  Mondes,  1879,  Aofit. 


Translator  s Preface 


Ixii 

Critique,  viz.  Copernicus,  De  revolutionibus  orbium  coeles- 
tium(i543);  Descartes,  Meditationes  de  prima  philosophia 
(1641);  Newton,  Principia  philosophise  naturalis  mathe- 
matica  (1687);  Montesquieu,  Esprit  des  Lois  (1748); 
Winckelmann,  Geschichte  der  Kunst  des  Alterthums 
(1764);  and  Adam  Smith,  Inquiry  into  the  nature  and 
causes  of  the  Wealth  of  Nations  (1776), — but  he  places 
Kant’s  Critique  at  the  head  of  them  all. 

I confess  I feel  almost  ashamed  lest  it  should  be  sup- 
posed that  I thought  Kant  in  need  of  these  testimonies. 
My  only  excuse  is  that  I had  to  defend  myself  against 
the  suspicion  of  having  wasted  my  time,  and  I therefore 
thought  that  by  pointing  out  the  position  assigned  to 
Kant’s  Critique  among  the  master-works  of  human  genius 
by  men  of  greater  weight  than  I could  ever  venture  to 
claim  for  myself,  I might  best  answer  the  kindly  meant 
question  addressed  to  me  by  my  many  friends : ‘ Blit  how 
can  you  waste  your  time  on  a translation  of  Kant's  Critik 
der  reinen  Vernunft  ? ' 

On  the  Text  of  Kant’s  Critique  of  Pure  Reason 

I have  still  to  say  a few  words  on  the  German  text  on 
which  my  translation  is  founded. 

I have  chosen  the  text  of  the  First  Edition,  first  of  all, 
because  it  was  the  centenary  of  that  edition  which  led  me 
to  carry  out  at  last  my  long-cherished  idea  of  an  English 
translation.  That  text  represents  an  historical  event.  It 
represents  the  state  of  philosophy,  as  it  was  then,  it  repre- 
sents Kant’s  mind  as  it  was  then,  at  the  moment  of  the 
greatest  crisis  in  the  history  of  philosophy.  Even  if  the 
later  editions  contained  improvements,  these  improvements 


iranslator’ s Preface 


lxiii 


would  belong  to  a later  phase  in  Kant’s  own  development; 
and  it  is  this  first  decisive  position,  as  taken  by  Kant 
against  both  Hume  and  Berkeley,  that  more  than  anything 
else  deserves  to  be  preserved  in  the  history  of  philosophy. 

Secondly,  I must  confess  that  I have  always  used  my- 
self the  First  Edition  of  Kant’s  Critique,  and  that  when  I 
came  to  read  the  Second  Edition,  I never  could  feel  so  at 
home  in  it  as  in  the  first.  The  First  Edition  seems  to  me 
cut  out  of  one  block,  the  second  always  leaves  on  my  mind 
the  impression  of  patchwork. 

Thirdly,  I certainly  dislike  in  the  Second  Edition  a cer- 
tain apologetic  tone,  quite  unworthy  of  Kant.  He  had 
evidently  been  attacked  by  the  old  Wolfian  professors,  and 
also  by  the  orthodox  clergy.  He  knew  that  these  attacks 
were  groundless,  and  arose  in  fact  from  an  imperfect 
understanding  of  his  work  on  the  part  of  his  critics.  He 
need  not  have  condescended  to  show  that  he  was  as  well- 
schooled  a philosopher  as  any  of  his  learned  colleagues,  or 
that  his  philosophy  would  really  prove  extremely  useful 
to  orthodox  clergymen  in  their  controversies  with  sceptics 
and  unbelievers. 

So  far,  and  so  far  only,  can  I understand  the  feeling 
against  the  Second  Edition,  which  is  shared  by  some  of 
the  most  accurate  and  earnest  students  of  Kant. 

But  I have  never  been  able  to  understand  the  exagger- 
ated charges  which  Schopenhauer  and  others  bring  against 
Kant,  both  for  the  omissions  and  the  additions  in  that 
Second  Edition.  What  I can  understand  and  fully  agree 
with  is  Jacobi’s  opinion,  when  he  says:1  ‘I  consider  the 
loss  which  the  Second  Edition  of  Kant’s  Critique  suffered 
by  omissions  and  changes  very  considerable,  and  I am 
1 Jacobi’s  Works,  Vol.  II.,  p.  291  (1815). 


lxiv 


Translator' s Preface 


very  anxious  by  the  expression  of  my  opinion  to  induce 
readers  who  seriously  care  for  philosophy  and  its  history 
to  compare  the  first  edition  of  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason 
with  the  second  improved  edition.  ...  It  is  not  suffi- 
ciently recognised  what  an  advantage  it  is  to  study  the 
systems  of  great  thinkers  in  their  first  original  form.  I 
was  told  by  Hamann  that  the  very  judicious  Ch.  J.  Krause 
(or  Kraus)  could  never  sufficiently  express  his  gratitude 
for  having  been  made  acquainted  with  Hume’s  first  philo- 
sophical work,  Treatise  on  Human  Nature,  1739,  where 
alone  he  had  found  the  right  point  of  view  for  judging  the 
later  essays.’ 

Nor  do  I differ  much  from  Michelet,  in  his  History  of 
the  later  systems  of  Philosophy  in  Germany  (1837,  Vol.  L, 
p.  49),  where  he  says,  ‘ Much  that  is  of  a more  speculative 
character  in  the  representation  of  Kant’s  system  has  been 
taken  from  the  First  Edition.  It  can  no  longer  be  found 
in  the  second  and  later  editions,  which,  as  well  as  the 
Prolegomena,  keep  the  idealistic  tendency  more  in  the 
background,  because  Kant  saw  that  this  side  of  his  phi- 
losophy had  lent  itself  most  to  attacks  and  misunder- 
standings.’ 

I can  also  understand  Schopenhauer,  when  he  states 
that  many  things  that  struck  him  as  obscure  and  self-con- 
tradictory in  Kant’s  Critique  ceased  to  be  so  when  he 
came  to  read  that  work  in  its  first  original  form.  But 
everything  else  that  Schopenhauer  writes  on  the  difference 
between  the  first  and  second  editions  of  the  Critique  seems 
to  me  perfectly  intolerable.  Kant,  in  the  Preface  to  his 
Second  Edition,  which  was  published  six  years  after  the 
first,  in  1787,  gives  a clear  and  straightforward  account  of 
the  changes  which  he  introduced.  ‘ My  new  representa- 


Translator' s Preface 


lxv 


tion,’  he  writes,  ‘ changes  absolutely  nothing  with  regard 
to  my  propositions  and  even  the  arguments  in  their  sup- 
port.’ He  had  nothing  to  retract,  but  he  thought  he  had 
certain  things  to  add,  and  he  evidently  hoped  he  could 
render  some  points  of  his  system  better  understood.  His 
freedom  of  thought,  his  boldness  of  speech,  and  his  love 
of  truth  are,  if  I am  any  judge  in  these  matters,  the  same 
in  1787  as  in  1781.  The  active  reactionary  measures  of 
the  Prussian  Government,  by  which  Kant  is  supposed  to 
have  been  frightened,  date  from  a later  period.  Zedlitz, 
Kant’s  friend  and  protector,  was  not  replaced  by  Wollner 
as  minister  till  1788.  It  was  not  till  1794  that  Kant  was 
really  warned  and  reprimanded  by  the  Cabinet,  and  we 
must  not  judge  too  harshly  of  the  old  philosopher  when  at 
his  time  of  life,  and  in  the  then  state  of  paternal  despotism 
in  Prussia,  he  wrote  back  to  say  ‘ that  he  would  do  even 
more  than  was  demanded  of  him,  and  abstain  in  future 
from  all  public  lectures  concerning  religion,  whether  nat- 
ural or  revealed.’  What  he  at  that  time  felt  in  his  heart 
of  hearts  we  know  from  some  remarks  found  after  his 
death  among  his  papers.  ‘ It  is  dishonourable,’  he  writes, 
‘to  retract  or  deny  one’s  real  convictions,  but  silence,  in  a 
case  like  my  own,  is  the  duty  of  a subject ; and  though  all 
we  say  must  be  true,  it  is  not  our  duty  to  declare  publicly 
all  that  is  true.’  Kant  never  retracted,  he  never  even  de- 
clared himself  no  longer  responsible  for  any  one  of  those 
portions  of  the  Critique  which  he  omitted  in  the  Second 
Edition.  On  the  contrary,  he  asked  his  readers  to  look 
for  them  in  the  First  Edition,  and  only  expressed  a regret 
that  there  was  no  longer  room  for  them  in  the  Second 
Edition. 

Now  let  us  hear  what  Schopenhauer  says.  He  not  only 


lxvi  Translator' s Preface 

calls  the  Second  Edition  ‘ crippled,  disfigured,  and  cor- 
rupt,’ but  imputes  motives  utterly  at  variance  with  all  we 
know  of  the  truthful,  manly,  and  noble  character  of  Kant. 
Schopenhauer  writes  : ‘ What  induced  Kant  to  make  these 
changes  was  fear  of  man,  produced  by  weakness  of  old  age, 
which  not  only  affects  the  head,  but  sometimes  deprives 
the  heart  also  of  that  firmness  which  alone  enables  us  to 
despise  the  opinions  and  motives  of  our  contemporaries, 
as  they  deserve  to  be.  No  one  can  be  great  without  that.’ 

All  this  is  simply  abominable.  First  of  all,  as  a matter 
of  fact,  Kant,  when  he  published  his  Second  Edition,  had 
not  yet  collapsed  under  the  weakness  of  old  age.  He  was 
about  sixty  years  of  age,  and  that  age,  so  far  from  making 
cowards  of  us,  gives  to  most  men  greater  independence 
and  greater  boldness  than  can  be  expected  from  the 
young,  who  are  awed  by  the  authority  of  their  seniors, 
and  have  often  to  steer  their  course  prudently  through 
the  conflicts  of  parties  and  opinions.1  What  is  the  use 
of  growing  old,  if  not  to  gain  greater  confidence  in  our 
opinions,  and  to  feel  justified  in  expressing  them  with 
perfect  freedom  ? And  as  to  ‘ that  firmness  which  alone 
enables  us  to  despise  the  opinions  and  motives  of  our  con- 
temporaries,’ let  us  hope  that  that  is  neither  a blessing 
of  youth,  nor  of  old  age.  Schopenhauer  personally,  no 
doubt,  had  a right  to  complain  of  his  contemporaries,  but 
he  would  have  been  greater  if  he  had  despised  them  either 
less  or  more,  or,  at  all  events,  if  he  had  despised  them  in 
silence. 

I am  really  reluctant  to  translate  all  that  follows,  and 

1 ‘ En  general  la  vigueur  de  l’esprit,  soit  dans  la  politique,  soit  dans  la 
science,  ne  se  deploie  dans  toute  sa  plenitude  qu’k  l’fige  ou  l’activite  vitale 
vient  i s’affaiblir.’  E.  Saisset,  L’Ame  et  la  Vie,  p.  60. 


Translator' s Preface 


lxvii 


yet,  as  Schopenhauer’s  view  has  found  so  many  echoes, 
it  seems  necessary  to  let  him  have  his  say. 

‘Kant  had  been  told,’  he  continues,  ‘that  his  system 
was  only  a rechauffe  of  Berkeley’s  Idealism.  This  seemed 
to  him  to  endanger  that  invaluable  and  indispensable 
originality  which  every  founder  of  a system  values  so 
highly  (see  Prolegomena  zu  jeder  kiinftigen  Metaphysik, 
pp.  70,  202  sq.).  At  the  same  time  he  had  given  offence 
in  other  quarters  by  his  upsetting  of  some  of  the  sacred 
doctrines  of  the  old  dogmas,  particularly  of  those  of 
rational  psychology.  Add  to  this  that  the  great  king,  the 
friend  of  light  and  protector  of  truth,  had  just  died  (1786). 
Kant  allowed  himself  to  be  intimidated  by  all  this,  and 
had  the  weakness  to  do  what  was  unworthy  of  him.  This 
consists  in  his  having  entirely  changed  the  first  chapter 
of  the  Second  Book  of  the  Transcendental  Dialectic  (first 
ed.,  p.  341),  leaving  out  fifty-seven  pages,  which  contained 
what  was  indispensable  for  a clear  understanding  of  the 
whole  work,  and  by  the  omission  of  which,  as  well  as  by 
what  he  put  in  its  place,  his  whole  doctrine  becomes  full 
of  contradictions.  These  I pointed  out  in  my  critique  of 
Kant  (pp.  612-18),  because  at  that  time  (in  1818)  I had 
never  seen  the  First  Edition,  in  which  they  are  really  not 
contradictions,  but  agree  perfectly  with  the  rest  of  his 
work.  In  truth  the  Second  Edition  is  like  a man  who  has 
had  one  leg  amputated,  and  replaced  by  a wooden  one. 
In  the  preface  to  the  Second  Edition  (p.  xlii),  Kant  gives 
hollow,  nay,  untrue  excuses  for  the  elimination  of  that 
important  and  extremely  beautiful  part  of  his  book.  He 
does  not  confessedly  wish  that  what  was  omitted  should 
be  thought  to  have  been  retracted  by  him.  “ People 
might  read  it  in  the  First  Edition,”  he  says ; “ he  had 


Jxviii 


Translator' s Preface 


wanted  room  for  new  additions,  and  nothing  had  been 
changed  and  improved  except  the  representation  of  his 
system.”  But  the  dishonesty  of  this  plea  becomes  clear 
if  we  compare  the  Second  with  the  First  Edition.  There, 
in  the  Second  Edition,  he  has  not  only  left  out  that  im- 
portant and  beautiful  chapter,  and  inserted  under  the 
same  title  another  half  as  long  and  much  less  significant, 
but  he  has  actually  embodied  in  that  Second  Edition  a 
refutation  of  idealism  which  says  the  very  contrary  of 
what  had  been  said  in  the  omitted  chapter,  and  defends 
the  very  errors  which  before  he  had  thoroughly  refuted, 
thus  contradicting  the  whole  of  his  own  doctrine.  This 
refutation  of  idealism  is  so  thoroughly  bad,  such  palpable 
sophistry,  nay,  in  part,  such  a confused  “galimatias,”  that 
it  is  unworthy  of  a place  in  his  immortal  work.  Conscious 
evidently  of  its  insufficiency,  Kant  has  tried  to  improve  it 
by  the  alteration  of  one  passage  (see  Preface,  p.  xxxix) 
and  by  a long  and  confused  note.  But  he  forgot  to  cancel 
at  the  same  time  in  the  Second  Edition  the  numerous  pas- 
sages which  are  in  contradiction  with  the  new  note,  and  in 
agreement  with  what  he  had  cancelled.  This  applies  par- 
ticularly to  the  whole  of  the  sixth  section  of  the  Antinomy 
of  Pure  Reason,  and  to  all  those  passages  which  I pointed 
out  with  some  amazement  in  my  critique  (which  was 
written  before  I knew  the  First  Edition  and  its  later  fate), 
because  in  them  he  contradicts  himself.  That  it  was  fear 
which  drove  the  old  man  to  disfigure  his  Critique  of 
rational  psychology  is  shown  also  by  this,  that  his  attacks 
on  the  sacred  doctrines  of  the  old  dogmatism  are  far 
weaker,  far  more  timid  and  superficial,  than  in  the  First 
Edition,  and  that,  for  the  sake  of  peace,  he  mixed  them 
up  at  once  with  anticipations  which  are  out  of  place,  nay, 


Translator' s Preface  lxix 

cannot  as  yet  be  understood,  of  the  immortality  of  the 
soul,  grounded  on  practical  reason  and  represented  as  one 
of  its  postulates.  By  thus  timidly  yielding  he  has  in 
reality  retracted,  with  regard  to  the  principal  problem  of 
all  philosophy,  viz.  the  relation  of  the  ideal  to  the  real, 
those  thoughts  which  he  had  conceived  in  the  vigour  of 
his  manhood  and  cherished  through  all  his  life.  This  he 
did  in  his  sixty-fourth  year  with  a carelessness  which  is 
peculiar  to  old  age  quite  as  much  as  timidity,  and  he  thus 
surrendered  his  system,  not  however  openly,  but  escaping 
from  it  through  a back-door,  evidently  ashamed  himself 
of  what  he  was  doing.  By  this  process  the  Critique  of 
Pure  Reason  has,  in  its  Second  Edition,  become  a self- 
contradictory, crippled,  and  corrupt  book,  and  is  no  longer 
genuine.’ 

‘ The  wrong  interpretation  of  the  Critique  of  Pure 
Reason,  for  which  the  successors  of  Kant,  both  those 
who  were  for  and  those  who  were  against  him,  have 
blamed  each  other,  as  it  would  seem,  with  good  reason, 
are  principally  due  to  the  so-called  improvements,  intro- 
duced into  his  work  by  Kant’s  own  hand.  For  who  can 
understand  what  contradicts  itself  ? ’ 

The  best  answer  to  all  this  is  to  be  found  in  Kant’s  own 
straightforward  statements  in  the  Preface  to  his  Second 
Edition  (Supplement  II.,  pp.  688  seq.).  That  the  unity 
of  thought  which  pervades  the  First  Edition  is  broken 
now  and  then  in  the  Second  Edition,  no  attentive  reader 
can  fail  to  see.  That  Kant  shows  rather  too  much  anxiety 
to  prove  the  harmlessness  of  his  Critique,  is  equally  true, 
and  it  would  have  been  better  if,  while  refuting  what  he 
calls  Empirical  Idealism,  he  had  declared  more  strongly 
his  unchanged  adherence  to  the  principles  of  Transcen- 


Ixx 


Translator’ s Preface 


dental  Idealism.1  But  all  this  leaves  Kant’s  moral  charactei 
quite  untouched.  If  ever  man  lived  the  life  of  a true  phi- 
losopher, making  the  smallest  possible  concessions  to  the 
inevitable  vanities  of  the  world,  valuing  even  the  shadowy 
hope  of  posthumous  fame2  at  no  more  than  its  proper 
worth,  but  fully  enjoying  the  true  enjoyments  of  this  life, 
an  unswerving  devotion  to  truth,  a consciousness  of  right- 
eousness, and  a sense  of  perfect  independence,  that  man 
was  Kant.  If  it  is  true  that  on  some  points  which  may 
seem  more  important  to  others  than  they  seemed  to  him- 
self, he  changed  his  mind,  or,  as  we  should  now  say,  if 
there  was  a later  development  in  his  philosophical  views, 
this  would  seem  to  me  to  impose  on  every  student  the 
duty,  which  I have  tried  to  fulfil  as  a translator  also,  viz. 
first  of  all,  to  gain  a clear  view  of  Kant’s  system  from  his 
First  Edition,  and  then  to  learn,  both  from  the  additions 
and  from  the  omissions  of  the  Second  Edition,  on  what 
points  Kant  thought  that  the  objections  raised  against 
his  theory  required  a fuller  and  clearer  statement  of  his 
arguments. 

The  additions  of  the  Second  Edition  will  be  found  on 
pp.  687-808  of  this  volume,  while  the  passages  omitted 
in  the  Second  Edition  have  been  included  throughout 
between  parentheses. 

Critical  Treatment  of  the  Text  of  Kant’s  Critique 

The  text  of  Kant’s  Critique  has  of  late  years  become  the 
subject  of  the  most  minute  philological  criticism,  and  it 
certainly  offers  as  good  a field  for  the  exercise  of  critical 
scholarship  as  any  of  the  Greek  and  Roman  classics. 

1 See  Critique,  p.  300  (369). 

2 See  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  Supp.  XXVII.,  p.  793. 


Translator  s Preface 


lxxi 


We  have,  first  of  all,  the  text  of  the  First  Edition,  full  of 
faults,  arising  partly  from  the  imperfect  state  of  Kant’s 
manuscript,  partly  from  the  carelessness  of  the  printer. 
Kant  received  no  proof-sheets,  and  he  examined  the  first 
thirty  clean  sheets,  which  were  in  his  hands  when  he  wrote 
the  preface,  so  carelessly  that  he  could  detect  in  them  only 
one  essential  misprint.  Then  followed  the  Second,  ‘ here 
and  there  improved,’  Edition  (1787),  in  which  Kant  not 
only  omitted  and  added  considerable  passages,  but  paid 
some  little  attention  also  to  the  correctness  of  the  text, 
improving  the  spelling  and  the  stopping,  and  removing  a 
number  of  archaisms  which  often  perplex  the  reader  of  the 
First  Edition. 

We  hardly  know  whether  these  minor  alterations  came 
from  Kant  himself,  for  he  is  said  to  have  remained  firmly 
attached  to  the  old  system  of  orthography  ; 1 and  it  seems 
quite  certain  that  he  himself  paid  no  further  attention  to 
the  later  editions,  published  during  his  lifetime,  the  Third 
Edition  in  1790,  the  Fourth  in  1794,  the  Fifth  in  1799. 

At  the  end  of  the  Fifth  Edition  of  the  Critique  of  Pure 
Reason,  published  in  1799,  there  is  a long  list  of  Corri- 
genda, the  authorship  of  which  has  exercised  the  critical 
students  of  Kant’s  text  very  much.  No  one  seems  to  have 
thought  of  attributing  it  to  Kant  himself,  who  at  that  time 
of  life  was  quite  incapable  of  such  work.  Professor  B. 
Erdmann  supposed  it  might  be  the  work  of  Rink,  or  some 
other  amanuensis  of  Kant.  Dr.  Vaihinger  has  shown  that 
it  is  the  work  of  a Professor  Grillo,  who,  in  the  Philoso- 
phische  Anzeiger,  a Supplement  to  L.  H.  Jacob’s  Annalen 
der  Philosophic  und  des  philosophischen  Geistes,  1795, 
published  a collection  of  Corrigenda,  not  only  for  Kant’s 

1 See  Kehrbach,  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft,  p.  viii. 


lxxii 


Translator' s Preface 


Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  but  for  several  others  of  his  works 
also.  Another  contributor  to  the  same  journal,  Meyer, 
thereupon  defended  Kant’s  publisher  (Hartknoch)  against 
the  charges  of  carelessness,  rejected  some  of  Grillo’s  cor- 
rections, and  showed  that  what  seemed  to  be  misprints 
were  in  many  cases  peculiarities  of  Kant’s  style.  It  is 
this  list  of  Professor  Grillo  which,  with  certain  deductions, 
has  been  added  to  the  Fifth  Edition  of  the  Critique. 
Some  of  Grillo’s  corrections  have  been  adopted  in  the  text, 
while  others,  even  those  which  Meyer  had  proved  to  be 
unnecessary,  have  retained  their  place  in  the  list. 

With  such  materials  before  him,  it  is  clear  that  a critical 
student  of  Kant’s  text  enjoys  considerable  freedom  in  con- 
jectural emendation,  and  that  freedom  has  been  used  with 
great  success  by  a number  of  German  critics.  The  more 
important  are : — 

Rosenkranz,  in  his  edition  of  Kant’s  Critique  (text  of 
First  Edition),  1838. 

Hartenstein,  in  his  edition  of  Kant’s  Critique  (text  of 
Second  Edition),  1838,  1867. 

Kehrbach,  in  his  edition  of  Kant’s  Critique  (text  of  First 
Edition),  1877. 

Leclair,  A.  von,  Kritische  Beitrage  zur  Kategorienlehre 
Kant’s,  1871. 

Paulsen,  Versuch  einer  Entwickelungsgeschichte  der 
Kantischen  Erkenntnisslehre,  1875. 

Erdmann,  B.,  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft  (text  of  Second 
Edition),  1878,  with  a valuable  chapter  on  the  Revision  of 
the  Text. 

Many  of  the  alterations  introduced  by  these  critics  affect 
the  wording  only  of  Kant’s  Critique,  without  materially 
altering  the  meaning,  and  were  therefore  of  no  importance 


Translator' s Preface 


lxxiii 


in  an  English  translation.  It  often  happens,  however,  tha. 
the  construction  of  a whole  sentence  depends  on  a verj 
slight  alteration  of  the  text.  In  Kant’s  long  sentences, 
the  gender  of  the  pronouns  der,  die , das , are  often  our  only 
guide  in  discovering  to  what  substantive  these  pronouns 
refer,  while  in  English,  where  the  distinction  of  gender 
is  wanting  in  substantives,  it  is  often  absolutely  necessary 
to  repeat  the  substantives  to  which  the  pronouns  refer. 
But  Kant  uses  several  nouns  in  a gender  which  has  be- 
come obsolete.  Thus  he  speaks  1 of  der  Wachsthum , der 
Wohlgefallen , der  Gegentheil , die  H hide  miss,  die  Bediirf- 
niss,  die  Verhaltniss,  and  he  varies  even  between  die  and 
das  Verhaltniss,  die  and  das  Erkenntniss,  etc.,  so  that  even 
the  genders  of  pronouns  may  become  blind  guides.  The 
same  applies  to  several  prepositions  which  Kant  construes 
with  different  cases  from  what  would  be  sanctioned  by 
modern  German  grammar.2  Thus  ausser  with  him  governs 
the  accusative,  wahrend  the  dative,  etc.  For  all  this,  and 
many  other  peculiarities,  we  must  be  prepared,  if  we  want 
to  construe  Kant’s  text  correctly,  or  find  out  how  far  we 
are  justified  in  altering  it. 

Much  has  been  achieved  in  this  line,  and  conjectural 
alterations  have  been  made  by  recent  editors  of  Kant  of 
which  a Bentley  or  a Lachmann  need  not  be  ashamed.  In 
cases  where  these  emendations  affected  the  meaning,  and 
when  the  reasons  why  my  translation  deviated  so  much 
from  the  textus  receptas  might  not  be  easily  perceived,  I 
have  added  the  emendations  adopted  by  me,  in  a note. 
Those  who  wish  for  fuller  information  on  these  points,  will 
have  to  consult  Dr.  Vaihinger’s  forthcoming  Commentary, 
which,  to  judge  from  a few  specimens  kindly  communi 

1 See  Erdmann,  p.  637.  * See  Erdmann,  p.  660. 


lxxiv  Translator' s Preface 

catecl  to  me  by  the  author,  will  give  the  fullest  information 
on  the  subject. 

How  important  some  of  the  emendations  are  which 
have  to  be  taken  into  account  before  an  intelligible  trans- 
lation is  possible,  may  be  seen  from  a few  specimens. 

On  p.  358  (442)  the  reading  of  the  first  edition  Antithesis 
must  be  changed  into  Thesis. 

Page  441  (545),  Nonmenon  seems  preferable  to  Phe- 
nomenon. 

Page  395  (484),  we  must  read  keine , instead  of  eine 
Wahrnehmung. 

Page  277  (340),  we  must  keep  the  reading  of  the  First 
Edition  transcendentalen,  instead  of  transcendent en , as 
printed  in  the  Second ; while  on  p.  542  (674),  transcenden- 
tal may  be  retained,  though  corrected  into  transcendentalen 
in  the  Corrigenda  of  the  Fifth  Edition. 

On  p.  627  (781),  the  First  Edition  reads,  sind  also  keine 
Privatmeinungen.  Hartenstein  rightly  corrects  this  into 
reine  Privatmeinungen,  i.e.  they  are  mere  private  opinions. 

Page  667  (832),  instead  of  ein  jeder  Theil,  it  is  proposed 
to  read  kein  Theil.  This  would  be  necessary  if  we  took 
vermisst  werden  kann , in  the  sense  of  can  be  spared , while 
if  we  take  it  in  the  sense  of  can  be  missed,  i.e.  can  be  felt 
to  be  absent,  the  reading  of  the  First  Edition  ein  jeder 
Theil  must  stand.  See  the  Preface  to  the  First  Edition, 
p.  xx,  note  1. 

On  p.  128  (157)  the  First  Edition  reads,  Weil  sie  kein 
Drittes,  ndmlich  reinen  Gegenstand  haben.  This  gives  no 
sense,  because  Kant  never  speaks  of  a reinen  Gegenstand. 
In  the  list  of  Corrigenda  at  the  end  of  the  Fifth  Edition, 
reinen  is  changed  into  keinen,  which  Hartenstein  has 
rightly  adopted,  while  Rosenkranz  retains  reinen. 


Translator' s Preface 


lxxv 


On  pp.  1 6 and  17  of  the  Introduction  to  the  Second 
Edition  (Supplement  IV.,  p.  717),  Dr.  Vaihinger  has  clearly 
proved,  I think,  that  the  whole  passage  from  Einige 
wenige  Grundsatze  to  Konnen  dargestellt  werden  interrupts 
the  drift  of  Kant’s  argument.  It  probably  was  a marginal 
note,  made  by  Kant  himself,  but  inserted  in  the  wrong 
place.  It  would  do  very  well  as  a note  to  the  sentence : 
Eben  so  wenig  ist  irgend  ein  Grundsatz  der  reinen  Geome- 
tric analytisch. 

With  these  prefatory  remarks  I leave  my  translation  in 
the  hands  of  English  readers.  It  contains  the  result  of 
hard  work  and  hard  thought,  and  I trust  it  will  do  some 
good.  I have  called  Kant’s  philosophy  the  Lingua  Franca 
of  modern  philosophy,  and  so  it  is,  and  I hope  will  become 
still  more.  But  that  Lingua  Franca , though  it  may 
contain  many  familiar  words  from  all  languages  of  the 
world,  has  yet,  like  every  other  language,  to  be  learnt. 
To  expect  that  we  can  understand  Kant’s  Critique  by 
simply  reading  it,  would  be  the  same  as  to  attempt  to  read 
a French  novel  by  the  light  of  English  and  Latin.  A 
book  which  Schiller  and  Schopenhauer  had  to  read  again 
and  again  before  they  could  master  it,  will  not  yield  its 
secrets  at  the  first  time  of  asking.  An  Indian  proverb 
says  that  it  is  not  always  the  fault  of  the  post,  if  a blind 
man  cannot  see  it,  nor  is  it  always  the  fault  of  the  pro- 
found thinker,  if  his  language  is  unintelligible  to  the  busy 
crowd.  I am  no  defender  of  dark  sayings,  and  I still  hold 
to  an  opinion  for  which  I have  often  been  blamed,  that 
there  is  nothing  in  any  science  that  cannot  be  stated 
clearly,  if  only  we  know  it  clearly.  Still  there  are  limits. 
No  man  has  a right  to  complain  that  he  cannot  under- 


lxxvi 


Translator' s Preface 


stand  higher  mathematics,  if  he  declines  to  advance  step 
by  step  from  the  lowest  to  the  highest  stage  of  that  science. 
It  is  the  same  in  philosophy.  Philosophy  represents  a 
long  toil  in  thought  and  word,  and  it  is  but  natural  that 
those  who  have  toiled  long  in  inward  thought  should  use 
certain  concepts,  and  bundles  of  concepts,  with  their  alge- 
braic exponents,  in  a way  entirely  bewildering  to  the  outer 
world.  Kant’s  obscurity  is  owing  partly  to  his  writing  for 
himself  rather  than  for  others,  and  partly  to  his  addressing 
himself,  when  defending  a cause,  to  the  judge,  and  not  to 
the  jury.  He  does  not  wish  to  persuade,  he  tries  to  con- 
vince. No  doubt  there  are  arguments  in  Kant’s  Critique 
which  fail  to  convince,  and  which  have  provoked  the  cavils 
and  strictures  of  his  opponents.  Kant  would  not  have 
been  the  really  great  man  he  was,  if  he  had  escaped  the 
merciless  criticism  of  his  smaller  contemporaries.  But 
herein  too  we  perceive  the  greatness  of  Kant,  that  those 
hostile  criticisms,  even  where  they  are  well  founded,  touch 
only  on  less  essential  points,  and  leave  the  solidity  of  the 
whole  structure  of  his  philosophy  unimpaired.  No  first 
perusal  will  teach  us  how  much  of  Kant’s  Critique  may 
safely  be  put  aside  as  problematical,  or,  at  all  events,  as 
not  essential.  But  with  every  year,  and  with  every  new 
perusal,  some  of  these  mists  and  clouds  will  vanish,  and 
the  centra]  truth  will  be  seen  rising  before  our  eyes  with 
constantly  increasing  warmth  and  splendour,  like  a cloud- 
less sun  in  an  Eastern  sky. 

And  now,  while  I am  looking  at  the  last  lines  that  I 
have  written,  it  may  be  the  last  lines  that  I shall  ever 
write  on  Kant,  the  same  feeling  comes  over  me  which  I 
expressed  in  the  Preface  to  the  last  volume  of  my  edition 
of  the  Rig-Veda  and  its  ancient  Commentary.  I feel  as  if 


Translator' s Preface 


lxxvii 


an  old  friend,  with  whom  I have  had  many  communings 
during  the  sunny  and  during  the  dark  days  of  life,  was 
taken  from  me,  and  I should  hear  his  voice  no  more. 

The  two  friends,  the  Rig-Veda  and  Kant’s  Critique  of 
Pure  Reason,  may  seem  very  different,  and  yet  my  life 
would  have  been  incomplete  without  the  one  as  without 
the  other. 

The  bridge  of  thoughts  and  sighs  that  spans  the  whole 
history  of  the  Aryan  world  has  its  first  arch  in  the  Veda, 
its  last,  in  Kant’s  Critique.  In  the  Veda  we  watch  the  first 
unfolding  of  the  human  mind  as  we  can  watch  it  nowhere 
else.  Life  seems  simple,  natural,  childlike,  full  of  hopes, 
undisturbed  as  yet  by  many  doubts  or  fears.  What  is 
beneath,  and  above,  and  beyond  this  life  is  dimly  perceived, 
and  expressed  in  a thousand  words  and  ways,  all  mere 
stammerings,  all  aiming  to  express  what  cannot  be  ex- 
pressed, yet  all  full  of  a belief  in  the  real  presence  of  the 
Divine  in  Nature,  of  the  Infinite  in  the  Finite.  Here  is 
the  childhood  of  our  race  unfolded  before  our  eyes,  at  least 
so  much  of  it  as  we  shall  ever  know  on  Aryan  ground,  — 
and  there  are  lessons  to  be  read  in  those  hymns,  aye,  in 
every  word  that  is  used  by  those  ancient  poets,  which  will 
occupy  and  delight  generations  to  come. 

And  while  in  the  Veda  we  may  study  the  childhood,  we 
may  study  in  Kant’s  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  the  perfect 
manhood  of  the  Aryan  mind.  It  has  passed  through 
many  phases,  and  every  one  of  them  had  its  purpose,  and 
has  left  its  mark.  It  is  no  longer  dogmatical,  it  is  no 
longer  sceptical,  least  of  all  is  it  positive.  It  has  arrived 
at  and  passed  through  its  critical  phase,  and  in  Kant’s 
Critique  stands  before  us,  conscious  both  of  its  weakness 
and  of  its  strength,  modest,  yet  brave.  It  knows  what  the 


lxxviii 


Translator' s Preface 


old  idols  of  its  childhood  and  its  youth  too  were  made  of. 
It  does  not  break  them,  it  only  tries  to  understand  them, 
but  it  places  above  them  the  Ideals  of  Reason  — no  longer 
tangible  — not  even  within  reach  of  the  understanding  — 
yet  real,  if  anything  can  be  called  real,  — bright  and 
heavenly  stars  to  guide  us  even  in  the  darkest  night. 

In  the  Veda  we  see  how  the  Divine  appears  in  the  fire, 
and  in  the  earthquake,  and  in  the  great  and  strong  wind 
which  rends  the  mountain.  In  Kant’s  Critique  the  Divine 
is  heard  in  the  still  small  voice  — the  Categorical  Impera- 
tive— the  I Ought  — which  Nature  does  not  know  and 
cannot  teach.  Everything  in  Nature  is  or  is  not,  is  neces- 
sary or  contingent,  true  or  false.  But  there  is  no  room  in 
Nature  for  the  Ought,  as  little  as  there  is  in  Logic,  Mathe- 
matics, or  Geometry.  Let  that  suffice,  and  let  future 
generations  learn  all  the  lessons  contained  in  that  simple 
word,  I ought,  as  interpreted  by  Kant. 

I feel  I have  done  but  little  for  my  two  friends,  far  less 
than  they  have  done  for  me.  I myself  have  learnt  from 
the  Veda  all  that  I cared  to  learn,  but  the  right  and  full 
interpretation  of  all  that  the  poets  of  the  Vedic  hymns 
have  said  or  have  meant  to  say,  mu  it  be  left  to  the  future. 
What  I could  do  in  this  short  life  of  ours  was  to  rescue 
from  oblivion  the  most  ancient  heirloom  of  the  Aryan 
family,  to  establish  its  text  on  a '.sound  basis,  and  to  render 
accessible  its  venerable  Commentary,  which,  so  long  as 
Vedic  studies  last,  may  be  criticised,  but  can  never  be 
ignored. 

The  same  with  Kant’s  Critique  of  Pure  Reason.  I do 
not  venture  to  give  the  right  and  full  explanation  of  all 
that  Kant  has  said  or  has  meant  to  say.  I myself  have 
learnt  from  him  all  that  I cared  to  learn,  and  I now  give 


Translator' s Preface 


lxxix 


to  the  world  the  text  of  his  principal  work,  critically  re- 
stored, and  so  translated  that  the  translation  itself  may 
serve  as  an  explanation,  and  in  some  places  even  as  a 
commentary  of  the  original.  The  materials  are  now  acces- 
sible, and  the  English-speaking  race,  the  race  of  the  future, 
will  have  in  Kant’s  Critique  another  Aryan  heirloom,  as 
precious  as  the  Veda  — a work  that  may  be  criticised,  but 
can  never  be  ignored. 

F.  MAX  MULLER. 


Oxford,  November  25,  1881. 


TRANSLATOR’S  PREFACE  TO  SECOND 
EDITION 


So  much  has  been  done  of  late  towards  a critical  restora- 
tion of  the  text  of  Kant’s  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  that  it 
was  impossible  to  republish  my  translation  without  a 
thorough  revision.  Scholars  who  are  acquainted  with  the 
circumstances  under  which  Kant’s  work  was  originally 
written  and  printed  will  easily  understand  why  the  text  of 
his  Critique  should  have  required  so  many  corrections  and 
conjectural  emendations.  Not  being  able  myself  to  find 
out  all  that  had  been  written  on  this  subject  in  successive 
editions  of  Kant’s  works  and  in  various  articles  scattered 
about  in  German  philosophical  journals,  I had  the  good 
fortune  to  secure  the  help  of  Dr.  Erich  Adickes,  well 
known  by  his  edition  of  Kant’s  Critique , published  in 
1889,  and  now  engaged  in  preparing  a new  critical  text 
under  the  auspices  of  the  Royal  Academy  of  Berlin. 
Dr.  Adickes  has  not  only  given  me  the  benefit  of  all  the 
really  important  various  readings  and  emendations  which 
will  form  part  of  his  standard  edition,  but  he  has  also 
pointed  out  to  me  passages  in  which  I seemed  to  have 
misapprehended  the  exact  meaning  of  Kant’s  peculiar 
and  often  very  ambiguous  style. 

That  emendations  of  Kant’s  text  are  often  of  great 
importance  for  a right  understanding  of  his  philosophi- 
cal arguments  can  easily  be  seen  from  the  list  given  in 
Dr.  Adickes’  edition  of  Kant’s  Critique , pp.  iv-vii.  Here 
we  find,  for  instance,  such  mistakes  as  : 

Ixxxi 


lxxxii 


Preface  to  Second  Edition 


helfen 

instead  of 

fehlen 

erfolgt 

u 

verfolgt 

alle 

u 

allein 

Realitdt 

u 

Idealit'at 

verdnderlich 

u 

teilbar 

Einsicht 

u 

Einheit 

reinen 

u 

keinen 

priori 

a 

posteriori 

einer 

u 

seiner 

Anleitung 

u 

Ableitung 

Antithese 

u 

These 

eine 

a 

keine 

phaenomenon 

u 

noountenon 

alle 

a 

als 

Ungrund 

u 

Urgrund 

More  perplexing  even  than  these  gross  mistakes  are 
smaller  inaccuracies,  such  as  ihr  instead  of  sie,  sie  instead 
of  ihn , den  instead  of  dent , noch  instead  of  nach,  which 
frequently  form  very  serious  impediments  in  the  right 
construction  of  a sentence. 

I cannot  conclude  this  preface  without  an  Ave,  pia 
anima  to  my  departed  friend,  Professor  Ludwig  Noire, 
who  encouraged  and  helped  me  when,  in  commemoration 
of  the  centenary  of  its  first  publication,  I undertook  the 
translation  of  Kant’s  Critique.  The  Introduction  which 
he  contributed,  his  Sketch  of  the  Development  of  Philoso- 
phy from  the  Eleatics  to  Kant,  seemed  to  me  indeed  the 
most  valuable  part  of  my  book,  and  the  most  likely  to 
remain  as  a lasting  monument  of  my  friend’s  comprehen- 
sive knowledge  and  clear  understanding  of  the  historical 
evolution  of  philosophy.  Though  it  has  been  left  out  in 
this  second  edition,  I hope  it  may  soon  be  republished  as 
an  independent  work. 

F.  MAX  MULLER. 


Oxford,  November,  1896. 


INTRODUCTION 

[p-  i] 


I 

THE  IDEA  OF  TRANSCENDENTAL  PHILOSOPHY 

[Experience  1 is  no  doubt  the  first  product  of  our  un- 
derstanding, while  employed  in  fashioning  the  raw  material 
of  our  sensations.  It  is  therefore  our  first  instruction,  and 
in  its  progress  so  rich  in  new  lessons  that  the  chain  of  all 
future  generations  will  never  be  in  want  of  new  informa- 
tion that  may  be  gathered  on  that  field.  Nevertheless, 
experience  is  by  no  means  the  only  field  to  which  our 
understanding  can  be  confined.  Experience  tells  us  what 
is,  but  not  that  it  must  be  necessarily  as  it  is,  and  not 
otherwise.  It  therefore  never  gives  us  any  really  gen- 
eral truths,  and  our  reason,  which  is  particularly  anxious 
for  that  class  of  knowledge,  is  roused  by  it  rather  than 
satisfied.  General  truths,  which  at  the  same  time  [p.  2] 
bear  the  character  of  an  inward  necessity,  must  be  in- 
dependent of  experience,  — clear  and  certain  by  them- 
selves. They  are  therefore  called  knowledge  a priori, 
while  what  is  simply  taken  from  experience  is  said  to 
be,  in  ordinary  parlance,  known  a posteriori  or  empiri- 
cally only. 

1 The  beginning  of  this  Introduction  down  to  ‘ But  what  is  still  more  ex- 
traordinary,’ is  left  out  in  the  Second  Edition.  Instead  of  it  Supplement  IV, 


2 


Introduction 


Now  it  appears,  and  this  is  extremely  curious,  that  even 
with  our  experiences  different  kinds  of  knowledge  are 
mixed  up,  which  must  have  their  origin  a priori , and 
which  perhaps  serve  only  to  produce  a certain  connec- 
tion between  our  sensuous  representations.  For  even  if 
we  remove  from  experience  everything  that  belongs  to 
the  senses,  there  remain  nevertheless  certain  original  con- 
cepts, and  certain  judgments  derived  from  them,  which 
must  have  had  their  origin  entirely  a priori>  and  inde- 
pendent of  all  experience,  because  it  is  owing  to  them 
that  we  are  able,  or  imagine  we  are  able,  to  predicate 
more  of  the  objects  of  our  senses  than  can  be  learnt 
from  mere  experience,  and  that  our  propositions  contain 
real  generality  and  strict  necessity,  such  as  mere  empirical 
knowledge  can  never  supply.] 

But 1 what  is  still  more  extraordinary  is  this,  that  cer- 
tain kinds  of  knowledge  leave  the  field  of  all  pos-  [p.  3] 
sible  experience,  and  seem  to  enlarge  the  sphere  of  our 
judgments  beyond  the  limits  of  experience  by  means  of 
concepts  to  which  experience  can  never  supply  any  cor- 
responding objects. 

And  it  is  in  this  very  kind  of  knowledge  which  tran- 
scends the  world  of  the  senses,  and  where  experience 
can  neither  guide  nor  correct  us,  that  reason  prosecutes 
its  investigations,  which  by  their  importance  we  consider 
far  more  excellent  and  by  their  tendency  far  more  ele- 
vated than  anything  the  understanding  can  find  in  the 
sphere  of  phenomena.  Nay,  we  risk  rather  anything, 
even  at  the  peril  of  error,  than  that  we  should  surrender 

'The  Second  Edition  gives  here  a new  heading:  — III,  Philosophy  re- 
quires a science  to  determine  the  possibility,  the  principles,  and  the  extent  of 
all  cognitions  a priori. 


Introduction 


3 


such  investigations,  either  on  the  ground  of  their  uncer- 
tainty, or  from  any  feeling  of  indifference  or  contempt.1 

Now  it  might  seem  natural  that,  after  we  have  left 
the  solid  ground  of  experience,  we  should  not  at  once 
proceed  to  erect  an  edifice  with  knowledge  which  we 
possess  without  knowing  whence  it  came,  and  trust  to 
principles  the  origin  of  which  is  unknown,  without  hav- 
ing made  sure  of  the  safety  of  the  foundations  by  means 
of  careful  examination.  It  would  seem  natural,  I say, 
that  philosophers  should  first  of  all  have  asked  the  ques- 
tion how  the  mere  understanding  could  arrive  at  all  this 
knowledge  a priori , and  what  extent,  what  truth,  and 
what  value  it  could  possess.  If  we  take  natural  [p.  4] 
to  mean  what  is  just  and  reasonable,  then  indeed  nothing 
could  be  more  natural.  But  if  we  understand  by  natural 
what  takes  place  ordinarily,  then,  on  the  contrary,  nothing 
is  more  natural  and  more  intelligible  than  that  this  exami- 
nation should  have  been  neglected  for  so  long  a time.  For 
one  part  of  this  knowledge,  namely,  the  mathematical,  has 
always  been  in  possession  of  perfect  trustworthiness ; and 
thus  produces  a favourable  presumption  with  regard  to 
other  parts  also,  although  these  may  be  of  a totally  dif- 
ferent nature.  Besides,  once  beyond  the  precincts  of  ex- 
perience, and  we  are  certain  that  experience  can  never 
contradict  us,  while  the  charm  of  enlarging  our  know- 
ledge is  so  great  that  nothing  will  stop  our  progress 
until  we  encounter  a clear  contradiction.  This  can  be 

1 The  Second  Edition  adds  here : ‘ These  inevitable  problems  of  pure 
reason  itself  are,  God , Freedom , and  Immortality.  The  science  which  with 
all  its  apparatus  is  really  intended  for  the  solution  of  these  problems,  is  called 
Metaphysic.  Its  procedure  is  at  first  dogmatic , i.e.  unchecked  by  a previous 
examination  of  what  reason  can  and  cannot  do,  before  it  engages  confidently 
in  so  arduous  an  undertaking.’ 


4 


Introduction 


avoided  if  only  we  are  cautious  in  our  imaginations, 
which  nevertheless  remain  what  they  are,  imaginations 
only.  How  far  we  can  advance  independent  of  all  ex- 
perience in  a priori  knowledge  is  shown  by  the  brilliant 
example  of  mathematics.  It  is  true  they  deal  with  objects 
and  knowledge  so  far  only  as  they  can  be  represented 
in  intuition.  But  this  is  easily  overlooked,  because  that 
intuition  itself  may  be  given  a priori , and  be  difficult  to 
distinguish  from  a pure  concept.  Thus  inspirited  [p.  5] 
by  a splendid  proof  of  the  power  of  reason,  the  desire  of 
enlarging  our  knowledge  sees  no  limits.  The  light  dove, 
piercing  in  her  easy  flight  the  air  and  perceiving  its  resist- 
ance, imagines  that  flight  would  be  easier  still  in  empty 
space.  It  was  thus  that  Plato  left  the  world  of  sense,  as 
opposing  so  many  hindrances  to  our  understanding,  and 
ventured  beyond  on  the  wings  of  his  ideas  into  the  empty 
space  of  pure  understanding.  He  did  not  perceive  that 
he  was  making  no  progress  by  these  endeavours,  because 
he  had  no  resistance  as  a fulcrum  on  which  to  rest  or 
to  apply  his  powers,  in  order  to  cause  the  understand- 
ing to  advance.  It  is  indeed  a very  common  fate  of 
human  reason  first  of  all  to  finish  its  speculative  edifice 
as  soon  as  possible,  and  then  only  to  enquire  whether  the 
foundation  be  sure.  Then  all  sorts  of  excuses  are  made 
in  order  to  assure  us  as  to  its  solidity,  or  to  decline  alto- 
gether such  a late  and  dangerous  enquiry.  The  reason 
why  during  the  time  of  building  we  feel  free  from  all 
anxiety  and  suspicion  and  believe  in  the  apparent  solidity 
of  our  foundation,  is  this: — A great,  perhaps  the  greatest 
portion  of  what  our  reason  finds  to  do  consists  in  the 
analysis  of  our  concepts  of  objects.  This  gives  us  a 
great  deal  of  knowledge  which,  though  it  consists  in  no 


Introduction 


5 


more  cnan  in  simplifications  and  explanations  of  [p.  6] 
what  is  comprehended  in  our  concepts  (though  in  a con- 
fused manner),  is  yet  considered  as  equal,  at  least  in 
form,  to  new  knowledge.  It  only  separates  and  arranges 
our  concepts,  it  does  not  enlarge  them  in  matter  or  con- 
tents. As  by  this  process  we  gain  a kind  of  real  know- 
ledge a priori,  which  progresses  safely  and  usefully,  it 
happens  that  our  reason,  without  being  aware  of  it,  ap- 
propriates under  that  pretence  propositions  of  a totally 
different  character,  adding  to  given  concepts  new  and 
strange  ones  a priori,  without  knowing  whence  they 
come,  nay  without  even  thinking  of  such  a question.  I 
shall  therefore  at  the  very  outset  treat  of  the  distinction 
between  these  two  kinds  of  knowledge. 

Of  the  Distinction  between  Analytical  and  Synthetical 
Judgments 

In  all  judgments  in  which  there  is  a relation  between 
subject  and  predicate  (I  speak  of  affirmative  judgments 
only,  the  application  to  negative  ones  being  easy),  that 
relation  can  be  of  two  kinds.  Either  the  predicate  B 
belongs  to  the  subject  A as  something  contained  (though 
covertly)  in  the  concept  A ; or  B lies  outside  the  sphere 
of  the  concept  A,  though  somehow  connected  with  it.  In 
the  former  case  I call  the  judgment  analytical,  in  the 
latter  synthetical.  Analytical  judgments  (affirmative)  are 
therefore  those  in  which  the  connection  of  the  [p.  7] 
predicate  with  the  subject  is  conceived  through  identity, 
while  others  in  which  that  connection  is  conceived  without 
identity,  may  be  called  synthetical.  The  former  might  be 
called  illustrating,  the  latter  expanding  judgments,  because 
in  the  former  nothing  is  added  by  the  predicate  to  the 


6 


Introduction 


concept  of  the  subject,  but  the  concept  is  only  divided  into 
its  constituent  concepts  which  were  always  conceived  as 
existing  within  it,  though  confusedly  ; while  the  latter  add 
to  the  concept  of  the  subject  a predicate  not  conceived  as 
existing  within  it,  and  not  to  be  extracted  from  it  by  any 
process  of  mere  analysis.  If  I say,  for  instance,  All 
bodies  are  extended,  this  is  an  analytical  judgment.  I 
need  not  go  beyond  the  concept  connected  with  the  name 
of  body,  in  order  to  find  that  extension  is  connected  with  it. 
I have  only  to  analyse  that  concept  and  become  conscious 
of  the  manifold  elements  always  contained  in  it,  in  order 
to  find  that  predicate.  This  is  therefore  an  analytical  judg- 
ment. But  if  I say,  All  bodies  are  heavy,  the  predicate  is 
something  quite  different  from  what  I think  as  the  mere 
concept  of  body.  The  addition  of  such  a predicate  gives 
us  a synthetical  judgment. 

[It  becomes  clear  from  this,1 

[i.  That  our  knowledge  is  in  no  way  extended  by 
analytical  judgments,  but  that  all  they  effect  is  [p.  8] 
to  put  the  concepts  which  we  possess  into  better  order  and 
render  them  more  intelligible. 

2.  That  in  synthetical  judgments  I must  have  besides 
the  concept  of  the  subject  something  else  ( x ) on  which 
the  understanding  relies  in  order  to  know  that  a predicate, 
not  contained  in  the  concept,  nevertheless  belongs  to  it. 

In  empirical  judgments  this  causes  no  difficulty,  because 
this  x is  here  simply  the  complete  experience  of  an  object 
which  I conceive  by  the  concept  A,  that  concept  forming 
one  part  only  of  my  experience.  For  though  I do  not  in- 
clude the  predicate  of  gravity  in  the  general  concept  of 

1 These  two  paragraphs  to  ‘ In  synthetical  judgments  a priori,  however,' 
are  left  out  in  the  Second  Edition,  and  replaced  by  Supplement  V. 


Introduction 


7 


body,  that  concept  nevertheless  indicates  the  complete 
experience  through  one  of  its  parts,  so  that  I may  add 
other  parts  also  of  the  same  experience,  all  belonging  to 
that  concept.  I may  first,  by  an  analytical  process,  realise 
the  concept  of  body  through  the  predicates  of  extension, 
impermeability,  form,  etc.,  all  of  which  are  contained  in  it. 
Afterwards  I expand  my  knowledge,  and  looking  back  to 
the  experience  from  which  my  concept  of  body  was  ab- 
stracted, I find  gravity  always  connected  with  the  before- 
mentioned  predicates.  Experience  therefore  is  the  x 
which  lies  beyond  the  concept  A,  and  on  which  rests 
the  possibility  of  a synthesis  of  the  predicate  of  gravity  B 
with  the  concept  A.] 

In  synthetical  judgments  a priori , however,  that  [p.  9] 
help  is  entirely  wanting.  If  I want  to  go  beyond  the  con- 
cept A in  order  to  find  another  concept  B connected  with 
it,  where  is  there  anything  on  which  I may  rest  and 
through  which  a synthesis  might  become  possible,  con- 
sidering that  I cannot  have  the  advantage  of  looking 
about  in  the  field  of  experience?  Take  the  proposition 
that  all  which  happens  has  its  cause.  In  the  concept  of 
something  that  happens  I no  doubt  conceive  of  something 
existing  preceded  by  time,  and  from  this  certain  analytical 
judgments  may  be  deduced.  But  the  concept  of  cause  is 
entirely  outside  that  concept,  and  indicates  something 
different  from  that  which  happens,  and  is  by  no  means 
contained  in  that  representation.  How  can  I venture  then 
to  predicate  of  that  which  happens  something  totally 
different  from  it,  and  to  represent  the  concept  of  cause, 
though  not  contained  in  it,  as  belonging  to  it,  and  belong- 
ing to  it  by  necessity  ? What  is  here  the  unknown  x , on 
which  the  understanding  may  rest  in  order  to  find  beyond 


8 


Introduction 


the  concept  A a foreign  predicate  B,  which  nevertheless 
is  believed  to  be  connected  with  it  ? It  cannot  be  ex- 
perience, because  the  proposition  that  all  which  happens 
has  its  cause  represents  this  second  predicate  as  added  to 
the  subject  not  only  with  greater  generality  than  experience 
can  ever  supply,  but  also  with  a character  of  necessity,. and 
therefore  purely  a priori , and  based  on  concepts.  All 
our  speculative  knowledge  a priori  aims  at  and  rests  on 
such  synthetical,  i.e.  expanding  propositions,  for  [p.  io] 
the  analytical  are  no  doubt  very  important  and  necessary, 
yet  only  in  order  to  arrive  at  that  clearness  of  concepts 
which  is  requisite  for  a safe  and  wide  synthesis,  serving 
as  a really  new  addition  to  what  we  possess  already. 

[We  1 have  here  a certain  mystery2  before  us,  which 
must  be  cleared  up  before  any  advance  into  the  unlimited 
field  of  a pure  knowledge  of  the  understanding  can  become 
safe  and  trustworthy.  We  must  discover  on  the  largest 
scale  the  ground  of  the  possibility  of  synthetical  judgments 
a priori  ; we  must  understand  the  conditions  which  render 
every  class  of  them  possible,  and  endeavour  not  only  to 
indicate  in  a sketchy  outline,  but  to  define  in  its  fulness 
and  practical  completeness,  the  whole  of  that  knowledge, 
which  forms  a class  by  itself,  systematically  arranged 
according  to  its  original  sources,  its  divisions,  its  extent 
and  its  limits.  So  much  for  the  present  with  regard  to 
the  peculiar  character  of  synthetical  judgments.] 

It  will  now  be  seen  how  there  can  be  a special  [p.  1 1] 

1 This  paragraph  left  out  in  the  Second  Edition,  and  replaced  by  Supple- 
ment VI. 

2 If  any  of  the  ancients  had  ever  thought  of  asking  this  question,  this  alone 
would  have  formed  a powerful  barrier  against  all  systems  of  pure  reason  to 
the  present  day,  and  would  have  saved  many  vain  attempts  undertaken  blindly 
and  without  a true  knowledge  of  the  subject  in  hand. 


Introductio7i 


9 


science  serving  as  a critique  of  pure  reason.  [Every 
kind  of  knowledge  is  called  pure,  if  not  mixed  with  any- 
thing heterogeneous.  But  more  particularly  is  that  know- 
ledge called  absolutely  pure,  which  is  not  mixed  up  with 
any  experience  or  sensation,  and  is  therefore  possible  en- 
tirely a priori .]  Reason  is  the  faculty  which  supplies  the 
principles  of  knowledge  a priori.  Pure  reason  therefore 
is  that  faculty  which  supplies  the  principles  of  knowing 
anything  entirely  a priori.  An  Organum  of  pure  reason 
ought  to  comprehend  all  the  principles  by  which  pure 
knowledge  a priori  can  be  acquired  and  fully  established. 
A complete  application  of  such  an  Organum  would  give 
us  a System  of  Pure  Reason.  But  as  that  would  be  a 
difficult  task,  and  as  at  present  it  is  still  doubtful  whether 
and  when  such  an  expansion  of  our  knowledge  is  here 
possible,  we  may  look  on  a mere  criticism  of  pure  reason, 
its  sources  and  limits,  as  a kind  of  preparation  for  a com- 
plete system  of  pure  reason.  It  should  be  called  a critique, 
not  a doctrine,  of  pure  reason.  Its  usefulness  would  be 
negative  only,  serving  for  a purging  rather  than  for  an 
expansion  of  our  reason,  and,  what  after  all  is  a consid- 
erable gain,  guarding  reason  against  errors. 

I call  all  knowledge  transcetidentai  which  is  occupied 
not  so  much  with  objects,  as  with  our  a priori  concepts 
of  objects.1  A system  of  such  concepts  might  be  [p.  12] 
called  Transcendental  Philosophy.  But  for  the  present 
this  is  again  too  great  an  undertaking.  We  should  have 
to  treat  therein  completely  both  of  analytical  knowledge, 
and  of  synthetical  knowledge  a priori , which  is  more  than 
we  intend  to  do,  being  satisfied  to  carry  on  the  analysis  so 

1 ‘ As  with  our  manner  of  knowing  objects,  so  far  as  this  is  meant  to  be 
possible  a priori.’  Second  Edition. 


10 


Introduction 


far  only  as  is.  indispensably  necessary  in  order  to  recognise 
in  their  whole  extent  the  principles  of  synthesis  a priori 
which  alone  concern  us.  This  investigation  which  should 
be  called  a transcendental  critique,  but  not  a systematic 
doctrine,  is  all  we  are  occupied  with  at  present.  It  is 
not  meant  to  extend  our  knowledge,  but  only  to  rectify 
it,  and  to  become  the  test  of  the  value  of  all  a priori 
knowledge.  Such  a critique  therefore  is  a preparation  for 
a New  Organum,  or,  if  that  should  not  be  possible,  for  a 
Canon  at  least,  according  to  which  hereafter  a complete 
system  of  a philosophy  of  pure  reason,  whether  it  serve 
for  an  expansion  or  merely  for  a limitation  of  it,  may  be 
carried  out,  both  analytically  and  synthetically.  That 
such  a system  is  possible,  nay  that  it  need  not  be  so  com- 
prehensive as  to  prevent  the  hope  of  its  completion,  may 
be. gathered  from  the  fact  that  it  would  have  to  deal,  not 
with  the  nature  of  things,  which  is  endless,  but  with  the 
understanding  which  judges  of  the  nature  of  [p.  13] 
things,  and  this  again  so  far  only  as  its  knowledge  a 
priori  is  concerned.  Whatever  the  understanding  pos- 
sesses a priori , as  it  has  not  to  be  looked  for  without,  can 
hardly  escape  our  notice,  nor  is  there  any  reason  to 
suppose  that  it  will  prove  too  extensive  for  a complete 
inventory,  and  for  such  a valuation  as  shall  assign  to  it  its 
true  merits  or  demerits.1 

II 

DIVISION  OF  TRANSCENDENTAL  PHILOSOPHY 

Transcendental  Philosophy  is  with  us  an  idea  (of  a 
science)  only,  for  which  the  critique  of  pure  reason  should 


1 Here  follows  Supplement  VII  in  Second  Edition. 


Introduction 


1 1 

trace,  according  to  fixed  principles,  an  architectonic  plan, 
guaranteeing  the  completeness  and  certainty  of  all  parts 
of  which  the  building  consists.  (It  is  a system  of  all 
principles  of  pure  reason.)1  The  reason  why  we  do  not 
call  such  a critique  a transcendental  philosophy  in  itself 
is  simply  this,  that  in  order  to  be  a complete  system,  it 
ought  to  contain  likewise  a complete  analysis  of  the  whole 
of  human  knowledge  a priori.  It  is  true  that  our  critique 
must  produce  a complete  list  of  all  the  fundamental  con- 
cepts which  constitute  pure  knowledge.  But  it  need  not 
give  a detailed  analysis  of  these  concepts,  nor  a complete 
list  of  all  derivative  concepts.  Such  an  analysis  would 
be  out  of  place,  because  it  is  not  beset  with  the  [p.  14] 
doubts  and  difficulties  which  are  inherent  in  synthesis, 
and  which  alone  necessitate  a critique  of  pure  reason. 
Nor  would  it  answer  our  purpose  to  take  the  responsi- 
bility of  the  completeness  of  such  an  analysis  and  deriva- 
tion. This  completeness  of  analysis,  however,  and  of 
derivation  from  such  a priori  concepts  as  we  shall  have 
to  deal  with  presently,  may  easily  be  supplied,  if  only 
they  have  first  been  laid  down  as  perfect  principles  of 
synthesis,  and  nothing  is  wanting  to  them  in  that  respect. 

All  that  constitutes  transcendental  philosophy  belongs 
to  the  critique  of  pure  reason,  nay  it  is  the  complete  idea 
of  transcendental  philosophy,  but  not  yet  the  whole  of 
that  philosophy  itself,  because  it  carries  the  analysis  so 
far  only  as  is  requisite  for  a complete  examination  of 
synthetical  knowledge  a priori. 

The  most  important  consideration  in  the  arrangement 
of  such  a science  is  that  no  concepts  should  be  admitted 


1 Addition  in  the  Second  Edition. 


12 


Introduction 


which  contain  anything  empirical,  and  that  the  a priori 
knowledge  shall  be  perfectly  pure.  Therefore,  although 
the  highest  principles  of  morality  and  their  fundamental 
concepts  are  a priori  knowledge,  they  do  not  [p.  15] 
belong  to  transcendental  philosophy,  because  the  con- 
cepts of  pleasure  and  pain,  desire,  inclination,  free-will, 
etc.,  which  are  all  of  empirical  origin,  must  here  be  pre- 
supposed. Transcendental  philosophy  is  the  wisdom  of 
pure  speculative  reason.  Everything  practical,  so  far  as 
it  contains  motives,  has  reference  to  sentiments,  and  these 
belong  to  empirical  sources  of  knowledge. 

If  we  wish  to  carry  out  a proper  division  of  our  science 
systematically,  it  must  contain  first  a doctrine  of  the  ele- 
ments, secondly,  a doctrine  of  the  method  of  pure  reason. 
Each  of  these  principal  divisions  will  have  its  subdivisions, 
the  grounds  of  which  cannot  however  be  explained  here. 
So  much  only  seems  necessary  for  previous  information, 
that  there  are  two  stems  of  human  knowledge,  which  per- 
haps may  spring  from  a common  root,  unknown  to  us,  viz. 
sensibility  and  the  understanding,  objects  being  given  by 
the  former  and  thought  by  the  latter.  If  our  sensibility 
should  contain  a priori  representations,  constituting  con- 
ditions under  which  alone  objects  can  be  given,  it  would 
belong  to  transcendental  philosophy,  and  the  doctrine  of 
this  transcendental  sense-perception  would  neces-  [p.  16] 
sarily  form  the  first  part  of  the  doctrine  of  elements,  be- 
cause the  conditions  under  which  alone  objects  of  human 
knowledge  can  be  given  must  precede  those  under  which 
they  are  thought. 


CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON 


I 


THE  ELEMENTS  OF  TRANSCENDENTALISM 


THE 


ELEMENTS  OF  TRANSCENDENTALISM 

[P-  l9 ] 

FIRST  PART 

TRANSCENDENTAL  ESTHETIC 

Whatever  the  process  and  the  means  may  be  by 
which  knowledge  reaches  its  objects,  there  is  one  that 
reaches  them  directly,  and  forms  the  ultimate  material 
of  all  thought,  viz.  intuition  (Anschauung).  This  is  pos- 
sible only  when  the  object  is  given,  and  the  object  can 
be  given  only  (to  human  beings  at  least)  through  a cer- 
tain affection  of  the  mind  (Gemiith). 

This  faculty  (receptivity)  of  receiving  representations 
(Vorstellungen),  according  to  the  manner  in  which  we  are 
affected  by  objects,  is  called  sensibility  (Sinnlichkeit). 

Objects  therefore  are  given  to  us  through  our  sensi- 
bility. Sensibility  alone  supplies  us  with  intuitions  (An- 
schauungen).  These  intuitions  become  thought  through 
the  understanding  (Verstand),  and  hence  arise  conceptions 
(Begriffe).  All  thought  therefore  must,  directly  or  indi- 
rectly, go  back  to  intuitions  (Anschauungen),  i.e.  to  our 
sensibility,  because  in  no  other  way  can  objects  be  given 
to  us. 


i5 


i6 


Transcende?ital  ALsthetic 


The  effect  produced  by  an  object  upon  the  faculty  of 
:epresentation  ( Vorstellungsfahigkeit),  so  far  as  we  [p.  20] 
are  affected  by  it,  is  called  sensation  (Empfindung).  An 
intuition  (Anschauung)  of  an  object,  by  means  of  sensa- 
tion, is  called  empirical.  The  undefined  object  of  such  an 
empirical  intuition  is  called  phenomenon  (Erscheinung). 

In  a phenomenon  I call  that  which  corresponds  to  the 
sensation  its  matter;  but  that  which  causes  the  manifold 
matter  of  the  phenomenon  to  be  perceived  as  arranged 
in  a certain  order,  I call  its  form. 

Now  it  is  clear  that  it  cannot  be  sensation  again 
through  which  sensations  are  arranged  and  placed  in 
certain  forms.  The  matter  only  of  all  phenomena  is 
given  us  a posteriori ; but  their  form  must  be  ready  for 
them  in  the  mind  (Gemiith)  a priori,  and  must  therefore 
be  capable  of  being  considered  as  separate  from  all  sen- 
sations. 

I call  all  representations  in  which  there  is  nothing  that 
belongs  to  sensation,  pure  (in  a transcendental  sense). 
The  pure  form  therefore  of  all  sensuous  intuitions,  that 
form  in  which  the  manifold  elements  of  the  phenomena 
are  seen  in  a certain  order,  must  be  found  in  the  mind 
a priori.  And  this  pure  form  of  sensibility  may  be  called 
the  pure  intuition  (Anschauung). 

Thus,  if  we  deduct  from  the  representation  (Vorstel- 
lung)  of  a body  what  belongs  to  the  thinking  of  the 
understanding,  viz.  substance,  force,  divisibility,  etc.,  and 
likewise  what  belongs  to  sensation,  viz.  impermeability, 
hardness,  colour,  etc.,  there  still  remains  some-  [p.  21] 
thing  of  that  empirical  intuition  (Anschauung),  viz.  exten- 
sion and  form.  These  belong  to  pure  intuition,  which  a 
priori,  and  even  without  a real  object  of  the  senses  or  of 


Transcendental  Aesthetic 


1 7 


sensation,  exists  in  the  mind  as  a mere  form  of  sensi- 
bility. 

The  science  of  all  the  principles  of  sensibility  a priori 
I call  Transcendental  Aesthetic}  There  must  be  such 
a science,  forming  the  first  part  of  the  Elements  of 
Transcendentalism,  as  opposed  to  that  which  treats  of 
the  principles  of  pure  thought,  and  which  should  be 
called  Transcendental  Logic. 

In  Transcendental  ^Esthetic  therefore  we  shall  [p.  22] 
first  isolate  sensibility,  by  separating  everything  which  the 
understanding  adds  by  means  of  its  concepts,  so  that 
nothing  remains  but  empirical  intuition  (Anschauung). 

Secondly,  we  shall  separate  from  this  all  that  belongs  to 
sensation  (Empfindung),  so  that  nothing  remains  but  pure 
intuition  (reine  Anschauung)  or  the  mere  form  of  the 
phenomena,  which  is  the  only  thing  which  sensibility  a 
priori  can  supply.  In  the  course  of  this  investigation  it 
will  appear  that  there  are,  as  principles  of  a p7'iori  know- 
ledge, two  pure  forms  of  sensuous  intuition  (Anschauung), 
namely,  Space  and  Time.  We  now  proceed  to  consider 
these  more  in  detail. 

1 The  Germans  are  the  only  people  who  at  present  (1781)  use  the  word 
(Esthetic  for  what  others  call  criticism  of  taste.  There-is-implied  in  that  name 
jy false  hope,  first  conceived  by  the  excellent  analytical  philosopher,  Baum- 
garten,  of  bringing  the  critical  judgment  of  the  beautiful  under  rational  prin- 
ciples, and  to  raise  its  rules  to  the  rank  of  a science.  But  such  endeavours 
are  vain.  For  such  rules  or  criteria  are,  according  to  their  principal  sources, 
empirical  only,  and  can  never  serve  as  definite  a priori  rules  for  our  judgment 
in  matters  of  taste;  on  the  contrary,  our  judgment  is  the  real  test  of  the  truth 
of  such  rules.  It  would  be  advisable  therefore  to  drop  the  name  in  that  sense, 
and  to  apply  it  to  a doctrine  which  is  a real  science,  thus  approaching  more 
nearly  to  the  language  and  meaning  of  the  ancients  with  whom  the  division 
into  alffdr/Ta  Kal  vot ird  was  very  famous  (or  to  share  that  name  in  common 
with  speculative  philosophy,  and  thus  to  use  aesthetic  sometimes  in  a transcen- 
dental, sometimes  in  a psychological  sense). 


i8 


Of  Space 


First  Section  of  the  Transcendental  Aesthetic 
Of  Space 

By  means  of  our  external  sense,  a property  of  our  mind 
(Gemiith),  we  represent  to  ourselves  objects  as  external  or 
outside  ourselves,  and  all  of  these  in  space.  It  is  within 
space  that  their  form,  size,  and  relative  position  are  fixed 
or  can  be  fixed.  The  internal  sense  by  means  of  which 
the  mind  perceives  itself  or  its  internal  state,  does  not 
give  an  intuition  (Anschauung)  of  the  soul  (Seele)  itself, 
as  an  object,  but  it  is  nevertheless  a fixed  form  under 
which  alone  an  intuition  of  its  internal  state  is  [p.  23] 
possible,  so  that  whatever  belongs  to  its  internal  determi- 
nations (Bestimmungen)  must  be  represented  in  relations  of 
time.  Time  cannot  be  perceived  (angeschaut)  externally, 
as  little  as  space  can  be  perceived  as  something  within  us. 

What  then  are  space  and  time  ? Are  they  real  beings  ? 
Or,  if  not  that,  are  they  determinations  or  relations  of 
things,  but  such  as  would  belong  to  them  even  if  they 
were  not  perceived  ? Or  lastly,  are  they  determinations 
and  relations  which  are  inherent  in  the  form  of  intuition 
only,  and  therefore  in  the  subjective  nature  of  our  mind, 
without  which  such  predicates  as  space  and  time  would 
never  be  ascribed  to  anything  ? 

In  order  to  understand  this  more  clearly,  let  us  first  con- 
sider space. 

1.  Space  is  not  an  empirical  concept  which  has  been 
derived  from  external  experience.  For  in  order  that  cer- 
tain sensations  should  be  referred  to  something  outside 
myself,  i.e.  to  something  in  a different  part  of  space  from 
that  where  I am ; again,  in  order  that  I may  be  able  to 


Of  Space 


19 


represent  them  (vorstellen)  as  side  by  side,  that  is,  not 
only  as  different,  but  as  in  different  places,  the  representa- 
tion (Vorstellung)  of  space  must  already  be  there.  There- 
fore the  representation  of  space  cannot  be  borrowed 
through  experience  from  relations  of  external  phenomena, 
but,  on  the  contrary,  this  external  experience  becomes 
possible  only  by  means  of  the  representation  of  space. 

2.  Space  is  a necessary  representation  a priori , form- 
ing the  very  foundation  of  all  external  intuitions,  [p.  24] 
It  is  impossible  to  imagine  that  there  should  be  no  space, 
though  one  might  very  well  imagine  that  there  should 
be  space  without  objects  to  fill  it.  Space  is  therefore 
regarded  as  a condition  of  the  possibility  of  phenomena, 
not  as  a determination  produced  by  them  ; it  is  a repre- 
sentation a priori  which  necessarily  precedes  all  external 
phenomena. 

[3.  On  this  necessity  of  an  a priori  representation  of 
space  rests  the  apodictic  certainty  of  all  geometrical  prin- 
ciples, and  the  possibility  of  their  construction  a priori. 
For  if  the  intuition  of  space  were  a concept  gained  a 
posteriori , borrowed  from  general  external  experience,  the 
first  principles  of  mathematical  definition  would  be  noth- 
ing but  perceptions.  They  would  be  exposed  to  all  the 
accidents  of  perception,  and  there  being  but  one  straight 
line  between  two  points  would  not  be  a necessity,  but 
only  something  taught  in  each  case  by  experience.  What- 
ever is  derived  from  experience  possesses  a relative 
generality  only,  based  on  induction.  We  should  there- 
fore not  be  able  to  say  more  than  that,  so  far  as  hitherto 
observed,  no  space  has  yet  been  found  having  more  than 
three  dimensions.] 

4.  Space  is  not  a discursive  or  so-called  general  [p.  25] 


20 


Of  Space 


concept  of  the  relations  of  things  in  general,  but  a pure 
intuition.  For,  first  of  all,  we  can  imagine  one  space  only 
and  if  we  speak  of  many  spaces,  we  mean  parts  only 
of  one  and  the  same  space.  Nor  can  these  parts  be 
considered  as  antecedent  to  the  one  and  all-embracing 
space  and,  as  it  were,  its  component  parts  out  of  which 
an  aggregate  is  formed,  but  they  can  be  thought  of  as 
existing  within  it  only.  Space  is  essentially  one  ; its 
multiplicity,  and  therefore  the  general  concept  of  spaces 
in  general,  arises  entirely  from  limitations.  Hence  it 
follows  that,  with  respect  to  space,  an  intuition  a priori, 
which  is  not  empirical,  must  form  the  foundation  of  all 
conceptions  of  space.  In  the  same  manner  all  geomet- 
rical principles,  e.g.  ‘ that  in  every  triangle  two  sides 
together  are  greater  than  the  third,’  are  never  to  be 
derived  from  the  general  concepts  of  side  and  triangle, 
but  from  an  intuition,  and  that  a priori,  with  apodictic 
certainty. 

[5.  Space  is  represented  as  an  infinite  quantity.  Now 
a general  concept  of  space,  which  is  found  in  a foot  as 
well  as  in  an  ell,  could  tell  us  nothing  in  respect  to  the 
quantity  of  the  space.  If  there  were  not  infinity  in  the 
progression  of  intuition,  no  concept  of  relations  of  space 
could  ever  contain  a principle  of  infinity.1] 

Conclusions  from  the  Foregoing  Concepts  [p.  26] 

a.  Space  does  not  represent  any  quality  of  objects  by 
themselves,  or  objects  in  their  relation  to  one  another;  i.e. 
space  does  not  represent  any  determination  which  is 
inherent  in  the  objects  themselves,  and  would  remain, 

1 No.  5 (No.  4)  is  differently  worded  in  the  Second  Edition;  see  Supple- 
ment VIII. 


Of  Space 


21 


even  if  all  subjective  conditions  of  intuition  were  removed. 
For  no  determinations  of  objects,  whether  belonging  to 
them  absolutely  or  in  relation  to  others,  can  enter  into  our 
intuition  before  the  actual  existence  of  the  objects  them- 
selves, that  is  to  say,  they  can  never  be  intuitions  a priori. 

b.  Space  is  nothing  but  the  form  of  all  phenomena  of 
the  external  senses ; it  is  the  subjective  condition  of  our 
sensibility,  without  which  no  external  intuition  is  possible 
for  us.  If  then  we  consider  that  the  receptivity  of  the 
subject,  its  capacity  of  being  affected  by  objects,  must 
necessarily  precede  all  intuition  of  objects,  we  shall  under- 
stand how  the  form  of  all  phenomena  may  be  given  before 
all  real  perceptions,  may  be,  in  fact,  a priori  in  the  soul, 
and  may,  as  a pure  intuition,  by  which  all  objects  must 
be  determined,  contain,  prior  to  all  experience,  principles 
regulating  their  relations. 

It  is  therefore  from  the  human  standpoint  only  that  we 
can  speak  of  space,  extended  objects,  etc.  If  we  drop 
the  subjective  condition  under  which  alone  we  can  gain 
external  intuition,  that  is,  so  far  as  we  ourselves  may  be 
affected  by  objects,  the  representation  of  space  means 
nothing.  For  this  predicate  is  applied  to  objects  only  in 
so  far  as  they  appear  to  us,  and  are  objects  of  our  [p.  27] 
senses.  The  constant  form  of  this  receptivity,  which  we 
call  sensibility,  is  a necessary  condition  of  all  relations  in 
which  objects,  as  without  us,  can  be  perceived ; and,  when 
abstraction  is  made  of  these  objects,  what  remains  is  that 
pure  intuition  which  we  call  space.  As  the  peculiar  con- 
ditions of  our  sensibility  cannot  be  looked  upon  as  condi- 
tions of  the  possibility  of  the  objects  themselves,  but  only 
of  their  appearance  as  phenomena  to  us,  we  may  say 
indeed  that  space  comprehends  all  things  which  may 


22 


Of  Space 


appear  to  us  externally,  but  not  all  things  by  themselves, 
whether  perceived  by  us  or  not,  or  by  any  subject  what- 
soever. We  cannot  judge  whether  the  intuitions  of  other 
thinking  beings  are  subject  to  the  same  conditions  which 
determine  our  intuition,  and  which  for  us  are  generally 
binding.  If  we  add  the  limitation  of  a judgment  to  a 
subjective  concept,  the  judgment  gains  absolute  validity. 
The  proposition  ‘all  things  are  beside  each  other  in  space,’ 
is  valid  only  under  the  limitation  that  things  are  taken  as 
objects  of  our  sensuous  intuition  (Anschauung).  If  I add 
that  limitation  to  the  concept  and  say  ‘ all  things,  as  exter- 
nal phenomena,  are  beside  each  other  in  space,’  the  rule 
obtains  universal  and  unlimited  validity.  Our  discussions 
teach  therefore  the  reality,  i.e.  the  objective  validity,  of 
space  with  regard  to  all  that  can  come  to  us  exter-  [p.  28] 
nally  as  an  object,  but  likewise  the  ideality  of  space  with 
regard  to  things,  when  they  are  considered  in  themselves 
by  our  reason,  and  independent  of  the  nature  of  our 
senses.  We  maintain  the  empirical  reality  of  space,  so 
far  as  every  possible  external  experience  is  concerned,  but 
at  the  same  time  its  transcendental  ideality ; that  is  to 
say,  we  maintain  that  space  is  nothing,  if  we  leave  out  of 
consideration  the  condition  of  a possible  experience,  and 
accept  it  as  something  on  which  things  by  themselves 
are  in  any  way  dependent. 

With  the  exception  of  space  there  is  no  other  subjective 
representation  (Vorstellung)  referring  to  something  exter- 
nal, that  would  be  called  a priori  objective.  [This  1 sub- 
jective condition  of  all  external  phenomena  cannot  there- 
fore be  compared  to  any  other.  The  taste  of  wine  does 

1 This  passage  to  ‘ my  object  in  what  I have  said  ’ is  differently  worded  in 
the  Second  Edition;  see  Supplement  IX. 


Of  Space 


23 


not  belong  to  the  objective  determinations  of  wine,  con- 
sidered as  an  object,  even  as  a phenomenal  object,  but  to 
the  peculiar  nature  of  the  sense  belonging  to  the  subject 
that  tastes  the  wine.  Colours  are  not  qualities  of  a body, 
though  inherent  in  its  intuition,  but  they  are  likewise  mod- 
ifications only  of  the  sense  of  sight,  as  it  is  affected  in  dif- 
ferent ways  by  light.  Space,  on  the  contrary,  as  the  very 
condition  of  external  objects,  is  essential  to  their  appear- 
ance or  intuition.  Taste  and  colour  are  by  no  means 
necessary  conditions  under  which  alone  things  [p.  29] 
can  become  to  us  objects  of  sensuous  perception.  They 
are  connected  with  their  appearance,  as  accidentally  added 
effects  only  of  our  peculiar  organisation.  They  are  not 
therefore  representations  a priori,  but  are  dependent  on 
sensation  (Empfindung),  nay  taste  even  on  an  affection 
(Gefiihl)  of  pleasure  and  pain,  which  is  the  result  of  a 
sensation.  No  one  can  have  a priori , an  idea  (Vorstellung) 
either  of  colour  or  of  taste,  but  space  refers  to  the  pure 
form  of  intuition  only,  and  involves  no  kind  of  sensation, 
nothing  empirical ; nay  all  kinds  and  determinations  of 
space  can  and  must  be  represented  a priori,  if  concepts 
of  forms  and  their  relations  are  to  arise.  Through  it  alone 
is  it  possible  that  things  should  become  external  objects  to 
us.] 

My  object  in  what  I have  said  just  now  is  only  to  pre- 
vent people  from  imagining  that  they  can  elucidate  the 
ideality  of  space  by  illustrations  which  are  altogether 
insufficient,  such  as  colour,  taste,  etc.,  which  should  never 
be  considered  as  qualities  of  things,  but  as  modifications 
of  the  subject,  and  which  therefore  may  be  different  with 
different  people.  For  in  this  case  that  which  originally  is 
itself  a phenomenon  only,  as  for  instance,  a rose,  is  taken 


24 


Of  Time 


by  the  empirical  understanding  for  a thing  by  itself,  which 
nevertheless,  with  regard  to  colour,  may  appear  [p.  30] 
different  to  every  eye.  The  transcendental  conception,  on 
the  contrary,  of  all  phenomena  in  space,  is  a critical  warn- 
ing that  nothing  which  is  seen  in  space  is  a thing  by  itself, 
nor  space  a form  of  things  supposed  to  belong  to  them  by 
themselves,  but  that  objects  by  themselves  are  not  known 
to  us  at  all,  and  that  what  we  call  external  objects  are 
nothing  but  representations  of  our  senses,  the  form  of 
which  is  space,  and  the  true  correlative  of  which,  that  is 
the  thing  by  itself,  is  not  known,  nor  can  be  known  by 
these  representations,  nor  do  we  care  to  know  anything 
about  it  in  our  daily  experience. 

Second  Section  of  the  Transcendental  ^Esthetic 
Of  Time 

I.  Time  is  not  an  empirical  concept  deduced  from  any 

experience,  for  neither  coexistence  nor  succession  would 
enter  into  our  perception,  if  the  representation  of  time 
were  not  given  a priori.  Only  when  this  representation 
a priori  is  given,  can  we  imagine  that  certain  things  happen 
at  the  same  time  (simultaneously)  or  at  different  times 
(successively).  [p.  31] 

II.  Time  is  a necessary  representation  on  which  all 
intuitions  depend.  We  cannot  take  away  time  from 
phenomena  in  general,  though  we  can  well  take  away 
phenomena  out  of  time.  Time  therefore  is  given  a priori. 
In  time  alone  is  reality  of  phenomena  possible.  All 

1 In  the  Second  Edition  the  title  is,  Metaphysical  exposition  of  the  concept 
of  time,  with  reference  to  par.  5,  Transcendental  exposition  of  the  concept  ol 
time. 


Of  Time  25 

phenomena  may  vanish,  but  time  itself  (as  the  genera' 
condition  of  their  possibility)  cannot  be  done  away  with. 

III.  On  this  a priori  necessity  depends  also  the  possi 
bility  of  apodictic  principles  of  the  relations  of  time,  or  of 
axioms  of  time  in  general.  Time  has  one  dimension  only  ; 
different  times  are  not  simultaneous,  but  successive,  while 
different  spaces  are  never  successive,  but  simultaneous. 
Such  principles  cannot  be  derived  from  experience, 
because  experience  could  not  impart  to  them  absolute 
universality  nor  apodictic  certainty.  We  should  only  be 
able  to  say  that  common  experience  teaches  us  that  it  is 
so,  but  not  that  it  must  be  so.  These  principles  are  valid 
as  rules  under  which  alone  experience  is  possible ; they 
teach  us  before  experience,  not  by  means  of  experience.1 

IV.  Time  is  not  a discursive,  or  what  is  called  a general 
concept,  but  a pure  form  of  sensuous  intuition.  Different 
times  are  parts  only  of  one  and  the  same  time.  Repre- 
sentation, which  can  be  produced  by  a single  [p.  32] 
object  only,  is  called  an  intuition.  The  proposition  that 
different  times  cannot  exist  at  the  same  time  cannot  be 
deduced  from  any  general  concept.  Such  a proposition  is 
synthetical,  and  cannot  be  deduced  from  concepts  only. 
It  is  contained  immediately  in  the  intuition  and  representa- 
tion of  time. 

V.  To  say  that  time  is  infinite  means  no  more  than  that 
every  definite  quantity  of  time  is  possible  only  by  limita- 
tions of  one  time  which  forms  the  foundation  of  all  times. 
The  original  representation  of  time  must  therefore  be 

1 I retain  the  reading  of  the  First  Edition,  vor  derselben,  nicht  durch  dieselbe. 
Von  denselben,  the  reading  of  later  editions,  is  wrong;  the  emendation  ol 
Rosenkranz,  vor  denselben,  nicht  durch  dieselben,  unnecessary.  The  Second 
Edition  has  likewise  vor  derselben. 


26 


Of  Time 


given  as  unlimited.  But  when  the  parts  themselves  and 
every  quantity  of  an  object  can  be  represented  as  deter- 
mined by  limitation  only,  the  whole  representation  cannot 
be  given  by  concepts  (for  in  that  case  the  partial  repre- 
sentations come  first),  but  it  must  be  founded  on  immediate 
intuition.1 

Conclusions  from  the  foregoing  concepts 

a.  Time  is  not  something  existing  by  itself,  or  inherent 
in  things  as  an  objective  determination  of  them,  something 
therefore  that  might  remain  when  abstraction  is  made  of 
all  subjective  conditions  of  intuition.  For  in  the  former 
case  it  would  be  something  real,  without  being  a real 
object.  In  the  latter  it  could  not,  as  a deter-  [p.  33! 
mination  or  order  inherent  in  things  themselves,  be  antece- 
dent to  things  as  their  condition,  and  be  known  and  per- 
ceived by  means  of  synthetical  propositions  a priori.  All 
this  is  perfectly  possible  if  time  is  nothing  but  a subjec- 
tive condition  under  which  alone2  intuitions  take  place 
within  us.  For  in  that  case  this  form  of  internal  intui- 
tion can  be  represented  prior  to  the  objects  themselves, 
that  is,  a priori. 

b.  Time  is  nothing  but  the  form  of  the  internal  sense, 
that  is,  of  our  intuition  of  ourselves,  and  of  our  internal 
state.  Time  cannot  be  a determination  peculiar  to  exter- 
nal phenomena.  It  refers  neither  to  their  shape,  nor 
their  position,  etc.,  it  only  determines  the  relation  of  rep- 
resentations in  our  internal  state.  And  exactly  because 
this  internal  intuition  supplies  no  shape,  we  try  to  make 
good  this  deficiency  by  means  of  analogies,  and  represent 

1 Here  follows  in  the  Second  Edition,  Supplement  X. 

2 Read  allein  instead  of  allt. 


Of  Time 


27 


to  ourselves  the  succession  of  time  by  a line  progressing 
to  infinity,  in  which  the  manifold  constitutes  a series  of  one 
dimension  only;  and  we  conclude  from  the  properties  of 
this  line  as  to  all  the  properties  of  time,  with  one  excep- 
tion, i.e.  that  the  parts  of  the  former  are  simultaneous, 
those  of  the  latter  successive.  From  this  it  becomes 
clear  also,  that  the  representation  of  time  is  itself  an 
intuition,  because  all  its  relations  can  be  expressed  by 
means  of  an  external  intuition. 

c.  Time  is  the  formal  condition,  a priori , of  all  phenom- 
ena whatsoever.  Space,  as  the  pure  form  of  all  [p.  34] 
external  intuition,  is  a condition,  a priori,  of  external  phe- 
nomena only.  But,  as  all  representations,  whether  they 
have  for  their  objects  external  things  or  not,  belong  by 
themselves,  as  determinations  of  the  mind,  to  our  inner 
state,  and  as  this  inner  state  falls  under  the  formal  con- 
ditions of  internal  intuition,  and  therefore  of  time,  time 
is  a condition,  a priori,  of  all  phenomena  whatsoever, 
and  is  so  directly  as  a condition  of  internal  phenomena 
(of  our  mind)  and  thereby  indirectly  of  external  phenom- 
ena also.  If  I am  able  to  say,  a priori,  that  all  external 
phenomena  are  in  space,  and  are  determined,  a priori, 
according  to  the  relations  of  space,  I can,  according  to 
the  principle  of  the  internal  sense,  make  the  general 
assertion  that  all  phenomena,  that  is,  all  objects  of  the 
senses,  are  in  time,  and  stand  necessarily  in  relations  of 
time. 

If  we  drop  our  manner  of  looking  at  ourselves  inter- 
nally, and  of  comprehending  by  means  of  that  intuition 
all  external  intuitions  also  within  our  power  of  represen- 
tation, and  thus  take  objects  as  they  may  be  by  them- 
selves,  then  time  is  nothing.  Time  has  objective  validity 


28 


Of  Time 


*vith  reference  to  phenomena  only,  because  these  are 
themselves  things  which  we  accept  as  objects  of  our 
senses;  but  time  is  no  longer  objective,  if  we  [p.  35] 
remove  the  sensuous  character  of  our  intuitions,  that  is 
to  say,  that  mode  of  representation  which  is  peculiar  to 
ourselves,  and  speak  of  things  in  general.  Time  is  there- 
fore simply  a subjective  condition  of  our  (human)  intui- 
tion (which  is  always  sensuous,  that  is  so  far  as  we  are 
affected  by  objects),  but  by  itself,  apart  from  the  subject, 
nothing.  Nevertheless,  with  respect  to  all  phenomena, 
that  is,  all  things  which  can  come  within  our  experience, 
time  is  necessarily  objective.  We  cannot  say  that  all 
things  are  in  time,  because,  if  we  speak  of  things  in  gen- 
eral, nothing  is  said  about  the  manner  of  intuition,  which 
is  the  real  condition  under  which  time  enters  into  our  rep- 
resentation of  things-  If  therefore  this  condition  is  added 
to  the  concept,  and  if  we  say  that  all  things  as  phenomena 
(as  objects  of  sensuous  intuition)  are  in  time,  then  such 
a proposition  has  its  full  objective  validity  and  a priori 
universality. 

What  we  insist  on  therefore  is  the  empirical  reality  of 
time,  that  is,  its  objective  validity,  with  reference  to  all 
objects  which  can  ever  come  before  our  senses.  And  as 
our  intuition  must  at  all  times  be  sensuous,  no  object  can 
ever  fall  under  our  experience  that  does  not  come  under 
the  conditions  of  time.  What  we  deny  is,  that  time  has 
any  claim  on  absolute  reality,  so  that,  without  [p.  36] 
taking  into  account  the  form  of  our  sensuous  condition,  it 
should  by  itself  be  a condition  or  quality  inherent  in 
things ; for  such  qualities  which  belong  to  things  by 
themselves  can  never  be  given  to  us  through  the  senses. 
This  is  what  constitutes  the  transcendental  ideality  of 


Of  Time 


29 


time,  so  that,  if  we  take  no  account  of  the  subjective  con- 
ditions of  our  sensuous  intuitions,  time  is  nothing,  and  can- 
not be  added  to  the  objects  by  themselves  (without  their 
relation  to  our  intuition)  whether  as  subsisting  or  inherent. 
This  ideality  of  time,  however,  as  well  as  that  of  space, 
should  not  be  confounded  with  the  deceptions  of  our  sen- 
sations, because  in  their  case  we  always  suppose  that  the 
phenomenon  to  which  such  predicates  belong  has  objective 
reality,  which  is  not  at  all  the  case  here,  except  so  far  as 
this  objective  reality  is  purely  empirical,  that  is,  so  far  as 
the  object  itself  is  looked  upon  as  a mere  phenomenon. 
On  this  subject  see  a previous  note,  in  section  i,  on  Space. 

Explanation 

Against  this  theory  which  claims  empirical,  but  denies 
absolute  and  transcendental  reality  to  time,  even  intelli- 
gent men  have  protested  so  unanimously,  that  I suppose 
that  every  reader  who  is  unaccustomed  to  these  consider- 
ations may  naturally  be  of  the  same  opinion.  What  they 
object  to  is  this  : Changes,  they  say,  are  real  (this  is  proved 
by  the  change  of  our  own  representations,  even  [p.  37] 
if  all  external  phenomena  and  their  changes  be  denied). 
Changes,  however,  are  possible  in  time  only,  and  there- 
fore time  must  be  something  real.  The  answer  is  easy 
enough.  I grant  the  whole  argument.  Time  certainly 
is  something  real,  namely,  the  real  form  of  our  internal 
intuition.  Time  therefore  has  subjective  reality  with 
regard  to  internal  experience : that  is,  I really  have  the 
^representation  of  time  and  of  my  determinations  in  it. 
Time  therefore  is  to  be  considered  as  real,  not  so  far  as  it 
is  an  object,  but  so  far  as  it  is  the  representation  of  myself 
as  an  object.  If  either  I myself  or  any  other  being  could 


30 


Of  Time 


see  me  without  this  condition  of  sensibility,  then  these 
self-same  determinations  which  we  now  represent  to  our- 
selves as  changes,  would  give  us  a kind  of  knowledge  in 
which  the  representation  of  time,  and  therefore  of  change 
also,  would  have  no  place.  There  remains  therefore  the 
empirical  reality  of  time  only,  as  the  condition  of  all  our 
experience,  while  absolute  reality  cannot,  according  to 
what  has  just  been  shown,  be  conceded  to  it.  Time  is 
nothing  but  the  form  of  our  own  internal  intuition.1  Take 
away  the  peculiar  condition  of  our  sensibility,  and  the  idea 
of  time  vanishes,  because  it  is  not  inherent  in  the  ob- 
jects, but  in  the  subject  only  that  perceives  them.  [p.  38] 

The  reason  why  this  objection  is  raised  so  unanimously, 
and  even  by  those  who  have  nothing  very  tangible  to  say 
against  the  doctrine  of  the  ideality  of  space,  is  this.  They 
could  never  hope  to  prove  apodictically  the  absolute  real- 
ity of  space,  because  they  are  confronted  by  idealism, 
which  has  shown  that  the  reality  of  external  objects  does 
not  admit  of  strict  proof,  while  the  reality  of  the  object  of 
our  internal  perceptions  (the  perception  of  my  own  self 
and  of  my  own  status)  is  clear  immediately  through  our 
consciousness.  The  former  might  be  merely  phenomenal, 
but  the  latter,  according  to  their  opinion,  is  undeniably 
something  real.  They  did  not  see  that  both,  without 
denying  to  them  their  reality  as  representations,  belong 
nevertheless  to  the  phenomenon  only,  which  must  always 
have  two  sides,  the  one  when  the  object  is  considered  by 
itself  (without  regard  to  the  manner  in  which  it  is  per- 

1 I can  say  indeed  that  my  representations  follow  one  another,  but  this 
means  no  more  than  that  we  are  conscious  of  them  as  in  a temporal  succes- 
sion, that  is,  according  to  the  form  of  our  own  internal  sense.  Time,  therefore, 
is  nothing  by  itself,  nor  is  it  a determination  inherent  objectively  in  things. 


Of  Time 


31 


ceived,  its  quality  therefore  remaining  always  problemati- 
cal), the  other,  when  the  form  of  the  perception  of  the 
object  is  taken  into  consideration ; this  form  belonging 
not  to  the  object  in  itself,  but  to  the  subject  which  per- 
ceives it,  though  nevertheless  belonging  really  and  neces- 
sarily to  the  object  as  a phenomenon. 

Time  and  space  are  therefore  two  sources  of  knowledge 
from  which  various  a priori  synthetical  cognitions  [p.  39] 
can  be  derived.  Of  this  pure  mathematics  give  a splendid 
example  in  the  case  of  our  cognitions  of  space  and  its  vari- 
ous relations.  As  they  are  both  pure  forms  of  sensuous^) 
intuition,  they  render  synthetical  propositions  a priori  pos- 
sible. But  these  sources  of  knowledge  a priori  (being  con- 
ditions of  our  sensibility  only)  fix  their  own  limits,  in  that 
they  can  refer  to  objects  only  in  so  far  as  they  are  consid- 
ered as  phenomena,  but  cannot  represent  things  as  they 
are  by  themselves.  That  is  the  only  field  in  which  they 
are  valid ; beyond  it  they  admit  of  no  objective  applica- 
tion. This  ideality  of  space  and  time,  however,  leaves  the 
truthfulness  of  our  experience  quite  untouched,  because 
we  are  equally  sure  of  it,  whether  these  forms  are  inher- 
ent in  things  by  themselves,  or  by  necessity  in  our  intui- 
tion of  them  only.  Those,  on  the  contrary,  who  maintain 
the  absolute  reality  of  space  and  time,  whether  as  subsist- 
ing or  only  as  inherent,  must  come  into  conflict  with  the 
principles  of  experience  itself.  For  if  they  admit  space 
and  time  as  subsisting  (which  is  generally  the  view  of 
mathematical  students  of  nature)  they  have  to  admit  two 
eternal  infinite  and  self-subsisting  nonentities  (space  and 
time),  which  exist  without  their  being  anything  real,  only 
in  order  to  comprehend  all  that  is  real.  If  they  take  the 
second  view  (held  by  some  metaphysical  students  [p.  40] 


32 


Of  Time 


of  nature),  and  look  upon  space  and  time  as  relations  of  phe- 
nomena, simultaneous  or  successive,  abstracted  from  expe- 
rience, though  represented  confusedly  in  their  abstracted 
form,  they  are  obliged  to  deny  to  mathematical  proposi- 
tions a priori  their  validity  with  regard  to  real  things  (for 
instance  in  space),  or  at  all  events  their  apodictic  cer- 
tainty, which  cannot  take  place  a posteriori , while  the  a 
priori  conceptions  of  space  and  time  are,  according  to 
their  opinion,  creations  of  our  imagination  only.  Their 
source,  they  hold,  must  really  be  looked  for  in  experience, 
imagination  framing  out  of  the  relations  abstracted  from 
experience  something  which  contains  the  general  charac- 
ter of  these  relations,  but  which  cannot  exist  without  the 
restrictions  which  nature  has  imposed  on  them.  The 
former  gain  so  much  that  they  keep  at  least  the  sphere 
of  phenomena  free  for  mathematical  propositions ; but,  as 
soon  as  the  understanding  endeavours  to  transcend  that 
sphere,  they  become  bewildered  by  these  very  conditions. 
The  latter  have  this  advantage  that  they  are  not  bewil- 
dered by  the  representations  of  space  and  time  when 
they  wish  to  form  judgments  of  objects,  not  as  phenom- 
ena, but  only  as  considered  by  the  understanding;  but 
they  can  neither  account  for  the  possibility  of  mathemati- 
cal knowledge  a priori  (there  being,  according  to  them, 
no  true  and  objectively  valid  intuition  a priori),  nor  can 
they  bring  the  laws  of  experience  into  true  harmony  with 
the  a priori  doctrines  of  mathematics.  According  to  our 
theory  of  the  true  character  of  these  original  [p.  41] 
forms  of  sensibility,  both  difficulties  vanish. 

Lastly,  that  transcendental  aesthetic  cannot  contain 
more  than  these  two  elements,  namely,  space  and  time, 
becomes  clear  from  the  fact  that  all  other  concepts  belong- 


Of  Time 


33 


ing  to  the  senses,  even  that  of  motion,  which  combines 
both,  presuppose  something  empirical.  Motion  presup- 
poses the  perception  of  something  moving.  In  space, 
however,  considered  by  itself,  there  is  nothing  that  moves. 
Hence  that  which  moves  must  be  something  which,  as  in 
space,  can  be  given  by  experience  only,  therefore  an  empir- 
ical datum.  On  the  same  ground,  transcendental  aesthetic 
cannot  count  the  concept  of  change  among  its  a priori 
data,  because  time  itself  does  not  change,  but  only  some- 
thing which  is  in  time.  For  this,  the  perception  of  some- 
thing existing  and  of  the  succession  of  its  determinations, 
in  other  words,  experience,  is  required. 

D 


GENERAL  OBSERVATIONS  ON  TRANSCEN- 
DENTAL ^ESTHETIC 


In  order  to  avoid  all  misapprehensions  it  will  be  neces- 
sary, first  of  all,  to  declare,  as  clearly  as  possible,  what  is 
our  view  with  regard  to  the  fundamental  nature  of  [p.  42] 
sensuous  knowledge. 

What  we  meant  to  say  was  this,  that  all  our  intuition 
is  nothing  but  the  representation  of  phenomena ; that 
things  which  we  see  are  not  by  themselves  what  we  see, 
nor  their  relations  by  themselves  such  as  they  appear  to 
us,  so  that,  if  we  drop  our  subject  or  the  subjective  form 
of  our  senses,  all  qualities,  all  relations  of  objects  in  space 
and  time,  nay  space  and  time  themselves,  would  vanish. 
They  cannot,  as  phenomena,  exist  by  themselves,  but  in 
us  only.  It  remains  completely  unknown  to  us  what 
objects  may  be  by  themselves  and  apart  from  the  recep- 
tivity of  our  senses.  We  know  nothing  but  our  manner 
of  perceiving  them,  that  manner  being  peculiar  to  us,  and 
not  necessarily  shared  in  by  every  being,  though,  no  doubt, 
by  every  human  being.  This  is  what  alone  concerns  us. 
Space  and  time  are  pure  forms  of  our  intuition,  while 
sensation  forms  its  matter.  What  we  can  know  a priori  — 
before  all  real  intuition,  are  the  forms  of  space  and  time, 
which  are  therefore  called  pure  intuition,  while  sensation 
is  that  which  causes  our  knowledge  to  be  called  a poste- 
riori knowledge,  i.e.  empirical  intuition.  Whatever  our 
sensation  may  be,  these  forms  are  necessarily  inherent 

34 


Transcendental  Aesthetic 


35 


in  it,  while  sensations  themselves  may  be  of  the  most 
different  character.  Even  if  we  could  impart  the  [p.  43] 
highest  degree  of  clearness  to  our  intuition,  we  should 
not  come  one  step  nearer  to  the  nature  of  objects  by 
themselves.  We  should  know  our  mode  of  intuition, 
i.e.  our  sensibility,  more  completely,  but  always  under 
the  indefeasible  conditions  of  space  and  time.  What  the 
objects  are  by  themselves  would  never  become  known  to 
us,  even  through  the  clearest  knowledge  of  that  which 
alone  is  given  us,  the  phenomenon. 

It  would  vitiate  the  concept  of  sensibility  and  phenom- 
ena, and  render  our  whole  doctrine  useless  and  empty,  if 
we  were  to  accept  the  view  (of  Leibniz  and  Wolf),  that 
our  whole  sensibility  is  really  but  a confused  representa- 
tion of  things,  simply  containing  what  belongs  to  them  by 
themselves,  though  smothered  under  an  accumulation  of 
signs  (Merkmal)  and  partial  concepts,  which  we  do  not 
consciously  disentangle.  The  distinction  between  con- 
fused and  well-ordered  representation  is  logical  only,  and 
does  not  touch  the  contents  of  our  knowledge.  Thus  the 
concept  of  Right,  as  employed  by  people  of  common  sense, 
contains  neither  more  nor  less  than  the  subtlest  specula- 
tion can  draw  out  of  it,  only  that  in  the  ordinary  practical 
use  of  the  word  we  are  not  always  conscious  of  the  mani- 
fold ideas  contained  in  that  thought.  But  no  one  would 
say  therefore  that  the  ordinary  concept  of  Right  was 
sensuous,  containing  a mere  phenomenon  ; for  Right  can 
never  become  a phenomenon,  being  a concept  of  [p.  44] 
the  understanding,  and  representing  a moral  quality  be- 
longing to  actions  by  themselves.  The  representation 
of  a Body,  on  the  contrary,  contains  nothing  in  intuition 
that  could  belong  to  an  object  by  itself,  but  is  merely 


Transcendental  A ’Esthetic 


“6 

the  phenomenal  appearance  of  something,  and  the  man- 
ner in  which  we  are  affected  by  it.  This  receptivity  of 
our  knowledge  is  called  sensibility.  Even  if  we  could 
see  to  the  very  bottom  of  a phenomenon,  it  would  remain 
for  ever  altogether  different  from  the  knowledge  of  the 
thing  by  itself. 

This  shows  that  the  philosophy  of  Leibniz  and  Wolf 
has  given  a totally  wrong  direction  to  all  investigations 
into  the  nature  and  origin  of  our  knowledge,  by  repre- 
senting the  difference  between  the  sensible  and  the  intel- 
ligible as  logical  only.  That  difference  is  in  truth  tran- 
scendental. It  affects  not  the  form  only,  as  being  more 
or  less  confused,  but  the  origin  and  contents  of  our 
knowledge;  so  that  by  our  sensibility  we  know  the  nat- 
ure of  things  by  themselves  not  confusedly  only,  but  not 
at  all.  If  we  drop  our  subjective  condition,  the  object,  as 
represented  with  its  qualities  bestowed  on  it  by  sensuous 
intuition,  is  nowhere  to  be  found,  and  cannot  possibly  be 
found  ; because  its  form,  as  phenomenal  appearance,  is 
determined  by  those  very  subjective  conditions. 

It  has  been  the  custom  to  distinguish  in  phe-  [p.  45] 
nomena  that  which  is  essentially  inherent  in  their  intuition 
4nd  is  recognised  by  every  human  being,  from  that  which 
belongs  to  their  intuition  accidentally  only,  being  valid 
not  for  sensibility  in  general,  but  only  for  a particular 
position  and  organisation  of  this  or  that  sense.  In  that 
case  the  former  kind  of  knowledge  is  said  to  represent 
the  object  by  itself,  the  latter  its  appearance  only.  But 
that  distinction  is  merely  empirical.  If,  as  generally  hap- 
pens, people  are  satisfied  with  that  distinction,  without 
again,  as  they  ought,  treating  the  first  empirical  intuition 
as  purely  phenomenal  also,  in  which  nothing  can  be  found 


Transcendental  Aesthetic 


37 


belonging  to  the  thing  by  itself,  our  transcendental  dis- 
tinction is  lost,  and  we  believe  that  we  know  things  by 
themselves,  though  in  the  world  of  sense,  however  far  we 
may  carry  our  investigation,  we  can  never  have  anything 
before  us  but  mere  phenomena.  To  give  an  illustration. 
People  might  call  the  rainbow  a mere  phenomenal  appear- 
ance during  a sunny  shower,  but  the  rain  itself  the  thing 
by  itself.  This  would  be  quite  right,  physically  speaking, 
and  taking  rain  as  something  which,  in  our  ordinary 
experience  and  under  all  possible  relations  to  our  senses, 
can  be  determined  thus  and  thus  only  in  our  intuition 
But  if  we  take  the  empirical  in  general,  and  ask,  [p.  46] 
without  caring  whether  it  is  the  same  with  every  particu- 
lar observer,  whether  it  represents  a thing  by  itself  (not 
the  drops  of  rain,  for  these  are  already,  as  phenomena, 
empirical  objects),  then  the  ^question  as  to  the  relation 
between  the  representation  and  the  object  becomes  tran- 
scendental, and  not  only  the  drops  are  mere  phenomena, 
but  even  their  round  shape,  nay  even  the  space  in  which 
they  fall,  are  nothing  by  themselves,  but  only  modifica- 
tions or  fundamental  dispositions  of  our  sensuous  intuition, 
the  transcendental  object  remaining  unknown  to  us. 

The  second  important  point  in  our  transcendental  aes- 
thetic is,  that  it  should  not  only  gain  favour  as  a plausible 
hypothesis,  but  assume  as  certain  and  undoubted  a charac- 
ter as  can  be  demanded  of  any  theory  which  is  to  serve 
as  an  organum.  In  order  to  make  this  certainty  self- 
evident  we  shall  select  a case  which  will  make  its  validity 
palpable. 

Let  us  suppose  that  space  and  time  are  in  themselves 
objective,  and  conditions  of  the  possibility  of  things  by 
themselves.  Now  there  is  with  regard  to  both  a large 


38 


Tra7isce?ide?ital  Aesthetic 


number  of  a priori  apodictic  and  synthetical  propositions, 
and  particularly  with  regard  to  space,  which  for  this  rea- 
son we  shall  chiefly  investigate  here  as  an  illustration. 
As  the  propositions  of  geometry  are  known  synthetically 
a priori,  and  with  apodictic  certainty,  I ask,  whence  do 
you  take  such  propositions?  and  what  does  the  [p.  47] 
understanding  rely  on  in  order  to  arrive  at  such  absolutely 
necessary  and  universally  valid  truths  ? There  is  no  other 
way  but  by  concepts  and  intuitions,  and  both  as  given 
either  a priori  or  a posteriori.  The  latter,  namely  em- 
pirical concepts,  as  well  as  the  empirical  intuition  on 
which  they  are  founded,  cannot  yield  any  synthetical 
propositions  except  such  as  are  themselves  also  empirical 
only,  that  is,  empirical  propositions,  which  can  never 
possess  that  necessity  and  absolute  universality  which  are 
characteristic  of  all  geometrical  propositions.  As  to  the 
other  and  only  means  of  arriving  at  such  knowledge 
through  mere  concepts  or  intuitions  a priori,  it  must  be 
clear  that  only  analytical,  but  no  synthetical  knowledge 
can  ever  be  derived  from  mere  concepts.  Take  the 
proposition  that  two  straight  lines  cannot  enclose  a space 
and  cannot  therefore  form  a figure,  and  try  to  deduce  it 
from  the  concept  of  straight  lines  and  the  number  two ; 
or  take  the  proposition  that  with  three  straight  lines  it 
is  possible  to  form  a figure,  and  try  to  deduce  that  from 
those  concepts.  All  your  labour  will  be  lost,  and  in  the 
end  you  will  be  obliged  to  have  recourse  to  intuition,  as 
is  always  done  in  geometry.  You  then  give  yourselves 
an  object  in  intuition.  But  of  what  kind  is  it  ? [p.  48] 
Is  it  a pure  intuition  a priori  or  an  empirical  one  ? In 
the  latter  case,  you  would  never  arrive  at  a universally 
valid,  still  less  at  an  apodictic  proposition,  because  ex- 


Transcendental  Esthetic 


39 


perience  can  never  yield  such.  You  must  therefore  take 
the  object  as  given  a priori  in  intuition,  and  found  your 
synthetical  proposition  on  that.  If  you  did  not  possess 
in  yourselves  the  power  of  a priori  intuition,  if  that 
subjective  condition  were  not  at  the  same  time,  as  to  the 
form,  the  general  condition  a priori  under  which  alone 
the  object  of  that  (external)  intuition  becomes  possible, 
if,  dn  fact,  the  object  (the  triangle)  were  something  by 
itself  without  any  reference  to  you  as  the  subject,  how 
could  you  say  that  what  exists  necessarily  in  your  subjective 
conditions  of  constructing  a triangle,  belongs  of  necessity 
to  the  triangle  itself  ? For  you  could  not  add  something 
entirely  new  (the  figure)  to  your  concepts  of  three  lines, 
something  which  should  of  necessity  belong  to  the  object, 
as  that  object  is  given  before  your  knowledge  of  it,  and 
not  by  it.  If  therefore  space,  and  time  also,  were  not 
pure  forms  of  your  intuition,  which  contains  the  a prior-i 
conditions  under  which  alone  things  can  become  external 
objects  to  you,  while,  without  that  subjective  condition, 
they  are  nothing,  you  could  not  predicate  anything  of 
external  objects  a priori  and  synthetically.  It  is  there- 
fore beyond  the  reach  of  doubt,  and  not  possible  [p.  49] 
only  or  probable,  that  space  and  time,  as  the  necessary 
conditions  of  all  experience,  external  and  internal,  are 
purely  subjective  conditions  of  our  intuition,  and  that, 
with  reference  to  them,  all  things  are  phenomena  only, 
and  not  things  thus  existing  by  themselves  in  such  or 
such  wise.  Hence,  so  far  as  their  form  is  concerned, 
much  may  be  predicated  of  them  a priori,  but  nothing 
whatever  of  the  things  by  themselves  on  which  these 
phenomena  may  be  grounded.1 

1 Here  follows  in  the  Second  Edition,  Supplement  XI. 


THE 


ELEMENTS  OF  TRANSCENDENTALISM 

[p-  50] 

SECOND  PART 

TRANSCENDENTAL  LOGIC 


INTRODUCTION 

THE  IDEA  OF  A TRANSCENDENTAL  LOGIC 

I 

Of  Logic  in  General 

Our  knowledge  springs  from  two  fundamental  sources 
of  our  soul  ; the  first  receives  representations  (receptivity 
of  impressions),  the  second  is  the  power  of  knowing  an 
object  by  these  representations  (spontaneity  of  concepts). 
By  the  first  an  object  is  given  us,  by  the  second  the 
object  is  thought , in  relation  to  that  representation  which 
is  a mere  determination  of  the  soul.  Intuition  therefore 
and  concepts  constitute  the  elements  of  all  our  knowledge, 
so  that  neither  concepts  without  an  intuition  correspond- 
ing to  them,  nor  intuition  without  concepts  can  yield  any 
real  knowledge. 

Both  are  either  pure  or  empirical.  They  are  empirical 
when  sensation,  presupposing  the  actual  presence  of  the 


40 


Transcendental  Logic 


4i 


object,  is  contained  in  it.  They  are  pure  when  no  sensa- 
tion is  mixed  up  with  the  representation.  The  latter  may 
be  called  the  material  of  sensuous  knowledge.  Pure  intui- 
tion therefore  contains  the  form  only  by  which  [p.  51] 
something  is  seen,  and  pure  conception  the  form  only  by 
which  an  object  is  thought.  Pure  intuitions  and  pure 
concepts  only  are  possible  a priori,  empirical  intuitions 
and  empirical  concepts  a posteriori. 

We  call  sensibility  the  receptivity  of  our  soul,  or 
its  power  of  receiving  representations  whenever  it  is 
in  any  wise  affected,  while  the  iinderstanding,  on  the 
contrary,  is  with  us  the  power  of  producing  representa- 
tions, or  the  spontaneity  of  knowledge.  We  are  so  con- 
stituted that  our  intuition  must  always  be  sensuous,  and 
consist  of  the  mode  in  which  we  are  affected  by  objects. 
What  enables  us  to  think  the  objects  of  our  sensuous 
intuition  is  the  understanding.  Neither  of  these  qualities 
or  faculties  is  preferable  to  the  other.  Without  sensibility 
objects  would  not  be  given  to  us,  without  understanding 
they  would  not  be  thought  by  us.  Thoughts  without  con- 
tents are  empty,  intuitions  without  co7icepts  are  blind. 
Therefore  it  is  equally  necessary  to  make  our  concepts 
sensuous,  i.e.  to  add  to  them  their  object  in  intuition,  as 
to  make  our  intuitions  intelligible,  i.e.  to  bring  them  under 
concepts.  These  two  powers  or  faculties  cannot  ex- 
change their  functions.  The  understanding  cannot  see, 
the  senses  cannot  think.  By  their  union  only  can  know- 
ledge be  produced.  But  this  is  no  reason  for  confounding 
the  share  which  belongs  to  each  in  the  production  of 
knowledge.  On  the  contrary,  they  should  al-  [p.  52] 
ways  be  carefully  separated  and  distinguished,  and  we 
have  therefore  divided  the  science  of  the  rules  of  sen- 


42  Transcendental  Logic 

sibility  in  general,  i.e.  aesthetic,  from  the  science  of  the 
rules  of  the  understanding  in  general,  i.e.  logic. 

Logic  again  can  be  taken  in  hand  for  two  objects, 
either  as  logic  of  the  general  or  of  a particular  use  of  the 
understanding.  The  former  contains  all  necessary  rules 
of  thought  without  which  the  understanding  cannot  be 
used  at  all.  It  treats  of  the  understanding  without  any 
regard  to  the  different  objects  to  which  it  may  be  directed. 
Logic  of  the  particular  use  of  the  understanding  contains 
rules  how  to  think  correctly  on  certain  classes  of  objects. 
The  former  may  be  called  Elementary  Logic , the  latter  the 
Organum  of  this  or  that  science.  The  latter  is  generally 
taught  in  the  schools  as  a preparation  for  certain  sciences, 
though,  according  to  the  real  progress  of  the  human 
understanding,  it  is  the  latest  achievement,  which  does 
not  become  possible  till  the  science  itself  is  really  made, 
and  requires  only  a few  touches  for  its  correction  and 
completion.  For  it  is  clear  that  the  objects  themselves 
must  be  very  well  known  before  it  is  possible  to  give  rules 
according  to  which  a science  of  them  may  be  established. 

General  logic  is  either  pure  or  applied.  In  the  [p.  53] 
former  no  account  is  taken  of  any  empirical  conditions 
under  which  our  understanding  acts,  i.e.  of  the  influence 
of  the  senses,  the  play  of  imagination,  the  laws  of  mem- 
ory, the  force  of  habit,  the  inclinations,  and  therefore  the 
sources  of  prejudice  also,  nor  of  anything  which  supplies 
or  seems  to  supply  particular  kinds  of  knowledge  ; for  all 
this  applies  to  the  understanding  under  certain  circum- 
stances of  its  application  only,  and  requires  experience 
as  a condition  of  knowledge.  General  but  pure  logic  has 
to  deal  with  principles  a priori  only,  and  is  a canon  of  the 
understa)uiing  and  of  reason , though  with  reference  to  its 


Transcendental  Logic 


43 


formal  application  only,  irrespective  of  any  contents, 
whether  empirical  or  transcendental.  General  logic  is 
called  applied,  if  it  refers  to  the  rules  of  the  use  of  our 
understanding  under  the  subjective  empirical  conditions 
laid  down  in  psychology.  It  therefore  contains  empirical 
principles,  yet  it  is  general,  because  referring  to  the  use 
of  the  understanding,  whatever  its  objects  may  be.  It 
is  neither  a canon  of  the  understanding  in  general  nor  an 
organum  of  any  particular  science,  but  simply  a cathar- 
ticon  of  the  ordinary  understanding. 

In  general  logic,  therefore,  that  part  which  is  to  con- 
stitute the  science  of  pure  reason  must  be  entirely  sepa- 
rated from  that  which  forms  applied,  but  for  all  [p.  54] 
that  still  general  logic.  The  former  alone  is  a real 
science,  though  short  and  dry,  as  a practical  exposition 
of  an  elementary  science  of  the  understanding  ought  to 
be.  In  this  logicians  should  never  lose  sight  of  two 
rules : — 


1.  As  general  logic  it  takes  no  account  of  the  content; 
of  the  knowledge  of  the  understanding  nor  of  the  differ 
ence  of  its  objects.  It  treats  of  nothing  but  the  men 
form  of  thought. 

2.  As  pure  logic  it  has  nothing  to  do  with  empirical 
principles,  and  borrows  nothing  from  psychology  (as 
some  have  imagined)  ; ’ psychology,  therefore,  has  no 
influence  whatever  on  the  canon  of  the  understanding. 
It  proceeds  by  way  of  demonstration,  and  everything  in 
it  must  be  completely  a priori. 

What  I call  applied  logic  (contrary  to  common  usage 
according  to  which  it  contains  certain  exercises  on  the 
rules  of  pure  logic)  is  a representation  of  the  understand- 
ing and  of  the  rules  according  to  which  it  is  necessarily 


44 


Transcendental  Logic 


applied  in  concreto,  i.e.  under  the  accidental  conditions 
of  the  subject,  which  may  hinder  or  help  its  application, 
and  are  all  given  empirically  only.  It  treats  of  attention, 
its  impediments  and  their  consequences,  the  sources  of 
error,  the  states  of  doubt,  hesitation,  and  conviction,  etc., 
and  general  and  pure  logic  stands  to  it  in  [p.  55] 
the  same  relation  as  pure  ethics,  which  treat  only  of  the 
necessary  moral  laws  of  a free  will,  to  applied  ethics, 
which  consider  these  laws  as  under  the  influence  of  sen- 
timents, inclinations,  and  passions  to  which  all  human 
beings  are  more  or  less  subject.  This  can  never  con- 
stitute a true  and  demonstrated  science,  because,  like 
applied  logic,  it  depends  on  empirical  and  psychological 
principles. 

II 

Of  Transcendental  Logic 

General  logic,  as  we  saw,  takes  no  account  of  the  con- 
tents of  knowledge,  i.e.  of  any  relation  between  it  and  its 
objects,  and  considers  the  logical  form  only  in  the  relation 
of  cognitions  to  each  other,  that  is,  it  treats  of  the  form 
of  thought  in  general.  But  as  we  found,  when  treating  of 
Transcendental  ^Esthetic,  that  there  are  pure  as  well  as 
empirical  intuitions,  it  is  possible  that  a similar  distinction 
might  appear  between  pure  and  empirical  thinking.  In 
this  case  we  should  have  a logic  in  which  the  contents 
of  knowledge  are  not  entirely  ignored,  for  such  a logic 
which  should  contain  the  rules  of  pure  thought  only, 
would  exclude  only  all  knowledge  of  a merely  empirical 
character.  It  would  also  treat  of  the  origin  of  our  know- 
ledge of  objects,  so  far  as  that  origin  cannot  be  attributed 


Transcendental  Logic 


45 


to  the  objects,  while  general  logic  is  not  at  all  [p.  56] 
concerned  with  the  origin  of  our  knowledge,  but  only  con- 
siders representations  (whether  existing  originally  a priori 
in  ourselves  or  empirically  given  to  us),  according  to  the 
laws  followed  by  the  understanding,  when  thinking  and 
treating  them  in  their  relation  to  each  other.  It  is  ^on- 
fined  therefore  to  the  form  imparted  by  the  understanding 
to  the  representations,  whatever  may  be  their  origin. 

And  here  I make  a remark  which  should  never  be  lost 
sight  of,  as  it  extends  its  influence  on  all  that  follows. 
Not  every  kind  of  knowledge  a priori  should  be  called 
transcendental  (i.e.  occupied  with  the  possibility  or  the  use 
of  knowledge  a priori ),  but  that  only  by  which  we  know 
that  and  how  certain  representations  (intuitional  or  con- 
ceptual) can  be  used  or  are  possible  a priori  only.  Neither 
space  nor  any  a priori  geometrical  determination  of  it  is  a 
transcendental  representation ; but  that  knowledge  only  is 
rightly  called  transcendental  which  teaches  us  that  these 
representations  cannot  be  of  empirical  origin,  and  how 
they  can  yet  refer  a priori  to  objects  of  experience.  The 
application  of  space  to  objects  in  general  would  likewise 
be  transcendental,  but,  if  restricted  to  objects  of  sense,  it 
is  empirical.  The  distinction  between  transcen-  [p.  57] 
dental  and  empirical  belongs  therefore  to  the  critique  of 
knowledge,  and  does  not  affect  the  relation  of  that  know- 
ledge to  its  objects. 

On  the  supposition  therefore  that  there  may  be  con- 
cepts, having  an  a priori  reference  to  objects,  not  as  pure 
or  sensuous  intuitions,  but  as  acts  of  pure  thought,  being 
concepts  in  fact,  but  neither  of  empirical  nor  aesthetic 
origin,  we  form  by  anticipation  an  idea  of  a science  of 
that  knowledge  which  belongs  to  the  pure  understanding 


46 


Transcendental  Logic 


and  reason,  and  by  which  we  may  think  objects  entirely 
a priori.  Such  a science,  which  has  to  determine  the 
origin,  the  extent,  and  the  objective  validity  of  such 
knowledge,  might  be  called  Transcendental  Logic,  having 
to  deal  with  the  laws  of  the  understanding  and  reason  in 
so  far  only  as  they  refer  a priori  to  objects,  and  not,  as 
general  logic,  in  so  far  as  they  refer  promiscuously  to  the 
empirical  as  well  as  to  the  pure  knowledge  of  reason. 

Ill 

Of  the  Division  of  General  Logic  into  Analytic  and 
Dialectic 

What  is  truth  ? is  an  old  and  famous  question  by  which 
people  thought  they  could  drive  logicians  into  a corner, 
and  either  make  them  take  refuge  in  a mere  circle,1  or 
make  them  confess  their  ignorance  and  conse-  [p.  58] 
quently  the  vanity  of  their  whole  art.  The  nominal  defi- 
nition of  truth,  that  it  is  the  agreement  of  the  cognition 
with  its  object,  is  granted.  What  is  wanted  is  to  know 
a general  and  safe  criterion  of  the  truth  of  any  and  every 
kind  of  knowledge. 

It  is  a great  and  necessary  proof  of  wisdom  and  sagac- 
ity to  know  what  questions  may  be  reasonably  asked. 
For  if  a question  is  absurd  in  itself  and  calls  for  an  answer 
where  there  is  no  answer,  it  does  not  only  throw  disgrace 
on  the  questioner,  but  often  tempts  an  uncautious  listener 
into  absurd  answers,  thus  presenting,  as  the  ancients  said, 
the  spectacle  of  one  person  milking  a he-goat,  and  of 
another  holding  the  sieve. 

If  truth  consists  in  the  agreement  of  knowledge  with 


1 The  First  Edition  has  Diallele,  the  Second,  Dialexe. 


Transcendental  Logic 


4 7 


its  object,  that  object  must  thereby  be  distinguished  from 
other  objects ; for  knowledge  is  untrue  if  it  does  not  agree 
with  its  object,  though  it  contains  something  which  may 
be  affirmed  of  other  objects.  A general  criterium  of  truth 
ought  really  to  be  valid  with  regard  to  every  kind  of 
knowledge,  whatever  the  objects  may  be.  But  it  is  clear, 
as  no  account  is  thus  taken  of  the  contents  of  knowledge 
(relation  to  its  object),  while  truth  concerns  these  very 
contents,  that  it  is  impossible  and  absurd  to  ask  [p.  59] 
for  a sign  of  the  truth  of  the  contents  of  that  knowledge, 
and  that  therefore  a sufficient  and  at  the  same  time 
general  mark  of  truth  cannot  possibly  be  found.  As  we 
have  before  called  the  contents  of  knowledge  its  material, 
it  will  be  right  to  say  that  of  the  truth  of  the  knowledge, 
so  far  as  its  material  is  concerned,  no  general  mark  can 
be  demanded,  because  it  would  be  self-contradictory. 

But,  when  we  speak  of  knowledge  with  reference  to  its 
form  only,  without  taking  account  of  its  contents,  it  is 
equally  clear  that  logic,  as  it  propounds  the  general  and 
necessary  rules  of  the  understanding,  must  furnish  in 
these  rules  criteria  of  truth.  For  whatever  contradicts 
those  rules  is  false,  because  the  understanding  would  thus 
contradict  the  general  rules  of  thought,  that  is,  itself. 
These  criteria,  however,  refer  only  to  the  form  of  truth 
or  of  thought  in  general.  They  are  quite  correct  so  far, 
but  they  are  not  sufficient.  For  although  our  knowledge 
may  be  in  accordance  with  logical  rule,  that  is,  may  not 
contradict  itself,  it  is  quite  possible  that  it  may  be 
in  contradiction  with  its  object.  Therefore  the  purely 
logical  criterium  of  truth,  namely,  the  agreement  of 
knowledge  with  the  general  and  formal  laws  of  the 
understanding  and  reason,  is  no  doubt  a conditio  sine 


48 


Transcendental  Logic 


qua  non,  or  a negative  condition  of  all  truth,  [p.  60] 
But  logic  can  go  no  further,  and  it  has  no  test  for  dis- 
covering error  with  regard  to  the  contents,  and  not  the 
form,  of  a proposition. 

General  logic  resolves  the  whole  formal  action  of  the 
understanding  and  reason  into  its  elements,  and  exhibits 
them  as  principles  for  all  logical  criticism  of  our  know- 
ledge. This  part  of  logic  may  therefore  be  called  Ana- 
lytic, and  is  at  least  a negative  test  of  truth,  because  all 
knowledge  must  first  be  examined  and  estimated,  so  far 
as  its  form  is  concerned,  according  to  these  rules,  before 
it  is  itself  tested  according  to  its  contents,  in  order  to  see 
whether  it  contains  positive  truth  with  regard  to  its 
object.  But  as  the  mere  form  of  knowledge,  however 
much  it  may  be  in  agreement  with  logical  laws,  is  far 
from  being  sufficient  to  establish  the  material  or  objec- 
tive truth  of  our  knowledge,  no  one  can  venture  with 
logic  alone  to  judge  of  objects,  or  to  make  any  assertion, 
without  having  first  collected,  apart  from  logic,  trust- 
worthy information,  in  order  afterwards  to  attempt  its 
application  and  connection  in  a coherent  whole  accord- 
ing to  logical  laws,  or,  still  better,  merely  to  test  it  by 
them.  However,  there  is  something  so  tempting  in  this 
specious  art  of  giving  to  all  our  knowledge  the  form  of 
the  understanding,  though  being  utterly  ignorant  [p.  61] 
as  to  the  contents  thereof,  that  general  logic,  which  is 
meant  to  be  a mere  canon  of  criticism,  has  been  employed 
as  if  it  were  an  organum,  for  the  real  production  of  at 
least  the  semblance  of  objective  assertions,  or,  more  truly, 
has  been  misemployed  for  that  purpose.  This  general 
logic,  which  assumes  the  semblance  of  an  organum,  is 
called  Dialectic. 


Transcendental  Logic 


49 


Different  as  are  the  significations  in  which  the  ancients 
used  this  name  of  a science  or  art,  it  is  easy  to  gather 
from  its  actual  employment  that  with  them  it  was  nothing 
but  a logic  of  semblance.  It  was  a sophistic  art  of  giving 
to  one’s  ignorance,  nay,  to  one’s  intentional  casuistry,  the 
outward  appearance  of  truth,  by  imitating  the  accurate 
method  which  logic  always  requires,  and  by  using  its  topic 
as  a cloak  for  every  empty  assertion.  Now  it  may  be 
taken  as  a sure  and  very  useful  warning  that  general 
logic,  if  treated  as  an  organum,  is  always  an  illusive  logic, 
that  is,  dialectical.  For  as  logic  teaches  nothing  with 
regard  to  the  contents  of  knowledge,  but  lays  down  the 
formal  conditions  only  of  an  agreement  with  the  under- 
standing, which,  so  far  as  the  objects  are  concerned,  are 
totally  indifferent,  any  attempt  at  using  it  as  an  organum 
in  order  to  extend  and  enlarge  our  knowledge,  at  least  in 
appearance,  can  end  in  nothing  but  mere  talk,  [p.  62] 
by  asserting  with  a certain  plausibility  anything  one  likes, 
or,  if  one  likes,  denying  it. 

Such  instruction  is  quite  beneath  the  dignity  of  philos- 
ophy. Therefore  the  title  of  Dialectic  has  rather  been 
added  to  logic,  as  a critique  of  dialectical  semblance ; and 
it  is  in  that  sense  that  we  also  use  it. 

IV 

Of  the  Division  of  Transcendental  Logic  into  Transcen- 
dental Analytic  and  Dialectic 

In  transcendental  logic  we  isolate  the  understanding,  as 
before  in  transcendental  aesthetic  the  sensibility,  and  fix 
our  attention  on  that  part  of  thought  only  which  has  its 
origin  entirely  in  the  understanding.  The  application  of 

E 


50 


Transcendental  Logic 


this  pure  knowledge  has  for  its  condition  that  objects  are 
given  in  intuition,  to  which  it  can  be  applied,  for  without 
intuition  all  our  knowledge  would  be  without  objects,  and 
it  would  therefore  remain  entirely  empty.  That  part  of 
transcendental  logic  therefore  which  teaches  the  elements 
of  the  pure  knowledge  of  the  understanding,  and  the  prin- 
ciples without  which  no  object  can  be  thought,  is  transcen- 
dental Analytic,  and  at  the  same  time  a logic  of  truth. 
No  knowledge  can  contradict  it  without  losing  at  the 
same  time  all  contents,  that  is,  all  relation  to  any  [p.  63] 
object,  and  therefore  all  truth.  But  as  it  is  very  tempt- 
ing to  use  this  pure  knowledge  of  the  understanding  and 
its  principles  by  themselves,  and  even  beyond  the  limits  of 
all  experience,  which  alone  can  supply  the  material  or  the 
objects  to  which  those  pure  concepts  of  the  understanding 
can  be  applied,  the  understanding  runs  the  risk  of  making, 
through  mere  sophisms,  a material  use  of  the  purely  for- 
mal principles  of  the  pure  understanding,  and  thus  of 
judging  indiscriminately  of  objects  which  are  not  given 
to  us,  nay,  perhaps  can  never  be  given.  As  it  is  properly 
meant  to  be  a mere  canon  for  criticising  the  empirical  use 
of  the  understanding,  it  is  a real  abuse  if  it  is  allowed  as 
an  organum  of  its  general  and  unlimited  application,  by 
our  venturing,  with  the  pure  understanding  alone,  to  judge 
synthetically  of  objects  in  general,  or  to  affirm  and  decide 
anything  about  them.  In  this  case  the  employment  of  the 
pure  understanding  would  become  dialectical. 

The  second  part  of  transcendental  logic  must  therefore 
form  a critique  of  that  dialectical  semblance,  and  is  called 
transcendental  Dialectic,  not  as  an  art  of  producing  dog- 
matically such  semblance  (an  art  but  too  popular  with 
many  metaphysical  jugglers),  but  as  a critique  of  .'the 


Transcendental  Logic  5 1 

understanding  and  reason  with  regard  to  their  hyper- 
physical employment,  in  order  thus  to  lay  bare  the  false 
semblance  of  its  groundless  pretensions,  and  to  [p.  64] 
reduce  its  claims  to  discovery  and  expansion,  which  was  to 
be  achieved  by  means  of  transcendental  principles  only, 
to  a mere  critique,  serving  as  a protection  of  the  pure 
understanding  against  all  sophistical  illusions. 


52 


Transce?idental  Logic 


TRANSCENDENTAL  LOGIC 

First  Division 
Transcendental  Analytic 

Transcendental  Analytic  consists  in  the  dissection  of  all 
our  knowledge  a priori  into  the  elements  which  constitute 
the  knowledge  of  the  pure  understanding.  Four  points 
are  here  essential : first,  that  the  concepts  should  be  pure 
and  not  empirical ; secondly,  that  they  should  not  belong 
to  intuition  and  sensibility,  but  to  thought  and  understand- 
ing ; thirdly,  that  the  concepts  should  be  elementary  and 
carefully  distinguished  from  derivative  or  composite  con- 
cepts ; fourthly,  that  our  tables  should  be  complete  and 
that  they  should  cover  the  whole  field  of  the  pure  under- 
standing. 

This  completeness  of  a science  cannot  be  confidently 
accepted  on  the  strength  of  a mere  estimate,  or  by  means 
of  repeated  experiments  only ; what  is  required  for  it  is  an 
idea  of  the  totality  of  the  a priori  knowledge  of  the  under- 
standing, and  a classification  of  the  concepts  based  [p.  65] 
upon  it;  in  fact,  a systematic  treatment.  Pure  under- 
standing must  be  distinguished,  not  merely  from  all  that 
is  empirical,  but  even  from  all  sensibility.  It  constitutes 
therefore  a unity  independent  in  itself,  self-sufficient,  and 
not  to  be  increased  by  any  additions  from  without.  The 
sum  of  its  knowledge  must  constitute  a system,  compre- 


Transcendental  Logic 


53 


hended  and  determined  by  one  idea,  and  its  completeness 
and  articulation  must  form  the  test  of  the  correctness  and 
genuineness  of  its  component  parts. 

This  part  of  transcendental  logic  consists  of  two  books, 
the  one  containing  the  concepts , the  other  the  principles  of 
pure  understanding. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC 


ROOK  I 

ANALYTIC  OF  CONCEPTS 

By  Analytic  of  concepts  I do  not  understand  their 
analysis,  or  the  ordinary  process  in  philosophical  dis- 
quisitions of  dissecting  any  given  concepts  according  to 
their  contents,  and  thus  rendering  them  more  distinct ; 
but  a hitherto  seldom  attempted  dissection  of  the  faculty 
of  the  understanding  itself,  with  the  sole  object  of  dis- 
covering the  possibility  of  concepts  a priori , by  looking 
for  them  nowhere  but  in  the  understanding  itself  [p.  66] 
as  their  birthplace,  and  analysing  the  pure  use  of  the 
understanding.  This  is  the  proper  task  of  a transcen- 
dental philosophy,  all  the  rest  is  mere  logical  treatment 
of  concepts.  We  shall  therefore  follow  up  the  pure  con- 
cepts to  their  first  germs  and  beginnings  in  the  human 
understanding,  in  which  they  lie  prepared,  till  at  last,  on 
the  occasion  of  experience,  they  become  developed,  and 
are  represented  by  the  same  understanding  in  their  full 
purity,  freed  from  all  inherent  empirical  conditions. 


54 


Transcendental  Analytic 


55 


ANALYTIC  OF  CONCEPTS 

CHAPTER  I 

METHOD  OF  DISCOVERING  ALE  PURE  CONCEPTS  OF  THE 
UNDERSTANDING 

When  we  watch  any  faculty  of  knowledge,  different 
concepts,  characteristic  of  that  faculty,  manifest  them- 
selves according  to  different  circumstances,  which,  as 
the  observation  has  been  carried  on  for  a longer  or 
shorter  time,  or  with  more  or  less  accuracy,  may  be 
gathered  up  into  a more  or  less  complete  collection. 
Where  this  collection  will  be  complete,  it  is  impossible 
to  say  beforehand,  when  we  follow  this  almost  mechan- 
ical process.  Concepts  thus  discovered  fortuitously  only, 
possess  neither  order  nor  systematic  unity,  but  [p.  67] 
are  paired  in  the  end  according  to  similarities,  and,  accord- 
ing to  their  contents,  arranged  as  more  or  less  complex 
in  various  series,  which  are  nothing  less  than  systematical, 
though  to  a certain  extent  put  together  methodically. 

Transcendental  philosophy  has  the  advantage,  but 
also  the  duty  of  discovering  its  concepts  according  to 
a fixed  principle.  As  they  spring  pure  and  unmixed 
from  the  understanding  as  an  absolute  unity,  they  must 
be  connected  with  each  other,  according  to  one  concept 
or  idea.  This  connection  supplies  us  at  the  same  time 
with  a rule,  according  to  which  the  place  of  each  pure 
concept  of  the  understanding  and  the  systematical  com- 


56 


Transcendental  Analytic 


pleteness  of  all  of  them  can  be  determined  a priori , in- 
stead of  being  dependent  on  arbitrary  choice  or  chance. 

TRANSCENDENTAL  METHOD  OF  THE  DISCOVERY 
OF  ALL  PURE  CONCEPTS  OF  THE  UNDER- 
STANDING 

Section  I 

Of  the  Logical  Use  of  the  Understanding  in  Ge?ieral 

We  have  before  defined  the  understanding  negatively 
only,  as  a non-sensuous  faculty  of  knowledge.  As  with- 
out sensibility  we  cannot  have  any  intuition,  [p.  68] 
it  is  clear  that  the  understanding  is  not  a faculty  of  intui- 
tion. Besides  intuition,  however,  there  is  no  other  kind 
of  knowledge  except  by  means  of  concepts.  The  know- 
ledge therefore  of  every  understanding,  or  at  least  of  the 
human  understanding,  must  be  by  means  of  concepts, 
not  intuitive,  but  discursive.  All  intuitions,  being  sen- 
suous, depend  on  affections,  concepts  on  functions.  By 
this  function  I mean  the  unity  of  the  act  of  arranging 
different  representations  under  one  common  representa- 
tion. Concepts  are  based  therefore  on  the  spontaneity 
of  thought,  sensuous  intuitions  on  the  receptivity  of 
impressions.  The  only  use  which  the  understanding  can 
make  of  these  concepts  is  to  form  judgments  by  them. 
As  no  representation,  except  the  intuitional,  refers  imme- 
diately to  an  object,  no  concept  is  ever  referred  to  an 
object  immediately,  but  to  some  other  representation  of 
it,  whether  it  be  an  intuition,  or  itself  a concept.  A judg- 
ment is  therefore  a mediate  knowledge  of  an  object,  or 
a representation  of  a representation  of  it.  In  every  judg- 
ment we  find  a concept  applying  to  many,  and  compre- 


Transcendental  Analytic 


57 


hending  among  the  many  one  single  representation,  which 
is  referred  immediately  to  the  object.  Thus  in  the  judg- 
ment that  all  bodies  are  divisible,1  the  concept  of  divisible 
applies  to  various  other  concepts,  but  is  here  applied  in 
particular  to  the  concept  of  body,  and  this  concept  of 
body  to  certain  phenomena  of  our  experience,  [p.  69] 
These  objects  therefore  are  represented  mediately  by 
the  concept  of  divisibility.  All  judgments  therefore  are 
functions  of  unity  among  our  representations,  the  know- 
ledge of  an  object  being  brought  about,  not  by  an  imme- 
diate representation,  but  by  a higher  one,  comprehending 
this  and  several  others,  so  that  many  possible  cognitions 
are  collected  into  one.  As  all  acts  of  the  understanding 
can  be  reduced  to  judgments,  the  understanding  may  be 
defined  as  the  faculty  of  judging.  For  we  saw  before 
that  the  understanding  is  the  faculty  of  thinking,  and 
thinking  is  knowledge  by  means  of  concepts,  while  con- 
cepts, as  predicates  of  possible  judgments,  refer  to  some 
representation  of  an  object  yet  undetermined.  Thus  the 
concept  of  body  means  something,  for  instance,  metal, 
which  can  be  known  by  that  concept.  It  is  only  a con- 
cept, because  it  comprehends  other  representations,  by 
means  of  which  it  can  be  referred  to  objects.  It  is  there- 
fore the  predicate  of  a possible  judgment,  such  as,  that 
every  metal  is  a body.  Thus  the  functions  of  the  under- 
standing can  be  discovered  in  their  completeness,  if  it  is 
possible  to  represent  the  functions  of  unity  in  judgments. 
That  this  is  possible  will  be  seen  in  the  following 
section. 

1 Verandcrlich.  in  the  First  Edition  is  rightly  corrected  into  theilbar  in 
later  editions,  though  in  the  Second  it  is  still  veranderlich. 


58 


T ranscendental  A nalytic 


METHOD  OF  THE  DISCOVERY  OF  ALL  PURE  CON- 
CEPTS OF  THE  UNDERSTANDING  [p.  70] 

Section  II 

Of  the  Logical  Function  of  the  Understanding  in 
Judgments 

If  we  leave  out  of  consideration  the  contents  of  any 
judgment  and  fix  our  attention  on  the  mere  form  of  the 
understanding,  we  find  that  the  function  of  thought  in  a 
judgment  can  be  brought  under  four  heads,  each  of  them 
with  three  subdivisions.  They  may  be  represented  in  the 
following  table  : — 

I 


Quantity  of  Judgments 

Universal. 

Particular. 

II 

Singular. 

Ill 

Quality 

Relation 

Affirmative. 

Categorical. 

Negative. 

Hypothetical. 

Infinite. 

IV 

Modality 

Problematical. 

Assertory. 

Apodictic. 

Disjunctive. 

As  this  classification  may  seem  to  differ  in  some,  though 
not  very  essential  points,  from  the  usual  technicalities  of 
logicians,  the  following  reservations  against  any  [p.  71] 
possible  misunderstanding  will  not  be  out  of  place. 

1.  Logicians  are  quite  right  in  saying  that  in  using 
judgments  in  syllogisms,  singular  judgments  may  be 


Transcendental  Analytic 


59 


created  like  universal  ones.  For  as  they  have  no  extent 
at  all,  the  predicate  cannot  refer  to  part  only  of  that 
which  is  contained  in  the  concept  of  the  subject,  and  be 
excluded  from  the  rest.  The  predicate  is  valid  therefore 
of  that  concept,  without  any  exception,  as  if  it  were  a 
general  concept,  having  an  extent  to  the  whole  of  which 
the  predicate  applies.  But  if  we  compare  a singular  with 
a general  judgment,  looking  only  at  the  quantity  of  know- 
ledge conveyed  by  it,  the  singular  judgment  stands  to  the 
universal  judgment  as  unity  to  infinity,  and  is  therefore 
essentially  different  from  it.  It  is  therefore,  when  we 
consider  a singular  judgment  ( judicium  singulars),  not 
only  according  to  its  own  validity,  but  according  to  the 
quantity  of  knowledge  which  it  conveys,  as  compared  with 
other  kinds  of  knowledge,  that  we  see  how  different  it  is 
from  general  judgments  {judicia  communia),  and  how  well 
it  deserves  a separate  place  in  a complete  table  of  the 
varieties  of  thought  in  general,  though  not  in  a logic 
limited  to  the  use  of  judgments  in  reference  to  each  other. 

2.  In  like  manner  infinite  judgments  must,  in  tran- 
scendental logic,  be  distinguished  from  affirmative  ones, 
though  in  general  logic  they  are  properly  classed  to- 
gether, and  do  not  constitute  a separate  part  in  [p.  72] 
the  classification.  General  logic  takes  no  account  of  the 
contents  of  the  predicate  (though  it  be  negative),  it  only 
asks  whether  the  predicate  be  affirmed  or  denied.  Tran- 
scendental logic,  on  the  contrary,  considers  a judgment 
according  to  the  value  also  or  the  contents  of  a logical 
affirmation  by  means  of  a purely  negative  predicate,  and 
asks  how  much  is  gained  by  that  affirmation,  with  refer- 
ence to  the  sum  total  of  knowledge.  If  I had  said  of  the 
soul,  that  it  is  not  mortal,  I should,  by  means  of  a nega- 


6o 


Transcendental  Analytic 


tive  judgment,  have  at  least  warded  off  an  error.  Now 
it  is  true  that,  so  far  as  the  logical  form  is  concerned,  I 
have  really  affirmed  by  saying  that  the  soul  is  non-mortal, 
because  I thus  place  the  soul  in  the  unlimited  sphere  of 
non-mortal  beings.  As  the  mortal  forms  one  part  of  the 
whole  sphere  of  possible  beings,  the  non-mortal  the  other, 
I have  said  no  more  by  my  proposition  than  that  the  soul 
is  one  of  the  infinite  number  of  things  which  remain, 
when  I take  away  all  that  is  mortal.  But  by  this  the 
infinite  sphere  of  all  that  is  possible  becomes  limited  only 
in  so  far  that  all  that  is  mortal  is  excluded  from  it,  and 
that  afterwards  the  soul  is  placed  in  the  remaining  part 
of  its  original  extent.  This  part,  however,  even  after  its 
limitation,  still  remains  infinite,  and  several  more  parts  of 
it  may  be  taken  away  without  extending  thereby  in  the 
least  the  concept  of  the  soul,  or  affirmatively  de-  [p.  73] 
termining  it.  These  judgments,  therefore,  though  infi- 
nite in  respect  to  their  logical  extent,  are,  with  respect 
to  their  contents,  limitative  only,  and  cannot  therefore  be 
passed  over  in  a transcendental  table  of  all  varieties  of 
thought  in  judgments,  it  being  quite  possible  that  the 
function  of  the  understanding  exercised  in  them  may 
become  of  great  importance  in  the  field  of  its  pure 
a priori  knowledge. 

3.  The  following  are  all  the  relations  of  thought  in 
judgments : — 

a.  Relation  of  the  predicate  to  the  subject. 

b.  Relation  of  the  cause  to  its  effect. 

c.  Relation  of  subdivided  knowledge,  and  of  the  col- 
lected members  of  the  subdivision  to  each  other. 

In  the  first  class  of  judgments  we  consider  two  con- 
cepts, in  the  second  two  judgments,  in  the  third  several 


Tra.7iscendental  Analytic  61 

judgments  in  their  relation  to  each  other.  The  hypo- 
thetical proposition,  if  perfect  justice  exists,  the  obsti- 
nately wicked  is  punished,  contains  really  the  relation  of 
two  propositions,  namely,  there  is  a perfect  justice,  and 
the  obstinately  wicked  is  punished.  Whether  both  these 
propositions  are  true  remains  unsettled.  It  is  only  the 
consequence  which  is  laid  down  by  this  judgment. 

The  disjunctive  judgment  contains  the  relation  of  two 
or  more  propositions  to  each  other,  but  not  as  a conse- 
quence, but  in  the  form  of  a logical  opposition,  the  sphere 
of  the  one  excluding  the  sphere  of  the  other,  and  at  the 
same  time  in  the  form  of  community,  all  the  propositions 
together  filling  the  whole  sphere  of  the  intended  know- 
ledge. The  disjunctive  judgment  contains  there-  [p.  74] 
fore  a relation  of  the  parts  of  the  whole  sphere  of  a given 
knowledge,  in  which  the  sphere  of  each  part  forms  the 
complement  of  the  sphere  of  the  other,  all  being  con- 
tained within  the  whole  sphere  of  the  subdivided  know- 
ledge. We  may  say,  for  instance,  the  world  exists  either 
by  blind  chance,  or  by  internal  necessity,  or  by  an  exter- 
nal cause.  Each  of  these  sentences  occupies  a part  of 
the  sphere  of  all  possible  knowledge  with  regard  to  the 
existence  of  the  world,  while  all  together  occupy  the  whole 
sphere.  To  take  away  the  knowledge  from  one  of  these 
spheres  is  the  same  as  to  place  it  into  one  of  the  other 
spheres,  and  to  place  it  in  one  sphere  is  the  same  as  to 
take  it  away  from  the  others.  There  exists  therefore  in 
disjunctive  judgments  a certain  community  of  the  differ- 
ent divisions  of  knowledge,  so  that  they  mutually  exclude 
each  other,  and  yet  thereby  determine  in  their  totality  the 
true  knowledge,  because,  if  taken  together,  they  constitute 
the  whole  contents  of  one  given  knowledge.  This  is  all 


62  Transcendental  Analytic 

I have  to  observe  here  for  the  sake  of  what  is  to  follow 
hereafter. 

4.  The  modality  of  judgments  is  a very  peculiar  func- 
tion, for  it  contributes  nothing  to  the  contents  of  a judg- 
ment (because,  besides  quantity,  quality,  and  relation,  there 
is  nothing  else  that  could  constitute  the  contents  of  a 
judgment),  but  refers  only  to  the  nature  of  the  copula 
in  relation  to  thought  in  general.  Problematical  judg- 
ments are  those  in  which  affirmation  or  negation  are 
taken  as  possible  (optional)  only,  while  in  assertory  judg- 
ments affirmation  or  negation  is  taken  as  real  (true),  in 
apodictic  as  necessary.1  Thus  the  two  judg-  [p.  75] 
ments,  the  relation  of  which  constitutes  the  hypothetical 
judgment  ( antecedents  et  consequents ) and  likewise  the 
judgments  the  reciprocal  relation  of  which  forms  the  dis- 
junctive judgment  (members  of  subdivision),  are  always 
problematical  only.  In  the  example  given  above,  the 
proposition,  there  exists  a perfect  justice,  is  not  made 
as  an  assertory,  but  only  as  an  optional  judgment,  which 
may  be  accepted  or  not,  the  consequence  only  being 
assertory.  It  is  clear  therefore  that  some  of  these  judg- 
ments may  be  wrong,  and  may  yet,  if  taken  problemati- 
cally, contain  the  conditions  of  the  knowledge  of  truth. 
Thus,  in  our  disjunctive  judgment,  one  of  its  component 
judgments,  namely,  the  world  exists  by  blind  chance,  has 
a problematical  meaning  only,  on  the  supposition  that  some 
one  might  for  one  moment  take  such  a view,  but  serves, 
at  the  same  time,  like  the  indication  of  a false  road  among 
all  the  roads  that  might  be  taken,  to  find  out  the  true  one. 

1 As  if  in  the  first,  thought  were  a function  of  the  understanding,  in  the 
second,  of  the  faculty  of  judgment,  in  the  third,  of  reason;  a remark  which 
will  receive  its  elucidation  in  the  sequel. 


Transcendental  Analytic 


63 


The  problematical  proposition  is  therefore  that  which  ex- 
presses logical  (not  objective)  possibility  only,  that  is,  a 
free  choice  of  admitting  such  a proposition,  and  a purely 
optional  admission  of  it  into  the  understanding.  The 
assertory  proposition  implies  logical  reality  or  truth. 
Thus,  for  instance,  in  a hypothetical  syllogism  the  ante- 
cedens  in  the  major  is  problematical,  in  the  [p.  76] 
minor  assertory,  showing  that  the  proposition  conforms 
to  the  understanding  according  to  its  laws.  The  apo- 
dictic  proposition  represents  the  assertory  as  determined 
by  these  very  laws  of  the  understanding,  and  therefore 
as  asserting  a priori , and  thus  expresses  logical  necessity. 
As  in  this  way  everything  is  arranged  step  by  step  in  the 
understanding,  inasmuch  as  we  begin  with  judging  prob- 
lematically, then  proceed  to  an  assertory  acceptation,  and 
finally  maintain  our  proposition  as  inseparably  united  with 
the  understanding,  that  is  as  necessary  and  apodictic,  we 
may  be  allowed  to  call  these  three  functions  of  modality 
so  many  varieties  or  momenta  of  thought. 

METHOD  OF  THE  DISCOVERY  OF  ALL  PURE  CON- 
CEPTS OF  THE  UNDERSTANDING 

Section  III 

Of  the  Pure  Concepts  of  the  Understanding,  or  of  the 

Categories 

General  logic,  as  we  have  often  said,  takes  no  account 
of  the  contents  of  our  knowledge,  but  expects  that  repre- 
sentations will  come  from  elsewhere  in  order  to  be  turned 
into  concepts  by  an  analytical  process.  Transcendental 
logic,  on  the  contrary,  has  before  it  the  manifold  contents 


64 


Transcendental  Analytic 


of  sensibility  a priori , supplied  by  transcendental  [p.  77] 
aesthetic  as  the  material  for  the  concepts  of  the  pure 
understanding,  without  which  those  concepts  would  be 
without  any  contents,  therefore  entirely  empty.  It  is  true 
that  space  and  time  contain  what  is  manifold  in  the  pure 
intuition  a priori , but  they  belong  also  to  the  conditions 
of  the  receptivity  of  our  mind  under  which  alone  it  can 
receive  representations  of  objects,  and  which  therefore 
must  affect  the  concepts  of  them  also.  The  spontaneity 
of  our  thought  requires  that  what  is  manifold  in  the 
pure  intuition  should  first  be  in  a certain  way  examined, 
received,  and  connected,  in  order  to  produce  a knowledge 
of  it.  This  act  I call  synthesis. 

In  its  most  general  sense,  I understand  by  synthesis 
the  act  of  arranging  different  representations  together, 
and  of  comprehending  what  is  manifold  in  them  under 
one  form  of  knowledge.  Such  a synthesis  is  pure,  if  the 
manifold  is  not  given  empirically,  but  a priori  (as  in  time 
and  space).  Before  we  can  proceed  to  an  analysis  of  our 
representations,  these  must  first  be  given,  and,  as  far  as 
their  contents  are  concerned,  no  concepts  can  arise  ana- 
lytically. Knowledge  is  first  produced  by  the  synthesis  of 
what  is  manifold  (whether  given  empirically  or  a priori). 
That  knowledge  may  at  first  be  crude  and  confused  and 
in  need  of  analysis,  but  it  is  synthesis  which  really  collects 
the  elements  of  knowledge,  and  unites  them  to  a certain 
extent.  It  is  therefore  the  first  thing  which  we  [p.  78] 
have  to  consider,  if  we  want  to  form  an  opinion  on  the 
first  origin  of  our  knowledge. 

We  shall  see  hereafter  that  synthesis  in  general  is  the 
mere  result  of  what  I call  the  faculty  of  imagination,  a 
blind  but  indispensable  function  of  the  soul,  without 


Transcendental  Analytic 


65 


which  we  should  have  no  knowledge  whatsoever,  but  of 
the  existence  of  which  we  are  scarcely  conscious.  But 
to  reduce  this  synthesis  to  concepts  is  a function  that 
belongs  to  the  understanding,  and  by  which  the  under- 
standing supplies  us  for  the  first  time  with  knowledge 
properly  so  called. 

Pure  synthesis  in  its  most  general  meaning  gives  us  the 
pure  concept  of  the  understanding.  By  this  pure  syn- 
thesis I mean  that  which  rests  on  the  foundation  of  what 
I call  synthetical  unity  a priori.  Thus  our  counting  (as 
we  best  perceive  when  dealing  with  higher  numbers)  is 
a synthesis  according  to  concepts,  because  resting  on  a 
common  ground  of  unity,  as  for  instance,  the  decade. 
The  unity  of  the  synthesis  of  the  manifold  becomes 
necessary  under  this  concept. 

By  means  of  analysis  different  representations  are 
brought  under  one  concept,  a task  treated  of  in  general 
logic ; but  how  to  bring,  not  the  representations,  but  the 
pure  synthesis  of  representations,  under  concepts,  that  is 
what  transcendental  logic  means  to  teach.  The  first  that 
must  be  given  us  a priori  for  the  sake  of  knowledge  of 
all  objects,  is  the  manifold  in  pure  intuition.  The  second 
is,  the  synthesis  of  the  manifold  by  means  of  [p.  79] 
imagination.  But  this  does  not  yet  produce  true  know- 
ledge. The  concepts  which  impart  unity  to  this  pure 
synthesis  and  consist  entirely  in  the  representation  of  this 
necessary  synthetical  unity,  add  the  third  contribution 
towards  the  knowledge  of  an  object,  and  rest  on  the 
understanding. 

The  same  function  which  imparts  unity  to  various  rep- 
resentations in  one  judgment  imparts  unity  likewise  to  the 
mere  synthesis  of  various  representations  in  one  intuition, 


66 


Transcendental  Analytic 


which  in  a general  way  may  be  called  the  pure  concept 
of  the  understanding.  The  same  understanding,  and  by 
the  same  operations  by  which  in  concepts  it  achieves 
through  analytical  unity  the  logical  form  of  a judgment, 
introduces  also,  through  the  synthetical  unity  of  the  mani- 
fold in  intuition,  a transcendental  element  into  its  repre- 
sentations. They  are  therefore  called  pure  concepts  of 
the  understanding,  and  they  refer  a priori  to  objects, 
which  would  be  quite  impossible  in  general  logic. 

In  this  manner  there  arise  exactly  so  many  pure  con- 
cepts of  the  understanding  which  refer  a priori  to  objects 
of  intuition  in  general,  as  there  were  in  our  table  logical 
functions  in  all  possible  judgments,  because  those  func- 
tions completely  exhaust  the  understanding,  and  compre- 
hend every  one  of  its  faculties.  Borrowing  a term  of 
Aristotle,  we  shall  call  these  concepts  categories , [p.  80] 

our  intention  being  originally  the  same  as  his,  though 
widely  diverging  from  it  in  its  practical  application. 

TABLE  OF  CATEGORIES 

I 

Of  Quantity 
Unity. 

Plurality. 

Totality. 

Ill 

Of  Relation 

Of  Inherence  and  Subsistence 
( substantia  et  accidents'). 

Of  Causality  and  Dependence 
(cause  and  effect). 

Of  Community  (reciprocity  be- 
tween the  active  and  the 
passive). 


II 

Of  Quality 
Reality. 
Negation. 
Limitation. 


Transcendental  Analytic 


67 


IV 

Of  Modality 

Possibility.  Impossibility. 

Existence.  Non-existence. 

Necessity.  Contingency. 

This  then  is  a list  of  all  original  pure  concepts  of  syn- 
thesis, which  belong  to  the  understanding  a priori , and 
for  which  alone  it  is  called  pure  understanding ; for  it 
is  by  them  alone  that  it  can  understand  something  in  the 
manifold  of  intuition,  that  is,  think  an  object  in  it.  The 
classification  is  systematical,  and  founded  on  a common 
principle,  namely,  the  faculty  of  judging  (which  is  the 
same  as  the  faculty  of  thinking).  It  is  not  the  [p.  81] 
result  of  a search  after  pure  concepts  undertaken  at  hap- 
hazard, the  completeness  of  which,  as  based  on  induc- 
tion only,  could  never  be  guaranteed.  Nor  could  we 
otherwise  understand  why  these  concepts  only,  and  no 
others,  abide  in  the  pure  understanding.  It  was  an  enter- 
prise worthy  of  an  acute  thinker  like  Aristotle  to  try  to 
discover  these  fundamental  concepts ; but  as  he  had  no 
guiding  principle  he  merely  picked  them  up  as  they 
occurred  to  him,  and  at  first  gathered  up  ten  of  them, 
which  he  called  categories  or  predicaments.  Afterwards 
he  thought  he  had  discovered  five  more  of  them,  which  he 
added  under  the  name  of  post-predicaments.  But  his  table 
remained  imperfect  for  all  that,  not  to  mention  that  we 
find  in  it  some  modes  of  pure  sensibility  (q  nan  do,  nbi, 
situs,  also  prius,  simul),  also  an  empirical  concept  ( motus ), 
none  of  which  can  belong  to  this  genealogical  register  of 
the  understanding.  Besides,  there  are  some  derivative 
concepts,  counted  among  the  fundamental  concepts  {actio, 
passio ),  while  some  of  the  latter  are  entirely  wanting. 


68 


Transcendental  Analytic 


With  regard  to  these,  it  should  be  remarked  that  the 
categories,  as  the  true  fundamental  concepts  of  the  pure 
understanding,  have  also  their  pure  derivative  concepts. 
These  could  not  be  passed  over  in  a complete  system  of 
transcendental  philosophy,  but  in  a merely  critical  [p.  82] 
essay  the  mention  of  the  fact  may  suffice. 

I should  like  to  be  allowed  to  call  these  pure  but  deriva- 
tive concepts  of  the  understanding  the  predicabilia,  in 
opposition  to  the  predicamenta  of  the  pure  understanding. 
If  we  are  once  in  possession  of  the  fundamental  and 
primitive  concepts,  it  is  easy  to  add  the  derivative  and 
secondary,  and  thus  to  give  a complete  image  of  the 
genealogical  tree  of  the  pure  understanding.  As  at  pres- 
ent I am  concerned  not  with  the  completeness,  but  only 
with  the  principles  of  a system,  I leave  this  supplemen- 
tary work  for  a future  occasion.  In  order  to  carry  it  out, 
one  need  only  consult  any  of  the  ontological  manuals,  and 
place,  for  instance,  under  the  category  of  causality  the  pre- 
dicabilia of  force,  of  action,  and  of  passion ; under  the 
category  of  community  the  predicabilia  of  presence  and 
resistance ; under  the  predicaments  of  modality  the  pre- 
dicabilia of  origin,  extinction,  change,  etc.  If  we  asso- 
ciate the  categories  among  themselves  or  with  the  modes 
of  pure  sensibility,  they  yield  us  a large  number  of  de- 
rivative concepts  a priori,  which  it  would  be  useful  and 
interesting  to  mark  and,  if  possible,  to  bring  to  a certain 
completeness,  though  this  is  not  essential  for  our  present 
purpose. 

I intentionally  omit  here  the  definitions  of  these  cate- 
gories, though  I may  be  in  possession  of  them.1  In  the 


1 See,  however,  Karl’s  remarks  on  p.  210  (p.  241  of  First  Edition). 


Transcendental  Analytic 


69 


sequel  I shall  dissect  these  concepts  so  far  as  is  [p.  83] 
sufficient  for  the  purpose  of  the  method  which  I am  pre- 
paring. In  a complete  system  of  pure  reason  they  might 
be  justly  demanded,  but  at  present  they  would  only  make 
us  lose  sight  of  the  principal  object  of  our  investigation, 
by  rousing  doubts  and  objections  which,  without  injury  to 
our  essential  object,  may  well  be  relegated  to  another 
time.  The  little  I have  said  ought  to  be  sufficient  to 
show  clearly  that  a complete  dictionary  of  these  concepts 
with  all  requisite  explanations  is  not  only  possible,  but 
easy.  The  compartments  exist ; they  have  only  to  be 
filled,  and  with  a systematic  topic  like  the  present  the 
proper  place  to  which  each  concept  belongs  cannot  easily 
be  missed,  nor  compartments  be  passed  over  which  are 
still  empty.1 


1 Here  follows  in  the  Second  Edition,  Supplement  XII. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC 

[p.  84] 


CHAPTER  II 

OF  THE  DEDUCTION  OF  THE  PURE  CONCEPTS  OF 
THE  UNDERSTANDING 

Section  I 

Of  the  Principles  of  a Transcendental  Deduction  in 
General 

Jurists,  when  speaking  of  rights  and  claims,  distin- 
guish in  every  lawsuit  the  question  of  right  {quid  juris ) 
from  the  question  of  fact  {quid  facti ),  and  in  demanding 
proof  of  both  they  call  the  former,  which  is  to  show 
the  right  or,  it  may  be,  the  claim,  the  deductio7i.  We, 
not  being  jurists,  make  use  of  a number  of  empirical 
concepts,  without  opposition  from  anybody,  and  consider 
ourselves  justified,  without  any  deduction,  in  attaching 
to  them  a sense  or  imaginary  meaning,  because  we  can 
always  appeal  to  experience  to  prove  their  objective  real- 
ity. There  exist  however  illegitimate  concepts  also,  such 
as,  for  instance,  chance,  or  fate,  which  through  an  almost 
general  indulgence  are  allowed  to  be  current,  but  are  yet 
from  time  to  time  challenged  by  the  question  quid  juris. 
In  that  case  we  are  greatly  embarrassed  in  looking  for 
their  deduction,  there  being  no  clear  legal  title,  whether 


70 


Transcendental  Analytic 


7 1 


from  experience  or  from  reason,  on  which  their  [p.  85] 
claim  to  employment  could  be  clearly  established. 

Among  the  many  concepts,  however,  which  enter  into 
the  complicated  code  of  human  knowledge,  there  are 
some  which  are  destined  for  pure  use  a priori,  indepen- 
dent of  all  experience,  and  such  a claim  requires  at  all 
times  a deduction,1  because  proofs  from  experience  would 
not  be  sufficient  to  establish  the  legitimacy  of  such  a use, 
though  it  is  necessary  to  know  how  much  concepts  can 
refer  to  objects  which  they  do  not  find  in  experience.  I 
call  the  explanation  of  the  manner  how  such  concepts 
can  a priori  refer  to  objects  their  transcendental  deduc- 
tion, and  distinguish  it  from  the  empirical  deduction 
which  shows  the  manner  how  a concept  may  be  gained 
by  experience  and  by  reflection  on  experience ; this  does 
not  touch  the  legitimacy,  but  only  the  fact  whence  the 
possession  of  the  concept  arose. 

We  have  already  become  acquainted  with  two  totally 
distinct  classes  of  concepts,  which  nevertheless  agree  in 
this,  that  they  both  refer  a priori  to  objects,  namely, 
the  concepts  of  space  and  time  as  forms  of  sensibility, 
and  the  categories  as  concepts  of  the  understanding.  It 
would  be  labour  lost  to  attempt  an  empirical  deduction 
of  them,  because  their  distinguishing  characteristic  is 
that  they  refer  to  objects  without  having  borrowed  any- 
thing from  experience  for  their  representation,  [p.  86] 
If  therefore  a deduction  of  them  is  necessary,  it  can 
only  be  transcendental. 

It  is  possible,  however,  with  regard  to  these  concepts, 
as  with  regard  to  all  knowledge,  to  try  to  discover  in 


1 That  is  a transcendental  deduction. 


72 


Transcendental  Analytic 


experience,  if  not  the  principle  of  their  possibility,  yet 
the  contingent  causes  of  their  production.  And  here 
we  see  that  the  impressions  of  the  senses  give  the  first 
impulse  to  the  whole  faculty  of  knowledge  with  respect 
to  them,  and  thus  produce  experience  which  consists  of 
two  very  heterogeneous  elements,  namely,  matter  for 
knowledge,  derived  from  the  senses,  and  a certain  form 
according  to  which  it  is  arranged,  derived  from  the  inter- 
nal source  of  pure  intuition  and  pure  thought,  first  brought 
into  action  by  the  former,  and  then  producing  concepts. 
Such  an  investigation  of  the  first  efforts  of  our  faculty 
of  knowledge,  beginning  with  single  perceptions  and  ris- 
ing to  general  concepts,  is  no  doubt  very  useful,  and  we 
have  to  thank  the  famous  Locke  for  having  been  the 
first  to  open  the  way  to  it.  A deduction  of  the  pure 
concepts  a priori , however,  is  quite  impossible  in  that 
way.  It  lies  in  a different  direction,  because,  with  refer- 
ence to  their  future  use,  which  is  to  be  entirely  indepen- 
dent of  experience,  a very  different  certificate  of  birth 
will  be  required  from  that  of  mere  descent  from  experi- 
ence. We  may  call  this  attempted  physiological  deriva- 
tion (which  cannot  properly  be  called  deduction,  [p.  87] 
because  it  refers  to  a quaestio  facti),  the  explanation  of 
the  possession  of  pure  knowledge.  It  is  clear  therefore 
that  of  these  pure  concepts  a priori  a transcendental 
deduction  only  is  possible,  and  that  to  attempt  an  empiri- 
cal deduction  of  them  is  mere  waste  of  time,  which  no 
one  would  think  of  except  those  who  have  never  under- 
stood the  very  peculiar  nature  of  that  kind  of  knowledge. 

But  though  it  may  be  admitted  that  the  only  possible 
deduction  of  pure  knowledge  a priori  must  be  transcen- 
dental, it  has  not  yet  been  proved  that  such  a deduction 


T)'a?iscendental  Analytic 


73 


is  absolutely  necessary.  We  have  before,  by  means  of 
a transcendental  deduction,  followed  up  the  concepts  of 
space  and  time  to  their  very  sources,  and  explained  and 
defined  their  objective  validity  a priori.  Geometry,  how- 
ever, moves  along  with  a steady  step,  through  every  kind 
of  knowledge  a priori , without  having  to  ask  for  a cer- 
tificate from  philosophy  as  to  the  pure  legitimate  descent 
of  its  fundamental  concept  of  space.  But  it  should  be 
remarked  that  in  geometry  this  concept  is  used  with 
reference  to  the  outer  world  of  sense  only,  of  which 
space  is  the  pure  form  of  intuition,  and  where  geometri- 
cal knowledge,  being  based  on  a priori  intuition,  possesses 
immediate  evidence,  the  objects  being  given,  so  far  as 
their  form  is  concerned,  through  their  very  knowledge 
a priori  in  intuition.  When  we  come,  however,  [p.  88] 
lO  the  pure  concepts  of  the  understanding,  it  becomes 
absolutely  necessary  to  look  for  a transcendental  deduc- 
tion, not  only  for  them,  but  for  space  also,  because  they, 
not  being  founded  on  experience,  apply  to  objects  gener- 
ally, without  any  of  the  conditions  of  sensibility ; and, 
speaking  of  objects,  not  through  predicates  of  intuition 
and  sensibility,  but  of  pure  thought  a priori,  are  not 
able  to  produce  in  intuition  a priori  any  object  on  which, 
previous  to  all  experience,  their  synthesis  was  founded. 
These  concepts  of  pure  understanding,  therefore,  not 
only  excite  suspicion  with  regard  to  the  objective  validity 
and  the  limits  of  their  own  application,  but  render  even 
the  concept  of  space  equivocal,  because  of  an  inclination 
to  apply  it  beyond  the  conditions  of  sensuous  intuition, 
which  was  the  very  reason  that  made  a transcendental 
deduction  of  it,  such  as  we  gave  before,  necessary.  Be- 
fore the  reader  has  made  a single  step  in  the  field  of 


74 


Transcendental  Analytic 


pure  reason,  he  must  be  convinced  of  the  inevitable 
necessity  of  such  a transcendental  deduction,  otherwise 
he  would  walk  on  blindly  and,  after  having  strayed  in 
every  direction,  he  would  only  return  to  the  same  igno- 
rance from  which  he  started.  He  must  at  the  same  time 
perceive  the  inevitable  difficulty  of  such  a deduction,  so 
that  he  may  not  complain  about  obscurity  where  the 
object  itself  is  obscure,  or  weary  too  soon  with  our  re- 
moval of  obstacles,  the  fact  being  that  we  have  [p.  89] 
either  to  surrender  altogether  all  claims  to  the  know- 
ledge of  pure  reason  — the  most  favourite  field  of  all 
philosophers,  because  extending  beyond  the  limits  of  all 
possible  experience  — or  to  bring  this  critical  investigation 
to  perfection. 

It  was  easy  to  show  before,  when  treating  of  the  con- 
cepts of  space  and  time,  how  these,  though  being  know- 
ledge a priori , refer  necessarily  to  objects,  and  how  they 
make  a synthetical  knowledge  of  them  possible,  which  is 
independent  of  all  experience.  For,  as  no  object  can 
appear  to  us,  that  is,  become  an  object  of  empirical  intui- 
tion, except  through  such  pure  forms  of  sensibility,  space 
and  time  are  pure  intuitions  which  contain  a priori  the  con- 
ditions of  the  possibility  of  objects  as  phenomena,  and  the 
synthesis  in  these  intuitions  possesses  objective  validity. 

The  categories  of  the  understanding,  on  the  contrary, 
are  not  conditions  under  which  objects  can  be  given  in 
intuition,  and  it  is  quite  possible  therefore  that  objects 
should  appear  to  us  without  any  necessary  reference  to 
the  functions  of  the  understanding,  thus  showing  that  the 
understanding  contains  by  no  means  any  of  their  con- 
ditions a priori.  There  arises  therefore  here  a difficulty, 
which  we  did  not  meet  with  in  the  field  of  sensibility, 


Transcendental  Analytic 


75 


namely,  how  subjective  conditions  of  thought  can  have 
objective  validity,  that  is,  become  conditions  of  the  possi- 
bility of  the  knowledge  of  objects.  It  cannot  be  [p.  90] 
denied  that  phenomena  may  be  given  in  intuition  without 
the  functions  of  the  understanding.  For  if  we  take,  for 
instance,  the  concept  of  cause,  which  implies  a peculiar 
kind  of  synthesis,  consisting  in  placing  according  to  a rule 
after  something  called  A something  totally  different  from 
it,  B,  we  cannot  say  that  it  is  a priori  clear  why  phenomena 
should  contain  something  of  this  kind.  We  cannot  appeal 
for  it  to  experience,  because  what  has  to  be  proved  is  the 
objective  validity  of  this  concept  a priori.  It  would  re- 
main therefore  a priori  doubtful  whether  such  a concept 
be  not  altogether  empty,  and  without  any  corresponding 
object  among  phenomena.  It  is  different  with  objects  of 
sensuous  intuition.  They  must  conform  to  the  formal 
conditions  of  sensibility  existing  a priori  in  the  mind, 
because  otherwise  they  could  in  no  way  be  objects  to  us. 
But  why  besides  this  they  should  conform  to  the  condi- 
tions which  the  understanding  requires  for  the  synthetical 
unity  of  thought,  does  not  seem  to  follow  quite  so  easily. 
For  we  could  quite  well  imagine  that  phenomena  might 
possibly  be  such  that  the  understanding  should  not  find 
them  conforming  to  the  conditions  of  its  synthetical  unity, 
and  all  might  be  in  such  confusion  that  nothing  should 
appear  in  the  succession  of  phenomena  which  could  sup- 
ply a rule  of  synthesis,  and  correspond,  for  instance,  to 
the  concept  of  cause  and  effect,  so  that  this  concept  would 
thus  be  quite  empty,  null,  and  meaningless.  With  all  this 
phenomena  would  offer  objects  to  our  intuition,  because 
intuition  by  itself  does  not  require  the  functions  [p.  91] 
of  thought. 


76 


Transcendental  Analytic 


It  might  be  imagined  that  we  could  escape  from  the 
trouble  of  these  investigations  by  saying  that  experience 
offers  continually  examples  of  such  regularity  of  phe- 
nomena as  to  induce  us  to  abstract  from  it  the  concept 
of  cause,  and  it  might  be  attempted  to  prove  thereby  the 
objective  validity  of  such  a concept.  But  it  ought  to  be 
seen  that  in  this  way  the  concept  of  cause  cannot  possibly 
arise,  and  that  such  a concept  ought  either  to  be  founded 
a priori  in  the  understanding  or  be  surrendered  altogether 
as  a mere  hallucination.  For  this  concept  requires  strictly 
that  something,  A,  should  be  of  such  a nature  that  some- 
thing else,  B,  follows  from  it  necessarily  and  according  to 
an  absolutely  universal  rule.  Phenomena  no  doubt  supply 
us  with  cases  from  which  a rule  becomes  possible  accord- 
ing to  which  something  happens  usually,  but  never  so  that 
the  result  should  be  necessary.  There  is  a dignity  in  the 
synthesis  of  cause  and  effect  which  cannot  be  expressed 
empirically,  for  it  implies  that  the  effect  is  not  only  an 
accessory  to  the  cause,  but  given  by  it  and  springing  from 
it.  Nor  is  the  absolute  universality  of  the  rule  a quality 
inherent  in  empirical  rules,  which  by  means  of  induction 
cannot  receive  any  but  a relative  universality,  that  [p.  92] 
is,  a more  or  less  extended  applicability.  If  we  were  to 
treat  the  pure  concepts  of  the  understanding  as  merely 
empirical  products,  we  should  completely  change  their 
character  and  their  use. 

Transition  to  a Transcendental  Deduction  of  the  Categories 

Two  ways  only  are  possible  in  which  synthetical  repre- 
sentations and  their  objects  can  agree,  can  refer  to  each 
other  with  necessity,  and  so  to  say  meet  each  other. 
Either  it  is  the  object  alone  that  makes  the  representation 


Transcendental  Analytic 


77 


possible,  or  it  is  the  representation  alone  that  makes  the 
object  possible.  In  the  former  case  their  relation  is  em- 
pirical only,  and  the  representation  therefore  never  possible 
a priori.  This  applies  to  phenomena  with  reference  to 
whatever  in  them  belongs  to  sensation.  In  the  latter  case, 
though  representation  by  itself  (for  we  do  not  speak  here 
of  its1  causality  by  means  of  the  will)  cannot  produce  its 
object  so  far  as  its  existence  is  concerned,  nevertheless 
the  representation  determines  the  object  a priori , if 
through  it  alone  it  is  possible  to  know  anything  as  an 
object.  To  know  a thing  as  an  object  is  possible  only 
under  two  conditions.  First,  there  must  be  intuition  by 
which  the  object  is  given  us,  though  as  a phenomenon 
only,  secondly,  there  must  be  a concept  by  which  [p.  93] 
an  object  is  thought  as  corresponding  to  that  intuition. 
From  what  we  have  said  before  it  is  clear  that  the  first 
condition,  namely,  that  under  which  alone  objects  can  be 
seen,  exists,  so  far  as  the  form  of  intuition  is  concerned, 
in  the  soul  a priori.  All  phenomena  therefore  must  con- 
form to  that  formal  condition  of  sensibility,  because  it  is 
through  it  alone  that  they  appear,  that  is,  that  they  are 
given  and  empirically  seen. 

Now  the  question  arises  whether  there  are  not  also 
antecedent  concepts  a priori,  forming  conditions  under 
which  alone  something  can  be,  if  not  seen,  yet  thought  as 
an  object  in  general ; for  in  that  case  all  empirical  know- 
ledge of  objects  would  necessarily  conform  to  such  con- 
cepts, it  being  impossible  that  anything  should  become  an 
object  of  experience  without  them.  All  experience  con- 
tains, besides  the  intuition  of  the  senses  by  which  some- 


1 Read  dircn  instead  of  dessert. 


7« 


Transcendental  Analytic 


thing  is  given,  a concept  also  of  the  object,  which  is  given 
in  intuition  as  a phenomenon.  Such  concepts  of  objects 
in  general  therefore  must  form  conditions  a priori  of  all 
knowledge  produced  by  experience,  and  the  objective 
validity  of  the  categories,  as  being  such  concepts  a priori, 
rests  on  this  very  fact  that  by  them  alone,  so  far  as  the 
form  of  thought  is  concerned,  experience  becomes  possi- 
ble. If  by  them  only  it  is  possible  to  think  any  object  of 
experience,  it  follows  that  they  refer  by  necessity  and 
a priori  to  all  objects  of  experience. 

There  is  therefore  a principle  for  the  trans-  [p.  94] 
cendental  deduction  of  all  concepts  a priori  which  must 
guide  the  whole  of  our  investigation,  namely,  that  all 
must  be  recognized  as  conditions  a priori  of  the  possibility 
of  experience,  whether  of  intuition,  which  is  found  in  it, 
or  of  thought.  Concepts  which  supply  the  objective 
ground  of  the  possibility  of  experience  are  for  that  very 
reason  necessary.  An  analysis  of  the  experience  in  which 
they  are  found  would  not  be  a deduction,  but  a mere  illus- 
tration, because  they  would  there  have  an  accidental  char- 
acter only.  Nay,  without  their  original  relation  to  all 
possible  experience  in  which  objects  of  knowledge  occur, 
their  relation  to  any  single  object  would  be  quite  incom- 
prehensible. 

[There  are  three  original  sources,  or  call  them  faculties 
or  powers  of  the  soul,  which  contain  the  conditions  of  the 
possibility  of  all  experience,  and  which  themselves  cannot 
be  derived  from  any  other  faculty,  namely,  sense,  imagina- 
tion, and  apperception.  On  them  is  founded  — 

1.  The  synopsis  of  the  manifold  a priori  through  the 
senses. 

2.  The  synthesis  of  this  manifold  through  the  imagination. 


Transcendental  Analytic  79 

3.  The  unity  of  that  synthesis  by  means  of  original 
apperception. 

Besides  their  empirical  use  all  these  faculties  have  a 
transcendental  use  also,  referring  to  the  form  only  and 
possible  a priori.  With  regard  to  the  senses  we  have  dis- 
cussed that  transcendental  use  in  the  first  part,  [p.  95] 
and  we  shall  now  proceed  to  an  investigation  of  the  re- 
maining two,  according  to  their  true  nature.1] 

DEDUCTION  OF  THE  PURE  CONCEPTS  OF  THE 
UNDERSTANDING 

Section  II 

Of  the  a priori  Grounds  for  the  Possibility  of  Experience 

[That  a concept  should  be  produced  entirely  a priori 
and  yet  refer  to  an  object,  though  itself  neither  belonging 
to  the  sphere  of  possible  experience,  nor  consisting  of  the 
elements  of  such  an  experience,  is  self-contradictory  and 
impossible.  It  would  have  no  contents,  because  no  intui- 
tion corresponds  to  it,  and  intuitions  by  which  objects  are 
given  to  us  constitute  the  whole  field  or  the  complete 
object  of  possible  experience.  An  a priori  concept  there- 
fore not  referring  to  experience  would  be  the  logical  form 
only  of  a concept,  but  not  the  concept  itself  by  which 
something  is  thought. 

If  therefore  there  exist  any  pure  concepts  a priori , 
though  they  cannot  contain  anything  empirical,  they  must 
nevertheless  all  be  conditions  a priori  of  a possible  ex- 
perience, on  which  alone  their  objective  reality  depends. 

1 The  last  paragraph  is  omitted  in  the  Second  Edition.  There  is  instead  a 
criticism  of  Locke  and  Hume,  Supplement  XIII.  The  Deduction  of  the 
Categories  is  much  changed,  as  seen  in  Supplement  XIV. 


8o 


Transcendental  Analytic 


If  therefore  we  wish  to  know  how  pure  concepts  of  the 
understanding  are  possible,  we  must  try  to  find  out  what 
are  the  conditions  a priori  on  which  the  possibility  [p.  96] 
of  experience  depends,  nay,  on  which  it  is  founded,  apart 
from  all  that  is  empirical  in  phenomena.  A concept  ex- 
pressing this  formal  and  objective  condition  of  experience 
with  sufficient  generality  might  properly  be  called  a pure 
concept  of  the  understanding.  If  we  once  have  these 
pure  concepts  of  the  understanding,  we  may  also  imagine 
objects  which  are  either  impossible,  or,  if  not  impossible 
in  themselves,  yet  can  never  be  given  in  any  experience. 
We  have  only  in  the  connection  of  those  concepts  to  leave 
out  something  which  necessarily  belongs  to  the  conditions 
of  a possible  experience  (concept  of  a spirit),  or  to  extend 
pure  concepts  of  the  understanding  beyond  what  can  be 
reached  by  experience  (concept  of  God).  But  the  ele- 
ments of  all  knowledge  a priori , even  of  gratuitous  and 
preposterous  fancies,  though  not  borrowed  from  experi- 
ence (for  in  that  case  they  would  not  be  knowledge  a 
priori ) must  nevertheless  contain  the  pure  conditions 
a priori  of  a possible  experience  and  its  object,  otherwise 
not  only  would  nothing  be  thought  by  them,  but  they 
themselves,  being  without  data,  could  never  arise  in  our 
mind. 

Such  concepts,  then,  which  comprehend  the  pure  think- 
ing a priori  involved  in  every  experience,  are  discovered 
in  the  categories,  and  it  is  really  a sufficient  deduction  of 
them  and  a justification  of  their  objective  validity,  if  we 
succeed  in  proving  that  by  them  alone  an  object  [p.  97] 
can  be  thought.  But  as  in  such  a process  of  thinking 
more  is  at  work  than  the  faculty  of  thinking  only,  namely, 
the  understanding,  and  as  the  understanding,  as  a faculty 


T ranscendental  A nalytic 


8i 


of  knowledge  which  is  meant  to  refer  to  objects,  requires 
quite  as  much  an  explanation  as  to  the  possibility  of  such 
a reference,  it  is  necessary  for  us  to  consider  the  subjective 
sources  which  form  the  foundation  a priori  for  the  possi- 
bility of  experience,  not  according  to  their  empirical,  but 
according  to  their  transcendental  character, 

If  every  single  representation  stood  by  itself,  as  if 
isolated  and  separated  from  the  others,  nothing  like  what 
we  call  knowledge  could  ever  arise,  because  knowledge 
forms  a whole  of  representations  connected  and  compared 
with  each  other.  If  therefore  I ascribe  to  the  senses  a 
synopsis,  because  in  their  intuition  they  contain  something 
manifold,  there  corresponds  to  it  always  a synthesis,  and 
receptivity  can  make  knowledge  possible  only  when 
joined  with  spontaneity.  This  spontaneity,  now,  appears 
as  a threefold  synthesis  which  must  necessarily  take  place 
in  every  kind  of  knowledge,  namely,  first,  that  of  the 
apprehension  of  representations  as  modifications  of  the 
soul  in  intuition,  secondly,  of  the  reproductio7i  of  them  in 
the  imagination,  and,  thirdly,  that  of  their  recognition 
in  concepts.  This  leads  us  to  three  subjective  sources  of 
knowledge  which  render  possible  the  understanding,  and 
through  it  all  experience  as  an  empirical  product  of  the 
understanding.  [p.  98] 

Preliminary  Remark 

The  deduction  of  the  categories  is  beset  with  so  many 
difficulties  and  obliges  us  to  enter  so  deeply  into  the  first 
grounds  of  the  possibility  of  our  knowledge  in  general, 
that  I thought  it  more  expedient,  in  order  to  avoid  the 
lengthiness  of  a complete  theory,  and  yet  to  omit  nothing 
in  so  essential  an  investigation,  to  add  the  following  four 


82 


Transcendental  Analytic 


paragraphs  with  a view  of  preparing  rather  than  instruct- 
ing the  reader.  After  that  only  I shall  in  the  third  sec- 
tion proceed  to  a systematical  discussion  of  these  elements 
of  the  understanding.  Till  then  the  reader  must  not 
allow  himself  to  be  frightened  by  a certain  amount  of 
obscurity  which  at  first  is  inevitable  on  a road  never 
trodden  before,  but  which,  when  we  come  to  that  section, 
will  give  way,  I hope,  to  a complete  comprehension. 

I 

Of  the  Synthesis  of  Apprehension  in  Intuition 

Whatever  the  origin  of  our  representations  may  be, 
whether  they  be  due  to  the  influence  of  external  things 
or  to  internal  causes,  whether  they  have  arisen  a priori 
or  empirically  as  phenomena,  as  modifications  of  the 
mind  they  must  always  belong  to  the  internal  [p.  99] 
sense,  and  all  our  knowledge  must  therefore  finally  be 
subject  to  the  formal  condition  of  that  internal  sense, 
namely,  time,  in  which  they  are  all  arranged,  joined, 
and  brought  into  certain  relations  to  each  other.  This 
is  a general  remark  which  must  never  be  forgotten  in 
all  that  follows. 

Every  representation  contains  something  manifold, 
which  could  not  be  represented  as  such,  unless  the 
mind  distinguished  the  time  in  the  succession  of  one 
impression  after  another;  for  as  contained  in  one 
moment,  each  representation  can  never  be  anything 
but  absolute  unity.  In  order  to  change  this  manifold 
into  a unity  of  intuition  (as,  for  instance,  in  the  repre- 
sentation of  space),  it  is  necessary  first  to  run  through 
the  manifold  and  then  to  hold  it  together.  It  is  this 


Transcmdental  A?ialytic 


83 


act  which  I call  the  synthesis  of  apprehension,  because 
it  refers  directly  to  intuition  which  no  doubt  offers  some- 
thing manifold,  but  which,  without  a synthesis,  can  never 
make  it  such,  as  it  is  contained  in  one  representation. 

This  synthesis  of  apprehension  must  itself  be  carried 
out  a priori  also,  that  is,  with  reference  to  representations 
which  are  not  empirical.  For  without  it  we  should  never 
be  able  to  have  the  representations  either  of  space  or  time 
a priori,  because  these  cannot  be  produced  except  [p.  100] 
by  a synthesis  of  the  manifold  which  the  senses  offer  in 
their  original  receptivity.  It  follows  therefore  that  we 
have  a pure  synthesis  of  apprehension. 

II 

Of  the  Synthesis  of  Reproduction  in  Imagination 

It  is  no  doubt  nothing  but  an  empirical  law  according 
to  which  representations  which  have  often  followed  or 
accompanied  one  another,  become  associated  in  the  end 
and  so  closely  united  that,  even  without  the  presence  of 
the  object,  one  of  these  representations  will,  according  to 
an  invariable  law,  produce  a transition  of  the  mind  to  the 
other.  This  law  of  reproduction,  however,  presupposes 
that  the  phenomena  themselves  are  really  subject  to  such 
a rule,  and  that  there  is  in  the  variety  of  these  representa- 
tions a sequence  and  concomitancy  subject  to  certain 
rules ; for  without  this  the  faculty  of  empirical  imagina- 
tion would  never  find  anything  to  do  that  it  is  able  to 
do,  and  remain  therefore  buried  within  our  mind  as  a 
dead  faculty,  unknown  to  ourselves.  If  cinnabar  were 
sometimes  red  and  sometimes  black,  sometimes  light  and 
sometimes  heavy,  if  a man  could  be  changed  now  into 


84 


Transcendental  Analytic 


this,  now  into  another  animal  shape,  if  on  the  longest  day 
the  fields  were  sometimes  covered  with  fruit,  [p.  ioi] 
sometimes  with  ice  and  snow,  the  faculty  of  my  empirical 
imagination  would  never  be  in  a position,  when  represent- 
ing red  colour,  to  think  of  heavy  cinnabar.  Nor,  if  a cer- 
tain name  could  be  given  sometimes  to  this,  sometimes 
to  that  object,  or  if  that  the  same  object  could  sometimes 
be  called  by  one,  and  sometimes  by  another  name,  with- 
out any  rule  to  which  representations  are  subject  by  them- 
selves, would  it  be  possible  that  any  empirical  synthesis 
of  reproduction  should  ever  take  place. 

There  must  therefore  be  something  to  make  this  repro- 
duction of  phenomena  possible  by  being  itself  the  founda- 
tion a priori  of  a necessary  synthetical  unity  of  them. 
This  becomes  clear  if  we  only  remember  that  all  phe- 
nomena are  not  things  by  themselves,  but  only  the  play 
of  our  representations,  all  of  which  are  in  the  end  deter- 
minations only  of  the  internal  sense.  If  therefore  we 
could  prove  that  even  our  purest  intuitions  a priori  give 
us  no  knowledge,  unless  they  contain  such  a combination 
of  the  manifold  as  to  render  a constant  synthesis  of  repro- 
duction possible,  it  would  follow  that  this  synthesis  of  the 
imagination  is,  before  all  experience,  founded  on  principles 
a priori , and  that  we  must  admit  a pure  transcendental 
synthesis  of  imagination  which  forms  even  the  foundation 
of  the  possibility  of  all  experience,  such  experience  being 
impossible  without  the  reproductibility  of  phe-  [p.  102] 
nomena.  Now,  when  I draw  a line  in  thought,  or  if  I 
think  the  time  from  one  noon  to  another,  or  if  I only 
represent  to  myself  a certain  number,  it  is  clear  that  I 
must  first  necessarily  apprehend  one  of  these  manifold 
representations  after  another.  If  I were  to  lose  from  my 


Transcendental  Analytic 


85 


thoughts  what  precedes,  whether  the  first  parts  of  a line 
or  the  antecedent  portions  of  time,  or  the  numerical  unities 
representing  one  after  the  other,  and  if,  while  I proceed 
to  what  follows,  I were  unable  to  reproduce  what  came 
before,  there  would  never  be  a complete  representation, 
and  none  of  the  before-mentioned  thoughts,  not  even  the 
first  and  purest  representations  of  space  and  time,  could 
ever  arise  within  us. 

The  synthesis  of  apprehension  is  therefore  inseparably 
connected  with  the  synthesis  of  reproduction,  and  as  the 
former  constitutes  the  transcendental  ground  of  the  possi- 
bility of  all  knowledge  in  general  (not  only  of  empirical, 
but  also  of  pure  a priori  knowledge),  it  follows  that  a 
reproductive  synthesis  of  imagination  belongs  to  the  tran- 
scendental acts  of  the  soul.  We  may  therefore  call  this 
faculty  the  transcendental  faculty  of  imagination. 

Ill  [p.  103] 

Of  the  Synthesis  of  Recognition  in  Concepts 

Without  our  being  conscious  that  what  we  are  thinking 
now  is  the  same  as  what  we  thought  a moment  before,  all 
reproduction  in  the  series  of  representations  would  be  vain. 
Each  representation  would,  in  its  present  state,  be  a new 
one,  and  in  no  wise  belonging  to  the  act  by  which  it  was 
to  be  produced  by  degrees,  and  the  manifold  in  it  would 
never  form  a whole,  because  deprived  of  that  unity  which 
consciousness  alone  can  impart  to  it.  If  in  counting  I for- 
get that  the  unities  which  now  present  themselves  to  my 
mind  have  been  added  gradually  one  to  the  other,  I should 
not  know  the  production  of  the  quantity  by  the  successive 
addition  of  one  to  one,  nor  should  I know  consequently 


86 


Transcendental  Analytic 


the  number,  produced  by  the  counting,  this  number  being 
a concept  consisting  entirely  in  the  consciousness  of  that 
unity  of  synthesis. 

The  very  word  of  concept  (Begriff)  could  have  sug- 
gested this  remark,  for  it  is  the  one  consciousness  which 
unites  the  manifold  that  has  been  perceived  successively, 
and  afterwards  reproduced  into  one  representation.  This 
consciousness  may  often  be  very  faint,  and  we  may  con- 
nect it  with  the  effect  only,  and  not  with  the  act  itself,  i.e. 
with  the  production  of  a representation.  But  in  [p.  104] 
spite  of  this,  that  consciousness,  though  deficient  in  pointed 
clearness,  must  always  be  there,  and  without  it,  concepts, 
and  with  them,  knowledge  of  objects  are  perfectly  impos- 
sible. 

And  here  we  must  needs  arrive  at  a clear  understanding 
of  what  we  mean  by  an  object  of  representations.  We 
said  before  that  phenomena  are  nothing  but  sensuous  rep- 
resentations, which  therefore  by  themselves  must  not  be 
taken  for  objects  outside  our  faculty  of  representation. 
What  then  do  we  mean  if  we  speak  of  an  object  corre- 
sponding to,  and  therefore  also  different  from  our  know- 
ledge ? It  is  easy  to  see  that  such  an  object  can  only 
be  conceived  as  something  in  general  =x:  because,  beside 
our  knowledge,  we  have  absolutely  nothing  which  we  could 
put  down  as  corresponding  to  that  knowledge. 

Now  we  find  that  our  conception  of  the  relation  of  all 
knowledge  to  its  object  contains  something  of  necessity, 
the  object  being  looked  upon  as  that  which  prevents  our 
knowledge  from  being  determined  at  haphazard,  and 
causes  it  to  be  determined  a priori  in  a certain  way,  be- 
cause, as  they  are  all  to  refer  to  an  object,  they  must 
necessarily,  with  regard  to  that  object,  agree  with  each 


Transcendental  Analytic 


89 


other,  that  is  to  say,  possess  that  unity  which  [p.  105 
constitutes  the  concept  of  an  object. 

It  is  clear  also  that,  as  we  can  only  deal  with  the  mani- 
fold in  our  representations,  and  as  the  ;r  corresponding  to 
them  (the  object),  since  it  is  to  be  something  different 
from  all  our  representations,  is  really  nothing  to  us,  it  is 
clear,  I say,  that  the  unity,  necessitated  by  the  object,  can- 
not be  anything  but  the  formal  unity  of  our  consciousness 
in  the  synthesis  of  the  manifold  in  our  representations. 
Then  and  then  only  do  we  say  that  we  know  an  object,  if 
we  have  produced  synthetical  unity  in  the  manifold  of 
intuition.  Such  unity  is  impossible,  if  the  intuition  could 
not  be  produced,  according  to  a rule,  by  such  a function 
of  synthesis  as  makes  the  reproduction  of  the  manifold 
a priori  necessary,  and  a concept  in  which  that  manifold 
is  united,  possible.  Thus  we  conceive  a triangle  as  an 
object,  if  we  are  conscious  of  the  combination  of  three 
straight  lines,  according  to  a rule,  which  renders  such  an 
intuition  possible  at  all  times.  This  unity  of  ride  deter- 
mines the  manifold  and  limits  it  to  conditions  which  ren- 
der the  unity  of  apperception  possible,  and  the  concept  of 
that  unity  is  really  the  representation  of  the  object  = x, 
which  I think,  by  means  of  the  predicates  of  a triangle. 

No  knowledge  is  possible  without  a concept,  [p.  106] 
however  obscure  or  imperfect  it  may  be,  and  a concept 
is  always,  with  regard  to  its  form,  something  general, 
something  that  can  serve  as  a rule.  Thus  the  concept  of 
body  serves  as  a rule  to  our  knowledge  of  external  phe- 
nomena, according  to  the  unity  of  the  manifold  which  is 
thought  by  it.  It  can  only  be  such  a rule  of  intuitions 
because  representing,  in  any  given  phenomena,  the  neces- 
sary reproduction  of  their  manifold  elements,  or  the  syn- 


86 


Transcendental  Analytic 


hetical  unity  in  our  consciousness  of  them.  Thus  th^. 
concept  of  body,  whenever  we  perceive  something  outside 
us,  necessitates  the  representation  of  extension,  and,  with 
it,  those  of  impermeability,  shape,  etc. 

Necessity  is  always  founded  on  transcendental  condi- 
tions. There  must  be  therefore  a transcendental  ground  of 
the  unity  of  our  consciousness  in  the  synthesis  of  the  man- 
ifold of  all  our  intuitions,  and  therefore  also  a transcendental 
ground  of  all  concepts  of  objects  in  general,  and  therefore 
again  of  all  objects  of  experience,  without  which  it  would 
be  impossible  to  add  to  our  intuitions  the  thought  of  an 
object,  for  the  object  is  no  more  than  that  something  of 
which  the  concept  predicates  such  a necessity  of  synthesis. 

That  original  and  transcendental  condition  is  nothing 
else  but  what  I call  transcendental  apperception,  [p.  107] 
The  consciousness  of  oneself,  according  to  the  determina- 
tions of  our  state,  is,  with  all  our  internal  perceptions,  em- 
pirical only,  and  always  transient.  There  can  be  no  fixed 
or  permanent  self  in  that  stream  of  internal  phenomena. 
It  is  generally  called  the  internal  sense , or  the  empirical 
apperception.  What  is  necessarily  to  be  represented  as 
numerically  identical  with  itself,  cannot  be  thought  as 
such  by  means  of  empirical  data  only.  It  must  be  a con- 
dition which  precedes  all  experience,  and  in  fact  renders  it 
possible,  for  thus  only  could  such  a transcendental  suppo- 
sition acquire  validity. 

No  knowledge  can  take  place  in  us,  no  conjunction  or 
unity  of  one  kind  of  knowledge  with  another,  without  that 
unity  of  consciousness  which  precedes  all  data  of  intui- 
tion, and  without  reference  to  which  no  representation 
of  objects  is  possible.  This  pure,  original,  and  unchange- 
able consciousness  I shall  call  transcendetital  apperception. 


Transcendental  Analytic 


89 


That  it  deserves  such  a name  may  be  seen  from  the  fact 
that  even  the  purest  objective  unity,  namely,  that  of  the 
concepts  a priori  (space  and  time),  is  possible  only  by  a 
reference  of  all  intuitions  to  it.  The  numerical  unity  of 
that  apperception  therefore  forms  the  a priori  condition  of 
all  concepts,  as  does  the  manifoldness  of  space  and  time 
of  the  intuitions  of  the  senses. 

The  same  transcendental  unity  of  appercep-  [p.  108] 
tion  constitutes,  in  all  possible  phenomena  which  may 
come  together  in  our  experience,  a connection  of  all  these 
representations  according  to  laws.  For  that  unity  of  con- 
sciousness would  be  impossible,  if  the  mind,  in  the  know- 
ledge of  the  manifold,  could  not  become  conscious  of  the 
identity  of  function,  by  which  it  unites  the  manifold  syn- 
thetically in  one  knowledge.  Therefore  the  original  and 
necessary  consciousness  of  the  identity  of  oneself  is  at  the 
same  time  a consciousness  of  an  equally  necessary  unity 
of  the  synthesis  of  all  phenomena  according  to  concepts, 
that  is,  according  to  rules,  which  render  them  not  only 
necessarily  reproducible,  but  assign  also  to  their  intuition 
an  object,  that  is,  a concept  of  something  in  which  they 
are  necessarily  united.  The  mind  could  never  conceive 
the  identity  of  itself  in  the  manifoldness  of  its  representa- 
tions (and  this  a priori)  if  it  did  not  clearly  perceive  the 
identity  of  its  action,  by  which  it  subjects  all  synthesis  of 
apprehension  (which  is  empirical)  to  a transcendental 
unity,  and  thus  renders  its  regular  coherence  a priori  pos- 
sible. When  we  have  clearly  perceived  this,  we  shall  be 
able  to  determine  more  accurately  our  concept  of  an  ob- 
ject in  general.  All  representations  have,  as  representa- 
tions, their  object,  and  can  themselves  in  turn  become 
objects  of  other  representations.  The  only  objects  whicu 


9o 


T ranscendental  A nalytic 


can  be  given  to  us  immediately  are  phenomena,  and  what- 
ever in  them  refers  immediately  to  the  object  is  [p.  109] 
called  intuition.  These  phenomena,  however,  are  not 
things  in  themselves,  but  representations  only  which  have 
their  object,  but  an  object  that  can  no  longer  be  seen  by 
us,  and  may  therefore  be  called  the  not-empirical,  that  is, 
the  transcendental  object,  = x. 

The  pure  concept  of  such  a transcendental  object 
(which  in  reality  in  all  our  knowledge  is  always  the  same 
= x)  is  that  which  alone  can  give  to  all  our  empirical  con- 
cepts a relation  to  an  object  or  objective  reality.  That 
concept  cannot  contain  any  definite  intuition,  and  can 
therefore  refer  to  that  unity  only,  which  must  be  found 
in  the  manifold  of  our  knowledge,  so  far  as  it  stands  in  re- 
lation to  an  object.  That  relation  is  nothing  else  but  a 
necessary  unity  of  consciousness,  and  therefore  also  of 
the  synthesis  of  the  manifold,  by  a common  function  of 
the  mind,  which  unites  it  in  one  representation.  As  that 
unity  must  be  considered  as  a priori  necessary  (because, 
without  it,  our  knowledge  would  be  without  an  object),  we 
may  conclude  that  the  relation  to  a transcendental  object, 
that  is,  the  objective  reality  of  our  empirical  knowledge, 
rests  on  a transcendental  law,  that  all  phenomena,  if  they 
are  to  give  us  objects,  must  be  subject  to  rules  [p.  no] 
a priori  of  a synthetical  unity  of  these  objects,  by  which 
rules  alone  their  mutual  relation  in  an  empirical  intuition 
becomes  possible : that  is,  they  must  be  subject,  in  experi- 
ence, to  the  conditions  of  the  necessary  unity  of  apper- 
ception quite  as  much  as,  in  mere  intuition,  to  the  formal 
conditions  of  space  and  time.  Without  this  no  knowledge 
is  possible. 


Transcendental  Analytic 


91 


IV 

Preliminary  Explanation  of  the  Possibility  of  the  Categories 
as  Knowledge  a priori 

There  is  but  one  experience  in  which  all  perceptions 
are  represented  as  in  permanent  and  regular  connection, 
as  there  is  but  one  space  and  one  time  in  which  all  forms 
of  phenomena  and  all  relations  of  being  or  not  being  take 
place.  If  we  speak  of  different  experiences,  we  only 
mean  different  perceptions  so  far  as  they  belong  to  one 
and  the  same  general  experience.  It  is  the  permanent 
and  synthetical  unity  of  perceptions  that  constitutes  the 
form  of  experience,  and  experience  is  nothing  but  the  syn 
thetical  unity  of  phenomena  according  to  concepts. 

Unity  of  synthesis,  according  to  empirical  concepts, 
would  be  purely  accidental,  nay,  unless  these  [p.  111] 
were  founded  on  a transcendental  ground  of  unity,  a whole 
crowd  of  phenomena  might  rush  into  our  soul,  without 
ever  forming  real  experience.  All  relation  between  our 
knowledge  and  its  objects  would  be  lost  at  the  same  time, 
because  that  knowledge  would  no  longer  be  held  together 
by  general  and  necessary  laws ; it  would  therefore  become 
thoughtless  intuition,  never  knowledge,  and  would  be  to 
us  the  same  as  nothing. 

The  conditions  a priori  of  any  possible  experience  in 
general  are  at  the  same  time  conditions  of  the  possibility 
of  any  objects  of  our  experience.  Now  I maintain  that 
the  categories  of  which  we  are  speaking  are  nothing  but 
the  conditions  of  thought  which  make  experience  possible, 
as  much  as  space  and  time  contain  the  conditions  of  that 
intuition  which  forms  experience.  These  categories  there* 


92 


Tra?iscendental  Analytic 


fore  are  also  fundamental  concepts  by  which  we  think 
objects  in  general  for  the  phenomena,  and  have  therefore 
a priori  objective  validity.  This  is  exactly  what  we  wish 
to  prove. 

The  possibility,  nay  the  necessity  of  these  categories 
rests  on  the  relation  between  our  whole  sensibility,  and 
therefore  all  possible  phenomena,  and  that  original  apper- 
ception in  which  everything  must  be  necessarily  subject 
to  the  conditions  of  the  permanent  unity  of  self-conscious- 
ness, that  is,  must  submit  to  the  general  functions  [p.  1 12] 
of  that  synthesis  which  we  call  synthesis  according  to 
concepts,'  by  which  alone  our  apperception  can  prove  its 
permanent  and  necessary  identity  a priori.  Thus  the  con- 
cept of  cause  is  nothing  but  a synthesis  of  that  which 
follows  in  temporal  succession,  with  other  phenomena,  but 
a synthesis  according  to  concepts:  and  without  such  a 
unity  which  rests  on  a rule  a priori , and  subjects  all  phe- 
nomena to  itself,  no  permanent  and  general,  and  therefore 
necessary  unity  of  consciousness  would  be  formed  in  the 
manifold  of  our  perceptions.  Such  perceptions  would 
then  belong  to  no  experience  at  all,  they  would  be  without 
an  object,  a blind  play  of  representations, — dess  even  than 
a dream. 

All  attempts  therefore  at  deriving  those  pure  concepts 
of  the  understanding  from  experience,  and  ascribing  to 
them  a purely  empirical  origin,  are  perfectly  vain  and 
useless.  I shall  not  dwell  here  on  the  fact  that  a concept 
of  cause,  for  instance,  contains  an  element  of  necessity, 
which  no  experience  can  ever  supply,  because  experience, 
though  it  teaches  us  that  after  one  phenomenon  something 
else  follows  habitually,  can  never  teach  us  that  it  follows 
necessarily,  nor  that  we  could  a priori,  and  without  any 


Transcendental  Analytic 


93 


limitation,  derive  from  it,  as  a condition,  any  conclusion  as 
to  what  must  follow.  And  thus  I ask  with  reference  to 
that  empirical  rule  of  association,  which  must  always  be 
admitted  if  we  say  that  everything  in  the  succession  of 
events  is  so  entirely  subject  to  rules  that  nothing  [p.  1 13] 
ever  happens  without  something  preceding  it  on  which  it 
always  follows, — What  does  it  rest  on,  if  it  is  a law  of 
nature,  nay,  how  is  that  very  association  possible?  You 
call  the  ground  for  the  possibility  of  the  association  of  the 
manifold,  so  far  as  it  is  contained  in  the  objects  them- 
selves, the  affinity  of  the  manifold.  I ask,  therefore,  how 
do  you  make  that  permanent  affinity  by  which  phenomena 
stand,  nay,  must  stand,  under  permanent  laws,  conceivable 
to  yourselves  ? , 

According  to  my  principles  it  is  easily  conceivable.  All 
possible  phenomena  belong,  as  representations,  to  the 
whole  of  our  possible  self-consciousness.'  From  this,  as  a 
transcendental  representation,  numerical  identity  is  insep- 
arable and  a priori  certain,  because  nothing  can  become 
knowledge  except  by  means  of  that  original  apperception. 
As  this  identity  must  necessarily  enter  into  the  synthesis 
of  the  whole  of  the  manifold  of  phenomena,  if  that  syn- 
thesis is  to  become  empirical  knowledge,  it  follows  that 
the  phenomena  are  subject  to  conditions  a priori  to  which 
their  synthesis  (in  apprehension)  must  always  conform. 
The  representation  of  a general  condition  according  to 
which  something  manifold  can  be  arranged  (with  uni- 
formity) is  called  a rale,  if  it  must  be  so  arranged,  a law. 
All  phenomena  therefore  stand  in  a permanent  connection 
according  to  necessary  laws,  and  thus  possess  [p.  114] 
that  transcendental  affinity  of  which  the  empirical  is  a 
mere  consequence. 


94 


Transcendental  Analytic 


It  sounds  no  doubt  very  strange  and  absurd  that  nature 
should  have  to  conform  to  our  subjective  ground  of  apper- 
ception, nay,  be  dependent  on  it,  with  respect  to  her  laws. 
But  if  we  consider  that  what  we  call  nature  is  nothing  but 
a whole  of  phenomena,  not  a thing  by  itself,  but  a number 
of  representations  in  our  soul,  we  shall  no  longer  be  sur- 
prised that  we  only  see  her  through  the  fundamental 
faculty  of  all  our  knowledge,  namely,  the  transcendental 
apperception,  and  in  that  unity  without  which  it  could  not 
be  called  the  object  (or  the  whole)  of  all  possible  experience, 
that  is,  nature.  We  shall  thus  also  understand  why  we 
can  recognise  this  unity  a priori , and  therefore  as  nec- 
essary, which  would  be  perfectly  impossible  if  it  were 
given  by  itself  and  independent  of  the  first  sources  of  our 
own  thinking.  In  that  case  I could  not  tell  whence  we 
should  take  the  synthetical  propositions  of  such  general 
unity  of  nature.  They  would  have  to  be  taken  from  the 
objects  of  nature  themselves,  and  as  this  could  be  done 
empirically  only,  we  could  derive  from  it  none  but  an 
accidental  unity,  which  is  very  different  from  that  neces- 
sary connection  which  we  mean  when  speaking  of  nature. 

DEDUCTION  OF  THE  PURE  CONCEPTS  OF  THE 
UNDERSTANDING  [p.115] 

Section  III 

Of  the  Relation  of  the  Understanding  to  Objects  in  General, 
and  the  Possibility  of  Knoiving  Them,  a priori 

What  in  the  preceding  section  we  have  discussed 
singly  and  separately  we  shall  now  try  to  treat  in  con- 
nection with  each  other  and  as  a whole.  We  saw  that 
there  are  three  subjective  sources  of  knowledge  on 


Transcendental  Analytic 


95 


which  the  possibility  of  all  experience  and  of  the 
knowledge  of  its  objects  depends,  namely,  sense,  imagi- 
nation, and  apperception.  Each  of  them  may  be  con- 
sidered as  empirical  in  its  application  to  given  phenom- 
ena ; all,  however,  are  also  elements  or  grounds  a priori 
which  render  their  empirical  application  possible.  Sense 
represents  phenomena  empirically  in  perception,  imagina- 
tion in  association  (and  reproduction),  apperceptioii  in  the 
empirical  consciousness  of  the  identity  of  these  reproduc- 
tive representations  with  the  phenomena  by  which  they 
were  given ; therefore  in  recognition.  . 

The  whole  of  our  perception  rests  a priori  on  pure  in- 
tuition (if  the  perception  is  regarded  as  representation, 
then  on  time,  as  the  form  of  our  internal  intuition),  the 
association  of  it  (the  whole)  on  the  pure  syn-  [p.  116] 
thesis  of  imagination,  and  our  empirical  consciousness 
of  it  on  pure  apperception,  that  is,  on  the  permanent 
identity  of  oneself  in  the  midst  of  all  possible  repre- 
sentations. 

If  we  wish  to  follow  up  the  internal  ground  of  this 
connection  of  representations  to  that  point  towards 
which  they  must  all  converge,  and  where  they  receive 
for  the  first  time  that  unity  of  knowledge  which  is 
requisite  for  every  possible  experience,  we  must  begin 
with  pure  apperception.  Intuitions  are  nothing  to  us, 
and  do  not  concern  us  in  the  least,  if  they  cannot  be 
received  into  our  consciousness,  into  which  they  may 
enter  either  directly  or  indirectly.  Knowledge  is  im- 
possible in  any  other  way.  We  are  conscious  a priori 
of  our  own  permanent  identity  with  regard  to  all  repre- 
sentations that  can  ever  belong  to  our  knowledge,  as 
forming  a necessary  condition  of  the  possibility  of  all 


96 


Transcendental  Analytic 


representations  (because  these  could  not  represent  any- 
thing in  me,  unless  they  belonged  with  everything  else 
to  one  consciousness  and  could  at  least  be  connected 
within  it).  This  principle  stands  firm  a priori , and  may 
be  called  the  transcendental  principle  of  the  unity  of 
all  the  manifold  of  our  representations  (therefore  also 
of  intuition).  This  unity  of  the  manifold  in  one  subject 
is  synthetical ; the  pure  apperception  therefore  supplies 
us  with  a principle  of  the  synthetical  unity  of  [p.  117] 
the  manifold  in  all  possible  intuitions.1 

This  synthetical  unity,  however,  presupposes  [p.  118] 
or  involves  a synthesis,  and  if  that  unity  is  necessary 
a priori,  the  synthesis  also  must  be  a priori.  The  tran- 
scendental unity  of  apperception  therefore  refers  to  the 
pure  synthesis  of  imagination  as  a condition  a priori  of 

1 This  point  is  of  great  importance  and  should  be  carefully  considered. 
All  representations  have  a necessary  relation  to  some  possible  empirical  con- 
sciousness, for  if  they  did  not  possess  that  relation,  and  if  it  were  entirely  im- 
possible to  become  conscious  of  them,  this  would  be  the  same  as  if  they  did 
not  exist.  All  empirical  consciousness  has  a necessary  relation  to  a transcen- 
dental consciousness,  which  precedes  all  single  experiences,  namely,  the  con- 
sciousness of  my  own  self  as  the  original  apperception.  It  is  absolutely 
necessary  therefore  that  in  my  knowledge  all  consciousness  should  belong 
to  one  consciousness  of  my  own  self.  Here  we  have  a synthetical  unity  of 
the  manifold  (consciousness)  which  can  be  known  a priori,  and  which  may 
thus  supply  a foundation  for  synthetical  propositions  a priori  concerning  pure 
thinking  in  the  same  way  as  space  and  time  supply  a foundation  for  syn- 
thetical propositions  which  concern  the  form  of  mere  intuition. 

The  synthetical  proposition  that  the  different  kinds  of  empirical  conscious- 
ness must  be  connected  in  one  self-consciousness,  is  the  very  first  and  syn- 
thetical foundation  of  all  our  thinking.  It  should  be  remembered  that  the 
mere  representation  of  the  Ego  in  reference  to  all  other  representations  (the 
collective  unity  of  which  would  be  impossible  without  it)  constitutes  our 
transcendental  consciousness.  It  does  not  matter  whether  that  representation 
is  clear  (empirical  consciousness)  or  confused,  not  even  whether  it  is  real; 
but  the  possibility  of  the  logical  form  of  all  knowledge  rests  necessarily  on  the 
relation  to  this  apperception  as  a faculty. 


Transcendental  Analytic 


97 


the  possibility  of  the  manifold  being  united  in  one 
knowledge.  Now  there  can  take  place  a priori  the  pro- 
ductive synthesis  of  imagination  only,  because  the  re- 
productive rests  on  conditions  of  experience.  The 
principle  therefore  of  the  necessary  unity  of  the  pure 
(productive)  synthesis  of  imagination,  before  all  apper- 
ception, constitutes  the  ground  of  the  possibility  of  all 
knowledge,  nay,  of  all  experience. 

The  synthesis  of  the  manifold  in  imagination  is  called 
transcendental,  if,  without  reference  to  the  difference  of 
intuitions,  it  affects  only  the  a priori  conjunction  of  the 
manifold  ; and  the  unity  of  that  synthesis  is  called  tran- 
scendental if,  with  reference  to  the  original  unity  of  ap- 
perception, it  is  represented  as  a priori  necessary.  As  the 
possibility  of  all  knowledge  depends  on  the  unity  of  that 
apperception,  it  follows  that  the  transcendental  unity 
of  the  synthesis  of  imagination  is  the  pure  form  of  all 
possible  knowledge  through  which  therefore  all  objects  of 
possible  experience  must  be  represented  a priori. 

This  unity  of  apperception  with  reference  to  [p.  1 1 9] 
the  synthesis  of  imagination  is  the  understanding,  and 
the  same  unity  with  reference  to  the  transcendental 
synthesis  of  the  imagination,  the  pure  understanding. 
It  must  be  admitted  therefore  that  there  exist  in  the 
understanding  pure  forms  of  knowledge  a priori,  which 
contain  the  necessary  unity  of  the  pure  synthesis  of  the 
imagination  in  reference  to  all  possible  phenomena. 
These  are  the  categories,  that  is,  the  pure  concepts 
of  the  understanding.  The  empirical  faculty  of  know- 
ledge of  man  contains  therefore  by  necessity  an  under- 
standing which  refers  to  all  objects  of  the  senses, 
though  by  intuition  only,  and  by  its  synthesis  through 


H 


98 


Transcendental  A?ialytic 


imagination,  and  all  phenomena,  as  data  of  a possible 
experience,  must  conform  to  that  understanding.  As 
this  relation  of  phenomena  to  a possible  experience  is 
likewise  necessary,  (because,  without  it,  we  should  receive 
no  knowledge  through  them,  and  they  would  not  in  the 
least  concern  us),  it  follows  that  the  pure  understanding 
constitutes  by  the  means  of  the  categories  a formal  and 
synthetical  principle  of  all  experience,  and  that  phenomena 
have  thus  a necessary  relation  to  the  understanding. 

We  shall  now  try  to  place  the  necessary  connection  of 
the  understanding  with  the  phenomena  by  means  of  the 
categories  more  clearly  before  the  reader,  by  beginning 
with  the  beginning,  namely,  with  the  empirical. 

The  first  that  is  given  us  is  the  phenomenon , [p.  120] 

which,  if  connected  with  consciousness,  is  called  perception. 
(Without  its  relation  to  an  at  least  possible  consciousness, 
the  phenomenon  could  never  become  to  us  an  object  of 
knowledge.  It  would  therefore  be  nothing  to  us ; and 
because  it  has  no  objective  reality  in  itself,  but  exists  only 
in  being  known,  it  would  be  nothing  altogether.)  As  every 
phenomenon  contains  a manifold,  and  different  percep- 
tions are  found  in  the  mind  singly  and  scattered,  a con- 
nection of  them  is  necessary,  such  as  they  cannot  have  in 
the  senses  by  themselves.  There  exists  therefore  in  us  an 
active  power  for  the  synthesis  of  the  manifold  which  we 
call  imagination,  and  the  function  of  which,  as  applied 
to  perceptions,  I call  apprehension } This  imagination 

1 It  has  hardly  struck  any  psychologist  that  this  imagination  is  a necessary 
ingredient  of  perception.  This  was  partly  owing  to  their  confining  this  faculty 
to  reproduction,  partly  to  our  belief  that  the  senses  do  not  only  give  us  im- 
pressions, but  compound  them  also  for  us,  thus  producing  pictures  of  objects. 
This,  however,  beyond  our  receptivity  of  impressions,  requires  something 
more,  namely,  a function  for  their  synthesis. 


T ranscendental  A nalytic 


99 


is  meant  to  change  the  manifold  of  intuition  into  an  im- 
age, it  must  therefore  first  receive  the  impressions  into 
its  activity,  which  I call  to  apprehend. 

It  must  be  clear,  however,  that  even  this  appre-  [p.  12 1] 
hension  of  the  manifold  could  not  alone  produce  a cohe- 
rence of  impressions  or  an  image,  without  some  subjective 
power  of  calling  one  perception  from  which  the  mind  has 
gone  over  to  another  back  to  that  which  follows,  and  thus 
forming  whole  series  of  perceptions.  This  is  the  repro- 
ductive faculty  of  imagination  which  is  and  can  be  em- 
pirical only. 

If  representations,  as  they  happen  to  meet  with  one 
another,  could  reproduce  each  other  at  haphazard,  they 
would  have  no  definite  coherence,  but  would  form  irregu- 
lar agglomerations  only,  and  never  produce  knowledge. 
It  is  necessary  therefore  that  their  reproduction  should  be 
subject  to  a rule  by  which  one  representation  connects 
itself  in  imagination  with  a second  and  not  with  a third. 
It  is  this  subjective  and  empirical  ground  of  reproduction 
according  to  rules,  which  is  called  the  association  of  repre- 
sentations. 

If  this  unity  of  association  did  not  possess  an  objective 
foundation  also,  which  makes  it  impossible  that  phenomena 
should  be  apprehended  by  imagination  in  any  other  way 
but  under  the  condition  of  a possible  synthetical  unity  of 
that  apprehension,  it  would  be  a mere  accident  that  phe- 
nomena lend  themselves  to  a certain  connection  in  human 
knowledge.  Though  we  might  have  the  power  of  asso- 
ciating perceptions,  it  would  still  be  a matter  of  [p.  122] 
uncertainty  and  chance  whether  they  themselves  are  asso- 
ciate ; and,  in  case  they  should  not  be  so,  a number  of 
perceptions,  nay,  the  whole  of  our  sensibility,  might  possi- 


ioo  Transcendental  Analytic 

bly  contain  a great  deal  of  empirical  consciousness,  but  in 
a separate  state,  nay,  without  belonging  to  the  one  con- 
sciousness of  myself,  which,  however,  is  impossible.  Only 
by  ascribing  all  perceptions  to  one  consciousness  (the  origi- 
nal apperception)  can  I say  of  all  of  them  that  I am  con- 
scious of  them.  It  must  be  therefore  an  objective  ground, 
that  is,  one  that  can  be  understood  as  existing  a priori, 
and  before  all  empirical  laws  of  imagination,  on  which 
alone  the  possibility,  nay,  even  the  necessity  of  a law  can 
rest,  which  pervades  all  phenomena,  and  which  makes  us 
look  upon  them  all,  without  exception,  as  data  of  the 
senses,  associable  by  themselves,  and  subject  to  general 
rules  of  a permanent  connection  in  their  reproduction. 
This  objective  ground  of  all  association  of  phenomena  I 
call  their  affinity,  and  this  can  nowhere  be  found  except 
in  the  principle  of  the  unity  of  apperception  applied  to  all 
knowledge  which  is  to  belong  to  me.  According  to  it 
all  phenomena,  without  exception,  must  so  enter  into  the 
mind  or  be  apprehended  as  to  agree  with  the  unity  of 
apperception.  This,  without  a synthetical  unity  in  their 
connection,  which  is  therefore  necessary  objectively  also, 
would  be  impossible. 

We  have  thus  seen  that  the  objective  unity  [p.  123] 
of  all  (empirical)  consciousness  in  one  consciousness  (that 
of  the  original  apperception)  is  the  necessary  condition 
even  of  all  possible  perception,  while  the  affinity  of  all 
phenomena  (near  or  remote)  is  a necessary  consequence  of 
a synthesis  in  imagination  which  is  a priori  founded  on 
rules. 

Imagination  is  therefore  likewise  the  power  of  a synthe- 
sis a priori  which  is  the  reason  why  we  called  it  produc- 
tive imagination,  and  so  far  as  this  aims  at  nothing  but 


Transcejidental  Analytic  ioi 

the  necessary  unity  in  the  synthesis  of  all  the  manifold  in 
phenomena,  it  may  be  called  the  transcendental  function 
of  imagination.  However  strange  therefore  it  may  appear 
at  first,  it  must  nevertheless  have  become  clear  by  this 
time  that  the  affinity  of  phenomena  and  with  it  their  asso- 
ciation, and  through  that,  lastly,  their  reproduction  also 
according  to  laws,  that  is,  the  whole  of  our  experience, 
becomes  possible  only  by  means  of  that  transcendental 
function  of  imagination,  without  which  no  concepts  of 
objects  could  ever  come  together  in  one  experience. 

It  is  the  permanent  and  unchanging  Ego  (or  pure  ap- 
perception) which  forms  the  correlative  of  all  our  repre- 
sentations, if  we  are  to  become  conscious  of  them,  and  all 
consciousness  belongs  quite  as  much  to  such  an  all-em- 
bracing pure  apperception  as  all  sensuous  intuitions  be- 
longs, as  a representation,  to  a pure  internal  [p.  124] 
intuition,  namely,  time.  This  apperception  it  is  which 
must  be  added  to  pure  imagination,  in  order  to  render 
its  function  intellectual.  For  by  itself,  the  synthesis  of 
imagination,  though  carried  out  a priori,  is  always  sensu- 
ous, and  only  connects  the  manifold  as  it  appears  in  intui- 
tion, for  instance,  the  shape  of  a triangle.  But  when  the 
manifold  is  brought  into  relation  with  the  unity  of  apper- 
ception, concepts  which  belong  to  the  understanding  be- 
come possible,  but  only  as  related  to  sensuous  intuition 
through  imagination. 

We  have  therefore  a pure  imagination  as  one  of  the 
fundamental  faculties  of  the  human  soul,  on  which  all 
knowledge  a priori  depends.  Through  it  we  bring  the 
manifold  of  intuition  on  one  side  in  connection  with  the 
condition  of  the  necessary  unity  of  pure  apperception  on 
the  other.  These  two  extreme  ends,  sense  and  under- 


102 


Transcendental  Analytic 


standing,  must  be  brought  into  contact  with  each  other 
by  means  of  the  transcendental  function  of  imagination, 
because,  without  it,  the  senses  might  give  us  phenomena, 
but  no  objects  of  empirical  knowledge,  therefore  no  expe- 
rience. Real  experience,  which  is  made  up  of  apprehen- 
sion, association  (reproduction),  and  lastly  recognition  of 
phenomena,  contains  in  this  last  and  highest  [p.  125] 
(among  the  purely  empirical  elements  of  experience)  con- 
cepts, which  render  possible  the  formal  unity  of  experi- 
ence, and  with  it,  all  objective  validity  (truth)  of  empirical 
knowledge.  These  grounds  for  the  recognition  of  the 
manifold,  so  far  as  they  concern  the  form  only  of  expe- 
rience in  general,  are  our  categories.  On  them  is  founded 
the  whole  formal  unity  in  the  synthesis  of  imagination 
and,  through  it,  of  1 the  whole  empirical  use  of  them  (in 
recognition,  reproduction,  association,  and  apprehension) 
down  to  the  very  phenomena,  because  it  is  only  by  means 
of  those  elements  of  knowledge  that  the  phenomena  can 
belong  to  our  consciousness  and  therefore  to  ourselves. 

It  is  we  therefore  who  carry  into  the  phenomena  which 
we  call  nature,  order  and  regularity,  nay,  we  should  never 
find  them  in  nature,  if  we  ourselves,  or  the  nature  of  our 
mind,  had  not  originally  placed  them  there.  For  the 
unity  of  nature  is  meant  to  be  a necessary  and  a priori 
certain  unity  in  the  connection  of  all  phenomena.  And 
how  should  we  a priori  have  arrived  at  such  a synthetical 
unity,  if  the  subjective  grounds  of  such  unity  were  not 
contained  a priori  in  the  original  sources  of  our  know- 
ledge, and  if  those  subjective  conditions  did  not  at  the 
same  time  possess  objective  validity,  as  being  the  grounds 


1 Of  may  be  omitted,  if  we  read  alter  cmpirischcr  Gebrauch. 


Transceiidental  Analytic  103 

on  which  alone  an  object  becomes  possible  in  [p.  126] 
our  experience  ? 

We  have  before  given  various  definitions  of  the  under- 
standing, by  calling  it  the  spontaneity  of  knowledge  (as 
opposed  to  the  receptivity  of  the  senses),  or  the  faculty 
of  thinking,  or  the  faculty  of  concepts  or  of  judgments  ; 
all  of  these  explanations,  if  more  closely  examined,  coming 
to  the  same.  We  may  now  characterise  it  as  the  faculty 
of  rules.  This  characteristic  is  more  significant,  and  ap- 
proaches nearer  to  the  essence  of  the  understanding. 
The  senses  give  us  forms  (of  intuition),  the  understanding 
rules,  being  always  busy  to  examine  phenomena,  in  order 
to  discover  in  them  some  kind  of  rule.  Rules,  so  far  as 
they  are  objective  (therefore  necessarily  inherent  in  our 
knowledge  of  an  object),  are  called  laws.  Although  expe- 
rience teaches  us  many  laws,  yet  these  are  only  particular 
determinations  of  higher  laws,  the  highest  of  them,  to 
which  all  others  are  subject,  springing  a priori  from  the 
understanding ; not  being  derived  from  experience,  but, 
on  the  contrary,  imparting  to  the  phenomena  their  regu- 
larity, and  thus  making  experience  possible.  The  under- 
standing therefore  is  not  only  a power  of  making  rules 
by  a comparison  of  phenomena,  it  is  itself  the  lawgiver  of 
nature,  and  without  the  understanding  nature,  that  is,  a 
synthetical  unity  of  the  manifold  of  phenomena,  [p.  127] 
according  to  rules,  would  be  nowhere  to  be  found,  because 
phenomena,  as  such,  cannot  exist  without  us,  but  exist  in 
our  sensibility  only.  This  sensibility,  as  an  object  of  our 
knowledge  in  any  experience,  with  everything  it  may  con- 
tain, is  possible  only  in  the  unity  of  apperception,  which 
unity  of  apperception  is  transcendental  ground  of  the 
necessary  order  of  all  phenomena  in  an  experience.  The 


104  Transcendental  Analytic 

same  unity  of  apperception  with  reference  to  the  mani- 
fold of  representations  (so  as  to  determine  it  out  of  one)1 
forms  what  we  call  the  rule,  and  the  faculty  of  these  rules 
I call  the  understanding.  As  possible  experience  there- 
fore, all  phenomena  depend  in  the  same  way  a priori  on 
the  understanding,  and  receive  their  formal  possibility 
from  it  as,  when  looked  upon  as  mere  intuitions,  they 
depend  on  sensibility,  and  become  possible  through  it,  so 
far  as  their  form  is  concerned. 

However  exaggerated  therefore  and  absurd  it  may 
sound,  that  the  understanding  is  itself  the  source  of  the 
laws  of  nature,  and  of  its  formal  unity,  such  a statement 
is  nevertheless  correct  and  in  accordance  with  experience. 
It  is  quite  true,  no  doubt,  that  empirical  laws,  as  such, 
cannot  derive  their  origin  from  the  pure  understanding, 
as  little  as  the  infinite  manifoldness  of  phenomena  could 
be  sufficiently  comprehended  through  the  pure  form  of 
sensuous  intuition.  But  all  empirical  laws  are  only  par- 
ticular determinations  of  the  pure  laws  of  the  [p.  128] 
understanding,  under  which  and  according  to  which  the 
former  become  possible,  and  phenomena  assume  a regular 
form,  quite  as  much  as  all  phenomena,  in  spite  of  the 
variety  of  their  empirical  form,  must  always  submit  to  the 
conditions  of  the  pure  form  of  sensibility. 

The  pure  understanding  is  therefore  in  the  categories 
the  law  of  the  synthetical  unity  of  all  phenomena,  and 
thus  makes  experience,  so  far  as  its  form  is  concerned,  for 
the  first  time  possible.  This,  and  no  more  than  this,  we 
were  called  upon  to  prove  in  the  transcendental  deduction 
of  the  categories,  namely,  to  make  the  relation  of  the 


1 That  is,  out  of  one,  or  out  of  the  unity  of  apperception. 


Transcendental  Analytic 


105 


understanding  to  our  sensibility,  and  through  it  to  all 
objects  of  experience,  that  is  the  objective  validity  of  the 
pure  concepts  a priori  of  the  understanding,  conceivable, 
and  thus  to  establish  their  origin  and  their  truth. 


SUMMARY  REPRESENTATION 

OF  THE  CORRECTNESS  AND  OF  THE  ONLY  POSSIBILITY  OF 

THIS  DEDUCTION  OF  THE  PURE  CONCEPTS  OF  THE  UNDER- 
STANDING 

If  the  objects  with  which  our  knowledge  has  to  deal 
were  things  by  themselves,  we  could  have  no  concepts  a 
priori  of  them.  For  where  should  we  take  them  ? If  we 
took  them  from  the  object  (without  asking  even  the  ques- 
tion, how  that  object  could  be  known  to  us)  our  [p.  129] 
concepts  would  be  empirical  only,  not  concepts  a priori. 
If  we  took  them  from  within  ourselves,  then  that  which 
is  within  us  only,  could  not  determine  the  nature  of  an 
object  different  from  our  representations,  that  is,  supply 
a ground  why  there  should  be  a thing  to  which  something 
like  what  we  have  in  our  thoughts  really  belongs,  and 
why  all  this  representation  should  not  rather  be  altogether 
empty.  But  if,  on  the  contrary,  we  have  to  deal  with 
phenomena  only,  then  it  becomes  not  only  possible,  but 
necessary,  that  certain  concepts  a priori  should  precede 
our  empirical  knowledge  of  objects.  For  being  phenom- 
ena, they  form  an  object  that  is  within  us  only,  because  a 
mere  modification  of  our  sensibility  can  never  exist  outside 
us.  The  very  idea  that  all  these  phenomena,  and  there- 
fore all  objects  with  which  we  have  to  deal,  are  altogether 
within  me,  or  determinations  of  my  own  identical  self, 


iq6  Transcendental  Analytic 

implies  by  itself  the  necessity  of  a permanent  unity  of 
them  in  one  and  the  same  apperception.  In  that  unity 
of  a possible  consciousness  consists  also  the  form  of  all 
knowledge  of  objects,  by  which  the  manifold  is  thought 
as  belonging  to  one  object.  The  manner  therefore  in 
which  the  manifold  of  sensuous  representation  (intuition) 
belongs  to  our  consciousness,  precedes  all  knowledge  of 
an  object,  as  its  intellectual  form,  and  constitutes  a kind 
of  formal  a prioi'i  knowledge  of  all  objects  in  general,  if 
they  are  to  be  thought  (categories).  Their  syn-  [p.  130] 
thesis  by  means  of  pure  imagination,  and  the  unity  of  all 
representations  with  reference  to  the  original  appercep- 
tion, precede  all  empirical  knowledge.  Pure  concepts  of 
the  understanding  are  therefore  a priori  possible,  nay, 
with  regard  to  experience,  necessary,  for  this  simple  rea- 
son, because  our  knowledge  has  to  deal  with  nothing  but 
phenomena,  the  possibility  of  which  depends  on  ourselves, 
and  the  connection  and  unity  of  which  (in  the  repre- 
sentation of  an  object)  can  be  found  in  ourselves  only,  as 
antecedent  to  all  experience,  nay,  as  first  rendering  all 
experience  possible,  so  far  as  its  form  is  concerned.  On 
this  ground,  as  the  only  possible  one,  our  deduction  of  the 
categories  has  been  carried  out.} 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC 


BOOK  II 

ANALYTIC  OF  PRINCIPLES 

General  logic  is  built  up  on  a plan  that  coincides  accu- 
rately with  the  division  of  the  higher  faculties  of  know- 
ledge. These  are,  Understanding , Judgment,  and  Reason. 
Logic  therefore  treats  in  its  analytical  portion  of  concepts , 
judgments,  and  syllogisms  corresponding  with  the  func- 
tions and  the  order  of  the  above-named  faculties  [p.  1 3 1 ] 
of  the  mind,  which  are  generally  comprehended  under  the 
vague  name  of  the  understanding. 

As  formal  logic  takes  no  account  of  the  contents  of  our 
knowledge  (pure  or  empirical),  but  treats  of  the  form  of 
thought  only  (discursive  knowledge),  it  may  well  contain 
in  its  analytical  portion  the  canon  of  reason  also,  reason 
being,  according  to  its  form,  subject  to  definite  rules 
which,  without  reference  to  the  particular  nature  of  the 
knowledge  to  which  they  are  applied,  can  be  found  out 
a priori  by  a mere  analysis  of  the  acts  of  reasoning  into 
their  component  parts. 

Transcendental  logic,  being  limited  to  a certain  content, 
namely,  to  pure  knowledge  a priori,  cannot  follow  general 
logic  in  this  division  ; for  it  is  clear  that  the  transcendental 
use  of  reason  cannot  be  objectively  valid,  and  cannot  there- 
fore belong  to  the  logic  of  truth,  that  is,  to  Analytic,  but 
must  be  allowed  to  form  a separate  part  of  our  scholastic 

107 


io8  Transcendental  Analytic 

system,  as  a logic  of  illusion , under  the  name  of  transcen- 
dental Dialectic. 

Understanding  and  judgment  have  therefore  a canon 
of  their  objectively  valid,  and  therefore  true  use  in  tran- 
scendental logic,  and  belong  to  its  analytical  portion.  But 
reason,  in  its  attempts  to  determine  anything  a priori  with 
reference  to  objects,  and  to  extend  knowledge  beyond  the 
limits  of  possible  experience,  is  altogether  dialectical,  and 
its  illusory  assertions  have  no  place  in  a canon  [p.  132] 
such  as  Analytic  demands. 

Our  Analytic  of  principles  therefore  will  be  merely  a 
canon  of  the  faculty  of  judgment,  teaching  it  how  to  apply 
to  phenomena  the  concepts  of  the  understanding,  which 
contain  the  condition  of  rules  a priori.  For  this  reason, 
and  in  order  to  indicate  my  purpose  more  clearly,  I shall 
use  the  name  of  doctrine  of  the  faculty  of  judgment , while 
treating  of  the  real  principles  of  the  understanding. 

INTRODUCTION 

OF  THE  TRANSCENDENTAL  FACULTY  OF  JUDGMENT  IN 
GENERAL 

If  the  understanding  is  explained  as  the  faculty  of 
rules,  the  faculty  of  judgment  consists  in  performing  the 
subsumption  under  these  rules,  that  is,  in  determining 
whether  anything  falls  under  a given  rule  ( casus  dates 
legis ) or  not.  General  logic  contains  no  precepts  for  the 
faculty  of  judgment  and  cannot  contain  them.  For  as  it 
takes  no  account  of  the  contents  of  our  knowledge,  it  has 
only  to  explain  analytically  the  mere  form  of  knowledge 
in  concepts,  judgments,  and  syllogisms,  and  thus  [p.  133] 
to  establish  formal  rules  for  the  proper  employment  of  the 


Transcendental  Analytic  109 

understanding.  If  it  were  to  attempt  to  show  in  general 
how  anything  should  be  arranged  under  these  rules,  and 
how  we  should  determine  whether  something  falls  under 
them  or  not,  this  could  only  take  place  by  means  of  a new 
rule.  This,  because  it  is  a new  rule,  requires  a new  pre- 
cept for  the  faculty  of  judgment,  and  we  thus  learn  that, 
though  the  understanding  is  capable  of  being  improved 
and  instructed  by  means  of  rules,  the  faculty  of  judgment 
is  a special  talent  which  cannot  be  taught,  but  must  be 
practised.  This  is  what  constitutes  our  so-called  mother- 
wit,  the  absence  of  which  cannot  be  remedied  by  any 
schooling.  For  although  the  teacher  may  offer,  and  as 
it  were  graft  into  a narrow  understanding,  plenty  of  rules 
borrowed  from  the  experience  of  others,  the  faculty  of 
using  them  rightly  must  belong  to  the  pupil  himself,  and 
without  that  talent  no  precept  that  may  be  given  is  safe 
fromabuse.1  A physician,  therefore,  a judge,  or  [p.134] 
a politician,  may  carry  in  his  head  many  beautiful  patho- 
logical, juridical,  or  political  rules,  nay,  he  may  even  be- 
come an  accurate  teacher  of  them,  and  he  may  yet  in  the 
application  of  these  rules  commit  many  a blunder,  either 
because  he  is  deficient  in  judgment,  though  not  in  under- 
standing, knowing  the  general  in  the  abstract,  but  unable 
to  determine  whether  a concrete  case  falls  under  it ; or,  it 
may  be,  because  his  judgment  has  not  been  sufficiently 
trained  by  examples  and  practical  experience.  It  is  the 

1 Deficiency  in  the  faculty  of  judgment  is  really  what  we  call  stupidity,  and 
there  is  no  remedy  for  that.  An  obtuse  and  narrow  mind,  deficient  in  nothing 
but  a proper  degree  of  understanding  and  correct  concepts,  may  be  improved 
by  study,  so  far  as  to  become  even  learned.  But  as  even  then  there  is  often  a 
deficiency  of  judgment  (seeunda  Petri ) we  often  meet  with  very  learned  men, 
who  in  handling  their  learning  betray  that  original  deficiency  which  can  never 
be  mended. 


I IO 


T ranscendental  A na lytic 


one  great  advantage  of  examples  that  they  sharpen  the 
faculty  of  judgment,  but  they  are  apt  to  impair  the  accu- 
racy and  precision  of  the  understanding,  because  they 
fulfil  but  rarely  the  conditions  of  the  rule  quite  adequately 
(as  casus  in  tcrminis ).  Nay,  they  often  weaken  the  effort 

of  the  understanding  in  comprehending  rules  according 
to  their  general  adequacy,  and  independent  of  the  special 
circumstances  of  experience,  and  accustom  us  to  use  those 
rules  in  the  end  as  formulas  rather  than  as  principles. 
Examples  may  thus  be  called  the  go-cart  of  the  judgment, 
which  those  who  are  deficient  in  that  natural  talent1  can 
never  do  without. 

But  although  general  logic  can  give  no  pre-  [p.  135] 
cepts  to  the  faculty  of  judgment,  the  case  is  quite  differ- 
ent with  transcendental  logic,  so  that  it  even  seems  as  if 
it  were  the  proper  business  of  the  latter  to  correct  and 
to  establish  by  definite  rules  the  faculty  of  the  judgment 
in  the  use  of  the  pure  understanding.  For  as  a doctrine 
and  a means  of  enlarging  the  field  of  pure  knowledge  a 
priori  for  the  benefit  of  the  understanding,  philosophy 
does  not  seem  necessary,  but  rather  hurtful,  because,  in 
spite  of  all  attempts  that  have  been  hitherto  made,  hardly 
a single  inch  of  ground  has  been  gained  by  it.  For  criti- 
cal purposes,  however,  and  in  order  to  guard  the  faculty 
of  judgment  against  mistakes  ( lapsus  judicii ) in  its  use  of 
the  few  pure  concepts  of  the  understanding  which  we  pos- 
sess, philosophy  (though  its  benefits  may  be  negative  only) 
has  to  employ  all  the  acuteness  and  penetration  at  its 
command. 

1 Desselben  has  been  changed  into  derselben  in  later  editions.  Dtsselben, 
however,  may  be  meant  to  refer  to  Urtheil,  as  contained  in  Urtheilskraft, 
The  second  edition  has  desselben. 


Transcendental  Analytic 


1 1 1 


What  distinguishes  transcendental  philosophy  is,  that 
besides  giving  the  rules  (or  rather  the  general  condition 
of  rules)  which  are  contained  in  the  pure  concept  of  the 
understanding,  it  can  at  the  same  time  indicate  a priori 
the  case  to  which  each  rule  may  be  applied.  The  superi- 
ority which  it  enjoys  in  this  respect  over  all  other  sciences, 
except  mathematics,  is  due  to  this,  that  it  treats  of  con- 
cepts which  are  meant  to  refer  to  their  objects  a priori , so 
that  their  objective  validity  cannot  be  proved  [p.  136] 
a posteriori,  because  this  would  not  affect  their  own 
peculiar  dignity.  It  must  show,  on  the  contrary,  by 
means  of  general  but  sufficient  marks,  the  conditions 
under  which  objects  can  be  given  corresponding  to  those 
concepts  ; otherwise  these  would  be  without  any  contents, 
mere  logical  forms,  and  not  pure  concepts  of  the  under- 
standing. 

Our  transcendental  doctrine  of  the  faculty  of  judgment 
will  consist  of  two  chapters.  The  first  will  treat  of  the 
sensuous  condition  under  which  alone  pure  concepts  of 
the  understanding  can  be  used.  This  is  what  I call  the 
schematism  of  the  pure  understanding.  The  second  will 
treat  of  the  synthetical  judgments,  which  can  be  derived 
a priori  under  these  conditions  from  pure  concepts  of  the 
understanding,  and  on  which  all  knowledge  a priori  de- 
pends. It  will  treat,  therefore,  of  the  principles  of  the 
pure  understanding. 


THE 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DOCTRINE 

[p-  137] 

OF  THE 

FACULTY  OF  JUDGMENT 

OR 

ANALYTIC  OF  PRINCIPLES 

CHAPTER  I 

OF  THE  SCHEMATISM  OF  THE  PURE  CONCEPTS  OF  THE 
UNDERSTANDING 

In  comprehending  any  object  under  a concept,  the 
representation  of  the  former  must  be  homogeneous 
with  the  latter, 1 that  is,  the  concept  must  contain  that 
which  is  represented  in  the  object  to  be  comprehended 
under  it,  for  this  is  the  only  meaning  of  the  expression 
that  an  object  is  comprehended  under  a concept.  Thus, 
for  instance,  the  empirical  concept  of  a plate  is  homo- 
geneous with  the  pure  geometrical  concept  of  a circle, 
the  roundness  which  is  conceived  in  the  first  forming  an 
object  of  intuition  in  the  latter. 

Now  it  is  clear  that  pure  concepts  of  the  understanding( 
as  compared  with  empirical  or  sensuous  impressions  in 
general,  are  entirely  heterogeneous,  and  can  never  be  met 

1 Read  Jem  letzteren,  as  corrected  by  Rosenkranz,  for  der  letzteren. 


112 


Transcendental  Analytic  1 1 3 

with  in  any  intuition.  How  then  can  the  latter  be  com- 
prehended under  the  former,  or  how  can  the  categories 
be  applied  to  phenomena,  as  no  one  is  likely  to  say  that 
causality,  for  instance,  could  be  seen  through  the  senses, 
and  was  contained  in  the  phenomenon?  It  is  [p.  138] 
really  this  very  natural  and  important  question  which 
renders  a transcendental  doctrine  of  the  faculty  of  judg- 
ment necessary,  in  order  to  show  how  it  is  possible  that 
any  of  the  pure  concepts  of  the  understanding  can  be 
applied  to  phenomena.  In  all  other  sciences  in  which  the 
concepts  by  which  the  object  is  thought  in  general  are  not 
so  heterogeneous  or  different  from  those  which  represent 
it  in  concreto,  and  as  it  is  given,  there  is  no  necessity  to 
enter  into  any  discussions  as  to  the  applicability  of  the 
former  to  the  latter. 

In  our  case  there  must  be  some  third  thing  homo- 
geneous on  the  one  side  with  the  category,  and  on  the 
other  with  the  phenomenon,  to  render  the  application  of  the 
former  to  the  latter  possible.  This  intermediate  repre- 
sentation must  be  pure  (free  from  all  that  is  empirical) 
and  yet  intelligible  on  the  one  side,  and  sensuous  on  the 
other.  Such  a representation  is  the  transcendental  schema. 

The  concept  of  the  understanding  contains  pure  syn- 
thetical unity  of  the  manifold  in  general.  Time,  as  the 
formal  condition  of  the  manifold  in  the  internal  sense, 
consequently  of  the  conjunction  of  all  representations, 
contains  a manifold  a priori  in  pure  intuition.  A tran- 
scendental determination  of  time  is  so  far  homogeneous 
with  the  category  (which  constitutes  its  unity)  that  it  is 
general  and  founded  on  a rule  a priori ; and  it  is  on  the 
other  hand  so  far  homogeneous  with  the  phe-  [p.  139] 
nomenon,  that  time  must  be  contained  in  every  empirical 
1 


i 1 4 Transcendental  A na lytic 

representation  of  the  manifold.  The ' application  of  the 
category  to  phenomena  becomes  possible  therefore  by 
means  of  the  transcendental  determination  of  time,  which, 
as  a schema  of  the  concepts  of  the  understanding,  allows 
the  phenomena  to  be  comprehended  under  the  category. 

After  what  has  been  said  in  the  deduction  of  the  cate- 
gories, we  hope  that  nobody  will  hesitate  in  answering  the 
question  whether  these  pure  concepts  of  the  understand- 
ing allow  only  of  an  empirical  or  also  of  a transcendental 
application,  that  is,  whether,  as  conditions  of  a possible 
experience,  they  refer  a priori  to  phenomena  only,  or 
whether,  as  conditions  of  the  possibility  of  things  in  gem 
eral,  they  may  be  extended  to  objects  by  themselves  (with- 
out restriction  to  our  sensibility).  For  there  we  saw  that 
concepts  are  quite  impossible,  and  cannot  have  any  mean- 
ing unless  there  be  an  object  given  either  to  them  or,  at 
least,  to  some  of  the  elements  of  which  they  consist,  and 
that  they  can  never  refer  to  things  by  themselves  (without 
regard  as  to  whether  and  how  things  may  be  given  to  us). 
We  likewise  saw  that  the  only  way  in  which  objects  can 
be  given  to  us,  consists  in  a modification  of  our  sensibility, 
and  lastly,  that  pure  concepts  a priori  must  contain,  besides 
the  function  of  the  understanding  in  the  category  itself, 
formal  conditions  a priori  of  sensibility  (particu-  [p.  140] 
larly  of  the  internal  sense)  which  form  the  general  condi- 
tion under  which  alone  the  category  may  be  applied  to 
any  object.  We  shall  call  this  formal  and  pure  condition 
of  sensibility,  to  which  the  concept  of  the  understanding 
is  restricted  in  its  application,  its  schema  ; and  the  function 
of  the  understanding  in  these  schemata,  the  schematism  of 
the  pure  understanding. 

The  schema  by  itself  is  no  doubt  a product  of  the  imagi- 


T ranscendental.  A nalytic  1 1 5 

nation  only,  but  as  the  synthesis  of  the  imagination  does 
not  aim  at  a single  intuition,  but  at  some  kind  of  unity 
alone  in  the  determination  of  sensibility,  the  schema  ought 
to  be  distinguished  from  the  image.  Thus,  if  I place  five 

points,  one  after  the  other this  is  an  image  of  the 

number  five.  If,  on  the  contrary,  I think  of  a number  in 
general,  whether  it  be  five  or  a hundred,  this  thinking  is 
rather  the  representation  of  a method  of  representing  in 
one  image  a certain  quantity  (for  instance  a thousand) 
according  to  a certain  concept,  than  the  image  itself,  which, 
in  the  case  of  a thousand,  I could  hardly  take  in  and  com- 
pare with  the  concept.  This  representation  of  a general 
procedure  of  the  imagination  by  which  a concept  receives 
its  image,  I call  the  schema  of  such  concept. 

The  fact  is  that  our  pure  sensuous  concepts  do  not 
depend  on  images  of  objects,  but  on  schemata,  [p.  14 1] 
No  image  of  a triangle  in  general  could  ever  be  adequate 
to  its  concept.  It  would  never  attain  to  that  generality  of 
the  concept,  which  makes  it  applicable  to  all  triangles, 
whether  right-angled,  or  acute-angled,  or  anything  else, 
but  would  always  be  restricted  to  one  portion  only  of  the 
sphere  of  the  concept.  The  schema  of  the  triangle  can 
exist  nowhere  but  in  thought,  and  is  in  fact  a rule  for 
the  synthesis  of  imagination  with  respect  to  pure  forms 
in  space.  Still  less  does  an  object  of  experience  or  its 
image  ever  cover  the  empirical  concept,  which  always 
refers  directly  to  the  schema  of  imagination  as  a rule  for 
the  determination  of  our  intuitions,  according  to  a certain 
general  concept.  The  concept  of  dog  means  a rule  ac- 
cording to  which  my  imagination  can  always  draw  a 
general  outline  of  the  figure  of  a four-footed  animal, 
without  being  restricted  to  any  particular  figure  supplied 


1 1 6 Transcendental  Analytic 

by  experience  or  to  any  possible  image  which  I may  draw 
in  the  concrete.  This  schematism  of  our  understanding 
applied  to  phenomena  and  their  mere  form  is  an  art  hid- 
den in  the  depth  of  the  human  soul,  the  true  secrets  of 
which  we  shall  hardly  ever  be  able  to  guess  and  reveal. 
So  much  only  we  can  say,  that  the  image  is  a product  of 
the  empirical  faculty  of  the  productive  imagination,  while 
the  schema  of  sensuous  concepts  (such  as  of  figures  in 
space)  is  a product  and  so  to  say  a monogram  of  [p.  142] 
the  pure  imagination  a priori,  through  which  and  accord- 
ing to  which  images  themselves  become  possible,  though 
they  are  never  fully  adequate  to  the  concept,  and  can  be 
connected  with  it  by  means  of  their  schema  only.  _ The 
schema  of  a pure  concept  of  the  understanding,  on  the 
contrary,  is  something  which  can  never  be  made  into  an 
image ; for  it  is  nothing  but  the  pure  synthesis  determined 
by  a rule  of  unity,  according  to  concepts,  a synthesis  as 
expressed  by  the  category,  and  represents  a transcendental 
product  of  the  imagination,  a product  which  concerns  the 
determination  of  the  internal  sense  in  general,  under  the 
conditions  of  its  form  (time),  with  reference  to  all  repre- 
sentations, so  far  as  these  are  meant  to  be  joined  a priori 
in  one  concept,  according  to  the  unity  of  apperception. 

Without  dwelling  any  longer  on  a dry  and  tedious 
determination  of  all  that  is  required  for  the  transcen- 
dental schemata  of  the  pure  concepts  of  the  understand- 
ing in  general,  we  shall  proceed  at  once  to  represent  them 
according  to  the  order  of  the  categories,  and  in  connection 
with  them. 

The  pure  image  of  all  quantities  (quanta)  before  the 
external  sense,  is  space ; that  of  all  objects  of  the  senses 
in  general,  time.  The  pure  schema  of  quantity  (yuan- 


Transcendental  Analytic  II 7 

titas),  however,  as  a concept  of  the  understanding,  is 
number,  a representation  which  comprehends  the  succes- 
sive addition  of  one  to  one  (homogeneous).  Number 
therefore  is  nothing  but  the  unity  of  the  syn-  [p.  143] 
thesis  of  the  manifold  (repetition)  of  a homogeneous 
intuition  in  general,  I myself  producing  the  time  in  the 
apprehension  of  the  intuition. 

Reality  is,  in  the  pure  concept  of  the  understanding, 
that  which  corresponds  to  a sensation  in  general : that, 
therefore,  the  concept  of  which  indicates  by  itself  being 
(in  time),  while  negation  is  that  the  concept  of  which  rep- 
resents not-being  (in  time).  The  opposition  of  the  two 
takes  place  therefore  by  a distinction  of  one  and  the 
same  time,  as  either  filled  or  empty.  As  time  is  only 
the  form  of  intuition,  that  is,  of  objects  as  phenomena, 
that  which  in  the  phenomena  corresponds  to  sensation, 
constitutes  the  transcendental  matter  of  all  objects,  as 
things  by  themselves  (reality,  Sachheit).  Every  sensa- 
tion, however,  has  a degree  of  quantity  by  which  it  can 
fill  the  same  time  (that  is,  the  internal  sense,  with  refer- 
ence to  the  same  representation  of  an  object),  more  or  less, 
till  it  vanishes  into  nothing  (equal  to  nought  or  negation). 
There  exists,  therefore,  a relation  and  connection,  or  rather 
a transition  from  reality  to  negation,  which  makes  every 
reality  representable  as  a quantum  ; and  the  schema  of  a 
reality,  as  the  quantity  of  something  which  fills  time,  is 
this  very  continuous  and  uniform  production  of  reality  in 
time ; while  we  either  descend  from  the  sensation  which 
has  a certain  degree,  to  its  vanishing  in  time,  or  ascend 
from  the  negation  of  sensation  to  some  quantity  of  it. 

The  schema  of  substance  is  the  permanence  [p.  144] 
of  the  real  in  time,  that  is,  the  representation  of  it  as  a 


1 18 


Transcendental  Analytic 


substratum  for  the  empirical  determination  of  time  in 
general,  which  therefore  remains  while  everything  else 
changes.  (It  is  not  time  that  passes,  but  the  existence  of 
the  changeable  passes  in  time.  What  corresponds  there- 
fore in  the  phenomena  to  time,  which  in  itself  is  unchange- 
able and  permanent,  is  the  unchangeable  in  existence,  that 
is,  substance ; and  it  is  only  in  it  that  the  succession  and 
the  coexistence  of  phenomena  can  be  determined  according 
to  time.) 

The  schema  of  cause  and  of  the  causality  of  a thing  in 
general  is  the  real  which,  when  once  supposed  to  exist,  is 
always  followed  by  something  else.  It  consists  therefore 
in  the  succession  of  the  manifold,  in  so  far  as  that  succes- 
sion is  subject  to  a rule. 

The  schema  of  community  (reciprocal  action)  or  of  the 
reciprocal  causality  of  substances,  in  respect  to  their  acci- 
dents, is  the  coexistence,  according  to  a general  rule,  of 
the  determinations  of  the  one  with  those  of  the  other. 

The  schema  of  possibility  is  the  agreement  of  the  syn- 
thesis of  different  representations  with  the  conditions  of 
time  in  general,  as,  for  instance,  when  opposites  cannot 
exist  at  the  same  time  in  the  same  thing,  but  only  one 
after  the  other.  It  is  therefore  the  determination  of  the 
representation  of  a thing  at  any  time  whatsoever. 

The  schema  of  reality  is  existence  at  a given  time.  [p.  145] 

The  schema  of  necessity  is  the  existence  of  an  object  at 
all  times. 

It  is  clear,  therefore,  if  we  examine  all  the  categories, 
that  the  schema  of  quantity  contains  and  represents  the 
production  (synthesis)  of  time  itself  in  the  successive 
apprehension  of  an  object  ; the  schema  of  quality,  the 
synthesis  of  sensation  (perception)  with  the  representation 


Transcendental  Analytic  119 

of  time  or  the  filling-up  of  time ; the  schema  of  relation, 
the  relation  of  perceptions  to  each  other  at  all  times  (that 
is,  according  to  a rule  which  determines  time) ; lastly,  the 
schema  of  modality  and  its  categories,  time  itself  as  the 
correlative  of  the  determination  of  an  object  as  to  whether 
and  how  it  belongs  to  time.  The  schemata  therefore  are 
nothing  but  determinations  of  time  a priori  according  to 
rules,  and  these,  as  applied  to  all  possible  objects,  refer  in  the 
order  of  the  categories  to  the  series  of  time,  the  contents  of 
time,  the  order  of  time,  and  lastly,  the  comprehension  of  tune. 

We  have  thus  seen  that  the  schematism  of  the  under- 
standing, by  means  of  a transcendental  synthesis  of 
imagination,  amounts  to  nothing  else  but  to  the  unity  of 
the  manifold  in  the  intuition  of  the  internal  sense,  and 
therefore  indirectly  to  the  unity  of  apperception,  as  an 
active  function  corresponding  to  the  internal  sense  (as  re- 
ceptive). These  schemata  therefore  of  the  pure  concepts 
of  the  understanding  are  the  true  and  only  con-  [p.  146] 
ditions  by  which  these  concepts  can  gain  a relation  to 
objects,  that  is,  a significance,  and  the  categories  are  thus 
in  the  end  of  no  other  but  a possible  empirical  use,  serv- 
ing only,  on  account  of  an  a priori  necessary  unity  (the 
necessary  connection  of  all  consciousness  in  one  original 
apperception)  to  subject  all  phenomena  to  general  rules  of 
synthesis,  and  thus  to  render  them  capable  of  a general 
connection  in  experience. 

All  our  knowledge  is  contained  within  this  whole  of 
possible  experience,  and  transcendental  truth,  which  pre- 
cedes all  empirical  truth  and  renders  it  possible,  consists 
in  general  relation  of  it  to  that  experience. 

But  although  the  schemata  of  sensibility  serve  thus  to 
realise  the  categories,  it  must  strike  everybody  that  they 


120 


Transcendental  Analytic 


at  the  same  time  restrict  them,  that  is,  limit  them  by  con- 
ditions  foreign  to  the  understanding  and  belonging  to  sen- 
sibility. Hence  the  schema  is  really  the  phenomenon,  or 
the  sensuous  concept  of  an  object  in  agreement  with  the 
category  (numerus  est  quantitas  phaenomenon , sensatio 
realitas  phaenomenon,  constans  et  perdurabile  rerum  sub- 
stantia phaenomenon  — aeternitas  necessitas  phaenomenon, 
etc.).  If  we  omit  a restrictive  condition,  it  would  seem 
that  we  amplify  a formerly  limited  concept,  and  that 
therefore  the  categories  in  their  pure  meaning,  [p.  147] 
free  from  all  conditions  of  sensibility,  should  be  valid  of 
things  in  general,  as  they  are,  while  their  schemata  rep- 
resent them  only  as  they  appear , so  that  these  categories 
might  claim  a far  more  extended  power,  independent  of 
all  schemata.  And  in  truth  we  must  allow  to  these  pure 
concepts  of  the  understanding,  apart  from  all  sensuous 
conditions,  a certain  significance,  though  a logical  one 
only,  with  regard  to  the  mere  unity  of  representations 
produced  by  them,  although  these  representations  have 
no  object  and  therefore  no  meaning  that  could  give  us 
a concept  of  an  object.  Thus  substance,  if  we  leave  out 
the  sensuous  condition  of  permanence,  would  mean  noth- 
ing but  a something  that  may  be  conceived  as  a subject, 
without  being  the  predicate  of  anything  else.  Of  such 
a representation  we  can  make  nothing,  because  it  does 
not  teach  us  how  that  thing  is  determined  which  is  thus 
to  be  considered  as  the  first  subject.  Categories,  there- 
fore, without  schemata  are  functions  only  of  the  under- 
standing necessary  for  concepts,  but  do  not  themselves 
represent  any  object.  This  character  is  given  to  them 
by  sensibility  only,  which  realises  the  understanding  by, 
at  the  same  time,  restricting  it. 


THE 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DOCTRINE 

[P.  148] 

OF  THE 

FACULTY  OF  JUDGMENT 

OR 

ANALYTIC  OF  PRINCIPLES 

CHAPTER  II 

SYSTEM  OF  ALL  PRINCIPLES  OF  THE  PURE  UNDERSTANDING 

We  have  in  the  preceding  chapter  considered  the  tran- 
scendental faculty  of  judgment  with  reference  to  those 
general  conditions  only  under  which  it  is  justified  in 
using  the  pure  concepts  of  the  understanding  for  syn- 
thetical judgments.  It  now  becomes  our  duty  to  repre- 
sent systematically  those  judgments  which,  under  that 
critical  provision,  the  understanding,  can  really  produce 
a priori.  For  this  purpose  our  table  of  categories  will 
be  without  doubt  our  natural  and  best  guide.  For  it  is 
the  relation  of  the  categories  to  all  possible  experience 
which  must  constitute  all  pure  a priori  knowledge  of  the 
understanding ; and  their  relation  to  sensibility  in  general 
will  therefore  exhibit  completely  and  systematically  all 


121 


122  Transcendental  Analytic 

the  transcendental  principles  of  the  use  of  the  under- 
standing.1 

Principles  a priori  are  so  called,  not  only  because  they 
contain  the  grounds  for  other  judgments,  but  also  because 
they  themselves  are  not  founded  on  higher  and  more  gen- 
eral kinds  of  knowledge.  This  peculiarity,  however,  does 
not  enable  them  to  dispense  with  every  kind  of  proof ; for 
although  this  could  not  be  given  objectively,  as  [p.  149] 
all  knowledge  of  any  object  really  rests  on  it,  this  does 
not  prevent  us  from  attempting  to  produce  a proof  drawn 
from  the  subjective  sources  of  the  possibility  of  a know- 
ledge of  the  object  in  general ; nay,  it  may  be  necessary 
to  do  so,  because,  without  it,  our  assertion  might  be  sus- 
pected of;  being  purely  gratuitous. 

We  shall  treat,  however,  of  those  principles  only  which 
relate  to  the  categories.  We  shall  have  nothing  to  do 
with  the  principles  of  transcendental  aesthetic,  according 
to1  which  space  and  time  are  the  conditions  of  the  pos- 
sibility of  all  things  as  phenomena,  nor  with  the  limita- 
tion of  those  principles,  prohibiting  their  application  to 
things  by  themselves.  Mathematical  principles  also  do 
not  belong  to  this  part  of  our  discussion,  because  they 
are  derived  from  intuition,  and  not  from  the  pure  con- 
cept of  the  understanding.  As  they  are,  however,  syn- 
thetical judgments  a priori , their  possibility  will  have  to 
be  discussed,  not  in  order  to  prove  their  correctness  and 
apodictic  certainty,  which  would  be  unnecessary,  but  in 
order  to  make  the  possibility  of  such  self-evident  know- 
ledge a priori  conceivable  and  intelligible. 

We  shall  also  have  to  speak  of  the  principle  of  analyti- 

1 The  insertion  of  man,  as  suggested  by  Rosenkranz,  is  impossible. 


Transcendental  Analytic 


123 


cal  as  opposed  to  synthetical  judgments,  the  [p.  150] 
latter  being  the  proper  subject  of  our  enquiries,  because 
this  very  opposition  frees  the  theory  of  the  latter  from 
all  misunderstandings,  and  places  them  clearly  before 
us  in  their  own  peculiar  character. 


SYSTEM  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  THE  PURE 
UNDERSTANDING 

Section  I 

Of  the  Highest  Principle  of  all  Analytical  Judgments 

Whatever  the  object  of  our  knowledge  may  be,  and 
whatever  the  relation  between  our  knowledge  and  its 
object,  it  must  always  submit  to  that  general,  though  only 
negative  condition  of  all  our  judgments,  that  they  do  not 
contradict  themselves;  otherwise  these  judgments,  without 
any  reference  to  their  object,  are  in  themselves  nothing. 
But  although  there  may  be  no  contradiction  in  our  judg- 
ment, it  may  nevertheless  connect  concepts  in  a manner 
not  warranted  by  the  object,  or  without  there  being  any 
ground,  whether  a priori  or  a posteriori , to  confirm  such  a 
judgment.  A judgment  may  therefore  be  false  or  ground- 
less, though  in  itself  it  is  free  from  all  contradiction. 

The  proposition  that  no  subject  can  have  a [p.  1 5 1 ] 
predicate  which  contradicts  it,  is  called  the  principle  of 
contradiction.  It  is  a general  though  only  negative  crite- 
rion of  all  truth,  and  belongs  to  logic  only,  because  it 
applies  to  knowledge  as  knowledge  only,  without  reference 
to  its  object,  and  simply  declares  that  such  contradiction 
would  entirely  destroy  and  annihilate  it. 

Nevertheless,  a positive  use  also  may  be  made  of  that 


124 


Transcendental  Analytic 


principle,  not  only  in  order  to  banish  falsehood  and  error, 
so  far  as  they  arise  from  contradiction,  but  also  in  order 
to  discover  truth.  For  in  an  analytical  judgment,  whether 
negative  or  affirmative,  its  truth  can  always  be  sufficiently 
tested  by  the  principle  of  contradiction,  because  the  oppo- 
site of  that  which  exists  and  is  thought  as  a concept  in 
our  knowledge  of  an  object,  is  always  rightly  negatived, 
while  the  concept  itself  is  necessarily  affirmed  of  it,  for  the 
simple  reason  that  its  opposite  would  be  in  contradiction 
with  the  object. 

It  must  therefore  be  admitted  that  the  principle  of  con- 
tradiction is  the  general  and  altogether  sufficient  principle 
of  all  analytical  knowledge,  though  beyond  this  its  au- 
thority and  utility,  as  a sufficient  criterion  of  truth,  must 
not  be  allowed  to  extend.  For  the  fact  that  no  knowledge 
can  run  counter  to  that  principle,  without  destroying 
itself,  makes  it  no  doubt  a conditio  sine  qua  non,  [p.  152] 
but  never  the  determining  reason  of  the  truth  of  our 
knowledge.  Now,  as  in  our  present  enquiry  we  are 
chiefly  concerned  with  the  synthetical  part  of  our  know- 
ledge, we  must  no  doubt  take  great  care  never  to  offend 
against  that  inviolable  principle,  but  we  ought  never  to 
expect  from  it  any  help  with  regard  to  the  truth  of  this 
kind  of  knowledge. 

There  is,  however,  a formula  of  this  famous  principle  — 
a principle  merely  formal  and  void  of  all  contents  — which 
contains  a synthesis  that  has  been  mixed  up  with  it  from 
mere  carelessness  and  without  any  real  necessity.  This 
formula  is  : It  is  impossible  that  anything  should  be  and  at 
the  same  time  not  be.  Here,  first  of  all,  the  apodictic  cer- 
tainty expressed  by  the  word  impossible  is  added  unnec- 
essarily, because  it  is  understood  by  itself  from  the  nature 


Transcendental  Analytic 


125 


of  the  proposition ; secondly,  the  proposition  is  affected 
by  the  condition  of  time,  and  says,  as  it  were,  something 
= A,  which  is  something  = B,  cannot  be  at  the  same 
time  not-B,  but  it  can  very  well  be  both  (B  and  not-B)  in 
succession.  For  instance,  a man  who  is  young  cannot  be 
at  the  same  time  old,  but  the  same  man  may  very  well 
be  young  at  one  time  and  not  young,  that  is,  old,  at 
another.  The  principle  of  contradiction,  however,  as  a 
purely  logical  principle,  must  not  be  limited  in  its  appli- 
cation by  time;  and  the  before-mentioned  for-  [p.  153] 
mula  runs  therefore  counter  to  its  very  nature.  The  mis- 
understanding arises  from  our  first  separating  one  predi- 
cate of  an  object  from  its  concept,  and  by  our  afterwards 
joining  its  opposite  with  that  predicate,  which  gives  us 
a contradiction,  not  with  the  subject,  but  with  its  predicate 
only  which  was  synthetically  connected  with  it,  and  this 
again  only  on  condition  that  the  first  and  second  predicate 
have  both  been  applied  at  the  same  time.  If  I want  to 
say  that  a man  who  is  unlearned  is  not  learned,  I must 
add  the  condition  ‘at  the  same  time,’  for  a man  who  is 
unlearned  at  one  time  may  very  well  be  learned  at  an- 
other. But  if  I say  no  unlearned  man  is  learned,  then 
the  proposition  is  analytical,  because  the  characteristic 
(unlearnedness)  forms  part  now  of  the  concept  of  the 
subject,  so  that  the  negative  proposition  becomes  evident 
directly  from  the  principle  of  contradiction,  and  without 
the  necessity  of  adding  the  condition,  ‘at  the  same  time.’ 
This  is  the  reason  why  I have  so  altered  the  wording  of 
that  formula  that  it  displays  at  once  the  nature  of  an 
analytical  proposition. 


126 


Transcendental  Analytic 


SYSTEM  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  THE  PURE  [p.154] 
UNDERSTANDING 

Section  II 

Of  the  Highest  Principle  of  all  Synthetical  "Judgments 

The  explanation  of  the  possibility  of  synthetical  judg- 
ments is  a subject  of  which  general  logic  knows  nothing, 
not  even  its  name,  while  in  a transcendental  logic  it  is  the 
most  important  task  of  all,  nay,  even  the  only  one,  when 
we  have  to  consider  the  possibility  of  synthetical  judg- 
ments a priori , their  conditions,  and  the  extent  of  their 
validity.  For  when  that  task  is  accomplished,  the  object 
of  transcendental  logic,  namely,  to  determine  the  extent 
and  limits  of  the  pure  understanding,  will  have  been  fully 
attained. 

In  forming  an  analytical  judgment  I remain  within  a 
given  concept,  while  predicating  something  of  it.  If  what 
I predicate  is  affirmative,  I only  predicate  of  that  concept 
what  is  already  contained  in  it ; if  it  is  negative,  I only 
exclude  from  it  the  opposite  of  it.  In  forming  synthet- 
ical judgments,  on  the  contrary,  I have  to  go  beyond  a 
given  concept,  in  order  to  bring  something  together  with 
it,  which  is  totally  different  from  what  is  contained  in  it. 
Here  we  have  neither  the  relation  of  identity  [p.  155] 
nor  of  contradiction,  and  nothing  in  the  judgment  itself 
by  which  we  can  discover  its  truth  or  its  falsehood. 

Granted,  therefore,  that  we  must  go  beyond  a given 
concept  in  order  to  compare  it  synthetically  with  another, 
something  else  is  necessary  in  which,  as  in  a third,  the 
synthesis  of  two  concepts  becomes  possible.  What,  then, 


Transcendental  Analytic 


1 27 


is  that  third?  What  is  the  medium  of  all  synthetical 
judgments?  It  can  only  be  that  in  which  all  our  concepts 
are  contained,  namely,  the  internal  sense  and  its  a priori 
form,  time.  The  synthesis  of  representations  depends  on 
imagination,  but  their  synthetical  unity,  which  is  neces- 
sary for  forming  a judgment,  depends  on  the  unity  of 
apperception.  It  is  here  therefore  that  the  possibility  of 
synthetical  judgments,  and  (as  all  the  three  contain  the 
sources  of  representations  a priori ) the  possibility  of  pure 
synthetical  judgments  also,  will  have  to  be  discovered  ; 
nay,  they  will  on  these  grounds  be  necessary,  if  any 
knowledge  of  objects  is  to  be  obtained  that  rests  entirely 
on  a synthesis  of  representations. 

If  knowledge  is  to  have  any  objective  reality,  that  is  to 
say,  if  it  is  to  refer  to  an  object,  and  receive  by  means  of 
it  any  sense  and  meaning,  the  object  must  necessarily  be 
given  in  some  way  or  other.  Without  that  all  concepts 
are  empty.  We  have  thought  in  them,  but  we  have  not, 
by  thus  thinking,  arrived  at  any  knowledge.  We  have 
only  played  with  representations.  To  give  an  object,  if 
this  is  not  meant  again  as  mediate  only,  but  if  [p.  156] 
it  means  to  represent  something  immediately  in  intuition, 
is  nothing  else  but  to  refer  the  representation  of  the 
object  to  experience  (real  or  possible).  Even  space  and 
time,  however  pure  these  concepts  may  be  of  all  that  is 
empirical,  and  however  certain  it  is  that  they  are  repre- 
sented in  the  mind  entirely  a priori,  would  lack  neverthe- 
less all  objective  validity,  all  sense  and  meaning,  if  we 
could  not  show  the  necessity  of  their  use  with  reference 
to  all  objects  of  experience.  Nay,  their  representation  is 
is  a pure  schema,  always  referring  to  that  reproductive 
imagination  which  calls  up  the  objects  of  experience, 


128 


Transcendental  Analytic 


without  which  objects  would  be  meaningless.  The  same 
applies  to  all  concepts  without  any  distinction. 

It  is  therefore  the  possibility  of  experience  which  alone 
gives  objective  reality  to  all  our  knowledge  a priori. 
Experience,  however,  depends  on  the  synthetical  unity 
of  phenomena,  that  is,  on  a synthesis  according  to  con- 
cepts of  the  object  of  phenomena  in  general.  Without 
it,  it  would  not  even  be  knowledge,  but  only  a rhapsody 
of  perceptions,  which  would  never  grow  into  a connected 
text  according  to  the  rules  of  an  altogether  coherent 
(possible)  consciousness,  nor  into  a transcendental  and 
necessary  unity  of  apperception.  Experience  depends 
therefore  on  a priori  principles  of  its  form,  that  is,  on 
general  rules  of  unity  in  the  synthesis  of  phe-  [p.  157] 
nomena,  and  the  objective  reality  of  these  (rules)  can 
always  be  shown  by  their  being  the  necessary  conditions 
in  all  experience ; nay,  even  in  the  possibility  of  all 
experience.  Without  such  a relation  synthetical  proposi- 
tions a priori  would  be  quite  impossible,  because  they 
have  no  third  medium,  that  is,  no  object  in  which  the 
synthetical  unity  of  their  concepts  could  prove  their 
objective  reality. 

Although  we  know  therefore  a great  deal  a priori  in 
synthetical  judgments  with  reference  to  space  in  general, 
or  to  the  figures  which  productive  imagination  traces  in 
it,  without  requiring  for  it  any  experience,  this  our  know- 
ledge would  nevertheless  be  nothing  but  a playing  with 
the  cobwebs  of  our  brain,  if  space  were  not  to  be  con- 
sidered as  the  condition  of  phenomena  which  supply  the 
material  for  external  experience.  Those  pure  synthetical 
judgments  therefore  refer  always,  though  mediately  only, 
to  possible  experience,  or  rather  to  the  possibility  of 


Transcendental  Analytic 


129 


experience,  on  which  alone  the  objective  validity  of  their 
synthesis  is  founded. 

As  therefore  experience,  being  an  empirical  synthesis, 
is  in  its  possibility  the  only  kind  of  knowledge  that  im- 
parts reality  to  every  other  synthesis,  this  other  synthesis, 
as  knowledge  a priori , possesses  truth  (agreement  with 
its  object)  on  this  condition  only,  that  it  contains  nothing 
beyond  what  is  necessary  for  the  synthetical  [p.  1 58] 
unity  of  experience  in  general. 

The  highest  principle  of  all  synthetical  judgments  is 
therefore  this,  that  every  object  is  subject  to  the  necessary 
conditions  of  a synthetical  unity  of  the  manifold  of  intui- 
tion in  a possible  experience. 

Thus  synthetical  judgments  a priori  are  possible,  if  we 
refer  the  formal  conditions  of  intuition  a priori , the  syn- 
thesis of  imagination,  and  the  necessary  unity  of  it  in  a 
transcendental  apperception,  to  a possible  knowledge  in 
general,  given  in  experience,  and  if  we  say  that  the  con- 
ditions of  the  possibility  of  experience  in  general  are  at 
the  same  time  conditions  of  the  possibility  of  the  objects 
of  experience  themselves,  and  thus  possess  objective  valid- 
ity in  a synthetical  judgment  a priori. 

SYSTEM  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  THE  PURE 
UNDERSTANDING 

Section  III 

Systematical  Representation  of  all  Synthetical  Principles 
of  the  Understanding 

That  there  should  be  principles  at  all  is  entirely  due  to 
the  pure  understanding,  which  is  not  only  the  faculty  of 
rules  in  regard  to  all  that  happens,  but  itself  the  source 

K 


130 


Transcendental  Analytic 


of  principles,  according  to  which  everything  [p.  159] 
(that  can  become  an  object  to  us)  is  necessarily  subject 
to  rules,  because,  without  such,  phenomena  would  never 
become  objects  corresponding  to  knowledge.  Even  laws 
of  nature,  if  they  are  considered  as  principles  of  the 
empirical  use  of  the  understanding,  carry  with  them  a 
character  of  necessity,  and  thus  lead  to  the  supposition 
that  they  rest  on  grounds  which  are  valid  a priori  and 
before  all  experience.  Nay,  all  laws  of  nature  without 
distinction  are  subject  to  higher  principles  of  the  under- 
standing, which  they  apply  to  particular  cases  of  experi- 
ence. They  alone  therefore  supply  the  concept  which 
contains  the  condition,  and,  as  it  were,  the  exponent  of  a 
rule  in  general,  while  experience  furnishes  each  case  to 
which  the  general  rule  applies. 

There  can  hardly  be  any  danger  of  our  mistaking 
purely  empirical  principles  for  principles  of  the  pure 
understanding  or  vice  versa,  for  the  character  of  neces- 
sity which  distinguishes  the  concepts  of  the  pure  under- 
standing, and  the  absence  of  which  can  easily  be  perceived 
in  every  empirical  proposition,  however  general  it  may 
seem,  will  always  prevent  their  confusion.  There  are, 
however,  pure  principles  a priori  which  I should  not  like 
to  ascribe  to  the  pure  understanding,  because  they  are 
derived,  not  from  pure  concepts,  but  from  pure  intuitions 
(although  by  means  of  the  understanding);  the  [p.  160] 
understanding  being  the  faculty  of  the  concepts.  We 
find  such  principles  in  mathematics,  but  their,  application 
to  experience,  and  therefore  their  objective  validity,  nay, 
even  the  possibility  of  such  synthetical  knowledge  a 
priori  (the  deduction  thereof)  rests  always  on  the  pure 
understanding. 


Transcendental  Analytic  1 3 1 

Hence  my  principles  will  not  include  the  principles  of 
mathematics,  but  they  will  include  those  on  which  the 
possibility  and  objective  validity  a priori  of  those  mathe- 
matical principles  are  founded,  and  which  consequently 
are  to  be  looked  upon  as  the  source  of  those  principles, 
proceeding  from  concepts  to  intuitions,  and  not  from 
intuitions  to  concepts. 

When  the  pure  concepts  of  the  understanding  are 
applied  to  every  possible  experience,  their  synthesis  is 
either  mathematical  or  dynamical , for  it  is  directed  partly 
to  the  intuition  of  a phenomenon  only,  partly  to  its  exist- 
ence. The  conditions  a priori  of  intuition  are  absolutely 
necessary  with  regard  to  every  possible  experience,  while 
the  conditions  of  the  existence  of  the  object  of  a possible 
empirical  intuition  are  in  themselves  accidental  only. 
The  principles  of  the  mathematical  use  of  the  categories 
will  therefore  be  absolutely  necessary,  that  is  apodictic, 
while  those  of  their  dynamical  use,  though  likewise  pos- 
sessing the  character  of  necessity  a pi'iori,  can  possess 
such  a character  subject  only  to  the  condition  of  empirical 
thought  in  experience,  that  is  mediately  and  indirectly, 
and  cannot  therefore  claim  that  immediate  evidence  which 
belongs  to  the  former,  although  their  certainty  with  re- 
gard to  experience  in  general  remains  unaffected  by  this. 
Of  this  we  shall  be  better  qualified  to  judge  at  [p.  161] 
the  conclusion  of  this  system  of  principles. 

Our  table  of  categories  gives  us  naturally  the  best  in- 
structions for  drawing  up  a table  of  principles,  because 
these  are  nothing  but  rules  for  the  objective  use  of  the 
former. 


132 


Transcendental  Analytic 


All  principles  of  the  pure  understanding  are  there- 


fore, 


I 

Axioms  of  Intuition. 


II 


III 


Anticipations  of 
Perception. 


Analogies  of 
Experience. 


IV 


Postulates  of  Empirical 
Thought  in  General. 


I have  chosen  these  names  not  unadvisedly,  so  that  the 
difference  with  regard  to  the  evidence  and  the  application 
of  those  principles  should  not  be  overlooked.  We  shall 
soon  see  that,  both  with  regard  to  the  evidence  and  the 
a priori  determination  of  phenomena  according  to  the  cat- 
egories of  quantity  and  quality  (if  we  attend  to  the  form 
of  them  only)  their  principles  differ  considerably  from 
those  of  the  other  two  classes,  inasmuch  as  the  [p.  162] 
former  are  capable  of  an  intuitive,  the  latter  of  a merely 
discursive,  though  both  of  a complete  certainty.  I shall 
therefore  call  the  former  mathematical,  the  latter  dynami- 
cal principles.1  It  should  be  observed,  however,  that  I do 
not  speak  here  either  of  the  principles  of  mathematics,  or 
of  those  of  general  physical  dynamics,  but  only  of  the 
principles  of  the  pure  understanding  in  relation  to  the 
internal  sense  (without  any  regard  to  the  actual  represen- 
tations given  in  it).  It  is  these  through  which  the  former 
become  possible,  and  I have  given  them  their  name,  more 
on  account  of  their  application  than  of  their  contents.  I 
shall  now  proceed  to  consider  them  in  the  same  order  in 
which  they  stand  in  the  table. 


1 Here  follows  in  the  Second  Edition,  Supplement  XV. 


Transcendental  Analytic 


133 


I 

[OF  THE  AXIOMS  OF  INTUITION1 

Principle  of  the  Pure  Understanding 

All  Phenomena  are,  with  reference  to  their  intuition,  extensive 
quantities  ’] 

I call  an  extensive  quantity  that  in  which  the  represen- 
tation of  the  whole  is  rendered  possible  by  the  representa- 
tion of  its  parts,  and  therefore  necessarily  preceded  by  it. 
I cannot  represent  to  myself  any  line,  however  small  it 
may  be,  without  drawing  it  in  thought,  that  is,  without 
producing  all  its  parts  one  after  the  other,  start-  [p.  163] 
ing  from  a given  point,  and  thus,  first  of  all,  drawing  its 
intuition.  The  same  applies  to  every,  even  the  smallest 
portion  of  time.  I can  only  think  in  it  the  successive  prog- 
ress from  one  moment  to  another,  thus  producing  in  the 
end,  by  all  portions  of  time  and  their  addition,  a definite 
quantity  of  time.  As  in  all  phenomena  pure  intuition  is 
either  space  or  time,  every  phenomenon,  as  an  intuition, 
must  be  an  extensive  quantity,  because  it  can  be  known 
in  apprehension  by  a successive  synthesis  only  (of  part 
with  part).  All  phenomena  therefore,  when  perceived  in 
intuition,  are  aggregates  (collections)  of  previously  given 
parts,  which  is  not  the  case  with  every  kind  of  quantities, 
but  with  those  only  which  are  represented  to  us  and 
apprehended  as  extensive. 

On  this  successive  synthesis  of  productive  imagination 
in  elaborating  figures  are  founded  the  mathematics  of  ex- 
tension with  their  axioms  (geometry),  containing  the  con- 


1 Here  follows,  in  the  later  Editions,  Supplement  XVI. 


134 


l 'rquscendental  A nalytic 


ditions  of  sensuous  intuition  a priori , under  which  alone 
the  schema  of  a pure  concept  of  an  external  phenomenal 
appearance  can  be  produced  ; for  instance,  between  two 
points  one  straight  line  only  is  possible,  or  two  straight 
lines  cannot  enclose  a space,  etc.  These  are  the  axioms 
which  properly  relate  only  to  quantities  ( quanta ) as  such. 

But  with  regard  to  quantity  ( quantitas ),  that  is,  with 
regard  to  the  answer  to  the  question,  how  large  something 
may  be,  there  are  no  axioms,  in  the  proper  [p.  164] 
sense  of  the  word,  though  several  of  the  propositions 
referring  to  it  possess  synthetical  and  immediate  certainty 
( indemonstrabilia ).  The  propositions  that  if  equals  be 
added  to  equals  the  wholes  are  equal,  and  if  equals  be 
taken  from  equals  the  remainders  are  equal,  are  really 
analytical,  because  I am  conscious  immediately  of  the 
identity  of  my  producing  the  one  quantity  with  my  pro- 
ducing the  other ; axioms  on  the  contrary  must  be  synthet- 
ical propositions  a priori.  The  self-evident  propositions 
on  numerical  relation  again  are  no  doubt  synthetical,  but 
they  are  not  general,  like  those  of  geometry,  and  there- 
fore cannot  be  called  axioms,  but  numerical  formulas 
only.  That  7 + 5 = 12  is  not  an  analytical  proposition. 
For  neither  in  the  representation  of  7,  nor  in  that  of  5, 
nor  in  that  of  the  combination  of  both,  do  I think  the 
number  12.  (That  I am  meant  to  think  it  in  the  addition 
of  the  two,  is  not  the  question  here,  for  in  every  analytical 
proposition  all  depends  on  this,  whether  the  predicate  is 
really  thought  in  the  representation  of  the  subject.) 
Although  the  proposition  is  synthetical,  it  is  a singular 
proposition  only.  If  in  this  case  we  consider  only  the 
synthesis  of  the  homogeneous  unities,  then  the  synthesis 
can  here  take  place  in  one  way  only,  although  afterwards 


Transce7ide7ital  A7ialytic 


135 


the  use  of  these  numbers  becomes  general.  If  I say,  a 
triangle  can  be  constructed  with  three  lines,  two  of  which 
together  are  greater  than  the  third,  I have  before  me  the 
mere  function  of  productive  imagination,  which  may  draw 
the  lines  greater  or  smaller,  and  bring  them  together  at 
various  angles.  The  number  7,  on  the  contrary,  [p.  165] 
is  possible  in  one  way  only,  and  so  likewise  the  number 
12,  which  is  produced  by  the  synthesis  of  the  former  with 
5.  Such  propositions  therefore  must  not  be  called  axioms 
(for  their  number  would  be  endless)  but  numerical  for- 
mulas. 

This  transcendental  principle  of  phenomenal  mathemat- 
ics adds  considerably  to  our  knowledge  a priori.  Through 
it  alone  it  becomes  possible  to  make  pure  mathematics 
in  their  full  precision  applicable  to  objects  of  experience, 
which  without  that  principle  would  by  no  means  be  self- 
evident,  nay,  has  actually  provoked  much  contradiction. 
Phenomena  are  not  things  in  themselves.  Empirical 
intuition  is  possible  only  through  pure  intuition  (of  space 
and  time),  and  whatever  geometry  says  of  the  latter  is 
valid  without  contradiction  of  the  former.  All  evasions, 
as  if  objects  of  the  senses  should  not  conform  to  the 
rules  of  construction  in  space  (for  instance,  to  the  rule 
of  the  infinite  divisibility  of  lines  or  angles)  must  cease, 
for  one  would  thus  deny  all  objective  validity  to  space 
and  with  it  to  all  mathematics,  and  would  no  longer 
know  why  and  how  far  mathematics  can  be  applied  to 
phenomena.  The  synthesis  of  spaces  and  times,  as  the 
synthesis  of  the  essential  form  of  all  intuition,  is  that 
which  renders  possible  at  the  same  time  the  apprehen- 
sion of  phenomena,  that  is,  every  external  [p.  166] 
experience,  and  therefore  also  all  knowledge  of  its  ob- 


Transcendental  Analytic 


136 


jects,  and  whatever  mathematics,  in  their  pure  use  prove 
of  that  synthesis  is  valid  necessarily  also  of  this  knowledge. 
All  objections  to  this  are  only  the  chicaneries  of  a falsely 
guided  reason,  which  wrongly  imagines  that  it  can  sepa- 
rate the  objects  of  the  senses  from  the  formal  conditions 
of  our  sensibility,  and  represents  them,  though  they  are 
phenomena  only,  as  objects  by  themselves,  given  to  the 
understanding.  In  this  case,  however,  nothing  could  be 
known  of  them  a priori , nothing  could  be  known  syn- 
thetically through  pure  concepts  of  space,  and  the  sci- 
ence which  determines  those  concepts,  namely,  geometry, 
would  itself  become  impossible. 

II 

[Anticipations  of  Perception 

The  principle  which  anticipates  all  perceptions  as  such,  is  this  : In 
all  phenomena  sensation,  and  the  Real  which  corresponds  to  it  in 
the  object  ( realitas  phaenomenon ),  has  an  intensive  quantity,  that 
is,  a degree 1 ] 

All  knowledge  by  means  of  which  I may  know  and 
determine  a priori  whatever  belongs  to  empirical  know- 
ledge, may  be  called  an  anticipation,  and  it  is  no  doubt 
in  this  sense  that  Epicurus  used  the  expression  [p.  167] 
7rpo\r]yjn<;.  But  as  there  is  always  in  phenomena  some- 
thing which  can  never  be  known  a priori , and  constitutes 
the  real  difference  between  empirical  and  a priori  know- 
ledge, namely,  sensation  (as  matter  of  perception),  it  fol- 
lows that  this  can  never  be  anticipated.  The  pure 
determinations,  on  the  contrary,  in  space  and  time,  as 


1 Here  follows  in  the  Second  Edition,  Supplement  XVI  b. 


Transcendental  Analytic 


137 


regards  both  figure  and  quantity,  may  be  called  antici- 
pations of  phenomena,  because  they  represent  a priori , 
whatever  may  be  given  a posteriori  in  experience.  If, 
however,  there  should  be  something  in  every  sensation 
that  could  be  known  a priori  as  sensation  in  general, 
even  if  no  particular  sensation  be  given,  this  would,  in 
a very  special  sense,  deserve  to  be  called  anticipation, 
because  it  seems  extraordinary  that  we  should  anticipate 
experience  in  that  which  concerns  the  matter  of  experi- 
ence and  can  be  derived  from  experience  only.  Yet  such 
is  really  the  case. 

Apprehension,  by  means  of  sensation  only,  fills  no  more 
than  one  moment  (if  we  do  not  take  into  account  the  suc- 
cession of  many  sensations).  Sensation,  therefore,  being 
that  in  the  phenomenon  the  apprehension  of  which  does 
not  form  a successive  synthesis  progressing  from  parts  to 
a complete  representation,  is  without  any  extensive  quan- 
tity, and  the  absence  of  sensation  in  one  and  the  same  mo- 
ment would  represent  it  as  empty,  therefore  = 0.  [p.  168] 

What  corresponds  in  every  empirical  intuition  to  sensa- 
tion is  reality  ( realitas  phaenomenon ),  what  corresponds  to 
its  absence  is  negation  = 0.  Every  sensation,  however,  is 
capable  of  diminution,  so  that  it  may  decrease,  and  grad- 
ually vanish.  There  is  therefore  a continuous  connection 
between  reality  in  phenomena  and  negation,  by  means  of 
many  possible  intermediate  sensations,  the  difference  be- 
tween which  is  always  smaller  than  the  difference  between 
the  given  sensation  and  zero  or  complete  negation.  It 
thus  follows  that  the  real  in  each  phenomenon  has  always 
a quantity,  though  it  is  not  perceived  in  apprehension,  be- 
cause apprehension  takes  place  by  a momentary  sensation, 
not  by  a successive  synthesis  of  many  sensations ; it  does 


Transcendental  Analytic 


138 


not  advance  from  the  parts  to  the  whole,  and  though  it 
has  a quantity,  it  has  not  an  extensive  quantity. 

That  quantity  which  can  be  apprehended  as  unity  only, 
and  in  which  plurality  can  be  represented  by  approxima- 
tion only  to  negation  = 0,  I call  intensive  quantity.  Every 
reality  therefore  in  a phenomenon  has  intensive  quantity, 
that  is,  a degree.  If  this  reality  is  considered  as  a cause 
(whether  of  sensation,  or  of  any  other  reality  in  the  phe- 
nomenon, for  instance,  of  change)  the  degree  of  that 
reality  as  a cause  we  call  a momentum,  for  instance,  the 
momentum  of  gravity : and  this  because  the  degree  indi- 
cates that  quantity  only,  the  apprehension  of  [p.  169] 
which  is  not  successive,  but  momentary.  This  I men- 
tion here  in  passing,  because  we  have  not  yet  come  to 
consider  causality. 

Every  sensation,  therefore,  and  every  reality  in  phe- 
nomena, however  small  it  may  be,  has  a degree,  that 
is,  an  intensive  quantity  which  can  always  be  diminished, 
and  there  is  between  reality  and  negation  a continuous 
connection  of  possible  realities,  and  of  possible  smaller 
perceptions.  Every  colour,  red,  for  instance,  has  a 
degree,  which,  however  small,  is  never  the  smallest ; 
and  the  same  applies  to  heat,  the  momentum  of  gravity, 
etc. 

This  peculiar  property  of  quantities  that  no  part 
of  them  is  the  smallest  possible  part  (no  part  indi- 
visible) is  called  continuity.  Time  and  space  are  quanta 
continua , because  there  is  no  part  of  them  that  is  not 
enclosed  between  limits  (points  and  moments),  no  part 
that  is  not  itself  again  a space  or  a time.  Space  con- 
sists of  spaces  only,  time  of  times.  Points  and  moments 
are  only  limits,  mere  places  of  limitation,  and  as  places 


Transcendental  Analytic  139 

presupposing  always  those  intuitions  which  they  are 
meant  to  limit  or  to  determine.  Mere  places  or  parts 
that  might  be  given  before  space  or  time,  could  [p.  170} 
never  be  compounded  into  space  or  time.  Such  quanti- 
ties can  also  be  called  flowing , because  the  synthesis 
of  the  productive  imagination  which  creates  them  is  a 
progression  in  time,  the  continuity  of  which  we  are  wont 
to  express  by  the  name  of  flowing,  or  passing  away. 

All  phenomena  are  therefore  continuous  quantities, 
whether  according  to  their  intuition  as  extensive,  or 
according  to  mere  perception  (sensation  and  therefore 
reality)  as  intensive  quantities.  When  there  is  a break 
in  the  synthesis  of  the  manifold  of  phenomena,  we  get 
only  an  aggregate  of  many  phenomena,  not  a phenom- 
enon, as  a real  quantum ; for  aggregate  is  called  that 
what  is  produced,  not  by  the  mere  continuation  of  pro- 
ductive synthesis  of  a certain  kind,  but  by  the  repeti- 
tion of  a synthesis  (beginning  and)  ending  at  every 
moment.  If  I call  thirteen  thalers  a quantum  of 
money,  I am  right,  provided  I understand  by  it  the 
value  of  a mark  of  fine  silver.  This  is  a continuous 
quantity  in  which  no  part  is  the  smallest,  but  every 
part  may  constitute  a coin  which  contains  material  for 
still  smaller  coins.  But  if  I understand  by  it  thirteen 
round  thalers,  that  is,  so  many  coins  (whatever  their 
value  in  silver  may  be),  then  I should  be  wrong  in 
speaking  of  a quantum  of  thalers,  but  should  call  it 
an  aggregate,  that  is  a number  of  coins.  As  every 
number  must  be  founded  on  some  unity,  every  [p.  171] 
phenomenon,  as  a unity,  is  a quantum,  and,  as  such,  a 
continuum. 

If  then  all  phenomena,  whether  considered  as  exten- 


140 


Transcendental  Analytic 


sive  or  intensive,  are  continuous  quantities,  it  might  seem 
easy  to  prove  with  mathematical  evidence  that  all  change 
also  (transition  of  a thing  from  one  state  into  another)  must 
be  continuous,  if  the  causality  of  the  change  did  not  lie 
quite  outside  the  limits  of  transcendental  philosophy,  and 
presupposed  empirical  principles.  For  the  understand- 
ing a priori  tells  us  nothing  of  the  possibility  of  a cause 
which  changes  the  state  of  things,  that  is,  determines 
them  to  the  opposite  of  a given  state,  and  this  not  only 
because  it  does  not  perceive  the  possibility  of  it  (for 
such  a perception  is  denied  to  us  in  several  kinds  of 
knowledge  a priori ),  but  because  the  changeability 
relates  to  certain  determinations  of  phenomena  to  be 
taught  by  experience  only,  while  their  cause  must  lie 
in  that  which  is  unchangeable.  But  as  the  only  ma- 
terials which  we  may  use  at  present  are  the  pure 
fundamental  concepts  of  every  possible  experience, 
from  which  all  that  is  empirical  is  excluded,  we  cannot 
here,  without  injuring  the  unity  of  our  system,  antici- 
pate general  physical  science  which  is  based  upon 
certain  fundamental  experiences.  [p.  172] 

Nevertheless,  there  is  no  lack  of  evidence  of  the 
great  influence  which  our  fundamental  principle  exer- 
cises in  anticipating  perceptions,  nay,  even  in  making 
up  for  their  deficiency,  in  so  far  as  it  (that  principle) 
stops  any  false  conclusions  that  might  be  drawn  from 
this  deficiency. 

If  therefore  all  reality  in  perception  has  a certain 
degree,  between  which  and  negation  there  is  an  in- 
finite succession  of  ever  smaller  degrees,  and  if  every 
sense  must  have  a definite  degree  of  receptivity  of  sen- 
sations, it  follows  that  no  perception,  and  therefore  no 


T ranscendental  A nalytic  1 4 1 

experience,  is  possible,  that  could  prove,  directly  or 
indirectly,  by  any  roundabout  syllogisms,  a complete 
absence  of  all  reality  in  a phenomenon.  We  see  there- 
fore that  experience  can  never  supply  a proof  of  empty 
space  or  empty  time,  because  the  total  absence  of  reality 
in  a sensuous  intuition  can  itself  never  be  perceived, 
neither  can  it  be  deduced  from  any  phenomenon  what- 
soever and  from  the  difference  of  degree  in  its  reality ; 
nor  ought  it  ever  to  be  admitted  in  explanation  of  it. 
For  although  the  total  intuition  of  a certain  space  or 
time  is  real  all  through,  no  part  of  it  being  empty,  yet 
as  every  reality  has  its  degree  which,  while  the  exten- 
sive quality  of  the  phenomenon  remains  un-  [p.  173] 
changed,  may  diminish  by  infinite  degrees  down  to 
the  nothing  or  void,  there  must  be  infinitely  differing 
degrees  in  which  space  and  time  are  filled,  and  the 
intensive  quantity  in  phenomena  may  be  smaller  or 
greater,  although  the  extensive  quantity  as  given  in 
intuition  remains  the  same. 

We  shall  give  an  example.  Almost  all  natural  philos- 
ophers, perceiving  partly  by  means  of  the  momentum 
of  gravity  or  weight,  partly  by  means  of  the  momentum 
of  resistance  against  other  matter  in  motion,  that  there 
is  a great  difference  in  the  quantity  of  various  kinds 
of  matter  though  their  volume  is  the  same,  conclude 
unanimously  that  this  volume  (the  extensive  quantity 
of  phenomena)  must  in  all  of  them,  though  in  differ- 
ent degrees,  contain  a certain  amount  of  empty  space. 
Who  could  have  thought  that  these  mathematical  and 
mechanical  philosophers  should  have  based  such  a 
conclusion  on  a purely  metaphysical  hypothesis,  which 
they  always  profess  to  avoid,  by  assuming  that  the  real 


142 


Transcendental  Analytic 


in  space  (I  do  not  wish  here  to  call  it  impenetrability 
or  weight,  because  these  are  empirical  concepts)  must 
always  be  the  same,  and  can  differ  only  by  its  extensive 
quantity,  that  is,  by  the  number  of  parts.  I meet  this 
hypothesis,  for  which  they  could  find  no  ground  in 
experience,  and  which  therefore  is  purely  metaphysical, 
hy  a transcendental  demonstration,  which,  though  it  is 
not  intended  to  explain  the  difference  in  the  [p.  174] 
filling  of  spaces,  will  nevertheless  entirely  remove  the 
imagined  necessity  of  their  hypothesis  which  tries  to 
explain  that  difference  by  the  admission  of  empty 
spaces,  and  which  thus  restores,  at  least  to  the  under- 
standing, its  liberty  to  explain  to  itself  that  difference 
in  a different  way,  if  any  such  hypothesis  be  wanted 
in  natural  philosophy. 

We  can  easily  perceive  that  although  the  same  spaces 
are  perfectly  filled  by  two  different  kinds  of  matter,  so 
that  there  is  no  point  in  either  of  them  where  matter  is 
not  present,  yet  the  real  in  either,  the  quality  being  the 
same,  has  its  own  degrees  (of  resistance  or  weight)  which, 
without  any  diminution  of  its  extensive  quantity,  may  grow 
smaller  and  smaller  in  infinitum,  before  it  reaches  the 
void  and  vanishes.  Thus  a certain  expansion  which  fills 
a space,  for  instance,  heat,  and  every  other  kind  of  phe- 
nomenal reality,  may,  without  leaving  the  smallest  part  of 
space  empty,  diminish  by  degrees  in  infinitum,  and  never- 
theless fill  space  with  its  smaller,  quite  as  much  as  another 
phenomenon  with  greater  degrees.  I do  not  mean  to  say 
that  this  is  really  the  case  with  different  kinds  of  matter 
according  to  their  specific  of  gravity.  I only  want  to 
show  by  a fundamental  principle  of  the  pure  [p.  175] 
understanding,  that  the  nature  of  our  perceptions  renders 


Transcendental  Analytic 


143 


such  an  explanation  possible,  and  that  it  is  wrong  to  look 
upon  the  real  in  phenomena  as  equal  in  degree,  and  differ- 
ing only  in  aggregation  and  its  extensive  quantity,  nay  to 
maintain  this  on  the  pretended  authority  of  an  a priori 
principle  of  the  understanding. 

Nevertheless,  this  anticipation  of  perception  is  apt  to 
startle  1 an  enquirer  accustomed  to  and  rendered  cautious 
by  transcendental  disquisitions,  and  we  may  naturally  won- 
der that  the  understanding  should  be  able  to  anticipate  2 a 
synthetical  proposition  with  regard  to  the  degree  of  all 
that  is  real  in  phenomena,  and,  therefore,  with  regard  to 
the  possibility  of  an  internal  difference  of  sensation  itself, 
apart  from  its  empirical  quality ; and  it  seems  therefore  a 
question  well  worthy  of  a solution,  how  the  understanding 
can  pronounce  synthetically  and  a priori  about  phenomena, 
nay,  anticipate  them  with  regard  to  what,  properly  speak- 
ing, is  empirical,  namely,  sensation. 

The  quality  of  sensation,  colour,  taste,  etc.,  is  always  em- 
pirical, and  cannot  be  conceived  a priori.  But  the  real  that 
corresponds  to  sensations  in  general,  as  opposed  to  nega- 
tion = 0,  does  only  represent  something  the  concept  of 
which  implies  being,  and  means  nothing  but  the  synthesis 
in  any  empirical  consciousness.  In  the  internal  sense  that 
empirical  consciousness  can  be  raised  from  o to  [p.  176] 
any  higher  degree,  so  that  an  extensive  quantity  of  ■ intui- 
tion (for  instance,  an  illuminated  plain)  excites  the  same 

• . . '*  ;'j.  . . 

1 Kant  wrote,  etwas — etwas  Auffallendes,  the  second  etwas  being  the 
adverb.  Rosenkranz  has  left  out  one  etwas,  without  necessity.  It  seems 
necessary,  however,  to  add  Uberlegung  after  transcendentalen , as  done  by  Erd- 
mann. 

2 Anticipiren  konnc  must  certainly  be  added,  as  suggested  by  Schopen- 
hauer. 


144 


Transcendental  Analytic 


amount  of  sensation,  as  an  aggregate  of  many  other  less 
illuminated  plains.  It  is  quite  possible,  therefore,  to  take 
no  account  of  the  extensive  quantity  of  a phenomenon, 
and  yet  to  represent  to  oneself  in  the  mere  sensation  in 
any  single  moment  a synthesis  of  a uniform  progression 
from  o to  any  given  empirical  consciousness.  All  sensa- 
tions, as  such,  are  therefore  given  a posteriori 1 only,  but 
their  quality,  in  so  far  as  they  must  possess  a degree,  can 
be  known  a prio7-i.  It  is  remarkable  that  of  quantities  in 
general  we  can  know  one  quality  only  a priori , namely, 
their  continuity,  while  with  regard  to  quality  (the  real  of 
phenomena)  nothing  is  known  to  us  a priori , but  their  in- 
tensive quantity , that  is,  that  they  must  have  a degree. 
Everything  else  is  left  to  experience. 

Ill 

[ The  Aiialogies  of  Experience 

The  general  principle  of  them  is : All  phenomena,  as  far  as  their  ex- 
istence is  concerned,  are  subject  a priori  to  rules,  determining  their 
mutual  relation  in  one  and  the  same  time  2]  [p.  177] 

The  three  modi  of  time  are  pertna7ie7ice , successio7i,  and 
coexistence.  There  will  therefore  be  three  rules  of  all 
relations  of  phenomena  in  time,  by  which  the  existence  of 
every  phenomenon  with  regard  to  the  unity  of  time  is 
determined,  and  these  rules  will  precede  all  experience, 
nay,  render  experience  possible. 

The  general  principle  of  the  three  analogies  depends 
on  the  necessary  unity  of  apperception  with  reference  to 

1 The  first  and  later  editions  have  a priori.  The  correction  is  first  made 
in  the  Seventh  Edition,  1828. 

2 See  Supplement  XVII. 


Transcendental  Analytic  14$ 

every  possible  empirical  consciousness  (perception)  at 
every  time , and,  consequently,  as  that  unity  forms  an  a 
priori  ground,  on  the  synthetical  unity  of  all  phenomena, 
according  to  their  relation  in  time.  For  the  original  ap- 
perception refers  to  the  internal  sense  (comprehending  all 
representations),  and  it  does  so  a priori  to  its  form,  that  is, 
to  the  relation  of  the  manifold  of  the  empirical  conscious- 
ness in  time.  The  original  apperception  is  intended  to 
combine  all  this  manifold  according  to  its  relations  in 
time,  for  this  is  what  is  meant  by  its  transcendental  unity 
a priori,  to  which  all  is  subject  which  is  to  belong  to  my 
own  and  my  uniform  knowledge,  and  thus  to  become  an 
object  for  me.  This  synthetical  unity  in  the  time  relations 
of  all  perceptions,  which  is  determined  a priori,  is  expressed 
therefore  in  the  law,  that  all  empirical  determinations  of 
time  must  be  subject  to  rules  of  the  general  [p.  178] 
determination  of  time ; and  the  analogies  of  experience,  of 
which  we  are  now  going  to  treat,  are  exactly  rules  of  this 
kind. 

These  principles  have  this  peculiarity,  that  they  do  not 
refer  to  phenomena  and  the  synthesis  of  their  empirical 
intuition,  but  only  to  the  existence  of  phenomena  and  their 
mutual  relation  with  regard  to  their  existence.  The  man- 
ner in  which  something  is  apprehended  as  a phenomenon 
may  be  so  determined  a priori  that  the  rule  of  its  synthesis 
may  give  at  the  same  time  this  intuition  a priori  in  any 
empirical  case,  nay,  may  really  render  it  possible.  But 
the  existence  of  phenomena  can  never  be  known  a priori, 
and  though  we  might  be  led  in  this  way  to  infer  some 
kind  of  existence,  we  should  never  be  able  to  know  it 
definitely,  or  to  anticipate  that  by  which  the  empirical 
intuition  of  one  differs  from  that  of  others. 


146  Transcendental  Analytic 

The  principles  which  we  considered  before  and  which, 
as  they  enable  us  to  apply  mathematics  to  phenomena,  I 
called  mathematical,  refer  to  phenomena  so  far  only  as 
they  are  possible,  and  showed  how,  with  regard  both  to 
their  intuition  and  to  the  real  in  their  perception,  they  can 
be  produced  according  to  the  rules  of  a mathematical  syn- 
thesis, so  that,  in  the  one  as  well  as  in  the  other,  we  may 
use  numerical  quantities,  and  with  them  a determination 
of  all  phenomena  as  quantities.  Thus  I might,  [p.  179] 
for  example,  compound  the  degree  of  sensations  of  the 
sunlight  out  of,  say,  200,000  illuminations  by  the  moon, 
and  thus  determine  it  a priori  or  construct  it.  Those 
former  principles  might  therefore  be  called  constitutive. 

The  case  is  totally  different  with  those  principles  which 
are  meant  to  bring  the  existence  of  phenomena  under 
rules  a priori , for  as  existence  cannot  be  constructed,  they 
can  only  refer  to  the  relations  of  existence  and  become 
merely  regulative  principles.  Here  therefore  we  could 
not  think  of  either  axioms  or  anticipations,  and  whenever 
a perception  is  given  us  as  related  in  time  to  some  others 
(although  undetermined),  we  could  not  say  a priori  what 
other  perception  or  how  great  a perception  is  necessarily 
connected  with  it,  but  only  how,  if  existing,  it  is  neces- 
sarily connected  with  the  other  in  a certain  mode  of  time. 
In  philosophy  analogy  means  something  very  different  to 
what  it  does  in  mathematics.  In  the  latter  they  are  for- 
mulas which  state  the  equality  of  two  quantitative  relations, 
and  they  are  always  constitutive  so  that  when  three 1 
terms  of  a proposition  are  given,  the  fourth  also  is  given 
by  it,  that  is,  can  be  constructed  out  of  it.  In  philosophy, 

1 The  First  and  Second  Editions  read  ‘ When  two  terms  of  a proposition 
are  given,  the  third  also.’ 


147 


Transcendental  Analytic 

on  the  contrary,  analogy  does  not  consist  in  the  equality 
of  two  quantitative,  but  of  two  qualitative  relations,  so  that 
when  three  terms  are  given  I may  learn  from  them  a 
priori  the  relation  to  a fourth  only,  but  not  that  [p.  180] 
fourth  term  itself.  All  I can  thus  gain  is  a rule  according 
to  which  I may  look  in  experience  for  the  fourth  term,  or 
a characteristic  mark  by  which  I may  find  it.  An  analogy 
of  experience  can  therefore  be  no  more  than  a rule  accord- 
ing to  which  a certain  unity  of  experience  may  arise  from 
perceptions  (but  not  how  perception  itself,  as  an  empirical 
intuition,  may  arise);  it  may  serve  as  a principle  for  ob- 
jects (as  phenomena J)  not  in  a constitutive,  but  only  in  a 
regulative  capacity. 

Exactly  the  same  applies  to  the  postulates  of  empirical 
thought  in  general,  which  relate  to  the  synthesis  of  mere 
intuition  (the  form  of  phenomena),  the  synthesis  of  per- 
ception (the  matter  of  them),  and  the  synthesis  of  experi- 
ence (the  relation  of  these  perceptions).  They  too  are 
regulative  principles  only,  and  differ  from  the  mathemati- 
cal, which  are  constitutive,  not  in  their  certainty,  which  is 
established  in  both  a priori , but  in  the  character  of  their 
evidence,  that  is,  in  that  which  is  intuitive  in  it,  and  there- 
fore in  their  demonstration  also. 

What  has  been  remarked  of  all  synthetical  principles 
and  must  be  enjoined  here  more  particularly  is  this,  that 
these  analogies  have  their  meaning  and  validity,  not  as 
principles  of  the  transcendent,  but  only  as  princi-  [p.  1 8 1 ] 
pies  of  the  empirical  use  of  the  understanding.  They  can 
be  established  in  this  character  only,  nor  can  phenomena 
ever  be  comprehended  under  the  categories  directly,  but 


1 Read  den  Erscheinungen. 


'48  Transcendental  Analytic 

only  under  their  schemata.  If  the  objects  to  which  these 
principles  refer  were  things  by  themselves,  it  would  be 
perfectly  impossible  to  know  anything  of  them  a priori 
and  synthetically.  But  they  are  nothing  but  phenomena, 
and  our  whole  knowledge  of  them,  to  which,  after  all,  all 
principles  a priori  must  relate,  is  only  our  possible  experi- 
ence of  them.  Those  principles  therefore  can  aim  at 
nothing  but  the  conditions  of  the  unity  of  empirical  know- 
ledge in  the  synthesis  of  phenomena,  which  synthesis  is 
represented  only  in  the  schema  of  the  pure  concepts  of 
the  understanding,  while  the  category  contains  the  func- 
tion, restricted  by  no  sensuous  condition,  of  the  unity  of 
that  synthesis  as  synthesis  in  general.  Those  principles 
will  therefore  authorise  us  only  to  connect  phenomena, 
according  to  analogy,  with  the  logical  and  universal  unity 
of  concepts,  so  that,  though  in  using  the  principle  we  use 
the  category,  yet  in  practice  (in  the  application  to  phe- 
nomena) we  put  the  schema  of  the  category,  as  a practical 
key,  in  its1  place,  or  rather  put  it  by  the  side  of  the 
category  as  a restrictive  condition,  or,  as  what  may  be 
called,  a formula  of  the  category. 

1 I read  dertn , and  afterwards  der  ersteren,  though  even  then  the  whole 
passage  is  very  involved.  Professor  Noire  thinks  that  dessen  may  be  referred 
to  Gebrauch,  and  des  ersteren  to  Grnndsatz. 


Transcendental  Analytic 


149 


A [p.  182] 

[First  Analogy 
Principle  of  P ermanence* 

All  phenomena  contain  the  permanent  (substance)  as  the  object  itself, 
and  the  changeable  as  its  determination  only,  that  is,  as  a mode  in 
which  the  object  exists 

Proof  of  the  First  Analogy 

All  phenomena  take  place  in  time.  Time  can  deter- 
mine in  two  ways  the  relation  in  the  existence  of  phe- 
nomena, so  far  as  they  are  either  successive  or  coexistent. 
In  the  first  case  time  is  considered  as  a series,  in  the 
second  as  a whole.] 

Our  apprehension  of  the  manifold  of  phenomena  is 
always  successive,  and  therefore  always  changing.  By  it 
alone  therefore  we  can  never  determine  whether  the  man- 
ifold, as  an  object  of  experience,  is  coexistent  or  succes- 
sive, unless  there  is  something  in  it  which  exists  always, 
that  is,  something  constant  and  permanent,  while  change 
and  succession  are  nothing  but  so  many  kinds  ( modi ) of 
time  in  which  the  permanent  exists.  Relations  of  time 
are  therefore  possible  in  the  permanent  only  (coexistence 
and  succession  being  the  only  relations  of  time)  [p.  183] 
so  that  the  permanent  is  the  substratum  of  the  empirical 
representation  of  time  itself,  and  in  it  alone  all  determi- 
nation of  time  is  possible.  Permanence  expresses  time 
as  the  constant  correlative  of  all  existence  of  phenomena, 
of  all  change  and  concomitancy.  For  change  does  not 
affect  time  itself,  but  only  phenomena  in  time  (nor  is 


1 See  Supplement  XVIII. 


i5o 


Transcendental  Analytic 


coexistence  a mode  of  time  itself,  because  in  it  no  parts 
can  be  coexistent,  but  successive  only).  If  we  were  to 
ascribe  a succession  to  time  itself,  it  would  be  necessary 
to  admit  another  time  in  which  such  succession  should  be 
possible.  Only  through  the  permanent  does  existence  in 
different  parts  of  a series  of  time  assume  a quajitity  which 
we  call  duration.  For  in  mere  succession  existence  always 
comes  and  goes,  and  never  assumes  the  slightest  quantity. 
Without  something  permanent  therefore  no  relation  of 
time  is  possible.  Time  by  itself,  however,  cannot  be  per- 
ceived, and  it  is  therefore  the  permanent  in  phenomena 
that  forms  the  substratum  for  all  determination  of  time, 
and  at  the  same  time  the  condition  of  the  possibility  of  all 
synthetical  unity  of  perceptions,  that  is,  of  experience ; 
while  with  regard  to  that  permanent  all  existence  and  all 
change  in  time  can  only  be  taken  as  a mode  of  existence 
of  what  is  permanent.  In  all  phenomena  therefore  the 
permanent  is  the  object  itself,  that  is,  the  substance  (phe- 
nomenon), while  all  that  changes  or  can  change  [p.  184] 
belongs  only  to  the  mode  in  which  substance  or  substances 
exist,  therefore  to  their  determinations. 

I find  that  in  all  ages  not  only  the  philosopher,  but  also 
the  man  of  common  understanding  has  admitted  this 
permanence  as  a substratum  of  all  change  of  phenomena. 
It  will  be  the  same  in  future,  only  that  a philosopher 
generally  expresses  himself  somewhat  more  definitely  by 
saying  that  in  all  changes  in  the  world  the  substance 
remains,  and  only  the  accidents  change.  But  I nowhere 
find  even  the  attempt  at  a proof  of  this  very  synthetical 
proposition,  and  it  occupies  but  seldom  that  place  which 
it  ought  to  occupy  at  the  head  of  the  pure  and  entirely 
a priori  existing  laws  of  nature.  In  fact  the  proposition 


Transcendental  Analytic  15 1 

that  substance  is  permanent  is  tautological,  because  that 
permanence  is  the  only  ground  why  we  apply  the  category 
of  substance  to  a phenomenon,  and  it  ought  first  to  have 
been  proved  that  there  is  in  all  phenomena  something 
permanent,  while  the  changeable  is  only  a determination 
of  its  existence.  But  as  such  a proof  can  never  be  given 
dogmatically  and  as  deduced  from  concepts,  because  it 
refers  to  a synthetical  proposition  a priori,  and  as  no  one 
ever  thought  that  such  propositions  could  be  valid  only  in 
reference  to  possible  experience,  and  could  therefore  be 
proved  only  by  a deduction  of  the  possibility  of  [p.  185] 
experience,  we  need  not  wonder  that,  though  it  served  as 
the  foundation  of  all  experience  (being  felt  to  be  indis- 
pensable for  every  kind  of  empirical  knowledge),  it  has 
never  been  established  by  proof. 

A philosopher  was  asked,  What  is  the  weight  of  smoke? 
He  replied,  Deduct  from  the  weight  of  the  wood  burnt 
the  weight  of  the  remaining  ashes,  and  you  have  the 
weight  of  the  smoke.  He  was  therefore  convinced  that 
even  in  fire  matter  (substance)  does  not  perish,  but  that  its 
form  only  suffers  a change.  The  proposition  also,  from 
nothing  comes  nothing,  was  only  another  conclusion  from 
the  same  principle  of  permanence,  or  rather  of  the  con- 
stant presence  of  the  real  subject  in  phenomena.  For  if 
that  which  people  call  substance  in  a phenomenon  is  to  be 
the  true  substratum  for  all  determination  in  time,  then  all 
existence  in  the  past  as  well  as  the  future  must  be  deter- 
mined in  it,  and  in  it  only.  Thus  we  can  only  give  to  a 
phenomenon  the  name  of  substance  because  we  admit  its 
existence,  at  all  times,  which  is  not  even  fully  expressed  by 
the  word  permanence,  because  it  refers  rather  to  future 
time  only.  The  internal  necessity  however  of  permanence 


152 


Transcendental  Analytic 


is  inseparably  connected  with  the  necessity  to  have  been 
always,  and  the  expression  may  therefore  stand,  [p.  186 
Gigni  de  nihilo  nihil , in  nihilnm  nil  posse  reverti,  were 
two  propositions  which  the  ancients  never  separated,  but 
which  at  present  are  sometimes  parted,  because  people 
imagine  that  they  refer  to  things  by  themselves,  and  that 
the  former  might  contradict  the  dependence  of  the  world 
on  a Supreme  Cause  (even  with  regard  to  its  substance), 
an  apprehension  entirely  needless,  as  we  are  only  speak- 
ing here  of  phenomena  in  the  sphere  of  experience,  the 
unity  of  which  would  never  be  possible,  if  we  allowed  that 
new  things  (new  in  substance)  could  ever  arise.  For  in 
that  case  we  should  lose  that  which  alone  can  represent 
the  unity  of  time,  namely,  the  identity  of  the  substratum, 
in  which  alone  all  change  retains  complete  unity.  This 
permanence,  however,  is  nothing  but  the  manner  in  which 
we  represent  the  existence  of  things  (as  phenomenal). 

The  different  determinations  of  a substance,  which  are 
nothing  but  particular  modes  in  which  it  exists,  are  called 
accidents.  They  are  always  real,  because  they  concern 
the  existence  of  a substance  (negations  are  nothing  but 
determinations  which  express  the  non-existence  of  some- 
thing in  the  substance).  If  we  want  to  ascribe  a particular 
kind  of  existence  to  these  real  determinations  of  the  sub- 
stance, as,  for  instance,  to  motion,  as  an  accident  of  mat- 
ter, we  call  it  inherence,  in  order  to  distinguish  it  from  the 
existence  of  substance,  which  1 we  call  subsistence.  This, 
however,  has  given  rise  to  many  misunderstand-  [p.  187] 
ings,  and  we  shall  express  ourselves  better  and  more  cor- 
rectly, if  we  define  the  accident  through  the  manner  only 


1 Read  das  man. 


Transcendental  Analytic 


153 


in  which  the  existence  of  a substance  is  positively  deter- 
mined. It  is  inevitable,  however,  according  to  the  condi- 
tions of  the  logical  use  of  our  understanding,  to  separate, 
as  it  were,  whatever  can  change  in  the  existence  of  a 
substance,  while  the  substance  itself  remains  unchanged, 
and  to  consider  it  in  its  relation  to  that  which  is  radical 
and  truly  permanent.  Hence  a place  has  been  assigned 
to  this  category  under  the  title  of  relations,  not  so  much 
because  it  contains  itself  a relation,  as  because  it  contains 
their  condition. 

On  this  permanence  depends  also  the  right  understand 
ing  of  the  concept  of  change.  To  arise  and  to  perish  are 
not  changes  of  that  which  arises  or  perishes.  Change  is 
a mode  of  existence,  which  follows  another  mode  of 
existence  of  the  same  object.  Hence  whatever  changes 
is  permanent,  and  its  condition  only  changes.  As  this 
alteration  refers  only  to  determinations  which  may  have 
an  end  or  a beginning,  we  may  use  an  expression  that 
seems  somewhat  paradoxical  and  say : the  permanent  only 
(substance)  is  changed,  the  changing  itself  suffers  no 
change,  but  only  an  alteration,  certain  determinations 
ceasing  to  exist,  while  others  begin. 

It  is  therefore  in  substances  only  that  change  [p.  188] 
can  be  perceived.  Arising  or  perishing  absolutely,  and 
not  referring  merely  to  a determination  of  the  permanent 
can  never  become  a possible  perception,  because  it  is  the 
permanent  only  which  renders  the  representations  of  a 
transition  from  one  state  to  another,  from  not  being  to 
being,  possible,  which  (changes)  consequently  can  only  be 
known  empirically,  as  alternating  determinations  of  what 
is  permanent.  If  you  suppose  that  something  has  an 
absolute  beginning,  you  must  have  a moment  of  time  in 


154 


Transcendental  Analytic 


which  it  was  not.  But  with  what  can  you  connect  that 
moment,  if  not  with  that  which  already  exists  ? An  empty 
antecedent  time  cannot  be  an  object  of  perception.  But 
if  you  connect  this  beginning  with  things  which  existed 
already  and  continue  to  exist  till  the  beginning  of  some- 
thing new,  then  the  latter  is  only  a determination  of  the 
former,  as  of  the  permanent.  The  same  holds  good  with 
regard  to  perishing,  for  this  would  presuppose  the  empiri- 
cal representation  of  a time  in  which  a phenomenon  exists 
no  longer. 

Substances  therefore  (as  phenomena)  are  the  true  sub- 
strata of  all  determinations  of  time.  If  some  substances 
could  arise  and  others  perish,  the  only  condition  of  the 
empirical  unity  of  time  would  be  removed,  and  phenomena 
would  then  be  referred  to  two  different  times,  in  which 
existence  would  pass  side  by  side,  which  is  absurd.  For 
there  is  but  one  time  in  which  all  different  times  [p.  189] 
must  be  placed,  not  as  simultaneous,  but  as  successive. 

Permanence,  therefore,  is  a necessary  condition  under 
which  alone  phenomena,  as  things  or  objects,  can  be 
determined  in  a possible  experience.  What  the  empirical 
criterion  of  this  necessary  permanence,  or  of  the  substan- 
tiality of  phenomena  may  be,  we  shall  have  to  explain  in 
the  sequel. 


Transcendental  Analytic 


155 


B 

I Second  Analogy 
Principle  of  Productioii 1 

Everything  that  happens  (begins  to  be),  presupposes  something  on 
which  it  follows  according  to  a rule] 

Proof 

The  apprehension  of  the  manifold  of  phenomena  is 
always  successive.  The  representations  of  the  parts  fol- 
low one  upon  another.  Whether  they  also  follow  one 
upon  the  other  in  the  object  is  a second  point  for  reflec- 
tion, not  contained  in  the  former.  We  may  indeed  call 
everything,  even  every  representation,  so  far  as  we  are 
conscious  of  it,  an  object ; but  it  requires  a more  profound 
investigation  to  discover  what  this  word  may  [p.  190] 
mean  with  regard  to  phenomena,  not  in  so  far  as  they 
(as  representations)  are  objects,  but  in  so  far  as  they  only 
signify  an  object.  So  far  as  they,  as  representations  only, 
are  at  the  same  time  objects  of  consciousness,  they  cannot 
be  distinguished  from  our  apprehension,  that  is  from  their 
being  received  in  the  synthesis  of  our  imagination,  and  we 
must  therefore  say,  that  the  manifold  of  phenomena  is 
always  produced  in  the  mind  successively.  If  phenomena 
were  things  by  themselves,  the  succession  of  the  represen- 
tations of  their  manifold  would  never  enable  us  to  judge 
how  that  manifold  is  connected  in  the  object.  We  have 
always  to  deal  with  our  representations  only ; how  things 
may  be  by  themselves  (without  reference  to  the  represen- 
tations by  which  they  affect  us)  is  completely  beyond  the 


1 See  Supplement  XIX. 


156 


Transcendental  Analytic 


sphere  of  our  knowledge.  Since,  therefore,  phenomena 
are  not  things  by  themselves,  and  are  yet  the  only  thing 
that  can  be  given  to  us  to  know,  I am  asked  to  say  what 
kind  of  connection  in  time  belongs  to  the  manifold  of  the 
phenomena  itself,  when  the  representation  of  it  in  our 
apprehension  is  always  successive.  Thus,  for  instance, 
the  apprehension  of  the  manifold  in  the  phenomenal 
appearance  of  a house  that  stands  before  me,  is  succes- 
sive. The  question  then  arises,  whether  the  manifold  of 
the  house  itself  be  successive  by  itself,  which  of  course 
no  one  would  admit.  Whenever  I ask  for  the  transcen- 
dental meaning  of  my  concepts  of  an  object,  I find  that  a 
house  is  not  a thing  by  itself,  but  a phenomenon  [p.  191] 
only,  that  is,  a representation  the  transcendental  object 
of  which  is  unknown.  What  then  can  be  the  meaning  of 
the  question,  how  the  manifold  in  the  phenomenon  itself 
(which  is  not  a thing  by  itself)  may  be  connected?  Here 
that  which  is  contained  in  our  successive  apprehension  is 
considered  as  representation,  and  the  given  phenomenon, 
though  it  is  nothing  but  the  whole  of  those  representa- 
tions, as  their  object,  with  which  my  concept,  drawn  from 
the  representations  of  my  apprehension,  is  to  accord.  As 
the  accord  between  knowledge  and  its  object  is  truth,  it  is 
easily  seen,  that  we  can  ask  here  only  for  the  formal  con- 
ditions of  empirical  truth,  and  that  the  phenomenon,  in 
contradistinction  to  the  representations  of  our  apprehen- 
sion, can  only  be  represented  as  the  object  different  from 
them,  if  it  is  subject  to  a rule  distinguishing  it  from  every 
other  apprehension,  and  necessitating  a certain  kind  of 
conjunction  of  the  manifold.  That  which  in  the  phe- 
nomenon contains  the  condition  of  this  necessary  rule  of 
apprehension  is  the  object. 


Transcendental  Analytic  157 

Let  us  now  proceed  to  our  task.  That  something  takes 
piace,  that  is,  that  something,  or  some  state,  which  did 
not  exist  before,  begins  to  exist,  cannot  be  perceived  em- 
pirically, unless  there  exists  antecedently  a phenomenon 
which  does  not  contain  that  state ; for  a reality,  following 
on  empty  time,  that  is  a beginning  of  existence,  [p.  192] 
preceded  by  no  state  of  things,  can  be  apprehended  as 
little  as  empty  time  itself.  Every  apprehension  of  an 
event  is  therefore  a perception  following  on  another  per- 
ception. But  as  this  applies  to  all  synthesis  of  apprehen- 
sion, as  I showed  before  in  the  phenomenal  appearance  of 
a house,  that  apprehension  would  not  thereby  be  different 
from  any  other.  But  I observe  at  the  same  time,  that  if 
in  a phenomenon  which  contains  an  event  I call  the  ante- 
cedent state  of  perception  A,  and  the  subsequent  B,  B can 
only  follow  A in  my  apprehension,  while  the  perception  A 
can  never  follow  B,  but  can  only  precede  it.  I see,  for 
instance,  a ship  gliding  down  a stream.  My  perception 
of  its  place  below  follows  my  perception  of  its  place  higher 
up  in  the  course  of  the  stream,  and  it  is  impossible  in  the 
apprehension  of  this  phenomenon  that  the  ship  should  be 
perceived  first  below  and  then  higher  up.  We  see  there- 
fore that  the  order  in  the  succession  of  perceptions  in  our 
apprehension  is  here  determined,  and  our  apprehension 
regulated  by  that  order.  In  the  former  example  of  a 
house  my  perceptions  could  begin  in  the  apprehension  at 
the  roof  and  end  in  the  basement,  or  begin  below  and  end 
above  : they  could  apprehend  the  manifold  of  the  empirical 
intuition  from  right  to  left  or  from  left  to  right.  There 
was  therefore  no  determined  order  in  the  succession  of 
these  perceptions,  determining  the  point  where  [p.  193] 
I had  to  begin  in  apprehension,  in  order  to  connect  the 


158 


T ranscendental  A nalytic 


manifold  empirically ; while  in  the  apprehension  of  an 
event  there  is  always  a rule,  which  makes  the  order  of  the 
successive  perceptions  (in  the  apprehension  of  this  phe- 
nomenon) necessary. 

In  our  case,  therefore,  we  shall  have  to  derive  the  sub- 
jective succession  in  our  apprehension  from  the  objective 
succession  of  the  phenomena,  because  otherwise  the  for- 
mer would  be  entirely  undetermined,  and  unable  to  dis- 
tinguish one  phenomenon  from  another.  The  former 
alone  proves  nothing  as  to  the  connection  of  the  manifold 
in  the  object,  because  it  is  quite  arbitrary.  The  latter 
must  therefore  consist  in  the  order  of  the  manifold  in  a 
phenomenon,  according  to  which  the  apprehension  of 
what  is  happening  follows  upon  the  apprehension  of  what 
has  happened,  in  conformity  with  a rule.  Thus  only  can 
I be  justified  in  saying,  not  only  of  my  apprehension, 
but  of  the  phenomenon  itself,  that  there  exists  in  it  a 
succession,  which  is  the  same  as  to  say  that  I cannot 
arrange  the  apprehension  otherwise  than  in  that  very 
succession. 

In  conformity  with  this,  there  must  exist  in  that  which 
always  precedes  an  event  the  condition  of  a rule,  by  which 
this  event  follows  at  all  times,  and  necessarily;  [p.  194] 
but  I cannot  go  back  from  the  event  and  determine  by 
apprehension  that  which  precedes.  For  no  phenomenon 
goes  back  from  the  succeeding  to  the  preceding  point  of 
time,  though  it  is  related  to  some  preceding  point  of  time, 
while  the  progress  from  a given  time  to  a determined  fol- 
lowing time  is  necessary.  Therefore,  as  there  certainly  is 
something  that  follows,  I must  necessarily  refer  it  to  some- 
thing else  which  precedes,  and  upon  which  it  follows  by 
rule,  that  is,  by  necessity.  So  that  the  event,  as  being 


Transcendental  Analytic 


1 59 


conditional,  affords  a safe  indication  of  some  kind  of  con- 
dition, while  that  condition  itself  determines  the  event. 

If  we  supposed  that  nothing  precedes  an  event  upon 
which  such  event  must  follow  according  to  rule,  all  succes- 
sion of  perception  would  then  exist  in  apprehension  only, 
that  is,  subjectively ; but  it  would  not  thereby  be  deter- 
mined objectively,  what  ought  properly  to  be  the  antece- 
dent and  what  the  subsequent  in  perception.  We  should 
thus  have  a mere  play  of  representations  unconnected 
with  any  object,  that  is,  no  phenomenon  would,  by  our 
perception,  be  distinguished  in  time  from  any  other  phe- 
nomenon, because  the  succession  in  apprehension  would 
always  be  uniform,  and  there  would  be  nothing  in  the 
phenomena  to  determine  the  succession,  so  as  to  render 
a certain  sequence  objectively  necessary.  I could  not  say 
therefore  that  two  states  follow  each  other  in  a phenome- 
non, but  only  that  one  apprehension  follows  [p.  195] 
another,  which  is  purely  subjective,  and  does  not  deter- 
mine any  object,  and  cannot  be  considered  therefore  as 
knowledge  of  anything  (even  of  something  purely  phe- 
nomenal). 

If  therefore  experience  teaches  us  that  something  hap- 
pens, we  always  presuppose  that  something  precedes  on 
which  it  follows  by  rule.  Otherwise  I could  not  say  of 
the  object  that  it  followed,  because  its  following  in  my 
apprehension  only,  without  being  determined  by  rule  in 
reference  to  what  precedes,  would  not  justify  us  in  admit- 
ting an  objective  following.1  It  is  therefore  always  with 
reference  to  a rule  by  which  phenomena  as  they  follow, 
that  is  as  they  happen,  are  determined  by  an  antecedent 


1 Read  anzunehmcn  b(rechtigt. 


1 6o  Transcendental  Analytic 

state,  that  I can  give  an  objective  character  to  my  sub- 
jective synthesis  (of  apprehension);  nay,  it  is  under  this 
supposition  only  that  an  experience  of  anything  that  hap 
pens  becomes  possible. 

It  might  seem  indeed  as  if  this  were  in  contradiction 
to  all  that  has  always  been  said  on  the  progress  of  the 
human  understanding,  it  having  been  supposed  that  only 
by  a perception  and  comparison  of  many  events,  following 
in  the  same  manner  on  preceding  phenomena,  we  were  led 
to  the  discovery  of  a rule  according  to  which  certain  events 
always  follow  on  certain  phenomena,  and  that  thus  only 
we  were  enabled  to  form  to  ourselves  the  concept  of  a 
cause.  If  this  were  so,  that  concept  would  be  [p.  196] 
empirical  only,  and  the  rule  which  it  supplies,  that  every- 
thing which  happens  must  have  a cause,  would  be  as  acci- 
dental as  experience  itself.  The  universality  and  necessity 
of  that  rule  would  then  be  fictitious  only,  and  devoid  of 
any  true  and  general  validity,  because  not  being  a priori , 
but  founded  on  induction  only.  The  case  is  the  same  as 
with  other  pure  representations  a priori  {{or  instance  space 
and  time),  which  we  are  only  able  to  draw  out  as  pure 
concepts  from  experience,  because  we  have  put  them  first 
into  experience,  nay,  have  rendered  experience  possible 
only  by  them.  It  is  true,  no  doubt,  that  the  logical  clear- 
ness of  this  representation  of  a rule,  determining  the  suc- 
cession of  events,  as  a concept  of  cause,  becomes  possible 
only  when  we  have  used  it  in  experience,  but,  as  the  con- 
dition of  the  synthetical  unity  of  phenomena  in  time,  it 
was  nevertheless  the  foundation  of  all  experience,  and 
consequently  preceded  it  a priori. 

It  is  necessary  therefore  to  show  by  examples  that  we 
never,  even  in  experience,  ascribe  the  sequence  or  consd- 


Transcendental  Analytic  161 

quence  (of  an  event  or  something  happening  that  did  not 
exist  before)  to  the  object,  and  distinguish  it  from  the  sub- 
jective sequence  of  our  apprehension,  except  when  there 
is  a rule  which  forces  us  to  observe  a certain  order  of  per- 
ceptions, and  no  other ; nay,  that  it  is  this  force  which 
from  the  first  renders  the  representation  of  a [p.  197] 
succession  in  the  object  possible. 

We  have  representations  within  us,  and  can  become 
conscious  of  them ; but  however  far  that  consciousness 
may  extend,  and  however  accurate  and  minute  it  may  be, 
yet  the  representations  are  always  representations  only, 
that  is,  internal  determinations  of  our  mind  in  this  or 
that  relation  of  time.  What  right  have  we  then  to  add 
to  these  representations  an  object,  or  to  ascribe  to  these 
modifications,  beyond  their  subjective  reality,  another  ob- 
jective one  ? Their  objective  character  cannot  consist  in 
their  relation  to  another  representation  (of  that  which  one 
wished  to  predicate  of  the  object),  for  thus  the  question 
would  only  arise  again,  how  that  representation  could 
again  go  beyond  itself,  and  receive  an  objective  character 
in  addition  to  the  subjective  one,  which  belongs  to  it,  as  a 
determination  of  our  mind.  If  we  try  to  find  out  what 
new  quality  or  dignity  is  imparted  to  our  representations 
by  their  relation  to  an  object , we  find  that  it  consists  in 
nothing  but  the  rendering  necessary  the  connection  of 
representations  in  a certain  way,  and  subjecting  them  to 
a rule ; and  that  on  the  other  hand  they  receive  their 
objective  character  only  because  a certain  order  is  neces- 
sary in  the  time  relations  of  our  representations. 

In  the  synthesis  of  phenomena  the  manifold  [p.  198] 
of  our  representations  is  always  successive.  No  object 
can  thus  be  represented,  because  through  the  succession 


i62 


Transcendental  Analytic 


which  is  common  to  all  apprehensions,  nothing  can  be 
distinguished  from  anything  else.  But  as  soon  as  I per- 
ceive or  anticipate  that  there  is  in  this  succession  a rela- 
tion to  an  antecedent  state  from  which  the  representation 
follows  by  rule,  then  something  is  represented  as  an  event, 
or  as  something  that  happens : that  is  to  say,  I know  an 
object  to  which  I must  assign  a certain  position  in  time, 
which,  after  the  preceding  state,  cannot  be  different  from 
what  it  is.  If  therefore  I perceive  that  something  hap- 
pens, this  representation  involves  that  something  preceded, 
because  the  phenomenon  receives  its  position  in  time  with 
reference  to  what  preceded,  that  is,  it  exists  after  a time 
in  which  it  did  not  exist.  Its  definite  position  in  time  can 
only  be  assigned  to  it,  if  in  the  antecedent  state  something 
is  presupposed  on  which  it  always  follows  by  rule.  It 
thus  follows  that,  first  of  all,  I cannot  invert  the  order, 
and  place  that  which  happens  before  that  on  which  it 
follows ; secondly,  that  whenever  the  antecedent  state  is 
there,  the  other  event  must  follow  inevitably  and  neces- 
sarily. Thus  it  happens  that  there  arises  an  order  among 
our  representations,  in  which  the  present  state  [p.  199] 
(as  having  come  to  be),  points  to  an  antecedent  state,  as 
a correlative  of  the  event  that  is  given ; a correlative 
which,  though  as  yet  indefinite,  refers  as  determining  to 
the  event,  as  its  result,  and  connects  that  event  with  itself 
by  necessity,  in  the  succession  of  time. 

If  then  it  is  a necessary  law  of  our  sensibility,  and 
therefore  a formal  condition  of  all  perception,  that  a pre- 
ceding necessarily  determines  a succeeding  time  (because 
I cannot  arrive  at  the  succeeding  time  except  through  the 
preceding),  it  is  also  an  indispensable  law  of  the  empirical 
representation  of  the  series  of  time  that  the  phenomena  of 


Transcendental  Analytic  163 

past  time  determine  every  existence  in  succeeding  times, 
nay,  that  these,  as  events,  cannot  take  place  except  so  far 
as  the  former  determine  their  existence  in  time,  that  is, 
determine  it  by  rule.  For  it  is  of  course  in  phenomena  only 
that  we  can  know  empirically  this  continuity  in  the  cohe- 
rence of  times. 

What  is  required  for  all  experience  and  renders  it  pos- 
sible is  the  understanding,  and  the  first  that  is  added  by 
it  is  not  that  it  renders  the  representation  of  objects 
clear,  but  that  it  really  renders  the  representation  of  any 
object  for  the  first  time  possible.  This  takes  place  by  the 
understanding  transferring  the  order  of  time  to  the  phe- 
nomena and  their  existence,  and  by  assigning  to  each  of 
them  as  to  a consequence  a certain  a priori  determined 
place  in  time,  with  reference  to  antecedent  phenomena, 
without  which  place  phenomena  would  not  be  in  [p.  200] 
accord  with  time,  which  determines  a priori  their  places 
to  all  its  parts.  This  determination  of  place  cannot  be 
derived  from  the  relation  in  which  phenomena  stand  to 
absolute  time  (for  that  can  never  be  an  object  of  percep- 
tion) ; but,  on  the  contrary,  phenomena  must  themselves 
determine  to  each  other  their  places  in  time,  and  render 
them  necessary  in  the  series  of  time.  In  other  words,  what 
happens  or  follows  must  follow  according  to  a general  rule 
on  that  which  was  contained  in  a previous  state.  We  thus 
get  a series  of  phenomena  which,  by  means  of  the  under- 
standing, produces  and  makes  necessary  in  the  series  of 
possible  perceptions  the  same  order  and  continuous  cohe- 
rence which  exists  a priori  in  the  form  of  internal  intui- 
tion (time),  in  which  all  perceptions  must  have  their  place. 

That  something  happens  is  therefore  a perception 
which  belongs  to  a possible  experience,  and  this  experi- 


164 


Transcendental  Analytic 


ence  becomes  real  when  I consider  the  phenomenon  as 
determined  with  regard  to  its  place  in  time,  that  is  to  say, 
as  an  object  which  can  always  be  found,  according  to  a 
rule,  in  the  connection  of  perceptions.  This  rule,  by 
which  we  determine  everything  according  to  the  succes- 
sion of  time,  is  this  : the  condition  under  which  an  event 
follows  at  all  times  (necessarily)  is  to  be  found  in  what 
precedes.  All  possible  experience  therefore,  that  is,  all 
objective  knowledge  of  phenomena  with  regard  to  their 
relation  in  the  succession  of  time,  depends  on  [p.  201] 
‘ the  principle  of  sufficient  reason.’ 

The  proof  of  this  principle  rests  entirely  on  the  fol- 
lowing considerations.  All  empirical  knowledge  requires 
synthesis  of  the  manifold  by  imagination,  which  is  always 
successive,  one  representation  following  upon  the  other. 
That  succession,  however,  in  the  imagination  is  not  at  all 
determined  with  regard  to  the  order  in  which  something 
precedes  and  something  follows,  and  the  series  of  succes- 
sive representations  may  be  taken  as  retrogressive  as  well  as 
progressive.  If  that  synthesis,  however,  is  a synthesis  of 
apperception  (of  the  manifold  in  a given  phenomenon), 
then  the  order  is  determined  in  the  object,  or,  to  speak 
more  accurately,  there  is  then  in  it  an  order  of  successive 
synthesis  which  determines  the  object,  and  according  to 
which  something  must  necessarily  precede,  and,  when  it 
is  once  there,  something  else  must  necessarily  follow.  If 
therefore  my  perception  is  to  contain  the  knowledge  of  an 
event,  or  something  that  really  happens,  it  must  consist  of 
an  empirical  judgment,  by  which  the  succession  is  sup- 
posed to  be  determined,  so  that  the  event  presupposes 
another  phenomenon  in  time  on  which  it  follows  neces- 
sarily and  according  to  a rule.  If  it  were  different,  if  the 


Transcendental  Analytic 


165 


antecedent  phenomenon  were  there,  and  the  event  did  not 
follow  on  it  necessarily,  it  would  become  to  me  a mere 
play  of  my  subjective  imaginations,  or  if  I thought  it  to 
be  objective,  I should  call  it  a dream.  It  is  therefore  the 
relation  of  phenomena  (as  possible  perceptions)  [p.  202] 
according  to  which  the  existence  of  the  subsequent  (what 
happens)  is  determined  in  time  by  something  antecedent 
necessarily  and  by  rule,  or,  in  other  words,  the  relation 
of  cause  and  effect,  which  forms  the  condition  of  the 
objective  validity  of  our  empirical  judgments  with  regard 
to  the  series  of  perceptions,  and  therefore  also  the  condi- 
tion of  the  empirical  truth  of  them,  and  of  experience. 
The  principle  of  the  causal  relation  in  the  succession  of 
phenomena  is  valid  therefore  for  all  objects  of  experience, 
also  (under  the  conditions  of  succession),  because  that 
principle  is  itself  the  ground  of  the  possibility  of  such 
experience. 

Here,  however,  we  meet  with  a difficulty  that  must  first 
be  removed.  The  principle  of  the  causal  connection  of 
phenomena  is  restricted  in  our  formula  to  their  succession, 
while  in  practice  we  find  that  it  applies  also  to  their  coexist- 
ence, because  cause  and  effect  may  exist  at  the  same  time. 
There  may  be,  for  instance,  inside  a room  heat  which  is  not 
found  in  the  open  air.  If  I look  for  its  cause,  I find  a 
heated  stove.  But  that  stove,  as  cause,  exists  at  the  same 
time  with  its  effect,  the  heat  of  the  room,  and  there  is 
therefore  no  succession  in  time  between  cause  and  effect, 
but  they  are  coexistent,  and  yet  the  law  applies.  The 
fact  is,  that  the  greater  portion  of  the  active  [p.  203] 
causes1  in  nature  is  coexistent  with  its  effects,  and  the 

1 The  reading  of  the  First  Edition  is  Ursache;  Ursachen  is  a conjecture 
made  by  Rosenkranz  and  approved  by  others. 


1 66 


Transcendental  Analytic 


succession  of  these  effects  in  time  is  due  only  to  this,  that 
a cause  cannot  produce  its  whole  effect  in  one  moment. 
But  at  the  moment  in  which  an  effect  first  arises  it  is 
always  coexistent  with  the  causality  of  its  cause,  because 
if  that  had  ceased  one  moment  before,  the  effect  would 
never  have  happened.  Here  we  must  well  consider  that 
what  is  thought  of  is  the  order , not  the  lapse  of  time,  and 
that  the  relation  remains,  even  if  no  time  had  lapsed. 
The  time  between  the  causality  of  the  cause  and  its  im- 
mediate effect  can  be  vanishing  (they  may  be  simultane- 
ous), but  the  relation  of  the  one  to  the  other  remains  for 
all  that  determinable  in  time.  If  I look  upon  a ball  that 
rests  on  a soft  cushion,  and  makes  a depression  in  it,  as  a 
cause,  it  is  simultaneous  with  its  effect.  But  I neverthe- 
less distinguish  the  two  through  the  temporal  relation  of 
dynamical  connection.  For  if  I place  the  ball  on  a cush- 
ion, its  smooth  surface  is  followed  by  a depression,  while, 
if  there  is  a depression  in  the  cushion  (I  know  not 
whence),  a leaden  ball  does  by  no  means  follow  from  it. 

The  succession  in  time  is  therefore  the  only  empirical 
criterion  of  an  effect  with  regard  to  the  causality  of  the 
cause  which  precedes  it.  The  glass  is  the  cause  of  the 
rising  of  the  water  above  its  horizontal  surface,  [p.  204] 
although  both  phenomena  are  simultaneous.  For  as  soon 
as  I draw  water  in  a glass  from  a larger  vessel,  something 
follows,  namely,  the  change  of  the  horizontal  state  which 
it  had  before  into  a concave  state  which  it  assumes  in  the 
glass. 

This  causality  leads  to  the  concept  of  action,  that  to 
the  concept  of  force,  and  lastly,  to  the  concept  of  sub- 
stance. As  I do  not  mean  to  burden  my  critical  task, 
which  only  concerns  the  sources  of  synthetical  knowledge 


Transcendental  Analytic  167 

a priori , with  analytical  processes  which  aim  at  the  ex- 
planation, and  not  at  the  expansion  of  our  concepts,  I 
leave  a fuller  treatment  of  these  to  a future  system  of 
pure  reason ; nay,  I may  refer  to  many  well-known  man- 
uals in  which  such  an  analysis  may  be  found.  I cannot 
pass,  however,  over  the  empirical  criterion  of  a substance, 
so  far  as  it  seems  to  manifest  itself,  not  so  much  through 
the  permanence  of  the  phenomenon  as  through  action. 

Wherever  there  is  action,  therefore  activity  and  force, 
there  must  be  substance,  and  in  this  alone  the.  seat  of  that 
fertile  source  of  phenomena  can  be  sought.  This  sounds 
very  well,  but  if  people  are  asked  to  explain  what  they 
mean  by  substance,  they  find  it  by  no  means  easy  to 
answer  without  reasoning  in  a circle.  How  can  [p.  205] 
we  conclude  immediately  from  the  action  to  the  perma- 
nence of  the  agent,  which  nevertheless  is  an  essential 
and  peculiar  characteristic  of  substance  ( phaenomenoii)  ? 
After  what  we  have  explained  before,  however,  the  an- 
swer to  this  question  is  not  so  difficult,  though  it  would 
be  impossible,  according  to  the  ordinary  way  of  proceed- 
ing analytically  only  with  our  concepts.  Action  itself 
implies  the  relation  of  the  subject  of  the  causality  to  the 
effect.  As  all  effect  consists  in  that  which  happens,  that 
is,  in  the  changeable,  indicating  time  in  succession,  the  last 
subject  of  it  is  the  permanent,  as  the  substratum  of  all 
that  changes,  that  is  substance.  For,  according  to  the 
principle  of  causality,  actions  are  always  the  first  ground 
of  all  change  of  phenomena,  and  cannot  exist  therefore  in 
a subject  that  itself  changes,  because  in  that  case  other 
actions  and  another  subject  would  be  required  to  deter- 
mine that  change.  Action,  therefore,  is  a sufficient  em- 
pirical criterion  to  prove  substantiality,  nor  is  it  necessary 


1 68  Transcendental  Analytic 

that  I should  first  establish  its  permanency  by  means  of 
compared  perceptions,  which  indeed  would  hardly  be  pos- 
sible in  this  way,  at  least  with  that  completeness  which  is 
required  by  the  magnitude  and  strict  universality  of  the 
concept.  That  the  first  subject  of  the  causality  of  all  aris- 
ing and  perishing  cannot  itself  (in  the  field  of  phenomena) 
arise  and  perish,  is  a safe  conclusion,  pointing  in  [p.  206] 
the  end  to  empirical  necessity  and  permanency  in  exist- 
ence, that  is,  the  concept  of  a substance  as  a phenomenon. 

If  anything  happens,  the  mere  fact  of  something  aris- 
ing, without  any  reference  to  what  it  is,  is  in  itself  a mat- 
ter for  enquiry.  The  transition  from  the  not-being  of  a 
state  into  that  state,  even  though  it  contained  no  quality 
whatever  as  a phenomenon,  must  itself  be  investigated. 
This  arising,  as  we  have  shown  in  No.  A,  does  not  con- 
cern the  substance  (because  a substance  never  arises),  but 
its  state  only.  It  is  therefore  mere  change,  and  not  an 
arising  out  of  nothing.  When  such  an  arising  is  looked 
upon  as  the  effect  of  a foreign  cause,  it  is  called  creation. 
This  can  never  be  admitted  as  an  event  among  phenom- 
ena, because  its  very  possibility  would  destroy  the  unity 
of  experience.  If,  however,  we  consider  all  things,  not  as 
phenomena,  but  as  things  by  themselves  and  objects  of 
the  understanding  only,  then,  though  they  are  substances, 
they  may  be  considered  as  dependent  in  their  existence 
on  a foreign  cause.  Our  words  would  then  assume  quite 
a different  meaning,  and  no  longer  be  applicable  to  phe- 
nomena, as  possible  objects  of  experience. 

How  anything  can  be  changed  at  all,  how  it  is  possible 
that  one  state  in  a given  time  is  followed  by  an-  [p.  207] 
other  at  another  time,  of  that  we  have  not  the  slightest 
conception  a priori.  We  want  for  that  a knowledge  of 


Transcendental  Analytic  169 

real  powers,  which  can  be  given  empirically  only : for 
instance,  a knowledge  of  motive  powers,  or  what  is  the 
same,  a knowledge  of  certain  successive  phenomena  (as 
movements)  which  indicate  the  presence  of  such  forces. 
What  can  be  considered  a priori , according  to  the  law  of 
causality  and  the  conditions  of  time,  are  the  form  of  every 
change,  the  condition  under  which  alone,  as  an  arising  of 
another  state,  it  can  take  place  (its  contents,  that  is,  the 
state,  which  is  changed,  being  what  it  may),  and  therefore 
the  succession  itself  of  the  states  (that  which  has  hap- 
pened).1 

When  a substance  passes  from  one  state  a into  another 
b,  the  moment  of  the  latter  is  different  from  the  moment 
of  the  former  state,  and  follows  it.  Again,  that  second 
state,  as  a reality  (in  phenomena),  differs  from  the  first  in 
which  that  reality  did  not  exist,  as  b from  zero ; that  is, 
even  if  the  state  b differed  from  the  state  a in  quantity 
only,  that  change  is  an  arising  of  b — a,  which  in  the 
former  state  was  non-existent,  and  in  relation  to  [p.  208] 
which  that  state  is  = o. 

The  question  therefore  arises  how  a thing  can  pass  from 
a state  =a  to  another  = bt  Between  two  moments  there 
is  always  a certain  time,  and  between  two  states  in  these 
two  moments  there  is  always  a difference  which  must 
have  a certain  quantity,  because  all  parts  of  phenomena 
are  always  themselves  quantities.  Every  transition  there- 
fore from  one  state  into  another  takes  place  in  a certain 
time  between  two  moments,  the  first  of  which  determines 

1 It  should  be  remarked  that  I am  not  speaking  here  of  the  change  of 
certain  relations,  but  of  the  change  of  a state.  Therefore  when  a body  moves 
in  a uniform  way,  it  does  not  change  its  state  of  movement,  but  it  does  so 
when  its  motion  increases  or  decreases. 


170  Transcende?ital  Analytic 

the  state  from  which  a thing  arises,  the  second  that  at 
which  it  arrives.  Both  therefore  are  the  temporal  limits 
of  a change  or  of  an  intermediate  state  between  two 
states,  and  belong  as  such  to  the  whole  of  the  change. 
Every  change,  however,  has  a cause  which  proves  its 
causality  during  the  whole  of  the  time  in  which  the 
change  takes  place.  The  cause  therefore  does  not  pro- 
duce the  change  suddenly  (in  one  moment),  but  during  a 
certain  time ; so  that,  as  the  time  grows  from  the  initiatory 
moment  a to  its  completion  in  />,  the  quantity  of  reality 
also  (, b — a ) is  produced  through  all  the  smaller  degrees 
between  the  first  and  the  last.  All  change  therefore  is 
possible  only  through  a continuous  action  of  causality 
which,  so  far  as  it  is  uniform,  is  called  a mo-  [p.  209] 
mentum.  A change  does  not  consist  of  such  momenta, 
but  is  produced  by  them  as  their  effect. 

This  is  the  law  of  continuity  in  all  change,  founded  on 
this,  that  neither  time  nor  a phenomenon  in  time  consists 
of  parts  which  are  the  smallest  possible,  and  that  never- 
theless the  state  of  a thing  which  is  being  changed  passes 
through  all  these  parts,  as  elements,  to  its  new  state.  No 
difference  of  the  real  in  phenomena  and  no  difference  in 
the  quantity  of  times  is  ever  the  smallest;  and  thus  the 
new  state  of  reality  grows  from  the  first  state  in  which 
that  reality  did  not  exist  through  all  the  infinite  degrees 
thereof,  the  differences  of  which  from  one  another  are 
smaller  than  that  between  zero  and  a. 

It  does  not  concern  us  at  present  of  what  utility  this 
principle  may  be  in  physical  science.  But  how  such  a 
principle,  which  seems  to  enlarge  our  knowledge  of  nature 
so  much,  can  be  possible  a priori,  that  requires  a careful 
investigation,  although  we  can  see  that  it  is  real  and  true, 


Transcendental  Analytic  171 

and  might  thus  imagine  that  the  question  how  it  was  pos- 
sible is  unnecessary.  For  there  are  so  many  unfounded 
pretensions  to  enlarge  our  knowledge  by  pure  reason  that 
we  must  accept  it  as  a general  principle,  to  be  always  dis- 
trustful, and  never  to  believe  or  accept  any-  [p.  210] 
thing  of  this  kind  without  documents  capable  of  a thor- 
ough deduction,  however  clear  the  dogmatical  proof  of  it 
may  appear. 

All  addition  to  our  empirical  knowledge  and  every  ad- 
vance in  perception  is  nothing  but  an  enlargement  of  the 
determinations  of  our  internal  sense,  that  is,  a progression 
in  time,  whatever  the  objects  may  be,  whether  phenomena 
or  pure  intuitions.  This  progression  in  time  determines 
everything,  and  is  itself  determined  by  nothing  else,  that 
is,  the  parts  of  that  progression  are  only  given  in  time, 
and  through  the  synthesis  of  time,  but  not  time  before 
this  synthesis.  For  this  reason  every  transition  in  our 
perception  to  something  that  follows  in  time  is  really  a 
determination  of  time  through  the  production  of  that  per- 
ception, and  as  time  is  always  and  in  all  its  parts  a quantity, 
the  production  of  a perception  as  a quantity,  through  all 
degrees  (none  of  them  being  the  smallest),  from  zero  up 
to  its  determined  degree.  This  shows  how  it  is  possible 
to  know  a priori  a law  of  changes,  as  far  as  their  form  is 
concerned.  We  are  only  anticipating  our  own  apprehen- 
sion, the  formal  condition  of  which,  as  it  dwells  in  us 
before  all  given  phenomena,  may  well  be  known  a priori. 

In  the  same  manner  therefore  in  which  time  contains 
the  sensuous  condition  a priori  of  the  possi-  [p.  2 1 1 ] 
bility  of  a continuous  progression  of  that  which  exists  to 
that  which  follows,  the  understanding,  by  means  of  the 
unity  of  apperception,  is  a condition  a priori  of  the  possi- 


172 


Transcendental  Analytic 


bility  of  a continuous  determination  of  the  position  of  all 
phenomena  in  that  time,  and  this  through  a series  of 
causes  and  effects,  the  former  producing  inevitably  the 
existence  of  the  latter,  and  thus  rendering  the  empirical 
knowledge  of  the  relations  of  time  valid  for  all  times 
(universally)  and  therefore  objectively  valid. 

I 

C 

[ Third  Analogy 
Principle  of  Community 

All  substances,  in  so  far  as  they  are  coexistent,  stand  in  complete 
community,  that  is,  reciprocity  one  to  another1] 

Proof 

Things  are  coexistent  in  so  far  as  they  exist  at  one  and 
the  same  time.  But  how  can  we  know  that  they  exist  at 
one  and  the  same  time  ? Only  if  the  order  in  the  syn- 
thesis of  apprehension  of  the  manifold  is  indifferent,  that 
is,  if  I may  advance  from  A through  B,  C,  D,  to  E,  or 
contrariwise  from  E to  A.  For,  if  the  synthesis  were 
successive  in  time  (in  the  order  beginning  with  A and 
ending  with  E),  it  would  be  impossible  to  begin  the  appre- 
hension with  the  perception  of  E and  to  go  backwards  to 
A,  because  A belongs  to  past  time,  and  can  no  longer  be 
an  object  of  apprehension.  [p.  212] 

If  we  supposed  it  possible  that  in  a number  of  sub- 
stances, as  phenomena,  each  were  perfectly  isolated,  so 
that  none  influenced  another  or  received  influences  from 

1 See  Supplement  XX, 


Transcendental  Analytic 


173 


another,  then  the  coexistence  of  them  could  never  become 
an  object  of  possible  perception,  nor  could  the  existence  of 
the  one  through  any  process  of  empirical  synthesis  lead  us 
on  to  the  existence  of  another.  For  if  we  imagined  that 
they  were  separated  by  a perfectly  empty  space,  a percep- 
tion, proceeding  from  the  one  in  time  to  the  other  might 
no  doubt  determine  the  existence  of  it  by  means  of  a sub- 
sequent perception,  but  would  never  be  able  to  determine 
whether  that  phenomenon  followed  objectively  on  the 
other  or  was  coexistent  with  it. 

There  must  therefore  be  something  besides  their  mere 
existence  by  which  A determines  its  place  in  time  for  B, 
and  B for  A,  because  thus  only  can  these  two  substances 
be  represented  empirically  as  coexistent.  Nothing,  how- 
ever, can  determine  the  place  of  anything  else  in  time, 
except  that  which  is  its  cause  or  the  cause  of  its  deter- 
minations. Therefore  every  substance  (since  it  can  be 
effect  with  regard  to  its  determinations  only)  must  contain 
in  itself  the  causality  of  certain  determinations  in  another 
substance,  and,  at  the  same  time,  the  effects  of  the  causal- 
ity of  that  other  substance,  that  is,  substances  must  stand 
in  dynamical  communion,  immediately  or  medi-  [p.  213] 
ately,  with  each  other,  if  their  coexistence  is  to  be  known 
in  any  possible  experience.  Now,  everything  without 
which  the  experience  of  any  objects  would  be  impossible, 
may  be  said  to  be  necessary  with  reference  to  such  objects 
of  experience ; from  which  it  follows  that  it  is  necessary 
for  all  substances,  so  far  as  they  are  coexistent  as  phe- 
nomena, to  stand  in  a complete  communion  of  reciprocity 
with  each  other. 

The  word  communion  (Gemeinschaft)  may  be  used  in 
two  senses,  meaning  either  communio  or  commercium. 


174 


Tra?iscendental  Analytic 


We  use  it  here  in  the  latter  sense : as  a dynamical  com- 
munion without  which  even  the  local  communio  spatii 
could  never  be  known  empirically.  We  can  easily  per 
ceive  in  our  experience,  that  continuous  influences  only 
can  lead  our  senses  in  all  parts  of  space  from  one  object 
to  another ; that  the  light  which  plays  between  our  eyes 
and  celestial  bodies  produces  a mediate  communion  be- 
tween us  and  them,  and  proves  the  coexistence  of  the 
latter ; that  we  cannot  change  any  place  empirically  (per- 
ceive such  a change)  unless  matter  itself  renders  the  per- 
ception of  our  own  place  possible  to  us,  and  that  by  means 
of  its  reciprocal  influence  only  matter  can  evince  its  simul- 
taneous existence,  and  thus  (though  mediately  only)  its 
coexistence,  even  to  the  most  distant  objects.  Without 
this  communion  every  perception  (of  any  phe-  [p.  214] 
nomenon  in  space)  is  separated  from  the  others,  and  the 
chain  of  empirical  representations,  that  is,  experience 
itself,  would  have  to  begin  de  novo  with  every  new  object, 
without  the  former  experience  being  in  the  least  connected 
with  it,  or  standing  to  it  in  any  temporal  relation.  I do 
not  want  to  say  anything  here  against  empty  space. 
Empty  space  may  exist  where  perception  cannot  reach, 
and  where  therefore  no  empirical  knowledge  of  coexist- 
ence takes  place,  but,  in  that  case,  it  is  no  object  for  any 
possible  experience. 

The  following  remarks  may  elucidate  this.  It  is  neces- 
sary that  in  our  mind  all  phenomena,  as  being  contained 
in  a possible  experience,  must  share  a communion  of  ap- 
perception, and  if  the  objects  are  to  be  represented  as 
connected  in  coexistence,  they  must  reciprocally  determine 
their  place  in  time,  and  thus  constitute  a whole.  If  this 
subjective  communion  is  to  rest  on  an  objective  ground,  or 


Transcendental  Analytic 


175 


is  to  refer  to  phenomena  as  substances,  then  the  percep- 
tion of  the  one  as  cause  must  render  possible  the  per- 
ception of  the  other,  and  vice  versa:  so  that  the  succession 
which  always  exists  in  perceptions,  as  apprehensions,  may 
not  be  attributed  to  the  objects,  but  that  the  objects  should 
be  represented  as  existing  simultaneously.  This  is  a recip- 
rocal influence,  that  is  a real  commercitim  of  substances, 
without  which  the  empirical  relation  of  co-exist-  [p.  215] 
ence  would  be  impossible  in  our  experience.  Through 
this  commercium,  phenomena  as  being  apart  from  each 
other  and  yet  connected,  constitute  a compound  ( composi - 
turn  reale),  and  such  compounds  become  possible  in  many 
ways.  The  three  dynamical  relations,  therefore,  from 
which  all  others  are  derived,  are  inherence,  consequence, 
and  composition. 

* * •*  * * 

These  are  the  three  analogies  of  experience.  They  are 
nothing  but  principles  for  determining  the  existence  of 
phenomena  in  time,  according  to  its  three  modes.  First, 
the  relation  of  time  itself,  as  to  a quantity  (quantity  of 
existence,  that  is  duration).  Secondly,  the  relation  in 
time,  as  in  a series  (successively).  And  thirdly,  likewise 
in  time,  as  the  whole  of  all  existence  (simultaneously). 
This  unity  in  the  determination  of  time  is  dynamical  only, 
that  is,  time  is  not  looked  upon  as  that  in  which  experience 
assigns  immediately  its  place  to  every  existence,  for  this 
would  be  impossible ; because  absolute  time  is  no  object  of 
perception  by  which  phenomena  could  be  held  together ; 
but  the  rule  of  the  understanding  through  which  alone  the 
existence  of  phenomena  can  receive  synthetical  unity  in 
time  determines  the  place  of  each  of  them  in  time,  there- 
fore a priori  and  as  valid  for  all  time. 


176 


T ra  nscenden  tal  A nalytic 


By  nature  (in  the  empirical  sense  of  the  word)  [p.  216] 
we  mean  the  coherence  of  phenomena  in  their  existence, 
according  to  necessary  rules,  that  is,  laws.  There  are 
therefore  certain  laws,  and  they  exist  a priori,  which  them- 
selves make  nature  possible,  while  the  empirical  laws  exist 
and  are  discovered  through  experience,  but  in  accordance 
with  those  original  laws  which  first  render  experience  pos- 
sible. Our  analogies  therefore  represent  the  unity  of 
nature  in  the  coherence  of  all  phenomena,  under  certain 
exponents,  which  express  the  relation  of  time  (as  compre- 
hending all  existence)  to  the  unity  of  apperception,  which 
apperception  can  only  take  place  in  the  synthesis  accord- 
ing to  rules.  The  three  analogies,  therefore,  simply  say, 
that  all  phenomena  exist  in  one  nature,  and  must  so  exist 
because,  without  such  unity  a priori  no  unity  of  experi- 
ence, and  therefore  no  determination  of  objects  in  experi- 
ence, would  be  possible. 

With  regard  to  the  mode  of  proof,  by  which  we 
have  arrived  at  these  transcendental  laws  of  nature 
and  its  peculiar  character,  a remark  must  be  made 
which  will  become  important  as  a rule  for  any  other 
attempt  to  prove  intelligible,  and  at  the  same  time 
synthetical  propositions  a prioii.  If  we  had  attempted 
to  prove  these  analogies  dogmatically,  that  is  from  con- 
cepts, showing  that  all  which  exists  is  found  only  in 
that  which  is  permanent,  that  every  event  [p.  217] 
presupposes  something  in  a previous  state  on  which  it 
follows  by  rule,  and  lastly,  that  in  the  manifold  which 
is  coexistent,  states  coexist  in  relation  to  each  other 
by  rule,  all  our  labour  would  have  been  in  vain.  For 
we  may  analyse  as  much  as  we  like,  we  shall  never 
arrive  from  one  object  and  its  existence  at  the  existence 


Transcendental  Analytic 


1 17 


of  another,  or  at  its  mode  of  existence  by  means  of 
the  concepts  of  these  things  only.  What  else  then 
remained  ? There  remained  the  possibility  of  expe- 
rience, as  that  knowledge  in  which  all  objects  must 
in  the  end  be  capable  of  being  given  to  us,  if  their 
representation  is  to  have  any  objective  reality  for  us. 
In  this,  namely  in  the  synthetical  unity  of  appercep- 
tion of  all  phenomena,  we  discovered  the  conditions 
a priori  of  an  absolute  and  necessary  determination 
in  time  of  all  phenomenal  existence.  Without  this 
even  the  empirical  determinations  in  time  would  be 
impossible,  and  we  thus  established  the  rules  of  the 
synthetical  unity  a priori , by  which  we  might  antici- 
pate experience.  It  was  because  people  were  ignorant 
of  this  method,  and  imagined  that  they  could  prove 
dogmatically  synthetical  propositions  which  the  empir- 
ical use  of  the  understanding  follows  as  its  principles, 
that  so  many  and  always  unsuccessful  attempts  have 
been  made  to  prove  the  proposition  of  the  ‘ sufficient 
reason.’  The  other  two  analogies  have  not  even  been 
thought  of,  though  everybody  followed  them  uncon- 
sciously,1 because  the  method  of  the  categories  [p.  218] 
was  wanting,  by  which  alone  every  gap  in  the  under- 

1 The  unity  of  the  universe,  in  which  all  phenomena  are  supposed  to  be 
connected,  is  evidently  a mere  deduction  of  the  quietly  adopted  principle  of 
the  communion  of  all  substances  as  coexistent;  for  if  they  were  isolated,  they 
would  not  form  parts  of  a whole,  and  if  their  connection  (the  reciprocity  of 
the  manifold)  were  not  necessary  for  the  sake  of  their  coexistence,  it  would  be 
impossible  to  use  the  latter,  which  is  a purely  ideal  relation,  as  a proof  of  the 
former,  which  is  real.  We  have  shown,  however,  that  communion  is  really 
the  ground  of  the  possibility  of  an  empirical  knowledge  of  coexistence,  and 
that  really  we  can  only  conclude  from  this  the  existence  of  the  former,  as  its 
condition. 

N 


1 78 


Transcendental  Analytic 


standing,  both  with  regard  to  concepts  and  principles, 
can  be  discovered  and  pointed  out. 

IV 

The  Postulates  of  Empirical  Thought  in  General 

1.  What  agrees  with  the  formal  conditions  of  experience  (in  intuition 

and  in  concepts)  is  possible 

2.  What  is  connected  with  the  material  conditions  of  experience  (sensa- 

tion) is  real 

3.  That  which,  in  its  connection  with  the  real,  is  determined  by  uni- 

versal conditions  of  experience,  is  (exists  as)  necessary 

Explanation  [p.  219] 

The  categories  of  modality  have  this  peculiar  character 
that,  as  determining  an  object,  they  do  not  enlarge  in  the 
least  the  concept  to  which  they  are  attached  as  predicates, 
but  express  only  a relation  to  our  faculty  of  knowledge. 
Even  when  the  concept  of  a thing  is  quite  complete,  I can 
still  ask  with  reference  to  that  object,  whether  it  is  pos- 
sible only,  or  real  also,  and,  if  the  latter,  whether  it  is 
necessary?  No  new  determinations  of  the  object  are 
thereby  conceived,  but  it  is  only  asked  in  what  relation  it 
(with  all  its  determinations)  stands  to  the  understanding 
and  its  empirical  employment,  to  the  empirical  faculty  of 
judgment,  and  to  reason,  in  its  application  to  experience? 

The  principles  of  modality  are  therefore  nothing  but 
explanations  of  the  concepts  of  possibility,  reality,  and 
necessity,  in  their  empirical  employment,  confining  all 
categories  to  an  empirical  employment  only,  and  prohibit- 
ing their  transcendental1  use.  For  if  these  categories  are 

1 Here  the  same  as  transcendent. 


Transcendental  Analytic  179 

not  to  have  a purely  logical  character,  expressing  the 
forms  of  thought  analytically,  but  are  to  refer  to  things, 
their  possibility,  reality,  or  necessity,  they  must  have 
reference  to  possible  experience  and  its  synthetical  unity, 
in  which  alone  objects  of  knowledge  can  be  given. 

The  postulate  of  the  possibility  of  things  [p.  220] 
demands  that  the  concept  of  these  should  agree  with  the 
formal  conditions  of  experience  in  general.  This,  the  ob- 
jective form  of  experience  in  general,  contains  all  synthesis 
which  is  required  for  a knowledge  of  objects.  A concept 
is  to  be  considered  as  empty,  and  as  referring  to  no  object, 
if  the  synthesis  which  it  contains  does  not  belong  to 
experience,  whether  as  borrowed  from  it  (in  which  case  it 
is  called  an  empirical  concept),  or  as  a synthesis  on  which, 
as  a condition  a priori , all  experience  (in  its  form)  depends, 
in  which  case  it  is  a pure  concept,  but  yet  belonging  to 
experience,  because  its  object  can  only  be  found  in  it. 
For  whence  could  the  character  of  the  possibility  of  an 
object,  which  can  be  conceived  by  a synthetical  concept 
a priori,  be  derived,  except  from  the  synthesis  which  con- 
stitutes the  form  of  all  empirical  knowledge  of  objects  ? 
It  is  no  doubt  a necessary  logical  condition,  that  such  a 
concept  must  contain  nothing  contradictory,  but  this  is  by 
no  means  sufficient  to  establish  the  objective  reality  of  a 
concept,  that  is,  the  possibility  of  such  an  object,  as  is  con- 
ceived by  a concept.  Thus  in  the  concept  of  a figure  to 
be  enclosed  between  two  straight  lines,  there  is  nothing 
contradictory,  because  the  concepts  of  two  straight  lines 
and  their  meeting  contain  no  negation  of  a fig-  [p.  221] 
ure.  The  impossibility  depends,  not  on  the  concept  itself, 
but  on  its  construction  in  space,  that  is,  the  conditions  of 
space  and  its  determinations,  and  it  is  these  that  have  ob- 


180  Transcendental  Analytic 

jective  reality,  or  apply  to  possible  things,  because  they 
contain  a priori  in  themselves  the  form  of  experience  in 
general. 

And  now  we  shall  try  to  explain  the  manifold  usefulness 
and  influence  of  this  postulate  of  possibility.  If  I repre- 
sent to  myself  a thing  that  is  permanent,  while  everything 
which  changes  belongs  merely  to  its  state,  I can  never 
know  from  such  a concept  by  itself  that  a thing  of  that 
kind  is  possible.  Or,  if  I represent  to  myself  something 
so  constituted  that,  when  it  is  given,  something  else  must 
at  all  times  and  inevitably  follow  upon  it,  this  may  no 
doubt  be  conceived  without  contradiction,  but  we  have  as 
yet  no  means  of  judging  whether  such  a quality,  viz. 
causality,  is  to  be  met  with  in  any  possible  object.  Lastly, 
I can  very  well  represent  to  myself  different  things  (sub- 
stances) so  constituted,  that  the  state  of  the  one  produces 
an  effect  on  the  state  of  the  other,  and  this  reciprocally; 
but  whether  such  a relation  can  belong  to  any  things  can- 
not be  learned  from  these  concepts  which  contain  a purely 
arbitrary  synthesis.  The  objective  reality  of  these  con- 
cepts is  only  known  when  we  see  that  they  [p.  222] 
express  a priori  the  relations  of  perceptions  in  every  kind 
of  experience ; and  this  objective  reality,  that  is,  their 
transcendental  truth,  though  independent  of  all  experi- 
ence, is  nevertheless  not  independent  of  all  relation  to  the 
form  of  experience  in  general,  and  to  that  synthetical 
unity  in  which  alone  objects  can  be  known  empirically. 

But  if  we  should  think  of  framing  new  concepts  of  sub- 
stances, forces,  and  reciprocal  actions  out  of  the  material 
supplied  to  us  by  our  perceptions,  without  borrowing  from 
experience  the  instance  of  their  connection,  we  should  en- 
tangle ourselves  in  mere  cobwebs  of  our  brain,  the  possi- 


Transcendental  Analytic  181 

bility  of  which  could  not  be  tested  by  any  criteria,  because 
in  forming  them  we  were  not  guided  by  experience,  nor 
had  borrowed  these  concepts  from  it.  Such  purely  imag- 
inary concepts  cannot  receive  the  character  of  possibility, 
like  the  categories  a priori , as  conditions  on  which  all 
experience  depends,  but  only  a posteriori , as  concepts  that 
must  be  given  by  experience,  so  that  their  possibility  can 
either  not  be  known  at  all,  or  a posteriori , and  empirically 
only.  Thus,  for  instance,  a substance  supposed  to  be 
present  as  permanent  in  space,  and  yet  not  filling  it  (like 
that  something  between  matter  and  the  thinking  subject, 
which  some  have  tried  to  introduce),  or  a peculiar  faculty 
of  our  mind,  by  which  we  can  see  (not  only  infer)  the 
future,  or  lastly,  another  faculty,  by  which  we  can  enter 
into  a community  of  thought  with  other  men  (however  dis- 
tant they  may  be),  all  these  are  concepts  the  [p.  223] 
possibility  of  which  has  nothing  to  rest  on,  because  it  is 
not  founded  on  experience  and  its  known  laws.  Without 
these  they  are  and  can  only  be  arbitrary  combinations  of 
thought  which,  though  they  contain  nothing  contradictory 
in  themselves,  have  no  claim  to  objective  reality,  or  to  the 
possibility  of  such  an  object  as  is  to  be  conceived  by  them. 
With  regard  to  reality,  it  stands  to  reason  that  we  cannot 
conceive  it  in  the  concrete  without  the  aid  of  experience ; 
for  reality  concerns  sensation  only,  as  the  material  of  ex- 
perience, and  not  the  form  of  relations,  which  might  to  a 
certain  extent  allow  us  to  indulge  in  mere  fancies. 

I here  pass  by  everything  the  possibility  of  which  can 
only  be  learned  from  its  reality  in  experience,  and  I only 
mean  to  consider  the  possibility  of  things  through  con- 
cepts a priori.  Of  these  (concepts)  I persist  in  maintain- 
ing that  they  can  never  exist  as  such  concepts  by  them- 


182 


Transcendental  Analytic 


selves  alone,  but  only  as  formal  and  objective  conditions 
of  experience  in  general.1 

It  might  seem  indeed  as  if  the  possibility  of  a triangle 
could  be  known  from  its  concept  by  itself  (being  inde- 
pendent of  all  experience),  for  we  can  give  to  it  an  object 
entirely  a priori , that  is,  we  can  construct  it.  But  as  this 
is  only  the  form  of  an  object,  it  would  always  remain  a 
product  of  the  imagination  only.  The  possibil-  [p.  224] 
ity  of  its  object  would  remain  doubtful,  because  more  is 
wanted  to  establish  it,  namely,  that  such  a figure  should 
really  be  conceived  under  all  those  conditions  on  which  all 
objects  of  experience  depend.  That  which  alone  connects 
with  this  concept  the  representation  of  the  possibility  of 
such  a thing,  is  the  fact  that  space  is  a formal  condition 
a priori  of  all  external  experiences,  and  that  the  same  for- 
mative synthesis,  by  which  we  construct  a triangle  in  im- 
agination, should  be  identical  with  that  which  we  exercise 
in  the  apprehension  of  a phenomenon,  in  order  to  make 
an  empirical  concept  of  it.  And  thus  the  possibility  of 
continuous  quantities,  nay,  of  all  quantities,  the  concepts 
of  which  are  always  synthetical,  can  never  be  deduced 
from  the  concepts  themselves,  but  only  from  them,  as 
formal  conditions  of  the  determination  of  objects  in  all 
experience.  And  where  indeed  should  we  look  for  ob- 
jects, corresponding  to  our  concepts,  except  in  experience, 
by  which  alone  objects  are  given  us?  If  we  are  able 
to  know  and  determine  the  possibility  of  things  without 
any  previous  experience,  this  is  only  with  reference  to 
those  formal  conditions  under  which  anything  may  become 


1 I have  adopted  Erdmann’s  conjecture,  a/s  solche  Begriffe  instead  of  aus 
solchett  Begriffcn, 


Transcendental  Analytic 


183 


an  object  in  experience.  This  takes  place  entirely  a 
priori , but  nevertheless  in  constant  reference  to  experi- 
ence, and  within  its  limits. 

The  postulate  concerning  our  knowledge  of  [p.  225] 
the  reality  of  things,  requires  perception,  therefore  sensa- 
tion and  consciousness  of  it,  not  indeed  immediately  of 
the  object  itself,  the  existence  of  which  is  to  be  known, 
but  yet  of  a connection  between  it  and  some  real  percep- 
tion, according  to  the  analogies  of  experience  which  deter- 
mine in  general  all  real  combinations  in  experience. 

In  the  mere  concept  of  a thing  no  sign  of  its  existence 
can  be  discovered.  For  though  the  concept  be  ever  so 
perfect,  so  that  nothing  should  be  wanting  in  it  to  enable 
us  to  conceive  the  thing  with  all  its  own  determinations, 
existence  has  nothing  to  do  with  all  this.  It  depends  only 
on  the  question  whether  such  a thing  be  given  us,  so 
that  its  perception  may  even  precede  its  concept.  A con- 
cept preceding  experience  implies  its  possibility  only, 
while  perception,  which  supplies  the  material  of  a con- 
cept, is  the  only  characteristic  of  reality.  It  is  possible, 
however,  even  before  the  perception  of  a thing,  and  there- 
fore, in  a certain  sense,  a priori,  to  know  its  existence, 
provided  it  hang  together  with  some  other  perceptions, 
according  to  the  principles  of  their  empirical  connection 
(analogies).  For  in  that  case  the  existence  of  a thing 
hangs  together  at  least  with  our  perceptions  in  a possible 
experience,  and  guided  by  our  analogies  we  [p.  226] 
can,  starting  from  our  real  experience,  arrive  at  some 
other  thing  in  the  series  of  possible  perceptions.  Thus  we 
know  the  existence  of  some  magnetic  matter  pervading 
all  bodies  from  the  perception  of  the  attracted  iron  filings, 
though  our  organs  are  so  constituted  as  to  render  an  im- 


184 


T ranscendental  A na lytic 


mediate  perception  of  that  matter  impossible.  According 
to  the  laws  of  sensibility  and  the  texture  of  our  percep- 
tions, we  ought  in  our  experience  to  arrive  at  an  immedi- 
ate empirical  intuition  of  that  magnetic  matter,  if  only  our 
senses  were  more  acute,  for  their  actual  obtuseness  does 
not  concern  the  form  of  possible  experience.  Wherever, 
therefore,  perception  and  its  train  can  reach,  according  to 
empirical  laws,  there  our  knowledge  also  of  the  existence 
of  things  can  reach.  But  if  we  do  not  begin  with  experi- 
ence, or  do  not  proceed  according  to  the  laws  of  the  em- 
pirical connection  of  phenomena,  we  are  only  making  a 
vain  display,  as  if  we  could  guess  and  discover  the  exist- 
ence of  anything.1 

With  reference  to  the  third  postulate  we  find  that  it 
refers  to  the  material  necessity  in  existence,  and  not  to 
the  merely  formal  and  logical  necessity  in  the  connection 
of  concepts.  As  it  is  impossible  that  the  existence  of  the 
objects  of  the  senses  should  ever  be  known  entirely  a 
priori , though  it  may  be  known  to  a certain  extent  a 
priori , namely,  with  reference  to  another  already  given 
existence,  and  as  even  in  that  case  we  can  only  [p.  227] 
arrive  at  such  an  existence  as  must  somewhere  be  con- 
tained in  the  whole  of  the  experience  of  which  the  given 
perception  forms  a part,  it  follows  that  the  necessity  of 
existence  can  never  be  known  from  concepts,  but  always 
from  the  connection  only  with  what  is  actually  perceived, 
according  to  general  rules  of  experience.2  Now,  there  is 
no  existence  that  can  be  known  as  necessary  under  the 
condition  of  other  given  phenomena,  except  the  existence 

1 See  Supplement  XXI. 

2 Insert  man  before  gleichwohl,  and  leave  out  konnen  at  the  end  of  the 
sentence. 


Transcendental  Analytic 


185 


of  effects  from  given  causes,  according  to  the  laws  of 
causality.  It  is  not  therefore  the  existence  of  things 
(substances),  but  the  existence  of  their  state,  of  which 
alone  we  can  know  the  necessity,  and  this  from  other 
states  only,  which  are  given  in  perception,  and  according 
to  the  empirical  laws  of  causality.  Hence  it  follows  that 
the  criterium  of  necessity  can  only  be  found  in  the  law  of 
possible  experience,  viz.  that  everything  that  happens  is 
determined  a priori  by  its  cause  in  phenomena.1  We 
therefore  know  in  nature  the  necessity  of  those  effects 
only  of  which  the  causes  are  given,  and  the  character  of 
necessity  in  existence  never  goes  beyond  the  field  of 
possible  experience,  and  even  there  it  does  not  apply  to 
the  existence  of  things,  as  substances,  because  such  sub- 
stances can  never  be  looked  upon  as  empirical  effects  or 
as  something  that  happens  and  arises.  Necessity,  there- 
fore, affects  only  the  relations  of  phenomena  [p.  228] 
according  to  the  dynamical  law  of  causality,  and  the  pos- 
sibility, dependent  upon  it,  of  concluding  a priori  from  a 
given  existence  (of  a cause)  to  another  existence  (that  of 
an  effect).  Thus  the  principle  that  everything  which  hap- 
pens is  hypothetically  necessary,  subjects  all  the  changes  in 
the  world  to  a law,  that  is,  to  a rule  of  necessary  existence, 
without  which  there  would  not  even  be  such  a thing  as 
nature.  Hence  the  proposition  that  nothing  happens  by 
blind  chance  (in  ntundo  non  datar  casus)  is  an  a priori  law 
of  nature,  and  so  is  likewise  the  other,  that  no  necessity 
in  nature  is  a blind,  but  always  a conditional  and  there- 
fore an  intelligible,  necessity  (non  datur  fatuni).  Both 
these  are  laws  by  which  the  mere  play  of  changes  is  ren- 


1 Read  stint  Ursacht  instead  of  ihre. 


Transcendental  Analytic 


1 86 

dered  subject  to  a nature  of  things  (as  phenomena),  or 
what  is  the  same,  to  that  unity  of  the  understanding  in 
which  alone  they  can  belong  to  experience,  as  the  synthet- 
ical unity  of  phenomena.  Both  are  dynamical  principles. 
The  former  is  in  reality  a consequence  of  the  principle 
of  causality  (the  second  of  the  analogies  of  experience). 
The  latter  is  one  of  the  principles  of  modality,  which  to 
the  determination  of  causality  adds  the  concept  of  neces- 
sity, which  itself  is  subject  to  a rule  of  the  understanding. 
The  principle  of  continuity  rendered  every  break  in  the 
series  of  phenomena  (changes)  impossible  (in  mundo  non 
datur  saltus),  and  likewise  any  gap  between  two  [p.  229] 
phenomena  in  the  whole  of  our  empirical  intuitions  in 
space  (non  datur  hiatus).  For  so  we  may  express  the 
proposition  that  nothing  can  enter  into  experience  to 
prove  a vacuum,  or  even  to  admit  it  as  a possible  part  of 
empirical  synthesis.  For  the  vacuum,  which  one  may 
conceive  as  outside  the  field  of  possible  experience  (the 
world),  can  never  come  before  the  tribunal  of  the  under- 
standing which  has  to  decide  on  such  questions  only  as 
concern  the  use  to  be  made  of  given  phenomena  for  em- 
pirical knowledge.  It  is  in  reality  a problem  of  that  ideal 
reason  which  goes  beyond  the  sphere  of  a possible  experi- 
ence, and  wants  to  form  an  opinion  of  that  which  sur- 
rounds and  limits  experience,  and  will  therefore  have  to  be 
considered  in  our  transcendental  Dialectic.  With  regard 
to  the  four  propositions  (in  mundo  non  datur  hiatus,  non 
datus  saltus,  non  datur  casus,  non  datur  faturn),  it  would  be 
easy  to  represent  each  of  them,  as  well  as  all  principles  of 
a transcendental  origin,  according  to  the  order  of  the  cate- 
gories, and  thus  to  assign  its  proper  place  to  every  one 
of  them.  But,  after  what  has  been  said  before,  the  versed 


Transcendental  Analytic  187 

and  expert  reader  will  find  it  easy  to  do  this  himself,  and  to 
discover  the  proper  method  for  it.  They  all  simply  agree 
in  this,  that  they  admit  nothing  in  our  empirical  synthesis 
that  would  in  any  way  run  counter  to  the  understanding,  and 
to  the  continuous  cohesion  of  all  phenomena,  that  is,  to  the 
unity  of  its  concepts.  For  it  is  the  understand-  [p.  230] 
ing  alone  through  which  the  unity  of  experience,  in  which 
all  perceptions  must  have  their  place,  becomes  possible. 

Whether  the  field  of  possibility  be  larger  than  the  field 
which  contains  everything  which  is  real,  and  whether  this 
again  be  larger  than  the  field  of  what  is  necessary,  are 
curious  questions  and  admitting  of  a synthetical  solution, 
which  questions  however  are  to  be  brought  before  the 
tribunal  of  reason  only.  They  really  come  to  this,  whether 
all  things,  as  phenomena,  belong  to  the  sphere  of  one 
experience,  of  which  every  given  perception  forms  a part, 
that  could  not  be  connected  with  any  other  phenomena, 
or  whether  my  perceptions  can  ever  belong  to  more  than 
one  possible  experience  (in  its  general  connection).  The 
understanding  in  reality  does  nothing  but  give  to  experi- 
ence a rule  a priori , according  to  the  subjective  and  formal 
conditions  of  sensibility  and  apperception,  which  alone 
render  experience  possible.  Other  forms  of  intuition 
(different  from  space  and  time),  and  other  forms  of  the 
understanding  (different  from  the  discursive  forms  of 
thought  or  conceptual  knowledge),  even  if  they  were  pos- 
sible, we  could  in  no  wise  render  conceivable  or  intelli- 
gible to  ourselves ; and  even  if  we  could,  they  would  never 
belong  to  experience,  the  only  field  of  knowledge  in  which 
objects  are  given  to  us.  Whether  there  be  [p.  231] 
therefore  other  perceptions  but  those  that  belong  to  our 
whole  possible  experience,  whether  there  be  in  fact  a 


1 88  Transcendental  Analytic 

completely  new  field  of  matter,  can  never  be  determined 
by  the  understanding,  which  is  only  concerned  with  the 
synthesis  of  what  is  given. 

The  poverty  of  the  usual  arguments  by  which  we  con- 
struct a large  empire  of  possibility  of  which  all  that  is  real 
(the  objects  of  experience)  forms  but  a small  segment,  is 
but  too  apparent.  When  we  say  that  all  that  is  real  is 
possible,  we  arrive,  according  to  the  logical  rules  of  inver- 
sion, at  the  merely  particular  proposition  that  some  possible 
is  real,  and  thus  seem  to  imply  that  much  is  possible  that 
is  not  real.  Nay,  it  seems  as  if  we  might  extend  the  num- 
ber of  things  possible  beyond  that  of  things  real,  simply 
on  the  ground  that  something  must  be  added  to  the  pos- 
sible to  make  it  real.  But  this  addition  to  the  possible  I 
cannot  recognise,  because  what  would  thus  be  added  to 
the  possible,  would  be  really  the  impossible.  It  is  only 
to  my  understanding  that  anything  can  be  added  concern- 
ing the  agreement  with  the  formal  conditions  of  experi- 
ence, and  what  can  be  added  is  the  connection  with  some 
perception  ; and  whatever  is  connected  with  such  a per- 
ception, according  to  empirical  laws,  is  real,  though  it  may 
not  be  perceived  immediately.  But  that,  in  constant  con- 
nection with  what  is  given  us  in  experience,  [p.  232] 
there  should  be  another  series  of  phenomena,  and  there- 
fore more  than  one  all-embracing  experience,  cannot  pos- 
sibly be  concluded  from  what  is  given  us,  and  still  less, 
if  nothing  is  given  us,  because  nothing  can  be  thought 
without  some  kind  of  material.  What  is  possible  only 
under  conditions  which  themselves  are  possible  only,  is 
not  possible  in  the  full  sense  of  the  word,  not  therefore 
in  the  sense  in  which  we  ask  whether  the  possibility  of 
things  can  extend  beyond  the  limits  of  experience. 


Transcendental  Analytic 


189 


I have  only  touched  on  these  questions  in  order  to  leave 
no  gap  in  what  are  commonly  supposed  to  be  the  concepts 
of  the  understanding.  But  absolute  possibility  (which 
has  no  regard  for  the  formal  conditions  of  experience)  is 
really  no  concept  of  the  understanding,  and  can  never 
be  used  empirically,  but  belongs  to  reason  alone,  which 
goes  beyond  all  possible  empirical  use  of  the  under- 
standing. We  have  therefore  made  these  few  critical 
remarks  only,  leaving  the  subject  itself  unexplained  for 
the  present. 

And  here,  when  I am  on  the  point  of  concluding  this 
fourth  number  and  at  the  same  time  the  system  of  all 
principles  of  the  pure  understanding,  I think  I ought  to 
explain  why  I call  the  principles  of  modality  postulates. 
I do  not  take  this  term  in  the  sense  which  has  [p.  233] 
been  given  to  it  by  some  modern  philosophical  writers,  and 
which  is  opposed  to  the  sense  in  which  mathematicians 
take  it,  viz.  that  to  postulate  should  mean  to  represent  a 
proposition  as  certain  without  proof  or  justification ; for  if 
we  were  to  admit  with  regard  to  synthetical  propositions, 
however  evident  they  may  appear,  that  they  should  meet 
with  unreserved  applause,  without  any  deduction,  and  on 
their  own  authority  only,  all  criticism  of  the  understanding 
would  be  at  an  end.  And  as  there  is  no  lack  of  bold 
assertions,  which  public  opinion  does  not  decline  to  accept, 
(this  acceptance  being,  however,  no  credential),  our  under- 
standing would  be  open  to  every  fancy,  and  could  not 
refuse  its  sanction  to  claims  which  demand  admission  as 
real  axioms  in  the  same  confident  tone,  though  without 
any  substantial  reasons.  If  therefore  a condition  a priori 
is  to  be  synthetically  joined  to  the  concept  of  a thing,  it 
will  be  indispensable  that,  if  not  a proof,  at  least  a deduc- 


190  Transcendental  Analytic 

tion  of  the  legitimacy  of  such  an  assertion,  should  be 
forthcoming. 

The  principles  of  modality,  however,  are  not  objectively 
synthetical,  because  the  predicates  of  possibility,  reality, 
and  necessity  do  not  in  the  least  increase  the  concept  of 
which  they  are  predicated,  by  adding  anything  to  its  rep- 
resentation. But  as  nevertheless  they  are  synthetical, 
they  are  so  subjectively  only,  i.e.  they  add  to  the  [p.  234] 
concept  of  a (real)  thing,  without  predicating  anything  new, 
the  peculiar  faculty  of  knowledge  from  which  it  springs 
and  on  which  it  depends,  so  that,  if  in  the  understanding 
the  concept  is  only  connected  with  the  formal  conditions 
of  experience,  its  object  is  called  possible ; if  it  is  con- 
nected with  perception  (sensation  as  the  material  of  the 
senses),  and  through  it  determined  by  the  understanding, 
its  object  is  called  real ; while,  if  it  is  determined  through 
the  connection  of  perceptions,  according  to  concepts,  its 
object  is  called  necessary.  The  principles  of  modality 
therefore  predicate  nothing  of  a concept  except  the  act 
of  the  faculty  of  knowledge  by  which  it  is  produced. 
In  mathematics  a postulate  means  a practical  proposi- 
tion, containing  nothing  but  a synthesis  by  which  we 
first  give  an  object  to  ourselves  and  produce  its  concept, 
as  if,  for  instance,  we  draw  a circle  with  a given  line 
from  a given  point  in  the  plane.  Such  a proposition 
cannot  be  proved,  because  the  process  required  for  it  is 
the  very  process  by  which  we  first  produce  the  concept 
of  such  a figure.  We  may  therefore  with  the  same  right 
postulate  the  principles  of  modality,  because  they  never 
increase  1 the  concept  of  a thing,  but  indicate  the  manner 

1 No  doubt  by  reality  I assert  more  than  by  possibility,  but  not  in  the  thing 
itself,  which  can  never  contain  more  in  its  reality  than  what  is  contained  in 


Transcendental  Analytic  191 

only  in  which  the  concept  was  joined  with  our  faculty  of 
knowledge.1  [p.  235] 

its  complete  possibility.  While  possibility  is  only  the  positing  of  a thing  in 
reference  to  the  understanding  (in  its  empirical  use),  reality  is,  at  the  same 
time,  a connection  of  it  with  perception. 

1 See  Supplement  XXII. 


THE 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DOCTRINE 

OF  THE 

FACULTY  OF  JUDGMENT 

OR 

ANALYTIC  OF  PRINCIPLES 

CHAPTER  III 

ON  THE  GROUND  OF  DISTINCTION  OF  ALL  SUBJECTS  INTO 
PHENOMENA  AND  NOUMENA 

We  have  now  not  only  traversed  the  whole  domain  of 
the  pure  understanding,  and  carefully  examined  each  part 
of  it,  but  we  have  also  measured  its  extent,  and  assigned 
to  everything  in  it  its  proper  place.  This  domain,  how- 
ever, is  an  island  and  enclosed  by  nature  itself  within 
limits  that  can  never  be  changed.  It  is  the  country  of 
truth  (a  very  attractive  name),  but  surrounded  by  a wide 
and  stormy  ocean,  the  true  home  of  illusion,  where  many 
a fog  bank  and  ice  that  soon  melts  away  tempt  us  to  be- 
lieve in  new  lands,  while  constantly  deceiving  the  advent- 
urous mariner  with  vain  hopes,  and  involving  [p.  236] 
him  in  adventures  which  he  can  never  leave,  and  yet  can 
never  bring  to  an  end.  Before  we  venture  ourselves  on 
this  sea,  in  order  to  explore  it  on  every  side,  and  to  find 
out  whether  anything  is  to  be  hoped  for  there,  it  will  be 


192 


Transcendental  Analytic 


193 


useful  to  glance  once  more  at  the  map  of  that  country 
which  we  are  about  to  leave,  and  to  ask  ourselves,  first, 
whether  we  might  not  be  content  with  what  it  contains, 
nay,  whether  we  must  not  be  content  with  it,  supposing 
that  there  is  no  solid  ground  anywhere  else  on  which  we 
could  settle ; secondly,  by  what  title  we  possess  even  that 
domain,  and  may  consider  ourselves  safe  against  all  hos- 
tile claims.  Although  we  have  sufficiently  answered  these 
questions  in  the  course  of  the  analytic,  a summary  reca- 
pitulation of  their  solutions  may  help  to  strengthen  our 
conviction,  by  uniting  all  arguments  in  one  point. 

We  have  seen  that  the  understanding  possesses  every- 
thing which  it  draws  from  itself,  without  borrowing  from 
experience,  for  no  other  purpose  but  for  experience.  The 
principles  of  the  pure  understanding,  whether  constitutive 
a priori  (as  the  mathematical)  or  simply  relative  (as  the 
dynamical),  contain  nothing  but,  as  it  were,  the  pure 
schema  of  possible  experience;  for  that  experi-  [p.  237] 
ence  derives  its  unity  from  that  synthetical  unity  alone 
which  the  understanding  originally  and  spontaneously 
imparts  to  the  synthesis  of  imagination,  with  reference 
to  apperception,  and  to  which  all  phenomena,  as  data 
of  a possible  knowledge,  must  conform  a priori.  But 
although  these  rules  of  the  understanding  are  not  only 
true  a priori , but  the  very  source  of  all  truth,  that  is,  of 
the  agreement  of  our  knowledge  with  objects,  because 
containing  the  conditions  of  the  possibility  of  experi- 
ence, as  the  complete  sphere  of  all  knowledge  in  which 
objects  can  be  given  to  us,  nevertheless  we  do  not  seem 
to  be  content  with  hearing  only  what  is  true,  but  want  to 
know  a great  deal  more.  If  therefore  this  critical  investi- 
gation does  not  teach  us  any  more  than  what,  even  with- 


194 


Transcendental  Analytic 


out  such  subtle  researches,  we  should  have  practised 
ourselves  in  the  purely  empirical  use  of  the  understand- 
ing, it  would  seem  as  if  the  advantages  derived  from  it 
were  hardly  worth  the  labour.  One  might  reply  that 
nothing  would  be  more  prejudicial  to  the  enlargement 
of  our  knowledge  than  that  curiosity  which,  before  enter- 
ing upon  any  researches,  wishes  to  know  beforehand  the 
advantages  likely  to  accrue  from  them,  though  quite  un- 
able as  yet  to  form  the  least  conception  of  such  advan- 
tages, even  though  they  were  placed  before  our  eyes. 
There  is,  however,  one  advantage  in  this  transcendental 
investigation  which  can  be  rendered  intelligible,  [p.  238] 
nay,  even  attractive  to  the  most  troublesome  and  reluctant 
apprentice,  namely  this,  that  the  understanding  confined 
to  its  empirical  use  only  and  unconcerned  with  regard  to 
the  sources  of  its  own  knowledge,  may  no  doubt  fare  very 
well  in  other  respects,  but  can  never  determine  for  itself 
the  limits  of  its  own  use  and  know  what  is  inside  or  out- 
side its  own  sphere.  It  is  for  that  purpose  that  such 
profound  investigations  are  required  as  we  have  just  insti- 
tuted. If  the  understanding  cannot  decide  whether  cer- 
tain questions  lie  within  its  own  horizon  or  not,  it  can 
never  feel  certain  with  regard  to  its  claims  and  posses- 
sions, but  must  be  prepared  for  many  humiliating  correc- 
tions, when  constantly  transgressing,  as  it  certainly  will, 
the  limits  of  its  own  domain,  and  losing  itself  in  follies 
and  fancies. 

That  the  understanding  cannot  make  any  but  an  empir- 
ical, and  never  a transcendental,  use  of  all  its  principles 
a priori , nay,  of  all  its  concepts,  is  a proposition  which, 
if  thoroughly  understood,  leads  indeed  to  most  important 
consequences.  What  we  call  the  transcendental  use  of  a 


Transcendental  Analytic 


195 


concept  in  any  proposition  is  its  being  referred  to  things 
in  general  and  to  things  by  themselves,  while  its  empirical 
use  refers  to  phenomena  only,  that  is,  to  objects  of  a pos- 
sible experience.  That  the  latter  use  alone  is  admissible 
will  be  clear  from  the  following  considerations,  [p.  239] 
What  is  required  for  every  concept  is,  first,  the  logical 
form  of  a concept  (of  thought)  in  general;  and,  secondly, 
the  possibility  of  an  object  to  which  it  refers.  Without 
the  latter,  it  has  no  sense,  and  is  entirely  empty,  though 
it  may  still  contain  the  logical  function  by  which  a concept 
can  be  formed  out  of  any  data.  The  only  way  in  which 
an  object  can  be  given  to  a concept  is  in  intuition,  and 
though  a pure  intuition  is  possible  a priori  and  before  the 
object,  yet  even  that  pure  intuition  can  receive  its  object, 
and  with  it  its  objective  validity,  by  an  empirical  intuition 
only,  of  which  it  is  itself  nothing  but  the  form.  All  con- 
cepts, therefore,  and  with  them  all  principles,  though  they 
may  be  possible  a priori , refer  nevertheless  to  empirical 
intuitions,  that  is,  to  data  of  a possible  experience.  With- 
out this,  they  can  claim  no  objective  validity,  but  are  a 
mere  play,  whether  of  the  imagination  or  of  the  under- 
standing with  their  respective  representations.  Let  us 
take  the  concepts  of  mathematics  as  an  example,  and, 
first,  with  regard  to  pure  intuitions.  Although  such 
principles  as  ‘space  has  three  dimensions,’  ‘between  two 
points  there  can  be  only  one  straight  line,’  as  well  as  the 
representation  of  the  object  with  which  that  science  is  oc- 
cupied, may  be  produced  in  the  mind  a priori , they  would 
have  no  meaning,  if  we  were  not  able  at  all  times  [p.  240] 
to  show  their  meaning  as  applied  to  phenomena  (empirical 
objects).  It  is  for  this  reason  that  an  abstract  concept  is 
required  to  be  made  sensuous,  that  is,  that  its  correspond- 


196 


Transcendental  Analytic 


ing  object  is  required  to  be  shown  in  intuition,  because, 
without  this,  the  concept  (as  people  say)  is  without  sense, 
that  is,  without  meaning.  Mathematics  fulfil  this  require- 
ment by  the  construction  of  the  figure,  which  is  a phe- 
nomenon present  to  the  senses  (although  constructed  a 
priori).  In  the  same  science  the  concept  of  quantity  finds 
its  support  and  sense  in  number ; and  this  in  turn  in  the 
fingers,  the  beads  of  the  abacus,  or  in  strokes  and  points 
which  can  be  presented  to  the  eyes.  The  concept  itself 
was  produced  a priori,  together  with  all  the  synthetical 
principles  or  formulas  which  can  be  derived  from  such 
concepts ; but  their  use  and  their  relation  to  objects  can 
nowhere  be  found  except  in  experience,  of  which  those 
concepts  contain  a priori  the  (formal)  possibility  only. 

That  this  is  the  case  with  all  categories  and  with  all  the 
principles  drawn  from  them,  becomes  evident  from  the 
fact  that  we  could  not  define  any  one  of  them  (really, 
that  is,  make  conceivable  the  possibility  of  their  object),1 
without  at  once  having  recourse  to  the  conditions  of  sen- 
sibility or  the  form  of  phenomena,  to  which,  as  their  only 
possible  objects,  these  categories  must  necessarily  be 
restricted,  it  being  impossible,  if  we  take  away  [p.  241] 
these  conditions,  to  assign  to  them  any  meaning,  that  is, 
any  relation  to  an  object,  or  to  make  it  intelligible  to 
ourselves  by  an  example  what  kind  of  thing  could  be 
intended  by  such  concepts. 

[When  representing  the  table  of  the  categories,  we  dis- 
pensed with  the  definition  of  every  one  of  them,  because 
at  that  time  it  seemed  unnecessary  for  our  purpose,  which 
concerned  their  synthetical  use  only,  and  because  entail- 


1 Additions  of  the  Second  Edition. 


Transcendental  Analytic 


197 


ing  responsibilities  which  we  were  not  bound  to  incur. 
This  was  not  a mere  excuse,  but  a very  important  pru- 
dential rule,  viz.  not  to  rush  into  definitions,  and  to  attempt 
or  pretend  completeness  or  precision  in  the  definition  of 
a concept,  when  one  or  other  of  its  characteristic  marks 
is  sufficient  without  a complete  enumeration  of  all  that 
constitute  the  whole  concept.  Now,  however,  we  can 
perceive  that  this  caution  had  even  a deeper  ground, 
namely,  that  we  could  not  have  defined  them,  even  if  we 
had  wished  ; 1 for,  if  we  remove  all  conditions  of  [p.  242] 
sensibility,  which  distinguish  them  as  the  concepts  of 
a possible  empirical  use,  and  treat  them  as  concepts  of 
things  in  general  (therefore  as  of  transcendental  use), 
nothing  remains  but  to  regard  the  logical  function  in 
judgments  as  the  condition  of  the  possibility  of  the  things 
themselves,  without  the  slightest  indication  as  to  where 
they  could  have  their  application  and  their  object,  or  how 
they  could  have  any  meaning  or  objective  validity  in  the 
pure  understanding,  apart  from  sensibility.]  2 

No  one  can  explain  the  concept  of  quantity  in  general, 
except,  it  may  be,  by  saying  that  it  is  the  determination 
of  an  object,  by  which  we  may  know  how  many  times 
the  one  is  supposed  to  exist  in  it.  But  this  ‘ how  many 
times  ’ is  based  on  successive  repetition,  that  is  on  time, 
and  on  the  synthesis  in  it  of  the  homogeneous. 

1 I am  treating  here  of  the  real  definition,  which  not  only  puts  in  place  of 
the  name  of  a thing  other  and  more  intelligible  words,  but  that  which  contains 
a clear  mark  by  which  the  object  ( definitum ) can  at  all  times  be  safely  recog- 
nised, and  by  which  the  defined  concept  becomes  fit  for  practical  use.  A real 
definition  ( Rcalarklarung ) must  therefore  render  clear  the  concept  itself,  and 
its  objective  reality  also.  Of  this  kind  are  the  mathematical  explanations 
which  represent  an  object  in  intuition,  according  to  its  concept. 

2 Read  nimmt  instead  of  nehmen , and  k'dnnen  instead  of  kotine. 


I qS  Transcende?ital  Analytic 

Reality,  again,  can  only  be  explained  in  opposition 
to  a negation,  if  we  think  of  time  (as  containing  alL 
being)  being  either  filled  or  empty. 

Were  I to  leave  out  permanence  (which  means  ex- 
istence at  all  times),  nothing  would  remain  of  my  con- 
cept of  substance  but  the  logical  representation  of 
a subject  which  I think  I can  realise  by  imagining 
something  which  is  a subject  only,  without  [p.  243] 
being  a predicate  of  anything.  But  in  this  case  we 
should  not  only  be  ignorant  of  all  conditions  under 

which  this  logical  distinction  could  belong  to  any- 
thing, but  we  should  be  unable  to  make  any  use  of 
it  or  draw  any  conclusions  from  it,  because  no  object 
is  thus  determined  for  the  use  of  this  concept,  and  no 
one  can  tell  whether  such  a concept  has  any  meaning 
at  all. 

Of  the  concept  of  cause  also  (if  I leave  out  time,  in 
which  something  follows  on  something  else  by  rule) 
I should  find  no  more  in  the  pure  category  than 
that  it  is  something  which  enables  us  to  conclude 

the  existence  of  something  else,  so  that  it  would  not 
only  be  impossible  to  distinguish  cause  and  effect 
from  each  other,  but  the  concept  of  cause  would 

possess  no  indication  as  to  how  it  can  be  applied 

to  any  object,  because,  in  order  to  form  any  such 
conclusion,  certain  conditions  require  to  be  known 
of  which  the  concept  itself  tells  us  nothing.  The 
so-called  principle  that  everything  contingent  has  a 
cause,  comes  no  doubt  before  us  with  great  solemnity 
and  self-assumed  dignity.  But,  if  I ask  what  you 
understand  by  contingent  and  you  answer,  something 
of  which  the  non-existence  is  possible,  I should  be 


Transcendental  Analytic 


199 


glad  to  know  how  you  can  recognise  this  possibility  of 
non-existence,  if  you  do  not  represent  to  yourselves, 
in  the  series  of  phenomena,  some  kind  of  succession, 
and  in  it  an  existence  that  follows  upon  non-existence 
(or  vice  versa),  and  consequently  a change  ? To  say 
that  the  non-existence  of  a thing  is  not  self-  [p.  244] 
contradictory  is  but  a lame  appeal  to  a logical  condi- 
tion which,  though  it  is  necessary  for  the  concept, 
yet  is  by  no  means  sufficient  for  its  real  possibility. 
I can  perfectly  well  remove  in  thought  every  existing 
substance,  without  contradicting  myself,  but  I can  by 
no  means  conclude  from  this  as  to  its  objective  con- 
tingency in  its  existence,  that  is,  the  possibility  of 
its  non-existence  in  itself. 

As  regards  the  concept  of  community,  it  is  easy  to 
see  that,  as  the  pure  categories  of  substance  and 
causality  admit  of  no  explanation  that  would  deter- 
mine their  object,  neither  could  such  an  explanation 
apply  to  the  reciprocal  causality  in  the  relation  of 
substances  to  each  other  ( commercium ). 

As  to  possibility,  existence,  and  necessity,  no  one 
has  yet  been  able  to  explain  them,  except  by  a man- 
ifest tautology,  so  long  as  their  definition  is  to  be 
exclusively  drawn  from  the  pure  understanding.  To 
substitute  the  transcendental  possibility  of  things  (when 
an  object  corresponds  to  a concept)  for  the  logical 
possibility  of  the  concept  (when  the  concept  does  not 
contradict  itself)  is  a quibble  such  as  could  deceive 
and  satisfy  the  inexperienced  only. 

[It  seems  to  be  something  strange  and  even  illogical 1 

1 The  passage  from  ‘ It  seems  to  be  ’ to  * objective  concepts  ’ is  left  out  in 
the  Second  Edition,  and  replaced  by  a short  note,  see  Supplement  XXIII. 


200 


Transcendental  Analytic 


that  there  should  be  a concept  which  must  have  a 
meaning,  and  yet  is  incapable  of  any  explanation. ' 
But  the  case  of  these  categories  is  peculiar,  because 
it  is  only  by  means  of  the  general  sensuous  condition 
that  they  can  acquire  a definite  meaning,  and  a refer- 
ence to  any  objects.  That  condition  being  [p.  245] 
left  out  in  the  pure  category,  it  follows  that  it  can 
contain  nothing  but  the  logical  function  by  which  the 
manifold  is  brought  into  a concept.  By  means  of  this 
function,  that  is,  the  pure  form  of  the  concept,  nothing 
can  be  known  nor  distinguished  as  to  the  object  belong- 
ing to  it,  because  the  sensuous  condition,  under  which 
alone  objects  can  belong  to  it,  has  been  removed.  Thus 
we  see  that  the  categories  require,  besides  the  pure 
concept  of  the  understanding,  certain  determinations  of 
their  application  to  sensibility  in  general  (schemata). 
Without  them,  they  would  not  be  concepts  by  which 
an  object  can  be  known  and  distinguished  from  other 
objects,  but  only  so  many  ways  of  thinking  an  object 
for  possible  intuitions,  and  giving  to  it,  according  to 
one  of  the  functions  of  the  understanding,  its  meaning 
(certain  requisite  conditions  being  given).  They  are 
needed  to  define  an  object,  and  cannot  therefore  be  de- 
fined themselves.  The  logical  functions  of  judgments 
in  general,  namely,  unity  and  plurality,  assertion  and 
negation,  subject  and  predicate,  cannot  be  defined  with- 
out arguing  in  a circle,  because  the  definition  would 
itself  be  a judgment  and  contain  these  very  functions. 
The  pure  categories  are  nothing  but  representations  of 
things  in  general,  so  far  as  the  manifold  in  intuition 
must  be  thought  by  one  or  the  other  of  these  func- 
tions. Thus,  magnitude  is  the  determination  which  can 


Transcendental  Analytic 


201 


[only  be  thought  by  a judgment  possessing  [p.  246] 
quantity  ( judicium  commune ) ; reality,  the  determination 
which  can  only  be  thought  by  an  affirmative  judgment; 
while  substance  is  that  which,  in  regard  to  intuition, 
must  be  the  last  subject  of  all  other  determinations. 
With  all  this  it  remains  perfectly  undetermined,  what 
kind  of  things  they  may  be  with  regard  to  which  we 
have  to  use  one  rather  than  another  of  these  func- 
tions, so  that,  without  the  condition  of  sensuous  intui- 
tion, for  which  they  supply  the  synthesis,  the  categories 
have  no  relation  to  any  definite  object,  cannot  define 
any  object,  and  consequently  have  not  in  themselves 
the  validity  of  objective  concepts.] 

From  this  it  follows  incontestably,  that  the  pure 
concepts  of  the  understanding  never  admit  of  a tran- 
scendental, but  only  of  an  empirical  use,  and  that  the 
principles  of  the  pure  understanding  can  only  be  re- 
ferred, as  general  conditions  of  a possible  experience, 
to  objects  of  the  senses,  never  to  things  by  themselves 
(without  regard  to  the  manner  in  which  we  have  to 
look  at  them). 

Transcendental  Analytic  has  therefore  yielded  us  this 
important  result,  that  the  understanding  a priori  can  never 
do  more  than  anticipate  the  form  of  a possible  experience ; 
and  as  nothing  can  be  an  object  of  experience  except  the 
phenomenon,  it  follows  that  the  understanding  can  never 
go  beyond  the  limits  of  sensibility,  within  which  alone  ob- 
jects are  given  to  us.  Its  principles  are  prin-  [p.  247] 
ciples  for  the  exhibition  of  phenomena  only ; and  the 
proud  name  of  Ontology,  which  presumes  to  supply  in  a 
systematic  form  different  kinds  of  synthetical  knowledge  a 
priori  of  things  by  themselves  (for  instance  the  principle 


202 


Transcendental  Analytic 


of  causality),  must  be  replaced  by  the  more  modest  name 
of  a mere  Analytic  of  the  pure  understanding. 

Thought  is  the  act  of  referring  a given  intuition  to  an 
object.  If  the  mode  of  such  intuition  is  not  given,  the 
object  is  called  transcendental,  and  the  concept  of  the 
understanding  admits  then  of  a transcendental  use  only,  in 
producing  a unity  in  the  thought  of  the  manifold  in  gen- 
eral. A pure  category  therefore,  in  which  every  condition 
of  sensuous  intuition,  the  only  one  that  is  possible  for  us,  is 
left  out,  cannot  determine  an  object,  but  only  the  thought 
of  an  object  in  general,  according  to  different  modes. 
Now,  if  we  want  to  use  a concept,  we  require  in  addition 
some  function  of  the  faculty  of  judgment,  by  which  an 
object  is  subsumed  under  a concept,  consequently  the  at 
least  formal  condition  under  which  something  can  be  given 
in  intuition.  If  this  condition  of  the  faculty  of  judgment 
(schema)  is  wanting,  all  subsumption  is  impossible,  because 
nothing  is  given  that  could  be  subsumed  under  the  con- 
cept. The  purely  transcendental  use  of  categories  there- 
fore is  in  reality  of  no  use  at  all,  and  has  no  definite  or 
even,  with  regard  to  its  form  only,  definable  object.  Hence 
it  follows  that  a pure  category  is  not  fit  for  any  [p.  248] 
synthetical  a priori  principle,  and  that  the  principles  of 
the  pure  understanding  admit  of  empirical  only,  never  of 
transcendental  application,  nay,  that  no  synthetical  prin- 
ciples a priori  are  possible  beyond  the  field  of  possible 
experience. 

It  might  therefore  be  advisable  to  express  ourselves  in 
the  following  way  : the  pure  categories,  without  the  formal 
conditions  of  sensibility,  have  a transcendental  character 
only,  but  do  not  admit  of  any  transcendental  use,  because 
such  use  in  itself  is  impossible,  as  the  categories  are 


Transcendental  Analytic 


203 


deprived  of  all  the  conditions  of  being  used  in  judgments, 
that  is,  of  the  formal  conditions  of  the  subsumption  of 
any  possible  object  under  these  concepts.  As  therefore 
(as  pure  categories)  they  are  not  meant  to  be  used  empiri- 
cally, and  cannot  be  used  transcendentally,  they  admit,  if 
separated  from  sensibility,  of  no  use  at  all ; that  is,  they 
cannot  be  applied  to  any  possible  object,  and  are  nothing 
but  the  pure  form  of  the  use  of  the  understanding  with 
reference  to  objects  in  general,  and  of  thought,  without 
ever  enabling  us  to  think  or  determine  any  object  by  their 
means  alone. 

[Appearances,1  so  far  as  they  are  thought  as  objects 
under  the  unity  of  the  categories,  are  called  phenomena. 
But  if  I admit  things  which  are  objects  of  the  [p.  249] 
understanding  only,  and  nevertheless  can  be  given  as 
objects  of  an  intuition,  though  not  of  sensuous  intuition 
(as  coram  intuitu  intellectually  such  things  would  be  called 
Non  mena  ( in  tell igibil ia ). 

One  might  feel  inclined  to  think  that  the  concept  of 
Phenomena,  as  limited  by  the  transcendental  aesthetic, 
suggested  by  itself  the  objective  reality  of  the  Noumena, 
and  justified  a division  of  objects  into  phenomena  and 
noumena,  and  consequently  of  the  world  into  a sensible 
and  intelligible  world  ( tnundus  sensibilis  et  intelligibilis ) ; 
and  this  in  such  a way  that  the  distinction  between  the 
two  should  not  refer  to  the  logical  form  only  of  a more  or 
less  clear  knowledge  of  one  and  the  same  object,  but  to  a 
difference  in  their  original  presentation  to  our  knowledge, 
which  makes  them  to  differ  in  themselves  from  each  other 
in  kind.  For  if  the  senses  only  represent  to  us  something 

1 The  passage  from  ‘ Appearances  ’ to  ‘ given  to  me  in  intuition  ’ is  left  out 
in  the  Second  Edition,  and  replaced  by  Supplement  XXIV. 


204 


Transcendental  Analytic 


as  it  appears,  that  something  must  by  itself  also  be  a 
thing,  and  an  object  of  a non-sensuous  intuition,  i.e.  of  the 
understanding.  That  is,  there  must  be  a kind  of  know- 
ledge in  which  there  is  no  sensibility,  and  which  alone 
possesses  absolute  objective  reality,  representing  objects 
as  they  are,  while  through  the  empirical  use  of  our  under- 
standing we  know  things  only  as  they  appear.  Hence  it 
would  seem  to  follow  that,  beside  the  empirical  [p.  250] 
use  of  the  categories  (limited  by  sensuous  conditions), 
there  was  another  one,  pure  and  yet  objectively  valid,  and 
that  we  could  not  say,  as  we  have  hitherto  done,  that  our 
knowledge  of  the  pure  understanding  contained  nothing 
but  principles  for  the  exhibition  of  phenomena,  which, 
even  a priori , could  not  apply  to  anything  but  the  formal 
possibility  of  experience.  Here,  in  fact,  quite  a new  field 
would  seem  to  be  open,  a world,  as  it  were,  realised  in 
thought  (nay,  according  to  some,  even  in  intuition),  which 
would  be  a more,  and  not  a less,  worthy  object  for  the 
pure  understanding. 

All  our  representations  are  no  doubt  referred  by  the 
understanding  to  some  sort  of  object,  and  as  phenomena 
are  nothing  but  representations,  the  understanding  refers 
them  to  a something , as  the  object  of  our  sensuous  intui- 
tion, this  something  being  however  the  transcendental  ob- 
ject only.  This  means  a something  equal  to  x,  of  which 
we  do  not,  nay,  with  the  present  constitution  of  our  under- 
standing, cannot  know  anything,  but  which1  can  only 
serve,  as  a correlatum  of  the  unity  of  apperception,  for 
the  unity  of  the  manifold  in  sensuous  intuition,  by  means 
of  which  the  understanding  unites  the  manifold  into  the 


1 Read  welches  instead  of  welcher. 


Transcendental  Analytic 


205 


concept  of  an  object.  This  transcendental  object  cannot 
be  separated  from  the  sensuous  data,  because  in  that  case 
nothing  would  remain  by  which  it  could  be  [p.  251] 
thought.  It  is  not  therefore  an  object  of  knowledge  in 
itself,  but  only  the  representation  of  phenomena,  under  the 
concept  of  an  object  in  general,  which  can  be  defined  by 
the  manifold  of  sensuous  intuition. 

For  this  very  reason  the  categories  do  not  represent  a 
peculiar  object,  given  to  the  understanding  only,  but  serve 
only  to  define  the  transcendental  object  (the  concept  of 
something  in  general)  by  that  which  is  given  us  through 
the  senses,  in  order  thus  to  know  empirically  phenomena 
under  the  concepts  of  objects. 

What  then  is  the  cause  why  people,  not  satisfied  with 
the  substratum  of  sensibility,  have  added  to  the  phe- 
nomena the  noumena,  which  the  understanding  only  is 
supposed  to  be  able  to  realise  ? It  is  this,  that  sensibility 
and  its  sphere,  that  is  the  sphere  of  phenomena,  is  so  lim- 
ited by  the  understanding  itself  that  it  should  not  refer 
to  things  by  themselves,  but  only  to  the  mode  in  which 
things  appear  to  us,  in  accordance  with  our  own  sub- 
jective qualification.  This  was  the  result  of  the  whole 
transcendental  aesthetic,  and  it  really  follows  quite  nat- 
urally from  the  concept  of  a phenomenon  in  general,  that 
something  must  correspond  to  it,  which  in  itself  is  not  a 
phenomenon,  because  a phenomenon  cannot  be  anything 
by  itself,  apart  from  our  mode  of  representation,  [p.  252] 
Unless  therefore  we  are  to  move  in  a constant  circle,  we 
must  admit  that  the  very  word  phenomenon  indicates  a 
relation  to  something  the  immediate  representation  of 
which  is  no  doubt  sensuous,  but  which  nevertheless,  even 
without  this  qualification  of  our  sensibility  (on  which  the 


206 


Transcendental  Analytic 


form  of  our  intuition  is  founded)  must  be  something  by 
itself,  that  is  an  object  independent  of  our  sensibility. 

Hence  arises  the  concept  of  a noumenon,  which  how- 
ever is  not  positive,  nor  a definite  knowledge  of  anything, 
but  which  implies  only  the  thinking  of  something,  without 
taking  any  account  of  the  form  of  sensuous  intuition. 
But  in  order  that  a noumenon  may  signify  a real  object 
that  can  be  distinguished  from  all  phenomena,  it  is  not 
enough  that  I should  free  my  thought  of  all  conditions 
of  sensuous  intuition,  but  I must  besides  have  some  reason 
for  admitting  another  kind  of  intuition  besides  the  sen- 
suous, in  which  such  an  object  can  be  given;  otherwise 
my  thought  would  be  empty,  however  free  it  may  be  from 
contradictions.  It  is  true  that  we  were  not  able  to  prove 
that  the  sensuous  is  the  only  possible  intuition,  though  it 
is  so  for  us : but  neither  could  we  prove  that  another  kind 
of  intuition  was  possible;  and  although  our  thought  may 
take  no  account  of  any  sensibility,  the  question  always 
remains  whether,  after  that,  it  is  not  a mere  [p.  253] 
form  of  a concept,  and  whether  any  real  object  would  thus 
be  left. 

The  object  to  which  I refer  the  phenomenon  in  general 
is  the  transcendental  object,  that  is,  the  entirely  indefinite 
thought  of  something  in  general.  This  cannot  be  called 
the  noumenon,  for  I know  nothing  of  what  it  is  by  itself, 
and  have  no  conception  of  it,  except  as  the  object  of  sen- 
suous intuition  in  general,  which  is  therefore  the  same  for 
all  phenomena.  I cannot  lay  hold  of  it  by  any  of  the 
categories,  for  these  are  valid  for  empirical  intuitions  only, 
in  order  to  bring  them  under  the  concept  of  an  object  in 
general.  A pure  use  of  the  categories  is  no  doubt  pos- 
sible, that  is,  not  self-contradictory,  but  it  has  no  kind  of 


Transcendental  Analytic 


207 


objective  validity,  because  it  refers  to  no  intuition  to  which 
it  is  meant  to  impart  the  unity  of  an  object.  The  cate- 
gories remain  for  ever  mere  functions  of  thought  by  which 
no  object  can  be  given  to  me,  but  by  which  I can  only 
think  whatever  may  be  given  to  me  in  intuition.] 

If  all  thought  (by  means  of  categories)  is  taken  away 
from  empirical  knowledge,  no  knowledge  of  any  object 
remains,  because  nothing  can  be  thought  by  mere  intui- 
tion, and  the  mere  fact  that  there  is  within  me  an  affection 
of  my  sensibility,  establishes  in  no  way  any  relation  of 
such  a representation  to  any  object.  If,  on  the  contrary, 
all  intuition  is  taken  away,  there  always  remains  [p.  254] 
the  form  of  thought,  that  is,  the  mode  of  determining  an 
object  for  the  manifold  of  a possible  intuition.  In  this 
sense  the  categories  may  be  said  to  extend  further  than 
sensuous  intuition,  because  they  can  think  objects  in 
general  without  any  regard  to  the  special  mode  of  sensi- 
bility in  which  they  may  be  given  ; but  they  do  not  thus 
prove  a larger  sphere  of  objects,  because  we  cannot  admit 
that  such  objects  can  be  given,  without  admitting  the 
possibility  of  some  other  but  sensuous  intuition,  for  which 
we  have  no  right  whatever. 

I call  a concept  problematic,  if  it  is  not  self-contra- 
dictory, and  if,  as  limiting  other  concepts,  it  is  connected 
with  other  kinds  of  knowledge,  while  its  objective  reality 
cannot  be  known  in  any  way.  Now  the  concept  of  a 
noumenon,  that  is  of  a thing  which  can  never  be  thought 
as  an  object  of  the  senses,  but  only  as  a thing  by  itself 
(by  the  pure  understanding),  is  not  self-contradictory, 
because  we  cannot  maintain  that  sensibility  is  the  only 
form  of  intuition.  That  concept  is  also  necessary,  to 
prevent  sensuous  intuition  from  extending  to  things  by 


208 


Transcendental  Analytic 


themselves ; that  is,  in  order  to  limit  the  objective  validity 
of  sensuous  knowledge  (for  all  the  rest  to  which  sensuous 
intuition  does  not  extend  is  called  noumenon,  for  [p.  255] 
the  very  purpose  of  showing  that  sensuous  knowledge  can- 
not extend  its  domain  over  everything  that  can  be  thought 
by  the  understanding).  But,  after  all,  we  cannot  under- 
stand the  possibility  of  such  noumena,  and  whatever  lies 
beyond  the  sphere  of  phenomena  is  (to  us)  empty ; that  is, 
we  have  an  understanding  which  problematically  extends 
beyond  that  sphere,  but  no  intuition,  nay  not  even  the  con- 
ception of  a possible  intuition,  by  which,  outside  the  field 
of  sensibility,  objects  could  be  given  to  us,  and  our  under- 
standing could  extend  beyond  that  sensibility  in  its  asser- 
tory use.  The  concept  of  a noumenon  is  therefore  merely 
limitative , and  intended  to  keep  the  claims  of  sensibility 
within  proper  bounds,  therefore  of  negative  use  only. 
But  it  is  not  a mere  arbitrary  fiction,  but  closely  con- 
nected with  the  limitation  of  sensibility,  though  incapable 
of  adding  anything  positive  to  the  sphere  of  the  senses. 

A real  division  of  objects  into  phenomena  and  noumena, 
and  of  the  world  into  a sensible  and  intelligible  world  (in 
a positive  sense),1  is  therefore  quite  inadmissible,  although 
concepts  may  very  well  be  divided  into  sensuous  and  intel- 
lectual. For  no  objects  can  be  assigned  to  these  intellectual 
concepts,  nor  can  they  be  represented  as  objectively  valid. 
If  we  drop  the  senses,  how  are  we  to  make  it  [p.  256] 
conceivable  that  our  categories  (which  would  be  the  only 
remaining  concepts  for  noumena)  have  any  meaning  at 
all,  considering  that,  in  order  to  refer  them  to  any  object, 
something  more  must  be  given  than  the  mere  unity  of 


1 Addition  of  the  Second  Edition. 


Transcendental  Analytic 


209 


thought,  namely,  a possible  intuition,  to  which  the  cate- 
gories could  be  applied  ? With  all  this  the  concept  of  a 
noumenon,  if  taken  as  problematical  only,  remains  not 
only  admissible,  but,  as  a concept  to  limit  the  sphere  of 
sensibility,  indispensable.  In  this  case,  however,  it  is  not 
a particular  intelligible  object  for  our  understanding,  but 
an  understanding  to  which  it  could  belong  is  itself  a prob- 
lem, if  we  ask  how  it  could  know  an  object,  not  discursively 
by  means  of  categories,  but  intuitively,  and  yet  in  a non- 
sensuous  intuition,  — a process  of  which  we  could  not 
understand  even  the  bare  possibility.  Our  understanding 
thus  acquires  a kind  of  negative  extension,  that  is,  it 
does  not  become  itself  limited  by  sensibility,  but,  on  the 
contrary,  limits  it,  by  calling  things  by  themselves  (not 
considered  as  phenomena)  noumena.  In  doing  this,  it  im- 
mediately proceeds  to  prescribe  limits  to  itself,  by  admit- 
ting that  it  cannot  know  these  noumena  by  means  of  the 
categories,  but  can  only  think  of  them  under  the  name  of 
something  unknown. 

In  the  writings  of  modern  philosophers,  however,  I meet 
with  a totally  different  use  of  the  terms  of  mundus  sensi- 
bilis  and  intelligibilis}  totally  different  from  the  mean- 
ing assigned  to  these  terms  by  the  ancients,  [p.  257] 
Here  all  difficulty  seems  to  disappear.  But  the  fact  is, 
that  there  remains  nothing  but  mere  word-mongery.  In 
accordance  with  this,  some  people  have  been  pleased  to 
call  the  whole  of  phenomena,  so  far  as  they  are  seen,  the 
world  of  sense ; but  so  far  as  their  connection,  according 
to  general  laws  of  the  understanding,  is  taken  into  account, 
the  world  of  the  understanding.  Theoretical  astronomy, 


1 An  additional  note  in  the  Second  Edition  is  given  in  Supplement  XXV. 


P 


210 


Transcendental  Analytic 


which  only  teaches  the  actual  observation  of  the  starry 
heavens,  would  represent  the  former ; contemplative  as- 
tronomy, on  the  contrary  (taught  according  to  the  Coperni- 
can  system,  or,  it  may  be,  according  to  Newton’s  laws  of 
gravitation),  the  latter,  namely,  a purely  intelligible  world. 
But  this  twisting  of  words  is  a mere  sophistical  excuse,  in 
order  to  avoid  a troublesome  question,  by  changing  its 
meaning  according  to  one’s  own  convenience.  Under- 
standing and  reason  may  be  applied  to  phenomena,  but 
it  is  very  questionable  whether  they  can  be  applied  at  all 
to  an  object  which  is  not  a phenomenon,  but  a nou- 
menon ; and  it  is  this,  when  the  object  is  represented  as 
purely  intelligible,  that  is,  as  given  to  the  understanding 
only,  and  not  to  the  senses.  The  question  therefore  is 
whether,  besides  the  empirical  use  of  the  understanding 
(even  in  the  Newtonian  view  of  the  world),  a transcen- 
dental use  is  possible,  referring  to  the  noumenon,  as  its 
object;  and  that  question  we  have  answered  decidedly  in 
the  negative. 

When  we  therefore  say  that  the  senses  rep-  [p.  258] 
resent  objects  to  us  as  they  appear , and  the  understand- 
ing as  they  are,  the  latter  is  not  to  be  taken  in  a transcen- 
dental, but  in  a purely  empirical  meaning,  namely,  as  to 
how  they,  as  objects  of  experience,  must  be  represented, 
according  to  the  regular  connection  of  phenomena,  and 
not  according  to  what  they  may  be,  as  objects  of  the  pure 
understanding,  apart  from  their  relation  to  possible  experi- 
ence, and  therefore  to  our  senses.  This  will  always  remain 
unknown  to  us ; nay,  we  shall  never  know  whether  such 
a transcendental  and  exceptional  knowledge  is  possible 
at  all,  at  least  as  comprehended  under  our  ordinary  cate- 
gories. With  us  understanding  and  sensibility  cannot 


Transcendental  Analytic 


21  I 


determine  objects,  unless  they  are  joined  together.  If  we 
separate  them,  we  have  intuitions  without  concepts,  or 
concepts  without  intuitions,  in  both  cases  representations 
which  we  cannot  refer  to  any  definite  object. 

If,  after  all  these  arguments,  anybody  should  still  hesi- 
tate to  abandon  the  purely  transcendental  use  of  the  cate- 
gories, let  him  try  an  experiment  with  them  for  framing 
any  synthetical  proposition.  An  analytical  proposition 
does  not  in  the  least  advance  the  understanding,  which, 
as  in  such  a proposition  it  is  only  concerned  with  what 
is  already  thought  in  the  concept,  does  not  ask  whether 
the  concept  in  itself  has  any  reference  to  objects,  or  ex- 
presses only  the  unity  of  thought  in  general  [p.  259] 
(this  completely  ignoring  the  manner  in  which  an  object 
may  be  given).  The  understanding  in  fact  is  satisfied  if 
it  knows  what  it  contained  in  the  concept  of  an  object ; 
it  is  indifferent  as  to  the  object  to  which  the  concept  may 
refer.  But  let  him  try  the  experiment  with  any  syntheti- 
cal and  so-called  transcendental  proposition,  as  for  in- 
stance, ‘ Everything  that  exists,  exists  as  a substance,  or 
as  a determination  inherent  in  it,’  or  1 Everything  con- 
tingent exists  as  an  effect  of  some  other  thing,  namely, 
its  cause,’  etc.  Now  I ask,  whence  can  the  understand- 
ing take  these  synthetical  propositions,  as  the  concepts 
are  to  apply,  not  to  some  possible  experience,  but  to 
things  by  themselves  (noumena)  ? Where  is  that  third 
term  to  be  found  which  is  always  required  for  a syn- 
thetical proposition,  in  order  thus  to  join  concepts  which 
have  no  logical  (analytical)  relation  with  each  other  ? It 
will  be  impossible  to  prove  such  a proposition,  nay  even 
to  justify  the  possibility  of  any  such  pure  assertion,  with- 
out appealing  to  the  empirical  use  of  the  understanding, 


212 


Transcendental  A?ialytic 


and  thus  renouncing  entirely  the  so-called  pure  and  non- 
sensuous  judgment.  There  are  no  principles  therefore 
according  to  which  the  concepts  of  pure  and  merely  in- 
telligible objects  could  ever  be  applied,  because  we  cannot 
imagine  any  way  in  which  they  could  be  given,  and  the 
problematic  thought,  which  leaves  a place  open  to  them, 
serves  only,  like  empty  space,  to  limit  the  sphere  of  em- 
pirical principles,  without  containing  or  indicat-  [p.  260] 
ing  any  other  object  of  knowledge,  lying  beyond  that 
sphere. 

APPENDIX 

Of  the  Amphiboly  of  Reflective  Concepts,  owing  10 
the  Confusion  of  the  Empirical  with  the  Tran- 
scendental Use  of  the  Understanding 

Reflection  (rejlexio)  is  not  concerned  with  objects  them- 
selves, in  order  to  obtain  directly  concepts  of  them,  but  is 
a state  of  the  mind  in  which  we  set  ourselves  to  discover 
the  subjective  conditions  under  which  we  may  arrive  at 
concepts.  It  is  the  consciousness  of  the  relation  of  given 
representations  to  the  various  sources  of  our  knowledge 
by  which  alone  their  mutual  relation  can  be  rightly  de- 
termined. Before  saying  any  more  of  our  representa- 
tions, the  first  question  is,  to  which  faculty  of  knowledge 
they  may  all  belong;  whether  it  is  the  understanding  or 
the  senses  by  which  they  are  connected  and  compared. 
Many  a judgment  is  accepted  from  mere  habit,  or  made 
from  inclination,  and  as  no  reflection  precedes  or  even 
follows  it  critically,  the  judgment  is  supposed  [p.  261] 
to  have  had  its  origin  in  the  understanding.  It  is  not 
all  judgments  that  require  an  investigation,  that  is,  a 


T vanscendental  A nalytic 


213 


careful  attention  with  regard  to  the  grounds  of  their 
truth ; for  if  they  are  immediately  certain,  as  for  in- 
stance, that  between  two  points  there  can  be  only  one 
straight  line,  no  more  immediately  certain  marks  of 
their  truth  than  that  which  they  themselves  convey 
could  be  discovered.  But  all  judgments,  nay,  all  com- 
parisons, require  reflection,  that  is,  a discrimination  of 
the  respective  faculty  of  knowledge  to  which  any  given 
concepts  belong.  The  act  by  which  I place  in  general 
the  comparison  of  representations  by  the  side  of  the 
faculty  of  knowledge  to  which  that  comparison  be- 
longs, and  by  which  I determine  whether  these  repre- 
sentations are  compared  with  each  other  as  belonging 
to  the  pure  understanding  or  to  sensuous  intuition,  I 
call  transcendental  reflection.  The  relation  in  which  the 
two  concepts  may  stand  to  each  other  in  one  state  of  the 
mind  is  that  of  identity  and  difference , of  agreement  and 
opposition , of  the  internal  and  external,  and  finally  of  the 
determinable  and  the  determination  (matter  and  form). 
The  right  determination  of  that  relation  depends  on  the 
question  in  which  faculty  of  knowledge  they  subjectively 
belong  to  each  other,  whether  in  sensibility  or  in  the 
understanding.  For  the  proper  distinction  of  the  latter 
is  of  great  importance  with  regard  to  the  manner  in 
which  the  former  must  be  considered.  [p.  262] 

Before  proceeding  to  form  any  objective  judgments,  we 
have  to  compare  the  concepts  with  regard  to  the  identity 
(of  many  representations  under  one  concept)  as  the  founda- 
tion of  general  judgments,  or  with  regard  to  their  differ- 
ence as  the  foundation  of  particular  judgments,  or  with 
regard  to  their  agreement  and  opposition  serving  as  the 
foundations  of  affirmative  and  negative  judgments,  etc. 


214 


Transcendental  Analytic 


For  this  reason  it  might  seem  that  we  ought  to  call 
these  concepts  concepts  of  comparison  ( conceptns  com- 
paratio7iis).  But  as,  when  the  contents  of  concepts  and 
not  their  logical  form  must  be  considered,  that  is,  whether 
the  things  themselves  are  identical  or  different,  in  agree- 
ment or  in  opposition,  etc.,  all  things  may  have  a two- 
fold relation  to  our  faculty  of  knowledge,  namely,  either 
to  sensibility  or  to  the  understanding,  and  as  the  manner 
in  which  they  belong  to  one  another  depends  on  the  place 
to  which  they  belong,  it  follows  that  the  transcendental 
reflection,  that  is  the  power  of  determining  the  relation 
of  given  representations  to  one  or  the  other  class  of 
knowledge,  can  alone  determine  their  mutual  relation. 
Whether  the  things  are  identical  or  different,  in  agree- 
ment or  opposition,  etc.,  cannot  be  established  at  once 
by  the  concepts  themselves  by  means  of  a mere  com- 
parison (comparatio),  but  first  of  all  by  a proper  discrimi- 
nation of  that  class  of  knowledge  to  which  they  belong, 
that  is,  by  transcendental  reflection.  It  might  therefore  be 
said,  that  logical  rejlectio7i  is  a mere  comparison,  because 
it  takes  no  account  of  the  faculty  of  knowledge  to  which 
any  given  representations  belong,  and  treats  [p.  263] 
them,  so  far  as  they  are  all  found  in  the  mind,  as 
homogeneous,  while  transcendental  rejlectio7i  (which  re- 
fers to  the  objects  themselves)  supplies  the  possibility 
of  an  objective  comparison  of  representations  among 
themselves,  and  is  therefore  very  different  from  the 
other,  the  faculty  of  knowledge  to  which  they  belong 
not  being  the  same.  This  transcendental  reflection  is 
a duty  from  which  no  one  can  escape  who  wishes  to 
form  judgments  a priori.  We  shall  now  take  it  in  hand, 
and  may  hope  thus  to  throw  not  a little  light  on  the 
real  business  of  the  understanding. 


Transcendental  Analytic 


215 


I.  Identity  and  Difference 

When  an  object  is  presented  to  us  several  times,  but 
each  time  with  the  same  internal  determinations  ( qnalitas 
et  quantitas ),  it  is,  so  long  as  it  is  considered  as  an  object 
of  the  pure  understanding,  always  one  and  the  same,  one 
thing,  not  many  ( numerica  identitas).  But  if  it  is  a phe- 
nomenon, a comparison  of  the  concepts  is  of  no  conse- 
quence, and  though  everything  may  be  identical  with 
regard  to  the  concepts,  yet  the  difference  of  the  places  of 
this  phenomenon  at  the  same  time  is  a sufficient  ground 
for  admitting  the  numerical  difference  of  the  object  (of  the 
senses).  Thus,  though  there  may  be  no  internal  difference 
whatever  (either  in  quality  or  quantity)  between  two  drops 
of  water,  yet  the  fact  that  they  may  be  seen  [p.  264] 
at  the  same  time  in  different  places  is  sufficient  to 
establish  their  numerical  difference.  Leibniz  took  phe- 
nomena to  be  things  by  themselves,  intelligibilia , that  is, 
objects  of  the  pure  understanding  (though,  on  account  of 
the  confused  nature  of  their  representations,  he  assigned 
to  them  the  name  of  phenomena),  and  from  that  point 
of  view  his  principle  of  their  indiscernibility  ( principium 
identitas  indiscernibilium)  could  not  be  contested.  As, 
however,  they  are  objects  of  sensibility,  and  the  use  of 
the  understanding  with  regard  to  them  is  not  pure,  but 
only  empirical,  their  plurality  and  numerical  diversity  are 
indicated  by  space  itself,  as  the  condition  of  external 
phenomena.  For  one  part  of  space,  though  it  may  be 
perfectly  similar  and  equal  to  another,  is  still  outside  it, 
and  for  this  very  reason  a part  of  space  different  from  the 
first  which,  added  to  it,  makes  a larger  space : and  this 
applies  to  all  things  which  exist  at  the  same  time  in 


216 


T ranscendental  A nalytic 


different  parts  of  space,  however  similar  or  equal  they 
may  be  in  other  respects. 

II.  Agreement  and  Opposition 

When  reality  is  represented  by  the  pure  understanding 
only  ( realitas  noumenon),  no  opposition  can  be  conceived 
between  realities,  that  is,  no  such  relation  that,  if  connected 
in  one  subject,  they  should  annihilate  the  effects  one  of 
the  other,  as  for  instance  3 — 3=0.  The  real  in  [p.  265] 
the  phenomena,  on  the  contrary  ( realitas  phenomenon ), 
may  very  well  be  in  mutual  opposition,  and  if  connected 
in  one  subject,  one  may  annihilate  completely  or  in  part 
the  effect  of  the  other,  as  in  the  case  of  two  forces  moving 
in  the  same  straight  line,  either  drawing  or  impelling  a 
point  in  opposite  directions,  or  in  the  case  of  pleasure, 
counterbalancing  a certain  amount  of  pain. 

III.  The  Internal  and  the  External 

In  an  object  of  the  pure  understanding  that  only  is 
internal  which  has  no  relation  whatever  (as  regards  its 
existence)  to  anything  different  from  itself.  The  inner 
relations,  on  the  contrary,  of  a substantia  phenomenon  in 
space  are  nothing  but  relations,  and  the  substance  itself 
a complex  of  mere  relations.  We  only  know  substances 
in  space  through  the  forces  which  are  active  in  a certain 
space,  by  either  drawing  others  near  to  it  (attraction)  or 
by  preventing  others  from  penetrating  into  it  (repulsion 
and  impenetrability).  Other  properties  constituting  the 
concept  of  a substance  appearing  in  space,  and  which  we 
call  matter,  are  unknown  to  us.  As  an  object  of  the  pure 
understanding,  on  the  contrary,  every  substance  must  have 


Transcendental  Analytic 


217 


internal  determinations  and  forces  bearing  on  the  interna, 
reality.  But  what  other  internal  accidents  can  I think 
except  those  which  my  own  internal  sense  pre-  [p.  266] 
sents  to  me,  namely,  something  which  is  either  itself 
thought , or  something  analogous  to  it?  Hence  Leibniz 
represented  all  substances  (as  he  conceived  them  as  nou- 
mena),  even  the  component  parts  of  matter  (after  having 
in  thought  removed  from  them  everything  implying  exter- 
nal relation,  and  therefore  composition  also),  as  simple 
subjects  endowed  with  powers  of  representation,  in  one 
word,  as  monads. 

IV.  Matter  and  Form 

These  are  two  concepts  which  are  treated  as  the  foun- 
dation of  all  other  reflection,  so  inseparably  are  they  con- 
nected with  every  act  of  the  understanding.  The  former 
denotes  the  determinable  in  general,  the  latter  its  deter- 
mination (both  in  a purely  transcendental  meaning,  all 
differences  in  that  which  is  given  and  the  mode  in  which 
it  is  determined  being  left  out  of  consideration).  Logi- 
cians formerly  called  the  universal,  matter ; the  specific  dif- 
ference, form.  In  every  judgment  the  given  concepts  may 
be  called  the  logical  matter  (for  a judgment);  their  relation, 
by  means  of  the  copula,  the  form  of  a judgment.  In  every 
being  its  component  parts  ( essentialia ) are  the  matter ; the 
mode  in  which  they  are  connected  in  it,  the  essential  form. 
With  respect  to  things  in  general,  unlimited  reality  was 
regarded  as  the  matter  of  all  possibility,  and  the  limitation 
thereof  (negation)  as  that  form  by  which  one  [p.  267] 
thing  is  distinguished  from  another,  according  to  transcen- 
dental concepts.  The  understanding  demands  first  that 
something  should  be  given  (at  least  in  concept)  in  order  to 


2l8 


Transcendental  Analytic 


be  able  afterwards  to  determine  it  in  a certain  manner. 
In  the  concept  of  the  pure  understanding  therefore,  matter 
comes  before  form,  and  Leibniz  in  consequence  first  as- 
sumed things  (monads),  and  within  them  an  internal  power 
of  representation,  in  order  afterwards  to  found  thereon 
their  external  relation,  and  the  community  of  their  states, 
that  is,  of  their  representations.  In  this  way  space  and  time 
were  possible  only,  the  former  through  the  relation  of  sub- 
stances, the  latter  through  the  connection  of  their  deter- 
minations among  themselves,  as  causes  and  effects.  And 
so  it  would  be  indeed,  if  the  pure  understanding  could  be 
applied  immediately  to  objects,  and  if  space  and  time  were 
determinations  of  things  by  themselves.  But  if  they  are 
sensuous  intuitions  only,  in  which  we  determine  all  objects 
merely  as  phenomena,  then  it  follows  that  the  form  of 
intuition  (as  a subjective  quality  of  sensibility)  comes 
before  all  matter  (sensations),  that  space  and  time  there- 
fore come  before  all  phenomena,  and  before  all  data  of 
experience,  and  render  in  fact  all  experience  possible.  As 
an  intellectual  philosopher  Leibniz  could  not  endure  that 
this  form  should  come  before  things  and  determine  their 
possibility : a criticism  quite  just  when  he  assumed  that  we 
see  things  as  they  are  (though  in  a confused  representa- 
tion). But  as  sensuous  intuition  is  a peculiar  [p.  268] 
subjective  condition  on  which  all  perception  a priori  de- 
pends, and  the  form  of  which  is  original  and  independent, 
the  form  must  be  given  by  itself,  and  so  far  from  matter 
(or  the  things  themselves  which  appear)  forming  the  true 
foundation  (as  we  might  think,  if  we  judged  according  to 
mere  concepts),  the  very  possibility  of  matter  presupposes 
a formal  intuition  (space  and  time)  as  given. 


Transcendental  Analytic 


219 


NOTE  ON  THE  AMPHIBOLY  OF  REFLECTIVE 
CONCEPTS 

I beg  to  be  allowed  to  call  the  place  which  we  assign  to 
a concept,  either  in  sensibility  or  in  the  pure  understand- 
ing, its  transcendental  place.  If  so,  then  the  determination 
of  this  position  which  belongs  to  every  concept,  according 
to  the  difference  of  its  use,  and  the  directions  for  deter- 
mining according  to  rules  that  place  for  all  concepts,  would 
be  called  transcendejital  topic ; a doctrine  which  would 
thoroughly  protect  us  against  the  subreptitious  claims  of 
the  pure  understanding  and  the  errors  arising  from  it,  by 
always  distinguishing  to  what  faculty  of  knowledge  each 
concept  truly  belongs.  Every  concept,  or  every  title  to 
which  many  kinds  of  knowledge  belong,  may  be  called  a 
logical  place.  Upon  this  is  based  the  logical  topic  of  Aris- 
totle, of  which  orators  and  schoolmasters  avail  themselves 
in  order  to  find  under  certain  titles  of  thought  [p.  269] 
what  would  best  suit  the  matter  they  have  in  hand,  and 
thus  to  be  able,  with  a certain  appearance  of  thoroughness, 
to  argue  and  wrangle  to  any  extent. 

Transcendental  topic,  on  the  contrary,  contains  no  more 
than  the  above-mentioned  four  titles  of  all  comparison  and 
distinction,  which  differ  from  the  categories  because  they 
do  not  serve  to  represent  the  object  according  to  what  con- 
stitutes its  concept  (quantity,  reality,  etc.),  but  only  the 
comparison  of  representations,  in  all  its  variety,  which  pre- 
cedes the  concept  of  things.  This  comparison,  however, 
requires  first  a reflection,  that  is,  a determination  of  the 
place  to  which  the  representations  of  things  which  are  to  be 
compared  belong,  namely,  whether  they  are  thought  by  the 
pure  understanding  or  given  as  phenomena  by  sensibility. 


220 


Transcendental  Analytic 


Concepts  may  be  logically  compared  without  our  asking 
any  questions  as  to  what  place  their  objects  belong, 
whether  as  noumena  to  the  understanding,  or  to  sensi- 
bility as  phenomena.  But  if  with  these  concepts  we  wish 
to  proceed  to  the  objects  themselves,  a transcendental 
reflection  is  necessary  first  of  all,  in  order  to  determine 
whether  they  are  meant  to  be  objects  for  the  pure  under- 
standing or  for  sensibility.  Without  this  reflection  our  use 
of  these  concepts  would  be  very  uncertain,  and  [p.  270] 
synthetical  propositions  would  spring  up  which  critical 
reason  cannot  acknowledge,  and  which  are  simply  founded 
on  transcendental  amphiboly,  that  is,  on  our  confounding 
an  object  of  the  pure  understanding  with  a phenomenon. 

For  want  of  such  a transcendental  topic,  and  deceived 
by  the  amphiboly  of  reflective  concepts,  the  celebrated 
Leibniz  erected  an  intellectual  system  of  the  world , or 
believed  at  least  that  he  knew  the  internal  nature  of  things 
by  comparing  all  objects  with  the  understanding  only  and 
with  the  abstract  formal  concepts  of  his  thought.  Our 
table  of  reflective  concepts  gives  us  the  unexpected  ad- 
vantage of  being  able  to  exhibit  clearly  the  distinctive 
features  of  his  system  in  all  its  parts,  and  at  the  same  time 
the  leading  principle  of  this  peculiar  view  which  rested  on 
a simple  misunderstanding.  He  compared  all  things  with 
each  other  by  means  of  concepts  only,  and  naturally  found 
no  other  differences  but  those  by  which  the  understanding 
distinguishes  its  pure  concepts  from  each  other.  The 
conditions  of  sensuous  intuition,  which  carry  their  own 
differences,  are  not  considered  by  him  as  original  and 
independent ; for  sensibility  was  with  him  a confused 
mode  of  representation  only,  and  not  a separate  source  of 
representations.  According  to  him  a phenomenon  was 


Transcendental  Analytic 


221 


the  representation  of  a thing  by  itself,  though  different,  in 
its  logical  form,  from  knowledge  by  means  of  the  [p.  271] 
understanding,  because  the  phenomenon,  in  the  ordinary 
absence  of  analysis,  brings  a certain  admixture  of  collat- 
eral representations  into  the  concept  of  a thing  which  the 
understanding  is  able  to  separate.  In  one  word,  Leibniz 
intellectualised  phenomena,  just  as  Locke,  according  to 
his  system  of  Noogony  (if  I may  use  such  an  expression), 
sensualised  all  concepts  of  the  understanding,  that  is, 
represented  them  as  nothing  but  empirical,  though  ab- 
stract, reflective  concepts.  Instead  of  regarding  the 
understanding  and  sensibility  as  two  totally  distinct  sources 
of  representations,  which  however  can  supply  objectively 
valid  judgments  of  things  only  in  conjunction  with  each 
other,  each  of  these  great  men  recognised  but  one  of  them, 
which  in  their  opinion  applied  immediately  to  things  by 
themselves,  while  the  other  did  nothing  but  to  produce 
either  disorder  or  order  in  the  representations  of  the 
former. 

Leibniz  accordingly  compared  the  objects  of  the  senses 
with  each  other  as  things  in  general  and  in  the  under- 
standing only.  He  did  this, 

First,  so  far  as  they  are  judged  by  the  understanding 
to  be  either  identical  or  different.  As  he  considers  their 
concepts  only  and  not  their  place  in  intuition,  in  which 
alone  objects  can  be  given,  and  takes  no  account  of  the 
transcendental  place  of  these  concepts  (whether  the  object 
is  to  be  counted  among  phenomena  or  among  things  by 
themselves),  it  could  not  happen  otherwise  than  [p.  272] 
that  he  should  extend  his  principle  of  indiscernibility, 
which  is  valid  with  regard  to  concepts  of  things  in  gen- 
eral only,  to  objects  of  the  senses  also  ( mundus  phaenom - 


222 


Transcendental  Analytic 


enon),  and  imagine  that  he  thus  added  no  inconsiderable 
extension  to  our  knowledge  of  nature.  No  doubt,  if  I 
know  a drop  of  water  as  a thing  by  itself  in  all  its  internal 
determinations,  I cannot  allow  that  one  is  different  from 
the  other,  when  their  whole  concepts  are  identical.  But 
if  the  drop  of  water  is  a phenomenon  in  space,  it  has  its 
place  not  only  in  the  understanding  (among  concepts), 
but  in  the  sensuous  external  intuition  (in  space),  and  in 
this  case  the  physical  place  is  quite  indifferent  with  regard 
to  the  inner  determinations  of  things,  so  that  a place  B 
can  receive  a thing  which  is  perfectly  similar  or  identical 
with  another  in  place  A,  quite  as  well  as  if  it  were  totally 
different  from  it  in  its  internal  determinations.  Difference 
of  place  by  itself  and  without  any  further  conditions  ren- 
ders the  plurality  and  distinction  of  objects  as  phenomena 
not  only  possible,  but  also  necessary.  That  so-called  law 
of  Leibniz  therefore  is  no  law  of  nature,  but  only  an 
analytical  rule,  or  a comparison  of  things  by  means  of 
concepts  only. 

Secondly.  The  principle  that  realities  (as  mere  asser- 
tions) never  logically  contradict  each  other,  is  perfectly 
true  with  regard  to  the  relation  of  concepts,  but  [p.  273] 
has  no  meaning  whatever  either  as  regards  nature  or  as 
regards  anything  by  itself  (of  which  we  can  have  no  con- 
cept whatever).1  The  real  opposition,  as  when  A — B = o, 
takes  place  everywhere  wherever  one  reality  is  united 
with  another  in  the  same  subject  and  one  annihilates  the 
effect  of  the  other.  This  is  constantly  brought  before  our 
eyes  in  nature  by  all  impediments  and  reactions  which,  as 
depending  on  forces,  must  be  called  realitates  phaenomena. 


1 * Whatever  ’ is  omitted  in  the  Second  Edition. 


Transcendental  Analytic 


223 


General  mechanics  can  even  give  us  the  empirical  condi- 
tion of  that  opposition  in  an  a priori  rule,  by  attending  to 
the  opposition  of  directions  ; a condition  of  which  the  tran- 
scendental concept  of  reality  knows  nothing.  Although 
Leibniz  himself  did  not  announce  this  proposition  with 
all  the  pomp  of  a new  principle,  he  yet  made  use  of  it 
for  new  assertions,  and  his  followers  expressly  inserted 
it  in  their  system  of  the  Leibniz- Wolfian  philosophy. 
According  to  this  principle  all  evils,  for  example,  are 
nothing  but  the  consequences  of  the  limitations  of  created 
beings,  that  is,  they  are  negations,  because  these  can  be 
the  only  opposites  of  reality  (which  is  perfectly  true  in 
the  mere  concept  of  the  thing  in  general,  but  not  in  things 
as  phenomena).  In  like  manner  the  followers  of  Leibniz 
consider  it  not  only  possible,  but  even  natural,  to  unite 
all  reality,  without  fearing  any  opposition,  in  one  being ; 
because  the  only  opposition  they  know  is  that  [p.  274] 
of  contradiction  (by  which  the  concept  of  a thing  itself  is 
annihilated),  while  they  ignore  that  of  reciprocal  action 
and  reaction,  when  one  real  cause  destroys  the  effect  of 
another,  a process  which  we  can  only  represent  to  our- 
selves when  the  conditions  are  given  in  sensibility. 

Thirdly.  The  Leibnizian  monadology  has  really  no  other 
foundation  than  that  Leibniz  represented  the  difference  of 
the  internal  and  the  external  in  relation  to  the  understand- 
ing only.  Substances  must  have  something  internal , which 
is  free  from  all  external  relations,  and  therefore  from  com- 
position also.  The  simple,  therefore,  or  uncompounded, 
is  the  foundation  of  the  internal  of  things  by  themselves. 
This  internal  in  the  state  of  substances  cannot  consist  in 
space,  form,  contact,  or  motion  (all  these  determinations 
being  external  relations),  and  we  cannot  therefore  ascribe 


224 


Transcendental  Analytic 


to  substances  any  other  internal  state  but  that  which 
belongs  to  our  own  internal  sense,  namely,  the  state  of 
representations.  This  is  the  history  of  the  monads,  which 
were  to  form  the  elements  of  the  whole  universe,  and  the 
energy  of  which  consists  in  representations  only,  so  that 
properly  they  can  be  active  within  themselves  only. 

For  this  reason,  his  principle  of  a possible  community 
of  substances  could  only  be  a pre-established  harmony, 
and  not  a physical  influence.  For,  as  every-  [p.  275] 
thing  is  actively  occupied  internally  only,  that  is,  with  its 
own  representations,  the  state  of  representations  in  one 
substance  could  not  be  in  active  connection  with  that  of 
another ; but  it  became  necessary  to  admit  a third  cause, 
exercising  its  influence  on  all  substances,  and  making  their 
states  to  correspond  with  each  other,  not  indeed  by  oc- 
casional assistance  rendered  in  each  particular  case  ( sys - 
tenia  assistentiae),  but  through  the  unity  of  the  idea  of  a 
cause  valid  for  all,  and  in  which  all  together  must  receive 
their  existence  and  permanence,  and  therefore  also  their 
reciprocal  correspondence  according  to  universal  laws. 

Fourthly.  Leibniz’s  celebrated  doctrine  of  space  and 
time,  in  which  he  intellectualised  these  forms  of  sensi- 
bility, arose  entirely  from  the  same  delusion  of  transcen- 
dental reflection.  If  by  means  of  the  pure  understanding 
alone  I want  to  represent  the  external  relations  of  things, 
I can  do  this  only  by  means  of  the  concept  of  their 
reciprocal  action  ; and  if  I want  to  connect  one  state  with 
another  state  of  the  same  thing,  this  is  possible  only  in 
the  order  of  cause  and  effect.  Thus  it  happened  that 
Leibniz  conceived  space  as  a certain  order  in  the  com- 
munity of  substances,  and  time  as  the  dynamical  sequence 
of  their  states.  That  which  space  and  time  seem  to  pos- 


Transcendental  Analytic 


225 


sess  as  proper  to  themselves  and  independent  [p.  276] 
of  things,  he  ascribed  to  the  confusion  of  these  concepts, 
which  made  us  mistake  what  is  a mere  form  of  dynamical 
relations  for  a peculiar  and  independent  intuition,  ante- 
cedent to  things  themselves.  Thus  space  and  time  became 
with  him  the  intelligible  form  of  the  connection  of  things 
(substances  and  their  states)  by  themselves,  and  things 
were  intelligible  substances  ( substantiae  nonmena).  Never- 
theless he  tried  to  make  these  concepts  valid  for  phe- 
nomena, because  he  would  not  concede  to  sensibility  any 
independent  kind  of  intuition,  but  ascribed  all,  even  the 
empirical  representation  of  objects,  to  the  understanding, 
leaving  to  the  senses  nothing  but  the  contemptible  work 
of  confusing  and  mutilating  the  representations  of  the 
understanding. 

But,  even  if  we  could  predicate  anything  synthetically 
by  means  of  the  pure  understanding  of  things  by  them- 
selves (which  however  is  simply  impossible),  this  could 
never  be  referred  to  phenomena,  because  these  do  not 
represent  things  by  themselves.  We  should  therefore  in 
such  a case  have  to  compare  our  concepts  in  a transcen- 
dental reflection  under  the  conditions  of  sensibility  only, 
and  thus  space  and  time  would  never  be  determinations  of 
things  by  themselves,  but  of  phenomena.  What  things 
may  be  by  themselves  we  know  not,  nor  need  [p.  277] 
we  care  to  know,  because,  after  all,  a thing  can  never 
come  before  me  otherwise  than  as  a phenomenon. 

The  remaining  reflective  conceptions  have  to  be  treated 
in  the  same  manner.  Matter  is  substantia  phenomenon. 
What  may  belong  to  it  internally,  I seek  for  in  all  parts  of 
space  occupied  by  it,  and  in  all  effects  produced  by  it,  all 
of  which,  however,  can  be  phenomena  of  the  external 
Q 


226 


Transcendental  Analytic 


senses  only.  I have  therefore  nothing  that  is  absolutely, 
but  only  what  is  relatively  internal,  and  this  consists  itself 
of  external  relations.  Nay,  what  according  to  the  pure 
understanding  should  be  the  absolutely  internal  of  matter 
is  a mere  phantom,  for  matter  is  never  an  object  of 
the  pure  understanding,  while  the  transcendental  object 
which  may  be  the  ground  of  the  phenomenon  which  we 
call  matter,  is  a mere  something  of  which  we  could  not 
even  understand  what  it  is,  though  somebody  should  tell 
us.  We  cannot  understand  anything  except  what  carries 
with  it  in  intuition  something  corresponding  to  our  words. 
If  the  complaint  ‘ that  we  do  not  understand  the  internal 
of  things,’  means  that  we  do  not  comprehend  by  means  of 
the  pure  understanding  what  the  things  which  appear  to 
us  may  be  of  themselves,  it  seems  totally  unjust  and 
unreasonable ; for  it  means  that  without  senses  we  should 
be  able  to  know  and  therefore  to  see  things,  that  is,  that 
we  should  possess  a faculty  of  knowledge  totally  different 
from  the  human,  not  only  in  degree,  but  in  kind  [p.  278] 
and  in  intuition,  in  fact,  that  we  should  not  be  men,  but 
beings  of  whom  we  ourselves  could  not  say  whether  they 
are  even  possible,  much  less  what  they  would  be  like. 
Observation  and  analysis  of  phenomena  enter  into  the 
internal  of  nature,  and  no  one  can  say  how  far  this  may 
go  in  time.  Those  transcendental  questions,  however, 
which  go  beyond  nature,  would  nevertheless  remain  un- 
answerable, even  if  the  whole  of  nature  were  revealed  to 
us,  for  it  is  not  given  to  us  to  observe  even  our  own  mind 
with  any  intuition  but  that  of  our  internal  sense.  In  it  lies 
the  mystery  of  the  origin  of  our  sensibility.  Its  relation 
to  an  object,  and  the  transcendental  ground  of  that  unity, 
are  no  doubt  far  too  deeply  hidden  for  us,  who  can  know 


Transcendental  Analytic 


227 


even  ourselves  by  means  of  the  internal  sense  only,  that  is, 
as  phenomena,  and  we  shall  never  be  able  to  use  the  same 
imperfect  instrument  of  investigation  in  order  to  find  any- 
thing but  again  and  again  phenomena,  the  non-sensuous, 
and  non-phenomenal  cause  of  which  we  are  seeking  in  vain. 

What  renders  this  criticism  of  the  conclusions  by  means 
of  the  acts  of  mere  reflection  extremely  useful  is,  that  it 
shows  clearly  the  nullity  of  all  conclusions  with  regard  to 
objects  compared  with  each  other  in  the  understanding 
only,  and  that  it  confirms  at  the  same  time  what  fp.  279] 
we  have  so  strongly  insisted  on,  namely,  that  phenomena, 
though  they  cannot  be  comprehended  as  things  by  them- 
selves among  the  objects  of  the  pure  understanding,  are 
nevertheless  the  only  objects  in  which  our  knowledge  can 
possess  objective  reality,  i.e.  where  intuition  corresponds 
to  concepts. 

When  we  reflect  logically  only,  we  only  compare  in  our 
understanding  concepts  among  themselves,  trying  to  find 
out  whether  both  have  exactly  the  same  contents,  whether 
they  contradict  themselves  or  not,  whether  something 
belongs  to  a concept,  or  is  added  to  it,  and  which  of  the 
two  may  be  given,  while  the  other  may  be  a mode  only  of 
thinking  the  given  concept.  But  if  I refer  these  concepts 
to  an  object  in  general  (in  a transcendental  sense),  with- 
out determining  whether  it  be  an  object  of  sensuous  or 
intellectual  intuition,  certain  limitations  appear  at  once, 
warning  us  not  to  go  beyond  the  concept,  and  upsetting 
all  empirical  use  of  it,  thus  proving  that  a representation 
of  an  object,  as  of  a thing  in  general,  is  not  only  insuffi- 
cient, but,  if  without  sensuous  determination,  and  indepen- 
dent of  empirical  conditions,  self-contradictory.  It  is 
necessary  therefore  either  to  take  no  account  at  all  of  the 


228 


Transcendental  Analytic 


object  (as  we  do  in  logic)  or,  if  not,  then  to  think  it  under 
the  conditions  of  sensuous  intuition,  because  the  intelligi- 
ble would  require  a quite  peculiar  intuition  which  we  do 
not  possess,  and,  without  it,  would  be  nothing  to  us,  while 
on  the  other  side  phenomena  also  could  never  [p.  280] 
be  things  by  themselves.  For  if  I represent  to  myself 
things  in  general  only,  the  difference  of  external  relations 
cannot,  it  is  true,  constitute  a difference  of  the  things 
themselves,  but  rather  presupposes  it ; and,  if  the  concept 
of  one  thing  does  not  differ  at  all  internally  from  that  of 
another,  I only  have  one  and  the  same  thing  placed  in 
different  relations.  Furthermore,  by  adding  a mere  affir- 
mation (reality)  to  another,  the  positive  in  it  is  indeed 
augmented,  and  nothing  is  taken  away  or  removed,  so 
that  we  see  that  the  real  in  things  can  never  be  in  contra- 
diction with  itself,  etc. 

■*  * * * *■  *■  * * 

A certain  misunderstanding  of  these  reflective  concepts 
has,  as  we  showed,  exercised  so  great  an  influence  on  the 
use  of  the  understanding,  as  to  mislead  even  one  of  the 
most  acute  philosophers  to  the  adoption  of  a so-called 
system  of  intellectual  knowledge,  which  undertakes  to 
determine  objects  without  the  intervention  of  the  senses. 
For  this  reason  the  exposition  of  the  cause  of  the  misunder- 
standing, which  lies  in  the  amphiboly  of  these  concepts, 
as  the  origin  of  false  principles,  is  of  great  utility  in  deter- 
mining and  securing  the  true  limits  of  the  understanding. 

It  is  no  doubt  true,  that  what  can  be  affirmed  or  denied 
of  a concept  in  general,  can  also  be  affirmed  or  denied  of 
any  part  of  it  {dictum  de  omni  et  nullo) ; but  it  [p.  281] 
would  be  wrong  so  to  change  this  logical  proposition  as  to 
make  it  say  that  whatever  is  not  contained  in  a general 


Transcendental  Analytic 


229 


concept,  is  not  contained  either  in  the  particular  con- 
cepts comprehended  under  it ; for  these  are  particular 
concepts  for  the  very  reason  that  they  contain  more  than 
is  conceived  in  the  general  concept.  Nevertheless  the 
whole  intellectual  system  of  Leibniz  is  built  up  on  this 
fallacy,  and  with  it  falls  necessarily  to  the  ground,  to- 
gether with  all  equivocation  in  the  use  of  the  understand- 
ing, that  had  its  origin  in  it. 

Leibniz’s  principle  of  discernibility  is  really  based  on 
the  supposition  that,  if  a certain  distinction  is  not  to  be 
found  in  the  general  concept  of  a thing,  it  could  not  be 
met  with  either  in  the  things  themselves,  and  that  there- 
fore all  things  were  perfectly  the  same  ( numero  eadem), 
which  are  not  distinguished  from  each  other  in  their  con- 
cept also,  as  to  quality  or  quantity.  And  because  in  the 
mere  concept  of  a thing,  no  account  has  been  taken  of 
many  a necessary  condition  of  its  intuition,  it  has  rashly 
been  concluded  that  that  which,  in  forming  an  abstraction, 
has  been  intentionally  left  out  of  account,  did  really  not 
exist  anywhere,  and  nothing  has  been  allowed  to  a thing 
except  what  is  contained  in  its  concept.  [p.  282] 

The  concept  of  a cubic  foot  of  space,  wherever  and  how 
many  times  soever  I may  think  it,  is  in  itself  perfectly  the 
same.  But  two  cubic  feet  are  nevertheless  distinguished 
in  space,  by  their  places  alone  ( numero  diversa),  and  these 
places  are  conditions  of  the  intuition  in  which  the  object 
of  our  concept  is  given,  and  which,  though  they  do  not 
belong  to  the  concept,  belong  nevertheless  to  the  whole 
of  sensibility.  In  a similar  manner  there  is  no  contra- 
diction in  the  concept  of  a thing,  unless  something  nega- 
tive has  been  connected  with  something  affirmative ; and 
simply  affirmative  concepts,  if  joined  together,  cannot 


230 


Transcendental  Analytic 


neutralise  each  other.  But  in  sensuous  intuition,  where 
we  have  to  deal  with  reality  (for  instance  motion),  there 
exist  conditions  (opposite  directions)  of  which  in  the 
concept  of  motion  in  general  no  account  was  taken,  and 
which  render  possible  an  opposition  (not  however  a logical 
one),  and  from  mere  positives  produce  zero  = o,  so  that 
it  would  be  wrong  to  say  that  all  reality  must  be  in  per- 
fect agreement,  if  there  is  no  opposition  between  its  con- 
cepts.1 If  we  keep  to  concepts  only,  that  which  we  call 
internal  is  the  substratum  of  all  relations  or  [p.  283] 
external  determinations.  If  therefore  I take  no  account 
of  any  of  the  conditions  of  intuition,  and  confine  myself 
solely  to  the  concept  of  a thing,  then  I may  drop  no  doubt 
all  external  relations,  and  yet  there  must  remain  the  con- 
cept of  something  which  implies  no  relation,  but  internal 
determinations  only.  From  this  it  might  seem  to  follow 
that  there  exists  in  everything  something  (substance)  which 
is  absolutely  internal,  preceding  all  external  determinations, 
nay,  rendering  them  possible.  It  might  likewise  seem  to 
follow  that  this  substratum,  as  no  longer  containing  any 
external  relations,  must  be  simple  (for  corporeal  things  are 
always  relations  only,  at  least  of  their  parts  existing  side 
by  side) ; and  as  we  know  of  no  entirely  internal  deter- 
minations beyond  those  of  our  own  internal  sense,  that 
substratum  might  be  taken,  not  only  as  simple,  but  like- 

1 If  one  wished  to  use  here  the  usual  subterfuge  that  realitates  noumena , 
at  least,  cannot  oppose  each  other,  it  would  be  necessary  to  produce  an 
example  of  such  pure  and  non-sensuous  reality,  to  enable  us  to  see  whether 
it  was  something  or  nothing.  No  example,  however,  can  be  produced,  except 
from  experience,  which  never  offers  us  anything  but  phenomena;  so  that  this 
proposition  means  really  nothing  but  that  a concept,  which  contains  affirma- 
tives only,  contains  no  negative,  a proposition  which  we  at  least  have  never 
doubted. 


Transcendental  Analytic 


231 


wise  (according  to  the  analogy  of  our  own  internal  sense) 
as  determined  by  representations,  so  that  all  things  would 
be  really  monads,  or  simple  beings  endowed  with  repre- 
sentations. All  this  would  be  perfectly  true,  unless  some- 
thing more  than  the  concept  of  a thing  in  gen-  [p.  284] 
eral  were  required  in  order  to  give  us  objects  of  external 
intuition,  although  the  pure  concept  need  take  no  account 
of  it.  But  we  see,  on  the  contrary,  that  a permanent 
phenomenon  in  space  (impenetrable  extension)  may  con- 
tain mere  relations  without  anything  that  is  absolutely 
internal,  and  yet  be  the  first  substratum  of  all  external 
perception.  It  is  true  that  if  we  think  by  concepts  only, 
we  cannot  think  something  external  without  something 
internal,  because  conceptions  of  relations  presuppose 
things  given,  and  are  impossible  without  them.  But  as 
in  intuition  something  is  contained  which  does  not  exist 
at  all  in  the  mere  concept  of  a thing,  and  as  it  is  this 
which  supplies  the  substratum  that  could  never  be  known 
by  mere  concepts,  namely,  a space  which,  with  all  that 
is  contained  in  it,  consists  of  purely  formal,  or  real  rela- 
tions also,  I am  not  allowed  to  say,  that,  because  nothing 
can  be  represented  by  mere  concepts  without  something 
absolutely  internal,  there  could  not  be  in  the  real  things 
themselves,  comprehended  under  those  concepts,  and  in 
their  intuition,  anything  external,  without  a foundation  of 
something  absolutely  internal.  For,  if  we  take  no  account 
of  all  conditions  of  intuition,  then  no  doubt  nothing  re- 
mains in  the  mere  concept  but  the  internal  in  general, 
with  its  mutual  relations,  through  which  alone  the  exter- 
nal is  possible.  This  necessity,  however,  which  depends 
on  abstraction  alone,  does  not  apply  to  things,  if  [p.  285] 
they  are  given  in  intuition  with  determinations  expressive 


232 


Transcendental  Analytic 


of  mere  relations,  and  without  having  for  their  foundation 
anything  internal,  for  the  simple  reason  that  they  are 
phenomena  only,  and  not  things  in  themselves.  What- 
ever we  may  know  of  matter  are  nothing  but  relations 
(what  we  call  internal  determinations  are  but  relatively 
internal);  but  there  are  among  these  relations  some  which 
are  independent  and  permanent,  and  by  which  a certain 
object  is  given  us.  That  I,  when  abstraction  is  made  of 
these  relations,  have  nothing  more  to  think,  does  not  do 
away  with  the  concept  of  a thing,  as  a phenomenon,  nor 
with  the  concept  of  an  object  in  abstracto.  It  only  shows 
the  impossibility  of  such  an  object  as  could  be  determined 
by  mere  concepts,  that  is  of  a noumenon.  It  is  no  doubt 
startling  to  hear,  that  a thing  should  consist  entirely  of 
relations,  but  such  a thing  as  we  speak  of  is  merely  a 
phenomenon,  and  can  never  be  thought  by  means  of  the 
categories  only  ; nay,  it  consists  itself  of  the  mere  relation 
of  something  in  general  to  our  senses.  In  the  same  man- 
ner, it  is  impossible  for  us  to  represent  the  relations  of 
things  in  abstracto  as  long  as  we  deal  with  concepts  only, 
in  any  other  way  than  that  one  should  be  the  cause  of 
determinations  in  the  other,  this  being  the  very  concept 
of  our  understanding,  with  regard  to  relations.  But  as 
in  this  case  we  make  abstraction  of  all  intuition,  a whole 
class  of  determinations,  by  which  the  manifold  determines 
its  place  to  each  of  its  component  parts,  that  is,  the  form 
of  sensibility  (space),  disappears,  though  in  truth  [p.  286] 
it  precedes  all  empirical  casuality. 

If  by  purely  intelligible  objects  we  understand  things 
which,  without  all  schemata  of  sensibility,  are  thought  by 
mere  categories,  such  objects  arc  simply  impossible.  It  is 
our  sensuous  intuition  by  which  objects  are  given  to  us  that 


Transcendental  Analytic 


233 


forms  the  condition  of  the  objective  application  of  all  the 
concepts  of  our  understanding,  and  without  that  intuition 
the  categories  have  no  relation  whatever  to  any  object. 
Nay,  even  if  we  admitted  a kind  of  intuition  different  from 
the  sensuous,  our  functions  of  thought  would  have  no 
meaning  with  regard  to  it.  If  we  only  mean  objects  of  a 
non-sensuous  intuition,  to  which  our  categories  do  not  apply, 
and  of  which  we  can  have  no  knowledge  whatever  (either 
intuitional  or  conceptual),  there  is  no  reason  why  noumena, 
in  this  merely  negative  meaning,  should  not  be  admitted, 
because  in  this  case  we  mean  no  more  than  this,  that  our 
intuition  does  not  embrace  all  things,  but  objects  of  our 
senses  only ; that,  consequently,  its  objective  validity  is 
limited,  and  space  left  for  some  other  kind  of  intuition,  and 
consequently  for  things  as  objects  of  it.  But  in  that  sense 
the  concept  of  a noumenon  is  problematical , that  is,  the 
representation  of  a thing  of  which  we  can  neither  say  that 
it  is  possible  or  that  it  is  impossible,  because  we  have  no 
conception  of  any  kind  of  intuition  but  that  of  our  senses, 
or  of  any  kind  of  concepts  but  of  our  categories,  [p.  287] 
neither  of  them  being  applicable  to  any  extra-sensuous 
object.  We  cannot  therefore  extend  in  a positive  sense 
the  field  of  the  objects  of  our  thought  beyond  the  conditions 
of  our  sensibility,  or  admit,  besides  phenomena,  objects  of 
pure  thought,  that  is,  noumena,  simply  because  they  do  not 
possess  any  positive  meaning  that  could  be  pointed  out. 
For  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  categories  by  themselves 
are  not  sufficient  for  a knowledge  of  things,  and  that,  with- 
out the  data  of  sensibility,  they  would  be  nothing  but 
subjective  forms  of  unity  of  the  understanding,  and  without 
an  object.  We  do  not  say  that  thought  is  a mere  product 
of  the  senses,  and  therefore  limited  by  them,  but  it  does 


234 


Transcendental  Analytic 


not  follow  that  therefore  thought,  without  sensibility,  has 
its  own  pure  use,  because  it  would  really  be  without  an 
object.  Nor  would  it  be  right  to  call  the  noumenon  such 
an  object  of  the  pure  understanding,  for  the  noumenon 
means  the  problematical  concept  of  an  object,  intended  for 
an  intuition  and  understanding  totally  different  from  our 
own,  and  therefore  themselves  mere  problems.  The  con- 
cept of  the  noumenon  is  not  therefore  the  concept  of  an 
object,  but  only  a problem,  inseparable  from  the  limitation 
of  our  sensibility,  whether  there  may  not  be  objects  inde- 
pendent of  its  intuition.  This  is  a question  that  [p.  288] 
can  only  be  answered  in  an  uncertain  way,  by  saying  that 
as  sensuous  intuition  does  not  embrace  all  things  without 
exception,  there  remains  a place  for  other  objects,  that  can- 
not therefore  be  absolutely  denied,  but  cannot  be  asserted 
either  as  objects  of  our  understanding,  because  there  is  no 
definite  concept  for  them  (our  categories  being  unfit  for 
that  purpose). 

The  understanding  therefore  limits  the  sensibility  with- 
out enlarging  thereby  its  own  field,  and  by  warning  the 
latter  that  it  can  never  apply  to  things  by  themselves, 
but  to  phenomena  only,  it  forms  the  thought  of  an  object 
by  itself,  but  as  transcendental  only,  which  is  the  cause  of 
phenomena,  and  therefore  never  itself  a phenomenon : 
which  cannot  be  thought  as  quantity,  nor  as  reality,  nor  as 
substance  (because  these  concepts  require  sensuous  forms 
in  which  to  determine  an  object),  and  of  which  therefore 
it  must  always  remain  unknown,  whether  it  is  to  be  found 
within  us  only,  or  also  without  us ; and  whether,  if  sensi- 
bility were  removed,  it  would  vanish  or  remain.  If  we  like 
to  call  this  object  noumenon,  because  the  representation  of 
it  is  not  sensuous,  we  are  at  liberty  to  do  so.  But  as  we 


Transcendental  Analytic 


235 


cannot  apply  to  it  any  of  the  concepts  of  our  understand- 
ing, such  a representation  remains  to  us  empty,  serving  no 
purpose  but  that  of  indicating  the  limits  of  our  sensuous 
knowledge,  and  leaving  at  the  same  time  an  [p.  289] 
empty  space  which  we  cannot  fill  either  by  possible  expe- 
rience, or  by  the  pure  understanding. 

The  critique  of  the  pure  understanding  does  not  there- 
fore allow  us  to  create  a new  sphere  of  objects  beyond 
those  which  can  come  before  it  as  phenomena,  or  to  stray 
into  intelligible  worlds,  or  even  into  the  concept  of  such. 
The  mistake  which  leads  to  this  in  the  most  plausible 
manner,  and  which,  though  excusable,  can  never  be  justi- 
fied, consists  in  making  the  use  of  the  understanding,  con- 
trary to  its  very  intention,  transcendental,  so  that  objects, 
that  is,  possible  intuitions,  are  made  to  conform  to  con- 
cepts, not  concepts  to  possible  intuitions,  on  which  alone 
their  objective  validity  can  rest.  The  cause  of  this  is 
again,  that  apperception,  and  with  it  thought,  precedes 
every  possible  determinate  arrangement  of  represen- 
tations. We  are  thinking  something  in  general,  and 
determine  it  on  one  side  sensuously,  but  distinguish  at 
the  same  time  the  general  object,  represented  in  abstrac- 
tion, from  this  particular  mode  of  sensuous  intuition. 
Thus  there  remains  to  us  a mode  of  determining  the 
object  by  thought  only,  which,  though  it  is  a mere  logical 
form  without  any  contents,  seems  to  us  nevertheless  a 
mode  in  which  the  object  by  itself  exists  ( noumenon ),  with- 
out regard  to  the  intuition  which  is  restricted  to  our 
senses.  [p.  290] 

******** 

Before  leaving  this  transcendental  Analytic,  we  have  to 
add  something  which,  though  in  itself  of  no  particular 


236  Transcendental  Analytic 

importance,  may  yet  seem  to  be  requisite  for  the  complete- 
ness of  the  system.  The  highest  concept  of  which  all 
transcendental  philosophy  generally  begins,  is  the  division 
into  the  possible  and  the  impossible.  But,  as  all  division 
presupposes  a divisible  concept,  a higher  concept  is  re- 
quired, and  this  is  the  concept  of  an  object  in  general, 
taken  as  problematical,  it  being  left  uncertain  whether  it 
be  something  or  nothing.  As  the  categories  are  the  only 
concepts  which  apply  to  objects  in  general,  the  distinction 
whether  an  object  is  something  or  nothing  must  proceed 
according  to  the  order  and  direction  of  the  categories. 

I.  Opposed  to  the  concepts  of  all,  many , and  one , is 
the  concept  which  annihilates  everything,  that  is,  none ; 
and  thus  the  object  of  a concept,  to  which  no  intuition 
can  be  found  to  correspond,  is  = o,  that  is,  a concept  with- 
out an  object,  like  the  noumena,  which  cannot  be  counted 
as  possibilities,  though  not  as  impossibilities  either  (ens 
nationis) ; or  like  certain  fundamental  forces,  [p.  291] 
which  have  been  newly  invented,  and  have  been  con- 
ceived without  contradiction,  but  at  the  same  time  with- 
out any  example  from  experience,  and  must  not  therefore 
be  counted  among  possibilities. 

II.  Reality  is  something,  negation  is  nothing ; that  is, 
it  is  the  concept  of  the  absence  of  an  object,  as  shadow  or 
cold  ( nihil  privativum). 

III.  The  mere  form  of  intuition  (without  substance) 
is  in  itself  no  object,  but  the  merely  formal  condition  of 
it  (as  a phenomenon),  as  pure  space  and  pure  time  ( ens 
imaginarium),  which,  though  they  are  something,  as  forms 
of  intuition,  are  not  themselves  objects  of  intuition. 

IV.  The  object  of  a concept  which  contradicts  itself, 
is  nothing,  because  the  concept  is  nothing ; it  is  simply 


Transcendental  Analytic 


237 


the  impossible,  as  a figure  composed  of  two  straight  lines 
( nihil  negativum). 

A table  showing  this  division  of  the  concept  of  nothing 
(the  corresponding  division  of  the  concept  of  something 
follows  by  itself)  would  have  to  be  arranged  as  follows. 


We  see  that  the  ens  rationis  (No.  1)  differs  from  the 
ens  negativum  (No.  4),  because  the  former  cannot  be 
counted  among  the  possibilities,  being  the  result  of 
fancy,  though  not  self-contradictory,  while  the  latter  is 
opposed  to  possibility,  the  concept  annihilating  itself. 
Both,  however,  are  empty  concepts.  The  nihil  privati- 
vum  (No.  2)  and  the  ens  imaginarium  (No.  3)  are,  on 
the  contrary,  empty  data  for  concepts.  It  would  be 
impossible  to  represent  to  ourselves  darkness,  unless  light 
had  been  given  to  the  senses,  or  space,  unless  extended 
beings  had  been  perceived.  The  negation,  as  well  as 
the  pure  form  of  intuition  are,  without  something  real, 
no  objects. 


Nothing, 

as 

I.  Empty  concept  without  an  object. 
Ens  rat'onis. 


Lp.  292] 


II.  Empty  object  of  a 
concept. 

Nil  privativum. 


III.  Empty  intuition  without 
an  object. 

Ens  imaginarium 


IV.  Empty  object  without  a concept. 
Nihil  negativum . 


TRANSCENDENTAL  LOGIC  [p.293] 


Second  Division 
Transcendental  Dialectic 
INTRODUCTION 

1.  Of  Transcendental  Appearance  (Illusion) 

We  call  Dialectic  in  general  a logic  of  illusion  (eine 
Logik  des  Scheins).  This  does  not  mean  that  it  is  a 
doctrine  of  probability  (Wahrscheinlichkeit),  for  proba- 
bility is  a kind  of  truth,  known  through  insufficient 
causes,  the  knowledge  of  which  is  therefore  deficient, 
but  not  deceitful,  and  cannot  properly  be  separated  from 
the  analytical  part  of  logic.  Still  less  can  phenomenon 
(Erscheinung)  and  illusion  (Schein)  be  taken  as  identical. 
For  truth  or  illusion  is  not  to  be  found  in  the  objects  of 
intuition,  but  in  the  judgments  upon  them,  so  far  as  they 
are  thought.  It  is  therefore  quite  right  to  say,  that  the 
senses  never  err,  not  because  they  always  judge  rightly, 
but  because  they  do  not  judge  at  all.  Truth  therefore 
and  error,  and  consequently  illusory  appearance  also,  as 
the  cause  of  error,  exist  in  our  judgments  only,  that  is, 
in  the  relation  of  an  object  to  our  understanding.  No 
error  exists  in  our  knowledge,  if  it  completely  agrees  with 
the  laws  of  our  understanding,  nor  can  there  be  [p.  294] 
an  error  in  a representation  of  the  senses,  because  they 

238 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


239 


involve  no  judgment,  and  no  power  of  nature  can,  of  its 
own  accord,  deviate  from  its  own  laws.  Therefore  neither 
the  understanding  by  itself  (without  the  influence  of 
another  cause),  nor  the  senses  by  themselves  could  ever 
err.  The  understanding  could  not  err,  because  as  long 
as  it  acts  according  to  its  own  laws,  the  effect  (the  judg- 
ment) must  necessarily  agree  with  those  laws,  and  the 
formal  test  of  all  truth  consists  in  this  agreement  with 
the  laws  of  the  understanding.  The  senses  cannot  err, 
because  there  is  in  them  no  judgment  at  all,  whether 
true  or  false.  Now  as  we  have  no  other  sources  of  know- 
ledge but  these  two,  it  follows  that  error  can  only  arise 
through  the  unperceived  influence  of  the  sensibility  on 
the  understanding,  whereby  it  happens  that  subjective 
grounds  of  judgment  are  mixed  up  with  the  objective, 
and  cause  them  to  deviate  from  their  destination;1  just 
as  a body  in  motion  would,  if  left  to  itself,  always  follow 
a straight  line  in  the  same  direction,  which  is  changed 
however  into  a curvilinear  motion,  as  soon  as  another 
force  influences  it  at  the  same  time  in  a different  direc- 
tion. In  order  to  distinguish  the  proper  action  [p.  295] 
of  the  understanding  from  that  other  force  which  is  mixed 
up  with  it,  it  will  be  necessary  to  look  on  an  erroneous 
judgment  as  the  diagonal  between  two  forces,  which  de- 
termine the  judgment  in  two  different  directions,  forming 
as  it  were  an  angle,  and  to  dissolve  that  composite  effect 
into  the  simple  ones  of  the  understanding  and  of  the  sen- 
sibility, which  must  be  effected  in  pure  judgments  a priori 

1 Sensibility,  if  subjected  to  the  understanding  as  the  object  on  which  it 
exercises  its  function,  is  the  source  of  real  knowledge,  but  sensibility,  if  it  in- 
fluences the  action  of  the  understanding  itself  and  leads  it  on  to  a judgment, 
is  the  cause  of  error. 


240  Transcendental  Dialectic 

by  transcendental  reflection,  whereby,  as  we  tried  to  show, 
the  right  place  is  assigned  to  each  representation  in  the 
faculty  of  knowledge  corresponding  to  it,  and  the  influence 
of  either  faculty  upon  such  representation  is  determined. 

It  is  not  at  present  our  business  to  treat  of  empirical, 
for  instance,  optical  appearance  or  illusion,  which  occurs 
in  the  empirical  use  of  the  otherwise  correct  rules  of  the 
understanding,  and  by  which,  owing  to  the  influence  of 
imagination,  the  faculty  of  judgment  is  misled.  We 
have  to  deal  here  with  nothing  but  the  transcendental 
illusion , which  touches  principles  never  even  intended 
to  be  applied  to  experience,  which  might  give  us  a test 
of  their  correctness,  — an  illusion  which,  in  spite  of  all 
the  warnings  of  criticism,  tempts  us  far  beyond  the  em- 
pirical use  of  the  categories,  and  deludes  us  with  the  mere 
dream  of  an  extension  of  the  pure  understanding.  All 
principles  the  application  of  which  is  entirely  confined 
within  the  limits  of  possible  experience,  we  [p.  296] 
shall  call  immanent ; those,  on  the  contrary,  which  tend 
to  transgress^ those— limits,  tr^tlscendejiL  I do  not  mean 
by  this  the  transcendental  use  or  abuse  of  the  categories, 
which  is  a mere  fault  of  the  faculty  of  the  judgment, 
not  being  as  yet  sufficiently  subdued  by  criticism  nor 
sufficiently  attentive  to  the  limits  of  the  sphere  within 
which  alone  the  pure  understanding  has  full  play,  but 
real  principles  which  call  upon  us  to  break  down  all 
those  barriers,  and  to  claim  a perfectly  new  territory, 
which  nowhere  recognises  any  demarcation  at  all.  Here 
transcendental  and  transcendent  do  not  mean  the  same 
thing.  The  principles  of  the  pure  understanding,  which 
we  explained  before,  are  meant  to  be  only  of  empirical.- 
and  not  of  transcendental  application,  that  is,  they  cannot 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


241 


transcend  the  limits  of  experience.  A principle,  on  the 
contrary,  which  removes  these  landmarks,  nay,  insists 
on  our  transcending  them,  is  called  transcendent.  If  our 
critique  succeeds  in  laying  bare  the  illusion  of  those  pre- 
tended principles,  the  other  principles  of  a purely  em- 
pirical use  may,  in  opposition  to  the  former,  be  called 
immanent. 

Logical  illusion,  which  consists  in  a mere  imitation 
of  the  forms  of  reason  (the  illusion  of  sophistic  syllo- 
gisms), arises  entirely  from  want  of  attention  to  logical 
rules.  It  disappears  at  once,  when  our  attention  [p.  297] 
is  roused.  Transcendental  illusion,  on  the  contrary,  does 
not  disappear,  although  it  has  been  shown  up,  and  its 
worthlessness  rendered  clear  by  means  of  transcendental 
criticism,  as,  for  instance,  the  illusion  inherent  in  the 
proposition  that  the  world  must  have  a beginning  in 
time.  The  cause  of  this  is  that  there  exists  in  our 
reason  (considered  subjectively  as  a faculty  of  human 
knowledge)  principles  and  maxims  of  its  use,  which  have 
the  appearance  of  objective  principles,  and  lead  us  to 
mistake  the  subjective  necessity  of  a certain  connection 
of  our  concepts  in  favour  of  the  understanding  for  an 
objective  necessity  in  the  determination  of  things  by 
themselves.  This  illusion  is  as  impossible  to  avoid  as 
it  is  to  prevent  the  sea  from  appearing  to  us  higher  at 
a distance  than  on  the  shore,  because  we  see  it  by 
higher  rays  of  light ; or  to  prevent  the  moon  from  ap- 
pearing, even  to  an  astronomer,  larger  at  its  rising, 
although  he  is  not  deceived  by  that  illusion. 

Transcendental  Dialectic  must,  therefore,  be  content 
to  lay  bare  the  illusion  of  transcendental  judgments  and 
guarding  against  its  deceptions  — but  it  will  never  suc- 

R 


24  2 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


ceed  in  removing  the  transcendental  illusion  (like  the 
logical),  and  putting  an  end  to  it  altogether,  [p.  298] 
For  we  have  here  to  deal  with  a natural  and  inevitable 
illusion,  which  itself  rests  on  subjective  principle^  repre- 
senting them  to  us  as  objective,  while  logical  Dialectic, 
in  removing  sophisms,  has  to  deal  merely  with  a mis- 
take in  applying  the  principles,  or  with  an  artificial  illu- 
sion produced  by  an  imitation  of  them.  There  exists, 
therefore,  a natural  and  inevitable  Dialectic  of  pure  rea- 
son, not  one  in  which  a mere  bungler  might  get  entangled 
from  want  of  knowledge,  or  which  a sophist  might  arti- 
ficially devise  to  confuse  rational  people,  but  one  that 
is  inherent  in,  and  inseparable  from  human  reason,  and 
which,  even  after  its  illusion  has  been  exposed,  will  never 
cease  to  fascinate  our  reason,  and  to  precipitate  it  into 
momentary  errors,  such  as  require  to  be  removed  again 
and  again. 

2.  Of  Pure  Reason,  as  the  Seat  of  Transcendental  Illusion 

A.  Of  Reason  in  General 

All  our  knowledge  begins  with  the  senses,  proceeds 
thence  to  the  understanding,  and  ends  with  reason. 
There  is  nothing  higher  than  reason,  for  working  up 
the  material  of  intuition,  and  comprehending  it  under  the 
highest  unity  of  thought.  As  it  here  becomes  [p.  299] 
necessary  to  give  a definition  of  that  highest  faculty  of 
knowledge,  I begin  to  feel  considerable  misgivings.  There 
is  of  reason,  as  there  is  of  the  understanding,  a purely 
formal,  that  is  logical  use,  in  which  no  account  is  taken 
of  the  contents  of  knowledge ; but  there  is  also  a real 
use,  in  so  far  as  reason  itself  contains  the  origin  of  cer- 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


243 


cain  concepts  and  principles,  which  it  has  not  borrowed 
either  from  the  senses  or  from  the  understanding.  The 
former  faculty  has  been  long  defined  by  logicians  as  the 
faculty  of  mediate  conclusions,  in  contradistinction  to  im- 
mediate ones  ( consequentiae  immediatae ) ; but  this  does 
not  help  us  to  understand  the  latter,  which  itself  produces 
concepts.  As  this  brings  us  face  to  face  with  the  division 
of  reason  into  a logical  and  a transcendental  faculty,  we 
must  look  for  a higher  concept  for  this  source  of  know- 
ledge, to  comprehend  both  concepts  : though,  according  to 
the  analogy  of  the  concepts  of  the  understanding,  we  may 
expect  that  the  logical  concept  will  give  us  the  key  to  the 
transcendental,  and  that  the  table  of  the  functions  of  the 
former  will  give  us  the  genealogical  outline  of  the  con- 
cepts of  reason. 

In  the  first  part  of  our  transcendental  logic  we  defined 
the  understanding  as  the  facidty  of  rules , and  we  now 
distinguish  reason  from  it,  by  calling  it  the  faculty  of 
principles.  [p.  300] 

The  term  principle  is  ambiguous,  and  signifies  com- 
monly some  kind  of  knowledge  only  that  may  be  used  as 
a principle,  though  in  itself,  and  according  to  its  origin, 
it  is  no  principle  at  all.  Every  general  proposition,  even 
though  it  may  have  been  derived  from  experience  (by 
induction),  may  serve  as  a major  in  a syllogism  of  reason  ; 
but  it  is  not  on  that  account  a principle.  Mathematical 
axioms,  as,  for  instance,  that  between  two  points  there  can 
be  only  one  straight  line,  constitute  even  general  know- 
ledge a priori,  and  may  therefore,  with  reference  to  the 
cases  which  can  be  brought  under  them,  rightly  be  called 
principles.  Nevertheless  it  would  be  wrong  to  say,  that 
this  property  of  a straight  line,  in  general  and  by  itself, 


244 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


is  known  to  us  from  principles,  for  it  is  known  from  pure 
intuition  only. 

I shall  therefore  call  it  knowledge  from  principles, 
whenever  we  know  the  particular  in  the  general,  by 
means  of  concepts.  Thus  every  syllogism  of  reason  is  a 
form  of  deducing  some  kind  of  knowledge  from  a prin- 
ciple, because  the  major  always  contains  a concept  which 
enables  us  to  know,  according  to  a principle,  everything 
that  can  be  comprehended  under  the  conditions  of  that 
concept.  As  every  general  knowledge  may  serve  as  a 
major  in  such  a syllogism,  and  as  the  understanding 
supplies  such  general  propositions  a priori,  these  no 
doubt  may,  with  reference  to  their  possible  use,  be  called 
principles.  [p.  301] 

But,  if  we  consider  these  principles  of  the  pure  under- 
standing in  themselves,  and  according  to  their  origin,  we 
find  that  they  are  anything  rather  than  knowledge  J_rean._ 
concepts.  They  would  not  even  be  possible  a priori , 
unless  we  relied  on  pure  intuition  (in  mathematics)  or 
on  conditions  of  a possible  experience  in  general.  That 
everything  which  happens  has  a cause,  can  by  no  means 
be  concluded  from  the  concept  of  that  which  happens ; 
on  the  contrary,  that  very  principle  shows  in  what  man- 
ner alone  we  can  form  a definite  empirical  concept  of 
that  which  happens. 

It  is  impossible  therefore  for  the  understanding  to  sup- 
ply us  with  synthetical  knowledge  from  concepts,  and  it  is 
really  that  kind  of  knowledge  which  I call  principles  abso- 
lutely ; while  all  general  propositions  may  be  called  prin- 
ciples relatively. 

It  is  an  old  desideratum,  which  at  some  time,  however 
distant,  may  be  realised,  that,  instead  of  the  endless 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


245 


variety  of  civil  laws,  their  principles  might  be  discovered, 
for  thus  alone  the  secret  might  be  found  of  what  is  called 
simplifying  legislation.  Such  laws,  however,  are  only 
limitations  of  our  freedom  under  conditions  by  which  it 
always  agrees  with  itself ; they  refer  to  something  which 
is  entirely  our  own  work,  and  of  which  we  ourselves  can  be 
the  cause,  by  means  of  these  concepts.  But  that  objects 
in  themselves,  as  for  instance  material  nature,  should  be 
subject  to  principles,  and  be  determined  accord-  [p.  302] 
ing  to  mere  concepts,  is  something,  if  not  impossible,  at 
all  events  extremely  contradictory.  But  be  that  as  it  may 
(for  on  this  point  we  have  still  all  investigations  before 
us),  so  much  at  least  is  clear,  that  knowledge  from  princi- 
ples (by  itself)  is  something  totally  different  from  mere 
knowledge  of  the  understanding,  which,  in  the  form  of  a 
principle,  may  no  doubt  precede  other  knowledge,  but 
which  by  itself  (in  so  far  as  it  is  synthetical)  is  not  based 
on  mere  thought,  nor  contains  anything  general,  according 
to  concepts. 

If  the  understanding  is  a faculty  for  producing  unity 
among  phenomena,  according  to  rules,  reason  is  the  faculty 
for  producing  unity  among  the  rules  of  the  understanding, 
according  to  principles.  Reason  therefore  never  looks 
directly  to  experience,  or  to  any  object,  but  to  the  under- 
standing, in  order  to  impart  a priori  through  concepts  to 
its  manifold  kinds  of  knowledge  a unity  that  may  be  called 
the  unity  of  reason,  and  is  very  different  from  the  unity 
which  can  be  produced  by  the  understanding. 

This  is  a general  definition  of  the  faculty  of  reason,  so 
far  as  it  was  possible  to  make  it  intelligible  without  the 
help  of  illustrations,  which  are  to  be  given  hereafter. 


246 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


B.  Of  the  Logical  Use  of  Reason  [p.  3037 

A distinction  is  commonly  made  between  what  is  im- 
mediately known  and  what  is  only  inferred.  That  in  a 
figure  bounded  by  three  straight  lines  there  are  three 
angles,  is  known  immediately,  but  that  these  angles  to- 
gether are  equal  to  two  right  angles,  is  only  inferred.  As 
we  are  constantly  obliged  to  infer,  we  grow  so  accustomed 
to  it,  that  in  the  end  we  no  longer  perceive  this  difference, 
and  as  in  the  case  of  the  so-called  deceptions  of  the  senses, 
often  mistake  what  we  have  only  inferred  for  something 
perceived  immediately.  In  every  syllogism  there  is  first  a 
fundamental  proposition  ; secondly,  another  deduced  from 
it  ; and  lastly,  the  conclusion  (consequence),  according  to 
which  the  truth  of  the  latter  is  indissolubly  connected  with 
the  truth  of  the  former.  If  the  judgment  or  the  conclusion 
is  so  clearly  contained  in  the  first  that  it  can  be  inferred 
from  it  without  the  mediation  or  intervention  of  a third 
representation,  the  conclusion  is  called  immediate  (conse- 
quentia  immediata ) : though  I should  prefer  to  call  it  a 
conclusion  of  the  understanding.  But  if,  besides  the  fun- 
damental knowledge,  another  judgment  is  required  to 
bring  out  the  consequence,  then  the  conclusion  is  called 
a conclusion  of  reason.  In  the  proposition  ‘all  men  are 
mortal ,’  the  following  propositions  are  contained  : some 
men  are  mortal ; or  some  mortals  are  men  ; or  nothing  that 
is  immortal  is  a man.  These  are  therefore  im-  [p.  304] 
mediate  inferences  from  the  first.  The  proposition,  on 
the  contrary,  all  the  learned  are  mortal,  is  not  contained 
in  the  fundamental  judgment,  because  the  concept  of 
learned  does  not  occur  in  it,  and  can  only  be  deduced  from 
it  by  means  of  an  intervening  judgment. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


24  7 


In  every  syllogism  I first  think  a rule  (the  major)  by 
means  of  the  understanding.  I then  bring  some  special 
knowledge  under  the  condition  of  the  rule  (the  minor)  by 
means  of  the  faculty  of  judgment,  and  I finally  determine 
my  knowledge  through  the  predicate  of  the  rule  ( con - 
clusio),  that  is,  a priori,  by  means  of  reason.  It  is  there- 
fore the  relation  represented  by  the  major  proposition,  as 
the  rule,  between  knowledge  and  its  condition,  that  con- 
stitutes the  different  kinds  of  syllogism.  Syllogisms  are 
therefore  threefold,  like  all  judgments,  differing  from  each 
other  in  the  manner  in  which  they  express  the  relation  of 
knowledge  in  the  understanding,  namely,  categorical,  hy- 
pothetical, and  disjunctive. 

If,  as  often  happens,  the  conclusion  is  put  forward  as 
a judgment,  in  order  to  see  whether  it  does  not  follow  from 
other  judgments  by  which  a perfectly  different  object  is 
conceived,  I try  to  find  in  the  understanding  the  assertion 
of  that  conclusion,  in  order  to  see  whether  it  does  not  ex- 
ist in  it,  under  certain  conditions,  according  to  a general 
rule.  If  I find  such  a condition,  and  if  the  object  of  the 
conclusion  can  be  brought  under  the  given  [p.  305] 
condition,  then  that  conclusion  follows  from  the  rule 
which  is  valid  for  other  objects  of  knowledge  also.  Thus 
we  see  that  reason,  in  forming  conclusions,  tries  to  reduce 
the  great  variety  of  the  knowledge  of  the  understanding 
to  the  smallest  number  of  principles  (general  conditions), 
and  thereby  to  produce  in  it  the  highest  unity. 

C.  Of  the  Pure  Use  of  Reason 

The  question  to  which  we  have  at  present  to  give  an 
answer,  though  a preliminary  one  only,  is  this,  whether 
reason  can  be  isolated  and  thus  constitute  by  itself  an 


248 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


independent  source  of  concepts  and  judgments,  which 
spring  from  it  alone,  and  through  which  it  has  reference 
to  objects,  or  whether  it  is  only  a subordinate  faculty  for 
imparting  a certain  form  to  any  given  knowledge,  namely, 
a logical  form,  a faculty  whereby  the  cognitions  of  the 
understanding  are  arranged  among  themselves  only,  and 
lower  rules  placed  under  higher  ones  (the  condition  of  the 
latter  comprehending  in  its  sphere  the  condition  of  the 
former)  so  far  as  all  this  can  be  done  by  their  comparison. 
Variety  of  rules  with  unity  of  principles  is  a requirement 
of  reason  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  the  understanding 
into  perfect  agreement  with  itself,  just  as  the  understand- 
ing brings  the  variety  of  intuition  under  concepts,  and 
thus  imparts  to  intuition  a connected  form.  Such  a prin- 
ciple however  prescribes  no  law  to  the  objects  [p.  306] 
themselves,  nor  does  it  contain  the  ground  on  which  the 
possibility  of  knowing  and  determining  objects  depends. 
It  is  merely  a subjective  law  of  economy,  applied  to  the 
stores  of  our  understanding;  having  for  its  purpose,  by 
means  of  a comparison  of  concepts,  to  reduce  the  general 
use  of  them  to  the  smallest  possible  number,  but  without 
giving  us  a right  to  demand  of  the  objects  themselves 
such  a uniformity  as  might  conduce  to  the  comfort  and 
the  extension  of  our  understanding,  or  to  ascribe  to  that 
maxim  any  objective  validity.  In  one  word,  the  question 
is,  whether  reason  in  itself,  that  is  pure  reason,  contains 
synthetical  principles  and  rules  a priori , and  what  those 
principles  are  ? 

The  merely  formal  and  logical  procedure  of  reason  in 
syllogisms  gives  us  sufficient  hints  as  to  the  ground  on 
which  the  transcendental  principle  of  synthetical  know- 
ledge, by  means  of  pure  reason,  is  likely  to  rest. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


249 


First , a syllogism,  as  a function  of  reason,  does  not 
refer  to  intuitions  in  order  to  bring  them  under  rules  (as 
the  understanding  does  with  its  categories),  but  to  con- 
cepts and  judgments.  Although  pure  reason  refers  in  the 
end  to  objects,  it  has  no  immediate  relation  to  them  and 
their  intuition,  but  only  to  the  understanding  and  its  judg- 
ments, these  having  a direct  relation  to  the  [p.  307] 
senses  and  their  intuition,  and  determining  their  objects. 
Unity  of  reason  is  therefore  never  the  unity  of  a possible 
experience,  but  essentially  different  from  it,  as  the  unity 
of  the  understanding.  That  everything  which  happens 
has  a cause,  is  not  a principle  discovered  or  prescribed  by 
reason,  it  only  makes  the  unity  of  experience  possible,  and 
borrows  nothing  from  reason,  which  without  this  relation 
to  possible  experience  could  never,  from  mere  concepts, 
have  prescribed  such  a synthetical  unity. 

Secondly.  Reason,  in  its  logical  employment,  looks  for 
the  general  condition  of  its  judgment  (the  conclusion),  and 
the  syllogism  produced  by  reason  is  itself  nothing  but  a 
judgment  by  means  of  bringing  its  condition  under  a gen- 
eral rule  (the  major).  But  as  this  rule  is  again  liable  to 
the  same  experiment,  reason  having  to  seek,  as  long  as 
possible,  the  condition  of  a condition  (by  means  of  a pro- 
syllogism), it  is  easy  to  see  that  it  is  the  peculiar  principle 
of  reason  (in  its  logical  use)  to  find  for  every  condi- 
tioned knowledge  of  the  understanding  the  unconditioned, 
whereby  the  unity  of  that  knowledge  may  be  completed. 

This  logical  maxim,  however,  cannot  become  a principle 
of  pure  reason,  unless  we  admit  that,  whenever  the  condi- 
tion is  given,  the  whole  series  of  conditions,  subordinated 
to  one  another,  a series,  which  consequently  is  [p.  308] 
itself  unconditioned,  is  likewise  given  (that  is,  is  contained 
in  the  object  and  its  connection). 


250 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


Such  a principle  of  pure  reason,  however,  is  evidently 
synthetical ; for  analytically  the  conditioned  refers  no 
doubt  to  some  condition,  but  not  to  the  unconditioned. 
From  this  principle  several  other  synthetical  propositions 
also  must  arise  of  which  the  pure  understanding  knows 
nothing ; because  it  has  to  deal  with  objects  of  a possible 
experience  only,  the  knowledge  and  synthesis  of  which  are 
always  conditioned.  The  unconditioned,  if  it  is  really  to 
be  admitted,  has  to  be  especially  considered  with  regard  to 
all  the  determinations  which  distinguish  it  from  whatever 
is  conditioned,  and  will  thus  supply  material  for  many  a 
synthetical  proposition  a priori. 

The  principles  resulting  from  this  highest  principle  of 
pure  reason  will  however  be  transcendent,  with  regard  to  all 
phenomena ; that  is  to  say,  it  will  be  impossible  ever  to 
make  any  adequate  empirical  use  of  such  a principle.  It 
will  thus  be  completely  different  from  all  principles  of  the 
understanding,  the  use  of  which  is  entirely  immanent  and 
directed  to  the  possibility  of  experience  only.  The  task 
that  is  now  before  us  in  the  transcendental  Dialectic 
which  has  to  be  developed  from  sources  deeply  hidden  in 
the  human  reason,  is  this  : to  discover  the  correctness  or 
otherwise  the  falsehood  of  the  principle  that  the  series  of 
conditions  (in  the  synthesis  of  phenomena,  or  of  objective 
thought  in  general)  extends  to  the  unconditioned,  and 
what  consequences  result  therefrom  with  regard  to  the 
empirical  use  of  the  understanding:  — to  find  [p.  309] 
out  whether  there  is  realiy  such  an  objectively  valid  prin- 
ciple of  reason,  and  not  only,  in  place  of  it,  a logical  rule 
which  requires  us,  by  ascending  to  ever  higher  conditions, 
to  approach  their  completeness,  and  thus  to  bring  the 
highest  unity  of  reason,  which  is  possible  to  us,  into  our 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


251 


knowledge : to  find  out,  I say,  whether,  by  some  miscon- 
ception, a mere  tendency  of  reason  has  not  been  mistaken 
for  a transcendental  principle  of  pure  reason,  postulating, 
without  sufficient  reflection,  absolute  completeness  in  the 
series  of  conditions  in  the  objects  themselves,  and  what 
kind  of  misconceptions  and  illusions  may  in  that  case  have 
crept  into  the  syllogisms  of  reason,  the  major  proposition 
of  which  has  been  taken  over  from  pure  reason  (being 
perhaps  a petitio  rather  than  a postidatum ),  and  which 
ascend  from  experience  to  its  conditions.  We  shall  divide 
it  into  two  parts,  of  which  the  first  will  treat  of  the  tran- 
scendent concepts  of  pure  reason,  the  second  of  transcendent 
and  dialectical  syllogisms. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC 

[p-  3io] 


BOOK  I 

OF  THE  CONCEPTS  OF  PURE  REASON 

Whatever  may  be  thought  of  the  possibility  of  con- 
cepts of  pure  reason,  it  is  certain  that  they  are  not  simply 
obtained  by  reflection,  but  by  inference.  Concepts  of  the 
understanding  exist  a priori , before  experience,  and  for  the 
sake  of  it,  but  they  contain  nothing  but  the  unity  of  reflec- 
tion applied  to  phenomena,  so  far  as  they  are  necessarily 
intended  for  a possible  empirical  consciousness.  It  is 
through  them  alone  that  knowledge  and  determination  of 
an  object  become  possible.  They  are  the  first  to  give 
material  for  conclusions,  and  they  are  not  preceded  by  any 
concepts  a priori  of  objects  from  which  they  could  them- 
selves be  deduced.  Their  objective  reality  however  de- 
pends on  this,  that  because  they  constitute  the  intellectual 
form  of  all  experience,  it  is  necessary  that  their  application 
should  always  admit  of  being  exhibited  in  experience. 

The  very  name,  however,  of  a concept  of  1'eason  gives  a 
kind  of  intimation  that  it  is  not  intended  to  be  limited  to 
experience,  because  it  refers  to  a kind  of  knowledge  of 
which  every  empirical  knowledge  is  a part  only  (it  may  be, 

252 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


253 


the  whole  of  possible  experience  or  of  its  empir-  [p.  31 1] 
ical  synthesis)  : and  to  which  all  real  experience  belongs, 
though  it  can  never  fully  attain  to  it.  Concepts  of  reason 
serve  for  conceiving  or  comprehending ; concepts  of  the 
understanding  for  understanding  (perceptions).  If  they 
contain  the  unconditioned,  they  refer  to  something  to 
which  all  experience  may  belong,  but  which  itself  can 
never  become  an  object  of  experience ; — something  to 
which  reason  in  its  conclusions  from  experience  leads  up, 
and  by  which  it  estimates  and  measures  the  degree  of  its 
own  empirical  use,  but  which  never  forms  part  of  empirical 
synthesis.  If  such  concepts  possess,  notwithstanding, 
objective  validity,  they  may  be  called  conceptus  ratiocinati 
(concepts  legitimately  formed)  ; if  they  have  only  been 
surreptitiously  obtained,  by  a kind  of  illusory  conclusion, 
they  may  be  called  conceptus  ratiocinantes  (sophistical 
concepts).  But  as  this  subject  can  only  be  fully  treated 
in  the  chapter  on  the  dialectical  conclusions  of  pure  rea- 
son, we  shall  say  no  more  of  it  now,  but  shall  only,  as  we 
gave  the  name  of  categories  to  the  pure  concepts  of  the 
understanding,  give  a new  name  to  the  concepts  of  pure 
reason,  and  call  them  transcendental  ideas,  a name  that  has 
now  to  be  explained  and  justified.  [p  312] 


254 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC 

BOOK  I 
First  Section 
Of  Ideas  in  General 

In  spite  of  the  great  wealth  of  our  languages,  a thought- 
ful mind  is  often  at  a loss  for  an  expression  that  should 
square  exactly  with  its  concept ; and  for  want  of  which 
he  cannot  make  himself  altogether  intelligible,  either  to 
others  or  to  himself.  To  coin  new  words  is  to  arrogate  to 
oneself  legislative  power  in  matters  of  language,  a proceed- 
ing which  seldom  succeeds,  so  that,  before  taking  so  des- 
perate a step,  it  is  always  advisable  to  look  about,  in  dead 
and  learned  languages,  whether  they  do  not  contain  such  a 
concept  and  its  adequate  expression.  Even  if  it  should 
happen  that  the  original  meaning  of  the  word  had  become 
somewhat  uncertain,  through  carelessness  on  the  part  of 
its  authors,  it  is  better  nevertheless  to  determine  and  fix 
the  meaning  which  principally  belonged  to  it  (even  if  it 
should  remain  doubtful  whether  it  was  originally  used 
exactly  in  that  meaning),  than  to  spoil  our  labour  by 
becoming  unintelligible. 

Whenever  therefore  there  exists  one  single  word  only 
for  a certain  concept,  which,  in  its  received  meaning, 
exactly  covers  that  concept,  and  when  it  is  of  [p.  313] 
great  consequence  to  keep  that  concept  distinct  from  other 
related  concepts,  we  ought  not  to  be  lavish  in  using  it  nor 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


255 


employ  it,  for  the  sake  of  variety  only,  as  a synonyme  in 
the  place  of  others,  but  carefully  preserve  its  own  pecul- 
iar meaning,  as  otherwise  it  may  easily  happen  that  the 
expression  ceases  to  attract  special  attention,  and  loses 
itself  in  a crowd  of  other  words  of  very  different  import, 
so  that  the  thought,  which  that  expression  alone  could 
have  preserved,  is  lost  with  it. 

From  the  way  in  which  Plato  uses  the  term  idea,  it  is 
easy  to  see  that  he  meant  by  it  something  which  not  only 
was  never  borrowed  from  the  senses,  but  which  even  far 
transcends  the  concepts  of  the  understanding,  with  which 
Aristotle  occupied  himself,  there  being  nothing  in  experi- 
ence corresponding  to  the  ideas.  With  him  the  ideas  are 
archetypes  of  things  themselves,  not  only,  like  the  cate- 
gories, keys  to  possible  experiences.  According  to  his 
opinion  they  flowed  out  from  the  highest  reason,  which 
however  exists  no  longer  in  its  original  state,  but  has  to 
recall,  with  difficulty,  the  old  but  now  very  obscure  ideas, 
which  it  does  by  means  of  reminiscence,  commonly  called 
philosophy.  I shall  not  enter  here  on  any  literary  discus- 
sions in  order  to  determine  the  exact  meaning  which  the 
sublime  philosopher  himself  connected  with  that  expres- 
sion. I shall  only  remark,  that  it  is  by  no  [p.  314] 
means  unusual,  in  ordinary  conversations,  as  well  as  in 
written  works,  that  by  carefully  comparing  the  thoughts 
uttered  by  an  author  on  his  own  subject,  we  succeed  in 
understanding  him  better  than  he  understood  himself, 
because  he  did  not  sufficiently  define  his  concept,  and  thus 
not  only  spoke,  but  sometimes  even  thought,  in  opposition 
to  his  own  intentions. 

Plato  knew  very  well  that  our  faculty  of  knowledge 
was  filled  with  a much  higher  craving  than  merely  to 


256 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


spell  out  phenomena  according  to  a synthetical  unity, 
and  thus  to  read  and  understand  them  as  experience. 
He  knew  that  our  reason,  if  left  to  itself,  tries  to  soar 
up  to  knowledge  to  which  no  object  that  experience  may 
give  can  ever  correspond ; but  which  nevertheless  is  real, 
and  by  no  means  a mere  cobweb  of  the  brain. 

Plato  discovered  his  ideas  principally  in  what  is  prac- 
tical,1 that  is,  in  what  depends  on  freedom,  which  again 
belongs  to  a class  of  knowledge  which  is  a [p.  315] 
peculiar  product  of  reason.  He  who  would  derive  the 
concept  of  virtue  from  experience,  and  would  change 
what  at  best  could  only  serve  as  an  example  or  an  im- 
perfect illustration,  into  a type  and  a source  of  know- 
ledge (as  many  have  really  done),  would  indeed  transform 
virtue  into  an  equivocal  phantom,  changing  according 
to  times  and  circumstances,  and  utterly  useless  to  serve 
as  a rule.  Everybody  can  surely  perceive  that,  when  a 
person  is  held  up  to  us  as  a model  of  virtue,  we  have 
always  in  our  own  mind  the  true  original  with  which 
we  compare  this  so-called  model,  and  estimate  it  accord- 
ingly. The  true  original  is  the  idea  of  virtue,  in  regard 
to  which  all  possible  objects  of  experience  may  serve  as 
examples  (proofs  of  the  practicability,  in  a certain  degree, 
of  that  which  is  required  by  the  concept  of  reason),  but 
never  as  archetypes.  That  no  man  can  ever  act  up  to 


1 It  is  true,  however,  that  he  extended  his  concept  of  ideas  to  speculative 
knowledge  also,  if  only  it  was  pure,  and  given  entirely  a priori.  He  extended 
it  even  to  mathematics,  although  they  can  have  their  object  nowhere  but  in 
possible  experience.  In  this  I cannot  follow  him,  nor  in  the  mystical  deduc- 
tion of  his  ideas,  and  in  the  exaggerations  which  led  him,  as  it  were,  to  hypos- 
tasise  them,  although  the  high-flown  language  which  he  used,  when  treating 
of  this  subject,  may  well  admit  of  a milder  interpretation,  and  one  more  in 
accordance  with  the  nature  of  things. 


Transcendental  Dialectic  257 

the  pure  idea  of  virtue  does  not  in  the  least  prove  the 
chimerical  nature  of  that  concept ; for  every  judgment 
as  to  the  moral  worth  or  unworth  of  actions  is  possible 
by  means  of  that  idea  only,  which  forms,  therefore,  the 
necessary  foundation  for  every  approach  to  moral  perfec- 
tion, however  far  the  impediments  inherent  in  human 
nature,  the  extent  of  which  it  is  difficult  to  determine, 
may  keep  us  removed  from  it. 

The  Platonic  Republic  has  been  supposed  to  [p.  316] 
be  a striking  example  of  purely  imaginary  perfection. 
It  has  become  a byword,  as  something  that  could  exist 
in  the  brain  of  an  idle  thinker  only,  and  Brucker  thinks 
it  ridiculous  that  Plato  could  have  said  that  no  prince 
could  ever  govern  well,  unless  he  participated  in  the 
ideas.  We  should  do  better,  however,  to  follow  up  this 
thought  and  endeavour  (where  that  excellent  philosopher 
leaves  us  without  his  guidance)  to  place  it  in  a clearer 
light  by  our  own  efforts,  rather  than  to  throw  it  aside  as 
useless,  under  the  miserable  and  very  dangerous  pretext 
of  its  impracticability.  A constitution  founded  on  the 
greatest  possible  human  freedom,  according  to  laws 
which  enable  the  freedom  of  each  individual  to  exist  by 
the  side  of  the  freedom  of  others  (without  any  regard 
to  the  highest  possible  human  happiness,  because  that 
must  necessarily  follow  by  itself),  is,  to  say  the  least,  a 
necessary  idea,  on  which  not  only  the  first  plan  of  a 
constitution  or  a state,  but  all  laws  must  be  based,  it 
being  by  no  means  necessary  to  take  account  from  the 
beginning  of  existing  impediments,  which  may  owe  their 
origin  not  so  much  to  human  nature  itself  as  to  the 
actual  neglect  of  true  ideas  in  legislation.  For  nothing 
can  be  more  mischievous  and  more  unworthy  a philoso- 
s 


258 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


pher  than  the  vulgar  appeal  to  what  is  called  adverse 
experience,  which  possibly  might  never  have  existed,  if 
at  the  proper  time  institutions  had  been  framed  accord- 
ing to  those  ideas,  and  not  according  to  crude  [p.  317] 
concepts,  which,  because  they  were  derived  from  ex- 
perience only,  have  marred  all  good  intentions.  The 
more  legislation  and  government  are  in  harmony  with 
that  idea,  the  rarer,  no  doubt,  punishments  would  become ; 
and  it  is  therefore  quite  rational  to  say  (as  Plato  did), 
that  in  a perfect  state  no  punishments  would  be  neces- 
sary. And  though  this  can  never  be  realised,  yet  the 
idea  is  quite  correct  which  sets  up  this  maximum  as  an 
archetype,  in  order  thus  to  bring  our  legislative  constitu- 
tions nearer  and  nearer  to  the  greatest  possible  perfection. 
Which  may  be  the  highest  degree  where  human  nature 
must  stop,  and  how  wide  the  chasm  may  be  between 
the  idea  and  its  realisation,  no  one  can  or  ought  to  deter- 
mine, because  it  is  this  very  freedom  that  may  be  able 
to  transcend  any  limits  hitherto  assigned  to  it. 

It  is  not  only,  however,  where  human  reason  asserts  its 
free  causality  and  ideas  become  operative  agents  (with 
regard  to  actions  and  their  objects),  that  is  to  say,  in 
the  sphere  of  ethics,  but  also  in  nature  itself,  that  Plato 
rightly  discovered  clear  proofs  of  its  origin  from  ideas. 
A plant,  an  animal,  the  regular  plan  of  the  cosmos  (most 
likely  therefore  the  whole  order  of  nature),  show  clearly 
that  they  are  possible  according  to  ideas  only;  [p.  318] 
and  that  though  no  single  creature,  under  the  singular 
conditions  of  its  existence,  can  fully  correspond  with  the 
idea  of  what  is  most  perfect  of  its  kind  (as  little  as  any 
individual  man  with  the  idea  of  humanity,  which,  for  all 
that,  he  carries  in  his  mind  as  the  archetype  of  all  his 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


259 


actions),  those  ideas  are  nevertheless  determined  through- 
out in  the  highest  understanding  each  by  itself  as  un- 
changeable, and  are  in  fact  the  original  causes  of  things, 
although  it  can  only  be  said  of  the  whole  of  them,  con- 
nected together  in  the  universe,  that  it  is  perfectly 
adequate  to  the  idea.  If  we  make  allowance  for  the 
exaggerated  expression,  the  effort  of  the  philosopher  to 
ascend  from  the  mere  observing  and  copying  of  the 
physical  side  of  nature  to  an  architectonic  system  of 
it,  teleologically,  that  is  according  to  ideas,  deserves  re- 
spect and  imitation,  while  with  regard  to  the  principles 
of  morality,  legislation,  and  religion,  where  it  is  the  ideas 
themselves  that  make  experience  of  the  good  possible, 
though  they  can  never  be  fully  realised  in  experience, 
such  efforts  are  of  very  eminent  merit,  which  those 
only  fail  to  recognise  who  attempt  to  judge  it  accord- 
ing to  empirical  rules,  the  very  validity  of  which,  as 
principles,  was  meant  to  be  denied  by  Plato.  With  re- 
gard to  nature,  it  is  experience  no  doubt  which  supplies 
us  with  rules,  and  is  the  foundation  of  all  truth  : with 
regard  to  moral  laws,  on  the  contrary,  experience  is,  alas ! 
but  the  source  of  illusion  ; and  it  is  altogether  reprehen- 
sible to  derive  or  limit  the  laws  of  what  we  [p.  319] 
ought  to  do  according  to  our  experience  of  what  has 
been  done. 

Instead  of  considering  these  subjects,  the  full  develop- 
ment of  which  constitutes  in  reality  the  peculiar  character 
and  dignity  of  philosophy,  we  have  to  occupy  ourselves 
at  present  with  a task  less  brilliant,  though  not  less  use- 
ful, of  building  and  strengthening  the  foundation  of  that 
majestic  edifice  of  morality,  which  at  present  is  under- 
mined by  all  sorts  of  mole-tracks,  the  work  of  our  reason, 


26o 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


which  thus  vainly,  but  always  with  the  same  confidence, 
is  searching  for  buried  treasures.  It  is  our  duty  at  pres- 
ent to  acquire  an  accurate  knowledge  of  the  transcenden- 
tal use  of  the  pure  reason,  its  principles  and  ideas,  in 
order  to  be  able  to  determine  and  estimate  correctly  their 
influence  and  value.  But  before  I leave  this  preliminary 
introduction,  I beg  those  who  really  care  for  philosophy 
(which  means  more  than  is  commonly  supposed),  if  they 
are  convinced  by  what  I have  said  and  shall  still  have  to 
say,  to  take  the  term  idea , in  its  original  meaning,  under 
their  special  protection,  so  that  it  should  no  longer  be  lost 
among  other  expressions,  by  which  all  sorts  of  representa- 
tions are  loosely  designated,  to  the  great  detriment  of 
philosophy.  There  is  no  lack  of  names  adequate  to 
express  every  kind  of  representation,  without  our  having 
to  encroach  on  the  property  of  others.  I shall  [p.  320] 
give  a graduated  list  of  them.  The  whole  class  may  be 
called  representation  ( repraesentatio ).  Under  it  stands  con- 
scious representation,  perception  ( perceptio ).  A perception 
referring  to  the  subject  only,  as  a modification  of  his  state, 
is  sensation  ( sensatio ),  while  an  objective  sensation  is 
called  knowledge , cognition  (cognitio).  Cognition  is  either 
intuition  or  concept  ( intuitus  vel  conceptus ).  The  former 
refers  immediately  to  an  object  and  is  singular,  the  latter 
refers  to  it  mediately,  that  is,  by  means  of  a characteristic 
mark  that  can  be  shared  by  several  things  in  common.  A 
concept  is  either  empirical  or  pure , and  the  pure  concept, 
so  far  as  it  has  its  origin  in  the  understanding  only  (not 
in  the  pure  image  of  sensibility)  is  called  notion  ( notio ). 
A concept  formed  of  notions  and  transcending  all  possible 
experience  is  an  idea , or  a concept  of  reason.  To  any  one 
who  has  once  accustomed  himself  to  these  distinctions,  it 


T ra ns c end, en ta l Dialectic 


261 


must  be  extremely  irksome  to  hear  the  representation  of 
red  colour  called  an  idea,  though  it  could  not  even  be 
rightly  called  a notion  (a  concept  of  the  understanding). 

TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC 

[p-  321] 

BOOK  I 
Second  Section 
Of  Transcendental  Ideas 

We  had  an  instance  in  our  transcendental  Analytic, 
how  the  mere  logical  form  of  our  knowledge  could  con- 
tain the  origin  of  pure  concepts  a priori,  which  represent 
objects  antecedently  to  all  experience,  or  rather  indicate 
a synthetical  unity  by  which  alone  an  empirical  knowledge 
of  objects  becomes  possible.  The  form  of  judgments 
(changed  into  a concept  of  the  synthesis  of  intuitions) 
gave  us  the  categories  that  guide  and  determine  the  use 
of  the  understanding  in  every  experience.  We  may  ex- 
pect, therefore,  that  the  form  of  the  syllogisms,  if  referred 
to  the  synthetical  unity  of  intuitions,  according  to  the 
manner  of  the  categories,  will  contain  the  origin  of  cer- 
tain concepts  a priori,  to  be  called  concepts  of  pure  reason, 
or  tra7iscendental  ideas,  which  ought  to  determine  the  use 
of  the  understanding  within  the  whole  realm  of  experience, 
according  to  principles. 

The  function  of  reason  in  its  syllogisms  consists  in  the 
universality  of  cognition,  according  to  concepts,  and  the 
syllogism  itself  is  in  reality  a judgment,  deter-  [p.  322] 
mined  a priori  in  the  whole  extent  of  its  condition.  The 


262 


Tratiscendental  Dialectic 


proposition  ‘ Caius  is  mortal,’  might  be  taken  from  experi 
ence,  by  means  of  the  understanding  only.  But  what  we 
want  is  a concept,  containing  the  condition  under  which 
the  predicate  (assertion  in  general)  of  that  judgment  is 
given  (here  the  concept  of  man),  and  after  I have  arranged 
it  under  this  condition,  taken  in  its  whole  extent  (all  men 
are  mortal),  I proceed  to  determine  accordingly  the  know- 
ledge of  my  object  (Caius  is  mortal). 

What  we  are  doing  therefore  in  the  conclusion  of  a syl- 
logism is  to  restrict  the  predicate  to  a certain  object,  after 
we  have  used  it  first  in  the  major,  in  its  whole  extent, 
under  a certain  condition.  This  completeness  of  its  ex- 
tent, in  reference  to  such  a condition,  is  called  universality 
( universalitas ) ; and  to  this  corresponds,  in  the  synthesis 
of  intuitions,  the  totality  ( universitas ) of  conditions.  The 
transcendental  concept  of  reason  is,  therefore,  nothing 
but  the  concept  of  the  totality  of  the  conditions  of  any- 
thing given  as  conditioned.  As  therefore  the  uncondi- 
tioned alone  renders  a totality  of  conditions  possible,  and 
as  conversely  the  totality  of  conditions  must  always  be 
unconditioned,  it  follows  that  a pure  concept  of  reason  in 
general  may  be  explained  as  a concept  of  the  uncondi- 
tioned, so  far  as  it  contains  a basis  for  the  synthesis  of 
the  conditioned. 

As  many  kinds  of  relations  as  there  are,  which  [p.  323] 
the  understanding  represents  to  itself  by  means  of  the 
categories,  so  many  pure  concepts  of  the  reason  we  shall 
find,  that  is,  first,  the  unconditioned  of  the  categorical  syn- 
thesis in  a subject ; secondly,  the  unconditioned  of  the 
hypothetical  synthesis  of  the  members  of  a series  ; thirdly, 
the  unconditioned  of  the  disjunctive  synthesis  of  the  parts 
of  a system. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


263 


There  are  exactly  as  many  kinds  of  syllogisms,  each  of 
which  tries  to  advance  by  means  of  pro-syllogisms  to  the 
unconditioned  : the  first  to  the  subject,  which  itself  is  no 
longer  a predicate ; the  second  to  the  presupposition, 
which  presupposes  nothing  else ; and  the  third  to  an 
aggregate  of  the  members  of  a division,  which  requires 
nothing  else,  in  order  to  render  the  division  of  the  concept 
complete.  Hence  the  pure  concepts  of  reason  implying 
totality  in  the  synthesis  of  the  conditions  are  necessary, 
at  least  as  problems,  in  order  to  carry  the  unity  of  the 
understanding  to  the  unconditioned,  if  that  is  possible, 
and  they  are  founded  in  the  nature  of  human  reason,  even 
though  these  transcendental  concepts  may  be  without  any 
proper  application  in  concreto , and  thus  have  no  utility 
beyond  bringing  the  understanding  into  a direction  where 
its  application,  being  extended  as  far  as  possible,  is  brought 
throughout  in  harmony  with  itself. 

Whilst  speaking  here  of  the  totality  of  condi-  [p.  324] 
tions,  and  of  the  unconditioned,  as  the  common  title  of 
all  the  concepts  of  reason,  we  again  meet  with  a term 
which  we  cannot  do  without,  but  which,  by  long  abuse, 
has  become  so  equivocal  that  we  cannot  employ  it  with 
safety.  The  term  absolute  is  one  of  those  few  words 
which,  in  their  original  meaning,  were  fitted  to  a concept, 
which  afterwards  could  not  be  exactly  fitted  with  any 
other  word  of  the  same  language,  and  the  loss  of  which, 
or  what  is  the  same,  the  loose  employment  of  which, 
entails  the  loss  of  the  concept  itself,  and  that  of  a concept 
with  which  reason  is  constantly  occupied,  and  cannot  dis- 
pense with  without  real  damage  to  all  transcendental  in- 
vestigations. At  present  the  term  absolute  is  frequently 
used  simply  in  order  to  indicate  that  something  applies 


204 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


i 


to  an  object,  considered  in  itself,  and  thus  as  it  were  inter- 
nally. In  this  way  absolutely  possible  would  mean  that 
something  is  possible  in  itself  (interne),  which  in  reality 
is  the  least  that  could  be  said  of  it.  It  is  sometimes 
used  also  to  indicate  that  something  is  valid  in  all 
respects  (without  limitation),  as  people  speak  of  absolute 
sovereignty.  In  this  way  absolutely  possible  would  mean 
that  which  is  possible  in  all  respects,  and  this  is  again 
the  utmost  that  could  be  said  of  the  possibility  of  a 
thing.  It  is  true  that  these  two  significations  [p.  325] 
sometimes  coincide,  because  something  that  is  internally 
impossible  is  impossible  also  in  every  respect,  and  there- 
fore absolutely  impossible.  But  in  most  cases  they  are 
far  apart,  and  I am  by  no  means  justified  in  concluding 
that,  because  something  is  possible  in  itself,  it  is  possible 
also  in  every  respect,  that  is,  absolutely  possible.  Nay, 
with  regard  to  absolute  necessity,  I shall  be  able  to  show 
hereafter  that  it  by  no  means  always  depends  on  internal 
necessity,  and  that  the  two  cannot  therefore  be  considered 
synonymous.  No  doubt,  if  the  opposite  of  a thing  is  in- 
trinsically impossible,  that  opposite  is  also  impossible  in 
every  respect,  and  the  thing  itself  therefore  absolutely 
necessary.  But  I cannot  conclude  conversely,  that  the 
opposite  of  what  is  absolutely  necessary  is  internally 
impossible,  or  that  the  absolute  necessity  of  things  is 
the  same  as  an  internal  necessity.  For  in  certain  cases 
that  internal  necessity  is  an  entirely  empty  expression, 
with  which  we  cannot  connect  the  least  concept,  while 
that  of  the  necessity  of  a thing  in  every  respect  (with 
regard  to  all  that  is  possible)  implies  very  peculiar  deter- 


minations. As  therefore  the  loss  of  a concept  which  has 
acted  a great  part  in  speculative  philosophy  can  never 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


265 


be  indifferent  to  philosophers,  I hope  they  will  also  take 
some  interest  in  the  definition  and  careful  preservation  of 
the  term  with  which  that  concept  is  connected. 

I shall  therefore  use  the  term  absolute  in  this  [p.  326] 
enlarged  meaning  only,  in  opposition  to  that  which  is 
valid  relatively  and  in  particular  respects  only,  the  latter 
being  restricted  to  conditions,  the  former  free  from  any 
restrictions  whatsoever. 

It  is  then  the  absolute  totality  in  the  synthesis  of 
conditions  at  which  the  transcendental  concept  of  reason 
aims,  nor  does  it  rest  satisfied  till  it  has  reached  that 
which  is  unconditioned  absolutely  and  in  every  respect. 
Pure  reason  leaves  everything  to  the  understanding,  which 
has  primarily  to  do  with  the  objects  of  intuition,  or  rather 
their  synthesis  in  imagination.  It  is  only  the  absolute 
totality  in  the  use  of  the  concepts  of  the  understanding, 
which  reason  reserves  for  itself,  while  trying  to  carry 
the  synthetical  unity,  which  is  realised  in  the  category, 
to  the  absolutely  unconditioned.  We  might  therefore 
call  the  latter  the  unity  of  the  phenomena  in  reason, 
the  former,  which  is  expressed  by  the  category,  the 
unity  in  the  understanding.  Hence  reason  is  only  con- 
cerned with  the  use  of  the  understanding,  not  so  far  as 
it  contains  the  basis  of  possible  experience  (for  the  abso- 
lute totality  of  conditions  is  not  a concept  that  can  be 
used  in  experience,  because  no  experience  is  uncondi- 
tioned), but  in  order  to  impart  to  it  a direction  towards 
a certain  unity  of  which  the  understanding  knows  nothing, 
and  which  is  meant  to  comprehend  all  acts  of  the  under- 
standing, with  regard  to  any  object,  into  an  [p.  327] 
absolute  whole.  On  this  account  the  objective  use  of 
the  pure  concepts  of  reason  must  always  be  transcendent: 


266 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


while  that  of  the  pure  concepts  of  the  understanding 
must  always  be  immanent , being  by  its  very  nature 
restricted  to  possible  experience. 

By  idea  I understand  the  necessary  concept  of  reason, 
to  which  the  senses  can  supply  no  corresponding  object. 
The  concepts  of  reason,  therefore,  of  which  we  have  been 
speaking,  are  transcendental  ideas.  They  are  concepts  of 
pure  reason,  so  far  as  they  regard  all  empirical  knowledge 
as  determined  by  an  absolute  totality  of  conditions.  They 
are  not  mere  fancies,  but  supplied  to  us  by  the  very 
nature  of  reason,  and  referring  by  necessity  to  the  whole 
use  of  the  understanding.  They  are,  lastly,  transcendent, 
as  overstepping  the  limits  of  all  experience  which  can 
never  supply  an  object  adequate  to  the  transcendental  idea. 
If  we  speak  of  an  idea,  we  say  a great  deal  with  respect  to 
the  object  (as  the  object  of  the  pure  understanding)  but 
very  little  with  respect  to  the  subject,  that  is,  with  respect 
to  its  reality  under  empirical  conditions,  because  an  idea, 
being  the  concept  of  a maximum,  can  never  be  adequately 
given  in  concreto.  As  the  latter  is  really  the  whole  aim 
in  the  merely  speculative  use  of  reason,  and  as  [p.  328] 
the  mere  approaching  a concept,  which  in  reality  can 
never  be  reached,  is  the  same  as  if  the  concept  were 
missed  altogether,  people,  when  speaking  of  such  a con- 
cept, are  wont  to  say,  it  is  an  idea  only.  Thus  one  might 
say,  that  the  absolute  whole  of  all  phenomena  is  an  idea 
only,  for  as  we  can  never  form  a representation  of  such  a 
whole,  it  remains  a problem  without  a solution.  In  the 
practical  use  of  the  understanding,  on  the  contrary,  where 
we  are  only  concerned  with  practice,  according  to  rules, 
the  idea  of  practical  reason  can  always  be  realised  in  con- 
creto, although  partially  only ; nay,  it  is  the  indispensable 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


267 


condition  of  all  practical  use  of  reason.  The  practical 
realisation  of  the  idea  is  here  always  limited  and  deficient, 
but  these  limits  cannot  be  defined,  and  it  always  remains 
under  the  influence  of  a concept,  implying  absolute  com- 
pleteness and  perfection.  The  practical  idea  is  therefore 
in  this  case  truly  fruitful,  and,  with  regard  to  practical 
conduct,  indispensable  and  necessary.  In  it  pure  reason 
becomes  a cause  and  active  power,  capable  of  realising 
what  is  contained  in  its  concept.  Hence  we  cannot  say 
of  wisdom,  as  if  contemptuously,  that  it  is  an  idea  only, 
but  for  the  very  reason  that  it  contains  the  idea  of  the 
necessary  unity  of  all  possible  aims,  it  must  determine 
all  practical  acts,  as  an  original  and,  at  least,  limitative 
condition. 

Although  we  must  say  that  all  transcendental  [p.  329] 
concepts  of  reason  are  ideas  only,  they  are  not  therefore 
to  be  considered  as  superfluous  and  useless.  For  although 
we  cannot  by  them  determine  any  object,  they  may  never- 
theless, even  unobserved,  supply  the  understanding  with  a 
canon  or  rule  of  its  extended  and  consistent  use,  by  which, 
though  no  object  can  be  better  known  than  it  is  accord- 
ing to  its  concepts,  yet  the  understanding  may  be  better 
guided  onwards  in  its  knowledge,  not  to  mention  that 
they  may  possibly  render  practicable  a transition  from 
physical  to  practical  concepts,  and  thus  impart  to  moral 
ideas  a certain  strength  and  connection  with  the  specu- 
lative knowledge  of  reason.  On  all  this  more  light  will 
ae  thrown  in  the  sequel. 

For  our  present  purposes  we  are  obliged  to  set  aside 
i consideration  of  these  practical  ideas,  and  to  treat  of 
•eason  in  its  speculative,  or  rather,  in  a still  more  limited 
sense,  its  purely  transcendental  use.  Here  we  must  fol- 


268 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


low  the  same  road  which  we  took  before  in  the  deduction 
of  the  categories  ; that  is,  we  must  consider  the  logical 
form  of  all  knowledge  of  reason,  and  see  whether,  per- 
haps, by  this  logical  form,  reason  may  become  a source 
of  concepts  also,  which  enable  us  to  regard  objects  in 
themselves,  as  determined  synthetically  a priori  in  rela- 
tion to  one  or  other  of  the  functions  of  reason. 

Reason,  if  considered  as  a faculty  of  a certain  [p.  330] 
logical  form  of  knowledge,  is  the  faculty  of  concluding, 
that  is,  of  judging  mediately,  by  bringing  the  condition 
of  a possible  under  the  condition  of  a given  judgment. 
The  given  judgment  is  the  general  rule  (major).  Bring- 
ing the  condition  of  another  possible  judgment  under  the 
condition  of  the  rule,  which  may  be  called  subsumption, 
is  the  minor , and  the  actual  judgment,  which  contains  the 
assertion  of  the  rule  in  the  subsumed  case,  is  the  conclu- 
sion. We  know  that  the  rule  asserts  something  as  gen- 
eral under  a certain  condition.  The  condition  of  the  rule 
is  then  found  to  exist  in  a given  case.  Then  that  which, 
under  that  condition,  was  asserted  as  generally  valid,  has 
to  be  considered  as  valid  in  that  given  case  also,  which 
complies  with  that  condition.  It  is  easy  to  see  therefore 
that  reason  arrives  at  knowledge  by  acts  of  the  under- 
standing, which  constitute  a series  of  conditions.  If  I 
arrive  at  the  proposition  that  all  bodies  are  changeable, 
only  by  starting  from  a more  remote  knowledge  (which 
does  not  yet  contain  the  concept  of  body,  but  a condition 
of  such  a concept  only),  namely,  that  all  which  is  com- 
posite is  changeable;  and  then  proceed  to  something  less 
remotely  known,  and  depending  on  the  former,  namely, 
that  bodies  are  composite  ; and,  lastly,  only  advance  to  a 
third  proposition,  connecting  the  more  remote  knowledge 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


269 


(changeable)  with  the  given  case,  and  conclude  that  bodies 
therefore  are  changeable,  we  see  that  we  have  [p.  331] 
passed  through  a series  of  conditions  (premisses)  before 
we  arrived  at  knowledge  (conclusion).  Every  series,  the 
exponent  of  which  (whether  of  a categorical  or  hypothet- 
ical judgment)  is  given,  can  be  continued,  so  that  this 
procedure  of  reason  leads  to  ratiocinatio  polysyllogistica, 
a series  of  conclusions  which,  either  on  the  side  of  the 
conditions  {per  prosyllogismos ) or  of  the  conditioned  {per 
episyllogismos ),  may  be  continued  indefinitely. 

It  is  soon  perceived,  however,  that  the  chain  or  series 
of  prosyllogisms,  that  is,  of  knowledge  deduced  on  the 
side  of  reasons  or  conditions  of  a given  knowledge,  in 
other  words,  the  ascending  series  of  syllogisms,  must  stand 
in  a very  different  relation  to  the  faculty  of  reason  from 
that  of  the  descendwg  series,  that  is,  of  the  progress  of 
reason  on  the  side  of  the  conditioned,  by  means  of  episyl- 
logisms.  For,  as  in  the  former  case  the  knowledge  em- 
bodied in  the  conclusion  is  given  as  conditioned  only,  it 
is  impossible  to  arrive  at  it  by  means  of  reason  in  any 
other  way  except  under  the  supposition  at  least  that  all 
the  members  of  the  series  on  the  side  of  the  conditions 
are  given  (totality  in  the  series  of  premisses),  because  it 
is  under  that  supposition  only  that  the  contemplated  judg- 
ment a priori  is  possible  ; while  on  the  side  of  the  condi- 
tioned, or  of  the  inferences,  we  can  only  think  [p.  332] 
of  a growing  series,  not  of  one  presupposed  as  complete 
or  given,  that  is,  of  a potential  progression  only.  Hence, 
when  our  knowledge  is  considered  as  conditioned,  reason 
is  constrained  to  look  upon  the  series  of  conditions  in  the 
ascending  line  as  complete,  and  given  in  their  totality. 
But  if  the  same  knowledge  is  looked  upon  at  the  same 


2,70 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


time  as  a condition  of  other  kinds  of  knowledge,  which 
constitute  among  themselves  a series  of  inferences  in  a 
descending  line,  it  is  indifferent  to  reason  how  far  that 
progression  may  go  a parte  posteriori , or  whether  a total 
ity  of  the  series  is  possible  at  all,  because  such  a series 
is  not  required  for  the  conclusion  in  hand,  which  is  suffi- 
ciently determined  and  secured  on  grounds  a parte  priori. 
Whether  the  series  of  premisses  on  the  side  of  the  con- 
ditions have  a something  that  stands  first  as  the  highest 
condition,  or  whether  it  be  without  limits  a parte  priori , 
it  must  at  all  events  contain  a totality  of  conditions,  even 
though  we  should  never  succeed  in  comprehending  it ; 
and  the  whole  series  must  be  unconditionally  true,  if  the 
conditioned,  which  is  considered  as  a consequence  result- 
ing from  it,  is  to  be  accepted  as  true.  This  is  a demand 
of  reason  which  pronounces  its  knowledge  as  determined 
a priori  and  as  necessary,  either  in  itself,  and  in  that  case 
it  requires  no  reasons,  or,  if  derivative,  as  a member  of  a 
series  of  reasons,  which  itself  is  unconditionally  true. 


TRANSCENDENTAL 

[P-  333] 


DIALECTIC 


BOOK  I 
Third  Section 


System  of  Transcendental  Ideas 


We  are  not  at  present  concerned  with  logical  Dialectic, 
which  takes  no  account  of  the  contents  of  knowledge,  and 
has  only  to  lay  bare  the  illusions  in  the  form  of  syllogisms, 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


271 


but  with  transcendental  Dialectic,  which  is  supposed  to 
contain  entirely  a priori  the  origin  of  certain  kinds  of 
knowledge,  arising  from  pure  reason,  and  of  certain  de- 
duced concepts,  the  object  of  which  can  never  be  given 
empirically,  and  which  therefore  lie  entirely  outside  the 
domain  of  the  pure  understanding.  We  gathered  from 
the  natural  relation  which  must  exist  between  the  tran- 
scendental and  the  logical  use  of  our  knowledge,  in 
syllogisms  as  well  as  in  judgments,  that  there  must  be 
three  kinds  of  dialectic  syllogisms,  and  no  more,  corre- 
sponding to  the  three  kinds  of  conclusion  by  which  reason 
may  from  principles  arrive  at  knowledge,  and  that  in  all  of 
these  it  is  the  object  of  reason  to  ascend  from  the  condi- 
tioned synthesis,  to  which  the  understanding  is  always 
restricted,  to  an  unconditioned  synthesis,  which  the  under- 
standing can  never  reach. 

The  relations  which  all  our  representations  share  in 
common  are,  1st,  relation  to  the  subject;  2ndly,  the  rela- 
tion to  objects,  either  as  phenomena,  or  as  ob-  [p.  334] 
jects  of  thought  in  general.  If  we  connect  this  subdivi- 
sion with  the  former  division,  we  see  that  the  relation  of 
the  representations  of  which  we  can  form  a concept  or  an 
idea  can  only  be  threefold  : 1st,  the  relation  to  the  sub- 
ject ; 2ndly,  the  relation  to  the  manifold  of  the  phenom- 
enal object ; 3rdly,  the  relation  to  all  things  in  general. 

All  pure  concepts  in  general  aim  at  a synthetical  unity 
of  representations,  while  concepts  of  pure  reason  (tran- 
scendental ideas)  aim  at  unconditioned  synthetical  unity 
of  all  conditions.  All  transcendental  ideas  therefore  can 
be  arranged  in  three  classes : the  first  containing  the 
absolute  (unconditioned)  unity  of  the  thinking  subject ; the 
second  the  absolute  unity  of  the  series  of  conditions  of 


272  Transcendental  Dialectic 

phenomena ; the  third  the  absolute  unity  of  the  condition 
of  all  objects  of  thought  in  general. 

The  thinking  subject  is  the  object -matter  of  psychology, 
the  system  of  all  phenomena  (the  world)  the  object-matter 
of  cosmology,  and  the  being  which  contains  the  highest 
condition  of  the  possibility  of  all  that  can  be  thought  (the 
Being  of  all  beings),  the  object-matter  of  theology.  Thus 
it  is  pure  reason  which  supplies  the  idea  of  a transcen- 
dental science  of  the  soul  {psychologia  rationalis),  of  a tran- 
scendental science  of  the  world  {cosmologia  rationalis ), 
and,  lastly,  of  a transcendental  science  of  God  ( theologia 
transcendentalis).  Even  the  mere  plan  of  any  [p.  335] 
one  of  these  three  sciences  does  not  come  from  the  under- 
standing, even  if  connected  with  the  highest  logical  use  of 
reason,  that  is,  with  all  possible  conclusions,  leading  from 
one  of  its  objects  (phenomenon)  to  all  others,  and  on  to 
the  most  remote  parts  of  any  possible  empirical  synthesis, 
— but  is  altogether  a pure  and  genuine  product  or  rather 
problem  of  pure  reason. 

What  kinds  of  pure  concepts  of  reason  are  comprehended 
under  these  three  titles  of  all  transcendental  ideas  will  be 
fully  explained  in  the  following  chapter.  They  follow  the 
thread  of  the  categories,  for  pure  reason  never  refers 
direct  to  objects,  but  to  the  concepts  of  objects  framed  by 
the  understanding.  Nor  can  it  be  rendered  clear,  except 
hereafter  in  a detailed  explanation,  how  first,  reason 
simply  by  the  synthetical  use  of  the  same  function  which 
it  employs  for  categorical  syllogisms  is  necessarily  led  on 
to  the  concept  of  the  absolute  unity  of  the  thinking  sub- 
ject ; secondly,  how  the  logical  procedure  in  hypothetical 
syllogisms  leads  to  the  idea  of  something  absolutely  uncon- 
ditioned, in  a series  of  given  conditions,  and  how,  thirdly, 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


273 


the  mere  form  of  the  disjunctive  syllogism  produces 
necessarily  the  highest  concept  of  reason,  that  of  a Being 
of  all  beings ; a thought  which,  at  first  sight,  seems 
extremely  paradoxical.  [p.  336] 

No  objective  deduction,  like  that  given  of  the  categories, 
is  possible  with  regard  to  these  transcendental  ideas ; 
they  are  ideas  only,  and  for  that  very  reason  they  have  no 
relation  to  any  object  corresponding  to  them  in  experi- 
ence. What  we  could  undertake  to  give  was  a subjective 
deduction  1 of  them  from  the  nature  of  reason,  and  this 
has  been  given  in  the  present  chapter. 

We  can  easily  perceive  that  pure  reason  has  no  other 
aim  but  the  absolute  totality  of  synthesis  on  the  side  of 
conditions  (whether  of  inherence,  dependence,  or  concur- 
rence), and  that  it  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  absolute 
completeness  on  the  part  of  the  conditio7ied.  It  is  the 
former  only  which  is  required  for  presupposing  the  whole 
series  of  conditions,  and  thus  presenting  it  a priori  to  the 
understanding.  If  once  we  have  a given  condition,  com- 
plete and  unconditioned  itself,  no  concept  of  reason  is 
required  to  continue  the  series,  because  the  understanding 
takes  by  itself  every  step  downward  from  the  condition  to 
the  conditioned.  The  transcendental  ideas  therefore  serve 
only  for  ascending  in  the  series  of  conditions  till  they 
reach  the  unconditioned,  that  is,  the  principles.  With 
regard  to  descending  to  the  conditioned,  there  is  no  doubt 
a widely  extended  logical  use  which  our  reason  [p.  337] 
may  make  of  the  rules  of  the  understanding,  but  no  tran- 
scendental one  ; and  if  we  form  an  idea  of  the  absolute 
totality  of  such  a synthesis  (by  progressus),  as,  for 

1 Instead  of  Anleitung  read  Ableitung. 

T 


274 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


instance,  of  the  whole  series  of  all  future  changes  in  the 
world,  this  is  only  a thought  ( ens  rationis)  that  may  be 
thought  if  we  like,  but  is  not  presupposed  as  necessary  by 
reason.  For  the  possibility  of  the  conditioned,  the  totality 
of  its  conditions  only,  but  not  of  its  consequences,  is  pre- 
supposed. Such  a concept  therefore  is  not  one  of  the 
transcendental  ideas,  with  which  alone  we  have  to  deal. 

Finally,  we  can  perceive,  that  there  is  among  the  tran- 
scendental ideas  themselves  a certain  connection  and 
unity  by  which  pure  reason  brings  all  its  knowledge  into 
one  system.  There  is  in  the  progression  from  our  know- 
ledge of  ourselves  (the  soul)  to  a knowledge  of  the  world, 
and  through  it  to  a knowledge  of  the  Supreme  Being, 
something  so  natural  that  it  looks  like  the  logical  progres- 
sion of  reason  from  premisses  to  a conclusion.1  Whether 
there  exists  here  a real  though  hidden  relationship,  such 
as  we  saw  before  between  the  logical  and  transcendental 
use  of  reason,  is  also  one  of  the  questions  the  answer  to 
which  can  only  be  given  in  the  progress  of  these  investi- 
gations. For  the  present  we  have  achieved  what  we 
wished  to  achieve,  by  removing  the  transcen-  [p.  338] 
dental  concepts  of  reason,  which  in  the  systems  of  other 
philosophers  are  generally  mixed  up  with  other  concepts, 
without  being  distinguished  even  from  the  concepts  of  the 
understanding,  out  of  so  equivocal  a position  ; by  being 
able  to  determine  their  origin  and  thereby  at  the  same 
time  their  number,  which  can  never  be  exceeded,  and  by 
thus  bringing  them  into  a systematic  connection,  marking 
out  and  enclosing  thereby  a separate  field  for  pure  reason. 


1 See  Supplement  XXVI. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC 


BOOK  II 

OF  THE  DIALECTICAL  CONCLUSIONS  OF  PURE  REASON 

One  may  say  that  the  object  of  a purely  transcendental 
idea  is  something  of  which  we  have  no  concept,  although 
the  idea  is  produced  with  necessity  according  to  the  origi- 
nal laws  of  reason.  Nor  is  it  possible  indeed  to  form  of  an 
object  that  should  be  adequate  to  the  demands  of  reason, 
a concept  of  the  understanding,  that  is,  a concept  which 
could  be  shown  in  any  possible  experience,  and  rendered 
intuitive.  It  would  be  better,  however,  and  less  [p.  339] 
liable  to  misunderstandings,  to  say  that  we  can  have  no 
knowledge  of  an  object  corresponding  to  an  idea,  but  a 
problematic  concept  only. 

The  transcendental  (subjective)  reality,  at  least  of  pure 
concepts  of  reason,  depends  on  our  being  led  to  such  ideas 
by  a necessary  syllogism  of  reason.  There  will  be  syllo- 
gisms therefore  which  have  no  empirical  premisses,  and 
by  means  of  which  we  conclude  from  something  which  we 
know  to  something  else  of  which  we  have  no  concept,  and 
to  which,  constrained  by  an  inevitable  illusion,  we  never- 
theless attribute  objective  reality.  As  regards  their  result, 

275 


276 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


such  syllogisms  are  rather  to  be  called  sophistical  tnan 
rational,  although,  as  regards  their  origin,  they  may  claim 
the  latter  name,  because  they  are  not  purely  fictitious  or 
accidental,  but  products  of  the  very  nature  of  reason. 
They  are  sophistications,  not  of  men,  but  of  pure  reason 
itself,  from  which  even  the  wisest  of  men  cannot  escape. 
All  he  can  do  is,  with  great  effort,  to  guard  against  error, 
though  never  able  to  rid  himself  completely  of  an  illusion 
which  constantly  torments  and  mocks  him. 

Of  these  dialectical  syllogisms  of  reason  there  are  there- 
fore three  classes  only,  that  is  as  many  as  the  ideas  to 
which  their  conclusions  lead.  In  the  syllogism  [p.  340] 
of  the  first  class,  I conclude  from  the  transcendental  con- 
cept of  the  subject,  which  contains  nothing  manifold,  the 
absolute  unity  of  the  subject  itself,  of  which  however  I 
have  no  concept  in  this  regard.  This  dialectical  syllogism 
I shall  call  the  transcendental  pai-alogism. 

The  second  class  of  the  so-called  sophistical  syllogisms 
aims  at  the  transcendental  concept  of  an  absolute  totality 
in  the  series  of  conditions  to  any  given  phenomenon  ; and 
I conclude  from  the  fact  that  my  concept  of  the  uncon- 
ditioned synthetical  unity  of  the  series  is  always  self- 
contradictory on  one  side,  the  correctness  of  the  opposite 
unity,  of  which  nevertheless  I have  no  concept  either. 
The  state  of  reason  in  this  class  of  dialectical  syllogisms, 
I shall  call  the  antinomy  of  pure  reason. 

Lastly,  according  to  the  third  class  of  sophistical  syl- 
logisms, I conclude  from  the  totality  of  conditions,  under 
which  objects  in  general,  so  far  as  they  can  be  given  to  me, 
must  be  thought,  the  absolute  synthetical  unity  of  all  con- 
ditions of  the  possibility  of  things  in  general ; that  is  to 
say,  I conclude  from  things  which  I do  not  know  accord- 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


277 


ing  to  their  mere  transcendental 1 concept,  a Being  of  al 
beings,  which  I know  still  less  through  a transcendental 
concept,  and  of  the  unconditioned  necessity  of  which  I 
can  form  no  concept  whatever.  This  dialectical  syllogism 
of  reason  I shall  call  the  ideal  of  pure  reason. 


1 Transcendent  is  a misprint. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC 

[p-  341] 


BOOK  II 

CHAPTER  I 

OF  THE  PARALOGISMS  OF  PURE  REASON 

The  logical  paralogism  consists  in  the  formal  faulti- 
ness of  a conclusion,  without  any  reference  to  its  con- 
tents. But  a transcendental  paralogism  arises  from  a 
transcendental  cause,  which  drives  us  to  a formally  false 
conclusion.  Such  a paralogism,  therefore,  depends  most 
likely  on  the  very  nature  of  human  reason,  and  produces 
an  illusion  which  is  inevitable,  though  not  insoluble. 

We  now  come  to  a concept  which  was  not  inserted  in 
our  general  list  of  transcendental  concepts,  and  yet  must 
be  reckoned  with  them,  without  however  changing  that 
table  in  the  least,  or  proving  it  to  be  deficient.  This  is 
the  concept,  or,  if  the  term  is  preferred,  the  judgment, 
/ think.  It  is  easily  seen,  however,  that  this  concept  is 
the  vehicle  of  all  concepts  in  general,  therefore  of  transcen- 
dental concepts  also,  being  always  comprehended  among 
them,  and  being  itself  transcendental  also,  though  with- 
out any  claim  to  a special  title,  inasmuch  as  it  serves 
only  to  introduce  all  thought,  as  belonging  to  conscious- 

278 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


279 


ness.  However  free  that  concept  may  be  from  all  that 
is  empirical  (impressions  of  the  senses),  it  serves  [p.  342] 
nevertheless  to  distinguish  two  objects  within  the  nature 
of  our  faculty  of  representation.  /,  as  thinking,  am  an 
object  of  the  internal  sense,  and  am  called  soul.  That 
which  is  an  object  of  the  external  senses  is  called  body. 
The  term  /,  as  a thinking  being,  signifies  the  object  of 
psychology,  which  may  be  called  the  rational  science  of 
the  soul,  supposing  that  we  want  to  know  nothing  about 
the  soul  except  what,  independent  of  all  experience  (which 
determines  the  I more  especially  and  in  concreto ),  can  be 
deduced  from  the  concept  of  I,  so  far  as  it  is  present  in 
every  act  of  thought. 

Now  the  rational  science  of  the  soul  is  really  such  an 
undertaking ; for  if  the  smallest  empirical  element  of  my 
thought  or  any  particular  perception  of  my  internal  state 
were  mixed  up  with  the  sources  from  which  that  science 
derives  its  materials,  it  would  be  an  empirical,  and  no 
longer  a purely  rational  science  of  the  soul.  There  is 
therefore  a pretended  science,  founded  on  the  single  propo- 
sition of  I think , and  the  soundness  or  unsoundness  of 
which  may  well  be  examined  in  this  place,  according  to 
the  principles  of  transcendental  philosophy.  It  should 
not  be  objected  that  even  in  that  proposition,  which  ex- 
presses the  perception  of  oneself,  I have  an  internal 
experience,  and  that  therefore  the  rational  science  of  the 
soul,  which  is  founded  on  it,  can  never  be  quite  [p.  343] 
pure,  but  rests,  to  a certain  extent,  on  an  empirical  prin- 
ciple. For  this  inner  perception  is  nothing  more  than 
the  mere  apperception,  I think , without  which  even  all 
transcendental  concepts  would  be  impossible,  in  which 
we  really  say,  I think  the  substance,  I think  the  cause, 


28o 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


etc.  This  internal  experience  in  general  and  its  pos 
sibility,  or  perception  in  general  and  its  relation  to  other 
perceptions,  there  being  no  special  distinction  or  em- 
pirical determination  of  it,  cannot  be  regarded  as  em- 
pirical knowledge,  but  must  be  regarded  as  knowledge 
of  the  empirical  in  general,  and  falls  therefore  under 
the  investigation  of  the  possibility  of  all  experience,  which 
investigation  is  certainly  transcendental.  The  smallest 
object  of  perception  (even  pleasure  and  pain),  if  added 
to  the  general  representation  of  self-consciousness,  would 
at  once  change  rational  into  empirical  psychology. 

I think  is,  therefore,  the  only  text  of  rational  psychology, 
out  of  which  it  must  evolve  all  its  wisdom.  It  is  easily 
seen  that  this  thought,  if  it  is  to  be  applied  to  any  object 
(my  self),  cannot  contain  any  but  transcendental  predi- 
cates, because  the  smallest  empirical  predicate  would 
spoil  the  rational  purity  of  the  science,  and  its  indepen- 
dence of  all  experience. 

We  shall  therefore  follow  the  thread  of  the  [p.  344] 
categories,  with  this  difference,  however,  that  as  here  the 
first  thing  which  is  given  is  a thing,  the  I,  a thinking 
being,  we  must  begin  with  the  category  of  substance,  by 
which  a thing  in  itself  is  represented,  and  then  proceed 
backwards,  though  without  changing  the  respective  order 
of  the  categories,  as  given  before  in  our  table.  The 
topic  of  the  rational  science  of  the  soul,  from  which  has 
to  be  derived  whatever  else  that  science  may  contain, 
is  therefore  the  following. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


281 
I 

The  Soul  is  substance. 

II  III 

As  regards  its  quality,  simple.  As  regards  the  different 

times  in  which  it  exists, 
numerically  identical,  that 
is  unity  (not  plurality). 

IV 

It  is  in  relation  to 
possible  objects  in  space.1 

All  concepts  of  pure  psychology  arise  from  [p.  345] 
these  elements,  simply  by  way  of  combination,  and  with- 
out the  admixture  of  any  other  principle.  This  sub- 
stance, taken  simply  as  the  object  of  the  internal  sense, 
gives  us  the  concept  of  immateriality ; and  as  simple 
substance,  that  of  incorruptibility ; its  identity,  as  that 
of  an  intellectual  substance,  gives  us  personality ; and 
all  these  three  together,  spirituality;  its  relation  to 
objects  in  space  gives  us  the  concept  of  commercium 
(intercourse)  with  bodies ; the  pure  psychology  thus  rep- 
resenting the  thinking  substance  as  the  principle  of 
life  in  matter,  that  is,  as  soul  (anima),  and  as  the  ground 
of  animality ; which  again,  as  restricted  by  spirituality, 
gives  us  the  concept  of  immortality. 

To  these  concepts  refer  four  paralogisms  of  a transcen- 

1 The  reader,  who  may  not  guess  at  once  the  psychological  purport  of  these 
transcendental  and  abstract  terms,  or  understand  why  the  latter  attribute  of 
the  soul  belongs  to  the  category  of  existence,  will  find  their  full  explanation 
and  justification  in  the  sequel.  Moreover,  I have  to  apologise  for  the  many 
Latin  expressions  which,  contrary  to  good  taste,  have  crept  in  instead  of  their 
native  equivalents,  not  only  here,  but  throughout  the  whole  of  the  work.  My 
only  excuse  is,  that  I thought  it  better  to  sacrifice  something  of  the  elegance 
of  language,  rather  than  to  throw  any  impediments  in  the  way  of  real  students, 
by  the  use  of  inaccurate  and  obscure  expressions. 


28  2 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


dental  psychology,  which  is  falsely  supposed  to  be  a 
science  of  pure  reason,  concerning  the  nature  of  our 
thinking  being.  We  can,  however,  use  as  the  foundation 
of  such  a science  nothing  but  the  single,  and  in  itself  per- 
fectly empty,  representation  of  the  /,  of  which  [p.  346] 
we  cannot  even  say  that  it  is  a concept,  but  merely  a 
consciousness  that  accompanies  all  concepts.  By  this  /, 
or  he,  or  it  (the  thing),  which  thinks,  nothing  is  repre- 
sented beyond  a transcendental  subject  of  thoughts  = x, 
which  is  known  only  through  the  thoughts  that  are  its 
predicates,  and  of  which,  apart  from  them,  we  can  never 
have  the  slightest  concept,  so  that  we  are  really  turning 
round  it  in  a perpetual  circle,  having  already  to  use  its 
representation,  before  we  can  form  any  judgment  about  it. 
And  this  inconvenience  is  really  inevitable,  because  con- 
sciousness in  itself  is  not  so  much  a representation,  dis- 
tinguishing a particular  object,  but  really  a form  of  repre- 
sentation in  general,  in  so  far  as  it  is  to  be  called 
knowledge,  of  which  alone  I can  say  that  I think  some- 
thing by  it. 

It  must  seem  strange,  however,  from  the  very  begin- 
ning, that  the  condition  under  which  I think,  and  which 
therefore  is  a property  of  my  own  subject  only,  should  be 
valid  at  the  same  time  for  everything  which  thinks,  and 
that,  depending  on  a proposition  which  seems  to  be  em- 
pirical, we  should  venture  to  found  the  apodictical  and 
general  judgment,  namely,  that  everything  which  thinks 
is  such  as  the  voice  of  my  own  consciousness  declares  it 
to  be  within  me.  The  reason  of  it  is,  that  we  are  con- 
strained to  attribute  a priori  to  things  all  the  qualities 
which  form  the  conditions,  under  which  alone  [p.  347] 
we  are  able  to  think  them.  Now  it  is  impossible  for  me 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


283 


to  form  the  smallest  representation  of  a thinking  being  by 
any  external  experience,  but  I can  do  it  through  self-con- 
sciousness only.  Such  objects  therefore  are  nothing  but 
a transference  of  my  own  consciousness  to  other  things, 
which  thus,  and  thus  only,  can  be  represented  as  thinking 
beings.  The  proposition  / thitik  is  used  in  this  case,  how- 
ever, as  problematical  only ; not  so  far  as  it  may  contain 
the  perception  of  an  existence  (the  Cartesian,  cogito,  ergo 
sum),  but  with  regard  to  its  mere  possibility,  in  order  to 
see  what  properties  may  be  deduced  from  such  a simple 
proposition  with  regard  to  its  subject,  whether  such  sub- 
ject exists  or  not. 

If  our  knowledge  of  thinking  beings  in  general,  so  far 
as  it  is  derived  from  pure  reason,  were  founded  on  more 
than  the  cogito,  and  if  we  made  use  at  the  same  time  of 
observations  on  the  play  of  our  thoughts  and  the  natural 
laws  of  the  thinking  self,  derived  from  them,  we  should 
have  before  us  an  empirical  psychology,  which  would  form 
a kind  of  physiology  of  the  internal  sense,  and  perhaps  ex- 
plain its  manifestations,  but  would  never  help  us  to  under- 
stand such  properties  as  do  not  fall  under  any  possible 
experience  (as,  for  instance,  simplicity),  or  to  teach  apodic- 
tically  anything  touching  the  nature  of  thinking  beings  in 
general.  It  would  not  therefore  be  a rational  psychology. 

As  the  proposition  I think  (taken  problemati-  [p.  348] 
cally)  contains  the  form  of  every  possible  judgment  of  the 
understanding,  and  accompanies  all  categories  as  their 
vehicle,  it  must  be  clear  that  the  conclusions  to  be  drawn 
from  it  can  only  contain  a transcendental  use  of  the 
understanding,  which  declines  all  admixture  of  experience, 
and  of  the  achievements  of  which,  after  what  has  been  said 
before,  we  cannot  form  any  very  favourable  anticipations. 


284 


Transcendetital  Dialectic 


We  shall  therefore  follow  it,  with  a critical  eye,  through  all 
the  predicaments  of  pure  psychology.1 

[ The  First  Paralogism  of  Substantiality 

That  the  representation  of  which  is  the  absolute  subject 
of  our  judgments,  and  cannot  be  used  therefore  as  the 
determination  of  any  other  thing,  is  the  substance. 

I,  as  a thinking  being,  am  the  absolute  subject  of  all  my 
possible  judgments,  and  this  representation  of  myself  can 
never  be  used  as  the  predicate  of  any  other  thing. 

Therefore  I,  as  a thinking  being  (Soul),  am  Substance. 

Criticism  of  the  First  Paralogism  of  Pure 2 Psychology 

We  showed  in  the  analytical  portion  of  transcendental 
logic,  that  pure  categories,  and  among  them  that  of  sub- 
stance, have  in  themselves  no  objective  meaning,  unless 
they  rest  on  some  intuition,  and  are  applied  to  [p.  349] 
the  manifold  of  such  intuitions  as  functions  of  synthetical 
unity.  Without  this  they  are  merely  functions  of  a judg- 
ment without  contents.  I may  say  of  everything,  that  it 
is  a substance,  so  far  as  I distinguish  it  from  what  are  mere 
predicates  and  determinations.  Now  in  all  our  think- 
ing the  I is  the  subject,  in  which  thoughts  are  inherent 
as  determinations  only  ; nor  can  that  I ever  be  used  as  a 
determination  of  any  other  thing.  Thus  everybody  is  con- 
strained to  look  upon  himself  as  the  substance,  and  on 
thinking  as  the  accidents  only  of  his  being,  and  determi- 
nations of  his  state. 

1 All  that  follows  from  here  to  the  beginning  of  the  second  chapter,  is  left 
out  in  the  Second  Edition,  and  replaced  by  Supplement  XXVII. 

2 Afterwards  transcendental  instead  of  pure. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


285 


But  what  use  are  we  to  make  of  such  a concept  of  a 
substance  ? That  I,  as  a thinking  being,  continue  for  my- 
self, and  naturally  neither  arise  nor  perish , is  no  legitimate 
deduction  from  it ; and  yet  this  conclusion  would  be  the 
only  advantage  that  could  be  gained  from  the  concept  of 
the  substantiality  of  my  own  thinking  subject,  and,  but  for 
that,  I could  do  very  well  without  it. 

So  far  from  being  able  to  deduce  these  properties  from 
the  pure  category  of  substance,  we  have  on  the  contrary 
to  observe  the  permanency  of  an  object  in  our  experience 
and  then  lay  hold  of  this  permanency,  if  we  wish  to  apply 
to  it  the  empirically  useful  concept  of  substance.  In  this 
case,  however,  we  had  no  experience  to  lay  hold  of,  but 
have  only  formed  a deduction  from  the  concept  [p.  350] 
of  the  relation  which  all  thinking  has  to  the  I,  as  the  com- 
mon subject  to  which  it  belongs.  Nor  should  we,  what- 
ever we  did,  succeed  by  any  certain  observation  in  proving 
such  permanency.  For  though  the  I exists  in  all  thoughts, 
not  the  slightest  intuition  is  connected  with  that  repre- 
sentation, by  which  it  might  be  distinguished  from  other 
objects  of  intuition.  We  may  very  well  perceive  there- 
fore that  this  representation  appears  again  and  again  in 
every  act  of  thought,  but  not  that  it  is  a constant  and  per- 
manent intuition,  in  which  thoughts,  as  being  changeable, 
come  and  go. 

Hence  it  follows  that  in  the  first  syllogism  of  transcen- 
dental psychology  reason  imposes  upon  us  an  apparent 
knowledge  only,  by  representing  the  constant  logical  sub- 
ject of  thought  as  the  knowledge  of  the  real  subject  in 
which  that  knowledge  inheres.  Of  that  subject,  however, 
we  have  not  and  cannot  have  the  slightest  knowledge, 
because  consciousness  is  that  which  alone  changes  repre- 


286 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


sentations  into  thoughts,  and  in  which  therefore,  as  the 
transcendental  subject,  all  our  perceptions  must  be  found. 
Beside  this  logical  meaning  of  the  I,  we  have  no  know- 
ledge of  the  subject  in  itself,  which  forms  the  substratum 
and  foundation  of  it  and  of  all  our  thoughts.  In  spite  of 
this,  the  proposition  that  the  soul  is  a substance  may  well 
be  allowed  to  stand,  if  only  we  see  that  this  concept  can- 
not help  us  on  in  the  least  or  teach  us  any  of  the  ordinary 
conclusions  of  rationalising  psychology,  as,  for  [p.  351] 
instance,  the  everlasting  continuance  of  the  soul  amid  all 
changes  and  even  in  death,  and  that  it  therefore  signifies 
a substance  in  idea  only,  and  not  in  reality. 

The  Second  Paralogism  of  Simplicity 

Everything,  the  action  of  which  can  never  be  consid- 
ered as  the  concurrence  of  several  acting  things,  is  simple. 

Now  the  Soul,  or  the  thinking  I,  is  such  a thing : — 

Therefore,  etc. 

Criticism  of  the  Second  Paralogism  of  Transcendental 

Psychology 

This  is  the  strong  (yet  not  invulnerable)  syllogism 
among  all  dialectical  syllogisms  of  pure  psychology,  not  a 
mere  sophism  contrived  by  a dogmatist  in  order  to  impart 
a certain  plausibility  to  his  assertions,  but  a syllogism 
which  seems  able  to  stand  the  sharpest  examination  and 
the  gravest  doubts  of  the  philosopher.  It  is  this  : — 

Every  composite  substance  is  an  aggregate  of  many 
substances,  and  the  action  of  something  composite,  or 
that  which  is  inherent  in  it  as  such,  is  an  aggregate  of 
many  actions  or  accidents  distributed  among  many  sub- 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


2%7 


stances.  An  effect  due  to  the  concurrence  of  many  acting 
substances  is  no  doubt  possible,  if  that  effect  is  [p.  352] 
external  only  (as,  for  instance,  the  motion  of  a body  is  the 
combined  motion  of  all  its  parts).  The  case  is  different 
however  with  thoughts,  if  considered  as  accidents  belong- 
ing to  a thinking  being  within.  For  suppose  it  is  the 
composite  which  thinks,  then  every  part  of  it  would 
contain  a part  of  the  thought,  and  all  together  only  the 
whole  of  it.  This  however  is  self-contradictory.  For  as 
representations,  distributed  among  different  beings  (like 
the  single  words  of  a verse),  never  make  a whole  thought 
(a  verse),  it  is  impossible  that  a thought  should  be  inher- 
ent in  something  composite,  as  such.  Thought  therefore 
is  possible  only  in  a substance  which  is  not  an  aggregate 
of  many,  and  therefore  absolutely  simple.1 

What  is  called  the  nervns  probandi  in  this  argument  lies 
in  the  proposition  that,  in  order  to  constitute  a thought, 
the  many  representations  must  be  comprehended  under 
the  absolute  unity  of  the  thinking  subject.  Nobody  how- 
ever can  prove  this  proposition  from  concepts.  For  how 
would  he  undertake  to  do  it?  The  proposition  [p.  353] 
that  a thought  can  only  be  the  effect  of  the  absolute  unity 
of  a thinking  being,  cannot  be  considered  as  analytical. 
For  the  unity  of  thought,  consisting  of  many  representa- 
tions, is  collective,  and  may,  so  far  as  mere  concepts  are 
concerned,  refer  to  the  collective  unity  of  all  co-operating 
substances  (as  the  movement  of  a body  is  the  compound 
movement  of  all  its  parts)  quite  as  well  as  to  the  absolute 
unity  of  the  subject.  According  to  the  rule  of  identity 

1 It  would  be  very  easy  to  give  to  this  argument  the  ordinary  scholastic 
dress.  But  for  my  purposes  it  is  sufficient  to  have  clearly  exhibited,  even  in  a 
popular  form,  the  ground  on  which  it  rests. 


288 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


It  would  be  impossible  therefore  to  establish  the  necessity 
of  the  presupposition  of  a simple  substance,  the  thought 
being  composite.  That,  on  the  other  hand,  such  a propo- 
sition might  be  established  synthetically  and  entirely  a 
priori  from  mere  concepts,  no  one  will  venture  to  affirm 
who  has  once  understood  the  grounds  on  which  the  possi- 
bility of  synthetical  propositions  a priori  rests,  as  explained 
by  us  before. 

It  is  likewise  impossible,  however,  to  derive  this  neces- 
sary unity  of  the  subject,  as  the  condition  of  the  possi- 
bility of  the  unity  of  every  thought,  from  experience. 
For  experience  never  supplies  any  necessity  of  thought, 
much  less  the  concept  of  absolute  unity.  Whence  then 
do  we  take  that  proposition  on  which  the  whole  psycho- 
logical syllogism  of  reason  rests  ? 

It  is  manifest  that  if  we  wish  to  represent  to  ourselves 
a thinking  being,  we  must  put  ourselves  in  its  place,  and 
supplant  as  it  were  the  object  which  has  to  be  considered 
by  our  own  subject  (which  never  happens  in  any  [p.  354] 
other  kind  of  investigation).  The  reason  why  we  postu- 
late for  every  thought  absolute  unity  of  the  subject  is 
because  otherwise  we  could  not  say  of  it,  I think  (the 
manifold  in  one  representation).  For  although  the  whole 
of  a thought  may  be  divided  and  distributed  under  many 
subjects,  the  subjective  I can  never  thus  be  divided  and 
distributed,  and  it  is  this  I which  we  presuppose  in  every 
thought. 

As  in  the  former  paralogism  therefore,  so  here  also,  the 
formal  proposition  of  apperception,  I think,  remains  the 
sole  ground  on  which  rational  psychology  ventures  to 
undertake  the  extension  of  its  knowledge.  That  proposi- 
tion, however,  is  no  experience,  but  only  the  form  of 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


2 89 


apperception  inherent  in,  and  antecedent  to,  every  expe- 
rience, that  is  a purely  subjective  condition , having  refer- 
ence to  a possible  experience  only,  but  by  no  means  the 
condition  of  the  possibility  of  the  knowledge  of  objects, 
and  by  no  means  necessary  to  the  concept  of  a thinking 
being  in  general ; although  it  must  be  admitted  that  we 
cannot  represent  to  ourselves  another  intelligent  being 
without  putting  ourselves  in  its  place  with  that  formula 
of  our  consciousness. 

Nor  is  it  true  that  the  simplicity  of  my  self  (as  a soul) 
is  really  deduced  from  the  proposition,  I think,  for  it  is 
already  involved  in  every  thought  itself.  The  proposition 
I am  simple  must  be  considered  as  the  imme-  [p.  355] 
diate  expression  of  apperception,  and  the  so-called  syllo- 
gism of  Cartesius,  cogito,  ergo  sum , is  in  reality  tautological, 
because  cogito  (sum  cogitans)  predicates  reality  immediately. 
Iam  simple  means  no  more  than  that  this  representation 
of  I does  not  contain  the  smallest  trace  of  manifoldness, 
but  is  absolute  (although  merely  logical)  unity. 

Thus  we  see  that  the  famous  psychological  argument 
is  founded  merely  on  the  indivisible  unity  of  a representa- 
tion, which  only  determines  the  verb  with  reference  to  a 
person  ; and  it  is  clear  that  the  subject  of  inherence  is 
designated  transcendentally  only  by  the  I,  which  accom- 
panies the  thought,  without  our  perceiving  the  smallest 
quality  of  it,  in  fact,  without  our  knowing  anything  about 
it.  It  signifies  a something  in  general  (a  transcendental 
subject)  the  representation  of  which  must  no  doubt  be 
simple,  because  nothing  is  determined  in  it,  and  nothing 
can  be  represented  more  simple  than  by  the  concept  of 
a mere  something.  The  simplicity  however  of  the  repre- 
sentation of  a subject  is  not  therefore  a knowledge  of  the 
u 


290 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


simplicity  of  the  subject,  because  no  account  whatever  is 
taken  of  its  qualities  when  it  is  designated  by  the  entirely 
empty  expression  I,  an  expression  that  can  be  applied  to 
every  thinking  subject. 

So  much  is  certain  therefore  that  though  I [p.  356] 
always  represent  by  the  I an  absolute,  but  only  logical, 
unity  of  the  subject  (simplicity),  I never  know  thereby 
the  real  simplicity  of  my  subject.  We  saw  that  the  propo- 
sition, I am  a substance,  signified  nothing  but  the  mere 
category  of  which  I must  not  make  any  use  (empirically) 
in  coticreto.  In  the  same  manner,  I may  well  say,  I am  a 
simple  substance,  that  is,  a substance  the  representation 
of  which  contains  no  synthesis  of  the  manifold  ; but  that 
concept,  or  that  proposition  also,  teaches  us  nothing  at 
all  with  reference  to  myself,  as  an  object  of  experience, 
because  the  concept  of  substance  itself  is  used  as  a func- 
tion of  synthesis  only,  without  any  intuition  to  rest  on, 
and  therefore  without  any  object,  valid  with  reference  to 
the  condition  of  our  knowledge  only,  but  not  with  refer- 
ence to  any  object  of  it.  We  shall  test  the  usefulness  of 
this  proposition  by  an  experiment. 

Everybody  must  admit  that  the  assertion  of  the  simple 
nature  of  the  soul  can  only  be  of  any  value  in  so  far  as  it 
enables  me  to  distinguish  the  soul  from  all  matter,  and 
thus  to  except  it  from  that  decay  to  which  matter  is  at  all 
times  subject.  It  is  for  that  use  that  our  proposition  is 
really  intended,  and  it  is  therefore  often  expressed  by,  the 
soul  is  not  corporeal.  If  then  I can  show  that,  [p.  357] 
although  we  allow  to  this  cardinal  proposition  of  rational 
psychology  (as  a mere  judgment  of  reason  from  pure 
categories)  all  objective  validity  (everything  that  thinks 
is  simple  substance),  we  cannot  make  the  least  use  of  it, 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


291 


in  order  to  establish  the  homogeneousness  or  non-homo- 
geneousness  of  soul  and  matter,  this  will  be  the  same  as 
if  I had  relegated  this  supposed  psychological  truth  to 
the  field  of  mere  ideas,  without  any  real  or  objective  use. 

We  have  irrefutably  proved  in  the  transcendental  Es- 
thetic that  bodies  are  mere  phenomena  of  our  external 
sense,  not  things  by  themselves.  We  are  justified  there- 
fore in  saying  that  our  thinking  subject  is  not  a body,  i.e. 
that,  because  it  is  represented  by  us  as  an  object  of  the 
internal  sense,  it  is,  so  far  as  it  thinks,  no  object  of  our 
external  senses,  and  no  phenomenon  in  space.  This 
means  the  same  as  that  among  external  phenomena  we 
can  never  have  thinking  beings  as  such,  or  ever  see  their 
thoughts,  their  consciousness,  their  desires,  etc.,  exter- 
nally. All  this  belongs  to  the  internal  sense.  This  argu- 
ment seems  indeed  so  natural  and  popular  that  even  the 
commonest  understanding  has  always  been  led  [p.  358] 
to  it,  the  distinction  between  souls  and  bodies  being  of 
very  early  date. 

But  although  extension,  impermeability,  cohesion,  and 
motion,  in  fact  everything  that  the  external  senses  can 
give  us,  cannot  be  thoughts,  feeling,  inclination,  and  de- 
termination, or  contain  anything  like  them,  being  never 
objects  of  external  intuition,  it  might  be  possible,  never- 
theless, that  that  something  which  forms  the  foundation 
of  external  phenomena,  and  which  so  affects  our  sense 
as  to  produce  in  it  the  representations  of  space,  matter, 
form,  etc.,  if  considered  as  a noumenon  (or  better  as  a 
transcendental  object)  might  be,  at  the  same  time,  the 
subject  of  thinking,  although  by  the  manner  in  which 
it  affects  our  external  sense  it  produces  in  us  no  intui- 
tions of  representations,  will,  etc.,  but  only  of  space  and 


292 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


its  determinations.  This  something,  however,  is  not  ex 
tended,  not  impermeable,  not  composite,  because  such 
predicates  concern  sensibility  only  and  its  intuition,  when- 
ever we  are  affected  by  these  (to  us  otherwise  unknown) 
objects.  These  expressions,  however,  do  not  give  us  any 
information  what  kind  of  object  it  is,  but  only  that,  if 
considered  by  itself,  without  reference  to  the  external 
senses,  it  has  no  right  to  these  predicates,  peculiar  to 
external  appearance.  The  predicates  of  the  internal  sense, 
on  the  contrary,  such  as  representation,  think-  [p.  359] 
ing,  etc.,  are  by  no  means  contradictory  to  it,  so  that 
really,  even  if  we  admit  the  simplicity  of  its  nature,  the 
human  soul  is  by  no  means  sufficiently  distinguished  from 
matter,  so  far  as  its  substratum  is  concerned,  if  (as  it 
ought  to  be)  matter  is  considered  as  a phenomenon  only. 

If  matter  were  a thing  by  itself,  it  would,  as  a com- 
posite being,  be  totally  different  from  the  soul,  as  a simple 
being.  But  what  we  call  matter  is  an  external  phenome- 
non only,  the  substratum  of  which  cannot  possibly  be 
known  by  any  possible  predicates.  I can  therefore  very 
well  suppose  that  that  substratum  is  simple,  although  in 
the  manner  in  which  it  affects  our  senses  it  produces 
in  us  the  intuition  of  something  extended,  and  therefore 
composite,  so  that  the  substance  which,  with  reference 
to  our  external  sense,  possesses  extension,  might  very 
well  by  itself  possess  thoughts  which  can  be  represented 
consciously  by  its  own  internal  sense.  In  such  wise  the 
same  thing  which  in  one  respect  is  called  corporeal,  would 
in  another  respect  be  at  the  same  time  a thinking  being, 
of  which  though  we  cannot  see  its  thoughts,  we  can  yet 
see  the  signs  of  them  phenomenally.  Thus  the  expres- 
sion that  souls  only  (as  a particular  class  of  substances) 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


29? 


think,  would  have  to  be  dropt,  and  we  should  return  to 
the  common  expression  that  men  think,  that  is,  [p.  360] 
that  the  same  thing  which,  as  an  external  phenomenon,  is 
extended,  is  internally,  by  itself,  a subject,  not  composite, 
but  simple  and  intelligent. 

But  without  indulging  in  such  hypotheses,  we  may 
make  this  general  remark,  that  if  I understand  by  soul 
a being  by  itself,  the  very  question  would  be  absurd, 
whether  the  soul  be  homogeneous  or  not  with  matter 
which  is  not  a thing  by  itself,  but  only  a class  of  repre- 
sentations within  us ; for  so  much  at  all  events  must  be 
clear,  that  a thing  by  itself  is  of  a different  nature  from 
the  determinations  which  constitute  its  state  only. 

If,  on  the  contrary,  we  compare  the  thinking  I,  not  with 
matter,  but  with  that  object  of  the  intellect  that  forms  the 
foundation  of  the  external  phenomena  which  we  call  mat- 
ter, then  it  follows,  as  we  know  nothing  whatever  of  the 
matter,  that  we  have  no  right  to  say  that  the  soul  by 
itself  is  different  from  it  in  any  respect. 

The  simple  consciousness  is  not  therefore  a knowledge 
of  the  simple  nature  of  our  subject,  so  that  we  might  thus 
distinguish  the  soul  from  matter,  as  a composite  being. 

If  therefore,  in  the  only  case  where  that  concept  might 
be  useful,  namely,  in  comparing  myself  with  objects  of 
external  experience,  it  is  impossible  to  determine  the 
peculiar  and  distinguishing  characteristics  of  its  nature, 
what  is  the  use,  if  we  pretend  to  know  that  the  [p.  361] 
thinking  I,  or  the  soul  (a  name  for  the  transcendental 
object  of  the  internal  sense),  is  simple  ? Such  a propo- 
sition admits  of  no  application  to  any  real  object,  and  can 
not  therefore  enlarge  our  knowledge  in  the  least. 

Thus  collapses  the  whole  of  rational  psychology,  with 


294 


Transcettdental  Dialectic 


its  fundamental  support,  and  neither  here  nor  elsewherft 
can  vve  hope  by  means  of  mere  concepts  (still  less  through 
the  mere  subjective  form  of  all  our  concepts,  that  is, 
through  our  consciousness)  and  without  referring  these 
concepts  to  a possible  experience,  to  extend  our  know- 
ledge, particularly  as  even  the  fundamental  concept  of  a 
simple  7iature  is  such  that  it  can  never  be  met  with  in 
experience,  so  that  no  chance  remains  of  arriving  at  it  as 
a concept  of  objective  validity. 

The  Third  Paralogism  of  Personality 

Whatever  is  conscious  of  the  numerical  identity  of  its 
own  self  at  different  times,  is  in  so  far  a person. 

Now  the  Soul,  etc. 

Therefore  the  Soul  is  a person. 

Criticism  of  the  Third  Paralogism  of  Transcendental 
Psychology 

Whenever  I want  to  know  by  experience  the  numerical 
identity  of  an  external  object,  I shall  have  to  [p.  362] 
attend  to  what  is  permanent  in  that  phenomenon  to  which, 
as  the  subject,  everything  else  refers  as  determination,  and 
observe  the  identity  of  the  former  during  the  time  that 
the  latter  is  changing.  I myself,  however,  am  an  object 
of  the  internal  sense,  and  all  time  is  but  the  form  of  the 
internal  sense.  I therefore  refer  each  and  all  of  my  suc- 
cessive determinations  to  the  numerically  identical  self ; 
and  this  in  all  time,  that  is,  in  the  form  of  the  inner  intui- 
tion of  myself.  From  this  point  of  view,  the  personality 
of  the  soul  should  not  even  be  considered  as  inferred,  but 


Transcendental  Dialectic  295 

as  an  entirely  identical  proposition  of  self-consciousness  in 
time,  and  that  is  indeed  the  reason  why  it  is  valid  a 
priori.  For  it  really  says  no  more  than  this  : that  dur- 
ing the  whole  time,  while  I am  conscious  of  myself,  I am 
conscious  of  that  time  as  belonging  to  the  unity  of  my- 
self ; and  it  comes  to  the  same  thing  whether  I say  that 
this  whole  time  is  within  me  as  an  individual  unity,  or 
that  I with  numerical  identity  am  present  in  all  that 
time. 

In  my  own  consciousness,  therefore,  the  identity  of 
person  is  inevitably  present.  But  if  I consider  myself 
from  the  point  of  view  of  another  person  (as  an  object  of 
his  external  intuition),  then  that  external  observer  con- 
siders me,  first  of  all,  in  time,  for  in  the  apperception  time 
is  really  represented  in  me  only.  Though  he  admits, 
therefore,  the  I,  which  at  all  times  accompanies  all  rep- 
resentations in  my  consciousness,  and  with  [p.  363] 
entire  identity,  he  will  not  yet  infer  from  it  the  objective 
permanence  of  myself.  For  as  in  that  case  the  time  in 
which  the  observer  places  me  is  not  the  time  of  my  own, 
but  of  his  sensibility,  it  follows  that  the  identity  which  is 
connected  with  my  consciousness  is  not  therefore  con- 
nected with  his,  that  is,  with  the  external  intuition  of  my 
subject. 

The  identity  of  my  consciousness  at  different  times  is 
therefore  a formal  condition  only  of  my  thoughts  and  their 
coherence,  and  proves  in  no  way  the  numerical  identity  of 
my  subject,  in  which,  in  spite  of  the  logical  identity  of  the 
I,  such  a change  may  have  passed  as  to  make  it  impossible 
to  retain  its  identity,  though  we  may  still  attribute  to  it 
the  same  name  of  I,  which  in  every  other  state,  and  even 
in  the  change  of  the  subject,  might  yet  retain  the  thought 


296 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


of  the  preceding  and  hand  it  over  to  the  subsequent 
subject.1 

Although  the  teaching  of  some  old  schools  [p.  364] 
that  everything  is  in  a flux,  and  nothing  in  the  world 
permanent,  cannot  be  admitted,  if  we  admit  substances,  yet 
it  must  not  be  supposed  that  it  can  be  refuted  by  the  unity 
of  self-consciousness.  For  we  ourselves  cannot  judge  from 
our  own  consciousness  whether,  as  souls,  we  are  perma- 
nent or  not,  because  we  reckon  as  belonging  to  our  own 
identical  self  that  only  of  which  we  are  conscious,  and 
therefore  are  constrained  to  admit  that,  during  the  whole 
time  of  which  we  are  conscious,  we  are  one  and  the  same. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  a stranger,  however,  such  a 
judgment  would  not  be  valid,  because,  perceiving  in  the 
soul  no  permanent  phenomena,  except  the  representation 
of  the  I,  which  accompanies  and  connects  them  all,  we 
cannot  determine  whether  that  I (being  a mere  thought) 
be  not  in  the  same  state  of  flux  as  the  other  thoughts 
which  are  chained  together  by  the  I.  [p.  365] 

It  is  curious,  however,  that  the  personality  and  what 
is  presupposed  by  it,  namely,  the  permanence  and  sub- 
stantiality of  the  soul,  has  now  to  be  proved  first.  For 

1 An  elastic  ball,  which  impinges  on  another  in  a straight  line,  communi- 
cates to  it  its  whole  motion,  and  therefore  (if  we  only  consider  the  places  in 
space)  its  whole  state.  If  then,  in  analogy  with  such  bodies,  we  admit  sub- 
stances of  which  the  one  communicates  to  the  other  representations  with 
consciousness,  we  could  imagine  a whole  series  of  them,  in  which  the  first 
communicates  its  state  and  its  consciousness  to  the  second,  the  second  its  own 
state  with  that  of  the  first  substance  to  a third,  and  this  again  all  the  states 
of  the  former,  together  with  its  own,  and  a consciousness  of  them,  to  another. 
That  last  substance  would  be  conscious  of  all  the  states  of  the  previously 
changed  substances,  as  of  its  own,  because  all  of  them  had  been  transferred 
to  it  with  the  consciousness  of  them;  but  for  all  that  it  would  not  have  been 
the  same  person  in  all  those  states. 


Transcendental  Dialectic  297 

if  we  could  presuppose  these,  there  would  follow,  if  not 
the  permanence  of  consciousness,  yet  the  possibility  of  a 
permanent  consciousness  in  one  and  the  same  subject,  and 
this  is  sufficient  to  establish  personality  which  does  not 
cease  at  once,  because  its  effect  is  interrupted  at  the  time. 
This  permanence,  however,  is  by  no  means  given  us 
before  the  numerical  identity  of  ourself,  which  we  infer 
from  identical  apperception,  but  is  itself  inferred  from  it, 
so  that,  according  to  rule,  the  concept  of  substance,  which 
alone  is  empirically  useful,  would  have  to  follow  first  upon 
it.  But  as  the  identity  of  person  follows  by  no  means 
from  the  identity  of  the  I,  in  the  consciousness  of  all 
time  in  which  I perceive  myself,  it  follows  that  we  could 
not  have  founded  upon  it  the  substantiality  of  the  soul. 

Like  the  concept  of  substance  and  of  the  simple,  how- 
ever, the  concept  of  personality  also  may  remain,  so  long 
as  it  is  used  as  transcendental  only,  that  is,  as  a concept 
of  the  unity  of  the  subject  which  is  otherwise  unknown  to 
us,  but  in  the  determinations  of  which  there  is  an  uninter- 
rupted connection  by  apperception.  In  this  sense  such  a 
concept  is  necessary  for  practical  purposes  and  sufficient, 
but  we  can  never  pride  ourselves  on  it  as  helping  to  ex- 
pand our  knowledge  of  our  self  by  means  of  [p.  366] 
pure  reason,  which  only  deceives  us  if  we  imagine  that  we 
can  concluse  an  uninterrupted  continuance  of  the  subject 
from  the  mere  concept  of  the  identical  self.  That  concept 
is  only  constantly  turning  round  itself  in  a circle,  and  does 
not  help  us  as  with  respect  to  any  question  which  aims  at 
synthetical  knowledge.  What  matter  may  be  as  a thing 
by  itself  (a  transcendental  object)  is  entirely  unknown  to 
us  ; though  we  may  observe  its  permanence  as  a phenome- 
non, since  it  is  represented  as  something  external.  When 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


298 

however  I wish  to  observe  the  mere  I during  the  change 
of  all  representations,  I have  no  other  correlative  for  my 
comparisons  but  again  the  I itself,  with  the  general  condi- 
tions of  my  consciousness.  I cannot  therefore  give  any 
but  tautological  answers  to  all  questions,  because  I put 
my  concept  and  its  unity  in  the  place  of  the  qualities  that 
belong  to  me  as  an  object,  and  thus  really  take  for  granted 
what  was  wished  to  be  known. 

The  Fourth  Paralogism  of  Ideality  (with  Regard  to  Exter- 
nal Relations') 

That,  the  existence  of  which  can  only  be  inferred  as  a 
cause  of  given  perceptions,  has  a doubtful  existence 
only:—  [p-  3 67] 

All  external  phenomena  are  such  that  their  existence 
cannot  be  perceived  immediately,  but  that  we  can  only 
infer  them  as  the  cause  of  given  perceptions  : — 

Therefore  the  existence  of  all  objects  of  the  external 
senses  is  doubtful.  This  uncertainty  I call  the  ideality  of 
external  phenomena,  and  the  doctrine  of  that  ideality  is 
called  idealis?n  ; in  comparison  with  which  the  other  doc- 
trine, which  maintains  a possible  certainty  of  the  objects 
of  the  external  senses,  is  called  dualism. 

Criticism  of  the  Fourth  Paralogism  of  Transcendental 
Psychology 

We  shall  first  have  to  examine  the  premisses.  We  are 
perfectly  justified  in  maintaining  that  that  only  which  is 
within  ourselves  can  be  perceived  immediately,  and  that 
my  own  existence  only  can  be  the  object  of  a mere  percep- 
tion. The  existence  of  a real  object  therefore  outside  me 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


299 


(taking  this  word  in  its  intellectual  meaning)  can  never  be 
given  directly  in  perception,  but  can  only  be  added  in 
thought  to  the  perception,  which  is  a modification  of  the 
internal  sense,  and  thus  inferred  as  its  external  cause. 
Hence  Cartesius  was  quite  right  in  limiting  all  perception, 
in  the  narrowest  sense,  to  the  proposition,  I (as  a thinking 
being)  am.  For  it  must  be  clear  that,  as  what  [p.  368] 
is  without  is  not  within  me,  I cannot  find  it  in  my  apper- 
ception ; nor  hence  in  any  perception  which  is  in  reality  a 
determination  of  apperception  only. 

In  the  true  sense  of  the  word,  therefore,  I can  never 
perceive  external  things,  but  only  from  my  own  internal 
perception  infer  their  existence,  taking  the  perception  as 
an  effect  of  which  something  external  must  be  the  proxi- 
mate cause.  An  inference,  however,  from  a given  effect 
to  a definite  cause  is  always  uncertain,  because  the  effect 
may  be  due  to  more  than  one  cause.  Therefore  in  refer- 
ring a perception  to  its  cause,  it  always  remains  doubtful 
whether  that  cause  be  internal  or  external ; whether  in  fact 
all  so-called  external  perceptions  are  not  a mere  play  of 
our  external  sense,  or  point  to  real  external  objects  as  their 
cause.  At  all  events  the  existence  of  the  latter  is  infer- 
ential only,  and  liable  to  all  the  dangers  of  inferences, 
while  the  object  of  the  internal  sense  (I  myself  with  all 
my  representations)  is  perceived  immediately,  and  its 
existence  cannot  be  questioned. 

It  must  not  be  supposed,  therefore,  that  an  idealist  is 
he  who  denies  the  existence  of  external  objects  of  the 
senses ; all  he  does  is  to  deny  that  it  is  known  by  immedi- 
ate perception,  and  to  infer  that  we  can  never  [p.  369] 
become  perfectly  certain  of  their  reality  by  any  experience 
whatsoever. 


300 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


Before  I expose  the  deceptive  illusion  of  our  paralogism, 
let  me  remark  that  we  must  necessarily  distinguish  two 
kinds  of  idealism,  the  transcendental  and  the  empirical. 
Transcendental  idealism  teaches  that  all  phenomena  are 
representations  only,  not  things  by  themselves,  and  that 
space  and  time  therefore  are  only  sensuous  forms  of  our 
intuition,  not  determinations  given  independently  by  them- 
selves or  conditions  of  objects,  as  things  by  themselves. 
Opposed  to  this  transcendental  idealism,  is  a transcendental 
realism,  which  considers  space  and  time  as  something  in 
itself  (independent  of  our  sensibility).  Thus  the  tran- 
scendental realist  represents  all  external  phenomena 
(admitting  their  reality)  as  things  by  themselves,  existing 
independently  of  us  and  our  sensibility,  and  therefore 
existing  outside  us  also,  if  regarded  according  to  pure  con- 
cepts of  the  understanding.  It  is  this  transcendental 
realist  who  afterwards  acts  the  empirical  idealist,  and  who, 
after  wrongly  supposing  that  the  objects  of  the  senses,  if 
they  are  to  be  external,  must  have  an  existence  by  them- 
selves, and  without  our  senses,  yet  from  this  point  of  view 
considers  all  our  sensuous  representations  insufficient  to 
render  certain  the  reality  of  their  objects. 

The  transcendental  idealist,  on  the  contrary,  [p.  370] 
may  well  be  an  empirical  realist,  or,  as  he  is  called,  a 
dualist  ; that  is,  he  may  admit  the  existence  of  matter, 
without  taking  a step  beyond  mere  self-consciousness, 
or  admitting  more  than  the  certainty  of  representations 
within  me,  that  is  the  cogito,  ergo  sum.  For  as  he  con- 
siders matter,  and  even  its  internal  possibility,  as  a phe- 
nomenon only,  which,  if  separated  from  our  sensibility, 
is  nothing,  matter  with  him  is  only  a class  of  representa- 
tions (intuition)  which  are  called  external,  not  as  if  they 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


301 


referred  to  objects  external  by  themselves,  but  because 
they  refer  perceptions  to  space,  in  which  everything  is 
outside  everything  else,  while  space  itself  is  inside  us. 

We  have  declared  ourselves  from  the  very  beginning 
in  favour  of  this  transcendental  idealism.  In  our  system, 
therefore,  we  need  not  hesitate  to  admit  the  existence  of 
matter  on  the  testimony  of  mere  self-consciousness,  and 
to  consider  it  as  established  by  it  (i.e.  the  testimony),  in 
the  same  manner  as  the  existence  of  myself,  as  a thinking 
being.  I am  conscious  of  my  representations,  and  hence 
they  exist  as  well  as  I myself,  who  has  these  representa- 
tions. External  objects,  however  (bodies),  are  phenomena 
only,  therefore  nothing  but  a class  of  my  representations, 
the  objects  of  which  are  something  by  means  of  these  repre- 
sentations only,  and  apart  from  them  nothing,  [p.  371] 
External  things,  therefore,  exist  by  the  same  right  as  I 
myself,  both  on  the  immediate  testimony  of  my  self-con- 
sciousness, with  this  difference  only,  that  the  representa- 
tion of  myself,  as  a thinking  subject,  is  referred  to  the 
internal  sense  only,  while  the  representations  which  in- 
dicate extended  beings  are  referred  to  the  external  sense 
also.  With  reference  to  the  reality  of  external  objects,  I 
need  as  little  trust  to  inference,  as  with  reference  to  the 
reality  of  the  object  of  my  internal  sense  (my  thoughts), 
both  being  nothing  but  representations,  the  immediate 
perception  (consciousness)  of  which  is  at  the  same  time  a 
sufficient  proof  of  their  reality. 

The  transcendental  idealist  is,  therefore,  an  empirical 
realist,  and  allows  to  matter,  as  a phenomenon,  a reality 
which  need  not  be  inferred,  but  may  be  immediately  per- 
ceived. The  transcendental  realism,  on  the  contrary,  is 
necessarily  left  in  doubt,  and  obliged  to  give  way  to 


302 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


empirical  idealism,  because  it  considers  the  objects  of  the 
external  senses  as  something  different  from  the  senses 
themselves,  taking  mere  phenomena  as  independent 
beings,  existing  outside  us.  And  while  with  the  very- 
best  consciousness  of  our  representation  of  these  things, 
it  is  far  from  certain  that,  if  a representation  exists,  its 
corresponding  object  must  exist  also,  it  is  clear  that  in 
our  system  external  things,  that  is,  matter  in  all  its  shapes 
and  changes,  are  nothing  but  mere  phenomena,  [p.  372] 
that  is,  representations  within  us,  of  the  reality  of  which 
we  are  immediately  conscious. 

As,  so  far  as  I know,  all  psychologists  who  believe  in 
empirical  idealism  are  transcendental  realists,  they  have 
acted  no  doubt  quite  consistently,  in  ascribing  great  im- 
portance to  empirical  idealism,  as  one  of  the  problems 
from  which  human  reason  could  hardly  extricate  itself. 
For  indeed,  if  we  consider  external  phenomena  as  repre- 
sentations produced  inside  us  by  their  objects,  as  existing 
as  things  by  themselves  outside  us,  it  is  difficult  to  see 
how  their  existence  could  be  known  otherwise  but  through 
a syllogism  from  effect  to  cause,  where  it  must  always 
remain  doubtful,  whether  the  cause  be  within  or  without 
us.  Now  we  may  well  admit  that  something  which,  taken 
transcendentally,  is  outside  us,  may  be  the  cause  of  our 
external  intuitions,  but  this  can  never  be  the  object  which 
we  mean  by  the  representations  of  matter  and  material 
things ; for  these  are  phenomena  only,  that  is,  certain 
kinds  of  representations  existing  always  within  us,  and 
the  reality  of  which  depends  on  our  immediate  conscious- 
ness, quite  as  much  as  the  consciousness  of  my  own 
thoughts.  The  transcendental  object  is  unknown  equally 
in  regard  to  internal  and  external  intuition. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


303 


Of  this,  however,  we  are  not  speaking  at  [p.  373] 
present,  but  only  of  the  empirical  object,  which  is  called 
external,  if  represented  in  space,  and  internal,  when  repre- 
sented in  temporal  relations  only,  both  space  and  time 
being  to  be  met  with  nowhere  except  in  ourselves. 

The  expression,  outside  us,  involves  however  an  inevita- 
ble ambiguity,  because  it  may  signify  either,  something 
which,  as  a thing  by  itself,  exists  apart  from  us,  or  what 
belongs  to  outward  appearance  only.  In  order,  therefore, 
to  remove  all  uncertainty  from  that  concept,  taken  in  the 
latter  meaning  (which  alone  affects  the  psychological 
question  as  to  the  reality  of  our  external  intuition)  we 
shall  distinguish  empirically  external  objects  from  those 
that  may  be  called  so  in  a transcendental  sense,  by  calling 
the  former  simply  thitigs  occurring  in  space. 

Space  and  time  are  no  doubt  representations  a priori , 
which  dwell  in  us  as  forms  of  our  sensuous  intuition, 
before  any  real  object  has  determined  our  senses  by 
means  of  sensation,  enabling  them  to  represent  the  ob- 
ject under  those  sensuous  conditions.  But  this  some- 
thing, material  or  real,  that  is  to  be  seen  in  space, 
presupposes  necessarily  perception,  and  cannot  be  fancied 
or  produced  by  means  of  imagination  without  that  per- 
ception, which  indicates  the  reality  of  something  in  space. 
It  is  sensation,  therefore,  that  indicates  reality  [p.  374] 
in  space  and  time,  according  as  it  is  related  to  the  one  or 
the  other  mode  of  sensuous  intuition.  If  sensation  is  once 
given  (which,  if  referring  to  an  object  in  general,  and  not 
specialising  it,  is  called  perception),  many  an  object  may 
be  put  together  in  imagination  from  the  manifold  materials 
of  perception,  which  has  no  empirical  place  in  space  or 
time,  but  in  imagination  only.  This  admits  of  no  doubt, 


304 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


whether  we  take  the  sensations  of  pain  and  pleasure,  or 
the  external  ones  of  colour,  heat,  etc.  ; it  is  always  per- 
ception by  which  the  material  for  thinking  of  any  objects 
of  external  intuition  must  be  first  supplied.  This  per- 
ception, therefore  (to  speak  at  present  of  external  in- 
tuitions only),  represents  something  real  in  space.  For, 
first,  perception  is  the  representation  of  a reality,  while 
space  is  the  representation  of  a mere  possibility  of  co- 
existence. Secondly,  this  reality  is  represented  before 
the  external  sense,  that  is,  in  space.  Thirdly,  space  itself 
is  nothing  but  mere  representation,  so  that  nothing  in  it 
can  be  taken  as  real,  except  what  is  represented  in  it ; 1 or, 
vice  versa , whatever  is  given  in  it,  that  is,  what-  [p.  375] 
ever  is  represented  in  it  by  perception,  is  also  real  in  it, 
because,  if  it  were  not  real  in  it,  that  is,  given  immediately 
by  empirical  intuition,  it  could  not  be  created  by  fancy,  the 
real  of  intuition  being  unimaginable  a priori. 

Thus  we  see  that  all  external  perception  proves  imme- 
diately something  real  in  space,  or  rather  is  that  real  it- 
self. Empirical  realism  is  therefore  perfectly  true,  that 
is,  something  real  in  space  always  corresponds  to  our 
external  intuitions.  Space  itself,  it  is  true,  with  all  its 
phenomena,  as  representations,  exists  within  me  only,  but 
the  real  or  the  material  of  all  objects  of  intuition  is  never- 
theless given  in  that  space,  independent  of  all  fancy  or 

1 We  must  well  master  this  paradoxical,  but  quite  correct  proposition,  that 
nothing  can  be  in  space,  except  what  is  represented  in  it.  For  space  itself  is 
nothing  but  representation,  and  whatever  is  in  it  must  therefore  be  contained 
in  that  representation.  There  is  nothing  whatever  in  space,  except  so  far  as 
it  is  really  represented  in  it.  That  a thing  can  exist  only  in  the  representation 
of  it,  may  no  doubt  sound  strange;  but  will  lose  its  strangeness  if  we  consider 
that  the  things  with  which  we  have  to  deal,  are  not  things  by  themselves,  but 
phenomena  only,  that  is,  representations. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


305 


imagination  ; nay,  it  is  impossible  that  in  that  space  any- 
thing outside  us  (in  a transcendental  sense)  could  be 
given,  because  space  itself  is  nothing  outside  our  sensi- 
bility. The  strictest  idealist,  therefore,  can  never  require 
that  we  should  prove  that  the  object  without  us  [p.  376] 
(in  its  true  meaning)  corresponds  to  our  perception.  For 
granted  there  are  such  objects,  they  could  never  be  repre- 
sented and  seen,  as  outside  us,  because  this  presupposes 
space,  and  the  reality  in  space,  as  a mere  representation, 
is  nothing  but  the  perception  itself.  It  thus  follows,  that 
what  is  real  in  external  phenomena,  is  real  in  perception 
only,  and  cannot  be  given  in  any  other  way. 

From  such  perceptions,  whether  by  mere  play  of  fancy 
or  by  experience,  knowledge  of  objects  can  be  produced, 
and  here  no  doubt  deceptive  representations  may  arise, 
without  truly  corresponding  objects,  the  deception  being 
due,  either  to  illusions  of  imagination  (in  dreams),  or  to  a 
fault  of  judgment  (the  so-called  deceptions  of  the  senses). 
In  order  to  escape  from  these  false  appearances,  one  has 
to  follow  the  rule  that,  whatever  is  connected  according  to 
empirical  laws  with  a perception , is  real.  This  kind  of 
illusion,  however,  and  its  prevention,  concerns  idealism  as 
well  as  dualism,  since  it  affects  the  form  of  experience 
only.  In  order  to  refute  empirical  idealism  and  its  un- 
founded misgivings  as  to  the  objective  reality  of  our  exter- 
nal perceptions,  it  is  sufficient  to  consider  1)  that  exter- 
nal perception  proves  immediately  a reality  in  space, 
which  space,  though  in  itself  a mere  form  of  [p.  377] 
representations,  possesses  nevertheless  objective  reality 
with  respect  to  all  external  phenomena  (which  themselves 
are  mere  representations  only)  ; 2)  that  without  perception, 
even  the  creations  of  fancy  and  dreams  would  not  be  pos- 


3°6 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


sible,  so  that  our  external  senses,  with  reference  to  the 
data  from  which  experience  can  spring,  must  have  real 
objects  corresponding  to  them  in  space. 

There  are  two  kinds  of  idealists,  the  dogmatic , who 
denies  the  existence  of  matter,  and  the  sceptical , who 
doubts  it,  because  he  thinks  it  impossible  to  prove  it.  At 
present  we  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  former,  who  is  an 
idealist,  because  he  imagines  he  finds  contradictions  in 
the  possibility  of  matter  in  general.  This  is  a difficulty 
which  we  shall  have  to  deal  with  in  the  following  section 
on  dialectical  syllogisms,  treating  of  reason  in  its  internal 
struggle  with  reference  to  the  concepts  of  the  possibility 
of  all  that  belongs  to  the  connection  of  experience.  The 
sceptical  idealist,  on  the  contrary,  who  attacks  only  the 
ground  of  our  assertion,  and  declares  our  conviction  of  the 
existence  of  matter,  which  we  founded  on  immediate  per- 
ception, as  insufficient,  is  in  reality  a benefactor  of  human 
reason,  because  he  obliges  us,  even  in  the  smallest  matter 
of  common  experience,  to  keep  our  eyes  well  [p.  378] 
open,  and  not  to  consider  as  a well-earned  possession  what 
may  have  come  to  us  by  mistake  only.  We  now  shall 
learn  to  understand  the  great  advantage  of  these  idealistic 
objections.  They  drive  us  by  main  force,  unless  we  mean 
to  contradict  ourselves  in  our  most  ordinary  propositions, 
to  consider  all  perceptions,  whether  we  call  them  internal 
or  external,  as  a consciousness  only  of  what  affects  our 
sensibility,  and  to  look  on  the  external  objects  of  them, 
not  as  things  by  themselves,  but  only  as  representations 
of  which,  as  of  every  other  representation,  we  can  become 
immediately  conscious,  and  which  are  called  external, 
because  they  depend  on  what  we  call  the  external  sense 
with  its  intuition  of  space,  space  being  itself  nothing  but 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


307 


an  internal  kind  of  representation  in  which  certain  per- 
ceptions become  associated. 

If  we  were  to  admit  external  objects  to  be  things  by 
themselves,  it  would  be  simply  impossible  to  understand 
how  we  can  arrive  at  a knowledge  of  their  reality  outside 
us,  considering  that  we  always  depend  on  representations 
which  are  inside  us.  It  is  surely  impossible  that  we 
should  feel  outside  us,  and  not  inside  us,  and  the  whole  of 
our  self-consciousness  cannot  give  us  anything  but  our 
own  determinations.  Thus  sceptical  idealism  forces  us  to 
take  refuge  in  the  only  place  that  is  left  to  us,  namely,  in 
the  ideality  of  all  phenomena : the  very  ideality  which, 
though  as  yet  unprepared  for  its  consequences,  we  estab- 
lished in  our  own  transcendental  ./Esthetic.  If  [p.  379] 
then  we  ask  whether,  consequently,  dualism  only  must  be 
admitted  in  psychology,  we  answer,  certainly,  but  only  in 
its  empirical  acceptation.  In  the  connection  of  experi- 
ence matter,  as  the  substance  of  phenomena,  is  really 
given  to  the  external  sense  in  the  same  manner  as  the 
thinking  I,  likewise  as  the  substance  of  phenomena,  is 
given  to  the  internal  sense ; and  it  is  according  to  the 
rules  which  this  category  introduces  into  the  empirical 
connection  of  our  external  as  well  as  internal  perceptions, 
that  phenomena  on  both  sides  must  be  connected  among 
themselves.  If,  on  the  contrary,  as  often  happens,  we 
were  to  extend  the  concept  of  dualism  and  take  it  in  its 
transcendental  acceptation,  then  neither  it,  nor  on  one 
side  the  pnenmatism,  or  on  the  other  side  the  materialism , 
which  are  opposed  to  dualism,  would  have  the  smallest 
foundation  ; we  should  have  missed  the  determination  of 
our  concepts,  and  have  mistaken  the  difference  in  our 
mode  of  representing  objects,  which,  with  regard  to  what 


3°8 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


they  are  in  themselves,  remain  always  unknown  to  us,  for 
a difference  of  the  things  themselves.  No  doubt  I,  as 
represented  by  the  internal  sense  in  time,  and  objects  in 
space  outside  me,  are  two  specifically  different  phenomena, 
but  they  are  not  therefore  conceived  as  different  things. 
The  transcendental  object,  which  forms  the  foundation  of 
external  phenomena,  and  the  other,  which  forms  the 
foundation  of  our  internal  intuition,  is  therefore  [p.  380] 
neither  matter,  nor  a thinking  being  by  itself,  but  simply 
an  unknown  cause  of  phenomena  which  supply  to  us  the 
empirical  concept  of  both. 

If  therefore,  as  evidently  forced  to  do  Ly  this  very 
criticism,  we  remain  faithful  to  the  old  rule,  never  to 
push  questions  beyond  where  possible  experience  can 
supply  us  with  an  object,  we  shall  never  dream  of  going 
beyond  the  objects  of  our  senses  and  asking  what  they 
may  be  by  themselves,  that  is,  without  any  reference  to 
our  senses.  But  if  the  psychologist  likes  to  take  phe- 
nomena for  things  by  themselves,  then,  whether  he  admit 
into  his  system,  as  a materialist,  matter  only,  or,  as  a 
spiritualist,  thinking  beings  only  (according  to  the  form 
of  our  own  internal  sense),  or,  as  a dualist,  both,  as  things 
existing  in  themselves,  he  will  always  be  driven  by  his 
mistake  to  invent  theories  as  to  how  that  which  is  not  a 
thing  by  itself,  but  a phenomenon  only,  could  exist  by  itself. 

CONSIDERATION  [p.  381] 

071  the  Whole  of  Pure  Psychology,  as  affected  by  these 
Paralogisms 

If  we  compare  the  science  of  the  soul,  as  the  physi 
ology  of  the  internal  sense,  with  the  science  of  the  body, 
as  a physiology  of  the  objects  of  external  senses,  we  find, 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


309 


besides  many  things  which  in  both  must  be  known  empiri- 
cally, this  important  difference,  that  in  the  latter  many 
things  can  be  known  a priori  from  the  mere  concept  of 
an  extended  and  impermeable  being,  while  in  the  former 
nothing  can  be  known  a priori  and  synthetically  from 
the  concept  of  a thinking  being.  The  cause  is  this. 
Though  both  are  phenomena,  yet  the  phenomena  of  the 
external  sense  have  something  permanent,  which  sug- 
gests a substratum  of  varying  determinations,  and  conse- 
quently a synthetical  concept,  namely,  that  of  space,  and 
of  a phenomenon  in  space ; while  time,  the  only  form 
of  our  internal  intuition,  has  nothing  permanent,  and 
makes  us  to  know  the  change  of  determinations  only, 
but  not  the  determinable  object.  For  in  what  we  call 
soul  there  is  a continuous  flux,  and  nothing  permanent, 
except  it  may  be  (if  people  will  so  have  it)  the  simple 
/,  so  simple  because  this  representation  has  no  contents, 
consequently  nothing  manifold,  so  that  it  seems  to  repre- 
sent, or  more  accurately  to  indicate,  a simple  [p.  382] 
object.  This  I or  Ego  would  have  to  be  an  intuition, 
which,  being  presupposed  in  all  thought  (before  all  experi- 
ence), might  as  an  intuition  a priori  supply  synthetical 
propositions,  if  it  should  be  possible  to  get  any  know- 
ledge by  pure  reason  of  the  nature  of  a thinking  being 
in  general.  But  this  I is  neither  an  intuition  nor  a 
concept  of  any  object,  but  the  mere  form  of  conscious- 
ness which  can  accompany  both  classes  of  representa- 
tions, and  impart  to  them  the  character  of  knowledge, 
provided  something  else  be  given  in  intuition  which 
supplies  matter  for  a representation  of  an  object.  Thus 
we  see  that  the  whole  of  rational  psychology  is  impossi- 
ble as  transcending  the  powers  of  human  reason,  and 


3TO 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


nothing  remains  to  us  but  to  study  our  soul  under  the 
guidance  of  experience,  and  to  keep  ourselves  within  the 
limits  of  questions  which  do  not  go  beyond  the  line 
where  the  material  can  be  supplied  by  possible  internal 
experience. 

But  although  rational  psychology  is  of  no  use  in  ex- 
tending our  knowledge,  but  as  such  is  made  up  of  paral- 
ogisms only,  we  cannot  deny  to  it  an  important  negative 
utility,  if  it  does  not  pretend  to  be  more  than  a critical 
investigation  of  our  dialectical  syllogisms,  as  framed  by 
our  common  and  natural  reason. 

What  purpose  can  be  served  by  psychology  [p.  383] 
founded  on  pure  principles  of  reason  ? Its  chief  pur- 
pose is  meant  to  be  to  guard  our  thinking  self  against 
the  danger  of  materialism.  This  purpose  however  is 
answered,  as  we  have  shown,  by  the  concept  which  rea- 
son gives  of  our  thinking  self.  For,  so  far  from  there 
being  any  fear  lest,  if  matter  be  taken  away,  all  thought, 
and  even  the  existence  of  thinking  beings  might  vanish, 
it  has  been  on  the  contrary  clearly  shown  that,  if  we  take 
away  the  thinking  subject,  the  whole  material  world  would 
vanish,  because  it  is  nothing  but  a phenomenon  in  the 
sensibility  of  our  own  subject,  and  a certain  class  of  its 
representations. 

It  is  true  that  I do  not  know  thus  this  thinking  self 
any  better  according  to  its  qualities,  nor  can  I perceive 
its  permanence,  or  even  the  independence  of  its  exist- 
ence from  the  problematical  transcendental  substratum 
of  external  phenomena,  both  being  necessarily  unknown 
to  us.  But  as  it  is  nevertheless  possible  that  I may 
find  reason,  from  other  than  purely  speculative  causes, 
to  hope  for  an  independent,  and,  during  every  possible 


Transcende7ital  Dialectic 


31 1 

change  of  my  states,  permanently  abiding  existence  of 
my  thinking  nature,  much  is  gained  if,  though  I freely 
confess  my  own  ignorance,  I can  nevertheless  repel  the 
dogmatical  attacks  of  a speculative  opponent,  [p.  384] 
showing  to  him  that  he  can  never  know  more  of  the  nat- 
ure of  the  subject,  in  order  to  deny  the  possibility  of 

my  expectations,  than  I can  know,  in  order  to  cling  to 

them. 

Three  dialectical  questions,  which  form  the  real  object 
of  all  rational  psychology,  are  founded  on  this  transcen- 
dental illusion  of  our  psychological  concepts,  and  cannot 
be  answered  except  by  means  of  the  considerations  in 
which  we  have  just  been  engaged,  namely,  (1)  the  ques- 
tion of  the  possibility  of  the  association  of  the  soul  with 
an  organic  body,  that  is,  of  animality  and  the  state  of 

the  soul  in  the  life  of  man;  (2)  the  question  of  the  be- 

ginning of  that  association  of  the  soul  at  the  time  and 
before  the  time  of  our  birth  ; (3)  the  question  of  the 
end  of  that  association  of  the  soul  at  and  after  the 
time  of  death  (immortality). 

What  I maintain  is,  that  all  the  difficulties  which  we 
imagine  to  exist  in  these  questions,  and  with  which,  as 
dogmatical  objections,  people  wish  to  give  themselves  an 
air  of  deeper  insight  into  the  nature  of  things  than  the 
common  understanding  can  ever  claim,  rest  on  a mere 
illusion,  which  leads  us  to  hypostasise  what  exists  in 
thought  only,  and  to  accept  it  in  the  same  quality  in 
which  it  is  thought  as  a real  object,  outside  the  think- 
ing subject,  taking  in  fact  extension,  which  is  phenomenal 
only,  for  a quality  of  external  things,  existing  [p.  385] 
without  our  sensibility  also,  and  movement  as  their  effect, 
taking  place  by  itself  also,  and  independently  of  our 


312 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


senses.  For  matter,  the  association  of  which  with  the 
soul  causes  so  much  misgiving,  is  nothing  but  a mere 
orm,  or  a certain  mode  of  representing  an  unknown 
object  by  that  intuition  which  we  call  the  external 
sense.  There  may,  therefore,  well  be  something  outside 
us  to  which  the  phenomenon  which  we  call  matter  cor- 
responds ; though  in  its  quality  of  phenomenon  it  cannot 
be  outside  us,  but  merely  as  a thought  within  us,  although 
that  thought  represents  it  through  the  external  sense  as 
existing  outside  us.  Matter,  therefore,  does  not  signify 
a class  of  substances  totally  heterogeneous  and  different 
from  the  object  of  the  internal  sense  (the  soul),  but  only 
the  different  nature  of  the  phenomenal  appearance  of 
objects  (in  themselves  unknown  to  us),  the  representations 
of  which  we  call  external,  as  compared  with  those  which 
we  assign  to  the  internal  sense,  although,  like  other 
thoughts,  those  external  representations  also  belong  to 
the  thinking  subject  only.  They  possess  however  this 
illusion  that,  as  they  represent  objects  in  space,  they  seem 
to  separate  themselves  from  the  soul  and  to  move  out- 
side it,  although  even  the  space,  in  which  they  are  seen, 
is  nothing  but  a representation  of  which  no  homogeneous 
original  can  ever  be  found  outside  the  soul.  The  question 
therefore  is  no  longer  as  to  the  possibility  of  an  associa- 
tion of  the  soul  with  other  known  and  foreign  [p.  386] 
substances  outside  us,  but  only  as  to  the  connection  of 
the  representations  of  the  internal  sense  with  the  modi- 
fications of  our  external  sensibility,  and  how  these  can 
be  connected  with  each  other  according  to  constant  laws, 
and  acquire  cohesion  in  experience. 

So  long  as  we  connect  internal  and  external  phenomena 
with  each  other  as  mere  representations  in  our  experience, 


Transcendental  Dialectic  313 

there  is  nothing  irrational,  nor  anything  to  make  the  asso- 
ciation of  both  senses  to  appear  strange.  As  soon  how- 
ever as  we  hypostatise  the  external  phenomena,  looking 
upon  them  no  longer  as  representations,  but  as  things 
existing  by  themselves  and  outside  us,  with  the  same  qual- 
ity in  which  they  exist  inside  us,  and  referring  to  our  own 
thinking  subject  their  acts  which  they,  as  phenomena, 
show  in  their  mutual  relation,  the  effective  causes  outside 
us  assume  a character  which  will  not  harmonise  with  their 
effects  within  us,  because  that  character  refers  to  the  ex- 
ternal senses  only,  but  the  effects  to  the  internal  sense, 
both  being  entirely  unhomogeneous,  though  united  in  the 
same  subject.  We  then  have  no  other  external  effects 
but  changes  of  place,  and  no  forces  but  tendencies,  which 
have  for  their  effects  relations  in  space  only.  Within  us, 
on  the  contrary,  those  effects  are  mere  thoughts,  without 
any  relations  of  space,  movement,  shape,  or  local  [p.  387] 
determination  between  them ; and  we  entirely  lose  the 
thread  of  the  causes  in  the  effects  which  ought  to  show 
themselves  in  the  internal  sense.  We  ought  to  consider 
therefore  that  bodies  are  not  objects  by  themselves  which 
are  present  to  us,  but  a mere  appearance  of  we  do  not 
know  what  unknown  object,  and  that  movement  likewise 
is  not  the  effect  of  that  unknown  cause,  but  only  the 
appearance  of  its  influence  on  our  senses.  Both  are  not 
something  outside  us,  but  only  representation  within  us, 
and  consequently  it  is  not  the  movement  of  matter  which 
produces  representations  within  us,  but  that  motion  itself 
(and  matter  also,  which  makes  itself  known  through  it)  is 
representation  only.  Our  whole  self-created  difficulty 
turns  on  this,  how  and  why  the  representations  of  our 
sensibility  are  so  connected  with  each  other  that  those 


314  Transcendental  Dialectic 

which  we  call  external  intuitions  can,  according  to  em- 
pirical laws,  be  represented  as  objects  outside  us ; a ques- 
tion which  is  entirely  free  from  the  imagined  difficulty  of 
explaining  the  origin  of  our  representations  from  totally 
heterogeneous  efficient  causes,  existing  outside  us,  the 
confusion  arising  from  our  mistaking  the  phenomenal  ap- 
pearance of  an  unknown  cause  for  the  very  cause  outside 
us.  In  judgments  in  which  there  is  a misapprehension 
confirmed  by  long  habit,  it  is  impossible  to  bring  its  cor- 
rection at  once  to  that  clearness  which  can  be  [p.  388] 
produced  in  other  cases,  where  no  inevitable  illusion  con- 
fuses our  concept.  Our  attempt  therefore  at  freeing  rea- 
son from  these  sophistical  theories  can  hardly  claim  as  yet 
that  perspicuity  which  would  render  it  perfectly  satisfac- 
tory. I hope  however  to  arrive  at  greater  lucidity  in  the 
following  manner. 

All  objections  may  be  divided  into  dogmatical,  critical, 
and  sceptical.  The  dogmatical  attacks  the  proposition,  the 
critical  the  proof  of  a proposition.  The  former  presup- 
poses an  insight  into  the  peculiar  nature  of  the  object 
in  order  to  be  able  to  assert  the  contrary  of  what  the 
proposition  asserts.  It  is  therefore  itself  dogmatical,  and 
pretends  to  know  the  peculiar  nature  of  the  object  in 
question  better  than  the  opponent.  The  critical  objec- 
tion, as  it  says  nothing  about  the  worth  or  worthlessness 
of  the  proposition,  and  attacks  the  proof  only,  need  not 
know  the  object  itself  better,  or  claim  a better  knowledge 
of  it.  All  it  wants  to  show  is,  that  a proposition  is  not 
well  grounded,  not  that  it  is  false.  The  sceptical  objec- 
tion, lastly,  places  assertion  and  denial  side  by  side,  as 
of  equal  value,  taking  one  or  the  other  now  as  dogma, 
and  now  as  denial ; and  being  thus  in  appearance  dog- 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


315 


matical  on  both  sides,  it  renders  every  judgment  [p.  389] 
on  the  object  impossible.  Both  the  dogmatical  and  scep- 
tical objections  must  pretend  to  so  much  knowledge  of 
their  object  as  is  necessary  in  order  to  assert  or  deny 
anything  about  it.  The  critical  objection,  on  the  con- 
trary, wishes  only  to  show  that  something  purely  futile 
and  fanciful  has  been  used  in  support  of  a proposition, 
and  thus  upsets  a theory  by  depriving  it  of  its  pretended 
foundation,  without  wishing  to  establish  itself  anything 
else  about  the  nature  of  the  object. 

According  to  the  ordinary  concepts  of  our  reason  with 
regard  to  the  association  between  our  thinking  subject 
and  the  things  outside  us,  we  are  dogmatical,  and  look 
upon  them  as  real  objects,  existing  independently  of  our- 
selves, in  accordance  with  a certain  transcendental  dualism 
which  does  not  reckon  external  phenomena  as  representa- 
tions belonging  to  the  subject,  but  places  them,  as  they 
are  given  us  in  sensuous  intuition,  as  objects  outside  us 
and  entirely  separated  from  the  thinking  subject.  This 
mere  assumption  is  the  foundation  of  all  theories  on  the 
association  between  soul  and  body.  It  is  never  asked 
whether  this  objective  reality  of  phenomena  is  absolutely 
true,  but  it  is  taken  for  granted,  and  the  only  question 
seems  to  be,  how  it  is  to  be  explained  and  understood. 
The  three  systems  which  are  commonly  sug-  [p.390] 
gested,  and  which  in  fact  are  alone  possible,  are  those, 
1st,  of  physical  influence,  2nd,  of  pre-established  harmony, 
and  3rd,  of  supernatural  assistance. 

The  second  and  third  explanations  of  the  association 
between  soul  and  matter  arise  from  objections  to  the  first, 
which  is  that  of  the  ordinary  understanding,  the  objection 
being,  that  what  appears  as  matter  cannot  by  its  imme- 


316 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


diate  influence  be  the  cause  of  representations,  these  being 
a totally  heterogeneous  class  of  effects.  Those  who  start 
this  objection  cannot  understand  by  the  objects  of  the 
external  senses  matter,  conceived  as  phenomenon  only, 
and  therefore  itself  a mere  representation  produced  by 
whatever  external  objects.  For  in  that  case  they  would 
really  say  that  the  representations  of  external  objects 
(phenomena)  cannot  be  the  external  causes  of  the  repre- 
sentations in  our  mind,  which  would  be  a meaningless 
objection,  because  nobody  would  think  of  taking  for  an 
external  cause  what  he  knows  to  be  a mere  representation. 
According  to  our  principles  the  object  of  their  theory  can 
only  be,  that  that  which  is  the  true  (transcendental)  object 
of  our  external  senses  cannot  be  the  cause  of  those  repre- 
sentations (phenomena)  which  we  mean  by  the  name  of 
matter.  As  no  one  has  any  right  to  say  that  he  [p.  391] 
knows  anything  of  the  transcendental  cause  of  the  repre- 
sentations of  our  external  senses,  their  assertion  is  entirely 
groundless.  And  if  the  pretended  reformers  of  the  doc- 
trine of  physical  influence  represent,  according  to  the 
ordinary  views  of  transcendental  dualism,  matter,  as  such, 
as  a thing  by  itself  (not  simply  as  a mere  phenomenal 
appearance  of  an  unknown  thing),  and  then  proceed  in 
their  objections  to  show  that  such  an  external  object, 
which  shows  no  causality  but  that  of  movements,  can 
never  be  the  efficient  cause  of  representations,  but  that  a 
third  being  must  intervene  in  order  to  produce,  if  not 
reciprocal  action,  at  least  correspondence  and  harmony 
between  the  two,  they  would  really  begin  their  refutation 
by  admitting  in  their  dualism  the  irposTOv  yjrevBos  of  a 
physical  influence,  and  thus  refute  by  their  objection,  not 
so  much  the  physical  influence  as  their  own  dualistic 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


317 


premisses.  For  all  the  difficulties  with  regard  to  a possi- 
ble connection  between  a thinking  nature  and  matter 
arise,  without  exception,  from  that  too  readily  admitted 
dualistic  representation,  namely,  that  matter,  as  such,  is 
not  phenomenal,  that  is,  a mere  representation  of  the 
mind  to  which  an  unknown  object  corresponds,  but  the 
object  itself,  such  as  it  exists  outside  us,  and  independent 
of  all  sensibility.  [p.  392] 

It  is  impossible,  therefore,  to  start  a dogmatical  objec- 
tion against  the  commonly  received  theory  of  a physical 
influence.  For  if  the  opponent  were  to  say  that  matter 
and  its  movements  are  purely  phenomenal  and  therefore 
mere  representations,  the  only  difficulty  remaining  to  him 
would  be  that  the  unknown  object  of  our  senses  could  not 
be  the  cause  of  our  representations,  and  this  he  has  no 
right  to  say,  because  no  one  is  able  to  determine  what  an 
unknown  object  may  or  may  not  be  able  to  effect;  and, 
according  to  our  former  arguments,  he  must  necessarily 
admit  this  transcendental  idealism,  unless  he  wishes  to 
hypostasise  mere  representations  and  place  them  outside 
himself  as  real  things. 

What  is  quite  possible,  however,  is  to  raise  a well- 
founded  critical  objection  to  the  commonly  received  opinion 
of  a physical  influence.  For  the  pretended  association 
between  two  kinds  of  substances,  the  one  thinking,  the 
other  extended,  rests  on  a coarse  dualism,  and  changes 
the  latter,  though  they  are  nothing  but  representations  of 
the  thinking  subject,  into  things  existing  by  themselves. 
Thus  the  misunderstood  physical  influence  may  be  entirely 
upset  by  showing  that  the  proof  which  was  to  establish  it, 
was  surreptitiously  obtained,  and  therefore,  valueless. 

The  notorious  problem,  therefore,  as  to  a possible  asso- 


3 1 8 Transcendental  Dialectic 

ciation  between  the  thinking  and  the  extended,  would, 
when  all  that  is  purely  imaginative  is  deducted,  [p.  393] 
come  to  this,  how  external  intuition,  namely,  that  of  space 
(or  what  fills  space,  namely,  form  and  movement),  is  pos- 
sible in  any  thinking  subject  ? To  this  question,  however, 
no  human  being  can  return  an  answer,  and  instead  of 
attempting  to  fill  this  gap  in  our  knowledge,  all  we  can  do 
is  to  indicate  it  by  ascribing  external  phenomena  to  a 
transcendental  object  as  the  cause  of  this  class  of  repre- 
sentations, but  which  we  shall  never  know,  nor  be  able  to 
form  any  concept  of.  In  all  practical  questions  we  treat 
phenomena  as  objects  by  themselves,  without  troubling 
ourselves  about  the  first  cause  of  their  possibility  (as 
phenomena).  But  as  soon  as  we  go  beyond,  the  concept 
of  a transcendental  object  becomes  inevitable. 

The  decision  of  all  the  discussions  on  the  state  of  a 
thinking  being,  before  this  association  with  matter  (life) 
or  after  the  ceasing  of  such  association  (death),  depends 
on  the  remarks  which  we  have  just  made  on  the  associa- 
tion between  the  thinking  and  the  extended.  The  opinion 
that  the  thinking  subject  was  able  to  think  before  any 
association  with  bodies,  would  assume  the  following  form, 
that  before  the  beginning  of  that  kind  of  sensi-  [p.  394] 
bility  through  which  something  appears  to  us  in  space,  the 
same  transcendental  objects,  which  in  our  present  state 
appear  as  bodies,  could  have  been  seen  in  a totally  differ- 
ent way.  The  other  opinion  that,  after  the  cessation  of 
its  association  with  the  material  world,  the  soul  could 
continue  to  think,  would  be  expressed  as  follows  : that,  if 
that  kind  of  sensibility  through  which  transcendental  and, 
for  the  present,  entirely  unknown  objects  appear  to  us  as 
a material  world,  should  cease,  it  would  not  follow  that 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


319 


thereby  all  intuition  of  them  would  be  removed  : it  being 
quite  possible  that  the  same  unknown  objects  should  con- 
tinue to  be  known  by  the  thinking  subject,  although  no 
longer  in  the  quality  of  bodies. 

Now  it  is  quite  true  that  no  one  can  produce  from  spec- 
ulative principles  the  smallest  ground  for  such  an  asser- 
tion, or  do  more  than  presuppose  its  possibility,  but 
neither  can  any  valid  dogmatical  objection  be  raised 
against  it.  For  whoever  would  attempt  to  do  so,  would 
know  neither  more  nor  less  than  I myself,  or  anybody 
else,  about  the  absolute  and  internal  cause  of  external  and 
material  phenomena.  As  he  cannot  pretend  to  know  on 
what  the  reality  of  external  phenomena  in  our  present 
state  (in  life)  really  rests,  neither  can  he  know  that  the 
condition  of  all  external  intuition,  or  the  thinking  subject 
itself,  will  cease  after  this  state  (in  death).  [p.  395] 

We  thus  see  that  all  the  wrangling  about  the  nature  of 
a thinking  being,  and  its  association  with  the  material 
world,  arises  simply  from  our  filling  the  gap,  due  to  our 
ignorance,  with  paralogisms  of  reason,  and  by  changing 
thoughts  into  things  and  hypostasising  them.  On  this  an 
imaginary  science  is  built  up,  both  by  those  who  assert 
and  by  those  who  deny,  some  pretending  to  know  about 
objects  of  which  no  human  being  has  any  conception, 
while  others  make  their  own  representations  to  be  objects, 
all  turning  round  in  a constant  circle  of  ambiguities  and 
contradictions.  Nothing  but  a sober,  strict,  and  just 
criticism  can  free  us  of  this  dogmatical  illusion,  which, 
through  theories  and  systems,  deceives  so  many  by  an 
imaginary  happiness.  It  alone  can  limit  our  speculative 
pretensions  to  the  sphere  of  possible  experience,  and 
this  not  by  a shallow  scoffing  at  repeated  failures  or  by 


320 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


pious  sighs  over  the  limits  of  our  reason,  but  by  a demar- 
cation made  according  to  well-established  principles,  writ- 
ing the  nihil  ulterins  with  perfect  assurance  on  those 
Herculean  columns  which  Nature  herself  has  erected,  in 
order  that  the  voyage  of  our  reason  should  be  continued 
so  far  only  as  the  continuous  shores  of  experience  extend 
— shores  which  we  can  never  forsake  without  [p.  396] 
being  driven  upon  a boundless  ocean,  which,  after  deceiv- 
ing us  again  and  again,  makes  us  in  the  end  cease  all  our 
laborious  and  tedious  endeavours  as  perfectly  hopeless. 
******** 

We  have  yet  to  give  a general  and  clear  investigation  of 
the  transcendental,  and  yet  natural  illusion,  produced  by 
the  paralogisms  of  pure  reason,  and  the  justification  of  our 
systematical  arrangement  of  them,  which  ran  parallel  with 
the  table  of  the  categories.  We  could  not  have  done  this 
at  the  beginning  of  this  section,  without  running  the  risk 
of  becoming  obscure,  or  inconveniently  anticipating  our 
arguments.  We  shall  now  try  to  fulfil  our  duty. 

All  illusion  may  be  explained  as  mistaking  the  subjec- 
tive condition  of  thought  for  the  knowledge  of  the  object. 
In  the  introduction  to  the  transcendental  Dialectic,  we 
showed  that  pure  reason  is  occupied  exclusively  with  the 
totality  of  the  synthesis  of  conditions  belonging  to  any- 
thing conditioned.  Now  as  the  dialectical  illusion  of  pure 
reason  cannot  be  an  empirical  illusion,  such  as  occurs  in  cer- 
tain empirical  kinds  of  knowledge,  it  can  refer  only  to  the 
conditions  of  thought  in  general,  so  that  there  can  [p.  397] 
only  be  three  cases  of  the  dialectical  use  of  pure  reason  : — 

1.  The  synthesis  of  the  conditions  of  a thought  in 
general. 

2.  The  synthesis  of  the  conditions  of  empirical  thought. 


Transce?idental  Dialectic 


321 


3.  The  synthesis  of  the  conditions  of  pure  thought. 

In  every  one  of  these  three  cases  pure  reason  is  occu- 
pied only  with  the  absolute  totality  of  that  synthesis,  that 
is,  with  that  condition,  which  is  itself  unconditioned.  It 
is  on  this  division  also  that  the  threefold  transcendental 
illusion  is  founded  which  leads  to  three  subdivisions  of  the 
Dialectic,  and  to  as  many  pretended  sciences  flowing  from 
pure  reason,  namely,  transcendental  psychology,  cosmol- 
ogy, and  theology.  We  are  at  present  concerned  with  the 
first  only. 

As,  in  thinking  in  general,  we  take  no  account  of  the 
relation  of  our  thoughts  to  any  object  (whether  of  the 
senses  or  of  the  pure  understanding),  what  is  called  (1) 
the  synthesis  of  the  conditions  of  a thought  in  general,  is 
not  objective  at  all,  but  only  a synthesis  of  thought  with 
the  subject,  which  synthesis  is  wrongly  taken  for  the 
synthetical  representation  of  an  object. 

It  follows  from  this  that  the  dialectical  conclusion  as  to 
the  condition  of  all  thought  in  general,  which  condition 
itself  is  unconditioned,  does  not  involve  a fault  in  its  con- 
tents (for  it  ignores  all  contents  or  objects),  but  only  a 
fault  in  form,  and  must  therefore  be  called  a [p.  398] 
paralogism. 

As,  moreover,  the  only  condition  which  accompanies  all 
thought  is  the  /,  in  the  general  proposition  / think,  reason 
has  really  to  deal  with  this  condition,  so  far  as  that  condi- 
tion is  itself  unconditioned.  It  is  however  a formal  con- 
dition only,  namely,  the  logical  unity  of  every  thought,  no 
account  being  taken  of  any  object ; but  it  is  represented 
nevertheless  as  an  object  which  I think,  namely,  as  the  I 
itself  and  its  unconditioned  unity. 

If  I were  asked  what  is  the  nature  of  a thing  which 

Y 


322 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


thinks,  I could  not  give  any  answer  a priori,  for  the 
answer  ought  to  be  synthetical,  as  an  analytical  answer 
might  explain  perhaps  the  meaning  of  the  term  “thought,” 
but  could  never  add  any  real  knowledge  of  that  on  which 
the  possibility  of  thought  depends.  For  a synthetical 
solution,  however,  we  should  require  intuition,  and  this 
has  been  entirely  left  out  of  account  in  the  general  form 
given  to  our  problem.  It  is  equally  impossible  to  answer 
the  general  question,  what  is  the  nature  of  a thing  which 
is  moveable,  because  in  that  case  the  impermeable  exten- 
sion (matter)  is  not  given.  But  although  I have  no 
answer  to  return  to  that  question  in  general,  it  might 
seem  that  I could  answer  it  in  a special  case,  namely,  in 
the  proposition  which  expresses  the  self-consciousness,  I 
think.  For  this  I is  the  first  subject,  i.e.  sub-  [p.  399] 
stance,  it  is  simple,  etc.  These,  however,  ought  then  to 
be  propositions  of  experience,  which  nevertheless,  without 
a general  rule  containing  the  conditions  of  the  possibility 
of  thought  in  general  and  a priori,  could  not  contain  such 
predicates  (which  are  not  empirical).  This  consideration 
makes  our  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  a thinking  being 
derived  from  pure  concepts,  which  seemed  at  first  so 
plausible,  extremely  suspicious,  though  we  have  not  yet 
discovered  the  place  where  the  fault  really  lies. 

A further  investigation,  however,  of  the  origin  of  the 
attributes  which  I predicate  of  myself  as  a thinking  being 
in  general,  may  help  us  to  discover  the  fault.  They  are 
no  more  than  pure  categories  by  which  I can  never  think 
a definite  object,  but  only  the  unity  of  the  representations 
which  is  requisite  in  order  to  determine  an  object.  With- 
out a previous  intuition,  no  category  by  itself  can  give  me 
a concept  of  an  object,  for  by  intuition  alone  the  object  is 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


323 


given,  which  afterwards  is  thought  in  accordance  with  a 
category.  In  order  to  declare  a thing  to  be  a substance 
in  phenomenal  appearance,  predicates  of  its  intuition  must 
first  be  given  to  me,  in  which  I may  distinguish  the  per- 
manent from  the  changeable,  and  the  substratum  (the 
thing  in  itself)  from  that  which  is  merely  inher-  [p.  400] 
ent  in  it.  If  I call  a thing  simple  as  a phenomenon, 
what  I mean  is  that  its  intuition  is  a part  of  phenomenal 
appearance,  but  cannot  itself  be  divided  into  parts,  etc. 
But  if  I know  something  to  be  simple  by  a concept  only, 
and  not  by  phenomenal  appearance,  I have  really  no 
knowledge  whatever  of  the  object,  but  only  of  my  concept 
which  I make  to  myself  of  something  in  general,  that  is 
incapable  of  any  real  intuition.  I only  say  that  I think 
something  as  perfectly  simple,  because  I have  really  noth- 
ing to  say  of  it  except  that  it  is  something. 

Now  the  mere  apperception  (the  I)  is  substance  in 
concept,  simple  in  concept,  etc.,  and  so  far  all  the  psycho- 
logical propositions  of  which  we  spoke  before  are  incon- 
testably true.  Nevertheless  what  we  really  wish  to  know 
of  the  soul,  becomes  by  no  means  known  to  us  in  that 
way,  because  all  those  predicates  are  with  regard  to  intui- 
tion non-valid,  entailing  no  consequences  with  regard  to 
objects  of  experience,  and  therefore  entirely  empty.  For 
that  concept  of  substance  does  not  teach  me  that  the  soul 
continues  by  itself,  or  that  it  is  a part  of  external  intui- 
tions, which  itself  cannot  be  resolved  into  parts,  and  can- 
not therefore  arise  or  perish  by  any  changes  of  nature. 
These  are  qualities  which  would  make  the  soul  known  to 
us  in  its  connection  with  experience,  and  might  give  us 
an  insight  into  its  origin  and  future  state.  But  [p.  401] 
if  I say,  by  means  of  the  category  only,  that  the  soul  is 


324 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


a simple  substance,  it  is  clear  that  the  bare  rational  con- 
cept of  substance  contains  nothing  beyond  the  thought 
that  a thing  should  be  represented  as  a subject  in  itself, 
without  becoming  in  turn  a predicate  of  anything  else. 
Nothing  can  be  deduced  from  this,  with  regard  to  the 
permanence  (of  the  I),  nor  can  the  attribute  of  simplicity 
add  that  of  permanence,  nor  can  we  thus  learn  anything 
whatsoever  as  to  the  fate  of  the  soul  in  the  revolutions  of 
the  world.  If  anybody  could  tell  us  that  the  soul  is  a 
simple  part  of  matter , we  might,  with  the  help  of  experi- 
ence, deduce  from  this  the  permanence  and,  on  account 
of  its  simple  nature,  the  indestructibility  of  the  soul. 
But  of  all  this,  the  concept  of  the  I,  in  the  psychological 
proposition  of  / think , tells  us  nothing. 

The  reason  why  that  being  which  thinks  within  us 
imagines  that  it  knows  itself  by  means  of  pure  categories, 
and  especially  by  that  which  expresses  absolute  unity 
under  each  head,  is  this.  The  apperception  itself  is  the 
ground  of  the  possibility  of  the  categories,  and  these 
represent  nothing  but  the  synthesis  of  the  manifold  in 
intuition,  so  far  as  it  has  unity  in  apperception.  Self-con- 
sciousness therefore  is  the  representation  of  that  which 
forms  the  condition  of  all  unity,  and  is  itself  uncondi- 
tioned. One  may  therefore  say  of  the  thinking  [p.  402] 
I (the  soul),  which  represents  itself  as  substance,  simple, 
numerically  identical  in  all  time,  and  as  the  correlative  of 
all  existence,  from  which  in  fact  all  other  existence  must 
be  concluded,  that  it  does  not  know  itself  through  the  cate- 
gories, but  knows  the  categories  only,  and  through  them 
all  objects,  in  the  absolute  unity  of  apperception,  that  is, 
through  itself.  It  may  seem  no  doubt  self-evident  that  I 
cannot  know  as  an  object  that  which  is  presupposed  in 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


325 


order  to  enable  me  to  know  an  object,  and  that  the  deter- 
mining self  (thought)  differs  from  the  self  that  is  to  be 
determined  (the  thinking  subject),  like  knowledge  from  its 
object.  Nevertheless  nothing  is  more  natural  or  at  least 
more  tempting  than  the  illusion  which  makes  us  look  upon 
the  unity  in  the  synthesis  of  thoughts  as  a perceived  unity 
in  the  subject  of  thoughts.  One  might  call  it  the  surrep- 
titious admission  of  an  hypostasised  consciousness  ( apper - 
ceptionis  substantiatae). 

If  we  want  to  have  a logical  term  for  the  paralogism  in 
the  dialectical  syllogisms  of  rational  psychology,  based  on 
perfectly  correct  premisses,  it  might  be  called  a sophisma 
figurae  dictionis.  In  the  major  we  use  the  category,  with 
reference  to  its  condition,  transcendentally  only  ; in  the 
minor  and  in  the  conclusion,  we  use  the  same  category, 
with  reference  to  the  soul  which  is  to  be  compre-  [p.  403] 
hended  under  that  condition,  empirically.  Thus,  in  the 
paralogism  of  substantiality,1  the  concept  of  substance  is 
a purely  intellectual  concept  which,  without  the  conditions 
of  sensuous  intuition,  admits  of  a transcendental  use  only, 
that  is,  of  no  use  at  all.  In  the  minor,  however,  we  refer 
the  same  concept  to  the  object  of  all  internal  experience, 
though  without  having  previously  established  the  condi- 
tion of  its  application  in  concreto , namely,  its  permanence. 
We  thus  are  making  an  empirical,  and  therefore  entirely 
inadmissible  use  of  it. 

Lastly,  in  order  to  show  the  systematical  connection  of 
all  these  dialectical  propositions  of  a rationalising  psy- 
chology, according  to  their  connection  in  pure  reason, 
and  thus  to  establish  their  completeness,  it  should  be 


1 Simplicitdt  was  a misprint  for  substantialitdt. 


326 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


remarked  that  the  apperception  is  carried  through  all  the 
classes  of  the  categories,  but  only  with  reference  to  those 
concepts  of  the  understanding,  which  in  each  of  them 
formed  a foundation  of  unity  for  the  others  in  a possible 
perception,  namely  subsistence,  reality,  unity  (not  plu- 
rality), and  existence,  all  of  which  are  here  represented  by 
reason,  as  conditions  (themselves  unconditioned)  of  the 
possibility  of  a thinking  being.  Thus  the  soul  knows  in 
itself : — 


I 


[p.  404] 


The  unconditioned  unity 
of  the  relation, 
that  is, 

itself,  not  as  inherent, 
but  as 
subsisting. 

II  III 


The  unconditioned  unity 
of  quality, 
that  is, 

not  as  a real  whole, 
but  as 
simple.1 


The  unconditioned  unity 
in  the  manifoldness  of  time, 
that  is, 

not  as  at  different  times 
numerically  different, 
but  as 

one  and  the  same  subject. 


IV 


The  unconditioned  unity 
of  existence  in  space, 
that  is, 

not  as  the  consciousness  of  many  things  outside  it, 
but  as  the  consciousness  of  the  existence  of  itself  only, 
and  of  other  things,  merely 
as  its  representations. 


1 How  the  simple  can  again  correspond  to  the  category  of  reality  cannot 
yet  be  explained  here  ; but  will  be  shown  in  the  following  chapter,  when 
another  use  has  to  be  discussed  which  reason  makes  of  the  same  concept. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


327 


Reason  is  the  faculty  of  principles.  The  state-  [p.  405] 
ments  of  pure  psychology  do  not  contain  empirical  predi- 
cates of  the  soul,  but  such  as,  if  they  exist,  are  meant  to 
determine  the  object  by  itself,  independent  of  all  experi- 
ence, and  therefore  by  a pure  reason  only.  They  ought 
therefore  to  rest  on  principles  and  on  general  concepts  of 
thinking  beings.  Instead  of  this  we  find  that  a single 
representation,  I think,1  governs  them  all,  a representation 
which,  for  the  very  reason  that  it  expresses  the  pure 
formula  of  all  my  experience  (indefinitely),  claims  to  be  a 
general  proposition,  applicable  to  all  thinking  beings,  and, 
though  single  in  all  respects,  has  the  appearance  of  an 
absolute  unity  of  the  conditions  of  thought  in  general,  thus 
stretching  far  beyond  the  limits  of  possible  experience.] 


1 Ich  bin  was  a mistake,  it  can  only  be  meant  for  Ich  denke. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC 


BOOK  II 

CHAPTER  II 

THE  ANTINOMY  OF  PURE  REASON 

In  the  Introduction  to  this  part  of  our  work  we  showed 
that  all  the  transcendental  illusion  of  pure  reason  depended 
on  three  dialectical  syllogisms,  the  outline  of  which  is  sup- 
plied to  us  by  logic  in  the  three  formal  kinds  of  the  ordi- 
nary syllogism,  in  about  the  same  way  in  which  the  logical 
outline  of  the  categories  was  derived  from  the  [p.  406] 
four  functions  of  all  judgments.  The  first  class  of  these  1 
rationalising  syllogisms  aimed  at  the  unconditioned  unity 
of  the  subjective  conditions  of  all  representations  (of  the 
subject  or  the  soul)  as  corresponding  to  the  categorical  syl- 
logisms of  reason,  the  major  of  which,  as  the  principle, 
asserts  the  relation  of  a predicate  to  a subject.  The 
second  class  of  the  dialectical  arguments  will,  therefore, 
in  analogy  with  the  hypothetical  syllogisms,  take  for  its 
object  the  unconditioned  unity  of  the  objective  condi- 
tions in  phenomenal  appearance,  while  the  third  class, 
which  has  to  be  treated  in  the  following  chapter,  will  be 
concerned  with  the  unconditioned  unity  of  the  objective 
conditions  of  the  possibility  of  objects  in  general. 

328 


Transce7ide7ital  Dialectic 


329 


It  is  strange,  however,  that  a transcendental  paralogism 
caused  a one-sided  illusion  only,  with  regard  to  our  idea  of 
the  subject  of  our  thought ; and  that  it  is  impossible  to 
find  in  mere  concepts  of  reason  the  slightest  excuse  for 
maintaining  the  contrary.  All  the  advantage  is  on  the 
side  of  pneumatism,  although  it  cannot  hide  the  heredi- 
tary taint  by  which  it  evaporates  into  nought,  when  sub- 
jected to  the  ordeal  of  our  critique. 

The  case  is  totally  different  when  we  apply  reason  to 
the  objective  symthesis  of  phenomena  ; here  reason  tries  at 
first,  with  great  plausibility,  to  establish  its  prin-  [p.  407] 
ciple  of  unconditioned  unity,  but  becomes  soon  entangled 
in  so  many  contradictions,  that  it  must  give  up  its  pre- 
tensions with  regard  to  cosmology  also. 

For  here  we  are  met  by  a new  phenomenon  in  human 
reason,  namely,  a perfectly  natural  Antithetic,  which 
is  not  produced  by  any  artificial  efforts,  but  into  which 
reason  falls  by  itself,  and  inevitably.  Reason  is  no  doubt 
preserved  thereby  from  the  slumber  of  an  imaginary  con- 
viction, which  is  often  produced  by  a purely  one-sided 
illusion  ; but  it  is  tempted  at  the  same  time,  either  to 
abandon  itself  to  sceptical  despair,  or  to  assume  a dog- 
matical obstinacy,  taking  its  stand  on  certain  assertions, 
without  granting  a hearing  and  doing  justice  to  the  argu- 
ments of  the  opponent.  In  both  cases,  a death-blow  is 
dealt  to  sound  philosophy,  although  in  the  former  we 
might  speak  of  the  Euthanasia  of  pure  reason. 

Before  showing  the  scenes  of  discord  and  confusion 
produced  by  the  conflict  of  the  laws  (antinomy)  of  pure 
reason,  we  shall  have  to  make  a few  remarks  in  order  to 
explain  and  justify  the  method  which  we  mean  to  follow 
in  the  treatment  of  this  subject.  I shall  call  all  transcen- 


330 


Tra?iscendental  Dialectic 


dental  ideas,  so  far  as  they  relate  to  the  absolute  totality 
in  the  synthesis  of  phenomena,  cosmical  concepts,  [p.  408] 
partly,  because  of  even  this  unconditioned  totality  on 
which  the  concept  of  the  cosmical  universe  also  rests 
(which  is  itself  an  idea  only),  partly,  because  they  refer 
to  the  synthesis  of  phenomena  only,  which  is  empirical, 
while  the  absolute  totality  in  the  synthesis  of  the  con- 
ditions of  all  possible  things  must  produce  an  ideal  of 
pure  reason,  totally  different  from  the  cosmical  concept, 
although  in  a certain  sense  related  to  it.  As  therefore 
the  paralogisms  of  pure  reason  formed  the  foundation  for 
a dialectical  psychology,  the  antinomy  of  pure  reason  will 
place  before  our  eyes  the  transcendental  principles  of  a 
pretended  pure  (rational)  cosmology,  not  in  order  to  show 
that  it  is  valid  and  can  be  accepted,  but,  as  may  be 
guessed  from  the  very  name  of  the  antinomy  of  reason,  ' 
in  order  to  expose  it  as  an  idea  surrounded  by  deceptive 
and  false  appearances,  and  utterly  irreconcileable  with 
phenomena. 

THE  ANTINOMY  OF  PURE  REASON 
Section  I 

System  of  Cosmological  Ideas 

Before  we  are  able  to  enumerate  these  ideas  according 
to  a principle  and  with  systematic  precision,  we  must  bear 
in  mind, 

1st,  That  pure  and  transcendental  concepts  arise  from 
the  understanding  only,  and  that  reason  does  not  [p.  409] 
in  reality  produce  any  concept,  but  only  frees , it  may  be, 
the  concept  of  the  understanding  of  the  inevitable  limita- 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


331 


tion  of  a possible  experience,  and  thus  tries  to  enlarge  it, 
beyond  the  limits  of  experience,  yet  in  connection  with 
it.  Reason  does  this  by  demanding  for  something  that  is 
given  as  conditioned,  absolute  totality  on  the  side  of  the 
conditions  (under  which  the  understanding  subjects  all 
phenomena  to  the  synthetical  unity).  It  thus  changes 
the  category  into  a transcendental  idea,  in  order  to  give 
absolute  completeness  to  the  empirical  synthesis,  by  con- 
tinuing it  up  to  the  unconditioned  (which  can  never  be 
met  with  in  experience,  but  in  the  idea  only).  In  doing 
this,  reason  follows  the  principle  that,  if  the  conditioned  is 
given,  the  whole  sum  of  conditions,  and  therefore  the  abso- 
lutely unconditioned  must  be  given  likewise,  the  former  being 
impossible  without  the  latter.  Hence  the  transcendental 
ideas  are  in  reality  nothing  but  categories,  enlarged  till 
they  reach  the  unconditioned,  and  those  ideas  must  admit 
of  being  arranged  in  a table,  according  to  the  titles  of  the 
categories. 

2ndly,  Not  all  categories  will  lend  themselves  to  this, 
but  those  only  in  which  the  synthesis  constitutes  a series, 
and  a series  of  subordinated  (not  of  co-ordinated)  condi- 
tions. Absolute  totality  is  demanded  by  reason,  [p.  410] 
with  regard  to  an  ascending  series  of  conditions  only,  not 
therefore  when  we  have  to  deal  with  a descending  line  of 
consequences,  or  with  an  aggregate  of  co-ordinated  condi- 
tions. For,  with  reference  to  something  given  as  condi- 
tioned, conditions  are  presupposed  and  considered  as  given 
with  it,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  as  consequences  do  not 
render  their  conditions  possible,  but  rather  presuppose 
them,  we  need  not,  in  proceeding  to  the  consequences 
(or  in  descending  from  any  given  condition  to  the  condi- 
tioned), trouble  ourselves  whether  the  series  comes  to  an 


332 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


end  or  not,  the  question  as  to  their  totality  being  in  fact 
no  presupposition  of  reason  whatever. 

Thus  we  necessarily  conceive  time  past  up  to  a given 
moment,  as  given,  even  if  not  determinable  by  us.  But 
with  regard  to  time  future,  which  is  not  a condition  of 
arriving  at  time  present,  it  is  entirely  indifferent,  if  we 
want  to  conceive  the  latter,  what  we  may  think  about 
the  former,  whether  we  take  it,  as  coming  to  an  end  some- 
where, or  as  going  on  to  infinity.  Let  us  take  the  series, 
m,  n,  o,  where  n is  given  as  conditioned  by  m , and  at  the 
same  time  as  a condition  of  o.  Let  that  series  ascend 
from  the  conditioned  n to  its  condition  m (/,  k,  i,  etc.), 
and  descend  from  the  condition  n to  the  conditioned  o 
(p,  q , r , etc.).  I must  then  presuppose  the  former  series,  in 
order  to  take  n as  given,  and  according  to  reason  (the  total- 
ity of  conditions)  n is  possible  only  by  means  of  that  series, 
while  its  possibility  depends  in  no  way  on  the  [p.  41 1] 
subsequent  series,  o,  p,  q,  r,  which  therefore  cannot  be  con- 
sidered as  given,  but  only  as  dabilis,  capable  of  being  given. 

I shall  call  the  synthesis  of  a series  on  the  side  of  the 
conditions,  beginning  with  the  one  nearest  to  a given  phe- 
nomenon, and  advancing  to  the  more  remote  conditions, 
regressive ; the  other,  which  on  the  side  of  the  con- 
ditioned advances  from  the  nearest  effect  to  the  more 
remote  ones,  progressive.  The  former  proceeds  in  ante- 
cedent'ia,  the  second  in  consequentia.  Cosmological  ideas 
therefore,  being  occupied  with  the  totality  of  regressive 
synthesis,  proceed  in  antecedentia , not  in  consequentia.  If 
the  latter  should  take  place,  it  would  be  a gratuitous,  not 
a necessary  problem  of  pure  reason,  because  for  a com- 
plete comprehension  of  what  is  given  us  in  experience  we 
want  to  know  the  causes,  but  not  the  effects. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


333 


In  order  to  arrange  a table  of  ideas  in  accordance  with 
the  table  of  the  categories,  we  must  take,  first,  the  two 
original  quanta  of  all  our  intuition,  time  and  space.  Time 
is  in  itself  a series  (and  the  formal  condition  of  all  series), 
and  in  it,  therefore,  with  reference  to  any  given  present, 
we  have  to  distinguish  a priori  the  antecedentia  as  conditions 
(the  past)  from  the  consequentia  (the  future).  Hence  the 
transcendental  idea  of  the  absolute  totality  of  [p.  412] 
the  series  of  conditions  of  anything  conditioned  refers  to 
time  past  only.  The  whole  of  time  past  is  looked  upon, 
according  to  the  idea  of  reason,  as  a necessary  condition  of 
the  given  moment.  With  regard  to  space  there  is  in  it 
no  difference  between  progressus  and  regressus,  because  all 
its  parts  exist  together  and  form  an  aggregate,  but  no 
series.  We  can  look  upon  the  present  moment,  with 
reference  to  time  past,  as  conditioned  only,  but  never  as 
condition,  because  this  moment  arises  only  through  time 
past  (or  rather  through  the  passing  of  antecedent  time). 
But  as  the  parts  of  space  are  not  subordinate  to  one 
another,  but  co-ordinate,  no  part  of  it  is  in  the  condition 
of  the  possibility  of  another,  nor  does  it,  like  time,  con- 
stitute a series  in  itself.  Nevertheless  the  synthesis  by 
which  we  apprehend  the  many  parts  of  space  is  successive, 
takes  place  in  time,  and  contains  a series.  And  as  in  that 
series  of  aggregated  spaces  (as,  for  instance,  of  feet  in  a 
rood)  the  spaces  added  to  a given  space  are  always  the 
condition  of  the  limit  of  the  preceding  spaces,  we  ought  to 
consider  the  measuring  of  a space  also  as  a synthesis  of  a 
series  of  conditions  of  something  given  as  conditioned, 
with  this  difference  only,  that  the  side  of  the  [p.  413] 
conditions  is  by  itself  not  different  from  the  other  side 
which  comprehends  the  conditioned,  so  that  regressus  and 


334 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


progressus  seem  to  be  the  same  in  space.  As  however 
every  part  of  space  is  limited  only,  and  not  given  by 
another,  we  must  look  upon  every  limited  space  as  con- 
ditioned also,  so  far  as  it  presupposes  another  space  as  the 
condition  of  its  limit,  and  so  on.  With  reference  to  limita- 
tion therefore  progressus  in  space  is  also  regressus,  and 
the  transcendental  idea  of  the  absolute  totality  of  the 
synthesis  in  the  series  of  conditions  applies  to  space  also. 
I may  ask  then  for  the  absolute  totality  of  phenomena  in 
space,  quite  as  well  as  in  time  past,  though  we  must  wait 
to  see  whether  an  answer  is  ever  possible. 

Secondly,  reality  in  space,  that  is,  matter,  is  something 
conditioned,  the  parts  of  which  are  its  internal  conditions, 
and  the  parts  of  its  parts,  its  remoter  conditions.  We 
have  therefore  here  a regressive  synthesis  the  absolute 
totality  of  which  is  demanded  by  reason,  but  which  can- 
not take  place  except  by  a complete  division,  whereby  the 
reality  of  matter  dwindles  away  into  nothing,  or  into  that 
at  least  which  is  no  longer  matter,  namely,  the  simple ; 
consequently  we  have  here  also  a series  of  conditions,  and 
a progress  to  the  unconditioned. 

Thirdly,  when  we  come  to  the  categories  of  the  real 
relation  between  phenomena,  we  find  that  the  [p.  414] 
category  of  substance  with  its  accidents  does  not  lend 
itself  to  a transcendental  idea ; that  is,  reason  has  here  no 
inducement  to  proceed  regressively  to  conditions.  We 
know  that  accidents,  so  far  as  they  inhere  in  one  and  the 
same  substance,  are  co-ordinated  with  each  other,  and  do 
not  constitute  a series ; and  with  reference  to  the  sub- 
stance, they  are  not  properly  subordinate  to  it,  but  are  the 
mode  of  existence  of  the  substance  itself.  The  concept 
of  the  substantial  might  seem  to  be  here  an  idea  of  tran- 


Tra?iscendental  Dialectic 


335 


cendental  reason.  This,  however,  signifies  nothing  but 
the  concept  of  the  object  in  general,  which  subsists,  so  far 
as  we  think  in  it  the  transcendental  subject  only,  without 
any  predicates  ; and,  as  we  are  here  speaking  only  of  the 
unconditioned  in  the  series  of  phenomena,  it  is  clear  that 
the  substantial  cannot  be  a part  of  it.  The  same  applies 
to  substances  in  community,  which  are  aggregates  only, 
without  having  an  exponent  of  a series,  since  they  are  not 
subordinate  to  each  other,  as  conditions  of  their  possibil- 
ity, in  the  same  way  as  spaces  were,  the  limits  of  which 
can  never  be  determined  by  itself,  but  always  through 
another  space.  There  remains  therefore  only  the  cate- 
gory of  causality,  which  offers  a series  of  causes  to  a given 
effect,  enabling  us  to  ascend  from  the  latter,  as  the  condi- 
tioned, to  the  former  as  the  conditions,  and  thus  to  answer 
the  question  of  reason.  [p.  415] 

Fourthly,  the  concepts  of  the  possible,  the  real,  and  the 
necessary  do  not  lead  to  any  series,  except  so  far  as  the 
accidental  in  existence  must  always  be  considered  as  con- 
ditioned, and  point,  according  to  a rule  of  the  understand- 
ing, to  a condition  which  makes  it  necessary  to  ascend  to 
a higher  condition,  till  reason  finds  at  last,  only,  in  the 
totality  of  that  series,  the  unconditioned  necessity  which  it 
requires. 

If  therefore  we  select  those  categories  which  necessa- 
rily imply  a series  in  the  synthesis  of  the  manifold,  we 
shall  have  no  more  than  four  cosmological  ideas,  accord- 
to  the  four  titles  of  the  categories. 

I 

Absolute  completeness 
of  the  composition 

of  the  given  whole  of  all  phenomena. 


336 


Tra?isce?idental  Dialectic 


II 


III 


Absolute  completeness 
of  the  division 
of  a given  whole 


Absolute  completeness 
of  the  origination 
of  a phenomenon 
in  general. 


in  phenomenal  appearance. 


IV 


Absolute  completeness 
of  the  dependence  of  the  existence 
of  the  changeable  in  phenomenal  appearance. 


[p.  416] 


It  should  be  remarked,  first , that  the  idea  of  absolute 
totality  refers  to  nothing  else  but  the  exhibition  of  phe- 
nomena, and  not  therefore  to  the  pure  concept,  formed  by 
the  understanding,  of  a totality  of  things  in  general.  Phe- 
nomena, therefore,  are  considered  here  as  given,  and  rea- 
son postulates  the  absolute  completeness  of  the  conditions 
of  their  possibility,  so  far  as  these  conditions  constitute 
a series,  that  is,  an  absolutely  (in  every  respect)  complete 
synthesis,  whereby  phenomena  could  be  exhibited  accord- 
ing to  the  laws  of  the  understanding. 

Secondly , it  is  in  reality  the  unconditioned  alone  which 
reason  is  looking  for  in  the  synthesis  of  conditions,  con- 
tinued regressively  and  serially,  as  it  were  a completeness 
in  the  series  of  premisses,  which  taken  together  require  no 
further  premisses.  This  unconditioned  is  always  con- 
tained in  the  absolute  totality  of  a series,  as  represented  in 
imagination.  But  this  absolutely  complete  synthesis  is 
again  an  idea  only,  for  it  is  impossible  to  know  beforehand, 
whether  such  a synthesis  be  possible  in  phenomena.  If  we 
represent  everything  by  means  of  pure  concepts  of  the 
understanding  only,  and  without  the  conditions  of  sensu- 
ous intuition,  we  might  really  say  that  of  everything  given 
as  conditioned  the  whole  series  also  of  conditions,  sub- 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


337 


ordinated  to  each  other,  is  given,  for  the  conditioned  is 
given  through  the  conditions  only.  When  we  come  to 
phenomena,  however,  we  find  a particular  limitation  of 
the  mode  in  which  conditions  are  given,  namely,  [p.  417] 
through  the  successive  synthesis  of  the  manifold  of  intui- 
tion which  should  become  complete  by  the  regressus. 
Whether  this  completeness,  however,  is  possible,  with 
regard  to  sensuous  phenomena,  is  still  a question.  But 
the  idea  of  that  completeness  is  no  doubt  contained  in 
reason,  without  reference  to  the  possibility  or  impossibil- 
ity of  connecting  with  it  adequate  empirical  concepts. 
As  therefore  in  the  absolute  totality  of  the  regressive 
synthesis  of  the  manifold  in  intuition  (according  to  the 
categories  which  represent  that  totality  as  a series  of 
conditions  of  something  given  as  conditioned)  the  uncon- 
ditioned is  necessarily  contained  without  attempting  to 
determine  whether  and  how  such  a totality  be  possible, 
reason  here  takes  the  road  to  start  from  the  idea  of 
totality,  though  her  final  aim  is  the  unconditioned , whether 
of  the  whole  series  or  of  a part  thereof. 

This  unconditioned  may  be  either  conceived  as  existing 
in  the  whole  series  only,  in  which  all  members  without 
exception  are  conditioned  and  the  whole  of  them  only 
absolutely  unconditioned  — - and  in  this  case  the  regressus 
is  called  infinite  — or  the  absolutely  unconditioned  is  only 
a part  of  the  series,  the  other  members  being  subordinate 
to  it,  while  it  is  itself  conditioned  by  nothing  else.1  In  the 


1 The  absolute  total  of  a series  of  conditions  of  anything  given  as  con- 
ditioned, is  itself  always  unconditioned;  because  there  are  no  conditions 
beyond  on  which  it  could  depend.  Such  an  absolute  total  of  a series  is,  how- 
ever, an  idea  only,  or  rather  a problematical  concept,  the  possibility  of  which 
has  to  be  investigated  with  reference  to  the  mode  in  which  the  unconditioned, 


338 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


former  case  the  series  is  without  limits  a parte  [p.  418] 
priori  (without  a beginning),  that  is  infinite ; given  how- 
ever as  a whole  in  which  the  regressus  is  never  complete, 
and  can  therefore  be  called  infinite  potentially  only.  In 
the  latter  case  there  is  something  that  stands  first  in 
the  series,  which,  with  reference  to  time  past,  is  called  the 
beginning  of  the  world;  with  reference  to  space,  the 
limit  of  the  world ; with  reference  to  the  parts  of  a lim- 
ited given  whole,  the  simple ; with  reference  to  causes, 
absolute  spontaneity  (liberty) ; with  reference  to  the  exist- 
ence of  changeable  things,  the  absolute  necessity  of  nature. 

We  have  two  expressions,  world  and  nature,  which  fre- 
quently run  into  each  other.  The  first  denotes  the  math- 
ematical total  of  all  phenomena  and  the  totality  of  their 
synthesis  of  large  and  small  in  its  progress  whether  by 
composition  or  division.  That  world,  however,  is  called 
nature1  if  we  look  upon  it  as  a dynamical  [p.419] 
whole,  and  consider  not  the  aggregation  in  space  and 
time,  in  order  to  produce  a quantity,  but  the  unity  in  the 
existence  of  phenomena.  In  this  case  the  condition  of 
that  which  happens  is  called  cause,  the  unconditioned 
causality  of  the  cause  as  phenomenal,  liberty,  while  the 
conditioned  causality,  in  its  narrower  meaning,  is  called 
natural  cause.  That  of  which  the  existence  is  conditioned 

that  is,  in  reality,  the  transcendental  idea  with  which  we  are  concerned,  may 
be  contained  in  it. 

1 Nature,  if  taken  adjective  ( formaliter ),  is  meant  to  express  the  whole 
complex  of  the  determinations  of  a thing,  according  to  an  inner  principle  of 
causality;  while,  if  taken  substantive  ( materialito -),  it  denotes  the  totality 
of  phenomena,  so  far  as  they  are  all  held  together  by  an  internal  principle  of 
causality.  In  the  former  meaning  we  speak  of  the  nature  of  liquid  matter, 
of  fire,  etc.,  using  the  word  adjective;  while,  if  we  speak  of  the  objects  of 
nature,  or  of  natural  objects,  we  have  in  our  mind  the  idea  of  a subsisting 
whole. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


339 


is  called  contingent,  that  of  which  it  is  unconditioned,  nec- 
essary.  The  unconditioned  necessity  of  phenomena  may 
be  called  natural  necessity. 

I have  called  the  ideas,  which  we  are  at  present  dis- 
cussing, cosmological,  partly  because  we  understand  by 
world  the  totality  of  all  phenomena,  our  ideas  being 
directed  to  that  only  which  is  unconditioned  among  the 
phenomena ; partly,  because  world,  in  its  transcendental 
meaning,  denotes  the  totality  of  all  existing  things,  and  we 
are  concerned  only  with  the  completeness  of  the  synthesis 
(although  properly  only  in  the  regressus  to  the  [p.  420] 
conditions).  Considering,  therefore,  that  all  these  ideas 
are  transcendent  because,  though  not  transcending  in 
kind  their  object,  namely,  phenomena,  but  restricted  to 
the  world  of  sense  (and  excluded  from  all  noumena)  they 
nevertheless  carry  synthesis  to  a degree  which  transcends 
all  possible  experience,  they  may,  according  to  my  opinion, 
very  properly  be  called  costnical  concepts.  With  reference 
to  the  distinction,  however,  between  the  mathematically  or 
the  dynamically  unconditioned  at  which  the  regressus  aims, 
I might  call  the  two  former,  in  a narrower  sense,  cosmi- 
cal  concepts  (macrocosmically  or  microcosmically)  and  the 
remaining  two  transcendent  concepts  of  naUire.  This  dis- 
tinction, though  for  the  present  of  no  great  consequence, 
may  become  important  hereafter. 

THE  ANTINOMY  OF  PURE  REASON 
Section  II 

Antithetic  of  Pure  Reason 

If  every  collection  of  dogmatical  doctrines  is  called 
Thetic , I may  denote  by  Antithetic,  not  indeed  dogmatical 


340 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


assertions  of  the  opposite,  but  the  conflict  between  dif 
ferent  kinds  of  apparently  dogmatical  knowledge  ( thesis 
cum  antithesi),  to  none  of  which  we  can  ascribe  [p.  421] 
a superior  claim  to  our  assent.  This  antithetic,  therefore, 
has  nothing  to  do  with  one-sided  assertions,  but  considers 
general  knowledge  of  reason  with  reference  to  the  con- 
flict only  that  goes  on  in  it,  and  its  causes.  The  tran- 
scendental antithetic  is  in  fact  an  investigation  of  the 
antinomy  of  pure  reason,  its  causes  and  its  results.  If  we 
apply  our  reason,  not  only  to  objects  of  experience,  in 
order  to  make  use  of  the  principles  of  the  understanding, 
but  venture  to  extend  it  beyond  the  limit  of  experience, 
there  arise  rationalising  or  sophistical  propositions,  which 
can  neither  hope  for  confirmation  nor  need  fear  refutation 
from  experience.  Every  one  of  them  is  not  only  in  itself 
free  from  contradiction,  but  can  point  to  conditions  of  its 
necessity  in  the  nature  of  reason  itself,  only  that,  unfortu- 
nately, its  opposite  can  produce  equally  valid  and  nec- 
essary grounds  for  its  support. 

The  questions  which  naturally  arise  in  such  a Dialectic 
of  pure  reason  are  the  following.  1.  In  what  propositions 
is  pure  reason  inevitably  subject  to  an  antinomy?  2.  On 
what  causes  does  this  antinomy  depend?  3.  Whether,  and 
in  what  way,  reason  may,  in  spite  of  this  contradiction, 
find  a way  to  certainty  ? 

A dialectical  proposition  of  pure  reason  must  have  this 
characteristic  to  distinguish  it  from  all  purely  sophistical 
propositions,  first,  that  it  does  not  refer  to  a [p.  422] 
gratuitous  question,  but  to  one  which  human  reason  in  its 
natural  progress  must  necessarily  encounter,  and,  secondly, 
that  it,  as  well  as  its  opposite,  carries  with  itself  not  a 
merely  artificial  illusion,  which  when  once  seen  through 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


341 


disappears,  but  a natural  and  inevitable  illusion,  which, 
even  when  it  deceives  us  no  longer,  always  remains,  and 
though  rendered  harmless,  cannot  be  annihilated. 

This  dialectical  doctrine  will  not  refer  to  the  unity  of 
the  understanding  in  concepts  of  experience,  but  to  the 
unity  of  reason  in  mere  ideas,  the  condition  of  which, 
as  it  is  meant  to  agree,  as  a synthesis  according  to 
rules,  with  the  understanding,  and  yet  at  the  same 
time,  as  the  absolute  unity  of  that  synthesis,  with  rea- 
son, must  either,  if  it  is  adequate  to  the  unity  of 
reason,  be  too  great  for  the  understanding,  or,  if  ade- 
quate to  the  understanding,  too  small  for  reason.  Hence 
a conflict  must  arise,  which  cannot  be  avoided,  do  what 
we  will. 

These  apparently  rational,  but  really  sophistical  asser- 
tions open  a dialectical  battle-field,  where  that  side  always 
obtains  the  victory  which  is  allowed  to  make  the  attack, 
and  where  those  must  certainly  succumb  who  [p.  423] 
are  obliged  to  keep  on  the  defensive.  Hence  doughty 
knights,  whether  fighting  for  the  good  or  the  bad  cause, 
are  sure  to  win  their  laurels,  if  only  they  take  care  that 
they  have  the  right  to  make  the  last  attack,  and  are 
not  obliged  to  stand  a new  onslaught  of  the  enemy.  We 
can  easily  imagine  that  this  arena  has  often  been  entered, 
and  many  victories  have  been  won  on  both  sides,  the  last 
decisive  victory  being  always  guarded  by  the  defender  of 
the  good  cause  maintaining  his  place,  his  opponent  being 
forbidden  ever  to  carry  arms  again.  As  impartial  judges 
we  must  take  no  account  of  whether  it  be  the  good  or  the 
bad  cause  which  the  two  champions  defend.  It  is  best 
to  let  them  fight  it  out  between  themselves  in  the  hope 
that,  after  they  have  rather  tired  out  than  injured  each 


342 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


other,  they  may  themselves  perceive  the  uselessness  of 
their  quarrel,  and  part  as  good  friends. 

This  method  of  watching  or  even  provoking  such  a 
conflict  of  assertions,  not  in  order  to  decide  in  favour  of 
one  or  the  other  side,  but  in  order  to  find  out  whether  the 
object  of  the  struggle  be  not  a mere  illusion,  which  every- 
body tries  to  grasp  in  vain,  and  which  never  can  be  of 
any  use  to  any  one,  even  if  no  resistance  were  [p.  424] 
made  to  him,  this  method,  I say,  may  be  called  the 
sceptical  method.  It  is  totally  different  from  scepticism, 
or  that  artificial  and  scientific  agnosticism  which  under- 
mines the  foundations  of  all  knowledge,  in  order  if  pos- 
sible to  leave  nothing  trustworthy  and  certain  anywhere. 
The  sceptical  method,  on  the  contrary,  aims  at  certainty, 
because,  while  watching  a contest  which  on  both  sides  is 
carried  on  honestly  and  intelligently,  it  tries  to  discover 
the  point  where  the  misunderstanding  arises,  in  order  to 
do  what  is  done  by  wise  legislators,  namely,  to  derive  from 
the  embarrassments  of  judges  in  law-suits  information  as 
to  what  is  imperfectly,  or  not  quite  accurately,  determined 
in  their  laws.  The  antinomy  which  shows  itself  in  the 
application  of  laws,  is,  considering  our  limited  wisdom, 
the  best  criterion  of  the  original  legislation  (nomothetic), 
and  helps  to  attract  the  attention  of  reason,  which  in 
abstract  speculations  does  not  easily  become  aware  of 
its  errors,  to  the  important  points  in  the  determination 
of  its  principles. 

This  sceptical  method  is  essential  in  transcendental 
philosophy  only,  while  it  may  be  dispensed  with  in 
other  fields  of  investigation.  It  would  be  absurd  in 
mathematics,  for  no  false  assertions  can  there  be  hidden 
or  rendered  invisible,  because  the  demonstra-  [p.  425] 


Tra7iscendental  Dialectic 


343 


tions  must  always  be  guided  by  pure  intuition,  and  pro- 
ceed by  evident  synthesis.  In  experimental  philosophy 
a doubt,  which  causes  delay,  may  be  useful,  but  at  least 
no  misunderstanding  is  possible  that  could  not  be  easily 
removed,  and  the  final  means  for  deciding  a question, 
whether  found  sooner  or  later,  must  always  be  supplied 
by  experience.  Moral  philosophy  too  can  always  pro- 
duce its  principles  and  their  practical  consequences  in 
the  concrete  also,  or  at  least  in  possible  experience,  and 
thus  avoid  the  misunderstandings  inherent  in  abstraction. 
Transcendental  assertions,  on  the  contrary,  pretending  to 
knowledge  far  beyond  the  field  of  possible  experience, 
can  never  produce  their  abstract  synthesis  in  any  intui- 
tion a priori , nor  can  their  flaws  be  discovered  by  means 
of  any  experience.  Transcendental  reason,  therefore, 
admits  of  no  other  criterion  but  an  attempt  to  combine 
its  conflicting  assertions,  and  therefore,  previous  to  this, 
unrestrained  conflict  between  them.  This  is  what  we 
shall  now  attempt  to  do.1 

1 The  antinomies  follow  each  other,  according  to  the  order  of  the  tran- 
scendental ideas  mentioned  before  [p.  335  = p.  415]. 


344 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


[p.  426] 


Thesis 


THE  ANTINOMY 

FIRST  CONFLICT  OF  THE 


Thesis 

The  world  has  a beginning  in  time,  and  is  limited  also 
with  regard  to  space. 


Proof 

For  if  we  assumed  that  the  world  had  no  beginning  in 
time,  then  an  eternity  must  have  elapsed  up  to  every  given 
point  of  time,  and  therefore  an  infinite  series  of  succes- 
sive states  of  things  must  have  passed  in  the  world. 
The  infinity  of  a series,  however,  consists  in  this,  that 
it  never  can  be  completed  by  means  of  a successive 
synthesis.  Hence  an  infinite  past  series  of  worlds  is 
impossible,  and  the  beginning  of  the  world  a necessary 
condition  of  its  existence.  This  was  what  had  to  be 
proved  first. 

With  regard  to  the  second,  let  us  assume  again  the 
opposite.  In  that  case  the  world  would  be  given  as  an 
infinite  whole  of  co-existing  things.  Now  we  cannot 
conceive  in  any  way  the  extension  of  a quantum,  which 
is  not  given  within  certain  limits  to  every  intuition,1  ex- 
cept through  the  synthesis  of  its  parts,  nor  [p.  428] 
the  totality  of  such  a quantum  in  any  way,  except  through 

1 We  may  perceive  an  indefinite  quantum  as  a whole,  if  it  is  included  in 
limits,  without  having  to  build  up  its  totality  by  means  of  measuring,  that  is, 
by  the  successive  synthesis  of  its  parts.  The  limits  themselves  determine  its 
completeness,  by  cutting  off  everything  beyond. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


345 


Antithesis 

OF  PURE  REASON  [p.427] 

TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEAS 

Antithesis 

The  world  has  no  beginning  and  no  limits  in  space,  but 
is  infinite,  in  respect  both  to  time  and  space. 

Proof 

For  let  us  assume  that  it  has  a beginning.  Then,  as 
beginning  is  an  existence  which  is  preceded  by  a time  in 
which  the  thing  is  not,  it  would  follow  that  antecedently 
there  was  a time  in  which  the  world  was  not,  that  is,  an 
empty  time.  In  an  empty  time,  however,  it  is  impossible 
that  anything  should  take  its  beginning,  because  of  such 
a time  no  part  possesses  any  condition  as  to  existence 
rather  than  non-existence,  which  condition  could  distin- 
guish that  part  from  any  other  (whether  produced  by  itself 
or  through  another  cause).  Hence,  though  many  a series 
of  things  may  take  its  beginning  in  the  world,  the  world 
itself  can  have  no  beginning,  and  in  reference  to  time  past 
is  infinite. 

With  regard  to  the  second,  let  us  assume  again  the  oppo- 
site, namely,  that  the  world  is  finite  and  limited  in  space. 
In  that  case  the  world  would  exist  in  an  empty  space  with- 
out limits.  We  should  therefore  have  not  only  a relation 
of  things  in  space , but  also  of  things  to  space.  As  how- 
ever the  world  is  an  absolute  whole,  outside  of  [p.  429] 
which  no  object  of  intuition,  and  therefore  no  correlate  of 
the  world  can  be  found,  the  relation  of  the  world  to  empty 


346 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


Thesis 

a completed  synthesis,  or  by  the  repeated  addition  of 
unity  to  itself.1  In  order  therefore  to  conceive  the  world, 
which  fills  all  space,  as  a whole,  the  successive  synthesis 
of  the  parts  of  an  infinite  world  would  have  to  be  looked 
upon  as  completed ; that  is,  an  infinite  time  would  have 
to  be  looked  upon  as  elapsed,  during  the  enumeration 
of  all  co-existing  things.  This  is  impossible.  Hence  an 
infinite  aggregate  of  real  things  cannot  be  regarded  as 
a given  whole,  nor,  therefore,  as  given  at  the  same  time. 
Hence  it  follows  that  the  world  is  not  infinite,  as  regards 
extension  in  space,  but  enclosed  in  limits.  This  was  the 
second  that  had  to  be  proved. 

[p-430]  OBSERVATIONS  ON  THE 

I 

On  the  Thesis 

In  exhibiting  these  conflicting  arguments  I have  not 
tried  to  avail  myself  of  mere  sophisms  for  the  sake  of 
what  is  called  special  pleading,  which  takes  advantage  of 
the  want  of  caution  of  the  opponent,  and  gladly  allows  his 
appeal  to  a misunderstood  law,  in  order  to  establish  his 
own  illegitimate  claims  on  its  refutation.  Every  one  of 
our  proofs  has  been  deduced  from  the  nature  of  the  case, 
and  no  advantage  has  been  taken  of  the  wrong  conclu- 
sions of  dogmatists  on  either  side. 

1 The  concept  of  totality  is  in  this  case  nothing  but  the  representation  of 
the  completed  synthesis  of  its  parts,  because,  as  we  cannot  deduce  the  concept 
from  the  intuition  of  the  whole  (this  being  in  this  case  impossible),  we  can 
conceive  it  only  through  the  synthesis  of  its  parts,  up  to  the  completion  of  the 
infinite,  at  least  in  the  idea. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


34  7 


Antithesis 

space  would  be  a relation  to  no  object.  Such  a relation, 
and  with  it  the  limitation  of  the  world  by  empty  space,  is 
nothing,  and  therefore  the  world  is  not  limited  with  regard 
to  space,  that  is,  it  is  infinite  in  extension. 1 


FIRST  ANTINOMY  [p.431] 

II 

On  the  Antithesis 

The  proof  of  the  infinity  of  the  given  series  of  world, 
and  of  the  totality  of  the  world,  rests  on  this,  that  in  the 

1 Space  is  merely  the  form  of  external  intuition  (formal  intuition)  and  not 
a real  object  that  can  be  perceived  by  external  intuition.  Space,  as  prior  to 
all  things  which  determine  it  (fill  or  limit  it),  or  rather  which  give  an  empiri- 
cal intuition  determined  by  its  form,  is,  under  the  name  of  absolute  space, 
nothing  but  a mere  possibility  of  external  phenomena,  so  far  as  they  either 
exist  already,  or  can  be  added  to  given  phenomena.  Empirical  intuition, 
therefore,  is  not  a compound  of  phenomena  and  of  space  (perception  and 
empty  intuition).  The  one  is  not  a correlate  of  the  other  in  a synthesis,  but 
the  two  are  only  connected  as  matter  and  form  in  one  and  the  same  empirical 
intuition.  If  we  try  to  separate  one  from  the  other,  and  to  place  space  outside 
all  phenomena,  we  arrive  at  a number  of  empty  determinations  of  external 
intuition,  which,  however,  can  never  be  possible  perceptions;  for  instance, 
motion  or  rest  of  the  world  in  an  infinite  empty  space,  i.e.  a determination  of  the 
mutual  relation  of  the  two,  which  can  never  be  perceived,  and  is  therefore 
nothing  but  the  predicate  of  a mere  idea. 


348 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


Thesis 

I might  have  apparently  proved  my  thesis  too  by  put- 
ting forward,  as  is  the  habit  of  dogmatists,  a wrong 
definition  of  the  infinity  of  a given  quantity.  I might 
have  said  that  the  quantity  is  infinite,  if  no  greater  quan- 
tity (that  is,  greater  than  the  number  of  given  units  con- 
tained in  it)  is  possible.  As  no  number  is  the  greatest, 
because  one  or  more  units  can  always  be  added  to  it,  I 
might  have  argued  that  an  infinite  given  quantity,  and 
therefore  also  an  infinite  world  (infinite  as  regards  both 
the  past  series  of  time  and  extension  in  space)  is  impos- 
sible, and  therefore  the  world  limited  in  space  and  time. 
I might  have  done  this,  but,  in  that  case,  my  definition 
would  not  have  agreed  with  the  true  concept  of  an  infinite 
whole.  We  do  not  represent  by  it  how  large  it  is,  and 
the  concept  of  it  is  not  therefore  the  concept  of  a maxi- 
mum, but  we  conceive  by  it  its  relation  only  [p.  432] 
to  any  possible  unit,  in  regard  to  which  it  is  greater 
than  any  number.  According  as  this  unit  is  either  greater 
or  smaller,  the  infinite  would  be  greater  or  smaller,  while 
infinity,  consisting  in  the  relation  only  to  this  given  unit, 
would  always  remain  the  same,  although  the  absolute 
quantity  of  the  whole  would  not  be  known  by  it.  This, 
however,  does  not  concern  us  at  present. 

The  true  transcendental  concept  of  infinity  is,  that  the 
successive  synthesis  of  units  in  measuring  a quantum,  can 
never  be  completed.1  Hence  it  follows  with  perfect  cer- 
tainty, that  an  eternity  of  real  and  successive  states  cannot 
have  elapsed  up  to  any  given  (the  present)  moment,  and 
that  the  world  therefore  must  have  a beginning. 

1 This  quantum  contains  therefore  a multitude  (of  given  units)  which  is 
greater  than  any  number ; this  is  the  mathematical  concept  of  the  infinite. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


349 


Antithesis 

opposite  case  an  empty  time,  and  likewise  an  empty  space, 
would  form  the  limits  of  the  world.  Now  I am  quite 
aware  that  people  have  tried  to  escape  from  this  conclusion 
by  saying  that  a limit  of  the  world,  both  in  time  and  space, 
is  quite  possible,  without  our  having  to  admit  an  absolute 
time  before  the  beginning  of  the  world  or  an  absolute 
space  outside  the  real  world,  which  is  impossible.  I have 
nothing  to  say  against  the  latter  part  of  this  opinion,  held 
by  the  philosophers  of  the  school  of  Leibniz.  Space  is 
only  the  form  of  external  intuition,  and  not  a real  object 
that  could  be  perceived  externally,  nor  is  it  a correlate 
of  phenomena,  but  the  form  of  phenomena  themselves. 
Space,  therefore,  cannot  exist  absolutely  (by  itself)  as  some- 
thing determining  the  existence  of  things,  because  it  is 
no  object,  but  only  the  form  of  possible  objects.  Things, 
therefore,  as  phenomenal,  may  indeed  determine  space, 
that  is,  impart  reality  to  one  or  other  of  its  predicates 
(quantity  and  relation);  but  space,  on  the  other  side,  as 
something  existing  by  itself,  cannot  determine  the  reality 
of  things  in  regard  to  quantity  or  form,  because  it  is  noth- 
ing real  in  itself.  Space  therefore  (whether  full  or  empty  *) 
may  be  limited  by  phenomena,  but  phenomena  cannot  be 
limited  by  empty  space  outside  them.  The  same  [p.  433] 
applies  to  time.  But,  granting  all  this,  it  cannot  be  denied 
that  we  should  be  driven  to  admit  these  two  monsters, 
empty  space  outside,  and  empty  time  before  the  world,  if  we 
assumed  the  limit  of  the  world,  whether  in  space  or  time. 

1 It  is  easily  seen  that  what  we  wish  to  say  is  that  empty  space,  so  far  as 
limited  by  phenomena , that  is,  space  within  the  world,  does  not  at  least  con- 
tradict transcendental  principles,  and  may  be  admitted,  therefore,  so  far  as 
they  are  concerned,  though  by  this  its  possibility  is  not  asserted. 


350 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


Thesis 

With  regard  to  the  second  part  of  the  thesis,  the  diffi- 
culty of  an  endless  and  yet  past  series  does  not  exist ; 
for  the  manifold  of  a world,  infinite  in  extension,  is  given 
at  one  and  the  same  time.  But,  in  order  to  conceive  the 
totality  of  such  a multitude  of  things,  as  we  cannot  appeal 
to  those  limits  which  in  intuition  produce  that  totality  by 
themselves,  we  must  render  an  account  of  our  concept, 
which  in  our  case  cannot  proceed  from  the  whole  to  the 
determined  multitude  of  the  parts,  but  has  to  demonstrate 
the  possibility  of  a whole  by  the  successive  synthesis  of 
the  parts.  As  such  a synthesis  would  constitute  a series 
that  would  never  be  completed,  it  is  impossible  to  con- 
ceive a totality  either  before  it,  or  through  it.  For  the 
concept  of  totality  itself  is  in  this  case  the  representation 
of  a completed  synthesis  of  parts,  and  such  a completion, 
and  therefore  its  concept  also,  is  impossible. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


351 


Antithesis 

For  as  to  the  plea  by  which  people  try  to  escape  from 
the  conclusion,  that  if  the  world  has  limits  in  time  or  space, 
the  infinite  void  would  determine  the  existence  of  real 
things,  so  far  as  their  dimensions  are  concerned,  it  is  really 
no  more  than  a covered  attempt  at  putting  some  unknown 
intelligible  world  in  the  place  of  our  sensuous  world,  and  an 
existence  in  general,  which  presupposes  no  other  condition  in 
the  world,  in  the  place  of  a first  beginning  (an  existence 
preceded  by  a time  of  non-existence),  and  boundaries  of  the 
universe  in  place  of  the  limits  of  extension, — thus  getting 
rid  of  time  and  space.  But  we  have  to  deal  here  with  the 
mundus  phaenomenon  and  its  quantity,  and  we  could  not 
ignore  the  conditions  of  sensibility,  without  destroying  its 
very  essence.  The  world  of  sense,  if  it  is  limited,  lies 
necessarily  within  the  infinite  void.  If  we  ignore  this,  and 
with  it,  space  in  general,  as  an  a priori  condition  of  the 
possibility  of  phenomena,  the  whole  world  of  sense  van- 
ishes, which  alone  forms  the  object  of  our  enquiry.  The 
mundus  intelligibilis  is  nothing  but  the  general  concept  of 
any  world,  which  takes  no  account  of  any  of  the  conditions 
of  intuition,  and  which  therefore  admits  of  no  synthetical 
proposition,  whether  affirmative  or  negative. 


352 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


Thesis 


[p.  434]  THE  ANTINOMY 

SECOND  CONFLICT  OF  THE 
Thesis 

Every  compound  substance  in  the  world  consists  of 
simple  parts,  and  nothing  exists  anywhere  but  the  simple, 
or  what  is  composed  of  it. 

Proof 

For  let  us  assume  that  compound  substances  did  not 
consist  of  simple  parts,  then,  if  all  composition  is  removed 
in  thought,  there  would  be  no  compound  part,  and  (as  no 
simple  parts  are  admitted)  no  simple  part  either,  that  is, 
there  would  remain  nothing,  and  there  would  therefore  be 
no  substance  at  all.  Either,  therefore,  it  is  impossible  to 
remove  all  composition  in  thought,  or,  after  its  removal, 
there  must  remain  something  that  exists  without  composi- 
tion, that  is  the  simple.  In  the  former  case  the  com- 
pound could  not  itself  consist  of  substances  (because  with 
them  composition  is  only  an  accidental  relation  of  sub- 
stances, which  substances,  as  permanent  beings,  must 
subsist  without  it).  As  this  contradicts  the  [p.  436] 
supposition,  there  remains  only  the  second  view,  namely, 
that  the  substantial  compounds  in  the  world  consist  of 
simple  parts. 

It  follows  as  an  immediate  consequence  that  all  the 
things  in  the  world  are  simple  beings,  that  their  composi- 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


353 


Antithesis 


OF  PURE  REASON  [p- 435] 

TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEAS 

Antithesis 

No  compound  thing  in  the  world  consists  of  simple 
parts,  and  there  exists  nowhere  in  the  world  anything 
simple. 


Proof 

Assume  that  a compound  thing,  a substance,  consists  of 
simple  parts.  Then  as  all  external  relation,  and  therefore 
all  composition  of  substances  also,  is  possible  in  space 
only,  it  follows  that  space  must  consist  of  as  many  parts 
as  the  parts  of  the  compound  that  occupies  the  space. 
Space,  however,  does  not  consist  of  simple  parts,  but 
of  spaces.  Every  part  of  a compound,  therefore,  must 
occupy  a space.  Now  the  absolutely  primary  parts  of 
every  compound  are  simple.  It  follows  therefore  that  the 
simple  occupies  a space.  But  as  everything  real,  which 
occupies  a space,  contains  a manifold,  the  parts  of  which 
are  by  the  side  of  each  other,  and  which  therefore  is  com- 
pounded, and,  as  a real  compound,  compounded  not  of 
accidents  (for  these  could  not  exist  by  the  side  of  each 
other,  without  a substance),  but  of  substances,  it  would 
follow  that  the  simple  is  a substantial  compound,  which  is 
self-contradictory. 

The  second  proposition  of  the  antithesis,  that  there 

2A 


354 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


Thesis 

tion  is  only  an  external  condition,  and  that,  though  we  are 
unable  to  remove  these  elementary  substances  from  their 
state  of  composition  and  isolate  them,  reason  must  con- 
ceive them  as  the  first  subjects  of  all  composition,  and 
therefore,  antecedently  to  it,  as  simple  beings. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


355 


Antithesis 

exists  nowhere  in  the  world  anything  simple,  is  not 
intended  to  mean  more  than  that  the  existence  [p.  437] 
of  the  absolutely  simple  cannot  be  proved  from  any  ex- 
perience or  perception,  whether  external  or  internal,  and 
that  the  absolutely  simple  is  a mere  idea,  the  objective 
reality  of  which  can  never  be  shown  in  any  possible  expe- 
rience, so  that  in  the  explanation  of  phenomena  it  is  with- 
out any  application  or  object.  For,  if  we  assumed  that  an 
object  of  this  transcendental  idea  might  be  found  in  expe- 
rience, the  empirical  intuition  of  some  one  object  would 
have  to  be  such  as  to  contain  absolutely  nothing  manifold 
by  the  side  of  each  other,  and  combined  to  a unity.  But 
as,  from  our  not  being  conscious  of  such  a manifold,  we 
cannot  form  any  valid  conclusion  as  to  the  entire  impossi- 
bility of  it  in  any  objective  intuition,  and  as  without  this 
no  absolute  simplicity  can  be  established,  it  follows  that 
such  simplicity  cannot  be  inferred  from  any  perception 
whatsoever.  As,  therefore,  an  absolutely  simple  object  can 
never  be  given  in  any  possible  experience,  while  the  world 
of  sense  must  be  looked  upon  as  the  sum  total  of  all 
possible  experience,  it  follows  that  nothing  simple  exists 
in  it 

This  second  part  of  the  antithesis  goes  far  beyond  the 
first,  which  only  banished  the  simple  from  the  intuition  of 
the  composite,  while  the  second  drives  it  out  of  the  whole 
of  nature.  Hence  we  could  not  attempt  to  prove  it  out  of 
the  concept  of  any  given  object  of  external  intuition  (of 
the  compound),  but  from  its  relation  to  a possible  experi- 
ence in  general. 


356 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


Thesis 

[p.  438]  OBSERVATIONS  ON  THE 

I 

On  the  Thesis 

If  I speak  of  a whole  as  necessarily  consisting  of  sepa- 
rate parts,  I understand  by  it  a substantial  whole  only,  as 
a real  compound,  that  is,  that  contingent  unity  of  the 
manifold,  which,  given  as  separate  (at  least  in  thought),  is 
brought  into  a mutual  connection,  and  thus  constitutes  one 
whole.  We  ought  not  to  call  space  a compositum,  but  a 
totum,  because  in  it  its  parts  are  possible  only  in  the 
whole,  and  not  the  whole  by  its  parts.  It  might  therefore 
be  called  a compositum  ideate,  but  not  realc.  But  this  is 
an  unnecessary  distinction.  As  space  is  no  compound  of 
substances,  not  even  of  real  accidents,  nothing  remains  of 
it,  if  I remove  all  composition  in  it,  not  even  the  point,  for 
a point  is  possible  only  as  the  limit  of  a space,  and  there- 
fore of  a compound.  Space  and  time  do  not  [p.  440] 
therefore  consist  of  simple  parts.  What  belongs  only  to 
the  condition  of  a substance,  even  though  it  possesses 
quantity  (as,  for  instance,  change),  does  not  consist  of  the 
simple ; that  is  to  say,  a certain  degree  of  change  does  not 
arise  through  the  accumulation  of  many  simple  changes. 
We  can  infer  the  simple  from  the  compound  in  self-sub- 
sisting objects  only.  Accidents  of  a state,  however,  are 
not  self-subsisting.  The  proof  of  the  necessity  of  the 
simple,  as  the  component  parts  of  all  that  is  substantially 
composite,  can  therefore  easily  be  injured,  if  it  is  extended 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


357 


Antithesis 

SECOND  ANTINOMY  [p.  439] 

II 

On  the  Antithesis 

Against  the  theory  of  the  infinite  divisibility  of  matter, 
the  proof  of  which  is  mathematical  only,  objections  have 
been  raised  by  the  Mo?iadists,  which  become  suspicious  by 
their  declining  to  admit  the  clearest  mathematical  proofs 
as  founded  on  a true  insight  into  the  quality  of  space,  so 
far  as  space  is  indeed  the  formal  condition  of  the  possi- 
bility of  all  matter,  but  treating  them  only  as  conclusions 
derived  from  abstract  but  arbitrary  concepts,  which  ought 
not  to  be  applied  to  real  things.  But  how  is  it  possible 
to  conceive  a different  kind  of  intuition  from  that  given  in 
the  original  intuition  of  space,  and  how  can  its  determina- 
tions a priori  not  apply  to  everything,  since  it  becomes 
possible  only  by  its  filling  that  space  ? If  we  were  to 
listen  to  them,  we  should  have  to  admit,  beside  the 
mathematical  point,  which  is  simple,  but  no  part,  but 
only  the  limit  of  a space,  other  physical  points,  simple  like- 
wise, but  possessing  this  privilege  that,  as  parts  of  space, 
they  are  able,  by  mere  aggregation,  to  fill  space.  Without 
repeating  here  the  many  clear  refutations  of  this  absurd- 
ity, it  being  quite  futile  to  attempt  to  reason  away  by 
purely  discursive  concepts  the  evidence  of  mathematics,  I 
only  remark,  that  if  philosophy  in  this  case  seems  to  play 
tricks  with  mathematics,  it  does  so  because  it  [p.  441] 
forgets  that  in  this  discussion  we  are  concerned  with  phe- 


358 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


Thesis 

too  far,  and  applied  to  all  compounds  without  distinction, 
as  has  often  been  the  case. 

I am,  however,  speaking  here  of  the  simple  only  so  far 
as  it  is  necessarily  given  in  the  composite,  which  can  be 
dissolved  into  the  former,  as  its  component  parts.  The 
true  meaning  of  the  word  Monas  (as  used  by  [p.  442] 
Leibniz)  should  refer  to  that  simple  only,  which  is  given 
immediately  as  simple  substance  (for  example  in  self-con- 
sciousness), and  not  as  an  element  of  the  composite,  in 
which  case  it  is  better  called  an  Atomus}  As  I wish  to 
prove  the  existence  of  simple  substances,  as  the  elements 
of  the  composite  only,  I might  call  the  thesis1 2  of  the 
second  antinomy  transcendental  Atomistic.  But  as  this 
word  has  long  been  used  as  the  name  of  a particular 
explanation  of  material  phenomena  ( moleculae ) and  pre- 
supposes, therefore,  empirical  concepts,  it  will  be  better  to 
call  it  the  dialectic  principle  of  monadology. 

1 Rosenkranz  thinks  that  atomus  is  here  used  intentionally  by  Kant  as  a 
masculine , to  distinguish  it  from  the  atomon,  translated  by  scholastic  philos- 
ophers as  inseparable,  indiscernible,  simplex,  etc.,  while  with  the  Greek  philos- 
ophers atomus  is  feminine.  Erdman,  however,  has  shown  that  Kant  has 
used  atomus  elsewhere  also  as  masculine. 

* Antithesis  is  a misprint 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


359 


Antithesis 

nomena  only,  and  their  conditions.  Here,  however,  it  is 
not  enough  to  find  for  the  pure  concept , produced  by  the 
understanding,  of  the  composite  the  concept  of  the  simple, 
but  we  must  find  for  the  intuition  of  the  composite  (matter) 
the  intuition  of  the  simple ; and  this,  according  to  the  laws 
of  sensibility,  and  therefore  with  reference  to  the  objects 
of  the  senses,  is  totally  impossible.  Though  it  may  be 
true,  therefore,  with  regard  to  a whole,  consisting  of  sub- 
stances, which  is  conceived  by  the  pure  understanding 
only,  that  before  its  composition  there  must  be  the  simple, 
this  does  not  apply  to  the  totnm  substantiate  phaenomenon 
which,  as  an  empirical  intuition  in  space,  carries  with  it 
the  necessary  condition  that  no  part  of  it  is  simple,  because 
no  part  of  space  is  simple.  The  monadists,  however,  have 
been  clever  enough  to  try  to  escape  from  this  difficulty,  by 
not  admitting  space  as  a condition  of  the  possibility  of  the 
objects  of  external  intuition  (bodies),  but  by  presupposing 
these  and  the  dynamical  relation  of  substances  in  general 
as  the  condition  of  the  possibility  of  space.  But  we  have 
no  concept  of  bodies,  except  as  phenomena,  and,  as  such, 
they  presuppose  space  as  the  necessary  condition  of  the 
possibility  of  all  external  phenomena.  The  argument  of 
the  monadists,  therefore,  is  futile,  and  has  been  sufficiently 
answered  in  the  transcendental  ^Esthetic.  If  the  bodies 
were  things  by  themselves,  then,  and  then  only,  the  argu- 
ment of  the  monadists  would  be  valid. 

The  second  dialectical  assertion  possesses  this  [p.  443] 
peculiarity,  that  it  is  opposed  by  dogmatical  assertion 
which,  among  all  sophistical  assertions,  is  the  only  one 
which  undertakes  to  prove  palpably  in  an  object  of  ex- 
perience the  reality  of  that  which  we  counted  before  as 


360 


Transcendental  Dialectic 

Thesis 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


3 6; 


Antithesis 

belonging  only  to  transcendental  ideas,  namely,  the  abso- 
lute simplicity  of  a substance,  — I mean  the  assertion 
that  the  object  of  the  internal  sense,  or  the  thinking  I, 
is  an  absolutely  simple  substance.  Without  entering 
upon  this  question  (as  it  has  been  fully  discussed  before), 
I only  remark,  that  if  something  is  conceived  as  an  object 
only,  without  adding  any  synthetical  determination  of  its 
intuition  (and  this  is  the  case  in  the  bare  representation 
of  the  I),  it  would  no  doubt  be  impossible  that  anything 
manifold  or  composite  could  be  perceived  in  such  a rep- 
resentation. Besides,  as  the  predicates  through  which  I 
conceive  this  object  are  only  intuitions  of  the  internal 
sense,  nothing  can  occur  in  them  to  prove  a manifold 
(one  by  the  side  of  another),  and  therefore  a real  com- 
position. It  follows,  therefore,  from  the  nature  of  self- 
consciousness  that,  as  the  thinking  subject  is  at  the  same 
time  its  own  object,  it  cannot  divide  itself  (though  it  might 
divide  its  inherent  determinations)  ; for  in  regard  to  itself 
every  object  is  absolute  unity.  Nevertheless,  when  this 
subject  is  looked  upon  externally,  as  an  object  of  intuition, 
it  would  most  likely  exhibit  some  kind  of  composition  as 
a phenomenon,  and  it  must  always  be  looked  upon  in  this 
light,  if  we  wish  to  know  whether  its  manifold  constituent 
elements  are  by  the  side  of  each  other  or  not. 


362 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


[P.  444]  the  antinomy 

THIRD  CONFLICT  OF  THE 
Thesis 

Causality,  according  to  the  laws  of  nature,  is  not  the 
only  causality  from  which  all  the  phenomena  of  the 
world  can  be  deduced.  In  order  to  account  for  these 
phenomena  it  is  necessary  also  to  admit  another  causality, 
that  of  freedom. 

Proof 

Let  us  assume  that  there  is  no  other  causality  but  that 
according  to  the  laws  of  nature.  In  that  case  everything 
that  takes  place,  presupposes  an  anterior  state,  on  which 
it  follows  inevitably  according  to  a rule.  But  that  ante- 
rior state  must  itself  be  something  which  has  taken  place 
(which  has  come  to  be  in  time,  and  did  not  exist  before), 
because,  if  it  had  always  existed,  its  effect  too  would  not 
have  only  just  arisen,  but  have  existed  always.  The 
causality,  therefore,  of  a cause,  through  which  something 
takes  place,  is  itself  an  event,  which  again,  according  to 
the  law  of  nature,  presupposes  an  anterior  state  and  its 
causality,  and  this  again  an  anterior  state,  and  so  on. 
If,  therefore,  everything  takes  place  according  to  mere 
laws  of  nature,  there  will  always  be  a second-  [p.  446] 
ary  only,  but  never  a primary  beginning,  and  therefore 
no  completeness  of  the  series,  on  the  side  of  successive 
causes.  But  the  law  of  nature  consists  in  this,  that 
nothing  takes  place  without  a cause  sufficiently  deter- 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


363 


Antithesis 

OF  PURE  REASON  [p-  445] 

TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEAS 

Antithesis 

There  is  no  freedom,  but  everything  in  the  world  takes 
place  entirely  according  to  the  laws  of  nature. 

Proof 

If  we  admit  that  there  is  freedom , in  the  transcendental 
sense,  as  a particular  kind  of  causality,  according  to  which 
the  events  in  the  world  could  take  place,  that  is  a faculty 
of  absolutely  originating  a state,  and  with  it  a series  of 
consequences,  it  would  follow  that  not  only  a series  would 
have  its  absolute  beginning  through  this  spontaneity,  but 
the  determination  of  that  spontaneity  itself  to  produce  the 
series,  that  is,  the  causality,  would  have  an  absolute  begin- 
ning, nothing  preceding  it  by  which  this  act  is  determined 
according  to  permanent  laws.  Every  beginning  of  an  act, 
however,  presupposes  a state  in  which  the  cause  is  not  yet 
active,  and  a dynamically  primary  beginning  of  an  act 
presupposes  a state  which  has  no  causal  connection  with 
the  preceding  state  of  that  cause,  that  is,  in  no  wise  follows 
from  it.  Transcendental  freedom  is  therefore  opposed 
to  the  law  of  causality,  and  represents  such  a [p.  447] 
connection  of  successive  states  of  effective  causes,  that  no 
unity  of  experience  is  possible  with  it.  It  is  therefore  an 
empty  fiction  of  the  mind,  and  not  to  be  met  with  in  any 
experience. 


364 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


Thesis 

mined  a priori.  Therefore  the  proposition,  that  all  cau- 
sality is  possible  according  to  the  laws  of  nature  only, 
contradicts  itself,  if  taken  in  unlimited  generality,  and  it 
is  impossible,  therefore,  to  admit  that  causality  as  the 
only  one. 

We  must  therefore  admit  another  causality,  through 
which  something  takes  place,  without  its  cause  being 
further  determined  according  to  necessary  laws  by  a pre- 
ceding cause,  that  is,  an  absolute  spontaneity  of  causes,  by 
which  a series  of  phenomena,  proceeding  according  to 
natural  laws,  begins  by  itself ; we  must  consequently 
admit  transcendental  freedom,  without  which,  even  in 
the  course  of  nature,  the  series  of  phenomena  on  the 
side  of  causes,  can  never  be  perfect. 


[P.  448]  OBSERVATIONS  ON  THE 

I 

On  the  Thesis 

The  transcendental  idea  of  freedom  is  far  from  forming 
the  whole  content  of  the  psychological  concept  of  that 
name,  which  is  chiefly  empirical,  but  only  that  of  the 
absolute  spontaneity  of  action,  as  the  real  ground  of 


Tra?iscendental  Dialectic 


365 


Antithesis 


We  have,  therefore,  nothing  but  nature , in  which  we 
must  try  to  find  the  connection  and  order  of  cosmical 
events.  Freedom  (independence)  from  the  laws  of  nature 
is  no  doubt  a deliveraiice  from  restraint,  but  also  from  the 
guidance  of  all  rules.  For  we  cannot  say  that,  instead  of 
the  laws  of  nature,  laws  of  freedom  may  enter  into  the 
causality  of  the  course  of  the  world,  because,  if  determined 
by  laws,  it  would  not  be  freedom,  but  nothing  else  but 
nature.  Nature,  therefore,  and  transcendental  freedom 
differ  from  each  other  like  legality  and  lawlessness.  The 
former,  no  doubt,  imposes  upon  the  understanding  the 
difficult  task  of  looking  higher  and  higher  for  the  origin 
of  events  in  the  series  of  causes,  because  their  causality 
is  always  conditioned.  In  return  for  this,  however,  it 
promises  a complete  and  well-ordered  unity  of  experience ; 
while,  on  the  other  side,  the  fiction  of  freedom  promises, 
no  doubt,  to  the  enquiring  mind,  rest  in  the  chain  of 
causes,  leading  him  up  to  an  unconditioned  causality, 
which  begins  to  act  by  itself,  but  which,  as  it  is  blind 
itself,  tears  the  thread  of  rules  by  which  alone  a complete 
and  coherent  experience  is  possible. 


He  who  stands  up  for  the  omnipotence  of  nature  (tran- 
scendental physiocracy),  in  opposition  to  the  doctrine  of 
freedom,  would  defend  his  position  against  the  sophistical 
conclusions  of  that  doctrine  in  the  following  manner.  If 


THIRD  ANTINOMY 


II 


On  the  Antithesis 


366 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


Thesis 

imputability ; it  is,  however,  the  real  stone  of  offence  in 
the  eyes  of  philosophy,  which  finds  its  unsurmountanle 
difficulties  in  admitting  this  kind  of  unconditioned  causal- 
ity. That  element  in  the  question  of  the  freedom  of  the 
will,  which  has  always  so  much  embarrassed  speculative 
reason,  is  therefore  in  reality  transcendetital  only,  and 
refers  merely  to  the  question  whether  we  must  admit  a 
faculty  of  spontaneously  originating  a series  of  successive 
things  or  states.  How  such  a faculty  is  possible  need  not 
be  answered,  because,  with  regard  to  the  causality,  accord- 
ing to  the  laws  of  nature  also,  we  must  be  satisfied  to  know 
a priori  that  such  a causality  has  to  be  admitted,  though 
we  can  in  no  wise  understand  the  possibility  how,  through 
one  existence,  the  existence  of  another  is  given,  but  must 
for  that  purpose  appeal  to  experience  alone.  The  neces- 
sity of  a first  beginning  of  a series  of  phenomena  from 
freedom  has  been  proved  so  far  only  as  it  is  necessary  in 
order  to  comprehend  an  origin  of  the  world,  while  all  suc- 
cessive states  may  be  regarded  as  a result  in  succession 
according  to  mere  laws  of  nature.  But  as  thus  [p.  450] 
the  faculty  of  originating  a series  in  time  by  itself  has 
been  proved,  though  by  no  means  understood,  it  is  now 
permitted  also  to  admit,  within  the  course  of  the  world, 
different  series,  beginning  by  themselves,  with  regard  to 
their  causality,  and  to  attribute  to  their  substances  a fac- 
ulty of  acting  with  freedom.  But  we  must  not  allow  our- 
selves to  be  troubled  by  a misapprehension,  namely  that, 
as  every  successive  series  in  the  world  can  have  only  a 
relatively  primary  beginning,  some  other  state  of  things 
always  preceding  in  the  world,  therefore  no  absolutely 
primary  beginning  of  different  series  is  possible  in  the 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


3 67 


Antithesis 

you  do  not  admit  something  mathematically  the  first  in  the 
world  with  reference  to  time , there  is  no  necessity  why  you 
should  look  for  something  dynamically  the  first  with  refer- 
ence to  causality.  Who  has  told  you  to  invent  an  abso- 
lutely first  state  of  the  world,  and  with  it  an  absolute 
beginning  of  the  gradually  progressing  series  of  phenom- 
ena, and  to  set  limits  to  unlimited  nature  in  order  to  give 
to  your  imagination  something  to  rest  on  ? As  substances 
have  always  existed  in  the  world,  or  as  the  unity  of  expe- 
rience renders  at  least  such  a supposition  necessary,  there 
is  no  difficulty  in  assuming  that  a change  of  their  states, 
that  is,  a series  of  their  changes,  has  always  existed  also, 
so  that  there  is  no  necessity  for  looking  for  a first  begin- 
ning either  mathematically  or  dynamically.  It  is  true  we 
cannot  render  the  possibility  of  such  an  infinite  descent 
comprehensible  without  the  first  member  to  which  every- 
thing else  is  subsequent.  But,  if  for  this  reason  you  reject 
this  riddle  of  nature,  you  will  feel  yourselves  constrained 
to  reject  many  synthetical  fundamental  properties  (natural 
forces),  which  you  cannot  comprehend  any  more,  nay,  the 
very  possibility  of  change  in  general  would  be  [p.  451] 
full  of  difficulties.  For  if  you  did  not  know  from  expe- 
rience that  change  exists,  you  would  never  be  able  to  con- 
ceive a priori  how  such  a constant  succession  of  being  and 
not  being  is  possible. 

And,  even  if  the  transcendental  faculty  of  freedom 
might  somehow  be  conceded  to  start  the  changes  of  the 
world,  such  faculty  would  at  all  events  have  to  be  outside 
the  world  (though  it  would  always  remain  a bold  assump- 
tion to  admit,  outside  the  sum  total  of  all  possible  intui- 
tions, an  object  that  cannot  be  given  in  any  possible 


368 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


Thesis 

course  of  the  world.  For  we  are  speaking  here  of  the 
absolutely  first  beginning,  not  according  to  time,  but 
according  to  causality.  If,  for  instance,  at  this  moment 
I rise  from  my  chair  with  perfect  freedom,  without  the 
necessary  determining  influence  of  natural  causes,  a new 
series  has  its  absolute  beginning  in  this  event,  with  all  its 
natural  consequences  ad  infinitum,  although,  with  regard 
to  time,  this  event  is  only  the  continuation  of  a preceding 
series.  For  this  determination  and  this  act  do  not  belong 
to  the  succession  of  merely  natural  effects,  nor  are  they  a 
mere  continuation  of  them,  but  the  determining  natural 
causes  completely  stop  before  it,  so  far  as  this  event  is 
concerned,  which  no  doubt  follows  them,  and  does  not 
result  from  them,  and  may  therefore  be  called  an  abso- 
lutely first  beginning  in  a series  of  phenomena,  not  with 
reference  to  time,  but  with  reference  to  causality. 

This  requirement  of  reason  to  appeal  in  the  series  of 
natural  causes  to  a first  and  free  beginning  is  fully  con- 
firmed if  we  see  that,  with  the  exception  of  the  Epicu- 
rean school,  all  philosophers  of  antiquity  have  felt 
themselves  obliged  to  admit,  for  the  sake  of  explaining 
all  cosmical  movements,  a prime  mover,  that  is,  a freely 
acting  cause  which,  first  and  by  itself,  started  this  series 
of  states.  They  did  not  attempt  to  make  a first  be- 
ginning comprehensible  by  an  appeal  to  nature  only. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


369 


Antithesis 

experience).  But  to  attribute  in  the  world  itself  a faculty 
to  substances  can  never  be  allowed,  because  in  that  case 
the  connection  of  phenomena  determining  each  other  by 
necessity  and  according  to  general  laws,  which  we  call 
nature,  and  with  it  the  test  of  empirical  truth,  which  dis- 
tinguishes experience  from  dreams,  would  almost  entirely 
disappear.  For  by  the  side  of  such  a lawless  faculty  of 
freedom,  nature  could  hardly  be  conceived  any  longer, 
because  the  laws  of  the  latter  would  be  constantly 
changed  through  the  influence  of  the  former,  and  the 
play  of  phenomena  which,  according  to  nature,  is  regular 
and  uniform,  would  become  confused  and  incoherent. 

2 B 


370 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


Thesis 


[p.452]  THE  ANTINOMY 

FOURTH  CONFLICT  OF  THE 

Thesis 

There  exists  an  absolutely  necessary  Being  belonging  to 
the  world,  either  as  a part  or  as  a cause  of  it. 

Proof 

The  world  of  sense,  as  the  sum  total  of  all  phenomena, 
contains  a series  of  changes  without  which  even  the 
representation  of  a series  of  time,  which  forms  the  con- 
dition of  the  possibility  of  the  world  of  sense,  would 
not  be  given  us.1  But  every  change  has  its  condition 
which  precedes  it  in  time,  and  renders  it  necessary. 
Now,  everything  that  is  given  as  conditional  presup- 
poses, with  regard  to  its  existence,  a complete  series  of 
conditions,  leading  up  to  that  which  is  entirely  uncon- 
ditioned, and  alone  absolutely  necessary.  Something 
absolutely  necessary  therefore  must  exist,  if  there  exists  a 
change  as  its  consequence.  And  this  absolutely  necessary 
belongs  itself  to  the  world  of  sense.  For  if  we  sup- 
posed that  it  existed  outside  that  world,  then  the  series 
of  changes  in  the  world  would  derive  its  origin  from  it, 
while  the  necessary  cause  itself  would  not  be-  [p.  454] 
long  to  the  world  of  sense.  But  this  is  impossible.  For 

1 As  formal  condition  of  the  possibility  of  changes,  time  is  no  doubt  objec- 
tively prior  to  them  (read  dissen  instead  of  disser) ; subjectively,  however,  and 
in  the  reality  of  our  consciousness  the  representation  of  time,  like  every  other, 
is  occasioned  solely  by  perceptions. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


37: 


Antithesis 


OF  PURE  REASON  [p- 453] 

TRANSCENDENTAL  IDEAS 

Antithesis 

There  nowhere  exists  an  absolutely  necessary  Being, 
either  within  or  without  the  world,  as  the  cause  of  it. 

Proof 

If  we  supposed  that  the  world  itself  is  a necessary 
being,  or  that  a necessary  being  exists  in  it,  there  would 
then  be  in  the  series  of  changes  either  a beginning,  un- 
conditionally necessary,  and  therefore  without  a cause, 
which  contradicts  the  dynamical  law  of  the  determina- 
tion of  all  phenomena  in  time ; or  the  series  itself  would 
be  without  any  beginning,  and  though  contingent  and  con- 
ditioned in  all  its  parts,  yet  entirely  necessary  and  uncon- 
ditioned as  a whole.  This  would  be  self-contradictory, 
because  the  existence  of  a multitude  cannot  be  necessary, 
if  no  single  part  of  it  possesses  necessary  existence. 

If  we  supposed,  on  the  contrary,  that  there  exists  an 
absolutely  necessary  cause  of  the  world,  outside  the 
world,  then  that  cause,  as  the  highest  member  [p.  455] 
in  the  series  of  causes  of  cosmical  changes,  would  begin 
the  existence  of  the  latter  and  their  series.1  In  that 
case,  however,  that  cause  would  have  to  begin  to  act,  and 

1 The  word  to  begin  is  used  in  two  senses.  The  first  is  active  when  the 
cause  begins,  or  starts  (infit),  a series  of  states  as  its  effect.  The  second  is 
passive  (or  neuter)  when  the  causality  begins  in  the  cause  itself  (fit).  I reason 
here  from  the  former  to  the  latter  meaning. 


372 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


Thesis 

as  the  beginning  of  a temporal  series  can  be  determined 
only  by  that  which  precedes  it  in  time,  it  follows  that  the 
highest  condition  of  the  beginning  of  a series  of  changes 
must  exist  in  the  time  when  that  series  was  not  yet  (be- 
cause the  beginning  is  an  existence,  preceded  by  a time  in 
which  the  thing  which  begins  was  not  yet).  Hence  the 
causality  of  the  necessary  cause  of  changes  and  that 
cause  itself  belong  to  time  and  therefore  to  phenomena 
(in  which  alone  time,  as  their  form,  is  possible),  and  it 
cannot  therefore  be  conceived  as  separated  from  the 
world  of  sense,  as  the  sum  total  of  all  phenomena.  It 
follows,  therefore,  that  something  absolutely  necessary  is 
contained  in  the  world,  whether  it  be  the  whole  cosmical 
series  itself,  or  only  a part  of  it. 

>456]  OBSERVATIONS  ON  THE 

I 

On  the  Thesis 

In  order  to  prove  the  existence  of  a necessary  Being, 
I ought  not,  in  this  place,  to  use  any  but  the  cosmological 
argument,  which  ascends  from  what  is  conditioned  in  the 
phenomena  to  what  is  unconditioned  in  concept,  that 
being  considered  as  the  necessary  condition  of  the  abso- 
lute totality  of  the  series.  To  undertake  that  proof  from 
the  mere  idea  of  a Supreme  Being  belongs  to  another 
principle  of  reason,  and  will  have  to  be  treated  separately. 

The  pure  cosmological  proof  cannot  establish  the  ex- 
istence of  a necessary  Being,  without  leaving  it  open, 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


373 


Antithesis 

its  causality  would  belong  to  time,  and  therefore  to  the  sum 
total  of  phenomena.  It  would  belong  to  the  world,  and 
would  therefore  not  be  outside  the  world,  which  is  contrary 
to  our  supposition.  Therefore,  neither  in  the  world,  nor 
outside  the  world  (yet  in  causal  connection  with  it),  does 
there  exist  anywhere  an  absolutely  necessary  Being. 


FOURTH  ANTINOMY  [p- 457] 

II 


On  the  Antithesis 

If,  in  ascending  the  series  of  phenomena,  we  imagine 
we  meet  with  difficulties  militating  against  the  existence  of 
an  absolutely  necessary  supreme  cause,  such  difficulties 
ought  not  to  be  derived  from  mere  concepts  of  the  neces- 
sary existence  of  a thing  in  general.  They  ought  not  to 
be  ontological,  but  ought  to  arise  from  the  causal  connec- 
tion with  a series  of  phenomena  for  which  a condition  is 
required  which  is  itself  unconditioned,  that  is,  they  ought 
to  be  cosmological,  and  dependent  on  empirical  laws.  It 
must  be  shown  that  our  ascending  in  the  series  of  causes 


374 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


Thesis 

whether  that  Being  be  the  world  itself,  or  a Being  distinct 
from  it.  In  order  to  settle  this  question,  principles  are 
required  which  are  no  longer  cosmological,  and  do  not 
proceed  in  the  series  of  phenomena.  We  should  have 
to  introduce  concepts  of  contingent  beings  in  general 
(so  far  as  they  are  considered  as  objects  of  the  under- 
standing only),  and  also  a principle  according  to  which 
we  might  connect  them,  by  means  of  concepts  only,  with 
a necessary  Being.  All  this  belongs  to  a tran-  [p.  458] 
scendent  philosophy,  for  which  this  is  not  yet  the  place. 

If,  however,  we  once  begin  our  proof  cosmologically, 
taking  for  our  foundation  the  series  of  phenomena,  and 
the  regressus  in  it,  according  to  the  empirical  laws  of 
causality,  we  cannot  afterwards  suddenly  leave  this  line 
of  argument  and  pass  over  to  something  which  does  not 
belong  as  a member  to  this  series.  For  the  condition 
must  be  taken  in  the  same  meaning  in  which  the  rela- 
tion of  the  condition  to  that  condition  was  taken  in  the 
series  which,  by  continuous  progress,  was  to  lead  to  that 
highest  condition.  If  therefore  that  relation  is  sensuous 
and  intended  for  a possible  empirical  use  of  the  under- 
standing, the  highest  condition  or  cause  can  close  the 
regressus  according  to  the  laws  of  sensibility  only,  and 
therefore  as  belonging  to  that  temporal  series  itself.  The 
necessary  Being  must  therefore  be  regarded  as  the  highest 
member  of  the  cosmical  series. 

Nevertheless,  certain  philosophers  have  taken  the  liberty 
of  making  such  a salto  (/^eTa/Sacrt?  et?  aWo  7 eVo?).  From 
the  changes  in  the  world  they  concluded  their  empirical 
contingency,  that  is,  their  dependence  on  empirically  de- 
termining causes,  and  they  thus  arrived  at  an  ascend- 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


375 


Antithesis 

(in  the  world  of  sense)  can  never  end  with  a condition 
empirically  unconditioned,  and  that  the  cosmological  argu- 
ment, based  on  the  contingency  of  cosmical  states,  as 
proved  by  their  changes,  ends  in  a verdict  against  the 
admission  of  a first  cause,  absolutely  originating  the  whole 
series 

A curious  contrast  however  meets  us  in  this  [p.  459] 
antinomy.  From  the  same  ground  on  which,  in  the  thesis, 
the  existence  of  an  original  Being  was  proved,  its  non- 
existence is  proved  in  the  antithesis  with  equal  stringency. 
We  were  first  told,  that  a necessary  Being  exists , because 
the  whole  of  time  past  comprehends  the  series  of  all  con- 
ditions, and  with  it  also  the  unconditioned  (the  necessary). 
We  are  now  told  there  is  no  necessary  Being,  for  the  very 
reason  that  the  whole  of  past  time  comprehends  the  series 
of  all  conditions  (which  therefore  altogether  are  them- 
selves conditioned).  The  explanation  is  this.  The  first 
argument  regards  only  the  absolute  totality  of  the  series 
of  conditions  determining  each  other  in  time,  and  thus 
arrives  at  something  unconditioned  and  necessary.  The 
second,  on  the  contrary,  regards  the  contingency  of  all  that 
is  determined  in  the  temporal  series  (everything  being  pre- 
ceded by  a time  in  which  the  condition  itself  must  again 
be  determined  as  conditioned),  in  which  case  everything 
unconditioned,  and  every  absolute  necessity,  [p..  461] 
must  absolutely  vanish.  In  both,  the  manner  of  conclud- 
ing is  quite  in  conformity  with  ordinary  human  reason, 
which  frequently  comes  into  conflict  with  itself,  from  con- 
sidering its  object  from  two  different  points  of  view. 
Herr  von  Mairan  considered  the  controversy  between  two 
famous  astronomers,  which  arose  from  a similar  difficulty, 


376 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


Thesis 

ing  series  of  empirical  conditions.  This  was  quite  right. 
As,  however,  in  this  way  they  could  not  find  a first  be- 
ginning, or  any  highest  member,  they  suddenly  left  the 
empirical  concept  of  contingency,  and  took  to  the  pure 
category.  This  led  to  a purely  intelligible  series,  the 
completeness  of  which  depended  on  the  existence  of  an 
absolutely  necessary  cause,  which  cause,  as  no  longer 
subject  to  any  sensuous  conditions,  was  freed  also  from 
the  temporal  condition  of  itself  beginning  its  causality. 
Such  a proceeding  is  entirely  illegitimate,  as  may  be 
seen  from  what  follows. 

In  the  pure  sense  of  the  category  we  call  contingent 
that  the  contradictory  opposite  of  which  is  possible. 
Now  we  cannot  conclude  that  intelligible  contingency 
from  empirical  contingency.  Of  what  is  being  [p.  460] 
changed  we  may  say  that  the  opposite  (of  its  state)  is 
real,  and  therefore  possible  also  at  another  time.  But 
this  is  not  the  contradictory  opposite  of  the  preceding 
state.  In  order  to  establish  that,  it  is  necessary  that,  at 
the  same  time,  when  the  previous  state  existed,  its  oppo- 
site could  have  existed  in  its  place,  and  this  can  never 
be  concluded  from  change.  A body,  for  instance,  which, 
when  in  motion,  was  A,  comes  to  be,  when  at  rest,  = non 
A.  From  the  fact  that  the  state  opposite  to  the  state  A 
follows  upon  it,  we  can  in  no  wise  conclude  that  the  con- 
tradictory opposite  of  A is  possible,  and  therefore  A con- 
tingent only.  In  order  to  establish  this,  it  would  be 
necessary  to  prove  that,  at  the  same  time  when  there  was 
motion,  there  might  have  been,  instead  of  it,  rest.  But  we 
know  no  more  than  that,  at  a subsequent  time,  such  rest 
was  real,  and  therefore  possible  also.  Motion  at  one 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


377 


Antithesis 

as  to  the  choice  of  the  true  standpoint,  as  something 
sufficiently  important  to  write  a separate  treatise  on  it. 
The  one  reasoned  thus,  the  moon  revolves  on  its  own  axis , 
because  it  always  turns  the  same  side  towards  the  earth. 
The  other  concluded,  the  moon  does  not  revolve  on  its  own 
axis , because  it  always  turns  the  same  side  towards  the 
earth.  Both  conclusions  were  correct,  according  to  the 
point  of  view  from  which  one  chose  to  consider  the  motion 
of  the  moon. 


378 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


Thesis 

time,  and  rest  at  another,  are  not  contradictory  opposites. 
Therefore  the  succession  of  opposite  determinations,  that 
is,  change,  in  no  way  proves  contingency,  according  to 
the  concepts  of  the  pure  understanding,  and  can  there- 
fore never  lead  us  on  to  the  existence  of  a necessary 
Being,  according  to  the  pure  concepts  of  the  under- 
standing. Change  proves  empirical  contingency  only ; 
it  proves  that  the  new  state  could  not  have  taken  place 
according  to  the  law  of  causality  by  itself,  and  without  a 
cause  belonging  to  a previous  time.  This  cause,  even 
if  it  is  considered  as  absolutely  necessary,  must,  as  we 
see,  exist  in  time,  and  belong  to  the  series  of  phenomena. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


379 


THE  ANTINOMY  OF  PURE  REASON  [p.  462] 
Section  III 

Of  the  Interest  of  Reason  i>i  these  Conflicts 

We  have  thus  watched  the  whole  dialectical  play  of 
the  cosmological  ideas,  and  have  seen  that  they  do  not 
even  admit  of  any  adequate  object  being  supplied  to  them 
in  any  possible  experience,  nay,  not  even  of  reason  treat- 
ing them  in  accordance  with  the  general  laws  of  experi- 
ence. Nevertheless  these  ideas  are  not  arbitrary  fictions, 
but  reason  in  the  continuous  progress  of  empirical  syn- 
thesis is  necessarily  led  on  to  them,  whenever  it  wants 
to  free  what,  according  to  the  rules  of  experience,  can 
be  determined  as  conditioned  only,  from  all  conditions, 
and  comprehend  it  in  its  unconditioned  totality.  These 
rationalising  or  dialectical  assertions  are  so  many  attempts 
at  solving  four  perfectly  natural  and  inevitable  problems 
of  reason.  There  cannot  be  either  more  or  less  of  them, 
because  there  are  neither  more  nor  less  series  of  synthet- 
ical hypotheses,  which  limit  empirical  synthesis  a priori. 

We  have  represented  the  brilliant  pretensions  of  reason, 
extending  its  domain  beyond  all  the  limits  of  experience, 
in  dry  formulas  only,  containing  nothing  but  the  grounds 
of  its  claims  ; and,  as  it  bents  transcendental  [p.  463] 
philosophy,  divested  them  of  everything  empirical,  al- 
though it  is  only  in  connection  with  this  that  the  whole 
splendour  of  the  assertions  of  reason  can  be  fully  seen. 
In  their  application,  and  in  the  progressive  extension  of 
the  employment  of  reason,  beginning  from  the  field  of 
experience,  and  gradually  soaring  up  to  those  sublime 


380 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


ideas,  philosophy  displays  a grandeur  which,  if  it  could 
only  establish  its  pretensions,  would  leave  all  other  kinds 
of  human  knowledge  far  behind,  promising  to  us  a safe 
foundation  for  our  highest  expectations  and  hopes  for 
the  attainment  of  the  highest  aims,  towards  which  all 
the  exertions  of  reason  must  finally  converge.  The  ques- 
tions, whether  the  world  has  a beginning  and  any  limit 
of  its  extension  in  space ; whether  there  is  anywhere,  and 
it  may  be  in  my  own  thinking  self,  an  indivisible  and 
indestructible  unity,  or  whether  there  exists  nothing  but 
what  is  divisible  and  perishable ; whether  in  my  acts  I 
am  free,  or,  like  other  beings,  led  by  the  hand  of  nature 
and  of  fate ; whether,  finally,  there  exists  a supreme 
cause  of  the  world,  or  whether  the  objects  of  nature 
and  their  order  form  the  last  object  which  we  can  reach 
in  all  our  speculations,  — these  are  questions  for  the 
solution  of  which  the  mathematician  would  gladly  sacri- 
fice the  whole  of  his  science,  which  cannot  give  him  any 
satisfaction  with  regard  to  the  highest  and  dearest  as- 
pirations of  mankind.  Even  the  true  dignity  and  worth 
of  mathematics,  that  pride  of  human  reason,  rest  [p.  464] 
on  this,  that  they  teach  reason  how  to  understand  nature 
in  what  is  great  and  what  is  small  in  her,  in  her  order 
and  regularity,  and  likewise  in  the  admirable  unity  of 
her  moving  powers,  far  above  all  expectations  of  a philos- 
ophy restricted  to  common  experience,  and  thus  encour- 
age reason  to  extend  its  use  far  beyond  experience,  nay, 
supply  philosophy  with  the  best  materials  intended  to 
support  its  investigations,  so  far  as  their  nature  admits 
of  it,  by  adequate  intuitions. 

Unfortunately  for  mere  speculation  (but  fortunately 
perhaps  for  the  practical  destinies  of  men),  reason,  in  the 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


38i 


very  midst  of  her  highest  expectations,  finds  herself  so 
hemmed  in  by  a press  of  reasons  and  counter  reasons, 
that,  as  neither  her  honour  nor  her  safety  admit  of  her 
retreating  and  becoming  an  indifferent  spectator  of  what 
might  be  called  a mere  passage  of  arms,  still  less  of  her 
commanding  peace  in  a strife  in  which  she  is  herself 
deeply  interested,  nothing  remains  to  her  but  to  reflect  on 
the  origin  of  this  conflict,  in  order  to  find  out  whether  it 
may  not  have  arisen  from  a mere  misunderstanding. 
After  such  an  enquiry  proud  claims  would  no  [p.  465] 
doubt  have  to  be  surrendered  on  both  sides,  but  a per- 
manent and  tranquil  rule  of  reason  over  the  understand- 
ing and  the  senses  might  then  be  inaugurated. 

For  the  present  we  shall  defer  this  thorough  enquiry, 
in  order  to  consider  which  side  we  should  like  to  take,  if 
it  should  become  necessary  to  take  sides  at  all.  As  in 
this  case  we  do  not  consult  the  logical  test  of  truth,  but 
only  our  own  interest,  such  an  enquiry,  though  settling 
nothing  as  to  the  contested  rights  of  both  parties,  will 
have  this  advantage,  that  it  makes  us  understand  why 
those  who  take  part  in  this  contest  embrace  one  rather 
than  the  other  side,  without  being  guided  by  any  special 
insight  into  the  subject.  It  may  also  explain  some  other 
things,  as,  for  instance,  the  zelotic  heat  of  the  one  and 
the  calm  assurance  of  the  other  party,  and  why  the  world 
greets  one  party  with  rapturous  applause,  and  entertains 
towards  the  other  an  irreconcileable  prejudice. 

There  is  something  which  in  this  preliminary  enquiry 
determines  the  right  point  of  view,  from  which  alone  it 
can  be  carried  on  with  proper  completeness,  and  this  is 
the  comparison  of  the  principles  from  which  both  parties 
start.  If  we  look  at  the  propositions  of  the  antithesis, 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


I82 

we  shall  find  in  it  a perfect  uniformity  in  the  mode  of 
thought  and  a complete  unity  of  principle,  [p.  466] 
namely,  the  principle  of  pure  empiricism,  not  only  in  the 
explanation  of  the  phenomena  of  the  world,  but  also  in 
the  solution  of  the  transcendental  ideas  of  the  cosmical 
universe  itself.  The  propositions  of  the  thesis,  on  the 
contrary,  rest  not  only  on  the  empirical  explanation 
within  the  series  of  phenomena,  but  likewise  on  intelli- 
gible beginnings,  and  its  maxim  is  therefore  not  simple. 
With  regard  to  its  essential  and  distinguishing  character- 
istic, I shall  call  it  the  dogmatism  of  pure  reason. 

On  the  side  of  dogmatism  we  find  in  the  determination 
of  the  cosmological  ideas,  or  in  the  Thesis : — 

First , A certain  practical  interest,  which  every  right- 
thinking  man,  if  he  knows  his  true  interests,  will  heartily 
share.  That  the  world  has  a beginning  ; that  my  think- 
ing self  is  of  a simple  and  therefore  indestructible  nature  ; 
that  the  same  self  is  free  in  all  his  voluntary  actions,  and 
raised  above  the  compulsion  of  nature  ; that,  finally,  the 
whole  order  of  things,  or  the  world,  derives  its  origin  from 
an  original  Being,  whence  everything  receives  both  unity 
and  purposeful  connection  — these  are  so  many  foundation 
stones  on  which  morals  and  religion  are  built  up.  The 
antithesis  robs  us,  or  seems  to  rob  us,  of  all  these  sup- 
ports. 

Secondly,  Reason  has  a certain  specidative  interest  on 
the  same  side.  For,  if  we  take  and  employ  the  tran- 
scendental ideas  as  they  are  in  the  thesis,  one  may  quite 
a priori  grasp  the  whole  chain  of  conditions  and  [p.  467] 
comprehend  the  derivation  of  the  conditioned  by  begin- 
ning with  the  unconditioned.  This  cannot  be  done  by 
the  antithesis,  which  presents  itself  in  a very  unfavourable 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


383 


light,  because  it  cannot  return  to  the  question  as  to  the 
conditions  of  its  synthesis  any  answer  which  does  not 
lead  to  constantly  new  questions.  According  to  it  one 
has  always  to  ascend  from  a given  beginning  to  a higher 
one,  every  part  leads  always  to  a still  smaller  part,  every 
event  has  always  before  it  another  event  as  its  cause, 
and  the  conditions  of  existence  in  general  always  rest 
on  others,  without  ever  receiving  unconditioned  strength 
and  support  from  a self-subsisting  thing,  as  the  original 
Being. 

Thirdly,  This  side  has  also  the  advantage  of  popularity, 
which  is  by  no  means  its  smallest  recommendation.  The 
common  understanding  does  not  see  the  smallest  difficulty 
in  the  idea  of  the  unconditioned  beginning  of  all  synthesis, 
being  accustomed  rather  to  descend  to  consequences,  than 
to  ascend  to  causes.  It  finds  comfort  in  the  ideas  of  the 
absolutely  first  (the  possibility  of  which  does  not  trouble 
it),  and  at  the  same  time  a firm  point  to  which  the  leading 
strings  of  its  life  may  be  attached,  while  there  is  no  pleas- 
ure in  a restless  ascent  from  condition  to  condition,  and 
keeping  one  foot  always  in  the  air. 

On  the  side  of  empiricism,  so  far  as  it  deter-  [p.  468] 
mines  the  cosmological  ideas,  or  the  antithesis,  there 
is  : — 

First,  No  such  practical  interest,  arising  from  the  pure 
principles  of  reason,  as  morality  and  religion  possess. 
On  the  contrary,  empiricism  seems  to  deprive  both  of 
their  power  and  influence.  If  there  is  no  original  Being, 
different  from  the  world  ; if  the  world  is  without  a be- 
ginning, and  therefore  without  a Creator ; if  our  will  is 
not  free,  and  our  soul  shares  the  same  divisibility  and 
perishableness  with  matter,  moral  ideas  also  and  principles 


3^4 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


lose  all  validity,  and  fall  with  the  tra7iscendental  ideas, 
which  formed  their  theoretic  support. 

But,  on  the  other  side,  empiricism  offers  advantages 
to  the  speculative  interests  of  reason,  which  are  very 
tempting,  and  far  exceed  those  which  the  dogmatical 
teacher  can  promise.  With  the  empiricist  the  under- 
standing is  always  on  its  own  proper  ground,  namely, 
the  field  of  all  possible  experience,  the  laws  of  which 
may  be  investigated  and  serve  to  enlarge  certain  and 
intelligible  knowledge  without  end.  Here  every  object 
can  and  ought  to  be  represented  to  intuition,  both  in 
itself  and  in  its  relations,  or  at  least  in  concepts,  the 
images  of  which  can  be  clearly  and  distinctly  represented 
in  given  similar  intuitions.  Not  only  is  there  no  necessity 
for  leaving  the  chain  of  the  order  of  nature  in  order  to  lay 
hold  of  ideas,  the  objects  of  which  are  not  known,  [p.  469] 
because,  as  mere  products  of  thought,  they  can  never  be 
given,  but  the  understanding  is  not  even  allowed  to  leave 
its  proper  business  and,  under  pretence  of  its  being  finished, 
to  cross  into  the  domain  of  idealising  reason  and  transcen- 
dental concepts,  where  it  need  no  longer  observe  and  in- 
vestigate according  to  the  laws  of  nature,  but  only  think  and 
dream , without  any  risk  of  being  contradicted  by  the  facts 
of  nature,  not  being  bound  by  their  evidence,  but  justified 
in  passing  them  by,  or  in  even  subordinating  them  to  a 
higher  authority,  namely,  that  of  pure  reason. 

Hence  the  empiricist  will  never  allow  that  any  epoch  of 
nature  should  be  considered  as  the  absolutely  first,  or  any 
limit  of  his  vision  into  the  extent  of  nature  should  be  con- 
sidered as  the  last.  He  will  not  approve  of  a transition 
from  the  objects  of  nature,  which  he  can  analyse  by 
observation  and  mathematics  and  determine  synthetically 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


385 


in  intuition  (the  extended),  to  those  which  neither  sense 
nor  imagination  can  ever  represent  in  coticreto  (the  sim- 
ple) ; nor  will  he  concede  that  a faculty  be  presupposed, 
even  in  nature,  to  act  independent  of  the  laws  of  nature 
(freedom),  thus  narrowing  the  operations  of  the  under- 
standing in  investigating,  according  to  the  necessary 
rules,  the  origin  of  phenomena.  Lastly,  he  will  never 
tolerate  that  the  cause  of  anything  should  be  [p.  470] 
looked  for  anywhere  outside  of  nature  (in  the  original 
Being),  because  we  know  nothing  but  nature,  which  alone 
can  offer  us  objects  and  instruct  us  as  to  their  laws. 

If  the  empirical  philosopher  had  no  other  purpose  with 
his  antithesis  but  to  put  down  the  rashness  and  presump- 
tion of  reason  in  mistaking  her  true  purpose,  while  boasting 
of  insight  and  knowledge , where  insight  and  knowledge 
come  to  an  end,  nay,  while  representing,  what  might  have 
been  allowed  to  pass  on  account  of  practical  interests, 
as  a real  advancement  of  speculative  enquiry,  in  order, 
when  it  is  so  disposed,  either  to  tear  the  thread  of  physical 
enquiry,  or  to  fasten  it,  under  the  pretence  of  enlarging 
our  knowledge,  to  those  transcendental  ideas,  which  really 
teach  us  only  that  we  know  nothing ; if,  I say,  the  em- 
piricist were  satisfied  with  this,  then  his  principle  would 
only  serve  to  teach  moderation  in  claims,  modesty  in 
assertions,  and  encourage  the  greatest  possible  enlarge- 
ment of  our  understanding  through  the  true  teacher 
given  to  us,  namely,  experience.  For  in  such  a case  we 
should  not  be  deprived  of  our  own  intellectual  presump- 
tions or  of  our  faith  in  their  influence  on  our  practical 
interests.  They  would  only  have  lost  the  pompous  titles 
of  science  and  rational  insight,  because  true  [p.  471] 
speculative  knoivledge  can  never  have  any  other  object 

2C 


386 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


but  experience  ; and,  if  we  transcend  its  limits,  our  syn- 
thesis, which  attempts  new  kinds  of  knowledge  indepen- 
dent of  experience,  lacks  that  substratum  of  intuition  to 
which  alone  it  could  be  applied. 

As  it  is,  empiricism  becomes  often  itself  dogmatical 
with  regard  to  ideas,  and  boldly  denies  what  goes  beyond 
the  sphere  of  its  intuitive  knowledge,  and  thus  becomes 
guilty  itself  of  a want  of  modesty,  which  here  is  all  the 
more  reprehensible,  because  an  irreparable  injury  is 
thereby  inflicted  on  the  practical  interests  of  reason. 

This  constitutes  the  opposition  of  Epicureanism. 1 to 
Platonism. 

Either  party  says  more  than  it  knows  ; but,  [p.  472] 
while  the  former  encourages  and  advances  knowledge, 
although  at  the  expense  of  practical  interests,  the  latter 
supplies  excellent  practical  principles,  but  with  regard  to 
everything  of  which  speculative  knowledge  is  open  to  us, 
it  allows  reason  to  indulge  in  ideal  explanations  of  natural 
phenomena  and  to  neglect  physical  investigation. 

With  regard  to  the  third  point  which  has  to  be  con- 


1 It  is,  however,  doubtful  whether  Epicurus  did  ever  teach  these  principles 
as  objective  assertions.  If  he  meant  them  to  be  no  more  than  maxims  for  the 
speculative  use  of  reason,  he  would  have  shown  thereby  a truer  philosophical 
spirit  than  any  of  the  philosophers  on  antiquity.  The  principles  that  in  ex- 
plaining phenomena  we  must  proceed  as  if  the  field  of  investigation  were 
enclosed  by  no  limit  or  beginning  of  the  world;  that  the  material  of  the  world 
should  be  accepted  as  it  must  be,  if  we  want  to  learn  anything  about  it  from 
experience  ; that  there  is  no  origination  of  events  except  as  determined  by 
invariable  laws  of  nature;  and,  lastly,  that  we  must  not  appeal  to  a cause 
distinct  from  the  world,  all  these  are  still  perfectly  true,  though  seldom  ob- 
served in  enlarging  the  field  of  speculative  philosophy,  or  in  discovering  the 
principles  of  morality,  independently  of  foreign  aid.  It  is  not  permissible 
that  those  who  wish  only  to  ignore  those  dogmatical  propositions,  while 
still  engaged  in  mere  speculation,  should  be  accused  of  wishing  to  deny 
them. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


387 


sidered  in  a preliminary  choice  between  the  two  opposite 
parties,  it  is  very  strange  that  empiricism  should  be  so 
unpopular,  though  it  might  be  supposed  that  the  common 
understanding  would  readily  accept  a theory  which  prom- 
ises to  satisfy  it  by  experimental  knowledge  and  its  ra- 
tional connection,  while  transcendental  dogmatism  forces 
it  to  ascend  to  concepts  which  far  surpass  the  insight 
and  rational  faculties  of  the  most  practised  thinkers.  But 
here  is  the  real  motive;  — the  man  of  ordinary  [p.  473] 
understanding  is  so  placed  thereby  that  even  the  most 
learned  can  claim  no  advantage  over  him.  If  he  knows  little 
or  nothing,  no  one  can  boast  of  knowing  much  more,  and 
though  he  may  not  be  able  to  employ  such  scholastic  terms 
as  others,  he  can  argue  and  subtilise  infinitely  more,  because- 
he  moves  about  among  mere  ideas,  about  which  it  is  easy 
to  be  eloquent,  because  no  one  knows  anything  about  them. 
The  same  person  would  have  to  be  entirely  silent,  or 
would  have  to  confess  his  ignorance  with  regard  to  sci- 
entific enquiries  into  nature.  Indolence,  therefore,  and 
vanity  are  strongly  in  favour  of  those  principles.  Besides, 
although  a true  philosopher  finds  it  extremely  hard  to 
accept  the  principle  of  which  he  can  give  no  reasonable 
account,  still  more  to  introduce  concepts  the  objective 
reality  of  which  cannot  be  established,  nothing  comes 
more  natural  to  the  common  understanding  that  wants 
something  with  which  it  can  operate  securely.  The 
difficulty  of  comprehending  such  a supposition  does  not 
disquiet  a person  of  common  understanding,  because  not 
knowing  what  comprehending  really  means,  it  never  enters 
into  his  mind,  and  he  takes  everything  for  known  that  has 
become  familiar  to  him  by  frequent  use.  At  last  all  specu- 
lative interest  disappears  before  the  practical,  and  he 


388 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


imagines  that  he  understands  and  knows  what  his  fears 
and  hopes  impel  him  to  accept  or  to  believe.  Thus  the 
empiricism  of  a transcendentally  idealising  reason  [p.  474] 
loses  all  popularity  and,  however  prejudicial  it  may  be  to 
the  highest  practical  principles,  there  is  no  reason  to  fear 
that  it  will  ever  pass  the  limits  of  the  school  and  obtain 
in  the  commonwealth  any  considerable  authority,  or  any 
favour  with  the  multitude. 

Human  reason  is  by  its  nature  architectonic,  and  looks 
upon  all  knowledge  as  belonging  to  a possible  system. 
It  therefore  allows  such  principles  only  which  do  not 
render  existing  knowledge  incapable  of  being  associated 
with  other  knowledge  in  some  kind  of  system.  The 
propositions  of  the  antithesis,  however,  are  of  such  a 
character  that  they  render  the  completion  of  any  system 
of  knowledge  quite  impossible.  According  to  them  there 
is  always  beyond  every  state  of  the  world,  an  older  state ; 
in  every  part,  other  and  again  divisible  parts ; before  every 
event,  another  event  which  again  is  produced  from  else- 
where, and  everything  in  existence  is  conditioned,  without 
an  unconditioned  and  first  existence  anywhere.  As  there- 
fore the  antithesis  allows  of  nothing  that  is  first,  and  of 
no  beginning  which  could  serve  as  the  foundation  of  an 
edifice,  such  an  edifice  of  knowledge  is  entirely  impossible 
with  such  premisses.  Hence  the  architectonic  interest  of 
reason  (which  demands  not  empirical,  but  pure  [p.  475] 
rational  unity  a priori ) serves  as  a natural  recommendation 
of  the  propositions  of  the  thesis. 

But  if  men  could  free  themselves  from  all  such  interests, 
and  consider  the  assertions  of  reason,  unconcerned  about 
their  consequences,  according  to  the  value  of  their  argu- 
ments only,  they  would  find  themselves,  if  they  knew  of 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


389 

no  escape  from  the  press  except  adhesion  to  one  or  the 
other  of  the  opposite  doctrines,  in  a state  of  constant 
oscillation.  To-day  they  would  be  convinced  that  the 
human  will  is  free ; to-morrow,  when  considering  the 
indissoluble  chain  of  nature,  they  would  think  that  free- 
dom is  nothing  but  self-deception,  and  nature  all  in  all. 
When  afterwards  they  come  to  act,  this  play  of  purely 
speculative  reason  would  vanish  like  the  shadows  of  a 
dream,  and  they  would  choose  their  principles  according 
to  practical  interests  only.  But,  as  it  well  befits  a reflect- 
ing and  enquiring  being  to  devote  a certain  time  entirely 
to  the  examination  of  his  own  reason,  divesting  himself  of 
all  partiality,  and  then  to  publish  his  observations  for  the 
'udgment  of  others,  no  one  ought  to  be  blamed,  still  less 
be  prevented,  if  he  wishes  to  produce  the  thesis  [p.  476] 
as  well  as  the  antithesis,  so  that  they  may  defend  them- 
selves, terrified  by  no  menace,  before  a jury  of  his  peers, 
that  is,  before  a jury  of  weak  mortals. 

THE  ANTINOMY  OF  PURE  REASON 
Section  IV 

Of  the  Transcendental  Problems  of  Pure  Reason , and  the 
Absolute  Necessity  of  their  Solution 

To  attempt  to  solve  all  problems,  and  answer  all  ques- 
tions, would  be  impudent  boasting,  and  so  extravagant  a 
self-conceit,  that  it  would  forfeit  all  confidence.  Never- 
theless there  are  sciences  the  very  nature  of  which  requires 
that  every  question  which  can  occur  in  them  should  be 
answerable  at  once  from  what  is  known,  because  the 
answer  must  arise  from  the  same  sources  from  which  the 


390 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


question  springs.  Here  it  is  not  allowed  to  plead  inevita- 
ble ignorance,  but  a solution  can  be  demanded.  We  must 
be  able,  for  instance,  to  know,  according  to  a rule,  what  in 
every  possible  case  is  right  or  wrong , because  this  touches 
our  obligation,  and  we  cannot  have  any  obligation  to  that 
which  we  cannot  know.  In  the  explanation,  [p.  477] 
however,  of  the  phenomena  of  nature,  many  things  must 
remain  uncertain,  and  many  a question  insoluble,  because 
what  we  know  of  nature  is  by  no  means  sufficient,  in  all 
cases,  to  explain  what  has  to  be  explained.  It  has  now  to 
be  considered,  whether  there  exists  in  transcendental  phi- 
losophy any  question  relating  to  any  object  of  reason 
which,  by  that  pure  reason,  is  unanswerable,  and  whether 
we  have  a right  to  decline  its  decisive  answer  by  treating 
the  object  as  absolutely  uncertain  (from  all  that  we  are 
able  to  know),  and  as  belonging  to  that  class  of  objects  of 
which  we  may  form  a sufficient  conception  for  starting  a 
question,  without  having  the  power  or  means  of  ever 
answering  it. 

Now  I maintain  that  transcendental  philosophy  has  this 
peculiarity  among  all  speculative  knowledge,  that  no  ques- 
tion, referring  to  an  object  of  pure  reason,  can  be  insoluble 
for  the  same  human  reason ; and  that  no  excuse  of  inevita- 
ble ignorance  on  our  side,  or  of  unfathomable  depth  on 
the  side  of  the  problem,  can  release  us  from  the  obligation 
to  answer  it  thoroughly  and  completely  ; because  the  same 
concept,  which  enables  us  to  ask  the  question,  must 
qualify  us  to  answer  it,  considering  that,  as  in  the  case 
of  right  and  wrong,  the  object  itself  does  not  exist,  except 
in  the  concept. 

There  are,  however,  in  transcendental  philoso-  [p.  478] 
phy  no  other  questions  but  the  cosmological,  with  regard 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


391 


to  which  we  have  a right  to  demand  a satisfactory  answer, 
touching  the  quality  of  the  object ; nor  is  the  philosopher 
allowed  here  to  decline  an  answer  by  pleading  impenetra- 
ble obscurity.  These  questions  can  refer  to  cosmological 
ideas  only,  because  the  object  must  be  given  empirically, 
and  the  question  only  refers  to  the  adequateness  of  it  to 
an  idea.  If  the  object  is  transcendental  and  therefore 
itself  unknown,  as,  for  instance,  whether  that  something 
the  phenomenal  appearance  of  which  (within  ourselves)  is 
the  thinking  (soul),  be  in  itself  a simple  being,  whether 
there  be  an  absolutely  necessary  cause  of  all  things,  etc., 
we  are  asked  to  find  an  object  for  our  idea  of  which  we 
may  well  confess  that  it  is  unknown  to  us,  though  not 
therefore  impossible.1  The  cosmological  ideas  alone  pos- 
sess this  peculiarity  that  they  may  presuppose  [p.  479] 
their  object,  and  the  empirical  synthesis  required  for  the 
object,  as  given,  and  the  question  which  they  suggest 
refers  only  to  the  progress  of  that  synthesis,  so  far  as  it  is 
to  contain  absolute  totality,  such  absolute  totality  being 
no  longer  empirical,  because  it  cannot  be  given  in  any 
experience.  As  we  are  here  concerned  solely  with  a 
thing,  as  an  object  of  possible  experience,  not  as  a thing 

1 Though  we  cannot  answer  the  question,  what  kind  of  quality  a transcen- 
dental object  may  possess,  or  what  it  is , we  are  well  able  to  answer  that  the 
question  itself  is  nothing , because  it  is  without  an  object.  All  questions,  there- 
fore, of  transcendental  psychology  are  answerable,  and  have  been  answered, 
for  they  refer  to  the  transcendental  subject  of  all  internal  phenomena,  which 
itself  is  not  phenomenal,  and  not  given  as  an  object,  and  possesses  none  of  the 
conditions  which  make  any  of  the  categories  (and  it  is  to  them  that  the  ques- 
tion really  refers)  applicable  to  it.  We  have,  therefore,  here  a case  where  the 
common  saying  applies,  that  no  answer  is  as  good  as  an  answer,  that  is,  that 
the  question  regarding  the  quality  of  something  which  cannot  be  conceived 
by  any  definite  predicates,  being  completely  beyond  the  sphere  of  objects,  is 
entirely  null  and  void. 


392 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


by  itself,  it  is  impossible  that  the  answer  of  the  transcen 
dent  cosmological  question  can  be  anywhere  but  in  the 
idea,  because  it  refers  to  no  object  by  itself ; and  in 
respect  to  possible  experience  we  do  not  ask  for  that 
which  can  be  given  in  concreto  in  any  experience,  but  for 
that  which  lies  in  the  idea,  to  which  the  empirical  synthe- 
sis can  no  more  than  approach.  Hence  that  question  can 
be  solved  from  the  idea  only,  and  being  a mere  creation  of 
reason,  reason  cannot  decline  her  responsibility  and  put  it 
on  the  unknown  object. 

It  is  in  reality  not  so  strange  as  it  may  seem  [p.  480] 
at  first,  that  a science  should  demand  and  expect  definite 
answers  to  all  the  questions  belonging  to  it  ( quaestiones 
domesticae ),  although  at  present  these  answers  have  not 
yet  been  discovered.  There  are,  in  addition  to  transcen- 
dental philosophy,  two  other  sciences  of  pure  reason,  the 
one  speculative,  the  other  practical,  pure  mathematics , and 
pure  ethics.  Has  it  ever  been  alleged  that,  it  may  be  on 
account  of  our  necessary  ignorance  of  the  conditions,  it 
must  remain  uncertain  what  exact  relation  the  diameter 
bears  to  a circle,  in  rational  or  irrational  numbers?  As 
by  the  former  the  relation  cannot  be  expressed  ade- 
quately, and  by  the  latter  has  not  yet  been  discovered, 
it  was  judged  rightly  that  the  impossibility  at  least  of 
the  solution  of  such  a problem  can  be  known  with  cer- 
tainty, and  Lambert  gave  even  a demonstration  of  this. 
In  the  general  principles  of  morality  there  can  be  noth- 
ing uncertain,  because  its  maxims  are  either  entirely  null 
and  void,  or  derived  from  our  own  rational  concepts  only. 
In  natural  science,  on  the  contrary,  we  have  an  infinity 
of  conjectures  with  regard  to  which  certainty  can  never 
be  expected,  because  natural  phenomena  are  objects  given 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


393 


to  us  independent  of  our  concepts,  and  the  key  to  them 
cannot  be  found  within  our  own  mind,  but  in  the  world 
outside  us.  For  that  reason  it  cannot  in  many  cases 
be  found  at  all,  and  a satisfactory  answer  must  not  be 
expected.  The  questions  of  the  transcendental  [p.  481] 
Analytic,  referring  to  the  deduction  of  our  pure  know- 
ledge, do  not  belong  to  this  class,  because  we  are  treating 
at  present  of  the  certainty  of  judgments  with  reference 
to  their  objects  only,  and  not  with  reference  to  the  origin 
of  our  concepts  themselves. 

We  shall  not,  therefore,  be  justified  in  evading  the  obli- 
gation of  a critical  solution,  at  least  of  the  questions  of 
reason,  by  complaints  on  the  narrow  limits  of  our  reason, 
and  by  confessing,  under  the  veil  of  humble  self-know- 
ledge, that  it  goes  beyond  the  powers  of  our  reason  to 
determine  whether  the  world  has  existed  from  eternity, 
or  has  had  a beginning ; whether  cosmical  space  is  filled 
with  beings  ad  infinitum,  or  enclosed  within  certain 
limits ; whether  anything  in  the  world  is  simple,  or 
everything  can  be  infinitely  divided ; lastly,  whether  there 
is  a Being  entirely  unconditioned  and  necessary  in  itself, 
or  whether  the  existence  of  everything  is  conditioned, 
and  therefore  externally  dependent,  and  in  itself  contin- 
gent. For  all  these  questions  refer  to  an  object  which 
can  be  found  nowhere  except  in  our  own  thoughts, 
namely,  the  absolutely  unconditioned  totality  of  the  syn- 
thesis of  phenomena.  If  we  are  not  able  to  say  and 
establish  anything  certain  about  this  from  our  own  con- 
cepts, we  must  not  throw  the  blame  on  the  [p.  482] 
object  itself  as  obscure,  because  such  an  object  (being 
nowhere  to  be  found,  except  in  our  ideas)  can  never  be 
given  to  us ; but  we  must  look  for  the  real  cause  of 


394 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


obscurity  in  our  idea  itself,  which  is  a problem  admit 
ting  of  no  solution,  though  we  insist  obstinately  that  a 
real  object  must  correspond  to  it.  A clear  explanation 
of  the  dialectic  within  our  own  concept,  would  soon  show 
us,  with  perfect  certainty,  how  we  ought  to  judge  with 
reference  to  such  a question. 

If  people  put  forward  a pretext  of  being  unable  to 
arrive  at  certainty  with  regard  to  these  problems,  the 
first  question  which  we  ought  to  address  to  them,  and 
which  they  ought  to  answer  clearly,  is  this,  Whence  do 
you  get  those  ideas,  the  solution  of  which  involves  you 
in  such  difficulty  ? Are  they  phenomena,  of  which  you 
require  an  explanation,  and  of  which  you  have  only  to 
find,  in  accordance  with  those  ideas,  the  principles,  or 
the  rule  of  their  explanation  ? Suppose  the  whole  of 
nature  were  spread  out  before  you,  and  nothing  were 
hid  to  your  senses  and  to  the  consciousness  of  all  that 
is  presented  to  your  intuition,  yet  you  would  never  be 
able  to  know  by  one  single  experience  the  object  of  your 
ideas  in  concreto  (because,  in  addition  to  that  complete 
intuition,  what  is  required  is  a completed  synthesis,  and 
the  consciousness  of  its  absolute  totality,  which  [p.  483] 
is  impossible  by  any  empirical  knowledge).  Hence  your 
question  can  never  be  provoked  for  the  sake  of  explain- 
ing any  given  phenomenon,  and  as  it  were  suggested  by 
the  object  itself.  Such  an  object  can  never  come  before 
you,  because  it  can  never  be  given  by  any  possible  expe- 
rience. In  all  possible  perceptions  you  always  remain 
under  the  sway  of  conditions,  whether  in  space  or  in 
time ; you  never  come  face  to  face  with  anything  uncon- 
ditioned, in  order  thus  to  determine  whether  the  uncon- 
ditioned exists  in  an  absolute  beginning  of  the  synthesis, 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


395 


or  in  an  absolute  totality  of  the  series  without  any  begin- 
ning. The  whole,  in  its  empirical  meaning,  is  always 
relative  only.  The  absolute  whole  of  quantity  (the  uni- 
verse), of  division,  of  origination,  and  of  the  condition  of 
existence  in  general,  with  all  the  attendant  questions  as 
to  whether  it  can  be  realised  by  a finite  synthesis  or  by 
a synthesis  to  be  carried  on  ad  infinitum,  has  nothing 
to  do  with  any  possible  experience.  You  would,  for 
instance,  never  be  able  to  explain  the  phenomena  of  a 
body  in  the  least  better,  or  even  differently,  whether 
you  assume  that  it  consists  of  simple  or  throughout  of 
composite  parts : for  neither  a simple  phenomenon,  nor 
an  infinite  composition  can  ever  meet  your  senses.  Phe- 
nomena require  to  be  explained  so  far  only  as  the  condi- 
tions of  their  explanation  are  given  in  perception ; but 
whatever  may  exist  in  them,  if  comprehended  [p.  484] 
as  an  absolute  whole,  can1  never  be  a perception.  Yet  it 
is  this  very  whole  the  explanation  of  which  is  required  in 
the  transcendental  problems  of  reason. 

As  therefore  the  solution  of  these  problems  can  never 
be  supplied  by  experience,  you  cannot  say  that  it  is  un- 
certain what  ought  to  be  predicated  of  the  object.  For 
your  object  is  in  your  brain  only,  and  cannot  possibly 
exist  outside  it ; so  that  you  have  only  to  take  care  to 
be  at  one  with  yourselves,  and  to  avoid  the  amphiboly, 
which  changes  your  idea  into  a pretended  representation 
of  an  object  empirically  given,  and  therefore  to  be  known 
according  to  the  laws  of  experience.  The  dogmatical 
solution  is  therefore  not  only  uncertain,  but  impossible  ; 
while  the  critical  solution,  which  may  become  perfectly 


1 Read  kcine  in  original,  not  tint. 


396 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


certain,  does  not  consider  the  question  objectively,  but 
only  with  reference  to  the  foundation  of  the  knowledge 
on  which  it  is  based. 

THE  ANTINOMY  OF  PURE  REASON  [p.  485] 
Section  V 

Sceptical  Representation  of  the  Cosmological  Questions  in 
the  Four  Transcendental  Ideas 

We  should  no  doubt  gladly  desist  from  wishing  to  have 
our  questions  answered  dogmatically,  if  we  understood 
beforehand  that,  whatever  the  answer  might  be,  it  would 
only  increase  our  ignorance,  and  throw  us  from  one  incom- 
prehensibility into  another,  from  one  obscurity  into  a still 
greater  obscurity,  or  it  may  be  even  into  contradictions. 
If  our  question  can  only  be  answered  by  yes  or  no,  it 
would  seem  to  be  prudent  to  take  no  account  at  first  of 
the  probable  grounds  of  the  answer,  but  to  consider 
before,  what  we  should  gain,  if  the  answer  was  yes,  and 
what,  if  the  answer  was  no.  If  we  should  find  that  in 
either  case  nothing  comes  of  it  but  mere  nonsense,  we 
are  surely  called  upon  to  examine  our  question  critically, 
and  to  see  whether  it  does  not  rest  on  a groundless  sup- 
position, playing  only  with  an  idea  which  betrays  its  fal- 
sity in  its  application  and  its  consequences  better  than 
when  represented  by  itself.  This  is  the  great  advantage 
of  the  sceptical  treatment  of  questions  which  [p.  486] 
pure  reason  puts  to  pure  reason.  We  get  rid  by  it,  with 
a little  effort,  of  a great  amount  of  dogmatical  rubbish, 
in  order  to  put  in  its  place  sober  criticism  which,  as  a 
true  cathartic,  removes  successfully  all  illusion  with  its 
train  of  omniscience. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


39  7 


If,  therefore,  I could  know  beforehand  that  a cosmo- 
logical idea,  in  whatever  way  it  might  try  to  realise  the 
unconditioned  of  the  regressive  synthesis  of  phenomena 
(whether  in  the  manner  of  the  thesis  or  in  that  of  the 
antithesis),  that,  I say,  the  cosmological  idea  would  always 
be  either  too  large  or  too  small  for  any  concept  of  the  under- 
standing, I should  understand  that,  as  that  cosmological 
idea  refers  only  to  an  object  of  experience  which  is  to 
correspond  to  a possible  concept  of  the  understanding,  it 
must  be  empty  and  without  meaning,  because  the  object 
does  not  fit  into  it,  whatever  I may  do  to  adapt  it.  And 
this  must  really  be  the  case  with  all  cosmical  concepts, 
which  on  that  very  account  involve  reason,  so  long  as  it 
remains  attached  to  them,  in  inevitable  antinomy.  For 
suppose : — 

First,  That  the  world  has  no  beginning,  and  you  will 
find  that  it  is  too  large  for  your  concept,  which,  as  it 
consists  in  a successive  regressus,  can  never  reach  the 
whole  of  past  eternity.  Or,  suppose,  that  the  world  has 
a beginning,  then  it  is  again  too  small  for  the  concept 
of  your  understanding  engaged  in  the  necessary  empiri- 
cal regressus.  For  as  a beginning  always  pre-  [p.  487] 
supposes  a time  preceding,  it  is  not  yet  unconditioned ; 
and  the  law  of  the  empirical  use  of  the  understanding 
obliges  you  to  look  for  a higher  condition  of  time,  so  that, 
with  reference  to  such  a law,  the  world  (as  limited  in  time) 
is  clearly  too  small. 

The  same  applies  to  the  twofold  answer  to  the  question 
regarding  the  extent  of  the  world  in  space.  For  if  it  is 
infinite  and  unlimited,  it  is  too  large  for  every  possible 
empirical  concept.  If  it  is  finite  and  limited,  you  have 
a perfect  right  to  ask  what  determines  that  limit.  Empty 


398 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


space  is  not  an  independent  correlate  of  things,  and  can- 
not be  a final  condition,  still  less  an  empirical  condition 
forming  a part  of  a possible  experience ; — for  how  can 
there  be  experience  of  what  is  absolutely  void  ? But,  in 
order  to  produce  an  absolute  totality  in  an  empirical  syn- 
thesis, it  is  always  requisite  that  the  unconditioned  should 
be  an  empirical  concept.  Thus  it  follows  that  a limited 
world  would  be  too  small  for  your  concept. 

Secondly , If  every  phenomenon  in  space  (matter)  con- 
sists of  an  infinite  number  of  parts , the  regressus  of  a 
division  will  always  be  too  large  for  your  concept,  while 
if  the  division  of  space  is  to  stop  at  any  member  (the 
simple),  it  would  be  too  small  for  the  idea  of  the  uncondi- 
tioned, because  that  member  always  admits  of  a regres- 
sus to  more  parts  contained  in  it.  [p.  488] 

Thirdly,  If  you  suppose  that  everything  that  happens 
in  the  world  is  nothing  but  the  residt  of  the  laws  of 
nature,  the  causality  of  the  cause  will  always  be  some- 
thing that  happens,  and  that  necessitates  a regressus  to 
a still  higher  cause,  and  therefore  a continuation  of  the 
series  of  conditions  a parte  priori  without  end.  Mere 
active  nature,  therefore,  is  too  large  for  any  concept  in 
the  synthesis  of  cosmical  events. 

If  you  admit,  on  the  contrary,  spontaneously  produced 
events,  therefore  generation  from  freedom,  you  have  still, 
according  to  an  inevitable  law  of  nature,  to  ask  why,  and 
you  are  forced  by  the  empirical  law  of  causality  beyond 
that  point,  so  that  you  find  that  any  such  totality  of  con- 
nection is  too  small  for  your  necessary  empirical  concept. 

Fourthly,  If  you  admit  an  absolutely  necessaiy  Being 
(whether  it  be  the  world  itself  or  something  in  the  world, 
or  the  cause  of  the  world),  you  place  it  at  a time  infinitely 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


399 


remote  from  any  given  point  of  time,  because  otherwise 
it  would  be  dependent  on  another  and  antecedent  exist- 
ence. In  that  case,  however,  such  an  existence  would 
be  unapproachable  by  your  empirical  concept,  and  too 
large  even  to  be  reached  by  any  continued  regressus. 

But  if,  according  to  your  opinion,  everything  [p.  489] 
which  belongs  to  the  world  (whether  as  conditioned  or 
as  condition)  is  contingent , then  every  given  existence 
is  too  small  for  your  concept,  because  compelling  you 
to  look  still  for  another  existence,  on  which  it  depends. 

We  have  said  that  in  all  these  cases,  the  cosmical  idea 
is  either  too  large  or  too  small  for  the  empirical  regressus, 
and  therefore  for  every  possible  concept  of  the  under- 
standing. But  why  did  we  not  take  the  opposite  view 
and  say  that  in  the  former  case  the  empirical  concept  is 
always  too  small  for  the  idea,  and  in  the  latter  too  large, 
so  that  blame  should  attach  to  the  empirical  regressus, 
and  not  to  the  cosmological  idea,  which  we  accused  of 
deviating  from  its  object,  namely,  possible  experience, 
either  by  its  too-much  or  its  too-little  ? The  reason  was 
this.  It  is  possible  experience  alone  that  can  impart 
reality  to  our  concepts  ; without  this,  a concept  is  only 
an  idea  without  truth,  and  without  any  reference  to  an 
object.  Hence  the  possible  empirical  concept  was  the 
standard  by  which  to  judge  the  idea,  whether  it  be  an 
idea  and  fiction  only,  or  whether  it  has  an  object  in  the 
world.  For  we  then  only  say  that  anything  is  relatively 
to  something  else  either  too  large  or  too  small,  if  it  is 
required  for  the  sake  of  the  other  and  ought  to  be 
adapted  to  it.  One  of  the  playthings  of  the  old  dia- 
lectical school  was  the  question,  whether  we  [p.  490] 
should  say  that  the  ball  is  too  large  or  the  hole  too  small, 


400  Transcendental  Dialectic 

if  a ball  cannot  pass  through  a hole.  In  this  case  it  is 
indifferent  what  expression  we  use,  because  we  do  not 
know  which  of  the  two  exists  for  the  sake  of  the  other. 
But  you  would  never  say  that  the  man  is  too  large  for 
his  coat,  but  that  the  coat  is  too  small  for  the  man. 

We  have  thus  been  led  at  least  to  a well-founded 
suspicion  that  the  cosmological  ideas,  and  with  them  all 
the  conflicting  sophistical  assertions,  may  rest  on  an 
empty  and  merely  imaginary  conception  of  the  manner 
in  which  the  object  of  those  ideas  can  be  given,  and  this 
suspicion  may  lead  us  on  the  right  track  to  discover  the 
illusion  which  has  so  long  led  us  astray. 

THE  ANTINOMY  OF  PURE  REASON 
Section  VI 

Transcendental  Idealism  as  the  Key  to  the  Solution  oj 
Cosmological  Dialectic 

It  has  been  sufficiently  proved  in  the  transcendental 
^Esthetic  that  everything  which  is  perceived  in  space  and 
time,  therefore  all  objects  of  an  experience  possible  to  us, 
are  nothing  but  phenomena,  that  is,  mere  representations 
which,  such  as  they  are  represented,  namely,  as  [p.  491] 
extended  beings,  or  series  of  changes,  have  no  inde- 
pendent existence  outside  our  thoughts.  This  system 
I call  Transcendental  Idealism } Transcendental  realism 
changes  these  modifications  of  our  sensibility  into  self- 
subsistent  things,  that  is,  it  changes  mere  representations 
into  things  by  themselves. 


1 Sec  Supplement  XXVIII. 


Transcendental  Dialectic  401 

It  would  be  unfair  to  ask  us  to  adopt  that  long-decried 
empirical  idealism  which,  while  it  admits  the  independent 
reality  of  space,  denies  the  existence  of  extended  beings 
in  it,  or  at  all  events  considers  it  as  doubtful  and  does  not 
admit  that  there  is  in  this  respect  a sufficiently  established 
difference  between  dream  and  reality.  It  sees  no  difficulty 
with  regard  to  the  phenomena  of  the  internal  sense  in 
time,  being  real  things ; nay,  it  even  maintains  that  this 
internal  experience  alone  sufficiently  proves  the  real 
existence  of  its  object  (by  itself),  with  all  the  deter- 
minations in  time. 

Our  own  transcendental  idealism,  on  the  contrary, 
allows  that  the  objects  of  external  intuition  may  be  real, 
as  they  are  perceived  in  space,  and  likewise  all  changes  in 
time,  as  they  are  represented  by  the  internal  sense.  For 
as  space  itself  is  a form  of  that  intuition  which  we  call  ex- 
ternal, and  as  there  would  be  no  empirical  repre-  [p.  492] 
sentation  at  all,  unless  there  were  objects  in  space,  we  can 
and  must  admit  the  extended  beings  in  it  as  real ; and  the 
same  applies  to  time.  Space  itself,  however,  as  well  as 
time,  and  with  them  all  phenomena,  are  not  things  by 
themselves,  but  representations,  and  cannot  exist  outside 
our  mind  ; and  even  the  internal  sensuous  intuition  of  our 
mind  (as  an  object  of  consciousness)  which  is  represented 
as  determined  by  the  succession  of  different  states  in  time, 
is  not  a real  self,  as  it  exists  by  itself,  or  what  is  called  the 
transcendental  subject,  but  a phenomenon  only,  given  to 
the  sensibility  of  this  to  us  unknown  being.  It  cannot  be 
admitted  that  this  internal  phenomenon  exists  as  a thing 
by  itself,  because  it  is  under  the  condition  of  time,  which 
can  never  be  the  determination  of  anything  by  itself.  In 
space  and  time,  however,  the  empirical  truth  of  phenomena 


402 


Transce7idental  Dialectic 


is  sufficiently  established,  and  kept  quite  distinct  from  a 
dream,  if  both  are  properly  and  completely  connected  to- 
gether in  experience,  according  to  empirical  laws. 

The  objects  of  experience  are  therefore  never  given  by 
themselves,  but  in  our  experience  only,  and  do  not  exist 
outside  it.  That  there  may  be  inhabitants  in  [p.  493] 
the  moon,  though  no  man  has  ever  seen  them,  must  be 
admitted  ; but  it  means  no  more  than  that,  in  the  possible 
progress  of  our  experience,  we  may  meet  with  them  ; for 
everything  is  real  that  hangs  together  with  a perception, 
according  to  the  laws  of  empirical  progress.  They  are 
therefore  real,  if  they  are  empirically  connected  with  any 
real  consciousness,  although  they  are  not  therefore  real  by 
themselves,  that  is,  apart  from  that  progress  of  experience. 

Nothing  is  really  given  to  us  but  perception,  and  the 
empirical  progress  from  this  to  other  possible  perceptions. 
For  by  themselves  phenomena,  as  mere  representations, 
are  real  in  perception  only,  which  itself  is  nothing  but  the 
reality  of  an  empirical  representation,  that  is,  phenomenal 
appearance.  To  call  a phenomenon  a real  thing,  before  it 
is  perceived,  means  either,  that  in  the  progress  of  ex- 
perience we  must  meet  with  such  a perception,  or  it 
means  nothing.  For  that  it  existed  by  itself,  without  any 
reference  to  our  senses  and  possible  experience,  might  no 
doubt  be  said  when  we  speak  of  a thing  by  itself.  We 
here  are  speaking,  however,  of  a phenomenon  only  in 
space  and  time,  which  are  not  determinations  of  things 
by  themselves,  but  only  of  our  sensibility.  Hence  that 
which  exists  in  them  (phenomena)  is  not  something  by 
itself,  but  consists  in  representations  only,  [p.  494] 
which,  unless  they  are  given  in  us  (in  perception),  exist 
nowhere. 


Transcende7ital  Dialectic 


403 


The  faculty  of  sensuous  intuition  is  really  some  kind 
of  receptivity  only,  according  to  which  we  are  affected  in 
a certain  way  by  representations  the  mutual  relation  of 
which  is  a pure  intuition  of  space  and  time  (mere  forms 
of  our  sensibility),  and  which,  if  they  are  connected  and 
determined  in  that  relation  of  space  and  time,  according 
to  the  laws  of  the  unity  of  experience,  are  called  objects. 
The  non-sensuous  cause  of  these  representations  is  entirely 
unknown  to  us,  and  we  can  never  perceive  it  as  an  object, 
for  such  a cause  would  have  to  be  represented  neither  in 
space  nor  in  time,  which  are  conditions  of  sensuous  rep- 
resentations only,  and  without  which  we  cannot  conceive 
any  intuition.  We  may,  however,  call  that  purely  in- 
telligible cause  of  phenomena  in  general,  the  tran- 
scendental object,  in  order  that  we  may  have  something 
which  corresponds  to  sensibility  as  a kind  of  receptivity. 
We  may  ascribe  to  that  transcendental  object  the  whole 
extent  and  connection  of  all  our  possible  perceptions,  and 
we  may  say  that  it  is  given  by  itself  antecedently  to  all 
experience.  Phenomena,  however,  are  given  accordingly, 
not  by  themselves,  but  in  experience  only,  because  they 
are  mere  representations  which  as  perceptions  [p.  495] 
only,  signify  a real  object,  provided  that  the  perception 
is  connected  with  all  others,  according  to  the  rules  of 
unity  in  experience.  Thus  we  may  say  that  the  real 
things  of  time  past  are  given  in  the  transcendental  object 
of  experience,  but  they  only  are  objects  to  me,  and  real 
in  time  past,  on  the  supposition  that  I conceive  that  a 
regressive  series  of  possible  perceptions  (whether  by  the 
light  of  history,  or  by  the  vestiges  of  causes  and  effects), 
in  one  word,  the  course  of  the  world,  leads,  according  to 
empirical  laws,  to  a past  series  of  time,  as  a condition  of 


404 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


the  present  time.  It  is  therefore  represented  as  real, 
not  by  itself,  but  in  connection  with  a possible  experience, 
so  that  all  past  events  from  time  immemorial  and  before 
my  own  existence  mean  after  all  nothing  but  the  possi- 
bility of  an  extension  of  the  chain  of  experience,  begin- 
ning with  present  perception  and  leading  upwards  to  the 
conditions  which  determine  it  in  time. 

If,  therefore,  I represent  to  myself  all  existing  objects  of 
the  senses,  at  all  times  and  in  all  spaces,  I do  not  place 
them  before  experience  into  space  and  time,  but  the  whole 
representation  is  nothing  but  the  idea  of  a possible  experi- 
ence, in  its  absolute  completeness.  In  that  alone  those 
objects  (which  are  nothing  but  mere  representations) 
are  given  ; and  if  we  say  that  they  exist  before  [p.  496] 
my  whole  experience,  this  only  means  that  they  exist  in 
that  part  of  experience  to  which,  starting  from  perception, 
I have  first  to  advance.  The  cause  of  empirical  conditions 
of  that  progress,  and  consequently  with  what  members,  or 
how  far  I may  meet  with  certain  members  in  that  re- 
gressus,  is  transcendental,  and  therefore  entirely  unknown 
to  me.  But  that  cause  does  not  concern  us,  but  only  the 
rule  of  the  progress  of  experience,  in  which  objects, 
namely  phenomena,  are  given  to  me.  In  the  end  it  is 
just  the  same  whether  I say,  that  in  the  empirical  progress 
in  space  I may  meet  with  stars  a hundred  times  more  dis- 
tant than  the  most  distant  which  I see,  or  whether  I say 
that  such  stars  are  perhaps  to  be  met  with  in  space, 
though  no  human  being  did  ever  or  will  ever  see  them. 
For  though,  as  things  by  themselves,  they  might  be  given 
without  any  relation  to  possible  experience,  they  are 
nothing  to  me,  and  therefore  no  objects,  unless  they  can 
be  comprehended  in  the  series  of  the  empirical  regressus. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


405 


Only  in  another  relation,  when  namely  these  phenomena 
are  meant  to  be  used  for  the  cosmological  idea  of  an  abso- 
lute whole,  and  when  we  have  to  deal  with  a question  that 
goes  beyond  the  limits  of  possible  experience,  the  distinction 
of  the  mode  in  which  the  reality  of  those  objects  of  the 
senses  is  taken  becomes  of  importance,  in  order  [p.  497] 
to  guard  against  a deceptive  error  that  would  inevitably 
arise  from  a misinterpretation  of  our  own  empirical  concepts. 

THE  ANTINOMY  OF  PURE  REASON 
Section  VII 

Critical  Decision  of  the  Cosmological  Conflict  of  Reason  with 

itself 

The  whole  antinomy  of  pure  reason  rests  on  the  dialec- 
tical argument  that,  if  the  conditioned  is  given,  the  whole 
series  of  conditions  also  is  given.  As  therefore  the  objects 
of  the  senses  are  given  us  as  conditioned,  it  follows,  etc. 
Through  this  argument,  the  major  of  which  seems  so 
natural  and  self-evident,  cosmological  ideas  have  been 
introduced  corresponding  in  number  to  the  difference  of 
conditions  (in  the  synthesis  of  phenomena)  which  consti- 
tute a series.  These  cosmological  ideas  postulate  the 
absolute  totality  of  those  series,  and  thus  place  reason  in 
inevitable  contradiction  with  itself.  Before,  however,  we 
show  what  is  deceptive  in  this  sophistical  argument,  we 
must  prepare  ourselves  for  it  by  correcting  and  defining 
certain  concepts  occurring  in  it. 

First , the  following  proposition  is  clear  and  admits  of  no 
doubt,  that  if  the  conditioned  is  given,  it  imposes  on  us 
the  regressus  in  the  series  of  all  conditions  of  [p.  498] 
it ; for  it  follows  from  the  very  concept  of  the  conditioned 


406 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


that  through  it  something  is  referred  to  a condition,  and, 
if  that  condition  is  again  conditioned,  to  a more  distant 
condition,  and  so  on  through  all  the  members  of  the 
series.  This  proposition  is  really  analytical,  and  need  not 
fear  any  transcendental  criticism.  It  is  a logical  postulate 
of  reason  to  follow  up  through  the  understanding,  as  far  as 
possible,  that  connection  of  a concept  with  its  conditions, 
which  is  inherent  in  the  concept  itself. 

Further,  if  the  conditioned  as  well  as  its  conditions  are 
things  by  themselves,  then,  if  the  former  be  given,  the 
regressus  to  the  latter  is  not  only  required,  but  is  really 
given;  and  as  this  applies  to  all  the  members  of  the 
series,  the  complete  series  of  conditions  and  with  it  the 
unconditioned  also  is  given,  or  rather  it  is  presupposed 
that  the  conditioned,  which  was  possible  through  that 
series  only,  is  given.  Here  the  synthesis  of  the  condi- 
tioned with  its  condition  is  a synthesis  of  the  understand- 
ing only,  which  represents  things  as  they  are,  without 
asking  whether  and  how  we  can  arrive  at  the  knowledge 
of  them.  But  if  I have  to  deal  with  phenomena,  which, 
as  mere  representations,  are  not  given  at  all,  unless  I 
attain  to  a knowledge  of  them  (that  is,  to  the  [p.  499] 
phenomena  themselves,  for  they  are  nothing  but  empirical 
knowledge),  then  I cannot  say  in  the  same  sense  that,  if 
the  conditioned  is  given,  all  its  conditions  (as  phenomena) 
are  also  given,  and  can  therefore  by  no  means  conclude 
the  absolute  totality  of  the  series.  For  phenomena  in  their 
apprehension  are  themselves  nothing  but  an  empirical  syn- 
thesis (in  space  and  time),  and  are  given  therefore  in  that 
synthesis  only.  Now  it  follows  by  no  means  that,  if  the 
conditioned  (as  phenomenal)  is  given,  the  synthesis  also 
that  constitutes  its  empirical  condition  should  thereby  be 


Transcendental  Dialectic  407 

given  at  the  same  time  and  presupposed  ; for  this  takes 
place  in  the  regressus  only,  and  never  without  it.  What  we 
may  say  in  such  a case  is  this,  that  a regressus  to  the  con- 
ditions, that  is,  a continued  empirical  synthesis  in  that 
direction  is  required,  and  that  conditions  cannot  be  want- 
ing that  are  given  through  that  regressus. 

Hence  we  see  that  the  major  of  the  cosmological  argu- 
ment takes  the  conditioned  in  the  transcendental  sense  of 
a pure  category,  while  the  minor  takes  it  in  the  empirical 
sense  of  a concept  of  the  understanding,  referring  to  mere 
phenomena,  so  that  it  contains  that  dialectical  deceit  which 
is  called  Sophisma  figurae  dictionis.  That  deceit,  [p.  500] 
however,  is  not  artificial,  but  a perfectly  natural  illusion  of 
our  common  reason.  It  is  owing  to  it  that,  in  the  major, 
we  presuppose  the  conditions  and  their  series  as  it  were 
071  trust,  if  anything  is  given  as  conditioned,  because  this 
is  no  more  than  the  logical  postulate  to  assume  complete 
premisses  for  any  given  conclusion.  Nor  does  there  exist 
in  the  connection  of  the  conditioned  with  its  condition  any 
order  of  time,  but  they  are  presupposed  in  themselves  as 
given  together.  It  is  equally  natural  also  in  the  minor  to 
look  on  phenomena  as  things  by  themselves,  and  as  objects 
given  to  the  understanding  only  in  the  same  manner  as  in 
the  major,  as  no  account  was  taken  of  all  the  conditions  of 
intuition  under  which  alone  objects  can  be  given.  But 
there  is  an  important  distinction  between  these  concepts, 
which  has  been  overlooked.  The  synthesis  of  the  condi- 
tioned with  its  condition,  and  the  whole  series  of  condi- 
tions in  the  major,  was  in  no  way  limited  by  time,  and  was 
free  from  any  concept  of  succession.  The  empirical  syn- 
thesis, on  the  contrary,  and  the  series  of  conditions  in 
phenomena,  which  was  subsumed  in  the  minor,  is  neces- 


408 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


sarily  successive  and  given  as  such  in  time  only.  There- 
fore I had  no  right  to  assume  the  absolute  totality  of  the 
synthesis  and  of  the  series  represented  by  it  in  this  case 
as  well  as  in  the  former.  For  in  the  former  all  the  mem- 
bers of  the  series  are  given  by  themselves  (without  deter- 
mination in  time),  while  here  they  are  possible  through  the 
successive  regressus  only,  which  cannot  exist  [p.  501] 
unless  it  is  actually  carried  out. 

After  convicting  them  of  such  a mistake  in  the  argu- 
ment adopted  by  both  parties  as  the  foundation  of  their 
cosmological  assertions,  both  might  justly  be  dismissed  as 
not  being  able  to  produce  any  good  title  in  support  of 
their  claims.  But  even  thus  their  quarrel  is  not  yet 
ended,  as  if  it  had  been  proved  that  both  parties,  or  one  of 
them,  were  wrong  in  the  matter  contended  for  (in  the  con- 
clusion), though  they  had  failed  to  support  it  by  valid  proof. 
Nothing  seems  clearer  than  that,  if  one  maintains  that  the 
world  has  a beginning,  and  the  other  that  it  has  no  begin- 
ning, but  exists  from  all  eternity,  one  or  the  other  must  be 
right.  But  if  this  were  so,  as  the  arguments  on  both  sides 
are  equally  clear,  it  would  still  remain  impossible  ever  to 
find  out  on  which  side  the  truth  lies,  and  the  suit  continues, 
although  both  parties  have  been  ordered  to  keep  the  peace 
before  the  tribunal  of  reason.  Nothing  remains  therefore 
in  order  to  settle  the  quarrel  once  for  all,  and  to  the  satis- 
faction of  both  parties,  but  to  convince  them  that,  though 
they  can  refute  each  other  so  eloquently,  they  are  really 
quarrelling  about  nothing,  and  that  a certain  transcendental 
illusion  has  mocked  them  with  a reality  where  no  [p.  502] 
reality  exists.  We  shall  now  enter  upon  this  way  of  ad- 
justing a dispute,  which  cannot  be  adjudicated. 

******** 


Transcendental  Dialectic  409 

The  Eleatic  philosopher  Zeno,  a subtle  dialectician,  was 
severely  reprimanded  by  Plato  as  a heedless  Sophist  who, 
in  order  to  display  his  skill,  would  prove  a proposition  by 
plausible  arguments  and  subvert  the  same  immediately 
afterwards  by  arguments  equally  strong.  He  maintained, 
for  instance,  that  God  (which  to  him  was  probably  nothing 
more  than  the  universe)  is  neither  finite  nor  infinite, 
neither  in  motion  nor  at  rest,  neither  similar  nor  dissimilar 
to  any  other  thing.  It  seemed  to  his  critics  as  if  he  had 
intended  to  deny  completely  both  of  the  two  self-contra- 
dictory proposition  which  would  be  absurd.  But  I do  not 
think  that  he  can  be  rightly  charged  with  this.  We  shall 
presently  consider  the  first  of  these  propositions  more 
carefully.  With  regard  to  the  others,  if  by  the  word  God 
he  meant  the  universe,  he  could  not  but  say  that  it  is 
neither  permanently  present  in  its  place  (at  rest)  nor  that 
it  changes  it  (in  motion),  because  all  places  exist  in  the 
universe  only,  while  the  universe  exists  in  no  place.  If 
the  universe  comprehends  in  itself  everything  that  exists, 
it  follows  that  it  cannot  be  similar  or  dissimilar  to  any 
other  thing,  because  there  is  no  other  thing  besides  it 
with  which  it  could  be  compared.  If  two  oppo-  [p.  503] 
site  judgments  presuppose  an  inadmissible  condition,  they 
both,  in  spite  of  their  contradiction  (which,  however,  is  no 
real  contradiction),  fall  to  the  ground,  because  the  condi- 
tion fails  under  which  alone  either  of  the  propositions  was 
meant  to  be  valid. 

If  somebody  were  to  say  that  everybody  has  either  a 
good  or  a bad  smell,  a third  case  is  possible,  namely,  that 
it  has  no  smell  at  all,  in  which  case  both  contradictory 
propositions  would  be  false.  If  I say  that  it  is  either  good 
smelling  or  not  good  smelling  (vel  suaveolens  vel  non 


4io 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


suaveolens),  in  that  case  the  two  judgments  are  contradic- 
tory, and  the  former  only  is  wrong,  while  its  contradictory 
opposite,  namely,  that  some  bodies  are  not  good  smelling, 
comprehends  those  bodies  also  which  have  no  smell  at  all. 
In  the  former  opposition  ( per  disparata ) the  contingent 
condition  of  the  concept  of  a body  (smell)  still  remained 
in  the  contradictory  judgment  and  was  not  eliminated  by 
it,  so  that  the  latter  could  not  be  called  the  contradictory 
opposite  of  the  former. 

If  I say  therefore  that  the  world  is  either  infinite  in 
space  or  is  not  infinite  ( non  est  infinitus),  then,  if  the  for- 
mer proposition  is  wrong,  its  contradictory  opposite,  that 
the  world  is  not  infinite,  must  be  true.  I should  thus  only 
eliminate  an  infinite  world  without  affirming  another, 
namely,  the  finite.  But  if  I had  said  the  world  [p.  504] 
is  either  infinite  or  finite  (not-infinite),  both  statements 
may  be  false.  For  I then  look  upon  the  world,  as  by  itself, 
determined  in  regard  to  its  extent,  and  I do  not  only  elimi- 
nate in  the  opposite  statement  the  infinity,  and  with  it,  it 
may  be,  its  whole  independent  existence,  but  I add  a deter- 
mination to  the  world  as  a thing  existing  by  itself,  which 
may  be  false,  because  the  world  may  not  be  a thing  by 
itself,  and  therefore,  with  regard  to  extension,  neither 
infinite  nor  finite.  This  kind  of  opposition  I may  be 
allowed  to  call  dialectical , that  the  real  contradiction, 
the  analytical  opposition.  Thus  then  of  two  judgments 
opposed  to  each  other  dialectically  both  may  be  false, 
because  the  one  does  not  only  contradict  the  other,  but 
says  something  more  than  is  requisite  for  a contradic- 
tion. 

If  we  regard  the  two  statements  that  the  world  is  in- 
finite in  extension,  and  that  the  world  is  finite  in  exten- 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


4.1 1- 

sion,  as  contradictory  opposites,  we  assume  that  the  world 
(the  whole  series  of  phenomena)  is  a thing  by  itself ; for 
it  remains,  whether  I remove  the  infinite  or  the  finite 
regressus  in  the  series  of  its  phenomena.  But  if  we 
remove  this  supposition,  or  this  transcendental  illusion, 
and  deny  that  it  is  a thing  by  itself,  then  the  contradic- 
tory opposition  of  the  two  statements  becomes  [p.  505] 
purely  dialectical,  and  as  the  world  does  not  exist  by 
itself  (independently  of  the  regressive  series  of  my  rep- 
resentations), it  exists  neither  as  a whole  by  itself  infinite, 
nor  as  a whole  by  itself  finite.  It  exists  only  in  the  em- 
pirical regressus  in  the  series  of  phenomena,  and  nowhere 
by  itself.  Hence,  if  that  series  is  always  conditioned,  it 
can  never  exist  as  complete,  and  the  world  is  therefore 
not  an  inconditioned  whole,  and  does  not  exist  as  such, 
either  with  infinite  or  finite  extension. 

What  has  here  been  said  of  the  first  cosmological  idea, 
namely,  that  of  the  absolute  totality  of  extension  in  phe- 
nomena, applies  to  the  others  also.  The  series  of  condi- 
tions is  to  be. found  only  in  the  regressive  synthesis,  never 
by  itself,  as  complete,  in  phenomenon  as  an  independent 
thing,  existing  prior  to  every  regressus.  Hence  I shall 
have  to  say  that  the  number  of  parts  in  any  given  phe- 
nomenon is  by  itself  neither  finite  nor  infinite,  because 
a phenomenon  does  not  exist  by  itself,  and  its  parts  are 
only  found  through  the  regressus  of  the  decomposing  syn- 
thesis through  and  in  the  regressus,  and  that  regressus 
can  never  be  given  as  absolutely  complete,  whether  as 
finite  or  as  infinite.  The  same  applies  to  the  series  of 
causes,  one  being  prior  to  the  other,  and  to  the  series 
leading  from  conditioned  to  unconditioned  necessary  exist- 
ence, which  can  never  be  regarded  either  by  [p.  506] 


412 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


Itself  finite  in  its  totality  or  infinite,  because,  as  a series 
of  subordinated  representations,  it  forms  a dynamical  re- 
gressus  only,  and  cannot  exist  prior  to  it,  by  itself,  as  a 
self-subsistent  series  of  things. 

The  antinomy  of  pure  reason  with  regard  to  its  cosmo- 
logical ideas  is  therefore  removed  by  showing  that  it  is 
dialectical  only,  and  a conflict  of  an  illusion  produced  by 
our  applying  the  idea  of  absolute  totality,  which  exists 
only  as  a condition  of  things  by  themselves,  to  phe- 
nomena, which  exist  in  our  representation  only,  and 
if  they  form  a series,  in  the  successive  regressus,  but 
nowhere  else.  We  may,  however,  on  the  other  side, 
derive  from  that  antinomy  a true,  if  not  dogmatical,  at 
least  critical  and  doctrinal  advantage,  namely,  by  prov- 
ing through  it  indirectly  the  transcendental  ideality  of 
phenomena,  in  case  anybody  should  not  have  been  satis- 
fied by  the  direct  proof  given  in  the  transcendental 
^Esthetic.  The  proof  would  consist  in  the  following 
dilemma.  If  the  world  is  a whole  existing  by  itself,  it 
is  either  finite  or  infinite.  Now  the  former  as  well  as 
the  latter  proposition  is  false,  as  has  been  shown  by  the 
proofs  given  in  the  antithesis  on  one  and  in  the  thesis  on 
the  other  side.  It  is  false,  therefore,  that  the  world  (the 
sum  total  of  all  phenomena)  is  a whole  existing  [p.  507] 
by  itself.  Hence  it  follows  that  phenomena  in  general 
are  nothing  outside  our  representations,  which  was  what 
we  meant  by  their  transcendental  ideality. 

This  remark  is  of  some  importance,  because  it  shows 
that  our  proofs  of  the  fourfold  antinomy  were  not  mere 
sophistry,  but  honest  and  correct,  always  under  the 
(wrong)  supposition  that  phenomena,  or  a world  of  sense 
which  comprehends  them  all,  are  things  by  themselves. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


413 


The  conflict  of  the  conclusions  drawn  from  this  shows, 
however,  that  there  is  a flaw  in  the  supposition,  and  thus 
leads  us  to  the  discovery  of  the  true  nature  of  things,  as 
objects  of  the  senses.  This  transcendental  Dialectic 
therefore  does  not  favour  scepticism,  but  only  the  scep- 
tical method,  which  can  point  to  it  as  an  example  of  its 
great  utility,  if  we  allow  the  arguments  of  reason  to  fight 
against  each  other  with  perfect  freedom,  from  which  some- 
thing useful  and  serviceable  for  the  correction  of  our  judg- 
ments will  always  result,  though  it  may  not  be  always  that 
which  we  were  looking  for. 

THE  ANTINOMY  OF  PURE  REASON  [p.  508} 
Section  VIII 

The  Regulative  Principle  of  Pure  Reason  with  Regard  to 
the  Cosmological  Ideas 

As  through  the  cosmological  principle  of  totality  no  real 
maximum  is  given  of  the  series  of  conditions  in  the  world 
of  sense,  as  a thing  by  itself,  but  can  only  be  required  in 
the  regressus  of  that  series,  that  principle  of  pure  reason, 
if  thus  amended,  still  retains  its  validity,  not  indeed  as  an 
axiom,  requiring  us  to  think  the  totality  in  the  object  as 
real,  but  as  a problem  for  the  understanding,  and  therefore 
for  the  subject,  encouraging  us  to  undertake  and  to  con- 
tinue, according  to  the  completeness  in  the  idea,  the  re- 
gressus in  the  series  of  conditions  of  anything  given  as 
conditioned.  In  our  sensibility,  that  is,  in  space  and  time, 
every  condition  which  we  can  reach  in  examining  given 
phenomena  is  again  conditioned,  because  these  phenom- 
ena are  not  objects  by  themselves,  in  which  something 


414  Transcendental  Dialectic 

absolutely  unconditioned  might  possibly  exist,  but  empiri- 
cal representations  only,  which  always  must  have  their 
condition  in  intuition,  whereby  they  are  determined  in 
space  and  time.  The  principle  of  reason  is  therefore 
properly  a rule  only,  which  in  the  series  of  con-  [p.  509] 
ditions  of  given  phenomena  postulates  a regressus  which 
is  never  allowed  to  stop  at  anything  absolutely  uncondi- 
tioned. It  is  therefore  no  principle  of  the  possibility  of 
experience  and  of  the  empirical  knowledge  of  the  objects 
of  the  senses,  and  not  therefore  a principle  of  the  under- 
standing, because  every  experience  is  (according  to  a 
given  intuition)  within  its  limits  ; nor  is  it  a constitutive 
principle  of  reason,  enabling  us  to  extend  the  concept  of 
the  world  of  sense  beyond  all  possible  experience,  but  it 
is  merely  a principle  of  the  greatest  possible  continuation 
and  extension  of  our  experience,  allowing  no  empirical 
limit  to  be  taken  as  an  absolute  limit.  It  is  therefore  a 
principle  of  reason,  which,  as  a rule , postulates  what  we 
ought  to  do  in  the  regressus,  but  does  not  anticipate  what 
may  be  given  in  the  object , before  such  regressus.  I 
therefore  call  it  a regidative  principle  of  reason,  while,  on 
the  contrary,  the  principle  of  the  absolute  totality  of  the 
series  of  conditions,  as  given  in  the  object  (the  phenom- 
ena) by  itself,  would  be  a constitutive  cosmological  prin- 
ciple, the  hollowness  of  which  I have  tried  to  indicate 
by  this  very  distinction,  thus  preventing  what  otherwise 
would  have  inevitably  happened  (through  a transcenden- 
tal surreptitious  proceeding),  namely,  an  idea,  which  is  to 
serve  as  a rule  only,  being  invested  with  objective  reality. 

In  order  properly  to  determine  the  meaning  of  this  rule 
of  pure  reason  it  should  be  remarked,  first  of  all,  that  it 
cannot  tell  us  what  the  object  is,  but  only  how  [p.  510] 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


415 


the  empirical  regressus  is  to  be  carried  out , in  order  to 
arrive  at  the  complete  concept  of  the  object.  If  we 
attempted  the  first,  it  would  become  a constitutive  prin- 
ciple, such  as  pure  reason  can  never  supply.  It  cannot 
therefore  be  our  intention  to  say  through  this  principle, 
that  a series  of  conditions  of  something,  given  as  condi- 
tioned, is  by  itself  either  finite  or  infinite  ; for  in  that  case 
a mere  idea  of  absolute  totality,  produced  in  itself  only, 
would  represent  in  thought  an  object  such  as  can  never 
be  given  in  experience,  and  an  objective  reality,  indepen- 
dent of  empirical  synthesis,  would  have  been  attributed 
to  a series  of  phenomena.  This  idea  of  reason  can  there- 
fore do  no  more  than  prescribe  a rule  to  the  regressive 
synthesis  in  the  series  of  conditions,  according  to  which 
that  synthesis  is  to  advance  from  the  conditioned,  through 
all  subordinate  conditions,  towards  the  unconditioned, 
though  it  can  never  reach  it,  for  the  absolutely  uncon- 
ditioned can  never  be  met  with  in  experience. 

To  this  end  it  is  necessary,  first  of  all,  to  define  accu- 
rately the  synthesis  of  a series,  so  far  as  it  never  is  com- 
plete. People  are  in  the  habit  of  using  for  this  purpose 
two  expressions  which  are  meant  to  establish  a difference, 
though  they  are  unable  clearly  to  define  the  ground  of  the 
distinction.  Mathematicians  speak  only  of  a progressus 
in  infinitum.  Those  who  enquire  into  concepts  (philoso- 
phers) will  admit  instead  the  expression  of  a [p.  511] 
progressus  in  indefinitum  only.  Without  losing  any  time 
in  the  examination  of  the  reasons  which  may  have  sug- 
gested such  a distinction,  and  of  its  useful  or  useless 
application,  I shall  at  once  endeavour  to  define  these 
concepts  accurately  for  my  own  purpose. 

Of  a straight  line  it  can  be  said  correctly  that  it  may  be 


416  Transcendental  Dialectic 

produced  to  infinity  ; and  here  the  distinction  between  an 
infinite  and  an  indefinite  progress  ( progrcssus  in  indefini- 
tum)  would  be  mere  subtilty.  No  doubt,  if  we  are  told  to 
carry  on  a line,  it  would  be  more  correct  to  add  in  indefi- 
nitum,  than  in  infinitum , because  the  former  means  no 
more  than,  produce  it  as  far  as  you  wish,  but  the  second, 
you  shall  never  cease  producing  it  (which  can  never  be 
intended).  Nevertheless,  if  we  speak  only  of  what  is 
possible,  the  former  expression  is  quite  correct,  because 
we  can  always  make  it  longer,  if  we  like,  without  end. 
The  same  applies  in  all  cases  where  we  speak  only  of 
the  progressus,  that  is,  of  our  proceeding  from  the  con- 
dition to  the  conditioned,  for  such  progress  proceeds  in 
the  series  of  phenomena  without  end.  From  a given  pair 
of  parents  we  may,  in  the  descending  line  of  generation, 
proceed  without  end,  and  conceive  quite  well  that  that 
line  should  so  continue  in  the  world.  For  here  reason 
never  requires  an  absolute  totality  of  the  series,  [p.  512] 
because  it  is  not  presupposed  as  a condition,  and  as  it 
were  given  (datum),  but  only  as  something  conditioned, 
that  is,  capable  only  of  being  given  (dabile),  and  can  be 
added  to  without  end. 

The  case  is  totally  different  with  the  problem,  how  far 
the  regressus  from  something  given  as  conditioned  may 
ascend  in  a series  to  its  conditions ; whether  I may 
call  it  a regressus  into  the  infinite,  or  only  into  the 
indefinite  (in  indefinitum  ; and  whether  I may  ascend,  for 
instance,  from  the  men  now  living,  through  the  series  of 
their  ancestors,  in  infinitum  ; or  whether  I may  only  say 
that,  so  far  as  I have  gone  back,  I have  never  met  with 
an  empirical  ground  for  considering  the  series  limited  any- 
where, so  that  I feel  justified,  and  at  the  same  time  obliged 


Transcendental  Dialectic  417 

to  search  for  an  ancestor  of  every  one  of  these  ancestors, 
though  not  to  presuppose  them. 

I say,  therefore,  that  where  the  whole  is  given  in 
empirical  intuition,  the  regressus  in  the  series  of  its  in- 
ternal conditions  proceeds  in  infinitum , while  if  a mem- 
ber only  of  a series  is  given,  from  which  the  regressus 
to  the  absolute  totality  has  first  to  be  carried  out,  the 
regressus  is  only  in  indefinitum.  Thus  we  must  [p.  513] 
say  that  the  division  of  matter,  as  given  between  its  limits 
(a  body),  goes  on  in  infinitum,  because  that  matter  is 
complete  and  therefore,  with  all  its  possible  parts,  given  in 
empirical  intuition.  As  the  condition  of  that  whole  con- 
sists in  its  part,  and  the  condition  of  that  part  in  the  part 
of  that  part,  and  so  on,  and  as  in  this  regressus  of  decom- 
position we  never  meet  with  an  unconditioned  (indivisible) 
member  of  that  series  of  conditions,  there  is  nowhere  an 
empirical  ground  for  stopping  the  division ; nay,  the  fur- 
ther members  of  that  continued  division  are  themselves 
empirically  given  before  the  continuation  of  the  division, 
and  therefore  the  division  goes  on  in  infinitum.  The  series 
of  ancestors,  on  the  contrary,  of  any  given  man,  exists 
nowhere  in  its  absolute  totality,  in  any  possible  experience, 
while  the  regressus  goes  on  from  every  link  in  the  gener- 
ation to  a higher  one,  so  that  no  empirical  limit  can  be 
found  which  should  represent  a link  as  absolutely  uncon- 
ditioned. As,  however,  the  links  too,  which  might  supply 
the  condition,  do  not  exist  in  the  empirical  intuition  of  the 
whole,  prior  to  the  regressus,  that  regressus  does  not  pro- 
ceed in  infinitum  (by  a division  of  what  is  given),  but  to  an 
indefinite  distance,  in  its  search  for  more  links  in  addition 
to  those  which  are  given,  and  which  themselves  are  again 
always  conditioned  only. 


4 1 8 Transcendental  Dialectic 

In  neither  case  — the  regressus  in  infinitum  [p.  514] 
nor  the  regressus  in  indefinitum — is  the  series  of  conditions 
to  be  considered  as  given  as  infinite  in  the  object.  They 
are  not  things  by  themselves,  but  phenomena  only,  which, 
as  conditions  of  each  other,  are  given  only  in  the  regressus 
itself.  Therefore  the  question  is  no  longer  how  great  this 
series  of  conditions  may  be  by  itself,  whether  finite  or 
infinite,  for  it  is  nothing  by  itself,  but  only  how  we  are  to 
carry  out  the  empirical  regressus,  and  how  far  we  may 
continue  it.  And  here  we  see  a very  important  difference 
with  regard  to  the  rule  of  that  progress.  If  the  whole  is 
given  empirically,  it  is  possible  to  go  back  in  the  series  of 
its  conditions  in  infinitum.  But  if  the  whole  is  not  given, 
but  has  first  to  be  given  through  an  empirical  regressus,  I 
can  only  say  that  it  is  possible  to  proceed  to  still  higher 
conditions  of  the  series.  In  the  former  case  I could  say 
that  more  members  exist  and  are  empirically  given  than  I 
can  reach  through  the  regressus  (of  decomposition);  in  the 
latter  I can  only  say  that  I may  advance  still  further  in  the 
regressus,  because  no  member  is  empirically  given  as  abso- 
lutely unconditioned,  and  a higher  member  therefore  always 
possible,  and  therefore  the  enquiry  for  it  necessary.  In  the 
former  case  it  was  necessary  to  find  more  members  of  the 
series,  in  the  latter  it  is  necessary  to  enquire  for  more,  be- 
cause no  experience  is  absolutely  limiting.  For  [p.  515] 
either  you  have  no  perception  which  absolutely  limits  your 
empirical  regressus,  and  in  that  case  you  cannot  consider 
that  regressus  as  complete,  or  you  have  a perception  which 
limits  your  series,  and  in  that  case  it  cannot  be  a part  of 
your  finished  series  (because  what  limits  must  be  different 
from  that  which  is  limited  by  it),  and  you  must  therefore 
continue  your  regressus  to  that  condition  also,  and  so  on 
for  ever. 


Transcende)ital  Dialectic 


419 


The  following  section,  by  showing  their  application,  will 
place  these  observations  in  their  proper  light. 

THE  ANTINOMY  OF  PURE  REASON 
Section  IX 

Of  the  Empirical  Use  of  the  Regulative  Principle  of  Reason 
with  Regard  to  all  Cosmological  Ideas 

No  transcendental  use,  as  we  have  shown  on  several 
occasions,  can  be  made  of  the  concepts  either  of  the 
understanding  or  of  reason  ; and  the  absolute  totality  of 
the  series  of  conditions  in  the  world  of  sense  is  due 
entirely  to  a transcendental  use  of  reason,  which  demands 
this  unconditioned  completeness  from  what  presupposes 
as  a thing  by  itself.  As  no  such  thing  is  contained  in 
the  world  of  sense,  we  can  never  speak  again  [p.  516] 
of  the  absolute  quantity  of  different  series  in  it,  whether 
they  be  limited  or  in  themselves  unlimited ; but  the  ques- 
tion can  only  be,  how  far,  in  the  empirical  regressus,  we 
may  go  back  in  tracing  experience  to  its  conditions,  in 
order  to  stop,  according  to  the  rule  of  reason,  at  no  other 
answer  of  its  questions  but  such  as  is  in  accordance  with 
the  object. 

What  therefore  remains  to  us  is  only  the  validity  of  the 
principle  of  reason , as  a rule  for  the  continuation  and  for 
the  extent  of  a possible  experience,  after  its  invalidity,  as 
a constitutive  principle  of  things  by  themselves,  has  been 
sufficiently  established.  If  we  have  clearly  established 
that  invalidity,  the  conflict  of  reason  with  itself  will  be 
entirely  finished,  because  not  only  has  the  illusion  which 
led  to  that  conflict  been  removed  through  critical  analysis, 
but  in  its  place  the  sense  in  which  reason  agrees  with 


420  Transcendaital  Dialectic 

itself,  and  the  misapprehension  of  which  was  the  only 
cause  of  conflict,  has  been  clearly  exhibited,  and  a prin- 
ciple formerly  dialectical  changed  into  a doctrinal  one.  In 
fact,  if  that  principle,  according  to  its  subjective  meaning, 
can  be  proved  fit  to  determine  the  greatest  possible  use  of 
the  understanding  in  experience,  as  adequate  to  its  objects, 
this  would  be  the  same  as  if  it  determined,  as  an  ax- 
iom (which  is  impossible  from  pure  reason),  the  [p.  517] 
objects  themselves  a priori : for  this  also  could  not,  with 
reference  to  the  objects  of  experience,  exercise  a greater 
influence  on  the  extension  and  correction  of  our  know- 
ledge, than  proving  itself  efficient  in  the  most  extensive 
use  of  our  understanding,  as  applied  to  experience. 

I 

Solution  of  the  Cosmological  Idea  of  the  Totality  of  the 
Composition  of  Phenomena  in  an  Universe 

Here,  as  well  as  in  the  other  cosmological  problems, 
the  regulative  principle  of  reason  is  founded  on  the 
proposition  that,  in  the  empirical  regressus,  no  experience 
of  an  absolute  limit , that  is,  of  any  condition  as  such,  which 
empirically  is  absolutely  unconditioned , can  exist.  The 
ground  of  this  is  that  such  an  experience  would  contain 
a limitation  of  phenomena  by  nothing  or  by  the  void,  on 
which  the  continued  regressus  by  means  of  experience 
must  abut  ; and  this  is  impossible. 

This  proposition,  which  says  that  in  an  empirical 
regressus  I can  only  arrive  at  the  condition  which  itself 
must  be  considered  empirically  conditioned,  [p.  518] 
contains  the  rule  in  terminis , that  however  far  I may 


i 'ranscendental  Dialectic 


421 


have  reached  in  the  ascending  series,  I must  always  en- 
quire for  a still  higher  member  of  that  series,  whether  it 
be  known  to  me  by  experience  or  not. 

For  the  solution,  therefore,  of  the  first  cosmological 
problem,  nothing  more  is  wanted  than  to  determine 
whether,  in  the  regressus  to  the  unconditioned  extension 
of  the  universe  (in  time  and  in  space),  this  nowhere  limited 
ascent  is  to  be  called  a regressus  in  infinitum , or  a regres- 
sus in  indefinitum. 

The  mere  general  representation  of  the  series  of  all 
past  states  of  the  world,  and  of  the  things  which  exist 
together  in  space,  is  itself  nothing  but  a possible  empirical 
regressus,  which  I represent  to  myself,  though  as  yet  as  in- 
definite, and  through  which  alone  the  concept  of  such  a 
series  of  conditions  of  the  perception  given  to  me  can 
arise.1  Now  the  universe  exists  for  me  as  a concept  only, 
and  never  (as  a whole)  as  an  intuition.  Hence  [p.  519] 
I cannot  from  its  quantity  conclude  the  quantity  of  the 
regressus,  and  determine  the  one  by  the  other;  but  I must 
first  frame  to  myself  a concept  of  the  quantity  of  the  world 
through  the  quantity  of  the  empirical  regressus.  Of  this, 
however,  I never  know  anything  more  than  that,  em- 
pirically, I must  go  on  from  every  given  member  of  the 
series  of  conditions  to  a higher  and  more  distant  member. 
Hence  the  quantity  of  the  whole  of  phenomena  is  not  ab- 
solutely determined,  and  we  cannot  say  therefore  that  it  is 

1 This  cosmical  series  can  therefore  be  neither  greater  nor  smaller  than 
the  possible  empirical  regressus  on  which  alone  its  concept  rests.  And  as  this 
can  give  neither  a definite  infinite,  nor  a definite  finite  (absolutely  limited),  it 
becomes  clear  that  we  cannot  accept  the  quantity  of  the  world,  either  as  finite 
or  as  infinite,  because  the  regressus  (by  which  it  is  represented)  admits  of 
neither  the  one  nor  the  other. 


422 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


a regressus  in  infinitum,  because  this  would  anticipate  the 
members  which  the  regressus  has  not  yet  reached,  and 
represent  its  number  as  so  large  that  no  empirical  synthe- 
sis could  ever  reach  it.  It  would  therefore  (though  nega- 
tively only)  determine  the  quantity  of  the  world  prior  to 
the  regressus,  which  is  impossible,  because  it  is  not  given 
to  me  by  any  intuition  (in  its  totality),  so  that  its  quantity 
cannot  be  given  prior  to  the  regressus.  Hence  we  cannot 
say  anything  of  the  quantity  or  extension  of  the  world  by 
itself,  not  even  that  there  is  in  it  a regressus  in  infinitum  ; 
but  we  must  look  for  the  concept  of  its  quantity  according 
to  the  rule  that  determines  the  empirical  regressus  in  it. 
This  rule,  however,  says  no  more  than  that,  however  far 
we  may  have  got  in  the  series  of  empirical  conditions,  we 
ought  never  to  assume  an  absolute  limit,  but  subordinate 
every  phenomenon,  as  conditioned,  to  another,  [p.  520] 
as  its  condition,  and  that  we  must  proceed  further  to  that 
condition.  This  is  the  regressus  in  indefinitum,  which,  as 
it  fixes  no  quantity  in  the  object,  can  clearly  enough  be 
distinguished  from  the  regressus  in  infinitum. 

I cannot  say  therefore  that,  as  to  time  past  or  as  to 
space,  the  world  is  infinite.  For  such  a concept  of  quan- 
tity, as  a given  infinity,  is  empirical,  and  therefore,  with 
reference  to  the  world  as  an  object  of  the  senses,  abso- 
lutely impossible.  Nor  shall  I say  that  the  regressus, 
beginning  with  a given  perception,  and  going  on  to  every- 
thing that  limits  it  in  a series,  both  in  space  and  in  time 
past,  goes  on  in  infinitum,  because  this  would  presuppose 
an  infinite  quantity  of  the  world.  Nor  can  I say  again 
that  it  is  finite,  for  the  absolute  limit  is  likewise  empiri- 
cally impossible.  Hence  it  follows  that  I shall  not  be  able 
to  say  anything  of  the  whole  object  of  experience  (the 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


423 


world  of  sense),  but  only  of  the  rule,  according  to  which 
experience  can  take  place  and  be  continued  in  accordance 
with  its  object. 

To  the  cosmological  question,  therefore,  respecting  the 
quantity  of  the  world,  the  first  and  negative  answer  is, 
that  the  world  has  no  first  beginning  in  time,  and  no 
extreme  limit  in  space. 

For,  in  the  contrary  case,  the  world  would  be  limited 
by  empty  time  and  empty  space.  As  however,  [p.  521] 
as  a phenomenon,  it  cannot,  by  itself,  be  either,  — a phe- 
nomenon not  being  a thing  by  itself,  — we  should  have  to 
admit  the  perception  of  a limitation  by  means  of  absolute 
empty  time  or  empty  space,  by  which  these  limits  of  the 
world  could  be  given  in  a possible  experience.  Such  an 
experience,  however,  would  be  perfectly  void  of  contents, 
and  therefore  impossible.  Consequently  an  absolute  limit 
of  the  world  is  impossible  empirically,  and  therefore  ab- 
solutely also.1 

From  this  follows  at  the  same  time  the  affirmative 
answer,  that  the  regressus  in  the  series  of  the  phenomena 
of  the  world,  intended  as  a determination  of  the  quantity 
of  the  world,  goes  on  in  indefinitum , which  is  the  same  as 
if  we  say  that  the  world  of  sense  has  no  absolute  quantity, 
but  that  the  empirical  regressus  (through  which  alone  it 
can  be  given  on  the  side  of  its  conditions)  has  its  own  rule, 

1 It  will  have  been  observed  that  the  argument  has  here  been  carried  on 
in  a very  different  way  from  the  dogmatical  argument,  which  was  presented 
before,  in  the  antithesis  of  the  first  antinomy.  There  we  took  the  world  of 
sense,  according  to  the  common  and  dogmatical  view,  as  a thing  given  by 
itself,  in  its  totality,  before  any  regressus : and  we  had  denied  to  it,  if  it  did 
not  occupy  all  time  and  all  space,  any  place  at  all  in  both.  Hence  the  con- 
clusion also  was  different  from  what  it  is  here,  for  it  went  to  the  real  infinity 
of  the  world. 


424 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


namely,  to  advance  from  every  member  of  the  series,  as 
conditioned,  to  a more  distant  member,  whether  by  ou: 
own  experience,  or  by  the  guidance  of  history,  [p.  522] 
or  through  the  chain  of  causes  and  their  effects ; and 
never  to  dispense  with  the  extension  of  the  possible 
empirical  use  of  the  understanding,  this  being  the  proper 
and  really  only  task  of  reason  and  its  principles. 

We  do  not  prescribe  by  this  a definite  empirical  regres- 
sus  advancing  without  end  in  a certain  class  of  phe- 
nomena ; as,  for  instance,  that  from  a living  person  one 
ought  always  to  ascend  in  a series  of  ancestors,  without 
ever  expecting  a first  pair ; or,  in  the  series  of  cosmical 
bodies,  without  admitting  in  the  end  an  extremest  sun. 
All  that  is  demanded  is  a progressus  from  phenomena  to 
phenomena,  even  if  they  should  not  furnish  us  with  a real 
perception  (if  it  is  too  weak  in  degree  to  become  experi- 
ence in  our  consciousness),  because  even  thus  they  belong 
to  a possible  experience. 

Every  beginning  is  in  time,  and  every  limit  of  extension 
in  space.  Space  and  time,  however,  exist  in  the  world  of 
sense  only.  Hence  phenomena  only  are  limited  in  the 
world  conditionally  ; the  world  itself,  however,  is  limited 
neither  conditionally  nor  unconditionally. 

For  the  same  reason,  and  because  the  world  can  never 
be  given  complete , and  even  the  series  of  conditions  of 
something  given  as  conditioned  cannot,  as  a cosmical 
series,  be  given  as  complete , the  concept  of  the  quantity 
of  the  world  can  be  given  through  the  regressus  only, 
and  not  before  it  in  any  collective  intuition,  [p.  523] 
That  regressus,  however,  consists  only  in  the  determin- 
ing of  the  quantity,  and  does  not  give,  therefore,  any 
definite  concept,  nor  the  concept  of  any  quantity  which, 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


425 


with  regard  to  a certain  measure,  could  be  called  infinite. 
It  does  not  therefore  proceed  to  the  infinite  (as  if  given), 
but  only  into  an  indefinite  distance,  in  order  to  give  a 
quantity  (of  experience)  which  has  first  to  be  realised  by 
that  very  regressus. 

II 

Solution  of  the  Cosmological  Idea  of  the  Totality  of  the 
Division  of  a Whole  given  in  Intuition 

If  I divide  a whole,  given  in  intuition,  I proceed  from 
the  conditioned  to  the  conditions  of  its  possibility.  The 
division  of  the  parts  ( subdivisio  or  decompositio ) is  a 
regressus  in  the  series  of  those  conditions.  The  absolute 
totality  of  this  series  could  only  be  given,  if  the  regressus 
could  reach  the  simple  parts.  But  if  all  parts  in  a continu- 
ously progressing  decomposition  are  always  divisible  again, 
then  the  division,  that  is,  the  regressus  from  the  condi- 
tioned to  its  conditions,  goes  on  in  infinitum;  because 
the  conditions  (the  parts)  are  contained  in  the  conditioned 
itself,  and  as  that  is  given  as  complete  in  an  [p.  524] 
intuition  enclosed  within  limits,  are  all  given  with  it. 
The  regressus  must  therefore  not  be  called  a regressus 
in  indefinitum , such  as  was  alone  allowed  by  the  former 
cosmological  idea,  where  from  the  conditioned  we  had  to 
proceed  to  conditions  outside  it,  and  therefore  not  given 
at  the  same  time  through  it,  but  first  to  be  added  in  the 
empirical  regressus.  It  is  not  allowed,  however,  even  in 
the  case  of  a whole  that  is  divisible  in  infinitum,  to  say, 
that  it  consists  of  infinitely  matty  parts.  For  although  all 
parts  are  contained  in  the  intuition  of  the  whole,  yet  the 
whole  division  is  not  contained  in  it,  because  it  consists 


426 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


in  the  continuous  decomposition,  or  in  the  regressus  itself, 
which  first  makes  that  series  real.  As  this  regressus  is 
infinite,  all  members  (parts)  at  which  it  arrives  are  con- 
tained, no  doubt,  in  the  given  whole  as  aggregates ; but 
not  so  the  whole  series  of  the  division,  which  is  successively 
infinite  and  never  complete,  and  cannot,  therefore,  repre- 
sent an  infinite  number,  or  any  comprehension  of  it  as  a 
whole. 

It  is  easy  to  apply  this  remark  to  space.  Every 
space,  perceived  within  its  limits,  is  such  a whole  the 
parts  of  which,  in  spite  of  all  decomposition,  are 
always  spaces  again,  and  therefore  divisible  in  ui- 
finitum.  [p.  525] 

From  this  follows,  quite  naturally,  the  second  applica- 
tion to  an  external  phenomenon,  enclosed  within  its  limits 
(body).  The  divisibility  of  this  is  founded  on  the  divisi- 
bility of  space,  which  constitutes  the  possibility  of  the 
body,  as  an  extended  whole.  This  is  therefore  divisible 
in  infinitum,  without  consisting,  however,  of  an  infinite 
number  of  parts. 

It  might  seem  indeed,  as  a body  must  be  represented 
as  a substance  in  space,  that,  with  regard  to  the  law 
of  the  divisibility  of  space,  it  might  differ  from  it, 
for  we  might  possibly  concede,  that  in  the  latter  case 
decomposition  could  never  do  away  with  all  composition, 
because  in  that  case  all  space,  which  besides  has  nothing 
independent  of  its  own,  would  cease  to  be  (which  is 
impossible),  while,  even  if  all  composition  of  matter  should 
be  done  away  with  in  thought,  it  would  not  seem  com- 
patible with  the  concept  of  a substance  that  nothing 
should  remain  of  it,  because  substance  is  meant  to  be  the 
subject  of  all  composition,  and  ought  to  remain  in  its 


Transcendental  Dialectic  42  7 

elements,  although  their  connection  in  space,  by  which 
they  become  a body,  should  have  been  removed.  But, 
what  applies  to  a thing  by  itself,  represented  by  a 
pure  concept  of  the  understanding,  does  not  apply  to 
what  is  called  substance,  as  a phenomenon.  This  is 
not  an  absolute  subject,  but  only  a permanent  image 
of  sensibility,  nothing  in  fact  but  intuition,  [p.  526] 
in  which  nothing  unconditioned  can  ever  be  met  with. 

But  although  this  rule  of  the  progress  in  infinitum 
applies  without  any  doubt  to  the  subdivision  of  a phe- 
nomenon, as  a mere  occupant  of  space,  it  does  not  apply 
to  the  number  of  the  parts,  separated  already  in  a cer- 
tain way  in  a given  whole,  which  thus  constitute  a 
quantum  discretum.  To  suppose  that  in  every  organised 
whole  every  part  is  again  organised,  and  that  by  thus 
dissecting  the  parts  in  infinitum  we  should  meet  again 
and  again  with  new  organised  parts,  in  fact  that  the 
whole  is  organised  in  infinitum,  is  a thought  difficult  to 
think,  though  it  is  possible  to  think  that  the  parts  of 
matter  decomposed  in  infinitum  might  become  organised. 
For  the  infinity  of  the  division  of  a given  phenomenon 
in  space  is  founded  simply  on  this,  that  by  it  divisibility 
only,  that  is,  an  entirely  indefinite  number  of  parts,  is 
given,  while  the  parts  themselves  can  only  be  given  and 
determined  through  the  subdivision,  in  short,  that  the 
whole  is  not  itself  already  divided.  Thus  the  division 
can  determine  a number  in  it,  which  goes  so  far  as  we 
like  to  go,  in  the  regressus  of  a division.  In  an  or- 
ganic body,  on  the  contrary,  organised  in  infinitum  the 
whole  is  by  that  very  concept  represented  as  [p.  527] 
divided,  and  a number  of  parts,  definite  in  itself,  and  yet 
infinite,  is  found  in  it,  before  every  regressus  of  division. 


428 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


This  would  be  self-contradictory,  because  we  should  have 
to  consider  this  infinite  convolute  as  a never-to-be-com- 
pleted series  (infinite),  and  yet  as  complete  in  its  (or- 
ganised) comprehension.  Infinite  division  takes  the  phe- 
nomenon only  as  a quantum  continuum , and  is  insepa- 
rable from  the  occupation  of  space,  because  in  this  very 
occupation  lies  the  ground  of  endless  divisibility.  But  as 
soon  as  anything  is  taken  as  a quantum  discretion , the 
number  of  units  in  it  is  determined,  and  therefore  at  all 
times  equal  to  a certain  number.  How  far  the  organi- 
sation in  an  organised  body  may  go,  experience  alone  can 
show  us ; but  though  it  never  arrived  with  certainty  at 
any  unorganised  part,  they  would  still  have  to  be  admitted 
as  lying  within  possible  experience.  It  is  different  with 
the  transcendental  division  of  a phenomenon.  How  far 
that  may  extend  is  not  a matter  of  experience,  but  a 
principle  of  reason,  which  never  allows  us  to  consider 
the  empirical  regressus  in  the  decomposition  of  extended 
bodies,  according  to  the  nature  of  these  phenomena,  as  at 
any  time  absolutely  completed. 

******** 

Concluding  Remarks  on  the  Solution  of  the  [p.  528] 
Transcendental -mathematical  Ideas , and  Preliminary 
Remark  for  the  Solution  of  the  Transcendental-dynami- 
cal Ideas 

When  exhibiting  in  a tabular  form  the  antinomy  of 
pure  reason,  through  all  the  transcendental  ideas,  and 
indicating  the  ground  of  the  conflict  and  the  only  means 
of  removing  it,  by  declaring  both  contradictory  statements 
as  false,  we  always  represented  the  conditions  as  belong- 
ing to  that  which  they  conditioned,  according  to  relations 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


429 


of  space  and  time,  this  being  the  ordinary  supposition 
of  the  common  understanding,  and  in  fact  the  source 
from  which  that  conflict  arose.  In  that  respect  all  dialec- 
tical representations  of  the  totality  in  a series  of  condi- 
tions of  something  given  as  conditioned  were  always  of 
the  same  character.  It  was  always  a series  in  which  the 
condition  was  connected  with  the  conditioned,  as  mem- 
bers of  the  same  series,  both  being  thus  homogeneous.  In 
such  a series  the  regressus  was  never  conceived  as  com- 
pleted, or,  if  that  had  to  be  done,  one  of  the  members, 
being  in  itself  conditioned,  had  wrongly  to  be  accepted  as 
the  first,  and  therefore  as  unconditioned.  If  not  always 
the  object,  that  is,  the  conditioned,  yet  the  series  of  its 
conditions  was  always  considered  according  [p.  529] 
to  quantity  only,  and  then  the  difficulty  arose  (which 
could  not  be  removed  by  any  compromise,  but  only  by 
cutting  the  knot),  that  reason  made  it  either  too  long  or 
too  short  for  the  understanding,  which  could  in  neither 
case  come  up  to  the  idea. 

But  in  this  we  have  overlooked  an  essential  distinction 
between  the  objects,  that  is,  the  concepts  of  the  under- 
standing, which  reason  tries  to  raise  into  ideas.  Two  of 
them,  according  to  the  above  table  of  the  categories,  imply 
a mathematical,  the  remaining  two  a dy7iamical  synthesis 
of  phenomena.  Hitherto  this  overlooking  was  of  no  great 
importance,  because,  in  the  general  representation  of  all 
transcendental  ideas,  we  always  remained  under  phejiome- 
nal  conditions,  and  with  regard  to  the  two  transcenden- 
tal-mathematical ideas  also,  we  had  to  do  with  no  object 
but  the  phenomenal  only.  Now,  however,  as  we  have  come 
to  consider  the  dynamical  concepts  of  the  understanding, 
so  far  as  they  should  be  rendered  adequate  to  the  idea  of 


430 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


reason,  that  distinction  becomes  important,  and  opens  to 
us  an  entirely  new  insight  into  the  character  of  the  suit  in 
which  reason  is  implicated.  That  suit  had  before  been  dis- 
missed, as  resting  on  both  sides  on  wrong  presuppositions. 
Now,  however,  as  there  seems  to  be  in  the  dy-  [p.  530] 
namical  antinomy  such  a presupposition  as  may  be  com 
patible  with  the  pretensions  of  reason,  and  as  the  judge 
himself  supplies  perhaps  the  deficiency  of  legal  grounds, 
which  had  been  misunderstood  on  both  sides,  the  suit  may 
possibly  be  adjusted,  from  this  point  of  view,  to  the  satis- 
faction of  both  parties,  which  was  impossible  in  the  con- 
flict of  the  mathematical  antinomy. 

If  we  merely  look  to  the  extension  of  the  series  of  con- 
ditions, and  whether  they  are  adequate  to  the  idea,  or 
whether  the  idea  is  too  large  or  too  small  for  them,  the 
series  are  no  doubt  all  homogeneous.  But  the  concept 
of  the  understanding  on  which  these  ideas  are  founded 
contains  either  a synthesis  of  the  homogeneous  only  (which 
is  presupposed  in  the  composition  as  well  as  the  decom- 
position of  every  quantity),  or  of  the  heterogeneous  also, 
which  must  at  least  be  admitted  as  possible  in  the  dy- 
namical synthesis,  both  in  a causal  connection,  and  in  the 
connection  of  the  necessary  with  the  contingent. 

Thus  it  happens  that  none  but  sensuous  conditions  can 
enter  into  the  mathematical  connection  of  the  series  of 
phenomena,  that  is,  conditions  which  themselves  are  part 
of  the  series  ; while  the  dynamical  series  of  sensuous  con- 
ditions admits  also  of  a heterogeneous  condition,  which  is 
not  a part  of  the  series,  but,  as  merely  intelligible,  outside 
it ; so  that  a certain  satisfaction  is  given  to  reason  [p.  531] 
by  the  unconditioned  being  placed  before  the  phenomena, 
without  disturbing  the  series  of  the  phenomena,  which 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


431 


must  always  be  conditioned,  or  breaking  it  off,  contrary  to 
the  principles  of  the  understanding. 

Owing  to  the  dynamical  ideas  admitting  of  a condition 
of  the  phenomena  outside  their  series,  that  is,  a condition 
which  itself  is  not  a phenomenon,  something  arises  which 
is  totally  different  from  the  result  of  the  mathematical 1 
antinomy.  The  result  of  that  antinomy  was,  that  both 
the  contradictory  dialectical  statements  had  to  be  declared 
false.  The  throughout  conditioned  character,  however,  of 
the  dynamical  series,  which  is  inseparable  from  them  as 
phenomena,  if  connected  with  the  empirically  uncon- 
ditioned, but  at  the  same  time  not  sensuous  condition, 
may  give  satisfaction  to  the  understanding  on  one,  and 
the  reason  on  the  other  side,2  because  the  dialectical  argu- 
ments which,  in  some  way  or  other,  required  unconditioned 
totality  in  mere  phenomena,  vanish;  while  the  [p.  532] 
propositions  of  reason,  if  thus  amended,  may  both  be  true. 
This  cannot  be  the  case  with  the  cosmological  ideas,  which 
refer  only  to  a mathematically  unconditioned  unity,  be- 
cause with  them  no  condition  can  be  found  in  the  series 
of  phenomena  which  is  not  itself  a phenomenon,  and  as 
such  constitutes  one  of  the  links  of  the  series. 

1 Mathematical,  omitted  in  the  First  and  Second  Editions. 

2 The  understanding  admits  of  no  condition  among  phenomena , which 
should  itself  be  empirically  unconditioned.  But  if  we  might  conceive  an 
intelligible  condition,  that  is  to  say,  a condition,  not  belonging  itself  as  a link 
to  the  series  of  phenomena,  of  something  conditioned  (as  a phenomenon) 
without  in  the  least  interrupting  the  series  of  empirical  conditions,  such  a con- 
dition might  be  admitted  as  empirically  unconditioned,  without  interfering 
with  the  empirical  continuous  regressus. 


432 


Transcendefital  Dialectic 


III 

Solution  of  the  Cosmological  Ideas  with  Regard  to  the 
Totality  of  the  Derivation  of  Cosmical  Events  from  theil 
Causes 

We  can  conceive  two  kinds  of  causality  only  with 
reference  to  events,  causality  either  of  nature  or  of  free- 
dom. The  former  is  the  connection  of  one  state  in  the 
world  of  sense  with  a preceding  state,  on  which  it  follows 
according  to  a rule.  As  the  causality  of  phenomena  de- 
pends on  conditions  of  time,  and  as  the  preceding  state, 
if  it  had  always  existed,  could  not  have  produced  an  effect, 
which  first  takes  place  in  time,  it  follows  that  the  causality 
of  the  cause  of  that  which  happens  or  arises  must,  accord- 
ing to  the  principle  of  the  understanding,  have  itself  arisen 
and  require  a cause. 

By  freedom,  on  the  contrary,  in  its  cosmo-  [p.  533] 
logical  meaning,  I understand  the  faculty  of  beginning 
a state  spontaneously.  Its  causality,  therefore,  does  not 
depend,  according  to  the  law  of  nature,  on  another  cause, 
by  which  it  is  determined  in  time.  In  this  sense  freedom 
is  a purely  transcendental  idea,  which,  first,  contains  noth- 
ing derived  from  experience , and,  secondly,  the  object  of 
which  cannot  be  determined  in  any  experience  ; because  it 
is  a general  rule,  even  of  the  possibility  of  all  expei'ience, 
that  everything  which  happens  has  a cause,  and  that  there- 
fore the  causality  also  of  the  cause,  which  itself  has  hap- 
pened or  arisen,  must  again  have  a cause.  In  this  manner 
the  whole  field  of  experience,  however  far  it  may  extend, 
has  been  changed  into  one  great  v/hole  of  nature.  As, 
however,  it  is  impossible  in  this  way  to  arrive  at  an  ab- 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


433 


solute  totality  of  the  conditions  in  causal  relations,  reason 
creates  for  itself  the  idea  of  spontaneity,  or  the  power  of 
beginning  by  itself,  without  an  antecedent  cause  determin- 
ing it  to  action,  according  to  the  law  of  causal  connec- 
tion. 

It  is  extremely  remarkable,  that  the  practical  concept  of 
freedom  is  founded  on  the  transcendental  idea  of  freedom , 
which  constitutes  indeed  the  real  difficulty  which  at  all 
times  has  surrounded  the  question  of  the  possibility  of 
freedom.  Freedom , in  its  practical  sense , is  the  [p.  534] 
independence  of  our  (arbitrary)  will  from  the  coercion 
through  sensuous  impulses.  Our  (arbitrary)  will  is  sensu- 
ous, so  far  as  it  is  affected  pathologically  (by  sensuous 
impulses) ; it  is  called  animal  {arbitrium  brutum),  if  neces- 
sitated pathologically.  The  human  will  is  certainly  sensu- 
ous, an  arbitrium  sensitivum,  but  not  brutum,  but  liberum, 
because  sensuous  impulses  do  not  necessitate  its  action, 
but  there  is  in  man  a faculty  of  determination,  indepen- 
dent of  the  necessitation  through  sensuous  impulses. 

It  can  easily  be  seen  that,  if  all  causality  in  the  world 
of  sense  belonged  to  nature,  every  event  would  be  deter- 
mined in  time  through  another,  according  to  necessary 
laws.  As  therefore  the  phenomena,  in  determining  the 
will,  would  render  every  act  necessary  as  their  natural 
effect,  the  annihilation  of  transcendental  freedom  would 
at  the  same  time  destroy  all  practical  freedom.  Practical 
freedom  presupposes  that,  although  something  has  not 
happened,  it  ought  to  have  happened,  and  that  its  cause 
therefore  had  not  that  determining  force  among  phenom- 
ena, which  could  prevent  the  causality  of  our  will  from 
producing,  independently  of  those  natural  causes,  and 
even  contrary  to  their  force  and  influence,  something  de- 

2F 


434 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


termined  in  the  order  of  time,  according  to  empirical  laws, 
and  from  originating  entirely  by  itself  a series  of  events. 

What  happens  here  is  what  happens  generally  [p.  535] 
in  the  conflict  of  reason  venturing  beyond  the  limits  of 
possible  experience,  namely,  that  the  problem  is  not  physi- 
ological, but  transcendental.  Hence  the  question  of  the 
possibility  of  freedom  concerns  no  doubt  psychology  ; but 
its  solution,  as  it  depends  on  dialectical  arguments  of  pure 
reason,  belongs  entirely  to  transcendental  philosophy.  In 
order  to  enable  that  philosophy  to  give  a satisfactory  an- 
swer, which  it  cannot  decline  to  do,  I must  first  try  to  de- 
termine more  accurately  its  proper  procedure  in  this  task. 

If  phenomena  were  things  by  themselves,  and  therefore 
space  and  time  forms  of  the  existence  of  things  by  them- 
selves, the  conditions  together  with  the  conditioned  would 
always  belong,  as  members,  to  one  and  the  same  series, 
and  thus  in  our  case  also,  the  antinomy  which  is  common 
to  all  transcendental  ideas  would  arise,  namely,  that  that 
series  is  inevitably  too  large  or  too  small  for  the  under- 
standing. The  dynamical  concepts  of  reason,  however, 
which  we  have  to  discuss  in  this  and  the  following  section, 
have  this  peculiarity  that,  as  they  are  not  concerned  with 
an  object,  considered  as  a quantity,  but  only  with  its  ex- 
istence, we  need  take  no  account  of  the  quantity  of  the 
series  of  conditions.  All  depends  here  only  on  [p.  536] 
the  dynamical  relation  of  conditions  to  the  conditioned, 
so  that  in  the  question  on  nature  and  freedom  we  at  once 
meet  with  the  difficulty,  whether  freedom  is  indeed  possi- 
ble, and  whether,  if  it  is  possible,  it  can  exist  together  with 
the  universality  of  the  natural  law  of  causality.  The  ques- 
tion in  fact  arises,  whether  it  is  a proper  disjunctive  prop- 
osition to  say,  that  every  effect  in  the  world  must  arise, 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


435 


either  from  nature,  or  from  freedom,  or  whether  both  can- 
not coexist  in  the  same  event  in  different  relations.  The 
correctness  of  the  principle  of  the  unbroken  connection 
of  all  events  in  the  world  of  sense,  according  to  unchange- 
able natural  laws,  is  firmly  established  by  the  transcen- 
dental Analytic,  and  admits  of  no  limitation.  The  question, 
therefore,  can  only  be  whether,  in  spite  of  it,  freedom  also 
can  be  found  in  the  same  effect  which  is  determined  by 
nature;  or  whether  freedom  is  entirely  excluded  by  that 
inviolable  rule  ? Here  the  common  but  fallacious  suppo- 
sition of  the  absolute  reality  of  phenomena  shows  at  once 
its  pernicious  influence  in  embarrassing  reason.  For  if 
phenomena  are  things  by  themselves,  freedom  cannot  be 
saved.  Nature  in  that  case  is  the  complete  and  sufficient 
cause  determining  every  event,  and  its  condition  is  always 
contained  in  that  series  of  phenomena  only  which,  together 
with  their  effect,  are  necessary  under  the  law  of  nature. 
If,  on  the  contrary,  phenomena  are  taken  for  [p.  537] 
nothing  except  what  they  are  in  reality,  namely,  not  things 
by  themselves,  but  representations  only,  which  are  con- 
nected with  each  other  according  to  empirical  laws,  they 
must  themselves  have  causes,  which  are  not  phenomenal. 
Such  an  intelligible  cause,  however,  is  not  determined 
with  reference  to  its  causality  by  phenomena,  although  its 
effects  become  phenomenal,  and  can  thus  be  determined 
by  other  phenomena.  That  intelligible  cause,  therefore, 
with  its  causality,  is  outside  the  series,  though  its  effects 
are  to  be  found  in  the  series  of  empirical  conditions.  The 
effect  therefore  can,  with  reference  to  its  intelligible  cause, 
be  considered  as  free,  and  yet  at  the  same  time,  with  ref- 
erence to  phenomena,  as  resulting  from  them  according  to 
the  necessity  of  nature ; a distinction  which,  if  thus  repre- 


436 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


sented,  in  a general  and  entirely  abstract  form,  may  seem 
extremely  subtle  and  obscure,  but  will  become  clear  in  its 
practical  application.  Here  I only  wished  to  remark  that, 
as  the  unbroken  connection  of  all  phenomena  in  the  con- 
text (woof)  of  nature,  is  an  unalterable  law,  it  would 
necessarily  destroy  all  freedom,  if  we  were  to  defend  obsti- 
nately the  reality  of  phenomena.  Those,  therefore,  who 
follow  the  common  opinion  on  this  subject,  have  never 
been  able  to  reconcile  nature  and  freedom. 


Possibility  of  a Causality  through  Freedom,  in  [p.  538] 
Harmony  with  the  Universal  Law  of  Natural  Necessity 

Whatever  in  an  object  of  the  senses  is  not  itself  phe- 
nomenal, I call  intelligible.  If,  therefore,  what  in  the 
world  of  sense  must  be  considered  as  phenomenal,  pos- 
sesses in  itself  a faculty  which  is  not  the  object  of  sensuous 
intuition,  but  through  which  it  can  become  the  cause  of 
phenomena,  the  causality  of  that  being  may  be  considered 
from  two  sides,  as  intelligible  in  its  action,  as  the  causality 
of  a thing  by  itself,  and  as  sensible  in  the  effects  of  the 
action,  as  the  causality  of  a phenomenon  in  the  world  of 
sense.  Of  the  faculty  of  such  a being  we  should  have  to 
form  both  an  empirical  and  an  intellectual  cojicept  of  its 
causality,  both  of  which  consist  together  in  one  and  the 
same  effect.  This  twofold  way  of  conceiving  the  faculty 
of  an  object  of  the  senses  does  not  contradict  any  of  the 
concepts  which  we  have  to  form  of  phenomena  and  of  a 
possible  experience.  For  as  all  phenomena,  not  being 
things  by  themselves,  must  have  for  their  foundation  a 
transcendental  object,  determining  them  as  mere  repre- 
sentations, there  is  nothing  to  prevent  us  from  attribut- 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


437 


;ng  to  that  transcendental  object,  besides  the  [p.  539] 
quality  through  which  it  becomes  phenomenal,  a causality 
also  which  is  not  phenomenal,  although  its  effect  appears 
in  the  phenomenon.  Every  efficient  cause,  however,  must 
have  a character,  that  is,  a rule  according  to  which  it 
manifests  its  causality,  and  without  which  it  would  not 
be  a cause.  According  to  this  we  should  have  in  every 
subject  of  the  world  of  sense,  first,  an  empirical  character, 
through  which  its  acts,  as  phenomena,  stand  with  other 
phenomena  in  an  unbroken  connection,  according  to  per- 
manent la\ys  of  nature,  and  could  be  derived  from  them 
as  their  conditions,  and  in  connection  with  them  form  the 
links  of  one  and  the  same  series  in  the  order  of  nature. 
Secondly,  we  should  have  to  allow  to  it  an  intelligible 
character  also,  by  which,  it  is  true,  it  becomes  the  cause 
of  the  same  acts  as  phenomena,  but  which  itself  is  not 
subject  to  any  conditions  of  sensibility,  and  never  phe- 
nomenal. We  might  call  the  former  the  character  of  such 
a thing  as  a phenomenon,  in  the  latter  the  character  of 
the  thing  by  itself. 

According  to  its  intelligible  character,  this  active  sub- 
ject would  not  depend  on  conditions  of  time,  for  time  is 
only  the  condition  of  phenomena,  and  not  of  things  by 
themselves.  In  it  no  act  would  arise  or  perish,  [p.  540] 
neither  would  it  be  subject  therefore  to  the  law  of  determi- 
nation in  time  and  of  all  that  is  changeable,  namely,  that 
everything  which  happens  must  have  its  cause  in  the  phe- 
nomena (of  the  previous  state).  In  one  word  its  causality, 
so  far  as  it  is  intelligible,  would  not  have  a place  in  the 
series  of  empirical  conditions  by  which  the  event  is  ren- 
dered necessary  in  the  world  of  sense.  It  is  true  that 
that  intelligible  character  could  never  be  known  imme- 


438 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


diately,  because  we  cannot  perceive  anything,  except  so 
far  as  it  appears,  but  it  would  nevertheless  have  to  be 
conceived,  according  to  the  empirical  character,  as  we 
must  always  admit  in  thought  a transcendental  object,  as 
the  foundation  of  phenomena,  though  we  know  nothing 
of  what  it  is  by  itself. 

In  its  empirical  character,  therefore,  that  subject,  as  a 
phenomenon,  would  submit,  according  to  all  determining 
laws,  to  a causal  nexus,  and  in  that  respect  it  would  be 
nothing  but  a part  of  the  world  of  sense,  the  effects  of 
which,  like  every  other  phenomenon,  would  .arise  from 
nature  without  fail.  As  soon  as  external  phenomena  be- 
gan to  influence  it,  and  as  soon  as  its  empirical  character, 
that  is  the  law  of  its  causality,  had  been  known  through 
experience,  all  its  actions  ought  to  admit  of  explanation, 
according  to  the  laws  of  nature,  and  all  that  is  requisite  for 
its  complete  and  necessary  determination  would  be  found 
in  a possible  experience. 

In  its  intelligible  character,  however  (though  [p.  541] 
we  could  only  have  a general  concept  of  it),  the  same 
subject  would  have  to  be  considered  free  from  all  influ- 
ence of  sensibility,  and  from  all  determination  through 
phenomena : and  as  in  it,  so  far  as  it  is  a noumenon , 
nothing  happens , and  no  change  which  requires  dynamical 
determination  of  time,  and  therefore  no  connection  with 
phenomena  as  causes,  can  exist,  that  active  being  would 
so  far  be  quite  independent  and  free  in  its  acts  from  all 
natural  necessity,  which  can  exist  in  the  world  of  sense 
only.  One  might  say  of  it  with  perfect  truth  that  it  origi- 
nates its  effects  in  the  world  of  sense  by  itself \ though  the 
act  does  not  begin  in  itself.  And  this  would  be  perfectly 
true,  though  the  effects  in  the  world  of  sense  need  not 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


439 


therefore  originate  by  themselves,  because  in  it  they  are 
always  determined  previously  through  empirical  conditions 
in  the  previous  time,  though  only  by  means  of  the  empiri- 
cal character  (which  is  the  phenomenal  appearance  of  the 
intelligible  character),  and  therefore  impossible,  except  as 
a continuation  of  the  series  of  natural  causes.  In  this  way 
freedom  and  nature,  each  in  its  complete  signification, 
might  exist  together  and  without  any  conflict  in  the  same 
action,  according  as  we  refer  it  to  its  intelligible  or  to  its 
sensible  cause. 

Explanation  of  the  Cosmological  Idea  of  Freedom  [p.  542] 
in  Connection  zvith  the  General  Necessity  of  Nature 

I thought  it  best  to  give  first  this  sketch  of  the  solution 
of  our  transcendental  problem,  so  that  the  course  which 
reason  has  to  adopt  in  its  solution  might  be  more  clearly 
surveyed.  We  shall  now  proceed  to  explain  more  fully 
the  points  on  which  the  decision  properly  rests,  and  exam- 
ine each  by  itself. 

The  law  of  nature,  that  everything  which  happens  has  a 
cause, — that  the  causality  of  that  cause,  that  is,  its  activity 
(as  it  is  anterior  in  time,  and,  with  regard  to  an  effect 
which  has  arisen,  cannot  itself  have  always  existed,  but 
must  have  happened  at  some  time),  must  have  its  cause 
among  the  phenomena  by  which  it  is  determined,  and  that 
therefore  all  events  in  the  order  of  nature  are  empirically 
determined,  this  law,  I say,  through  which  alone  phenom- 
ena become  nature  and  objects  of  experience,  is  a law  of 
the  understanding,  which  can  on  no  account  be  surrendered, 
and  from  which  no  single  phenomenon  can  be  exempted  ; 
because  in  doing  this  we  should  place  it  outside  all  possible 
experience,  separate  from  all  objects  of  possible  [p.  543] 


440 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


experience,  and  change  it  into  a mere  fiction  of  the  mind 
or  a cobweb  of  the  brain. 

But  although  this  looks  merely  like  a chain  of  causes, 
which  in  the  regressus  to  its  conditions  admits  of  no  absolute 
totality , this  difficulty  does  not  detain  us  in  the  least,  be- 
cause it  has  already  been  removed  in  the  general  criticism 
of  the  antinomy  of  reason  when,  starting  from  the  series 
of  phenomena,  it  aims  at  the  unconditioned.  Were  we  to 
yield  to  the  illusion  of  transcendental  realism,  we  should 
have  neither  nature  nor  freedom.  The  question  therefore 
is,  whether,  if  we  recognise  in  the  whole  series  of  events 
nothing  but  natural  necessity,  we  may  yet  regard  the  same 
event  which  on  one  side  is  an  effect  of  nature  only,  on  the 
other  side,  as  an  effect  of  freedom  ; or  whether  there  is  a 
direct  contradiction  between  these  two  kinds  of  causality? 

There  can  certainly  be  nothing  among  phenomenal 
causes  that  could  originate  a series  absolutely  and  by 
itself.  Every  action,  as  a phenomenon,  so  far  as  it  pro- 
duces an  event,  is  itself  an  event,  presupposing  another 
state,  in  which  its  cause  can  be  discovered  ; and  thus 
everything  that  happens  is  only  a continuation  of  the 
series,  and  no  beginning,  happening  by  itself,  is  possible 
in  it.  Actions  of  natural  causes  in  the  succession  of  time 
are  therefore  themselves  effects,  which  likewise  [p.  544] 
presuppose  causes  in  the  series  of  time.  A spontaneous 
and  original  action  by  which  something  takes  place,  which 
did  not  exist  before,  cannot  be  expected  from  the  causal 
nexus  of  phenomena. 

But  is  it  really  necessary  that,  if  effects  are  phenomena, 
the  causality  of  their  cause,  which  cause  itself  is  phenom- 
enal, could  be  nothing  but  empirical  ; or  is  it  not  possible, 
although  for  every  phenomenal  effect  a connection  with  its 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


441 


cause,  according  to  the  laws  of  empirical  causality,  is  cer- 
tainly required,  that  empirical  causality  itself  could  never- 
theless, without  breaking  in  the  least  its  connection  with 
the  natural  causes,  represent  an  effect  of  a non-empirical 
and  intelligible  causality,  that  is,  of  a caused  action,  orig- 
inal in  respect  to  phenomena,  and  in  so  far  not  phenom- 
enal ; but,  with  respect  to  this  faculty,  intelligible,  although, 
as  a link  in  the  chain  of  nature,  to  be  regarded  as  entirely 
belonging  to  the  world  of  sense  ? 

We  require  the  principle  of  the  causality  of  phenomena 
among  themselves,  in  order  to  be  able  to  look  for  and  to 
produce  natural  conditions,  that  is,  phenomenal  causes  of 
natural  events.  If  this  is  admitted  and  not  weakened  by 
any  exceptions,  the  understanding,  which  in  its  empirical 
employment  recognises  in  all  events  nothing  but  nature, 
and  is  quite  justified  in  doing  so,  has  really  all  [p.  545] 
that  it  can  demand,  and  the  explanations  of  physical  phe- 
nomena may  proceed  without  let  or  hindrance.  The  under- 
standing would  not  be  wronged  in  the  least,  if  we  assumed, 
though  it  be  a mere  fiction,  that  some  among  the  natural 
causes  have  a faculty  which  is  intelligible  only,  and  whose 
determination  to  activity  does  not  rest  on  empirical  condi- 
tions, but  on  mere  grounds  of  the  intellect,  if  only  the  phe- 
nomenal activity  of  that  cause  is  in  accordance  with  all  the 
laws  of  empirical  causality.  For  in  this  way  the  active 
subject,  as  causa phaenomenon,  would  be  joined  with  nature 
through  the  indissoluble  dependence  of  all  its  actions,  and 
the  noumenon  1 only  of  that  subject  (with  all  its  phenomenal 
causality)  would  contain  certain  conditions  which,  if  we 
want  to  ascend  from  the  empirical  to  the  transcendental 


1 It  seems  better  to  read  noumenon  instead  of  phenomenon. 


442 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


object,  would  have  to  be  considered  as  intelligible  only 
For,  if  only  we  follow  the  rule  of  nature  in  that  which 
may  be  the  cause  among  phenomena,  it  is  indifferent  to  us 
what  kind  of  ground  of  those  phenomena,  and  of  their  con- 
nection, may  be  conceived  to  exist  in  the  transcendental 
subject,  which  is  empirically  unknown  to  us.  This  intel- 
ligible ground  does  not  touch  the  empirical  questions,  but 
concerns  only,  as  it  would  seem,  the  thought  in  the  pure 
understanding ; and  although  the  effects  of  that  thought 
and  action  of  the  pure  understanding  may  be  dis-  [p.  546] 
covered  in  the  phenomena,  these  have  nevertheless  to  be 
completely  explained  from  their  phenomenal  cause,  accord- 
ing to  the  laws  of  nature,  by  taking  their  empirical  char- 
acter as  the  highest  ground  of  explanation,  and  passing 
by  the  intelligible  character,  which  is  the  transcendental 
cause  of  the  other,  as  entirely  unknown,  except  so  far  as 
it  is  indicated  by  the  empirical,  as  its  sensuous  sign.  Let 
us  apply  this  to  experience.  Man  is  one  among  the  phe- 
nomena of  the  world  of  sense,  and  in  so  far  one  of  the 
natural  causes  the  causality  of  which  must  be  subject  to 
empirical  laws.  As  such  he  must  therefore  have  an  em- 
pirical character,  like  all  other  objects  of  nature.  We 
perceive  it  through  the  forces  and  faculties  which  he 
shows  in  his  actions  and  effects.  In  the  lifeless  or  merely 
animal  nature  we  see  no  ground  for  admitting  any  faculty, 
except  as  sensuously  conditioned.  Man,  however,  who 
knows  all  the  rest  of  nature  through  his  senses  only, 
knows  himself  through  mere  apperception  also,  and  this 
in  actions  and  internal  determinations,  which  he  cannot 
ascribe  to  the  impressions  of  the  senses.  Man  is  thus  to 
himself  partly  a phenomenon,  partly,  however,  namely 
with  reference  to  certain  faculties,  a purely  intelligible 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


443 


object,  because  the  actions  of  these  faculties  cannot  be 
ascribed  to  the  receptivity  of  sensibility.  We  [p.  547] 
call  these  faculties  understanding  and  reason.  It  is  the 
latter,  in  particular,  which  is  entirely  distinguished  from 
all  empirically  conditioned  forces  or  faculties,  because  it 
weighs  its  objects  according  to  ideas,  and  determines  the 
understanding  accordingly,  which  then  makes  an  empirical 
use  of  its  (by  themselves,  however  pure)  concepts. 

That  our  reason  possesses  causality,  or  that  we  at  least 
represent  to  ourselves  such  a causality  in  it,  is  clear  from 
the  imperatives  which,  in  all  practical  matters,  we  impose 
as  rules  on  our  executive  powers.  The  ought  expresses 
a kind  of  necessity  and  connection  with  causes,  which 
we  do  not  find  elsewhere  in  the  whole  of  nature.  The 
understanding  can  know  in  nature  only  what  is  present, 
past,  or  future.  It  is  impossible  that  anything  in  it  ought 
to  be  different  from  what  it  is  in  reality,  in  all  these  rela- 
tions of  time.  Nay,  if  we  only  look  at  the  course  of 
nature,  the  ought  has  no  meaning  whatever.  We  cannot 
ask,  what  ought  to  be  in  nature,  as  little  as  we  can  ask, 
what  qualities  a circle  ought  to  possess.  We  can  only 
ask  what  happens  in  it,  and  what  qualities  that  which 
happens  has. 

This  ought  expresses  a possible  action,  the  ground  of 
which  cannot  be  anything  but  a mere  concept ; while  in 
every  merely  natural  action  the  ground  must  [p.  548] 
always  be  a phenomenon.  Now  it  is  quite  true  that  the 
action  to  which  the  ought  applies  must  be  possible  under 
natural  conditions,  but  these  natural  conditions  do  not 
affect  the  determination  of  the  will  itself,  but  only  its 
effects  and  results  among  phenomena.  There  may  be 
ever  so  many  natural  grounds  which  impel  me  to  will  and 


444 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


ever  so  many  sensuous  temptations,  but  they  can  never 
produce  the  ought , but  only  a willing  which  is  always  con- 
ditioned, but  by  no  means  necessary,  and  to  which  the 
ought,  pronounced  by  reason,  opposes  measure,  ay,  pro- 
hibition and  authority.  Whether  it  be  an  object  of  the 
senses  merely  (pleasure),  or  of  pure  reason  (the  good), 
reason  does  not  yield  to  the  impulse  that  is  given  em- 
pirically, and  does  not  follow  the  order  of  things,  as  they 
present  themselves  as  phenomena,  but  frames  for  itself, 
with  perfect  spontaneity,  a new  order  according  to  ideas 
to  which  it  adapts  the  empirical  conditions,  and  according 
to  which  it  declares  actions  to  be  necessary,  even  though 
they  have  not  taken  place , and,  maybe,  never  will  take 
place.  Yet  it  is  presupposed  that  reason  may  have  causality 
with  respect  to  them,  for  otherwise  no  effects  in  experience 
could  be  expected  to  result  from  these  ideas. 

Now  let  us  take  our  stand  here  and  admit  it  at  least  as 
possible,  that  reason  really  possesses  causality  [p.  549] 
with  reference  to  phenomena.  In  that  case,  reason  though 
it  be,  it  must  show  nevertheless  an  empirical  character, 
because  every  cause  presupposes  a rule  according  to  which 
certain  phenomena  follow  as  effects,  and  every  rule  requires 
in  the  effects  a homogeneousness,  on  which  the  concept  of 
cause  (as  a faculty)  is  founded.  This,  so  far  as  it  is  derived 
from  mere  phenomena,  may  be  called  the  empirical  char- 
acter, which  is  permanent , while  the  effects,  according  to 
a diversity  of  concomitant,  and  in  part,  restraining  con- 
ditions, appear  in  changeable  forms. 

Every  man  therefore  has  an  empirical  character  of  his 
(arbitrary)  will,  which  is  nothing  but  a certain  causality  of 
his  reason,  exhibiting  in  its  phenomenal  actions  and  effects 
a rule,  according  to  which  one  may  infer  the  motives  of 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


445 


reason  and  its  actions,  both  in  kind  and  in  degree,  and 
judge  of  the  subjective  principles  of  his  will.  As  that 
empirical  character  itself  must  be  derived  from  phenomena, 
as  an  effect,  and  from  their  rule  which  is  supplied  by 
experience,  all  the  acts  of  a man,  so  far  as  they  are  phe- 
nomena, are  determined  from  his  empirical  character  and 
from  the  other  concomitant  causes,  according  to  the  order 
of  nature ; and  if  we  could  investigate  all  the  manifesta- 
tions of  his  will  to  the  very  bottom,  there  would  be  not  a 
single  human  action  which  we  could  not  predict  [p.  550] 
with  certainty  and  recognise  from  its  preceding  conditions 
as  necessary.  There  is  no  freedom  therefore  with  refer- 
ence to  this  empirical  character,  and  yet  it  is  only  with 
reference  to  it  that  we  can  consider  man,  when  we  are 
merely  observing,  and,  as  is  the  case  in  anthropology,  try- 
ing to  investigate  the  motive  causes  of  his  actions  physio- 
logically. 

If,  however,  we  consider  the  same  actions  with  refer- 
ence to  reason,  not  with  reference  to  speculative  reason, 
in  order  to  explain  their  origin,  but  solely  so  far  as  reason 
is  the  cause  which  produces  them  ; in  one  word,  if  we  com- 
pare actions  with  reason,  with  reference  to  practical  pur- 
poses, we  find  a rule  and  order,  totally  different  from  the 
order  of  nature.  For,  from  this  point  of  view,  everything, 
it  may  be,  ought  not  to  have  happened,  which  according  to 
the  course  of  nature  has  happened,  and  according  to  its 
empirical  grounds,  was  inevitable.  And  sometimes  we 
find,  or  believe  at  least  that  we  find,  that  the  ideas  of 
reason  have  really  proved  their  causality  with  reference 
to  human  actions  as  phenomena,  and  that  these  actions 
have  taken  place,  not  because  they  were  determined  by 
empirical  causes,  but  by  the  causes  of  reason. 


446  Transcendental  Dialectic 

Now  supposing  one  could  say  that  reason  [p.  551] 
possesses  causality  in  reference  to  phenomena,  could  the 
action  of  reason  be  called  free  in  that  case,  as  it  is  accu 
rately  determined  by  the  empirical  character  (the  disposi- 
tion) and  rendered  necessary  by  it  ? That  character  again 
is  determined  in  the  intelligible  character  (way  of  think- 
ing). The  latter,  however,  we  do  not  know,  but  signify 
only  through  phenomena,  which  in  reality  give  us  imme- 
diately a knowledge  of  the  disposition  (empirical  charac- 
ter) only.1  An  action,  so  far  as  it  is  to  be  attributed  to  the 
way  of  thinking  as  its  cause,  does  nevertheless  not  result 
from  it  according  to  empirical  laws,  that  is,  it  is  not 
preceded  by  the  conditions  of  pure  reason,  but  only  by 
its  effects  in  the  phenomenal  form  of  the  internal  sense. 
Pure  reason,  as  a simple  intelligible  faculty,  is  not  sub- 
ject to  the  form  of  time,  or  to  the  conditions  of  the  suc- 
cession of  time.  The  causality  of  reason  in  its  intelligible 
character  does  not  arise  or  begin  at  a certain  time  in  order 
to  produce  an  effect ; for  in  that  case  it  would  be  subject 
to  the  natural  law  of  phenomena,  which  deter-  [p.  552] 
mines  all  causal  series  in  time,  and  its  causality  would 
then  be  nature  and  not  freedom.  What,  therefore,  we  can 
say  is,  that  if  reason  can  possess  causality  with  reference 
to  phenomena,  it  is  a faculty  through  which  the  sensuous 
condition  of  an  empirical  series  of  effects  first  begins. 
For  the  condition  that  lies  in  reason  is  not  sensuous,  and 

1 The  true  morality  of  actions  (merit  or  guilt),  even  that  of  our  own  con- 
duct, remains  therefore  entirely  hidden.  Our  imputations  can  refer  to  the 
empirical  character  only.  How  much  of  that  may  be  the  pure  effect  of  free- 
dom, how  much  should  be  ascribed  to  nature  only,  and  to  the  faults  of  tem- 
perament, for  which  man  is  not  responsible,  or  its  happy  constitution  ( merits 
fortunae),  no  one  can  discover,  and  no  one  can  judge  with  perfect  justice. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


44  7 


therefore  does  itself  not  begin.  Thus  we  get  what  we 
missed  in  all  empirical  series,  namely,  that  the  condition  of 
a successive  series  of  events  should  itself  be  empirically 
unconditioned.  For  here  the  condition  is  really  outside 
the  series  of  phenomena  (in  the  intelligible),  and  there- 
fore not  subject  to  any  sensuous  condition,  nor  to  any 
temporal  determination  through  preceding  causes. 

Nevertheless  the  same  cause  belongs  also,  in  another 
respect,  to  the  series  of  phenomena.  Man  himself  is  a 
phenomenon.  His  will  has  an  empirical  character,  which 
is  the  (empirical)  cause  of  all  his  actions.  There  is  no 
condition,  determining  man  according  to  this  character, 
that  is  not  contained  in  the  series  of  natural  effects  and 
subject  to  their  law,  according  to  which  there  can  be 
no  empirically  unconditioned  causality  of  anything  that 
happens  in  time.  No  given  action  therefore  (as  it  can 
be  perceived  as  a phenomenon  only)  can  begin  absolutely 
by  itself.  Of  pure  reason,  however,  we  cannot  [p.  553] 
say  that  the  state  in  which  it  determines  the  will  is  pre- 
ceded by  another  in  which  that  state  itself  is  determined. 
For  as  reason  itself  is  not  a phenomenon,  and  not  subject 
to  any  of  the  conditions  of  sensibility,  there  exists  in  it, 
even  in  reference  to  its  causality,  no  succession  of  time, 
and  the  dynamical  law  of  nature,  which  determines  the 
succession  of  time  according  to  rules,  cannot  be  applied 
to  it. 

Reason  is  therefore  the  constant  condition  of  all  free 
actions  by  which  man  takes  his  place  in  the  phenomenal 
world.  Every  one  of  them  is  determined  beforehand  in 
his  empirical  character,  before  it  becomes  actual.  With 
regard  to  the  intelligible  character,  however,  of  which  the 
empirical  is  only  the  sensuous  schema,  there  is  neither 


448 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


before  nor  after ; and  every  action,  without  regard  to  the 
temporal  relation  which  connects  it  with  other  phe- 
nomena, is  the  immediate  effect  of  the  intelligible  char- 
acter of  pure  reason.  That  reason  therefore  acts  freely, 
without  being  determined  dynamically,  in  the  chain  of 
natural  causes,  by  external  or  internal  conditions,  anterior 
in  time.  That  freedom  must  then  not  only  be  regarded 
negatively,  as  independence  of  empirical  conditions  (for 
in  that  case  the  faculty  of  reason  would  cease  to  be  a 
cause  of  phenomena),  but  should  be  determined  positively 
also,  as  the  faculty  of  beginning  spontaneously  a series  of 
events.  Hence  nothing  begins  in  reason  itself,  [p.  554] 
and  being  itself  the  unconditioned  condition  of  every  free 
action,  reason  admits  of  no  condition  antecedent  in  time 
above  itself,  while  nevertheless  its  effect  takes  its  begin- 
ning in  the  series  of  phenomena,  though  it  can  never 
constitute  in  that  series  an  absolutely  first  beginning. 

In  order  to  illustrate  the  regulative  principle  of  reason 
by  an  example  of  its  empirical  application,  not  in  order  to 
confirm  it  (for  such  arguments  are  useless  for  transcen- 
dental propositions),  let  us  take  a voluntary  action,  for 
example,  a malicious  lie,  by  which  a man  has  produced 
a certain  confusion  in  society,  and  of  which  we  first  try 
to  find  out  the  motives,  and  afterwards  try  to  determine 
how  far  it  and  its  consequences  may  be  imputed  to  the 
offender.  With  regard  to  the  first  point,  one  has  first 
to  follow  up  his  empirical  character  to  its  very  sources, 
which  are  to  be  found  in  wrong  education,  bad  society, 
in  part  also  in  the  viciousness  of  a natural  disposition,  and 
a nature  insensible  to  shame,  or  ascribed  to  frivolity  and 
heedlessness,  not  omitting  the  occasioning  causes  at  the 
time.  In  all  this  the  procedure  is  exactly  the  same  as 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


449 


in  the  investigation  of  a series  of  determining  causes  of 
a given  natural  effect.  But  although  one  believes  that 
the  act  was  thus  determined,  one  neverthe-  [p.  555] 
less  blames  the  offender,  and  not  on  account  of  his  un- 
happy natural  disposition,  not  on  account  of  influencing 
circumstances,  not  even  on  acconnt  of  his  former  course 
of  life,  because  one  supposes  one  might  leave  entirely  out 
of  account  what  that  course  of  life  may  have  been,  and 
consider  the  past  series  of  conditions  as  having  never 
existed,  and  the  act  itself  as  totally  unconditioned  by 
previous  states,  as  if  the  offender  had  begun  with  it  a 
new  series  of  effects,  quite  by  himself.  This  blame  is 
founded  on  a law  of  reason,  reason  being  considered  as 
a cause  which,  independent  of  all  the  before-mentioned 
empirical  conditions,  would  and  should  have  determined 
the  behaviour  of  the  man  otherwise.  Nay,  we  do  not 
regard  the  causality  of  reason  as  a concurrent  agency 
only,  but  as  complete  in  itself,  even  though  the  sensuous 
motives  did  not  favour,  but  even  oppose  it.  The  action 
is  imputed  to  a man’s  intelligible  character.  At  the 
moment  when  he  tells  the  lie,  the  guilt  is  entirely  his  ; 
that  is,  we  regard  reason,  in  spite  of  all  empirical  condi- 
tions of  the  act,  as  completely  free,  and  the  act  has  to 
be  imputed  entirely  to  a fault  of  reason. 

Such  an  imputation  clearly  shows  that  we  imagine  that 
reason  is  not  affected  at  all  by  the  influences  of  the  senses, 
and  that  it  does  not  change  (although  its  manifestations, 
that  is  the  mode  in  which  it  shows  itself  by  its  [p.  556] 
effects,  do  change)  : that  in  it  no  state  precedes  as  deter- 
mining a following  state,  in  fact,  that  reason  does  not 
belong  to  the  series  of  sensuous  conditions  which  render 
phenomena  necessary,  according  to  laws  of  nature.  Rea- 

2G 


450 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


son,  it  is  supposed,  is  present  in  all  the  actions  of  man, 
in  all  circumstances  of  time,  and  always  the  same ; but  it 
is  itself  never  in  time,  never  in  a new  state  in  which  it 
was  not  before  ; it  is  determining,  never  determined.  We 
cannot  ask,  therefore,  why  reason  has  not  determined 
itself  differently,  but  only  why  it  has  not  differently  deter- 
mined the  phenomena  by  its  causality.  And  here  no  answer 
is  really  possible.  For  a different  intelligible  character 
would  have  given  a different  empirical  character,  and  if  we 
say  that,  in  spite  of  the  whole  of  his  previous  course  of 
life,  the  offender  could  have  avoided  the  lie,  this  only 
means  that  it  was  in  the  power  of  reason,  and  that  reason, 
in  its  causality,  is  subject  to  no  phenomenal  and  temporal 
conditions,  and  lastly,  that  the  difference  of  time,  though 
it  makes  a great  difference  in  phenomena  and  their  rela- 
tion to  each  other,  can,  as  these  are  neither  things  nor 
causes  by  themselves,  produce  no  difference  of  action  in 
reference  to  reason. 

We  thus  see  that,  in  judging  of  voluntary  [p.  557] 
actions,  we  can,  so  far  as  their  causality  is  concerned,  get 
only  so  far  as  the  intelligible  cause,  but  not  beyond.  We 
can  see  that  that  cause  is  free,  that  it  determines  as  inde- 
pendent of  sensibility,  and  therefore  is  capable  of  being 
the  sensuously  unconditioned  condition  of  phenomena. 
To  explain  why  that  intelligible  character  should,  under 
present  circumstances,  give  these  phenomena  and  this 
empirical  character,  and  no  other,  transcends  all  the  powers 
of  our  reason,  nay,  all  its  rights  of  questioning,  as  if  we 
were  to  ask  why  the  transcendental  object  of  our  external 
sensuous  intuition  gives  us  intuition  in  space  only  and  no 
other.  But  the  problem  which  we  have  to  solve  does  not 
require  us  to  ask  or  to  answer  such  questions.  Our 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


451 


problem  was,  whether  freedom  is  contradictory  to  natural 
necessity  in  one  and  the  same  action  : and  this  we  have 
sufficiently  answered  by  showing  that  freedom  may  have 
relation  to  a very  different  kind  of  conditions  from  those 
of  nature,  so  that  the  law  of  the  latter  does  not  affect  the 
former,  and  both  may  exist  independent  of,  and  undisturbed 

by,  each  other. 

^ ^ 

It  should  be  clearly  understood  that,  in  what  we  have 
said,  we  had  no  intention  of  establishing  the  reality  of 
freedom,  as  one  of  the  faculties  which  contain  [p.  558] 
the  cause  of  the  phenomenal  appearances  in  our  world  of 
sense.  For  not  only  would  this  have  been  no  transcen- 
dental consideration  at  all,  which  is  concerned  with  con- 
cepts only,  but  it  could  never  have  succeeded,  because 
from  experience  we  can  never  infer  anything  but  what 
must  be  represented  in  thought  according  to  the  laws  of 
experience.  It  was  not  even  our  intention  to  prove  the  pos- 
sibility of  freedom,  for  in  this  also  we  should  not  have  suc- 
ceeded, because  from  mere  concepts  a priori  we  can  never 
know  the  possibility  of  any  real  ground  or  any  causality. 
We  have  here  treated  freedom  as  a transcendental  idea 
only,  which  makes  reason  imagine  that  it  can  absolutely 
begin  the  series  of  phenomenal  conditions  through  what  is 
sensuously  unconditioned,  but  by  which  reason  becomes 
involved  in  an  antinomy  with  its  own  laws,  which  it  had 
prescribed  to  the  empirical  use  of  the  understanding. 
That  this  antinomy  rests  on  a mere  illusion,  and  that 
nature  does  not  contradict  the  causality  of  freedom,  that 
was  the  only  thing  which  we  could  prove,  and  cared  to 
prove. 


452 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


IV  [P-  559] 

Solution  of  the  Cosmological  Idea  of  the  Totality  of  the  De- 
pendence of  Phenomena , with  Regard  to  their  Existence 
in  General 

In  the  preceding  article  we  considered  the  changes  in 
the  world  of  sense  in  their  dynamical  succession,  every 
one  being  subordinate  to  another  as  its  cause.  Now, 
however,  the  succession  of  states  is  to  serve  only  as  our 
guide  in  order  to  arrive  at  an  existence  that  might  be  the 
highest  condition  of  all  that  is  subject  to  change,  namely, 
the  necessary  Being.  We  are  concerned  here,  not  with  the 
unconditioned  causality,  but  with  the  unconditioned  exist- 
ence of  the  substance  itself.  Therefore  the  succession 
which  we  have  before  us  is  properly  one  of  concepts  and 
not  of  intuitions,  so  far  as  the  one  is  the  condition  of  the 
other. 

It  is  easy  to  see,  however,  that  as  everything  compre- 
hended under  phenomena  is  changeable,  and  therefore 
conditioned  in  its  existence,  there  cannot  be,  in  the  whole 
series  of  dependent  existence,  any  unconditioned  link  the 
existence  of  which  might  be  considered  as  absolutely 
necessary,  and  that  therefore,  if  phenomena  were  things 
by  themselves,  and  their  condition  accordingly  belonged 
with  the  conditioned  always  to  one  and  the  same  series  of 
intuitions,  a necessary  being,  as  the  condition  of  [p.  560] 
the  existence  of  the  phenomena  of  the  world  of  sense, 
could  never  exist. 

The  dynamical  regressus  has  this  peculiar  distinction  as 
compared  with  the  mathematical,  that,  as  the  latter  is  only 
concerned  with  the  composition  of  parts  in  forming  a whole 
or  the  division  of  a whole  into  its  parts,  the  conditions  of 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


453 


that  series  must  always  be  considered  as  parts  of  it,  and 
therefore  as  homogeneous  and  as  phenomena,  while  in  the 
dynamical  regressus,  where  we  are  concerned,  not  with  the 
possibility  of  an  unconditioned  whole,  consisting  of  a num- 
ber of  given  parts,  or  of  an  unconditioned  part  belonging 
to  a given  whole,  but  with  the  derivation  of  a state  from  its 
cause,  or  of  the  contingent  existence  of  the  substance  itself 
from  the  necessary  substance,  it  is  not  required  that  the 
condition  should  form  one  and  the  same  empirical  series 
with  the  conditioned. 

There  remains  therefore  to  us  another  escape  from  this 
apparent  antinomy : because  both  conflicting  propositions 
might,  under  different  aspects,  be  true  at  the  same  time. 
That  is,  all  things  of  the  world  of  sense  might  be  entirely 
contingent,  and  have  therefore  an  empirically  conditioned 
existence  only,  though  there  might  nevertheless  be  a non- 
empirical  condition  of  the  whole  series,  that  is,  an  uncon- 
ditionally necessary  being.  For  this,  as  an  intelligible 
condition,  would  not  belong  to  the  series,  as  a link  of  it 
(not  even  as  the  highest  link),  nor  would  it  render  any 
link  of  that  series  empirically  unconditioned,  [p.  561] 
but  would  leave  the  whole  world  of  sense,  in  all  its  mem- 
bers, in  its  empirically  conditioned  existence.  This  man- 
ner of  admitting  an  unconditioned  existence  as  the  ground 
of  phenomena  would  differ  from  the  empirically  uncondi- 
tioned causality  (freedom),  treated  of  in  the  preceding 
article,  because,  with  respect  to  freedom,  the  thing  itself, 
as  cause  ( substatitia  phaenomenon ),  belonged  to  the  series 
of  conditions,  and  its  causality  only  was  represented  as 
intelligible,  while  here,  on  the  contrary,  the  necessary  be- 
ing has  to  be  conceived  as  lying  outside  the  series  of  the 
world  of  sense  (as  ens  extramundanum),  and  as  purely 


454 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


intelligible,  by  which  alone  it  could  be  guarded  against 
itself  becoming  subject  to  the  law  of  contingency  and 
dependence  applying  to  all  phenomena. 

The  regulative  principle  of  reason,  with  regard  to  our 
present  problem,  is  therefore  this,  that  everything  in  the 
world  of  sense  has  an  empirically  conditioned  existence, 
and  that  in  it  there  is  never  any  unconditioned  necessity 
with  reference  to  any  quality  ; that  there  is  no  member 
in  the  series  of  conditions  of  which  one  ought  not  to 
expect,  and  as  far  as  possible  to  seek,  the  empirical  con- 
dition in  some  possible  experience ; and  that  we  are 
never  justified  in  deriving  any  existence  from  a condition 
outside  the  empirical  series,  or  in  considering  it  as  inde- 
pendent and  self-subsistent  in  the  series  itself ; without 
however  denying  in  the  least  that  the  whole  [p.  562] 
series  may  depend  on  some  intelligible  being,  which  is 
free  therefore  from  all  empirical  conditions,  and  itself 
contains  rather  the  ground  of  the  possibility  of  all  those 
phenomena. 

By  this  we  by  no  means  intend  to  prove  the  uncondi- 
tionally necessary  existence  of  such  a being,  or  even  to 
demonstrate  the  possibility  of  a purely  intelligible  condi- 
tion of  the  existence  of  the  phenomena  of  the  world  of 
sense.  But  as  on  the  one  side  we  limit  reason,  lest  it 
should  lose  the  thread  of  the  empirical  condition  and  lose 
itself  in  transcendent  explanations  incapable  of  being  repre- 
sented in  concreto,  thus,  on  the  other  side,  we  want  to 
limit  the  law  of  the  purely  empirical  use  of  the  under- 
standing, lest  it  should  venture  to  decide  on  the  possibil- 
ity of  things  in  general,  and  declare  the  intelligible  to  be 
impossible,  because  it  has  been  shown  to  be  useless  for 
the  explanation  of  phenomena.  What  is  shown  by  this 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


455 


is  simply  this,  that  the  complete  contingency  of  all  things 
in  nature  and  of  all  their  (empirical)  conditions,  may  well 
coexist  with  the  arbitrary  presupposition  of  a necessary, 
though  purely  intelligible  condition,  and  that,  as  there  is 
no  real  contradiction  between  these  two  views,  they  may 
well  both  be  true.  Granted  even  that  such  an  absolutely 
necessary  being,  as  postulated  by  the  under-  [p.  563] 
standing,  is  impossible  in  itself,  we  still  maintain  that  this 
cannot  be  concluded  from  the  general  contingency  and 
dependence  of  all  that  belongs  to  the  world  of  sense,  nor 
from  the  principle  that  we  ought  not  to  stop  at  any  single 
member  so  far  as  it  is  contingent,  and  appeal  to  a cause 
outside  the  world.  Reason  follows  its  own  course  in  its 
empirical,  and  again  a peculiar  course  in  its  transcen- 
dental use. 

The  world  of  sense  contains  nothing  but  phenomena, 
and  these  are  mere  representations  which  are  always  sen- 
suously conditioned.  As  our  objects  are  never  things  by 
themselves,  we  need  not  be  surprised  that  we  are  never 
justified  in  making  a jump  from  any  member  of  the  sev- 
eral empirical  series,  beyond  the  connection  of  sensibility, 
as  if  they  were  things  by  themselves,  existing  apart  from 
their  transcendental  ground,  and  which  we  might  leave 
behind  in  order  to  seek  for  the  cause  of  their  existence 
outside  them.  This,  no  doubt,  would  have  to  be  done  in 
the  end  with  contingent  things , but  not  with  mere  repre- 
sentations of  things,  the  contingency  of  which  is  itself  a 
phenomenon,  and  cannot  lead  to  any  other  regressus  but 
that  which  determines  the  phenomena,  that  is,  which  is 
empirical.  To  conceive,  however,  an  intelligible  ground 
of  phenomena,  that  is,  of  the  world  of  sense,  and  to  con- 
ceive it  as  freed  from  the  contingency  of  the  latter,  does 


456 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


not  run  counter  either  to  the  unlimited  empirical  regressus 
in  the  series  of  phenomena,  nor  to  their  general  contin- 
gency. And  this  is  really  the  only  thing  which  [p.  564] 
we  had  to  do  in  order  to  remove  this  apparent  antinomy, 
and  which  could  be  done  in  this  wise  only.  For  if  every 
condition  of  everything  conditioned  (according  to  its  exist- 
ence) is  sensuous,  and  therefore  belongs  to  the  series,  that 
series  is  again  conditioned  (as  shown  in  the  antithesis  of 
the  fourth  antinomy).  Either  therefore  there  would  re- 
main a conflict  with  reason,  which  postulates  the  uncondi- 
tioned, or  this  would  have  to  be  placed  outside  the  series, 
i.e.  in  the  intelligible,  the  necessity  of  which  neither  re- 
quires nor  admits  of  any  empirical  condition,  and  is  there- 
fore, as  regards  phenomena,  unconditionally  necessary. 

The  empirical  use  of  reason  (with  regard  to  the  condi- 
tions of  existence  in  the  world  of  sense)  is  not  affected  by 
the  admission  of  a purely  intelligible  being,  but  ascends, 
according  to  the  principle  of  a general  contingency,  from 
empirical  conditions  to  higher  ones,  which  again  are 
empirical.  This  regulative  principle,  however,  does  not 
exclude  the  admission  of  an  intelligible  cause  not  compre- 
hended in  the  series,  when  we  come  to  the  pure  use  of 
reason  (with  reference  to  ends  or  aims).  For  in  this 
case,  an  intelligible  cause  only  means  the  transcendental, 
and,  to  us,  unknown  ground  of  the  possibility  of  the  sen- 
suous series  in  general,  and  the  existence  of  this,  inde- 
pendent of  all  conditions  of  the  sensuous  series,  and,  in 
reference  to  it,  unconditionally,  necessary,  is  by  [p.  565] 
no  means  opposed  to  the  unlimited  contingency  of  the 
former,  nor  to  the  never-ending  regressus  in  the  series  of 
empirical  conditions. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


457 


Concluding  Remark  on  the  Whole  Antinomy  of  Pure 
Reason 

So  long  as  it  is  only  the  totality  of  the  conditions  in  the 
world  of  sense  and  the  interest  it  can  have  to  reason,  that 
form  the  object  of  the  concepts  of  our  reason,  our  ideas 
are  no  doubt  transcendental,  but  yet  cosmological.  If, 
however,  we  place  the  unconditioned  (with  which  we  are 
chiefly  concerned)  in  that  which  is  entirely  outside  the 
world  of  sense,  therefore  beyond  all  possible  experience, 
our  ideas  become  transcendent : for  they  serve  not  only  for 
the  completion  of  the  empirical  use  of  the  understanding 
(which  always  remains  an  idea  that  must  be  obeyed,  though 
it  can  never  be  fully  carried  out),  but  they  separate  them- 
selves entirely  from  it,  and  create  to  themselves  objects 
the  material  of  which  is  not  taken  from  experience,  and 
the  objective  reality  of  which  does  not  rest  on  the  comple- 
tion of  the  empirical  series,  but  on  pure  concepts  a priori. 
Such  transcendent  ideas  have  a merely  intelligible  object, 
which  may  indeed  be  admitted  as  a transcendental  object, 
of  which,  for  the  rest,  we  know  nothing,  but  for  which,  if 
we  wish  to  conceive  it  as  a thing  determined  by  its  inter- 
nal distinguishing  predicates,  we  have  neither  [p.  5 66] 
grounds  of  possibility  (as  independent  of  all  concepts  of 
experience)  nor  the  slightest  justification  on  our  side  in 
admitting  it  as  an  object,  and  which,  therefore,  is  a mere 
creation  of  our  thoughts.  Nevertheless  that  cosmological 
idea,  which  owes  its  origin  to  the  fourth  antinomy,  urges 
us  on  to  take  that  step.  For  the  conditioned  existence  of 
all  phenomena,  not  being  founded  in  itself,  requires  us  to 
look  out  for  something  different  from  all  phenomena,  that 
is,  for  an  intelligible  object  in  which  there  should  be  no 


458 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


more  contingency.  As,  however,  if  we  have  once  allowed 
ourselves  to  admit,  outside  the  field  of  the  whole  of  sensible 
ity,  a reality  existing  by  itself,  phenomena  can  only  be  con. 
sidered  as  contingent  modes  of  representing  intelligible 
objects  on  the  part  of  beings  which  themselves  are  intel- 
ligences,1 nothing  remains  to  us,  in  order  to  form  some 
kind  of  concept  of  intelligible  things,  of  which  in  them- 
selves we  have  not  the  slightest  knowledge,  but  analogy, 
applied  to  the  concepts  of  experience.  As  we  know  the 
contingent  by  experience  only,  but  have  here  to  deal  with 
things  which  are  not  meant  to  be  objects  of  experience, 
we  shall  have  to  derive  our  knowledge  of  them  from  what 
is  necessary  in  itself,  that  is,  from  pure  concepts  of  things 
in  general.  Thus  the  first  step  which  we  take  [p.  567] 
outside  the  world  of  sense,  obliges  us  to  begin  our  new 
knowledge  with  the  investigation  of  the  absolutely  neces- 
sary Being,  and  to  derive  from  its  concepts  the  concepts 
of  all  things,  so  far  as  they  are  intelligible  only ; and  this 
we  shall  attempt  to  do  in  the  next  chapter. 

1 After  anzusehen,  sind  may  be  added  for  the  sake  of  clearness,  but  it  is 
often  omitted  in  Kant’s  style. 


THE  SECOND  BOOK  OF  TRANSCEN- 
DENTAL DIALECTIC 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  IDEAL  OF  PURE  REASON 

Section  I 

Of  the  Ideal  in  General 

We  have  seen  that  without  the  conditions  of  sensibility, 
it  is  impossible  to  represent  objects  by  means  of  the  pure 
concepts  of  the  understanding , because  the  conditions  of 
their  objective  reality  are  absent,  and  they  contain  the 
mere  form  of  thought  only.  If,  however,  we  apply  these 
concepts  to  phenomena,  they  can  be  represented  in  con- 
creto,  because  in  the  phenomena  they  have  the  material 
for  forming  concepts  of  experience,  which  are  nothing  but 
concepts  of  the  understanding  in  concreto.  Ideas,  however, 
are  still  further  removed  from  objective  reality  than  the 
categories,  because  they  can  meet  with  no  phenomenon  in 
which  they  could  be  represented  in  concreto.  They  con- 
tain a certain  completeness  unattainable  by  any  [p.  568] 
possible  empirical  knowledge,  and  reason  aims  in  them  at  a 
systematical  unity  only,  to  which  the  empirically  possible 
unity  is  to  approximate,  without  ever  fully  reaching  it. 

Still  further  removed  from  objective  reality  than  the 
Idea,  would  seem  to  be  what  I call  the  Ideal,  by  which  I 
mean  the  idea,  not  only  in  concreto,  but  in  individuo,  that 


459 


460 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


is,  an  individual  thing  determinable  or  even  determined  by 
the  idea  alone. 

Humanity  (as  an  idea),  in  its  complete  perfection,  im- 
plies not  only  all  essential  qualities  belonging  to  human 
nature,  which  constitute  our  concept  of  it,  enlarged  to  a 
degree  of  complete  agreement  with  the  highest  aims  that 
would  represent  our  idea  of  perfect  humanity,  but  every- 
thing also  which,  beside  this  concept,  is  required  for  the 
complete  determination  of  the  idea.  For  of  all  contra- 
dictory predicates  one  only  can  agree  with  the  idea  of  the 
most  perfect  man.  What  to  us  is  an  ideal,  was  in  Plato’s 
language  an  Idea  of  a divine  mind , an  individual  object 
present  to  its  pure  intuition,  the  most  perfect  of  every 
kind  of  possible  beings,  and  the  archetype  of  all  phenom- 
enal copies. 

Without  soaring  so  high,  we  have  to  admit  [p.  569) 
that  human  reason  contains  not  only  ideas,  but  ideals  also, 
which  though  they  have  not,  like  those  of  Plato,  creative, 
yet  have  certainly  practical  power  (as  regulative  prin- 
ciples), and  form  the  basis  of  the  possible  perfection  of 
certain  acts.  Moral  concepts  are  not  entirely  pure  con- 
cepts of  reason,  because  they  rest  on  something  empirical, 
pleasure  or  pain.  Nevertheless,  with  regard  to  the  prin- 
ciple by  which  reason  imposes  limits  on  freedom,  which  in 
itself  is  without  laws,  these  moral  concepts  (with  regard  to 
their  form  at  least)  may  well  serve  as  examples  of  pure 
concepts  of  reason.  Virtue  and  human  wisdom  in  its  per- 
fect purity  are  ideas,  while  the  wise  man  (of  the  Stoics)  is 
an  ideal,  that  is,  a man  existing  in  thought  only,  but  in 
complete  agreement  with  the  idea  of  wisdom.  While  the 
idea  gives  rides , the  ideal  serves  as  the  archetype  for  the 
permanent  determination  of  the  copy ; and  we  have  no 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


461 

other  rule  of  our  actions  but  the  conduct  of  that  divine 
man  within  us,  with  which  we  compare  ourselves,  and  by 
which  we  judge  and  better  ourselves,  though  we  can  never 
reach  it.  These  ideals,  though  they  cannot  claim  objective 
reality  (existence),  are  not  therefore  to  be  considered  as 
mere  chimeras,  but  supply  reason  with  an  indispensable 
standard,  because  it  requires  the  concept  of  that  which  is 
perfect  of  its  kind,  in  order  to  estimate  and  [p.  570] 
measure  by  it  the  degree  and  the  number  of  the  defects  in 
the  imperfect.  To  attempt  to  realise  the  ideal  in  an 
example,  that  is,  as  a real  phenomenon,  as  we  might 
represent  a perfectly  wise  man  in  a novel,  is  impossible, 
nay,  absurd,  and  but  little  encouraging,  because  the 
natural  limits,  which  are  constantly  interfering  with  the 
perfection  in  the  idea,  make  all  illusion  in  such  an  experi- 
ment impossible,  and  thus  render  the  good  itself  in  the  idea 
suspicious  and  unreal. 

This  is  the  case  with  the  ideal  of  reason,  which  must 
always  rest  on  definite  concepts,  and  serve  as  rule  and 
model,  whether  for  imitation  or  for  criticism.  The  case 
is  totally  different  with  those  creations  of  our  imagina- 
tion of  which  it  is  impossible  to  give  an  intelligible 
concept,  or  say  anything,  — which  are  in  fact  a kind  of 
monogram , consisting  of  single  lines  without  any  apparent 
rule,  a vague  outline  rather  of  different  experiences  than 
a definite  image,  such  as  painters  and  physiognomists 
pretend  to  carry  in  their  heads,  and  of  which  they  speak 
as  a kind  of  vague  shadow  only  of  their  creations  and 
criticisms  that  can  never  be  communicated  to  others. 
They  may  be  termed,  though  improperly,  ideals  of  sen- 
sibility, because  they  are  meant  to  be  the  never-attain- 
able  model  of  possible  empirical  intuitions,  and  yet  fur- 


462 


Transce?idental  Dialectic 


nish  no  rule  capable  of  being  explained  or  ex-  [p.  571] 
amined. 

In  its  ideal,  on  the  contrary,  reason  aims  at  a perfect 
determination,  according  to  rules  a priori , and  it  conceives 
an  object  throughout  determinable  according  to  principles, 
though  without  the  sufficient  conditions  of  experience,  so 
that  the  concept  itself  is  transcendent. 

THE  IDEAL  OF  PURE  REASON 
Section  II 

Of  the  Transcendental  Ideal  (. Prototypon  Transcendentale) 

Every  concept  is,  with  regard  to  that  which  is  not 
contained  in  it,  undetermined  and  subject  to  the  prin- 
ciple of  determinability , according  to  which  of  every  two 
contradictorily  opposite  predicates,  one  only  can  belong 
to  it.  This  rests  on  the  principle  of  contradiction,  and 
is  therefore  a purely  logical  principle,  taking  no  account 
of  any  of  the  contents  of  our  knowledge,  and  looking 
only  to  its  logical  form. 

Besides  this  everything  is  subject,  in  its  possibility, 
to  the  principle  of  complete  determination,  according  to 
which  one  of  all  the  possible  predicates  of  things,  as  com- 
pared with  their  opposites,  must  be  applicable  [p.  572] 
to  it.  This  does  not  rest  only  on  the  principle  of  contra- 
diction, for  it  regards  everything,  not  only  in  relation  to 
two  contradictory  predicates,  but  in  relation  to  the  whole 
possibility,  that  is,  to  the  whole  of  all  predicates  of  things, 
and,  presupposing  these  as  a condition  a priori,  it  repre- 
sents everything  as  deriving  its  own  possibility  from  the 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


463 


share  which  it  possesses  in  that  whole  possibility.1  This 
principle  of  complete  determination  relates  therefore  to 
the  content,  and  not  only  to  the  logical  form.  It  is  the 
principle  of  the  synthesis  of  all  predicates  which  are 
meant  to  form  the  complete  concept  of  a thing,  and  not 
the  principle  of  analytical  representation  only,  by  means 
of  one  of  two  contradictory  predicates  ; and  it  contains  a 
transcendental  presupposition,  namely,  that  of  the  material 
for  all  possibility  which  is  supposed  to  contain  [p.  573] 
a priori  the  data  for  the  particular  possibility  of  everything. 

The  proposition,  that  everything  which  exists  is  com- 
pletely determined,  does  not  signify  only  that  one  of  every 
pair  of  given  contradictory  predicates,  but  that  one  of  all 
possible  predicates  must  always  belong  to  a thing,  so  that 
by  this  proposition  predicates  are  not  only  compared  with 
each  other  logically,  but  the  thing  itself  is  compared  tran- 
scendentally  with  the  sum  total  of  all  possible  predicates. 
The  proposition  really  means  that,  in  order  to  know  a 
thing  completely,  we  must  know  everything  that  is  pos- 
sible, and  thereby  determine  it  either  affirmatively  or 
negatively.  This  complete  determination  is  therefore  a 
concept  which  in  concreto  can  never  be  represented  in 
its  totality,  and  is  founded  therefore  on  an  idea  which 
belongs  to  reason  only,  reason  prescribing  to  the  under- 
standing the  rule  of  its  complete  application. 

1 According  to  this  principle,  therefore,  everything  is  referred  to  a common 
correlate,  that  is,  the  whole  possibility,  which,  if  it  (that  is,  the  matter  for  all 
possible  predicates)  could  be  found  in  the  idea  of  any  single  thing,  would 
prove  an  affinity  of  all  possible  things,  through  the  identity  of  the  ground  of 
their  complete  determination.  The  determinability  of  any  concept  is  subordi- 
nate to  the  universality  ( universalitas ) of  the  principle  of  the  excluded  middle, 
while  the  determination  of  a thing  is  subordinate  to  the  totality  ( universitas ), 
or  the  sum  total  of  all  possible  predicates. 


464 


Tra?tscendental  Dialectic 


Now  although  this  idea  of  the  sum  total  of  all  possibility, 
so  far  as  it  forms  the  condition  of  the  complete  determina- 
tion of  everything,  is  itself  still  undetermined  with  regard 
to  its  predicates,  and  is  conceived  by  us  merely  as  a sum 
total  of  all  possible  predicates,  we  find  nevertheless  on 
closer  examination  that  this  idea,  as  a fundamental  con- 
cept, excludes  a number  of  predicates  which,  being  deriva- 
tive, are  given  by  others,  or  cannot  stand  one  [p.  574I 
by  the  side  of  the  other,  and  that  it  is  raised  to  a com- 
pletely a priori  determined  concept,  thus  becoming  the 
concept  of  an  individual  object  which  is  completely  deter- 
mined by  the  mere  idea,  and  must  therefore  be  called  an 
ideal  of  pure  reason. 

If  we  consider  all  possible  predicates  not  only  logically, 
but  transcendentally,  that  is,  according  to  their  content, 
which  may  be  thought  in  them  a priori,  we  find  that 
through  some  we  represent  being,  through  others  a mere 
not-being.  The  logical  negation,  which  is  merely  indicated 
through  the  small  word  not,  does  in  reality  never  apply  to 
a concept,  but  only  to  its  relation  to  another  in  a judg- 
ment, and  is  very  far  therefore  from  being  sufficient  to 
determine  a concept  with  regard  to  its  content.  The  ex- 
pression, not-mortal,  can  in  no  wise  indicate  that  mere  not- 
being  if  thereby  represented  in  an  object,  but  leaves  the 
content  entirely  untouched.  A transcendental  negation, 
on  the  contrary,  signifies  not-being  by  itself,  and  is  opposed 
to  transcendental  affirmation,  or  a something  the  concept 
of  which  in  itself  expresses  being.  It  is  called,  therefore, 
reality  (from  res,  a thing),  because  through  it  alone,  and 
so  far  only  as  it  reaches,  are  objects  something,  while  the 
opposite  negation  indicates  a mere  want,  and,  if  [p.  575] 
it  stands  by  itself,  represents  the  absence  of  everything. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


465 


No  one  can  definitely  think  a negation,  unless  he  founds 
it  on  the  opposite  affirmation.  A man  born  blind  cannot 
frame  the  smallest  conception  of  darkness,  because  he  has 
none  of  light.  The  savage  knows  nothing  of  poverty,  be- 
cause he  does  not  know  ease,  and  the  ignorant  has  no 
conception  of  his  ignorance,1  because  he  has  none  of  know- 
ledge, etc.  All  negative  concepts  are  therefore  derivative, 
and  it  is  the  realities  which  contain  the  data  and,  so 
to  speak,  the  material,  or  the  transcendental  content,  by 
which  a complete  determination  of  all  things  becomes 
possible. 

If,  therefore,  our  reason  postulates  a transcendental 
substratum  for  all  determinations,  a substratum  which 
contains,  as  it  were,  the  whole  store  of  material  whence 
all  possible  predicates  of  things  may  be  taken,  we  shall 
find  that  such  a substratum  is  nothing  but  the  idea  of  the 
sum  total  of  -reality  ( omnitudo  realitatis).  In  [p.  576] 
that  case  all  true  negations  are  nothing  but  limitations 
which  they  could  not  be  unless  there  were  the  substratum 
of  the  unlimited  (the  All). 

By  this  complete  possession  of  all  reality  we  represent 
the  concept  of  a thing  by  itself  a.s  completely  determined, 
and  the  concept  of  an  ens  realissimum  is  the  concept  of 
individual  being,  because  of  all  possible  opposite  predicates 
one,  namely,  that  which  absolutely  belongs  to  being,  is 
found  in  its  determination.  It  is  therefore  a transcen- 
dental ideal  which  forms  the  foundations  of  the  complete 

1 The  observations  and  calculations  of  astronomers  have  taught  us  much 
that  is  wonderful;  but  the  most  important  is,  that  they  have  revealed  to  us 
the  abyss  of  our  ignorance,  which  otherwise  human  reason  could  never  have 
conceived  so  great.  To  meditate  on  this  must  produce  a great  change  in  the 
determination  of  the  aims  of  our  reason. 


2 H 


466 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


determination  which  is  necessary  for  all  that  exists,  and 
which  constitutes  at  the  same  time  the  highest  and  complete 
condition  of  its  possibility,  to  which  all  thought  of  objects, 
with  regard  to  their  content,  must  be  traced  back.  It  is  at 
the  same  time  the  only  true  ideal  of  which  human  reason  is 
capable,  because  it  is  in  this  case  alone  that  a concept  of  a 
thing,  which  in  itself  is  general,  is  completely  determined 
by  itself,  and  recognised  as  the  representation  of  an  in- 
dividual. 

The  logical  determination  of  a concept  by  reason  is 
based  upon  a disjunctive  syllogism  in  which  the  major 
contains  a logical  division  (the  division  of  the  sphere  of 
a general  concept),  while  the  minor  limits  that  sphere  to 
a certain  part,  and  the  conclusion  determines  the  concept 
by  that  part.  The  general  concept  of  a reality  [p.  577] 
in  general  cannot  be  divided  a priori,  because  without  ex- 
perience we  know  no  definite  kinds  of  reality  contained 
under  that  genus.  Hence  the  transcendental  major  of  the 
complete  determination  of  all  things  is  nothing  but  a rep- 
resentation of  the  sum  total  of  all  reality,  and  not  only 
a concept  which  comprehends  all  predicates,  according  to 
their  transcendental  content,  7inder  itself,  but  within  itself ; 
and  the  complete  determination  of  everything  depends  on 
the  limitation  of  this  total  of  reality,  of  which  some  part  is 
ascribed  to  the  thing,  while  the  rest  is  excluded  from  it, 
a procedure  which  agrees  with  the  aut  ant  of  a disjunctive 
major,  and  with  the  determination  of  the  object  through 
one  of  the  members  of  that  division  in  the  minor.  Thus 
the  procedure  of  reason  by  which  the  transcendental  ideal 
becomes  the  basis  of  the  determination  of  all  possible 
things,  is  analogous  to  that  which  reason  follows  in  dis- 
junctive syllogisms,  a proposition  on  which  I tried  before 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


4&/ 


to  base  the  systematical  division  of  all  transcendental 
ideas,  and  according  to  which  they  are  produced,  as 
corresponding  to  the  three  kinds  of  the  syllogisms  of 
reason. 

It  is  self-evident  that  for  that  purpose,  namely,  in  order 
simply  to  represent  the  necessary  and  complete  deter- 
mination of  things,  reason  does  not  presuppose  [p.  578] 
the  existence  of  a being  that  should  correspond  to  the 
ideal,  but  its  idea  only,  in  order  to  derive  from  an  uncon- 
ditioned totality  of  complete  determination  the  condi- 
tioned one,  that  is  the  totality  of  something  limited. 
Reason  therefore  sees  in  the  ideal  the  prototypon  of  all 
things  which,  as  imperfect  copies  ( ectypa ),  derive  the 
material  of  their  possibility  from  it,  approaching  more 
or  less  nearly  to  it,  yet  remaining  always  far  from  reach- 
ing it. 

Thus  all  the  possibility  of  things  (or  of  the  synthesis 
of  the  manifold  according  to  their  content)  is  considered 
as  derivative,  and  the  possibility  of  that  only  which  in- 
cludes in  itself  all  reality  as  original.  For  all  negations 
(which  really  are  the  only  predicates  by  which  every- 
thing else  is  distinguished  from  the  truly  real  being)  are 
limitations  only  of  a greater  and,  in  the  last  instance,  of 
the  highest  reality,  presupposing  it,  and,  according  to 
their  content,  derived  from  it.  All  the  manifoldness  of 
things  consist  only  of  so  many  modes  of  limiting  the 
concept  of  the  highest  reality  that  forms  their  common 
substratum,  in  the  same  way  as  all  figures  are  only  differ- 
ent modes  of  limiting  endless  space.  Hence  the  object 
of  its  ideal  which  exists  in  reason  only  is  called  the  orig- 
inal Being  (ens  origination),  and  so  far  as  it  has  nothing 
above  it,  the  highest  Being  (ens  summum),  and  so  far 


468 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


as  everything  as  conditioned  is  subject  to  it,  the  Being  of 
all  beings  ( ens  entium).  All  this  however  does  not  mean 
the  objective  relation  of  any  real  thing  to  other  [p.  579^ 
things,  but  of  the  idea  to  concepts , and  leaves  us  in  perfect 
ignorance  as  to  the  existence  of  a being  of  such  super- 
lative excellence. 

Again,  as  we  cannot  say  that  an  original  being  consists 
of  so  many  derivative  beings,  because  these  in  reality  pre- 
suppose the  former,  and  cannot  therefore  constitute  it, 
it  follows  that  the  ideal  of  the  original  being  must  be 
conceived  as  simple. 

The  derivation  of  all  other  possibility  from  that  original 
being  cannot  therefore,  if  we  speak  accurately,  be  consid- 
ered as  a limitation  of  its  highest  reality,  and,  as  it  were,  a 
diznsion  of  it — -for  in  that  case  the  original  being  would 
become  to  us  a mere  aggregate  of  derivative  beings,  which, 
according  to  what  we  have  just  explained,  is  impos- 
sible, though  we  represented  it  so  in  our  first  rough 
sketch.  On  the  contrary,  the  highest  reality  would  form 
the  basis  of  the  possibility  of  all  things  as  a cause,  and 
not  as  a sum  total.  The  manifoldness  of  things  would 
not  depend  on  the  limitation  of  the  original  being,  but 
on  its  complete  effect,  and  to  this  also  would  belong  all 
our  sensibility,  together  with  all  reality  in  phenomenal 
appearance,  which  could  not,  as  an  ingredient,  belong 
to  the  idea  of  a supreme  being. 

If  we  follow  up  this  idea  of  ours  and  hypos-  [p.  580] 
tasise  it,  we  shall  be  able  to  determine  the  original  being 
by  means  of  the  concept  of  the  highest  reality  as  one, 
simple,  all  sufficient,  eternal,  etc.,  in  one  word,  determine 
it  in  its  unconditioned  completeness  through  all  predica- 
ments. The  concept  of  such  a being  is  the  concept  of 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


469 


God  in  its  transcendental  sense,  and  thus,  as  I indicated 
above,  the  ideal  of  pure  reason  is  the  object  of  a tran 
scendental  theology. 

By  such  an  employment  of  the  transcendental  idea, 
however,  we  should  be  overstepping  the  limits  of  its 
purpose  and  admissibility.  Reason  used  it  only,  as  being 
the  concept  of  all  reality,  for  a foundation  of  the  complete 
determination  of  things  in  general,  without  requiring  that 
all  this  reality  should  be  given  objectively  and  constitute 
itself  a thing.  This  is  a mere  fiction  by  which  we  com- 
prehend and  realise  the  manifold  of  our  idea  in  one  ideal, 
as  a particular  being.  We  have  no  right  to  do  this,  not 
even  to  assume  the  possibility  of  such  an  hypothesis  ; nor 
do  all  the  consequences  which  flow  from  such  an  ideal 
concern  the  complete  determination  of  things  in  general, 
for  the  sake  of  which  alone  the  idea  was  necessary,  or 
influence  it  in  the  least. 

It  is  not  enough  to  describe  the  procedure  [p.  581} 
of  our  reason  and  its  dialectic,  we  must  try  also  to  dis- 
cover its  sources,  in  order  to  be  able  to  explain  that  illu- 
sion itself  as  a phenomenon  of  the  understanding.  The 
ideal  of  which  we  are  speaking  is  founded  on  a natural, 
not  on  a purely  arbitrary  idea.  I ask,  therefore,  how  does 
it  happen  that  reason  considers  all  the  possibility  of 
things  as  derived  from  one  fundamental  possibility, 
namely,  that  of  the  highest  reality,  and  then  presupposes 
it  as  contained  in  a particular  original  being  ? 

The  answer  is  easily  found  in  the  discussions  of  the 
transcendental  Analytic.  The  possibility  of  the  objects 
of  our  senses  is  their  relation  to  our  thought,  by  which 
something  (namely,  the  empirical  form)  can  be  thought 
a priori , while  what  constitutes  the  matter,  the  reality 


470 


Transcende7ital  Dialectic 


in  the  phenomena  (all  that  corresponds  to  sensation)  mu=t 
be  given,  because  without  it  it  could  not  even  be  thought, 
nor  its  possibility  be  represented.  An  object  of  the 
senses  can  be  completely  determined  only  when  it  is 
compared  with  all  phenomenal  predicates,  and  represented 
by  them  either  affirmatively  or  negatively.  As,  however, 
that  which  constitutes  the  thing  itself  (as  a phenomenon), 
namely,  the  real,  must  be  given,  and  as  without  this  the 
thing  could  not  be  conceived  at  all,  and  as  that  in  which 
the  real  of  all  phenomena  is  given  is  what  we  [p.  582] 
call  the  one  and  all  comprehending  experience,  it  is  nec- 
essary that  the  material  for  the  possibility  of  all  objects 
of  our  senses  should  be  presupposed  as  given  in  one 
whole,  on  the  limitation  of  which  alone  the  possibility 
of  all  empirical  objects,  their  difference  from  each  other, 
and  their  complete  determination  can  be  founded.  And 
since  no  other  objects  can  be  given  us  but  those  of  the 
senses,  and  nowhere  but  in  the  context  of  a possible 
experience,  nothing  can  be  an  object  to  us,  if  it  does  not 
presuppose  that  whole  of  all  empirical  reality,  as  the  con- 
dition of  its  possibility.  Owing  to  a natural  illusion,  we 
are  led  to  consider  a principle  which  applies  only  to  the 
objects  of  our  senses,  as  a principle  valid  for  all  things, 
and  thus  to  take  the  empirical  principle  of  our  concepts  of 
the  possibility  of  things  as  phenomena,  by  omitting  this 
limitation,  as  a transcendental  principle  of  the  possibility 
of  things  in  general. 

If  afterwards  we  hypostasise  this  idea  of  the  whole  of 
all  reality,  this  is  owing  to  our  changing  dialectically  the 
distributive  unity  of  the  empirical  use  of  our  understand- 
ing into  the  collective  unity  of  an  empirical  whole,  and 
then  represent  to  ourselves  this  whole  of  phenomena  as 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


47i 


an  individual  thing,  containing  in  itself  all  empirical  reality. 
Afterwards,  by  means  of  the  aforementioned  tran-  [p.  583] 
scendental  subreption,  this  is  taken  for  the  concept  of  a 
thing  standing  at  the  head  of  the  possibility  of  all  things, 
and  supplying  the  real  conditions  for  their  complete  de- 
termination.1 

THE  IDEAL  OF  PURE  REASON 
Section  III 

Of  the  Arguments  of  Speculative  Reason  in  Proof  of  the 
Existence  of  a Supreme  Being 

Notwithstanding  this  urgent  want  of  reason  to  presup- 
pose something,  as  a foundation  for  the  complete  deter- 
mination of  the  concepts  of  the  understanding,  reason 
nevertheless  becomes  too  soon  aware  of  the  purely  ideal 
and  factitious  character  of  such  a supposition  to  allow 
itself  to  be  persuaded  by  it  alone  to  admit  a [p.  584] 
mere  creation  of  thought  as  a real  being,  unless  it  were 
forced  by  something  else  to  seek  for  some  rest  in  its 
regressus  from  the  conditioned,  which  is  given,  to  the 
unconditioned  which,  though  in  itself  and  according  to  its 
mere  concept  not  given  as  real,  can  alone  complete  the 
series  of  conditions  followed  up  to  their  causes.  This  is 

1 This  ideal  of  the  most  real  of  all  things,  although  merely  a representation, 
is  first  realised,  that  is,  changed  into  an  object,  then  hypostasised,  and  lastly, 
by  the  natural  progress  of  reason  towards  unity,  as  we  shall  presently  show, 
personified ; because  the  regulative  unity  of  experience  does  not  rest  on  the 
phenomena  themselves  (sensibility  alone),  but  on  the  connection  of  the  mani- 
fold, through  the  understanding  (in  an  apperception),  so  that  the  unity  of  the 
highest  reality,  and  the  complete  determinability  (possibility)  of  all  things, 
seem  to  reside  in  a supreme  understanding,  and  therefore  in  an  intelligence. 


472 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


the  natural  course,  taken  by  the  reason  of  every,  even  the 
most  ordinary,  human  being,  although  not  every  one  can 
hold  out  in  it.  It  does  not  begin  with  concepts,  but  with 
common  experience,  and  thus  has  something  really  exist- 
ing for  its  foundation.  That  foundation  however  sinks, 
unless  it  rests  upon  the  immoveable  rock  of  that  which  is 
absolutely  necessary ; and  this  itself  hangs  without  a sup- 
port, if  without  and  beneath  it  there  be  empty  space,  and 
everything  be  not  filled  by  it,  so  that  no  room  be  left  for  a 
why,  — in  fact,  if  it  be  not  infinite  in  reality. 

If  we  admit  the  existence  of  something,  whatever  it  may 
be,  we  must  also  admit  that  something  exists  by  necessity. 
For  the  contingent  exists  only  under  the  condition  of 
something  else  as  its  cause,  and  from  this  the  same  con- 
clusion leads  us  on  till  we  reach  a cause  which  is  not  con- 
tingent, and  therefore  unconditionally  necessary.  This  is 
the  argument  on  which  reason  founds  its  progress  towards 
an  original  being. 

Now  reason  looks  out  for  the  concept  of  a [p.  585] 
being  worthy  of  such  a distinction  as  the  unconditioned 
necessity  of  its  existence,  not  in  order  to  conclude  a priori 
its  existence  from  its  concept  (for  if  it  ventured  to  do  this, 
it  might  confine  itself  altogether  to  mere  concepts,  without 
looking  for  a given  existence  as  their  foundation),  but  only 
in  order  to  find  among  all  concepts  of  possible  things  one 
which  has  nothing  incompatible  with  absolute  necessity. 
For  that  something  absolutely  necessary  must  exist,  is 
regarded  as  certain  after  the  first  conclusion.  And  after 
discarding  everything  else,  as  incompatible  with  that 
necessity,  reason  takes  the  one  being  that  remains  for  the 
absolutely  necessary  being,  whether  its  necessity  can  be 
comprehended,  that  is,  derived  from  its  concept  alone,  or 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


473 


not.  Now  the  being  the  concept  of  which  contains  a 
therefore  for  every  wherefore,  which  is  in  no  point  and  no 
respect  defective,  and  is  sufficient  as  a condition  every- 
where, seems,  on  that  account,  to  be  most  compatible  with 
absolute  necessity,  because,  being  in  possession  of  all  con- 
ditions of  all  that  is  possible,  it  does  not  require,  nay,  is 
not  capable  of  any  condition,  and  satisfies  at  least  in  this 
one  respect  the  concept  of  unconditioned  necessity  more 
than  any  other  concept  which,  because  it  is  deficient  and 
in  need  of  completion,  does  not  exhibit  any  such  [p.  586] 
characteristic  of  independence  from  all  further  conditions. 
It  is  true  that  we  ought  not  to  conclude  that  what  does 
not  contain  the  highest  and  in  every  respect  complete 
condition,  must  therefore  be  conditioned  even  in  its 
existence  ; yet  it  does  not  exhibit  the  only  characteristic 
of  unconditioned  existence,  by  which  reason  is  able  to 
know  any  being  as  unconditioned  by  means  of  a concept 
a priori. 

The  concept  of  a being  of  the  highest  reality  ( ens  rea- 
lissimum)  would  therefore  seem  of  all  concepts  of  all  pos- 
sible things  to  be  the  most  compatible  with  the  concept  of 
an  unconditionally  necessary  Being,  and  though  it  may 
not  satisfy  that  concept  altogether,  yet  no  choice  is  left  to 
us,  and  we  are  forced  to  keep  to  it,  because  we  must  not 
risk  the  existence  of  a necessary  Being,  and,  if  we  admit 
it,  can,  in  the  whole  field  of  possibility,  find  nothing  that 
could  produce  better  founded  claims  on  such  a distinction 
in  existence. 

This  therefore  is  the  natural  course  of  human  reason. 
It  begins  by  persuading  itself  of  the  existence  of  some 
necessary  Being.  In  this  being  it  recognises  unconditioned 
existence.  It  then  seeks  for  the  concept  of  that  which  is 


474 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


independent  of  all  condition,  and  finds  it  in  that  [p.  587] 
which  is  itself  the  sufficient  condition  of  all  other  things, 
that  is,  in  that  which  contains  all  reality.  Now  as  the 
unlimited  all  is  absolute  unity,  and  implies  the  concept  of 
a being,  one  and  supreme,  reason  concludes  that  the 
Supreme  Being,  as  the  original  cause  of  all  things,  must 
exist  by  absolute  necessity. 

We  cannot  deny  that  this  argument  possesses  a certain 
foundation,  when  we  must  come  to  a decision,  that  is, 
when,  after  having  once  admitted  the  existence  of  some 
one  necessary  Being,  we  agree  that  we  must  decide  where 
to  place  it ; for  in  that  case  we  could  not  make  a better 
choice,  or  we  have  really  no  choice,  but  are  forged  to  vote 
for  the  absolute  unity  of  complete  reality,  as  the  source  of 
all  possibility.  If,  however,  we  are  not  forced  to  come  to  a 
decision,  but  prefer  to  leave  the  question  open  till  our  con- 
sent has  been  forced  by  the  full  weight  of  arguments,  that 
is,  if  we  only  have  to  form  a judgment  of  what  we  really 
do  know,  and  what  we  only  seem  to  know,  then  our  for- 
mer conclusion  does  by  no  means  appear  in  so  favourable 
a light,  and  must  appeal  to  favour  in  order  to  make  up  for 
the  defects  of  its  legal  claims. 

For,  if  we  accept  everything  as  here  stated,  namely,  first, 
that  we  may  infer  rightly  from  any  given  exist-  [p.  588] 
ence  (perhaps  even  my  own  only)  the  existence  of  an  un- 
conditionally necessary  Being,  secondly , that  I must  con- 
sider a being  which  contains  all  reality  and  therefore  also 
all  condition,  as  absolutely  unconditioned,  and  that  there- 
fore the  concept  of  the  thing  which  is  compatible  with 
absolute  necessity  has  thus  been  found,  it  follows  by  no 
means  from  this,  that  a concept  of  a limited  being,  which 
does  not  possess  the  highest  reality,  is  therefore  contra- 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


475 


dictory  to  absolute  necessity.  For,  though  I do  not  find 
in  its  concept  the  unconditioned  which  carries  the  whole 
of  conditions  with  it,  this  does  not  prove  that,  for  the  same 
reason,  its  existence  must  be  conditioned  ; for  I cannot  say 
in  a hypothetical  argument,  that  if  a certain  condition  is 
absent  (here  the  completeness  according  to  concepts),  the 
conditioned  also  is  absent.  On  the  contrary,  it  will  be 
open  to  us  to  consider  all  the  rest  of  limited  beings  as 
equally  unconditioned,  although  we  cannot  from  the  gen- 
eral concept  which  we  have  of  them  deduce  their  neces- 
sity. Thus  this  argument  would  not  have  given  us  the 
least  concept  of  the  qualities  of  a necessary  Being,  in  fact 
it  would  not  have  helped  us  in  the  least. 

Nevertheless  this  argument  retains  a certain  importance 
and  authority,  of  which  it  cannot  be  at  once  deprived  on 
account  of  this  objective  insufficiency.  For  sup-  [p.  589] 
pose  that  there  existed  certain  obligations,  quite  correct  in 
the  idea  of  reason,  but  without  any  reality  in  their  applica- 
tion to  ourselves,  that  is  without  any  motives,  unless  we 
admitted  a Supreme  Being  to  give  effect  to  practical  laws, 
we  should  then  be  bound  to  follow  the  concepts  which, 
though  not  objectively  sufficient,  are  yet,  according  to  the 
standard  of  our  reason,  preponderant,  and  more  convincing 
than  any  others.  The  duty  of  deciding  would  here  turn 
the  balance  against  the  hesitation  of  speculation  by  an 
additional  practical  weight;  nay,  reason  would  not  be  justi- 
fied, even  before  the  most  indulgent  judge,  if,  under  such 
urgent  pleas,  though  with  deficient  insight,  it  had  not  fol- 
lowed its  judgment,  of  which  we  can  say  at  least,  that  we 
know  no  better. 

This  argument,  though  it  is  no  doubt  transcendental,  as 
based  on  the  internal  insufficiency  of  the  contingent,  is 


476 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


nevertheless  so  simple  and  natural,  that  the  commonest 
understanding  accepts  it,  if  once  led  up  to  it.  We  see 
things  change,  arise  and  perish,  and  these,  or  at  least 
their  state,  must  therefore  have  a cause.  Of  [p.  590] 
every  cause,  however,  that  is  given  in  experience,  the 
same  question  must  be  asked.  Where,  therefore,  could 
we  more  fairly  place  the  last  causality,  except  where  there 
exists  also  the  supreme  causality,  that  is  in  that  Being, 
which  originally  contains  in  itself  the  sufficient  cause  for 
every  possible  effect,  and  the  concept  of  which  can  easily 
be  realised  by  the  one  trait  of  an  all-comprehending  per- 
fection ? That  supreme  cause  we  afterwards  consider  as 
absolutely  necessary,  because  we  find  it  absolutely  neces- 
sary to  ascend  to  it,  while  there  is  no  ground  for  going 
beyond  it.  Thus  among  all  nations,  even  when  still  in  a 
state  of  blind  polytheism,  we  always  see  some  sparks  of 
monotheism,  to  which  they  have  been  led,  not  by  medita- 
tion and  profound  speculation,  but  by  the  natural  bent 
of  the  common  understanding,  which  they  gradually  fol- 
lowed and  comprehended. 

There  are  only  three  kinds  of  proofs  of  the  existence 
of  God  from  speculative  reason. 

All  the  paths  that  can  be  followed  to  this  end  begin 
either  from  definite  experience  and  the  peculiar  nature 
of  the  world  of  sense,  known  to  us  through  experience, 
and  ascend  from  it,  according  to  the  laws  of  causality,  to 
the  highest  cause,  existing  outside  the  world ; or  they 
rest  on  indefinite  experience  only,  that  is,  on  any  exist- 
ence which  is  empirically  given  ; or  lastly,  they  leave  all 
experience  out  of  account,  and  conclude,  entirely  a priori 
from  mere  concepts,  the  existence  of  a supreme  [p.  591] 
cause.  The  first  proof  is  the  physico-theological , the  second 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


477 


(he  cosmological , the  third  the  ontological  proof.  There 
are  no  more,  and  there  can  be  no  more. 

I shall  show  that  neither  on  the  one  path,  the  empirical, 
nor  on  the  other,  the  transcendental,  can  reason  achieve 
anything,  and  that  it  stretches  its  wings  in  vain,  if  it  tries 
to  soar  beyond  the  world  of  sense  by  the  mere  power  of 
speculation.  With  regard  to  the  order  in  which  these 
three  arguments  should  be  examined,  it  will  be  the  oppo- 
site of  that,  followed  by  reason  in  its  gradual  development, 
in  which  we  placed  them  also  at  first  ourselves.  For  we 
shall  be  able  to  show  that,  although  experience  gives  the 
first  impulse,  it  is  the  transcendental  concept  only  which 
guides  reason  in  its  endeavours,  and  fixes  the  last  goal 
which  reason  wishes  to  retain.  I shall  therefore  begin 
with  the  examination  of  the  transcendental  proof,  and  see 
afterwards  how  far  it  may  be  strengthened  by  the  addition 
of  empirical  elements. 

THE  IDEAL  OF  PURE  REASON  [p.  592] 
Section  IV 

Of  the  Impossibility  of  an  Ontological  Proof  of  the 
Existence  of  God 

It  is  easily  perceived,  from  what  has  been  said  before, 
that  the  concept  of  an  absolutely  necessary  Being  is  a con- 
cept of  pure  reason,  that  is,  a mere  idea,  the  objective 
reality  of  which  is  by  no  means  proved  by  the  fact  that 
reason  requires  it.  That  idea  does  no  more  than  point  to 
a certain  but  unattainable  completeness,  and  serves  rather 
to  limit  the  understanding,  than  to  extend  its  sphere.  It 
seems  strange  and  absurd,  however,  that  a conclusion  of 


478 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


an  absolutely  necessary  existence  from  a given  existence 
in  general  should  seem  urgent  and  correct,  and  that  yet 
all  the  conditions  under  which  the  understanding  can  form 
a concept  of  such  a necessity  should  be  entirely  against 
us. 

People  have  at  all  times  been  talking  of  an  absolutely 
necessary  Being,  but  they  have  tried,  not  so  much  to  under- 
stand whether  and  how  a thing  of  that  kind  could  even  be 
conceived,  as  rather  to  prove  its  existence.  No  doubt  a 
verbal  definition  of  that  concept  is  quite  easy,  if  we  say 
that  it  is  something  the  non-existence  of  which  is  impos- 
sible. This,  however,  does  not  make  us  much  [p.  593] 
wiser  with  reference  to  the  conditions  that  make  it  neces- 
sary1 to  consider  the  non-existence  of  a thing  as  absolutely 
inconceivable.  It  is  these  conditions  which  we  want  to 
know,  and  whether  by  that  concept  we  are  thinking  any- 
thing or  not.  For  to  use  the  word  unconditioned , in  order 
to  get  rid  of  all  the  conditions  which  the  understanding 
always  requires,  when  wishing  to  conceive  something  as 
necessary,  does  not  render  it  clear  to  us  in  the  least 
whether,  after  that,  we  are  still  thinking  anything  or  per- 
haps nothing,  by  the  concept  of  the  unconditionally 
necessary. 

Nay,  more  than  this,  people  have  imagined  that  by  a 
number  of  examples  they  had  explained  this  concept,  at 
first  risked  at  haphazard,  and  afterwards  become  quite 
familiar,  and  that  therefore  all  further  inquiry  regarding 
its  intelligibility  were  unnecessary.  It  was  said  that 
every  proposition  of  geometry,  such  as,  for  instance,  that 
a triangle  has  three  angles,  is  absolutely  necessary,  and 


1 Read  nothwendig  instead  of  unmoglich.  Noire. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


479 


people  began  to  talk  of  an  object  entirely  outside  the 
sphere  of  our  understanding,  as  if  they  understood  per- 
fectly well  what,  by  that  concept,  they  wished  to  predicate 
of  it. 

But  all  these  pretended  examples  are  taken  without  ex- 
ception from  judgments  only,  not  from  things,  and  their 
existence.  Now  the  unconditioned  necessity  of  judgments 
is  not  the  same  thing  as  an  absolute  necessity  of  things. 
The  absolute  necessity  of  a judgment  is  only  a conditioned 
necessity  of  the  thing,  or  of  the  predicate  in  the  [p.  594] 
judgment.  The  above  proposition  did  not  say  that  three 
angles  were  absolutely  necessary,  but  that  under  the  con- 
dition of  the  existence  of  a triangle,  three  angles  are  given 
(in  it)  by  necessity.  Nevertheless,  this  pure  logical  neces- 
sity has  exerted  so  powerful  an  illusion,  that,  after  hav- 
ing formed  of  a thing  a concept  a priori  so  constituted 
that  it  seemed  to  include  existence  in  its  sphere,  people 
thought  they  could  conclude  with  certainty  that,  because 
existence  necessarily  belongs  to  the  object  of  that  concept, 
provided  always  that  I accept  the  thing  as  given  (existing), 
its  existence  also  must  necessarily  be  accepted  (according 
to  the  rule  of  identity),  and  that  the  Being  therefore  must 
itself  be  absolutely  necessary,  because  its  existence  is 
implied  in  a concept,  which  is  accepted  voluntarily  only, 
and  always  under  the  condition  that  I accept  the  object 
of  it  as  given. 

If  in  an  identical  judgment  I reject  the  predicate  and 
retain  the  subject,  there  arises  a contradiction,  and  hence, 
I say,  that  the  former  belongs  to  the  latter  necessarily. 
But  if  I reject  the  subject  as  well  as  the  predicate,  there 
is  no  contradiction,  because  there  is  nothing  left  that  can 
be  contradicted.  To  accept  a triangle  and  yet  to  reject 


480 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


its  three  angles  is  contradictory,  but  there  is  no  contradic- 
tion at  all  in  admitting  the  non-existence  of  the  triangle 
and  of  its  three  angles.  The  same  applies  to  the  concept 
of  an  absolutely  necessary  Being.  Remove  its  [p.  595] 
existence,  and  you  remove  the  thing  itself,  with  all  its 
predicates,  so  that  a contradiction  becomes  impossible. 
There  is  nothing  external  to  which  the  contradiction  could 
apply,  because  the  thing  is  not  meant  to  be  externally 
necessary  ; nor  is  there  anything  internal  that  could  be 
contradicted,  for  in  removing  the  thing  out  of  existence, 
you  have  removed  at  the  same  time  all  its  internal  quali- 
ties. If  you  say,  God  is  almighty,  that  is  a necessary 
judgment,  because  almightiness  cannot  be  removed,  if  you 
accept  a deity,  that  is,  an  infinite  Being,  with  the  concept 
of  which  that  other  concept  is  identical.  But  if  you  say, 
God  is  not,  then  neither  his  almightiness,  nor  any  other 
of  his  predicates  is  given  ; they  are  all,  together  with  the 
subject,  removed  out  of  existence,  and  therefore  there  is 
not  the  slightest  contradiction  in  that  sentence. 

We  have  seen  therefore  that,  if  I remove  the  predicate 
of  a judgment  together  with  its  subject,  there  can  never 
be  an  internal  contradiction,  whatever  the  predicate  may 
be.  The  only  way  of  evading  this  conclusion  would  be 
to  say  that  there  are  subjects  which  cannot  be  removed 
out  of  existence,  but  must  always  remain.  But  this  would 
be  the  same  as  to  say  that  there  exist  absolutely  necessary 
subjects,  an  assumption  the  correctness  of  which  I have 
called  in  question,  and  the  possibility  of  which  you  had 
undertaken  to  prove.  For  I cannot  form  to  myself  the 
smallest  concept  of  a thing  which,  if  it  had  been  removed 
together  with  all  its  predicates,  should  leave  be-  [p.  596] 
hind  a contradiction  ; and  except  contradiction,  I have 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


481 

no  other  test  of  impossibility  by  pure  concepts  a priori. 
Against  all  these  general  arguments  (which  no  one  can 
object  to)  you  challenge  me  with  a case,  which  you  repre- 
sent as  a proof  by  a fact,  namely,  that  there  is  one,  and 
this  one  concept  only,  in  which  the  non-existence  or  the 
removal  of  its  object  would  be  self-contradictory,  namely, 
the  concept  of  the  most  real  Being  ( ens  realissimum). 
You  say  that  it  possesses  all  reality,  and  you  are  no  doubt 
justified  in  accepting  such  a Being  as  possible.  This  for 
the  present  I may  admit,  though  the  absence  of  self-con- 
tradictoriness in  a concept  is  far  from  proving  the  possi- 
bility of  its  object.1  Now  reality  comprehends  existence, 
and  therefore  existence  is  contained  in  the  concept  of  a 
thing  possible.  If  that  thing  is  removed,  the  [p.  597] 
internal  possibility  of  the  thing  would  be  removed,  and 
this  is  self-contradictory. 

I answer:  — Even  in  introducing  into  the  concept  of  a 
thing,  which  you  wish  to  think  in  its  possibility  only,  the 
concept  of  its  existence,  under  whatever  disguise  it  may 
be,  you  have  been  guilty  of  a contradiction.  If  you  were 
allowed  to  do  this,  you  would  apparently  have  carried  your 
point  ; but  in  reality  you  have  achieved  nothing,  but 
have  only  committed  a tautology.  I simply  ask  you, 
whether  the  proposition,  that  this  or  that  thing  (which, 

1 A concept  is  always  possible,  if  it  is  not  self-contradictory.  This  is  the 
logical  characteristic  of  possibility,  and  by  it  the  object  of  the  concept  is  dis- 
tinguished from  the  nihil  negativum.  But  it  may  nevertheless  be  an  empty 
concept,  unless  the  objective  reality  of  the  synthesis,  by  which  the  concept  is 
generated,  has  been  distinctly  shown.  This,  however,  as  shown  above,  must 
always  rest  on  principles  of  possible  experience,  and  not  on  the  principle  of 
analysis  (the  principle  of  contradiction).  This  is  a warning  against  inferring 
at  once  from  the  possibility  of  concepts  (logical)  the  possibility  of  things 
(real). 


482 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


whatever  it  may  be,  I grant  you  as  possible)  exists , is  an 
analytical  or  a synthetical  proposition  ? If  the  former, 
then  by  its  existence  you  add  nothing  to  your  thought 
of  the  thing ; but  in  that  case,  either  the  thought  within 
you  would  be  the  thing  itself,  or  you  have  presupposed 
existence,  as  belonging  to  possibility,  and  have  according 
to  your  own  showing  deduced  existence  from  internal 
possibility,  which  is  nothing  but  a miserable  tautology. 
The  mere  word  reality,  which  in  the  concept  of  a thing 
sounds  different  from  existence  in  the  concept  of  the  pred- 
icate, can  make  no  difference.  For  if  you  call  all  accept- 
ing or  positing  (without  determining  what  it  is)  reality,  you 
have  placed  a thing,  with  all  its  predicates,  within  the  con- 
cept of  the  subject,  and  accepted  it  as  real,  and  you  do 
nothing  but  repeat  it  in  the  predicate.  If,  on  the  [p.  598] 
contrary,  you  admit,  as  every  sensible  man  must  do,  that 
every  proposition  involving  existence  is  synthetical,  how 
can  you  say  that  the  predicate  of  existence  does  not  admit 
of  removal  without  contradiction,  a distinguishing  property 
which  is  peculiar  to  analytical  propositions  only,  the  very 
character  of  which  depends  on  it  ? 

I might  have  hoped  to  put  an  end  to  this  subtle  argu- 
mentation, without  many  words,  and  simply  by  an  accurate 
definition  of  the  concept  of  existence,  if  I had  not  seen 
that  the  illusion,  in  mistaking  a logical  predicate  for  a real 
one  (that  is  the  predicate  which  determines  a thing),  resists 
all  correction.  Everything  can  become  a logical  predicate, 
even  the  subject  itself  may  be  predicated  of  itself,  because 
logic  takes  no  account  of  any  contents  of  concepts.  Deter- 
mination, however,  is  a predicate,  added  to  the  concept  of 
the  subject,  and  enlarging  it,  and  it  must  not  therefore  be 
contained  in  it. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


483 


Being  is  evidently  not  a real  predicate,  or  a concept  of 
something  that  can  be  added  to  the  concept  of  a thing. 
It  is  merely  the  admission  of  a thing,  and  of  certain  deter- 
minations in  it.  Logically,  it  is  merely  the  copula  of  a 
judgment.  The  proposition,  God  is  almighty,  contains 
two  concepts,  each  having  its  object,  namely,  God  and 
almightiness.  The  small  word  is,  is  not  an  addi-  [p.  599] 
tional  predicate,  but  only  serves  to  put  the  predicate  in 
relation  to  the  subject.  If,  then,  I take  the  subject  (God) 
with  all  its  predicates  (including  that  of  almightiness),  and 
say,  God  is,  or  there  is  a God,  I do  not  put  a new  predicate 
to  the  concept  of  God,  but  I only  put  the  subject  by  itself, 
with  all  its  predicates,  in  relation  to  my  concept,  as  its 
object.  Both  must  contain  exactly  the  same  kind  of  thing, 
and  nothing  can  have  been  added  to  the  concept,  which 
expresses  possibility  only,  by  my  thinking  its  object  as 
simply  given  and  saying,  it  is.  And  thus  the  real  does 
not  contain  more  than  the  possible.  A hundred  real 
dollars  do  not  contain  a penny  more  than  a hundred  possi- 
ble dollars.  For  as  the  latter  signify  the  concept,  the  for- 
mer the  object  and  its  position  by  itself,  it  is  clear  that,  in 
case  the  former  contained  more  than  the  latter,  my  con- 
cept would  not  express  the  whole  object,  and  would  not 
therefore  be  its  adequate  concept.  In  my  financial  posi- 
tion no  doubt  there  exists  more  by  one  hundred  real  dol- 
lars, than  by  their  concept  only  (that  is  their  possibility), 
because  in  reality  the  object  is  not  only  contained  analyti- 
cally in  my  concept,  but  is  added  to  my  concept  (which  is 
a determination  of  my  state),  synthetically  ; but  the  con- 
ceived hundred  dollars  are  not  in  the  least  increased 
through  the  existence  which  is  outside  my  concept. 

By  whatever  and  by  however  many  predicates  [p.  600] 


484 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


I may  think  a thing  (even  in  completely  determining  it), 
nothing  is  really  added  to  it,  if  I add  that  the  thing  exists. 
Otherwise,  it  would  not  be  the  same  that  exists,  but  some- 
thing more  than  was  contained  in  the  concept,  and  I could 
not  say  that  the  exact  object  of  my  concept  existed.  Nay, 
even  if  I were  to  think  in  a thing  all  reality,  except  one, 
that  one  missing  reality  would  not  be  supplied  by  my  say- 
ing that  so  defective  a thing  exists,  but  it  would  exist  with 
the  same  defect  with  which  I thought  it ; or  what  exists 
would  be  different  from  what  I thought.  If,  then,  I try 
to  conceive  a being,  as  the  highest  reality  (without  any 
defect),  the  question  still  remains,  whether  it  exists  or  not. 
For  though  in  my  concept  there  may  be  wanting  nothing 
of  the  possible  real  content  of  a thing  in  general,  some- 
thing is  wanting  in  its  relation  to  my  whole  state  of  think- 
ing, namely,  that  the  knowledge  of  that  object  should  be 
possible  a posteriori  also.  And  here  we  perceive  the 
cause  of  our  difficulty.  If  we  were  concerned  with  an 
object  of  our  senses,  I could  not  mistake  the  existence  of 
a thing  for  the  mere  concept  of  it ; for  by  the  concept  the 
object  is  thought  as  only  in  harmony  with  the  general 
conditions  of  a possible  empirical  knowledge,  while  by  its 
existence  it  is  thought  as  contained  in  the  whole  content 
of  experience.  Through  this  connection  with  the  content 
of  the  whole  experience,  the  concept  of  an  object  [p.  601] 
is  not  in  the  least  increased ; our  thought  has  only  received 
through  it  one  more  possible  perception.  If,  however,  we 
are  thinking  existence  through  the  pure  category  alone, 
we  need  not  wonder  that  we  cannot  find  any  characteristic 
to  distinguish  it  from  mere  possibility. 

Whatever,  therefore,  our  concept  of  an  object  may  con- 
tain, we  must  always  step  outside  it,  in  order  to  attribute 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


485 

to  it  existence.  With  objects  of  the  senses,  this  takes 
place  through  their  connection  with  any  one  of  my  per- 
ceptions, according  to  empirical  laws;  with  objects  of  pure 
thought,  however,  there  is  no  means  of  knowing  their  ex- 
istence, because  it  would  have  to  be  known  entirely  a pri- 
ori, while  our  consciousness  of  every  kind  of  existence, 
whether  immediately  by  perception,  or  by  conclusions 
which  connect  something  with  perception,  belongs  entirely 
to  the  unity  of  experience,  and  any  existence  outside  that 
field,  though  it  cannot  be  declared  to  be  absolutely  impos- 
sible, is  a presupposition  that  cannot  be  justified  by  any- 
thing. 

The  concept  of  a Supreme  Being  is,  in  many  respects, 
a very  useful  idea,  but,  being  an  idea  only,  it  is  quite  in- 
capable of  increasing,  by  itself  alone,  our  know-  [p.  602] 
ledge  with  regard  to  what  exists.  It  cannot  even  do  so 
much  as  to  inform  us  any  further  as  to  its  possibility. 
The  analytical  characteristic  of  possibility,  which  consists 
in  the  absence  of  contradiction  in  mere  positions  (reali- 
ties), cannot  be  denied  to  it ; but  the  connection  of  all  real 
properties  in  one  and  the  same  thing  is  a synthesis  the 
possibility  of  which  we  cannot  judge  a priori  because 
these  realities  are  not  given  to  us  as  such,  and  because, 
even  if  this  were  so,  no  judgment  whatever  takes  place,  it 
being  necessary  to  look  for  the  characteristic  of  the  pos- 
sibility of  synthetical  knowledge  in  experience  only,  to 
which  the  object  of  an  idea  can  never  belong.  Thus  we 
see  that  the  celebrated  Leibniz  is  far  from  having  achieved 
what  he  thought  he  had,  namely,  to  understand  a priori 
the  possibility  of  so  sublime  an  ideal  Being. 

Time  and  labour  therefore  are  lost  on  the  famous  onto- 
logical (Cartesian)  proof  of  the  existence  of  a Supreme 


486 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


Being  from  mere  concepts  ; and  a man  might  as  well  im- 
agine that  he  could  become  richer  in  knowledge  by  mere 
ideas,  as  a merchant  in  capital,  if,  in  order  to  improve  his 
position,  he  were  to  add  a few  noughts  to  his  cash  account. 


THE  IDEAL  OF  PURE  REASON 
Section  V 


[p.  603] 


Of  the  Impossibility  of  a Cosmological  Proof  of  the  Ex- 
istence of  God 


It  was  something  quite  unnatural,  and  a mere  innovation 
of  scholastic  wisdom,  to  attempt  to  pick  out  of  an  entirely 
arbitrary  idea  the  existence  of  the  object  corresponding 
to  it.  Such  an  attempt  would  never  have  been  made,  if 
there  had  not  existed  beforehand  a need  of  our  reason  of 
admitting  for  existence  in  general  something  necessary, 
to  which  we  may  ascend  and  in  which  we  may  rest ; and 
if,  as  that  necessity  must  be  unconditioned  and  a prio7'i 
certain,  reason  had  not  been  forced  to  seek  a concept 
which,  if  possible,  should  satisfy  such  a demand  and  give 
us  a knowledge  of  an  existence  entirely  a priori.  Such  a 
concept  was  supposed  to  exist  in  the  idea  of  an  ens  realis- 
simum,  and  that  idea  was  therefore  used  for  a more  defi- 
nite knowledge  of  that,  the  existence  of  which  one  had 
admitted  or  been  persuaded  of  independently,  namely,  of 
the  necessary  Being.  This  very  natural  procedure  of 
reason  was  carefully  concealed,  and  instead  of  ending  with 
that  concept,  an  attempt  was  made  to  begin  with  it,  and 
thus  to  derive  from  it  the  necessity  of  existence,  which  it 
was  only  meant  to  supplement.  Hence  arose  [p.  604] 
that  unfortunate  ontological  proof,  which  satisfies  neither 


Transcendental  Dialectic  487 

the  demands  of  our  natural  and  healthy  understanding, 
nor  the  requirements  of  the  schools. 

The  cosmological  proof,  which  we  have  now  to  examine, 
retains  the  connection  of  absolute  necessity  with  the  high- 
est reality,  but  instead  of  concluding,  like  the  former,  from 
the  highest  reality  necessity  in  existence,  it  concludes  from 
the  given  unconditioned  necessity  of  any  being,  its  un- 
limited reality.  It  thus  brings  everything  at  least  into 
the  groove  of  a natural,  though  I know  not  whether  of  a 
really  or  only  apparently  rational  syllogism,  which  carries 
the  greatest  conviction,  not  only  for  the  common,  but  also 
for  the  speculative  understanding,  and  has  evidently  drawn 
the  first  outline  of  all  proofs  of  natural  theology,  which 
have  been  followed  at  all  times,  and  will  be  followed  in 
future  also,  however  much  they  may  be  hidden  and  dis- 
guised. We  shall  now  proceed  to  exhibit  and  to  examine 
this  cosmological  proof  which  Leibniz  calls  also  the  proof 
a contingentia  mundi. 

It  runs  as  follows  : If  there  exists  anything,  there  must 
exist  an  absolutely  necessary  Being  also.  Now  I,  at  least, 
exist  ; therefore  there  exists  an  absolutely  necessary  Being. 
The  minor  contains  an  experience,  the  major  the  conclusion 
from  experience  in  general  to  the  existence  of  [p.  605] 
the  necessary.1  This  proof  therefore  begins  with  experi- 
ence, and  is  not  entirely  a priori,  or  ontological  ; and,  as 
the  object  of  all  possible  experience  is  called  the  world, 
this  proof  is  called  the  cosmological  proof.  As  it  takes 

1 This  conclusion  is  too  well  known  to  require  detailed  exposition.  It 
rests  on  the  apparently  transcendental  law  of  causality  in  nature,  that  everything 
contingent  has  its  cause,  which,  if  contingent  again,  must  likewise  have  a 
cause,  till  the  series  of  subordinate  causes  ends  in  an  absolutely  necessary 
cause,  without  which  it  could  not  be  complete. 


488 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


no  account  of  any  peculiar  property  of  the  objects  of  expe 
rience,  by  which  this  world  of  ours  may  differ  from  any 
other  possible  world,  it  is  distinguished,  in  its  name  also, 
from  the  physico-theological  proof,  which  employs  as  argu- 
ments, observations  of  the  peculiar  property  of  this  our 
world  of  sense. 

The  proof  then  proceeds  as  follows : The  necessary 
Being  can  be  determined  in  one  way  only,  that  is,  by  one 
only  of  all  possible  opposite  predicates  ; it  must  therefore 
be  determined  completely  by  its  own  concept.  Now, 
there  is  only  one  concept  of  a thing  possible,  which  a 
priori  completely  determines  it,  namely,  that  of  the  ens 
realissimum.  It  follows,  therefore,  that  the  concept  of  the 
ens  realissimum  is  the  only  one  by  which  a necessary  Being 
can  be  thought,  and  therefore  it  is  concluded  [p.  606] 
that  a highest  Being  exists  by  necessity. 

There  are  so  many  sophistical  propositions  in  this  cos- 
mological argument,  that  it  really  seems  as  if  specu- 
lative reason  had  spent  all  her  dialectical  skill  in  order 
to  produce  the  greatest  possible  transcendental  illusion. 
Before  examining  it,  we  shall  draw  up  a list  of  them,  by 
which  reason  has  put  forward  an  old  argument  disguised 
as  a new  one,  in  order  to  appeal  to  the  agreement  of  two 
witnesses,  one  supplied  by  pure  reason,  the  other  by  expe- 
rience, while  in  reality  there  is  only  one,  namely,  the  first, 
who  changes  his  dress  and  voice  in  order  to  be  taken  for  a 
second.  In  order  to  have  a secure  foundation,  this  proof 
takes  its  stand  on  experience,  and  pretends  to  be  different 
from  the  ontological  proof,  which  places  its  whole  confi- 
dence in  pure  concepts  a priori  only.  The  cosmological 
proof,  however,  uses  that  experience  only  in  order  to  make 
one  step,  namely,  to  the  existence  of  a necessary  Beings  in. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


489 


general.  What  properties  that  Being  may  have,  can  never 
be  learnt  from  the  empirical  argument,  and  for  that  pur- 
pose reason  takes  leave  of  it  altogether,  and  tries  to  find 
out,  from  among  concepts  only,  what  properties  an  abso- 
lutely necessary  Being  ought  to  possess,  i.e.  which  among 
all  possible  things  contains  in  itself  the  requisite  [p.  607] 
conditions  (; requisita ) of  absolute  necessity.  This  requisite 
is  believed  by  reason  to  exist  in  the  concept  of  an  ens 
realissimum  only,  and  reason  concludes  at  once  that  this 
must  be  the  absolutely  necessary  Being.  In  this  con- 
clusion it  is  simply  assumed  that  the  concept  of  a being  of 
the  highest  reality  is  perfectly  adequate  to  the  concept  of 
absolute  necessity  in  existence ; so  that  the  latter  might 
be  concluded  from  the  former.  This  is  the  same  proposi- 
tion as  that  maintained  in  the  ontological  argument,  and 
is  simply  taken  over  into  the  cosmological  proof,  nay, 
made  its  foundation,  although  the  intention  was  to  avoid 
it.  For  it  is  clear  that  absolute  necessity  is  an  existence 
from  mere  concepts.  If,  then,  I say  that  the  concept  of 
the  ens  realissimum  is  such  a concept,  and  is  the  only  con- 
cept adequate  to  necessary  existence,  I am  bound  to  admit 
that  the  latter  may  be  deduced  from  the  former.  The 
whole  conclusive  strength  of  the  so-called  cosmological 
qjroof  rests  therefore  in  reality  on  the  ontological  proof 
■'.from  mere  concepts,  while  the  appeal  to  experience  is 
quite  superfluous,  and,  though  it  may  lead  us  on  to  the 
.^concept  of  absolute  necessity,  it  cannot  demonstrate  it 
. with  any  definite  object.  For  as  soon  as  we  intend  to  do 
this,  we  must  at  once  abandon  all  experience,  and  try  to 
find  out  which  among  the  pure  concepts  may  contain 
the  conditions  of  the  possibility  of  an  absolutely  [p.  608] 
necessary  Being.  But  if  in  this  way  the  possibility  of 


490 


Tra?isce?idental  Dialectic 


such  a Being  has  been  perceived,  its  existence  also  has 
been  proved : for  what  we  are  really  saying  is  this,  that 
under  all  possible  things  there  is  one  which  carries  with 
it  absolute  necessity,  or  that  this  Being  exists  with  absolute 
necessity. 

Sophisms  in  arguments  are  most  easily  discovered,  if 
they  are  put  forward  in  a correct  scholastic  form.  This 
we  shall  now  proceed  to  do. 

If  the  proposition  is  right,  that  every  absolutely  necessary 
Being  is,  at  the  same  time,  the  most  real  Being  (and  this 
is  the  nervus probandi  of  the  cosmological  proof),  it  must, 
like  all  affirmative  judgments,  be  capable  of  conversion,  at 
least  per  accidens.  This  would  give  us  the  proposition 
that  some  entia  realissima  are  at  the  same  time  absolutely 
necessary  beings.  One  ens  realissinmm , however,  does 
not  differ  from  any  other  on  any  point,  and  what  applies 
to  one,  applies  also  to  all.  In  this  case,  therefore,  I may 
employ  absolute  conversion,  and  say,  that  every  ens  rea- 
lissimum  is  a necessary  Being.  As  this  proposition  is  de- 
termined by  its  concepts  a priori  only,  it  follows  that  the 
mere  concept  of  the  ens  realissinmm  must  carry  with  it 
its  absolute  necessity  ; and  this,  which  was  maintained  by 
the  ontological  proof,  and  not  recognised  by  the  cosmo- 
logical, forms  really  the  foundation  of  the  conclusions 
of  the  latter,  though  in  a disguised  form.  [p.  609] 

We  thus  see  that  the  second  road  taken  by  speculative 
reason,  in  order  to  prove  the  existence  of  the  highest 
Being,  is  not  only  as  illusory  as  the  first,  but  commits  in 
in  addition  an  ignoratio  elenchi , promising  to  lead  us  by 
a new  path,  but  after  a short  circuit  bringing  us  back  to 
the  old  one,  which  we  had  abandoned  for  its  sake. 

I said  before  that  a whole  nest  of  dialectical  assump- 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


491 


tions  was  hidden  in  that  cosmological  proof,  and  that  tran- 
scendental criticism  might  easily  detect  and  destroy  it.  I 
shall  here  enumerate  them  only,  leaving  it  to  the  experience 
of  the  reader  to  follow  up  the  fallacies  and  remove  them. 

We  find,  first,  the  transcendental  principle  of  inferring 
a cause  from  the  accidental.  Xhis  .principle,  that  every- 
thing contingent  must  have  a cause,  is  valid  in  the  world 
jjf  sense  only,  and  has  not  even  a meaning  outside  it.  For 
the  purely  intellectual  concept  of  the  contingent  cannot 
produce  a synthetical  proposition  like  that  of  causality, 
and  the  principle  of  causality  has  no  meaning  and  no 
criterion  of  its  use,  except  in  the  world  of  sense,  while 
here  it  is  meant  to  help  us  beyond  the  world  of  sense. 

Secondly.  .The  inference  of  a first  cause,  [p.  610] 
based  on  the  impossibility  of  an  infinite  ascending  series 
^of  given  causes  Jn  this  world  of  sense,  — an  inference 
.which  the  principles  of  the  use  of  reason  do  not  allow  us 
|l  _to  draw  even  in  experience,  while  here  we  extend  that 
1 1 principle  beyond  experience,  whither  that  series  can  never 
Jbe  prolonged. 

Thirdly.  The  false  self-satisfaction  of  reason  with 
[ . regard  to  the  completion  of  that  series,  brought  about 
^by  removing  in  the  end  every  kind  of  condition,  without 
which,  nevertheless,  no  concept  of  necessity  is  possible, 
vancLby  then,  when  any  definite  concepts  have  become 
^impossible,  accepting  this  as  a completion  of  our  concept. 

Fourthly.  The  mistaking  the  logical  possibility  of  a 
concept  of  all  united  reality  (without  any  internal  contra- 
diction) for  the  transcendental,  which  requires  a principle 
for  the  practicability  of  such  a synthesis,  such  principle 
however  being  applicable  to  the  field  of  possible  experience 
only,  etc. 


492 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


The  trick  of  the  cosmological  proof  consists  only  in 
trying  to  avoid  the  proof  of  the  existence  of  a necessary 
Being  a priori  by  mere  concepts.  -Such  a proof  would 
have  to  be  ontological,  and  of  this  we  feel  ourselves  quite 
incapable.  For  this  reason  we  take  a real  existence  (of 
any  experience  whatever),  and  conclude  from  it,  as  well 
as  may  be,  some  absolutely  necessary  condition  of  it.  In 
that  case  there  is  no  necessity  for  explaining  its  possi- 
bility, because,  if  it  has  been  proved  that  it  [p.  6 1 1 ] 
exists,  the  question  as  to  its  possibility  is  unnecessary.  If 
then  we  want  to  determine  that  necessary  Being  more 
accurately,  according  to  its  nature,  we  do  not  seek  what  is 
sufficient  to  make  us  understand  from  its  concept  the 
necessity  of  its  existence.  If  we  could  do  this,  no  empiri- 
cal presupposition  would  be  necessary.  No,  we  only  seek 
the  negative  condition  ( conditio  sine  qua  non),  without 
which  a Being  would  not  be  absolutely  necessary.  Now, 
in  every  other  kind  of  syllogisms  leading  from  a given 
effect  to  its  cause,  this  might  well  be  feasible.  In  our 
case,  however,  it  happens  unfortunately  that  the  condition 
which  is  required  for  absolute  necessity  exists  in  one  single 
Being  only,  which,  therefore,  would  have  to  contain  in  its 
concept  all  that  is  required  for  absolute  necessity,  and  that 
renders  a conclusion  a priori,  with  regard  to  such  neces- 
sity, possible.  I ought  therefore  to  be  able  to  reason 
conversely,  namely,  that  everything  is  absolutely  neces- 
sary, if  that  concept  (of  the  highest  reality)  belongs  to  it. 
If  I cannot  do  this  (and  I must  confess  that  I cannot,  if 
I wish  to  avoid  the  ontological  proof),  I have  suffered 
shipwreck  on  my  new  course,  and  have  come  back  again 
from  where  I started.  The  concept  of  the  highest  Being 
may  satisfy  all  questions  a priori  which  can  be  asked 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


493 


regarding  the  internal  determinations  of  a thing,  and  it  is 
therefore  an  ideal,  without  an  equal,  because  the  general 
concept  distinguishes  it  at  the  same  time  as  an  [p.  612] 
individual  being  among  all  possible  things.  But  it  does 
not  satisfy  the  really  important  question  regarding  its  own 
existence ; and  if  some  one  who  admitted  the  existence  of 
a necessary  Being  were  to  ask  us  which  of  all  things  in 
the  world  could  be  regarded  as  such,  we  could  not  answer : 
This  here  is  the  necessary  Being. 

It  may  be  allowable  to  admit  the  existence  of  a Being 
entirely  sufficient  to  serve  as  the  cause  of  all  possible 
effects,  simply  in  order  to  assist  reason  in  her  search  for 
unity  of  causes.  But  to  go  so  far  as  to  say  that  such  a 
Being  exists  necessarily , is  no  longer  the  modest  language 
of  an  admissible  hypothesis,  but  the  bold  assurance  of 
apodictic  certainty;  for  the  knowledge  of  that  which  is 
absolutely  necessary  must  itself  possess  absolute  necessity. 

The  whole  problem  of  the  transcendental  Ideal  is  this, 
either  to  find  a concept  compatible  with  absolute  neces- 
sity, or  to  find  the  absolute  necessity  compatible  with  the 
concept  of  anything.  If  the  one  is  possible,  the  other  must 
be  so  also,  for  reason  recognises  that  only  as  absolutely 
necessary  which  is  necessary  according  to  its  concept. 
Both  these  tasks  baffle  our  attempts  at  satisfying  our 
understanding  on  this  point,  and  likewise  our  [p.  613] 
endeavours  to  comfort  it  with  regard  to  its  impotence. 

That  unconditioned  necessity,  which  we  require  as  the 
last  support  of  all  things,  is  the  true  abyss  of  human 
reason.  Eternity  itself,  however  terrible  and  sublime  it 
may  have  been  depicted  by  Haller,  is  far  from  producing 
the  same  giddy  impression,  for  it  only  measures  the  dura- 
tion of  things,  but  does  not  support  them.  We  cannot 


494 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


put  off  the  thought,  nor  can  we  support  it,  that  a Being, 
which  we  represent  to  ourselves  as  the  highest  among  all 
possible  beings,  should  say  to  himself,  I am  from  eternity 
to  eternity,  there  is. nothing  beside  me,  except  that  which 
is  something  through  my  will,  — but  whetice  am  It  Here 
all  sinks  away  from  under  us,  and  the  highest  perfection, 
like  the  smallest,  passes  without  support  before  the  eyes 
of  speculative  reason,  which  finds  no  difficulty  in  making 
the  one  as  well  as  the  other  to  disappear  without  the 
slightest  impediment. 

Many  powers  of  nature,  which  manifest  their  existence 
by  certain  effects,  remain  perfectly  inscrutable  to  us, 
because  we  cannot  follow  them  up  far  enough  by  obser- 
vation. The  transcendental  object,  which  forms  the 
foundation  of  all  phenomena,  and  with  it  the  ground  of 
our  sensibility  having  this  rather  than  any  other  supreme 
conditions,  is  and  always  will  be  inscrutable.  The  thing 
no  doubt  is  given,  but  it  is  incomprehensible,  [p.  614] 
An  ideal  of  pure  reason,  however,  cannot  be  called  in- 
scrutable, because  it  cannot  produce  any  credentials  of  its 
reality  beyond  the  requirement  of  reason  to  perfect  all 
synthetical  unity  by  means  of  it.  As,  therefore,  it  is  not 
even  given  as  an  object  that  can  be  thought,  it  cannot 
be  said  to  be,  as  such,  inscrutable ; but,  being  a mere 
idea,  it  must  find  in  the  nature  of  reason  its  place  and  its 
solution,  and  in  that  sense  be  capable  of  scrutiny.  For 
it  is  the  very  essence  of  reason  that  we  are  able  to  give 
an  account  of  all  our  concepts,  opinions,  and  assertions 
either  on  objective  or,  if  they  are  a mere  illusion,  on  sub- 
jective grounds. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


495 


Discovery  and  Explanation  of  the  Dialectical  Illusion  in 

all  Transcendental  Proofs  of  the  Existence  of  a Neces- 
sary Being 

Both  proofs,  hitherto  attempted,  were  transcendental, 
that  is,  independent  of  empirical  principles.  For  although 
the  cosmological  proof  assumes  for  its  foundation  an  expe- 
rience in  general,  it  does  not  rest  on  any  particular  qual- 
ity of  it,  but  on  pure  principles  of  reason,  with  reference 
to  an  existence  given  by  the  empirical  consciousness  in 
general,  and  abandons  even  that  guidance  in  order  to 
derive  its  support  from  pure  concepts  only.  [p.  615] 
What  then  in  these  transcendental  proofs  is  the  cause  of 
the  dialectical,  but  natural,  illusion  which  connects  the 
concepts  of  necessity  and  of  the  highest  reality,  and 
realises  and  hypostasises  that  which  can  only  be  an  idea  ? 
What  is  the  cause  that  renders  it  inevitable  to  admit 
something  as  necessary  in  itself  among  existing  things, 
and  yet  makes  us  shrink  back  from  the  existence  of  such 
a Being  as  from  an  abyss  ? What  is  to  be  done  that 
reason  should  understand  itself  on  this  point,  and,  escap- 
ing from  the  wavering  state  of  hesitatingly  approving  or 
disapproving,  acquire  a calm  insight  into  the  matter? 

It  is  surely  extremely  strange  that,  as  soon  as  we  sup- 
pose that  something  exists,  we  cannot  avoid  the  con- 
clusion that  something  exists  necessarily.  On  this  quite 
natural,  though  by  no  means,  therefore,  certain  conclu- 
sion, rests  the  whole  cosmological  argument.  On  the 
other  side,  I may  take  any  concept  of  anything,  and  I 
find  that  its  existence  has  never  to  be  represented  by  me 
as  absolutely  necessary,  nay,  that  nothing  prevents  me, 
whatever  may  exist,  from  thinking  its  non-existence.  I 
may,  therefore,  have  to  admit  something  necessary  as  the 


49<5 


Transce7idental  Dialectic 


condition  of  existing  things  in  general,  but  I need  not 
think  any  single  thing  as  necessary  in  itself.  In  other 
words  I can  never  complete  the  regressus  to  the  [p.  6 1 6] 
conditions  of  existence  without  admitting  a necessary 
Being,  but  I can  never  begin  with  such  a Being. 

If,  therefore,  I am  obliged  to  think  something  neces- 
sary for  all  existing  things,  and  at  the  same  time  am  not 
justified  in  thinking  of  anything  as  in  itself  necessary,  the 
conclusion  is  inevitable  : that  necessity  and  contingency 
do  not  concern  things  themselves,  for  otherwise  there 
would  be  a contradiction,  and  that  therefore  neither  of 
the  two  principles  can  be  objective;  but  that  they  may 
possibly  be  subjective  principles  of  reason  only,  according 
to  which,  on  one  side,  we  have  to  find  for  all  that  is  given 
as  existing,  something  that  is  necessary,  and  thus  never 
to  stop  except  when  we  have  reached  an  a priori  com- 
plete explanation  ; while  on  the  other  we  must  never 
hope  for  that  completion,  that  is,  never  admit  anything 
empirical  as  unconditioned,  and  thus  dispense  with  its 
further  derivation.  In  that  sense  both  principles  as 
purely  heuristic  and  regulative , and  affecting  the  formal 
interests  of  reason  only,  may  well  stand  side  by  side. 
For  the  one  tells  us  that  we  ought  to  philosophise  on 
nature  as  if  there  was  a necessary  first  cause  for  every- 
thing that  exists,  if  only  in  order  to  introduce  systemati- 
cal unity  into  our  knowledge,  by  always  looking  for  such  an 
idea  as  an  imagined  highest  cause.  The  other  [p.  617] 
warns  us  against  mistaking  any  single  determination 
concerning  the  existence  of  things  for  such  a highest 
cause,  i.e.  for  something  absolutely  necessary,  and  bids 
us  to  keep  the  way  always  open  for  further  derivation, 
and  to  treat  it  always  as  conditioned.  If,  then,  every- 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


497 


thing  that  is  perceived  in  things  has  to  be  considered 
by  us  as  only  conditionally  necessary,  nothing  that  is 
empirically  given  can  ever  be  considered  as  absolutely 
necessary. 

It  follows  from  this  that  the  absolutely  necessary  must 
be  accepted  as  outside  the  world , because  it  is  only 
meant  to  serve  as  a principle  of  the  greatest  possible 
unity  of  phenomena,  of  which  it  is  the  highest  cause, 
and  that  it  can  never  be  reached  in  the  world , because 
the  second  rule  bids  you  always  to  consider  all  empirical 
causes  of  that  unity  as  derived. 

The  philosophers  of  antiquity  considered  all  form  in 
nature  as  contingent,  but  matter,  according  to  the  judg- 
ment of  common  reason,  as  primitive  and  necessary.  If, 
however,  they  had  considered  matter,  not  relatively  as 
the  substratum  of  phenomena,  but  as  existing  by  itself, 
the  idea  of  absolute  necessity  would  have  vanished  at 
once,  for  there  is  nothing  that  binds  reason  absolutely  to 
that  existence,  but  reason  can  at  any  time  and  without  con- 
tradiction remove  it  in  thought,  and  it  was  in  [p.  618] 
thought  only  that  it  could  claim  absolute  necessity.  The 
ground  of  this  persuasion  must  therefore  have  been  a cer- 
tain regulative  principle.  And  so  it  is  ; for  extension  and 
impermeability  (which  together  constitute  the  concept  of 
matter)  furnish  the  highest  empirical  principle  of  the 
unity  of  phenomena,  and  possess,  so  far  as  this  principle  is 
empirically  unconditioned,  the  character  of  a regulative 
principle.  Nevertheless,  as  every  determination  of  matter, 
which  constitutes  its  reality,  and  hence  the  impermeability 
of  matter  also,  is  an  effect  (action)  which  must  have  a cause, 
and  therefore  be  itself  derived,  matter  is  not  adequate  to 
the  idea  of  a necessary  Being,  as  a principle  of  all  derived 


2 K 


49s 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


unity,  because  every  one  of  its  real  qualities  is  derived 
and,  therefore,  conditionally  necessary  only,  so  that  it 
could  be  removed,  and  with  it  would  be  removed  the 
whole  existence  of  matter.  If  this  were  not  so,  we  should 
have  reached  the  highest  cause  of  unity,  empirically, 
which  is  forbidden  by  the  second  regulative  principle. 
It  follows  from  all  this  that  matter  and  everything  in 
general  that  belongs  to  the  world  are  not  fit  for  the 
idea  of  a necessary  original  Being,  as  a mere  principle 
of  the  greatest  empirical  unity,  but  that  we  must  place 
it  outside  the  world.  In  that  case  there  is  no  reason 
why  we  should  not  simply  derive  the  phenomena  of  the 
world  and  their  existence  from  other  phenomena,  as  if 
there  were  no  necessary  Being  at  all,  while  at  the  same 
time  we  might  always  strive  towards  the  completeness 
of  that  derivation,  just  as  if  such  a Being,  as  the  [p.  619] 
highest  cause,  were  presupposed. 

The  ideal  of  the  Supreme  Being  is  therefore,  according 
to  these  remarks,  nothing  but  a regulative  principle  of 
reason,  which  obliges  us  to  consider  all  connection  in 
the  world  as  if  it  arose  from  an  all-sufficient  necessary 
cause,  in  order  to  found  on  it  the  rule  of  a systematical 
unity  necessary  according  to  general  laws  for  the  explana- 
tion of  the  world  ; it  does  not  involve  the  assertion  of  an 
existence  necessary  by  itself.  It  is  impossible,  however, 
at  the  same  time,  to  escape  from  a transcendental  subrep- 
tio,  which  leads  us  to  represent  that  formal  principle  as 
constitutive,  and  to  think  that  unity  as  hypostasised.  It 
is  the  same  with  space.  Space,  though  it  is  only  a prin- 
ciple of  sensibility,  yet  serves  originally  to  make  all  forms 
possible,  these  being  only  limitations  of  it.  For  that  very 
reason,  however,  it  is  mistaken  for  something  absolutely 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


499 


necessary  and  independent,  nay,  for  an  object  a priori 
existing  in  itself.  It  is  the  same  here,  and  as  this  sys- 
tematical unity  of  nature  can  in  no  wise  become  the 
principle  of  the  empirical  use  of  our  reason,  unless  we 
base  it  on  the  idea  of  an  ens  realissimum  as  the  highest 
cause,  it  happens  quite  naturally  that  we  thus  represent 
that  idea  as  a real  object,  and  that  object  again,  as  it  is 
the  highest  condition,  as  necessary.  Thus  a regulative 
principle  has  been  changed  into  a constitutive  [p.  620] 
principle,  which  substitution  becomes  evident  at  once 
because,  as  soon  as  I consider  that  highest  Being,  which 
with  regard  to  the  world  was  absolutely  (unconditionally) 
necessary,  as  a thing  by  itself,  that  necessity  cannot  be 
conceived,  and  can  therefore  have  existed  in  my  reason 
as  a formal  condition  of  thought  only,  and  not  as  a 
material  and  substantial  condition  of  existence. 

THE  IDEAL  OF  PURE  REASON 
Section  VI 

Of  the  Impossibility  of  the  P hysico-theological  Proof 

If,  then,  neither  the  concept  of  things  in  general,  nor 
the  experience  of  any  existence  in  general,  can  satisfy  our 
demands,  there  still  remains  one  way  open,  namely,  to  try 
whether  any  definite  experience,  and  consequently  that  of 
things  in  the  world  as  it  is,  their  constitution  and  dis- 
position, may  not  supply  a proof  which  could  give  us  the 
certain  conviction  of  the  existence  of  a Supreme  Being. 
Such  a proof  we  should  call  physico-theological.  If  that, 
however,  should  prove  impossible  too,  then  it  is  clear 
that  no  satisfactory  proof  whatever,  from  merely  specula- 


500 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


tive  reason,  is  possible,  in  support  of  the  existence  of  a 
Being,  corresponding  to  our  transcendental  idea. 

After  what  has  been  said  already,  it  will  be  [p.  621] 
easily  understood  that  we  may  expect  an  easy  and  com- 
plete answer  to  this  question.  For  how  could  there  ever 
be  an  experience  that  should  be  adequate  to  an  idea?  It 
is  the  very  nature  of  an  idea  that  no  experience  can  ever 
be  adequate  to  it.  The  transcendental  idea  of  a necessary 
and  all-sufficient  original  Being  is  so  overwhelming,  so 
high  above  everything  empirical,  which  is  always  condi- 
tioned, that  we  can  never  find  in  experience  enough  mate- 
rial to  fill  such  a concept,  and  can  only  grope  about  among 
things  conditioned,  looking  in  vain  for  the  unconditioned, 
of  which  no  rule  of  any  empirical  synthesis  can  ever  give 
us  an  example,  or  even  show  the  way  towards  it. 

If  the  highest  Being  should  stand  itself  in  that  chain  of 
conditions,  it  would  be  a link  in  the  series,  and  would, 
exactly  like  the  lower  links,  above  which  it  is  placed, 
require  further  investigation  with  regard  to  its  own  still 
higher  cause.  If,  on  the  contrary,  we  mean  to  separate  it 
from  that  chain,  and,  as  a purely  intelligible  Being,  not 
comprehend  it  in  the  series  of  natural  causes,  what  bridge 
is  then  open  for  reason  to  reach  it,  considering  that  all 
rules  determining  the  transition  from  effect  to  cause,  nay, 
all  synthesis  and  extension  of  our  knowledge  in  general, 
refer  to  nothing  but  possible  experience,  and  therefore  to 
the  objects  of  the  world  of  sense  only,  and  are  [p.  622] 
valid  nowhere  else  ? 

This  present  world  presents  to  us  so  immeasurable  a 
stage  of  variety,  order,  fitness,  and  beauty,  whether  we 
follow  it  up  in  the  infinity  of  space  or  in  its  unlimited 
division,  that  even  with  the  little  knowledge  which  our 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


501 

poor  understanding  has  been  able  to  gather,  all  language, 
with  regard  to  so  many  and  inconceivable  wonders,  loses 
its  vigour,  all  numbers  their  power  of  measuring,  and  all 
our  thoughts  their  necessary  determination  ; so  that  our 
judgment  of  the  whole  is  lost  in  a speechless,  but  all  the 
more  eloquent  astonishment.  Everywhere  we  see  a chain 
of  causes  and  effects,  of  means  and  ends,  of  order  in  birth 
and  death,  and  as  nothing  has  entered  by  itself  into  the 
state  in  which  we  find  it,  all  points  to  another  thing  as 
its  cause.  As  that  cause  necessitates  the  same  further 
enquiry,  the  whole  universe  would  thus  be  lost  in  the 
abyss  of  nothing,  unless  we  admitted  something  which, 
existing  by  itself,  original  and  independent,  outside  the 
chain  of  infinite  contingencies,  should  support  it,  and,  as 
the  cause  of  its  origin,  secure  to  it  at  the  same  time  its 
permanence.  Looking  at  all  the  things  in  the  world, 
what  greatness  shall  we  attribute  to  that  highest  cause  ? 
We  do  not  know  the  whole  contents  of  the  world,  still  less 
can  we  measure  its  magnitude  by  a comparison  [p.  623] 
with  all  that  is  possible.  But,  as  with  regard  to  causality, 
we  cannot  do  without  a last  and  highest  Being,  why 
should  we  not  fix  the  degree  of  its  perfection  beyond  every- 
thing else  that  is  possible  ? This  we  can  easily  do,  though 
only  in  the  faint  outline  of  an  abstract  concept,  if  we 
represent  to  ourselves  all  possible  perfections  united  in 
it  as  in  one  substance.  Such  a concept  would  agree  with 
the  demand  of  our  reason,  which  requires  parsimony  in 
the  number  of  principles  ; it  would  have  no  contradictions 
in  itself,  would  be  favourable  to  the  extension  of  the 
employment  of  reason  in  the  midst  of  experience,  by 
guiding  it  towards  order  and  system,  and  lastly,  would 
never  be  decidedly  opposed  to  any  experience. 


502  Transcendental  Dialectic 

This  proof  will  always  deserve  to  be  treated  with  respect 
It  is  the  oldest,  the  clearest,  and  most  in  conformity 
with  human  reason.  It  gives  life  to  the  study  of  nature, 
deriving  its  own  existence  from  it,  and  thus  constantly 
acquiring  new  vigour. 

It  reveals  aims  and  intention,  where  our  own  obser- 
vation would  not  by  itself  have  discovered  them,  and 
enlarges  our  knowledge  of  nature  by  leading  us  towards 
that  peculiar  unity  the  principle  of  which  exists  outside 
nature.  This  knowledge  reacts  again  on  its  cause,  namely, 
the  transcendental  idea,  and  thus  increases  the  [p.  624] 
belief  in  a supreme  Author  to  an  irresistible  conviction. 

It  would  therefore  be  not  only  extremely  sad,  but 
utterly  vain  to  attempt  to  diminish  the  authority  of  that 
proof.  Reason,  constantly  strengthened  by  the  powerful 
arguments  that  come  to  hand  by  themselves,  though  they 
are  no  doubt  empirical  only,  cannot  be  discouraged  by  any 
doubts  of  subtle  and  abstract  speculation.  Roused  from 
every  inquisitive  indecision,  as  from  a dream,  by  one 
glance  at  the  wonders  of  nature  and  the  majesty  of  the 
cosmos,  reason  soars  from  height  to  height  till  it  reaches 
the  highest,  from  the  conditioned  to  conditions,  till  it 
reaches  the  supreme  and  unconditioned  Author  of  all. 

But  although  we  have  nothing  to  say  against  the 
reasonableness  and  utility  of  this  line  of  argument, 
but  wish,  on  the  contrary,  to  commend  and  encourage 
it,  we  cannot  approve  of  the  claims  which  this  proof 
advances  to  apodictic  certainty,  and  to  an  approval  on 
its  own  merits,  requiring  no  favour,  and  no  help  from 
any  other  quarter.  It  cannot  injure  the  good  cause,  if 
the  dogmatical  language  of  the  overweening  sophist  is 
toned  down  to  the  moderate  and  modest  statements  of 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


503 


a faith  which  does  not  require  unconditioned  submission, 
yet  is  sufficient  to  give  rest  and  comfort.  I therefore 
maintain  that  the  physico-theological  proof  can  never 
establish  by  itself  alone  the  existence  of  a [p.  625] 
Supreme  Being,  but  must  always  leave  it  to  the  ontolog- 
ical proof  (to  which  it  serves  only  as  an  introduction), 
to  supply  its  deficiency  ; so  that,  after  all,  it  is  the  onto- 
logical proof  which  contains  the  only  possible  argument 
(supposing  always  that  any  speculative  proof  is  possible), 
and  human  reason  can  never  do  without  it. 

The  principal  points  of  the  physico-theological  proof 
are  the  following.  1st.  There  are  everywhere  in  the 
world  clear  indications  of  an  intentional  arrangement 
carried  out  with  great  wisdom,  and  forming  a whole 
indescribably  varied  in  its  contents  and  infinite  in  extent. 

2ndly.  The  fitness  of  this  arrangement  is  entirely 
foreign  to  the  things  existing  in  the  world,  and  belongs 
to  them  contingently  only  ; that  is,  the  nature  of  differ- 
ent things  could  never  spontaneously,  by  the  combina- 
tion of  so  many  means,  co-operate  towards  definite  aims, 
if  these  means  had  not  been  selected  and  arranged  on 
purpose  by  a rational  disposing  principle,  according  to 
certain  fundamental  ideas. 

3rdly.  There  exists,  therefore,  a sublime  and  wise  cause 
(or  many),  which  must  be  the  cause  of  the  world,  not  only 
as  a blind  and  all-powerful  nature,  by  means  of  uncon- 
scious fecundity , but  as  an  intelligence,  by  freedom. 

4thly.  The  unity  of  that  cause  may  be  inferred  with 
certainty  from  the  unity  of  the  reciprocal  rela-  [p.  626] 
tion  of  the  parts  of  the  world,  as  portions  of  a skilful  edi- 
fice, so  far  as  our  experience  reaches,  and  beyond  it,  with 
plausibility,  according  to  the  principles  of  analogy. 


504 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


Without  wishing  to  argue,  for  the  sake  of  argument 
only,  with  natural  reason,  as  to  its  conclusion  in  inferring 
from  the  analogy  of  certain  products  of  nature  with  the 
works  of  human  art,  in  which  man  does  violence  to  nature, 
and  forces  it  not  to  follow  its  own  aims,  but  to  adapt  it- 
self to  ours  (that  is,  from  the  similarity  of  certain  products 
of  nature  with  houses,  ships,  and  watches),  in  inferring 
from  this,  I say,  that  a similar  causality,  namely,  under- 
standing and  will,  must  be  at  the  bottom  of  nature,  and 
in  deriving  the  internal  possibility  of  a freely  acting  nature 
(which,  it  may  be,  renders  all  human  art  and  even  human 
reason  possible)  from  another  though  superhuman  art  — 
a kind  of  reasoning,  which  probably  could  not  stand  the 
severest  test  of  transcendental  criticism  ; we  are  willing 
to  admit,  nevertheless,  that  if  we  have  to  name  such  a 
cause,  we  cannot  do  better  than  to  follow  the  analogy  of 
such  products  of  human  design,  which  are  the  only  ones 
of  which  we  know  completely  both  cause  and  effect. 
There  would  be  no  excuse,  if  reason  were  to  surrender  a 
causality  which  it  knows,  and  have  recourse  to  obscure 
and  indemonstrable  principles  of  explanation,  which  it 
does  not  know. 

According  to  this  argument,  the  fitness  and  harmony 
existing  in  so  many  works  of  nature  might  prove  [p.  627] 
the  contingency  of  the  form,  but  not  of  the  matter,  that 
is,  the  substance  in  the  world,  because,  for  the  latter  pur- 
pose, it  would  be  necessary  to  prove  in  addition,  that  the 
things  of  the  world  were  in  themselves  incapable  of  such 
order  and  harmony,  according  to  general  laws,  unless 
there  existed,  even  in  their  substance,  the  product  of  a 
supreme  wisdom.  For  this  purpose,  very  different  argu- 
ments would  be  required  from  those  derived  from  the 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


505 


analogy  of  human  art.  The  utmost,  therefore,  that  could 
be  established  by  such  a proof  would  be  an  architect  oj 
the  world , always  very  much  hampered  by  the  quality  of 
the  material  with  which  he  has  to  work,  not  a creator , 
to  whose  idea  everything  is  subject.  This  would  by  no 
means  suffice  for  the  purposed  aim  of  proving  an  all- 
sufficient  original  Being.  If  we  wished  to  prove  the  con- 
tingency of  matter  itself,  we  must  have  recourse  to  a 
transcendental  argument,  and  this  is  the  very  thing  which 
was  to  be  avoided. 

The  inference,  therefore,  really  proceeds  from  the  order 
and  design  that  can  everywhere  be  observed  in  the  world, 
as  an  entirely  contingent  arrangement,  to  the  existence  of 
a cause,  proportionate  to  it.  The  concept  of  that  cause 
must  therefore  teach  us  something  quite  definite  about  it, 
and  can  therefore  be  no  other  concept  but  that  of  a Being 
which  possesses  all  might,  wisdom,  etc.,  in  one  word, 
all  perfection  of  an  all-sufficient  Being.  The  [p.  628] 
predicates  of  a very  great,  of  an  astounding,  of  an  immeas- 
urable might  and  virtue  give  us  no  definite  concept,  and 
never  tell  us  really  what  the  thing  is  by  itself.  They  are 
only  relative  representations  of  the  magnitude  of  an  object, 
which  the  observer  (of  the  world)  compares  with  himself 
and  his  own  power  of  comprehension,  and  which  would  be 
equally  grand,  whether  we  magnify  the  object,  or  reduce 
the  observing  subject  to  smaller  proportions  in  reference 
to  it.  Where  we  are  concerned  with  the  magnitude  (of 
the  perfection)  of  a thing  in  general,  there  exists  no  defi- 
nite concept,  except  that  which  comprehends  all  possible 
perfection,  and  only  the  all  ( omnitudo ) of  reality  is  thor- 
oughly determined  in  the  concept. 

Now  I hope  that  no  one  would  dare  to  comprehend  the 


506 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


relation  of  that  part  of  the  world  which  he  has  observed 
(in  its  extent  as  well  as  in  its  contents)  to  omnipotence, 
the  relation  of  the  order  of  the  world  to  the  highest  wis- 
dom,  and  the  relation  of  the  unity  of  the  world  to  the  abso- 
lute unity  of  its  author,  etc.  Physico-theology,  therefore, 
can  never  give  a definite  concept  of  the  highest  cause  of 
the  world,  and  is  insufficient,  therefore,  as  a principle  of 
theology,  which  is  itself  to  form  the  basis  of  religion. 

The  step  leading  to  absolute  totality  is  entirely  impos- 
sible on  the  empirical  road.  Nevertheless,  that  step  is 
taken  in  the  physico-theological  proof.  How  then  has  this 
broad  abyss  been  bridged  over  ? [p.  629] 

The  fact  is  that,  after  having  reached  the  stage  of  ad- 
miration of  the  greatness,  the  wisdom,  the  power,  etc.  of 
the  Author  of  the  world,  and  seeing  no  further  advance 
possible,  one  suddenly  leaves  the  argument  carried  on  by 
empirical  proofs,  and  lays  hold  of  that  contingency  which, 
from  the  very  first,  was  inferred  from  the  order  and  design 
of  the  world.  The  next  step  from  that  contingency  leads, 
by  means  of  transcendental  concepts  only,  to  the  existence 
of  something  absolutely  necessary,  and  another  step  from 
the  absolute  necessity  of  the  first  cause  to  its  completely 
determined  or  determining  concept,  namely,  that  of  an  all- 
embracing  reality.  Thus  we  see  that  the  physico-theolog- 
ical proof,  baffled  in  its  own  undertaking,  takes  suddenly 
refuge  in  the  cosmological  proof,  and  as  this  is  only  the 
ontological  proof  in  disguise,  it  really  carries  out  its  orig- 
inal intention  by  means  of  pure  reason  only  ; though  it  sc 
strongly  disclaimed  in  the  beginning  all  connection  with 
it,  and  professed  to  base  everything  on  clear  proofs  from 
experience. 

Those  who  adopt  the  physico-theological  argument  have 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


507 


no  reason  to  be  so  very  coy  towards  the  transcendental 
mode  of  argument,  and  with  the  conceit  of  enlightened 
observers  of  nature  to  look  down  upon  them  as  the  cob- 
webs of  dark  speculators.  If  they  would  only  examine 
themselves,  they  would  find  that,  after  they  had  advanced 
a good  way  on  the  soil  of  nature  and  experience,  and 
found  themselves  nevertheless  as  much  removed  [p.  630] 
as  ever  from  the  object  revealed  to  their  reason,  they 
suddenly  leave  that  soil,  to  enter  into  the  realm  of  pure 
possibilities,  where  on  the  wings  of  ideas  they  hope  to 
reach  that  which  had  withdrawn  itself  from  all  their 
empirical  investigations.  Imagining  themselves  to  be  on 
firm  ground  after  that  desperate  leap,  they  now  proceed  to 
expand  the  definite  concept  which  they  have  acquired,  they 
do  not  know  how,  over  the  whole  field  of  creation ; and 
they  explain  the  ideal,  which  was  merely  a product  of 
pure  reason,  by  experience,  though  in  a very  poor  way,  and 
totally  beneath  the  dignity  of  the  object,  refusing  all  the 
while  to  admit  that  they  have  arrived  at  that  knowledge 
or  supposition  by  a very  different  road  from  that  of  expe- 
rience. 

Thus  we  have  seen  that  the  physico-theological  proof 
rests  on  the  cosmological,  and  the  cosmological  on  the 
ontological  proof  of  the  existence  of  one  original  Being  as 
the  Supreme  Being ; and,  as  besides  these  three,  there  is 
no  other  path  open  to  speculative  reason,  the  ontological 
proof,  based  exclusively  on  pure  concepts  of  reason,  is  the 
only  possible  one,  always  supposing  that  any  proof  of  a 
proposition,  so  far  transcending  the  empirical  use  of  the 
understanding,  is  possible  at  all. 


I 

508  Transcendental  Dialectic 

THE  IDEAL  OF  PURE  REASON  [p.  631] 
Section  VII 

Criticism  of  all  Theology  based  on  Speculative  Principles 

of  Reason 

If  by  Theology  we  understand  the  knowledge  of  the 
original  Being,  it  is  derived  either  from  reason  only  ( theo - 
logia  rationalis ),  or  from  revelation  ( revelata ).  The  for- 
mer thinks  its  object  either  by  pure  reason  and  through 
transcendental  concepts  only  (ens  originarium,  realissimum, 
ens  entium),  and  is  then  called  transcendental  theology,  or 
by  a concept,  borrowed  from  the  nature  (of  our  soul),  as 
the  highest  intelligence,  and  ought  then  to  be  called  natural 
theology.  Those  who  admit  a transcendental  theology  only 
are  called  Deists , those  who  admit  also  a natural  theology 
Theists.  The  former  admit  that  we  may  know  the  exist- 
ence of  an  original  Being  by  mere  reason,  but  that  our 
concept  of  it  is  transcendental  only,  as  of  a Being  which 
possesses  all  reality,  but  a reality  that  cannot  be  further 
determined.  The  latter  maintain  that  reason  is  capable  of 
determining  that  object  more  accurately  in  analogy  with 
nature,  namely,  as  a Being  which,  through  understanding 
and  freedom,  contains  within  itself  the  original  ground  of 
all  other  things.  The  former  admits  a cause  of  the  [p.632] 
world  only  (whether  through  the  necessity  of  its  nature  or 
through  freedom,  remains  undecided),  the  latter  an  author 
of  the  world. 

Transcendental  theology,  again,  either  derives  the  exist- 
ence of  the  original  Being  from  an  experience  in  general 
(without  saying  anything  about  the  world,  to  which  it  be- 
longs), and  is  then  called  Cosmotheology ; or  it  believes 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


509 


that  it  can  know  its  existence,  without  the  help  of  any  ex- 
perience whatsoever,  and  by  mere  concepts,  and  is  then 
called  Ontotheology. 

Natural  theology  infers  the  qualities  and  the  existence 
of  an  author  of  the  world  from  the  constitution,  the  order, 
and  the  unity,  which  are  seen  in  this  world,  in  which  two 
kinds  of  causality  with  their  rules  must  be  admitted,  namely, 
nature  and  freedom.  It  ascends  from  this  world  to  the 
highest  intelligence  as  the  principle  either  of  all  natural  or 
of  all  moral  order  and  perfection.  In  the  former  case  it 
is  called  Physico-theology,  in  the  other  Ethico-theology } 

As  we  are  accustomed  to  understand  by  the  concept  of 
God,  not  only  a blindly  working  eternal  nature,  as  the  root 
of  all  things,  but  a Supreme  Being,  which,  through  under- 
standing and  freedom,  is  supposed  to  be  the  [p.  633] 
author  of  all  things,  and  as  it  is  this  concept  alone  in 
which  we  really  take  an  interest,  one  might  strictly  deny 
to  the  Deist  all  belief  in  God,  and  allow  him  only  the 
maintaining  of  an  original  Being,  or  a supreme  cause. 
But  as  no  one,  simply  because  he  does  not  dare  to  assert, 
ought  to  be  accused  of  denying  a thing,  it  is  kinder  and 
juster  to  say,  that  the  Deist  believes  in  a God,  but  the 
Theist  in  a living  God  ( summa  intelligentia).  We  shall 
now  try  to  discover  the  possible  sources  of  all  these 
attempts  of  reason. 

I shall  not  do  more,  at  present,  than  define  theoretical 
knowledge  as  one  by  which  I know  what  there  is,  practical 
knowledge  as  one  by  which  I represent  to  myself  what 
ought  to  be.  Hence  the  theoretical  use  of  reason  is  that 

1 Not  theological  Ethics;  for  these  contain  moral  laws,  which  presuppose 
the  existence  of  a supreme  ruler  of  the  world,  while  Ethico-theology  is  the 
conviction  of  the  existence  of  a Supreme  Being,  founded  on  moral  laws. 


5io 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


by  which  I know  a priori  (as  necessary)  that  something  is, 
while  the  practical  use  of  reason  is  that  by  which  I know 
a priori  what  ought  to  be.  If  then  it  is  certain,  beyond 
the  possibility  of  doubt,  that  something  is,  or  that  some- 
thing ought  to  be,  though  both  are  conditioned,  then  a 
certain  definite  condition  of  it  may  be  either  absolutely 
necessary  or  presupposed  only  as  possible  and  contingent. 
In  the  former  case,  the  condition  is  postulated  {per  the  sin), 
in  the  latter  supposed  {per  hypothesin).  As  there  are 
practical  laws,  which  are  absolutely  necessary  (the  moral 
laws),  it  follows,  if  they  necessarily  presuppose  [p.  634] 
any  existence  as  the  condition  of  the  possibility  of  their 
obligatory  power,  that  the  existence  of  that  condition  must 
be  postulated , because  the  conditioned,  from  which  we  infer 
that  condition,  has  been  recognised  a priori  as  absolutely 
necessary.  On  a future  occasion  we  shall  show  that  the 
moral  laws  not  only  presuppose  the  existence  of  a Supreme 
Being,  but  that,  as  they  are  in  other  respects  absolutely 
necessary,  they  postulate  it  by  right,  though  of  course 
practically  only.  For  the  present  we  leave  this  mode  of 
argument  untouched. 

If  we  only  speak  of  that  which  is,  not  of  that  which 
ought  to  be,  the  conditioned  given  to  us  in  experience  is 
always  conceived  as  contingent,  and  the  condition  belong- 
ing to  it  can  therefore  not  be  known  as  absolutely  neces- 
sary, but  serves  only  as  a relatively  necessary,  or  rather 
needful,  though  in  itself  an  a priori  arbitrary  supposition 
for  a rational  understanding  of  the  conditioned.  If,  there- 
fore, we  wish  to  know  in  our  theoretical  knowledge  the 
absolute  necessity  of  a thing,  this  could  only  be  done  from 
concepts  a priori,  and  never  as  of  a cause  in  reference  to 
an  existence  which  is  given  in  experience. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


5i  i 

I call  a theoretical  knowledge  speculative , if  it  relates  to 
an  object,  or  such  concepts  of  an  object,  which  we  can 
never  reach  in  any  experience.  It  is  opposed  to  our  know- 
ledge of  nature,  which  relates  to  no  other  objects  [p.  635] 
or  predicates  of  them  except  those  that  can  be  given  in  a 
possible  experience. 

From  something  that  happens  (the  empirically  contin- 
gent) as  an  effect,  to  infer  a cause,  is  a principle  of  natural, 
though  not  of  speculative  knowledge.  For  if  we  no  longer 
use  it  as  a principle  involving  the  condition  of  possible 
experience,  and,  leaving  out  everything  that  is  empirical, 
try  to  apply  it  to  the  contingent  in  general,  there  does  not 
remain  the  smallest  justification  of  such  a synthetical  prop- 
osition, showing  how  from  something  which  is,  there  can 
be  a transition  to  something  totally  different,  which  we 
call  cause ; nay,  in  such  purely  speculative  application,  the 
concepts  both  of  cause  and  of  the  contingent  lose  all 
meaning,  the  objective  reality  of  which  would  be  made 
intelligible  in  the  concrete. 

If  from  the  existence  of  things  in  the  world  we  infer 
their  cause,  we  are  using  reason  not  naturally,  but  specu- 
latively. Naturally,  reason  refers  not  the  things  them- 
selves (substances;,  but  only  that  which  happens,  their 
states,  as  empirically  contingent,  to  some  cause ; but  it 
could  know  speculatively  only  that  a substance  itself 
(matter)  is  contingent  in  its  existence.  And  even  if  we 
were  thinking  only  of  the  form  of  the  world,  the  [p.  636] 
manner  of  its  composition  and  the  change  of  this  composi- 
tion, and  tried  to  infer  from  this  a cause  totally  different 
from  the  world,  this  would  be  again  a judgment  of  specula- 
tive reason  only;  because  the  object  here  is  not  an  object 
of  any  possible  experience.  In  this  case  the  principle  of 


512 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


causality,  which  is  valid  within  the  field  of  experience  only, 
and  utterly  useless,  nay,  even  meaningless,  outside  it, 
would  be  totally  diverted  from  its  proper  destination. 

What  I maintain  then  is,  that  all  attempts  at  a purely 
speculative  use  of  reason,  with  reference  to  theology,  are 
entirely  useless  and  intrinsically  null  and  void,  while  the 
principles  of  their  natural  use  can  never  lead  to  any  the- 
ology, so  that  unless  we  depend  on  moral  laws,  or  are  guided 
by  them,  there  cannot  be  any  theology  of  reason.  For  all 
synthetical  principles  of  the  understanding  are  applicable 
immanently  only,  i.e.  within  its  own  sphere,  while,  in  order 
to  arrive  at  the  knowledge  of  a Supreme  Being,  we  must 
use  them  transcendentally,  and  for  this  our  understanding 
is  not  prepared.  If  the  empirically  valid  law  of  causality 
is  to  conduct  us  to  the  original  Being,  that  Being  must 
belong  to  the  chain  of  objects  of  experience,  and  in  that  case 
it  would,  like  all  phenomena,  be  itself  conditioned.  And 
even  if  that  sudden  jump  beyond  the  limits  of  [p.  637] 
experience,  according  to  the  dynamical  law  of  the  relation 
of  effects  to  their  causes,  could  be  allowed,  what  concept 
could  we  gain  by  this  proceeding  ? Certainly  no  concept 
of  a Supreme  Being,  because  experience  never  presents  to 
us  the  greatest  of  all  possible  effects,  to  bear  witness  of  its 
cause.  If  we  claim  to  be  allowed,  only  in  order  to  leave 
no  void  in  our  reason,  to  supply  this  defect  in  the  complete 
determination  of  that  cause  by  the  mere  idea  of  the  highest 
perfection  and  of  original  necessity,  this  may  possibly  be 
granted  as  a favour,  but  can  never  be  demanded  on  the 
strength  of  an  irresistible  proof.  The  physico-theological 
proof,  as  connecting  speculation  with  intuition,  might  pos- 
sibly therefore  be  used  in  support  of  other  proofs  (if  they 
existed) ; it  cannot,  however,  finish  the  task  for  itself,  but 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


513 


can  only  prepare  the  understanding  for  theological  know- 
ledge, and  impart  to  it  the  right  and  natural  direction. 

It  must  have  been  seen  from  this  that  transcendental 
questions  admit  of  transcendental  answers  only,  that  is,  of 
such  which  consist  of  mere  concepts  a priori  without  any 
empirical  admixture.  Our  question,  however,  is  clearly 
synthetical,  and  requires  an  extension  of  our  knowledge 
beyond  all  limits  of  experience,  till  it  reaches  the  existence 
of  a Being  which  is  to  correspond  to  our  pure  idea,  though 
no  experience  can  ever  be  adequate  to  it.  Ac-  [p.  638] 
cording  to  our  former  proofs,  all  synthetical  knowledge  a 
priori  is  possible  only,  if  it  conforms  to  the  formal  con- 
ditions of  a possible  experience.  All  these  principles 
therefore  are  of  immanent  validity  only,  that  is,  they  must 
remain  within  the  sphere  of  objects  of  empirical  know- 
ledge, or  of  phenomena.  Nothing,  therefore,  can  be 
achieved  by  a transcendental  procedure  with  reference  to 
the  theology  of  a purely  speculative  reason. 

If  people,  however,  should  prefer  to  call  in  question  all 
the  former  proofs  of  the  Analytic,  rather  than  allow  them- 
selves to  be  robbed  of  their  persuasion  of  the  value  of  the 
proofs  on  which  they  have  rested  so  long,  they  surely  can- 
not decline  my  request,  when  I ask  them  to  justify  them- 
selves, at  least  on  this  point,  in  what  manner,  and  by  what 
kind  of  illumination  they  trust  themselves  to  soar  above 
all  possible  experience,  on  the  wings  of  pure  ideas.  I 
must  ask  to  be  excused  from  listening  to  new  proofs,  or 
to  the  tinkered  workmanship  of  the  old.  No  doubt  the 
choice  is  not  great,  for  all  speculative  proofs  end  in  the 
one,  namely,  the  ontological ; nor  need  I fear  to  be  much 
troubled  by  the  inventive  fertility  of  the  dogmatical  de- 
fenders of  that  reason  which  they  have  delivered  from  the 


514  Transcendental  Dialectic 

bondage  of  the  senses  ; nor  should  I even,  without  con- 
sidering myself  a very  formidable  antagonist,  decline  the 
challenge  to  detect  the  fallacy  in  every  one  of  their 
attempts,  and  thus  to  dispose  of  their  pretensions.  But 
I know  too  well  that  the  hope  of  better  success  [p.  639] 
will  never  be  surrendered  by  those  who  have  once  accus- 
tomed themselves  to  dogmatical  persuasion,  and  I therefore 
restrict  myself  to  the  one  just  demand,  that  my  opponents 
should  explain  in  general,  from  the  nature  of  the  human 
understanding,  or  from  any  other  sources  of  knowledge, 
what  we  are  to  do  in  order  to  extend  our  knowledge  en- 
tirely a priori,  and  to  carry  it  to  a point  where  no  possible 
experience,  and  therefore  no  means  whatever,  is  able  to 
secure  to  a concept  invented  by  ourselves  its  objective 
reality.  In  whatever  way  the  understanding  may  have 
reached  that  concept,  it  is  clearly  impossible  that  the 
existence  of  its  object  could  be  found  in  it  through  anal- 
ysis, because  the  very  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  the 
object  implies  that  it  exists  outside  our  thoughts.  We 
cannot  in  fact  go  beyond  concepts,  nor,  unless  we  follow 
the  empirical  connection  by  which  nothing  but  phenomena 
can  be  given,  hope  to  discover  new  objects  and  imaginary 
beings. 

Although  then  reason,  in  its  purely  speculative  appli- 
cation, is  utterly  insufficient  for  this  great  undertaking, 
namely,  to  prove  the  existence  of  a Supreme  Being,  it  has 
nevertheless  this  great  advantage  of  being  able  to  correct 
our  knowledge  of  it,  if  it  can  be  acquired  from  [p.  640] 
elsewhere,  to  make  it  consistent  with  itself  and  every 
intelligible  view,  and  to  purify  it  from  everything  incom- 
patible with  the  concept  of  an  original  Being,  and  from 
all  admixture  of  empirical  limitations. 


Transcendental  Dialectic  515 

In  spite  of  its  insufficiency,  therefore,  transcendental 
theology  has  a very  important  negative  use,  as  a constant 
test  of  our  reason,  when  occupied  with  pure  ideas  only, 
which,  as  such,  admit  of  a transcendental  standard  only. 
For  suppose  that  on  practical  grounds  the  admission  of 
a highest  and  all-sufficient  Being,  as  the  highest  intelli- 
gence, were  to  maintain  its  validity  without  contradiction, 
it  would  be  of  the  greatest  importance  that  we  should  be 
able  to  determine  that  concept  accurately  on  its  transcen- 
dental side,  as  the  concept  of  a necessary  and  most  real 
Being,  to  remove  from  't  what  is  contradictory  to  that 
highest  reality  and  purely  phenomenal  (anthropomorphic 
in  the  widest  sense),  and  at  the  same  time  to  put  an  end 
to  all  opposite  assertions,  whether  atheistic,  deistic,  or 
anthropomorphistic.  Such  a critical  treatment  would  not 
be  difficult,  because  the  same  arguments  by  which  the 
insufficiency  of  human  reason  in  asserting  the  existence 
of  such  9 Being  has  been  proved,  must  be  sufficient  also 
to  prove  the  invalidity  of  opposite  assertions,  [p.  641] 
For  whence  can  anybody,  through  pure  speculation  of 
reason,  derive  his  knowledge  that  there  is  no  Supreme 
Being,  as  the  cause  of  all  that  exists,  or  that  it  can  claim 
none  of  those  qualities  which  we,  to  judge  from  their 
effects,  represent  to  ourselves  as  compatible  with  the 
dynamical  realities  of  a thinking  Being,  or  that,  in  the 
latter  case,  they  would  be  subject  to  all  those  limitations 
which  sensibility  imposes  inevitably  on  all  the  intelligences 
known  to  us  by  experience  ? 

For  the  purely  speculative  use  of  reason,  therefore,  the 
Supreme  Being  remains,  no  doubt,  an  ideal  only,  but  an 
ideal  without  a flaw , a concept  which  finishes  and  crowns 
the  whole  of  human  knowledge,  and  the  objective  reality 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


516 

of  which,  though  it  cannot  be  proved,  can  neither  be  dis- 
proved in  that  way.  If  then  there  should  be  an  Ethico-the- 
ology  to  supply  that  deficiency,  transcendental  theology, 
which  before  was  problematical  only,  would  prove  itself  in- 
dispensable in  determining  its  concept,  and  in  constantly 
testing  reason,  which  is  so  often  deceived  by  sensibility,  and 
not  even  always  in  harmony  with  its  own  ideas.  Necessity, 
infinity,  unity,  extra-mundane  existence  (not  as  a world- 
soul),  eternity,  free  from  conditions  of  time,  omnipresence, 
free  from  conditions  of  space,  omnipotence,  etc.,  all  these 
are  transcendental  predicates,  and  their  purified  [p.  642] 
concepts,  which  are  so  much  required  for  every  theology, 
can  therefore  be  derived  from  transcendental  theology  only. 

APPENDIX 

to  the  Transcendental  Dialectic 

Of  the  Regulative  Use  of  the  Ideas  of  Pure  Reason 

The  result  of  all  the  dialectical  attempts  of  pure  reason 
does  not  only  confirm  what  we  proved  in  the  transcen- 
dental Analytic,  namely,  that  all  our  conclusions,  which 
are  to  lead  us  beyond  the  field  of  possible  experience, 
are  fallacious  and  groundless,  but  teaches  us  also  this  in 
particular,  that  human  reason  has  a natural  inclination 
to  overstep  these  limits,  and  that  transcendental  ideas  are 
as  natural  to  it  as  categories  to  the  understanding,  with 
this  distinction,  however,  that  while  the  latter  convey 
truth,  that  is,  agreement  of  our  concepts  with  their  ob- 
jects, the  former  produce  merely  an  irresistible  illusion, 
against  which  we  can  defend  ourselves  by  the  severest 
criticism  only. 


Transcendental  Dialectic  517 

Everything  that  is  founded  in  the  nature  of  our  fac- 
ulties must  have  some  purpose,  and  be  in  harmony  with 
the  right  use  of  them,  if  only  we  can  guard  against  a 
certain  misunderstanding  and  discover  their  [p.  643] 
proper  direction.  The  transcendental  ideas,  therefore, 
will  probably  possess  their  own  proper  and,  therefore, 
immanent  use,  although,  if  their  object  is  misunderstood, 
and  they  are  mistaken  for  the  concepts  of  real  things, 
they  may  become  transcendent  in  their  application,  and 
hence  deceptive.  For  not  the  idea  in  itself,  but  its  use 
only  can,  in  regard  to  the  whole  of  possible  experience, 
be  either  transcendent  or  immanent,  according  as  we  direct 
them  either  immediately  to  objects  wrongly  supposed  to 
correspond  to  them,  or  only  to  the  use  of  the  understand- 
ing in  general  with  reference  to  objects  with  which  it  has 
a right  to  deal.  All  the  faults  of  subreptio  are  to  be 
attributed  to  a want  of  judgment,  never  to  the  under- 
standing or  to  reason  themselves. 

Reason  never  refers  immediately  to  an  object,  but  to 
the  understanding  only,  and  through  it  to  its  own  empiri- 
cal use.  It  does  not  form,  therefore,  concepts  of  objects, 
but  arranges  them  only,  and  imparts  to  them  that  unity 
which  they  can  have  in  their  greatest  possible  extension, 
that  is,  with  reference  to  the  totality  of  different  series ; 
while  the  understanding  does  not  concern  itself  with  this 
totality,  but  only  with  that  connection  through  which 
such  series  of  conditions  become  possible  according  to 
concepts.  Reason  has  therefore  for  its  object  [p.  644] 
the  understanding  only  and  its  fittest  employment ; and, 
as  the  understanding  brings  unity  into  the  manifold  of  the 
objects  by  means  of  concepts,  reason  brings  unity  into 
the  manifold  of  concepts  by  means  of  ideas,  making  a 


5 1 8 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


certain  collective  unity  the  aim  of  the  operations  of  the 
understanding,  which  otherwise  is  occupied  with  distribu- 
tive unity  only 

I maintain,  accordingly,  that  transcendental  ideas  ought 
never  to  be  employed  as  constitutive,  so  that  by  them 
concepts  of  certain  objects  should  be  given,  and  that,  if 
they  are  so  employed,  they  are  merely  sophistical  (dia- 
lectic concepts).  They  have,  however,  a most  admirable 
and  indispensably  necessary  regulative  use,  in  directing 
the  understanding  to  a certain  aim,  towards  which  all 
the  lines  of  its  rules  converge  and  which,  though  it  is  an 
idea  only  ( focus  imaginarius),  that  is,  a point  from  which, 
as  lying  completely  outside  the  limits  of  possible  experi- 
ence, the  concepts  of  the  understanding  do  not  in  reality 
proceed,  serves  nevertheless  to  impart  to  them  the  greatest 
unity  and  the  greatest  extension.  Hence  there  arises,  no 
doubt,  the  illusion,  as  if  those  lines  sprang1  from  an  ob- 
ject itself,  outside  the  field  of  empirically  possible  experi- 
ence (as  objects  are  seen  behind  the  surface  of  a mirror) ; 
but  this  illusion  (by  which  we  need  not  allow  ourselves  to 
be  deceived)  is  nevertheless  indispensably  necessary,  if, 
besides  the  objects  which  lie  before  our  eyes,  [p.  645] 
we  want  to  see  those  also  which  lie  far  away  at  our  back, 
that  is  to  say,  if,  as  in  our  case,  we  wish  to  direct  the 
understanding  beyond  every  given  experience  (as  a part 
of  the  whole  of  possible  experience),  and  thus  to  its 
greatest  possible,  or  extremest  extension. 

If  we  review  the  entire  extent  of  our  knowledge  sup- 
plied to  us  by  the  understanding,  we  shall  find  that  it 
is  the  systematising  of  that  knowledge,  that  is,  its  cohe- 


1 Read  ausgeschosscn. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


519 


rence  according  to  one  principle,  which  forms  the  propev 
province  of  reason.  This  unity  of  reason  always  presup- 
poses an  idea,  namely,  that  of  the  form  of  a whole  of  our 
knowledge,  preceding  the  definite  knowledge  of  its  parts, 
and  containing  the  conditions  according  to  which  we  are  to 
determine  a priori  the  place  of  every  part  and  its  relation  to 
the  rest.  Such  an  idea  accordingly  demands  the  complete 
unity  of  the  knowledge  of  our  understanding,  by  which 
that  knowledge  becomes  not  only  a mere  aggregate  but 
a system,  connected  according  to  necessary  laws.  We 
ought  not  to  say  that  such  an  idea  is  a concept  of  an 
object,  but  only  of  the  complete  unity  of  concepts,  so  far 
as  that  unity  can  serve  as  a rule  of  the  understanding. 
Such  concepts  of  reason  are  not  derived  from  nature,  but 
we  only  interrogate  nature,  according  to  these  ideas,  and 
consider  our  knowledge  as  defective  so  long  as  it  is  not 
adequate  to  them.  We  must  confess  that  [p.  646] 
pure  earth,  pure  water,  pure  air,  etc.,  are  hardly  to  be  met 
with.  Nevertheless  we  require  the  concepts  of  them 
(which,  so  far  as  their  perfect  purity  is  concerned,  have 
their  origin  in  reason  only)  in  order  to  be  able  to  deter- 
mine properly  the  share  which  belongs  to  every  one  of 
these  natural  causes  in  phenomena.  Thus  every  kind  of 
matter  is  referred  to  earths  (as  mere  weight),  to  salts  and 
inflammable  bodies  (as  force),  and  lastly,  to  water  and  air 
as  vehicles  (or,  as  it  were,  machines,  by  which  the  former 
exercise  their  operations),  in  order  thus,  according  to  the 
idea  of  a mechanism,  to  explain  the  mutual  chemical 
workings  of  matter.  For,  although  not  openly  acknow- 
ledged in  these  terms,  such  an  influence  of  reason  on  the 
classifications  of  natural  philosophers  can  easily  be  dis- 
covered. 


520 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


If  reason  is  the  faculty  of  deducing  the  particular  from 
the  general,  the  general  is  either  certain  in  itself  and 
given,  or  not.  In  the  former  case  nothing  is  required 
but  judgment  in  subsuming,  the  particular  being  thus 
necessarily  determined  by  the  general.  This  I shall  call 
the  apodictic  use  of  reason.  In  the  latter  case,  when  the 
general  is  admitted  as  problematical  only,  and  as  a mere 
idea,  while  the  particular  is  certain,  but  the  universality 
of  the  rule  applying  to  it  is  still  a problem,  several  par- 
ticular cases,  which  are  all  certain,  are  tested  by  the  rule, 
whether  they  submit  to  it ; and  in  this  case,  when  it 
appears  that  all  particular  cases  which  can  be  produced 
are  subjected  to  it,  the  rule  is  concluded  to  be  [p.  647] 
universal,  and  from  that  universality  of  the  rule  conclu- 
sions are  drawn  afterwards  with  regard  to  all  cases,  even 
those  that  are  not  given  by  themselves.  This  I shall  call 
the  hypothetical  use  of  reason. 

The  hypothetical  use  of  reason,  resting  on  ideas  as 
problematical  concepts,  ought  not  to  be  used  constitutively , 
as  if  we  could  prove  by  it,  judging  strictly,  the  truth  of 
the  universal  rule,  which  has  been  admitted  as  an  hypothe- 
sis. For  how  are  we  to  know  all  possible  cases,  which,  as 
subject  to  the  same  principle,  should  prove  its  universality  ? 
The  proper  hypothetical  use  of  reason  is  regulative  only, 
and  intended  to  introduce,  as  much  as  possible,  unity  into 
the  particulars  of  knowledge,  and  thus  to  approximate  the 
rule  to  universality. 

The  hypothetical  use  of  reason  aims  therefore  at  the 
systematical  unity  of  the  knowledge  of  the  understanding, 
and  that  unity  is  the  touchstone  of  the  truth  of  the  rules. 
On  the  other  hand,  that  systematical  unity  (as  a mere  idea) 
is  only  a projected  unity,  to  be  considered,  not  as  given  in 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


5 2i 


itself,  but  as  a problem  only,  though  helping  us  to  dis- 
cover a principle  for  the  manifold  and  particular  exercise 
of  the  understanding,  and  thus  to  lead  the  understanding 
to  cases  also  which  are  not  given,  and  to  render  it  more 
systematical. 

We  have  learnt,  therefore,  that  the  systematical  unity, 
introduced  by  reason  into  the  manifold  know-  [p.  648] 
ledge  of  the  understanding,  is  a logical  principle,  intended 
to  help  the  understanding  by  means  of  ideas,  where  by  it- 
self it  is  insufficient  to  establish  rules,  and  at  the  same 
time  to  impart  to  the  variety  of  its  rules  a certain  harmony 
(or  system  according  to  principles),  and  by  it  a certain  co- 
herence, so  far  as  that  is  possible.  To  say,  however, 
whether  the  nature  of  the  objects  or  the  nature  of  the 
understanding  which  recognises  them  as  objects,  were  in 
themselves  intended  for  systematical  unity,  and  whether 
to  a certain  extent  we  may  postulate  real  unity  a priori, 
without  any  reference  to  the  peculiar  interest  of  reason, 
maintaining  that  all  possible  kinds  of  knowledge  of  the 
understanding  (therefore  the  empirical  also)  possess  such 
unity  and  are  subject  to  such  general  principles  from  which, 
in  spite  of  their  differences,  they  can  all  be  derived,  would 
be  to  apply  a transcendental  principle  of  reason,  and  to 
render  systematical  unity  necessary,  not  only  subjectively 
and  logically  as  a method,  but  objectively  also. 

We  shall  try  to  illustrate  this  use  of  reason  by  an  ex- 
ample. One  of  the  different  kinds  of  unity,  according  to 
the  concepts  of  the  understanding,  is  that  of  the  causality 
of  a substance,  which  we  call  power.  The  different  mani- 
festations of  one  and  the  same  substance  display  at  first 
so  much  diversity  that  one  feels  constrained  to  admit  at 
first  almost  as  many  powers  as  there  are  effects.  Thus 


522 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


we  see,  for  instance,  in  the  human  mind  sensa-  [p.  6497 
tion,  consciousness,  imagination,  memory,  wit,  discrimina 
tion,  pleasure,  desire,  etc.  At  first  a simple  logical  maxim 
tells  us  to  reduce  this  apparent  diversity  as  much  as 
possible  by  discovering,  through  comparison,  hidden  iden- 
tity, and  finding  out,  for  instance,  whether  imagination 
connected  with  consciousness,  be  not  memory,  wit,  dis- 
crimination, or,  it  may  be,  understanding  and  reason. 
The  idea  of  a fundamental  power,  of  which  logic  knows 
nothing  as  to  its  existence,  is  thus  at  least  the  problem  of 
a systematical  representation  of  the  existing  diversity  of 
powers.  The  logical  principle  of  reason  requires  us  to 
produce  this  unity  as  far  as  possible,  and  the  more  we 
find  that  manifestations  of  one  or  the  other  power  are 
identical,  the  more  probable  does  it  become  that  they  are 
only  different  expressions  of  one  and  the  same  power 
which,  relatively  speaking,  may  be  called  their  funda- 
mental power.  The  same  is  done  with  the  others. 

These  relatively  fundamental  powers  must  again  be 
compared  with  each  other,  in  order,  if  possible,  by  dis- 
covering their  harmony,  to  bring  them  nearer  to  one  only 
radical,  that  is,  absolute  fundamental  power.  Such  a 
unity,  however,  is  only  an  hypothesis  of  reason.  It  is  not 
maintained  that  such  a unity  must  really  exist,  but  only 
that  we  must  look  for  it  in  the  interest  of  reason,  that  is, 
for  the  establishment  of  certain  principles  for  the  various 
rules  supplied  to  us  by  experience,  and  thus  introduce,  if 
it  is  possible,  systematical  unity  into  our  know-  [p.  650] 
ledge. 

If,  however,  we  watch  the  transcendental  use  of  the 
understanding,  we  find  that  the  idea  of  a fundamental 
power  is  not  only  meant  as  a problem,  and  for  hypotheti- 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


523 


cal  use,  but  claims  for  itself  objective  reality,  postulating 
the  systematical  unity  of  the  diverse  powers  of  a sub- 
stance, and  thus  establishing  an  apodictic  principle  of 
reason.  For  without  even  having  tested  the  harmony  of 
those  diverse  powers,  nay,  even  if  failing  to  discover  it, 
after  repeated  experiments,  we  still  suppose  that  such  a 
unity  exists,  and  this  not  only,  as  in  our  example,  on 
account  of  the  unity  of  the  substance,  but  even  in  cases 
where  very  many,  though  to  a certain  degree  homo- 
geneous, powers  are  seen,  as  in  matter  in  general.  Here, 
too,  reason  presupposes  a systematical  unity  of  diverse 
powers,  because  particular  laws  of  nature  are  subject  to 
more  general  laws,  and  parsimony  in  principles  is  not  only 
considered  as  an  economical  rule  of  reason,  but  as  an 
: essential  law  of  nature. 

And,  indeed,  it  is  difficult  to  understand  how  a logical 
principle  by  which  reason  demands  the  unity  of  rules  can 
exist  without  a transcendental  principle,  by  which  such  a 
e systematical  unity  is  admitted  as  inherent  in  the  objects 
. themselves,  and  as  a priori  necessary.  For  how  could 
reason  in  its  logical  application  presume  to  treat  [p.  651] 
a the  diversity  of  powers  which  we  see  in  nature  as  simply 
J a disguised  unity,  and  to  deduce  it,  as  far  as  possible,  from 
some  fundamental  power,  if  it  were  open  to  reason  to 
s,  admit  equally  the  diversity  of  all  powers,  and  to  look  upon 
is  the  systematical  unity  in  their  derivation  as  contrary  to 
nature  ? In  doing  this  reason  would  run  counter  to  its 
own  destination,  and  propose  as  its  aim  an  idea  contrary 
to  the  constitution  of  nature.  Nor  could  we  say  that 
3e  reason  had  previously,  according  to  its  principles,  deduced 
al  that  unity  from  the  contingent  character  of  nature,  because 
ti  this  law  of  reason,  compelling  her  to  look  for  unity,  is 


524 


Tratiscendental  Dialectic 


necessary,  and  without  it  we  should  have  no  reason  at 
all,  and,  in  the  absence  of  reason,  no  coherent  use  of  the 
understanding,  and,  in  the  absence  of  that,  no  sufficient 
test  of  empirical  truth  ; — on  which  account  we  must  ad- 
mit the  systematical  unity  of  nature  as  objectively  valid 
and  necessary. 

We  find  this  transcendental  presupposition  concealed  in 
the  cleverest  way  in  the  principles  of  philosophers,  though 
they  are  not  aware  of  it,  nor  have  confessed  it  to  them- 
selves. That  all  the  diversities  of  particular  things  do  not 
exclude  identity  of  species,  that  the  various  species  must 
be  treated  as  different  determinations  (varieties)  [p.  652] 
of  a few  genera , and  these  again  of  still  higher  genera ; 
that  therefore  we  ought  to  look  for  a certain  systematical 
unity  of  all  possible  empirical  concepts,  as  derivable  from 
higher  and  more  general  concepts,  this  is  a rule  of  the 
schools  or  a logical  principle  without  which  no  use  of  the 
understanding  would  be  possible  ; for  we  can  only  conclude 
the  particular  from  the  general,  if  the  general  qualities  of 
things  form  the  foundation  on  which  the  particular  quali- 
ties rest. 

That,  however,  there  exists  in  nature  such  a unity,  is 
only  a supposition  of  the  philosophers,  embodied  in  their 
well-known  scholastic  rule,  ‘ entia  praeter  necessitatem  non 
esse  multiplicanda ,’  ‘ beginnings  or  principles  should  not 
be  multiplied  beyond  necessity.’  It  is  implied  in  this, 
that  the  nature  of  things  itself  offers  material  for  the  post- 
ulated unity  of  reason,  and  that  the  apparent  infinite  vari- 
ety ought  not  to  prevent  us  from  supposing  behind  it  the 
existence  of  unity  in  fundamental  properties,  from  which 
all  diversity  is  derived  by  mere  determination  only.  That 
unity,  though  it  is  an  idea  only,  has  been  at  all  times  so 


i 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


525 


zealously  pursued,  that  there  was  more  ground  for  moder- 
ating than  for  encouraging  the  desire  for  it.  It  was  some- 
thing when  chemists  succeeded  in  reducing  all  salts  to 
two  genera,  namely,  acids  and  alkalies ; but  they  tried  to 
consider  even  this  distinction  as  a variety  only,  or  as  a 
different  manifestation  of  one  and  the  same  fun-  [p.  653] 
damental  element.  Different  kinds  of  earths  (the  material 
of  stones  and  even  of  metals)  have  been  reduced  gradually 
to  three,  at  last  to  two  ; but  not  content  with  this,  chem- 
ists cannot  get  rid  of  the  idea  that  there  is  behind  those 
varieties  but  one  genus,  nay,  that  there  may  be  even  a com- 
mon principle  for  the  earths  and  the  salts.  It  might  be 
supposed  that  this  is  only  an  economical  trick  of  reason, 
for  the  purpose  of  saving  itself  trouble,  and  a purely  hy- 
pothetical  attempt  which,  if  successful,  would  impart  by 
that  very  unity  a certain  amount  of  probability  to  the 
presupposed  principle  of  explanation.  Such  a selfish  pur- 
pose, however,  can  easily  be  distinguished  from  the  idea 
according  to  which  we  all  presuppose  that  this  unity  of 
reason  agrees  with  nature,  and  that  in  this  case  reason 
does  not  beg  but  bids,  although  we  may  be  quite  unable, 
as  yet,  to  determine  the  limits  of  that  unity. 

If  there  existed  among  phenomena  so  great  a diversity, 
not  of  form,  for  in  this  they  may  be  similar,  but  of  con- 
tents, that  even  the  sharpest  human  understanding  could 
not,  by  a comparison  of  the  one  with  the  other,  discover 
the  slightest  similarity  among  them  (a  case  which  is  quite 
conceivable),  the  logical  law  of  genera  would  [p.  654] 
have  no  existence  at  all,  there  would  be  no  concept  of 
genus,  nor  any  general  concept,  nay,  no  understanding  at 
all,  considering  that  the  understanding  has  to  do  with 
concepts  only.  The  logical  principle  of  genera  presup- 


526 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


poses,  therefore,  a transcendental  one,  if  it  is  to  be  applied 
to  nature,  that  is,  to  all  objects  presented  to  our  senses. 
According  to  it,  in  the  manifoldness  of  a possible  experi- 
ence, some  homogeneousness  is  necessarily  supposed  (al- 
though it  many  be  impossible  to  determine  its  degree  a 
priori),  because  without  it,  no  empirical  concepts,  and  con- 
sequently no  experience,  would  be  possible. 

The  logical  principle  of  genera,  which  postulates  iden- 
tity, is  balanced  by  another  principle,  namely,  that  of 
species,  which  requires  manifoldness  and  diversity  in 
things,  in  spite  of  their  agreement  as  belonging  to  the 
same  genus,  and  which  prescribes  to  the  understanding 
that  it  should  pay  no  less  attention  to  the  one  than  to 
the  other.  This  principle,  depending  on  acute  observa- 
tion or  on  the  faculty  of  distinction,  checks  the  generalis- 
ing flights  of  fancy,  and  reason  thus  exhibits  a twofold 
and  conflicting  interest,  namely,  on  the  one  hand,  the 
interest  in  the  extent  (generality)  of  genera,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  interest  in  the  contents  (distinction)  of  the 
manifoldness  of  species.  Jn  the  former  case  the  under- 
standing thinks  more  under  its  concepts,  in  the  latter, 
more  in  its  concepts.  This  distinction  shows  itself  in 
the  different  manner  of  thought  among  students  [p.  655] 
of  nature,  some  of  them  (who  are  pre-eminently  specula- 
tive) being  almost  averse  to  heterogeneousness,  and 
always  intent  on  the  unity  of  genera ; while  others,  pre- 
eminently empirical,  are  constantly  striving  to  divide 
nature  into  so  much  variety  that  one  might  lose  almost 
all  hope  of  being  able  to  judge  its  phenomena  according 
to  general  principles. 

This  latter  tendency  of  thought  is  likewise  based  on 
a logical  principle  which  aims  at  the  systematical  com- 


Transcendental  Dialectic  527 

pleteness  of  all  knowledge,  so  that,  beginning  with  the 
genus  and  descending  to  the  manifold  that  may  be  con- 
tained in  it,  we  try  to  impart  extension  to  our  system, 
as  we  tried  to  impart  unity  to  it,  when  ascending  to  a 
genus.  For  if  we  only  know  the  sphere  of  a concept 
which  determines  a genus,  we  can  no  more  judge  how 
far  its  subdivision  may  be  carried  than  we  can  judge 
how  far  the  divisibility  of  matter  may  be  carried,  by 
knowing  the  space  it  occupies.  Hence  every  genus 
requires  species,  and  these  again  sub-species,  and  as  none 
even  of  these  sub-species  is  without  a sphere  (extent  as 
conceptus  communis),  reason  in  its  utmost  extension  re- 
quires that  no  species  or  sub-species  should  in  itself 
be  considered  as  the  lowest.  Every  species  is  always  a 
concept  containing  that  only  which  is  common  to  differ- 
ent things,  and  as  it  cannot  be  completely  determined,  it 
cannot  be  directly  referred  to  an  individual,  but  [p.  656] 
must  always  comprehend  other  concepts,  that  is,  sub- 
species. This  principle  of  specification  might  be  ex- 
pressed by  entium  varietates  non  temere  esse  minuendas. 

It  is  easily  seen  that  this  logical  law  also  would  be 
without  meaning  and  incapable  of  application,  unless  it 
were  founded  on  a transcendental  law  of  specification 
which,  though  it  cannot  demand  a real  infinity  of  variety 
in  things  that  are  to  become  our  objects  (for  this  would 
not  be  justified  by  the  logical  principle,  which  only  asserts 
the  indeterminability  of  the  logical  sphere  with  regard  to 
a possible  division),  yet  imposes  on  the  understanding  the 
duty  of  looking  for  sub-species  under  every  species,  and 
for  smaller  varieties  for  every  variety.  If  there  were  no 
lower  concepts,  there  could  not  be  higher  concepts.  Now 
the  understanding  knows  all  that  it  knows  by  concepts 


528 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


only,  and  hence,  however  far  it  may  carry  the  division, 
never  by  means  of  intuition  alone,  but  again  and  again 
by  lower  concepts.  In  order  to  know  phenomena  in 
their  complete  determination  (which  is  possible  by  the 
understanding  only)  it  is  necessary  to  carry  on  without 
stopping  the  specification  of  its  concepts,  and  always 
to  proceed  to  still  remaining  differences  or  varieties  of 
which  abstraction  had  been  made  in  forming  the  con- 
cept of  the  species,  and  still  more  in  forming  that  of 
the  genus. 

Nor  can  this  law  of  specification  have  been  [p.  657] 
derived  from  experience,  which  can  never  give  so  far- 
reaching  a prospect.  Empirical  specification  very  soon 
comes  to  a standstill  in  the  distinction  of  the  manifold, 
unless  it  is  led  by  the  antecedent  transcendental  law  of 
specification,  as  a principle  of  reason,  and  impelled  to 
look  for  and  to  conjecture  still  differences,  even  where 
they  do  not  appear  to  the  senses.  That  absorbent  earths 
are  of  different  kinds  (chalk  and  muriatic  earths)  could 
only  be  discovered  by  an  antecedent  rule  of  reason,  which 
required  the  understanding  to  look  for  diversity,  because 
it  presupposed  such  wealth  in  nature  as  to  feel  justified 
in  anticipating  such  diversity.  For  it  is  only  under  a 
presupposition  of  a diversity  in  nature,  and  under  the 
condition  that  its  objects  should  be  homogeneous,  that 
we  have  understanding,  because  it  is  this  very  diversity 
of  all  that  can  be  comprehended  under  a concept  which 
constitutes  the  use  of  that  concept,  and  the  occupation 
of  the  understanding. 

Reason  thus  prepares  the  field  for  the  understanding  — 

1st.  Through  the  principle  of  the  homogeneousness  of 
the  manifold,  as  arranged  under  higher  genera. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


529 


2ndly.  Through  the  principle  of  the  variety  of  the 
Homogeneous  in  lower  species ; to  which, 

3rdly,  it  adds  a law  of  the  affinity  of  all  concepts, 
which  requires  a continual  transition  from  every  species 
to  every  other  species,  by  a gradual  increase  of  [p.  658] 
diversity.  We  may  call  these  the  principles  of  homogene- 
ousness, of  specification,  and  of  continuity  of  forms.  The 
last  arises  from  the  union  of  the  two  former,  after  both 
in  ascending  to  higher  genera,  and  in  descending  to  lower 
species,  the  systematical  connection  in  the  idea  has  been 
completed  ; so  that  all  diversities  are  related  to  each 
other,  because  springing  from  one  highest  genus,  through 
all  degrees  of  a more  and  more  extended  determination. 

We  may  represent  to  ourselves  the  systematical  unity 
under  these  three  logical  principles,  in  the  following 
manner.  Every  concept  may  be  regarded  as  a point 
which,  as  the  standpoint  of  the  spectator,  has  its  own 
horizon,  enclosing  a number  of  things  that  may  be  repre- 
sented, and,  as  it  were,  surveyed  from  that  point.  Within 
that  horizon,  an  infinite  number  of  points  must  exist,  each 
of  which  has  again  its  own  narrower  horizon  ; that  is, 
every  species  contains  sub-species,  according  to  the  prin- 
ciple of  specification,  and  the  logical  horizon  consists  of 
smaller  horizons  (sub-species  only),  but  not  of  points, 
which  possess  no  extent  (individuals).  But  for  all  these 
different  horizons,  that  is  genera,  determined  by  as  many 
concepts,  a common  horizon  may  be  imagined,  in  which 
they  may  all  be  surveyed,  as  from  a common  centre.  This 
would  be  the  higher  genus,  while  the  highest  [p.  659] 
genus  would  be  the  universal  and  true  horizon,  determined 
from  the  standpoint  of  the  highest  concept,  and  compre- 
hending all  variety  as  genera,  species,  and  sub-species. 


2 M 


530 


Tra?iscendc7ital  Dialectic 


That  highest  standpoint  is  reached  by  the  law  oi 
homogeneousness,  and  all  the  lower  standpoints  in  their 
greatest  variety,  by  the  law  of  specification.  As  in  this 
way  there  is  no  void  in  the  whole  extent  of  all  possible 
concepts,  and  as  nothing  can  be  met  with  outside  it, 
there  arises  from  the  presupposition  of  that  universal 
horizon  and  its  complete  division,  the  principle  of  non 
datur  vacuum  formarum.  According  to  this  principle 
there  are  no  different  original  and  first  genera>  as  it  were 
isolated  and  separated  from  each  other  (by  an  intervening 
void),  but  all  diverse  genera  are  divisions  only  of  one 
supreme  and  general  genus.  From  that  principle  springs 
its  immediate  consequence,  datur  continuum  formarum ; 
that  is,  all  the  diversities  of  species  touch  each  other 
and  admit  of  no  transition  from  one  to  another  per 
salt/on,  but  only  by  small  degrees  of  difference,  by 
which  from  one  we  arrive  at  the  other.  In  one  word, 
there  are  neither  species  nor  sub-species,  which  (in  the 
view  of  reason)  are  the  nearest  possible  to  each  other, 
but  there  always  remain  possible  intermediate  species, 
differing  from  the  first  and  the  second  by  [p.  660] 
smaller  degrees  than  those  by  which  these  differ  from 
each  other. 

The  first  law,  therefore,  keeps  us  from  admitting  an 
extravagant  variety  of  different  original  genera,  and  recom- 
mends attention  to  homogeneousness.  The  second,  on 
the  contrary,  checks  that  tendency  to  unity,  and  pre- 
scribes distinction  of  sub-species  before  applying  any 
general  concept  to  individuals.  The  third  unites  both, 
by  prescribing,  even  with  the  utmost  variety,  homogene- 
ousness, through  the  gradual  transition  from  the  one 
species  to  another : thus  indicating  a kind  of  relation- 


Transcendental  Dialectic  531 

ship  of  the  different  branches,  as  having  all  sprung  from 
the  same  stem. 

This  logical  law,  however,  of  the  continuum  specierum 
( formarum  logicarum)  presupposes  a transcendental  law 
(i lex  continui  in  natura),  without  which  the  understand- 
ing would  only  be  misled  by  following,  it  may  be,  a path 
contrary  to  nature.  That  law  must  therefore  rest  on 
purely  transcendental,  and  not  on  empirical  grounds. 
For  in  the  latter  case,  it  would  come  later  than  the 
systems,  while  in  fact  the  systematical  character  of  our 
knowledge  of  nature  is  produced  by  it.  Nor  are  these 
laws  intended  only  for  tests  to  be  carried  out  experimen- 
tally by  their  aid,  although  such  a connection,  if  it  is  found 
in  nature,  forms  a powerful  argument  in  support  [p.  661] 
of  that  unity  which  was  conceived  as  hypothetical  only. 
These  laws  have  therefore  a certain  utility  in  this  respect 
also,  yet  it  is  easily  seen  that  they  regard  the  parsimony 
of  causes,  the  manifoldness  of  effects,  and  an  affinity  be- 
tween the  parts  of  nature  arising  from  thence,  as  both 
rational  and  natural,  so  that  these  principles  carry  their 
recommendation  direct,  and  not  only  as  aids  towards  a 
proper  method  of  studying  nature. 

It  is  easy  to  see,-  however,  that  this  continuity  of  forms 
is  a mere  idea,  and  that  no  object  corresponding  to  it  can 
be  pointed  out  in  experience,  not  only  because  the  species 
in  nature  are  actually  divided,  and  must  form,  each  by  it- 
self, a quantum  discretum , while,  if  the  gradual  progression 
of  their  affinity  were  continuous,  nature  would  contain  a 
real  infinity  of  intermediate  links  between  every  two 
given  species,  which  is  impossible ; but  also,  because  we 
cannot  make  any  definite  empirical  use  of  that  law, 
considering  that  not  the  smallest  criterion  of  affinity  is 


532 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


indicated  by  it  to  tell  us  how  and  how  far  we  ough; 
to  seek  for  grades  of  affinity,  it  telling  us  only  that  we 
ought  to  seek  for  them. 

If  we  now  arrange  these  principles  of  systematical  unity 
in  the  order  required  for  their  empirical  employ-  [p.  662] 
ment , they  might  stand  thus  : manifoldness,  variety,  and 
unity,  each  of  them  as  ideas  taken  in  the  highest  degree 
of  their  completeness.  Reason  presupposes  the  cognitions 
of  the  understanding  in  their  direct  relation  to  experience, 
and  looks  for  their  unity  according  to  ideas  which  go 
far  beyond  the  possibility  of  experience.  The  affinity  of 
the  manifold,  in  spite  of  its  diversity,  under  one  principle 
of  unity,  refers  not  only  to  things,  but  even  more  to  the 
qualities  and  powers  of  things.  Thus  if,  for  example,  our 
imperfect  experience  represents  to  us  the  orbits  of  the 
planets  as  circular,  and  we  find  deviations  from  that  course, 
we  look  for  them  in  that  which  is  able  to  change  the 
circle  according  to  a fixed  law,  through  infinite  interven- 
ing degrees,  into  one  of  these  deviating  courses  ; that  is, 
we  suppose  that  the  movements  of  the  planets  which  are 
not  circular  will  approximate  more  or  less  to  the  proper- 
ties of  a circle,  and  thus  are  led  on  to  the  ellipse.  The 
comets  display  a still  greater  deviation  in  their  courses, 
because,  so  far  as  our  experience  goes,  they  do  not  return 
in  a circle,  and  we  then  conjecture  a parabolic  course 
which,  at  all  events,  is  allied  to  the  ellipse,  and  if  its 
longer  axis  is  widely  extended,  cannot  be  distinguished 
from  it  in  our  observations.  We  thus  arrive,  [p.  663] 
under  the  guidance  of  these  principles,  at  a unity  of  the 
different  genera  or  kinds  in  the  forms  of  these  orbits, 
and,  proceeding  still  further,  at  a unity  of  the  cause  of  all 
the  laws  of  their  movements,  namely,  gravitation.  Here 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


533 


we  take  our  stand  and  extend  our  conquests,  trying  to 
explain  all  varieties  and  seeming  deviations  from  those 
rules  from  the  same  principle,  nay,  adding  more  than  ex- 
perience can  ever  affirm,  namely,  imaginary  hyperbolic 
courses  of  comets  constructed  according  to  the  rules  of 
affinity,  in  which  courses  these  heavenly  bodies  may 
entirely  leave  our  solar  system,  and,  moving  from  sun  to 
sun,  unite  in  their  course  the  most  distant  parts  of  a 
universe  unlimited  to  our  minds,  but  yet  held  together 
by  one  and  the  same  moving  power. 

What  is  most  remarkable  in  these  principles,  and  is,  in 
fact,  their  chief  interest  for  us  is,  that  they  seem  to  be 
transcendental,  and,  although  containing  mere  ideas  for 
the  guidance  of  the  empirical  use  of  reason,  ideas  which 
our  reason  can  only  follow  as  it  were  asymptotically,  that 
is,  approximately  and  without  our  reaching  them,  they 
nevertheless  possess,  as  synthetical  propositions  a priori , 
an  objective,  though  an  undefined  validity,  serving  as  a 
rule  for  possible  experience,  nay,  as  heuristic  principles  in 
the  elaboration  of  experience.  With  all  this  a transcen- 
dental deduction  of  them  cannot  be  produced,  [p.  664] 
and  is,  in  fact,  as  we  have  proved  before,  always  impossi- 
ble with  regard  to  ideas. 

In  the  transcendental  Analytic  we  distinguished  the 
dynamical  principles  of  the  understanding,  as  purely  regu- 
lative principles  of  the  intuition,  from  the  mathematical, 
which,  in  regard  to  intuition,  are  constitutive.  In  spite 
of  this,  these  dynamical  laws  are  constitutive  with  regard 
to  experience,  because  they  render  the  concepts,  without 
which  there  can  be  no  experience,  a priori  possible.  The 
principles  of  pure  reason,  however,  cannot  be  constitutive, 
even  with  reference  to  empirical  concepts,  because  we  cannot 


534 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


assign  to  them  any  corresponding  schema  of  sensibility  ; 
they  cannot,  consequently,  have  any  object  in  concreto. 
If,  then,  I give  up  an  empirical  use  of  them  as  constitutive 
principles,  how  can  I yet  secure  to  them  a regulative 
employment,  and  with  it  some  objective  validity,  and  what 
can  be  the  meaning  of  it? 

The  understanding  forms  an  object  for  reason  in  the 
same  manner  as  sensibility  for  the  understanding.  It  is 
the  proper  business  of  reason  to  render  the  unity  of  all 
possible  empirical  acts  of  the  understanding  systematical, 
in  the  same  manner  as  the  understanding  connects  the 
manifold  of  phenomena  by  concepts,  and  brings  it  under 
empirical  laws.  The  acts  of  the  understanding,  however, 
without  the  schemata  of  sensibility,  are  undefined , and  in 
the  same  manner  the  unity  of  reason  is  in  itself  [p.  665] 
undefined  with  reference  to  the  conditions  under  which, 
and  the  extent  to  which,  the  understanding  may  connect 
its  concepts  systematically.  But  although  no  schema  of 
intuition  can  be  discovered  for  the  perfect  systematical 
unity  of  all  the  concepts  of  the  understanding,  it  is  possi- 
ble and  necessary  that  there  should  be  an  analogon  of 
such  a schema,  and  this  is  the  idea  of  the  maximum,  both 
of  the  division  and  of  the  combination  of  the  knowledge 
of  the  understanding  under  one  single  principle.  It  is 
quite  possible  to  form  a definite  thought  of  what  is  great- 
est and  absolutely  complete,  when  all  restrictive  condi- 
tions that  lead  to  an  undefined  manifoldness  have  been 
omitted.  In  this  sense  the  idea  of  reason  forms  an  analo- 
gon of  the  schema  of  sensibility,  but  with  this  difference, 
that  the  application  of  the  concepts  of  the  understanding 
to  the  schema  of  reason  is  not  a knowledge  of  the  object 
itself,  as  in  the  case  of  the  application  of  the  categories 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


535 


to  sensuous  schemata,  but  only  a rule  or  principle  for  the 
systematical  unity  in  the  whole  use  of  the  understanding. 
Now,  as  every  principle  which  fixes  a priori  a perfect 
unity  of  its  use  for  the  understanding  is  valid,  though  in- 
directly only,  for  the  object  of  experience  also,  it  follows 
that  the  principles  of  pure  reason  have  objective  reality 
with  reference  to  that  object  also,  not,  however,  in  order 
to  determine  anything  therein,  but  only  in  order  to  indi- 
cate the  procedure  by  which  the  empirical  and  definite 
use  of  the  understanding  may  throughout  re-  [p.  666] 
main  in  complete  harmony  with  itself,  by  being  brought 
into  connection,  as  much  as  possible , with  the  principle  of 
systematical  unity,  and  being  deduced  from  it. 

I call  all  subjective  principles  which  are  derived,  not 
from  the  quality  of  an  object,  but  from  the  interest  which 
reason  takes  in  a certain  possible  perfection  of  our  know- 
ledge of  an  object,  maxims  of  reason.  Thus  there  are 
maxims  of  speculative  reason,  which  rest  entirely  on  its 
speculative  interest,  though  they  may  seem  to  be  objec- 
tive principles. 

When  purely  regulative  principles  are  taken  for  consti- 
tutive, they  may  become  contradictory,  as  objective  prin- 
ciples. If,  however,  they  are  taken  for  maxims  only, 
there  is  no  real  contradiction,  but  it  is  only  the  differ- 
ent interest  of  reason  which  causes  different  modes  of 
thought.  In  reality,  reason  has  one  interest  only,  and 
the  conflict  of  its  maxims  arises  only  from  a difference 
and  a mutual  limitation  of  the  methods  in  which  that 
interest  is  to  be  satisfied. 

In  this  manner  one  philosopher  is  influenced  more  by 
the  interest  of  diversity  (according  to  the  principle  of 
specification),  another  by  the  interests  of  unity  (according 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


536 

to  the  principle  of  aggregation).  Each  believes  [p.  667] 
that  he  has  derived  his  judgment  from  his  insight  into 
the  object,  and  yet  founds  it  entirely  on  the  greater  or 
smaller  attachment  to  one  of  the  two  principles,  neither1 
of  which  rests  on  objective  grounds,  but  only  on  an  in- 
terest of  reason,  and  should  therefore  be  called  maxims 
rather  than  principles.  I often  see  even  intelligent  men 
quarrelling  with  each  other  about  the  characteristic  dis- 
tinctions of  men,  animals,  or  plants,  nay,  even  of  minerals, 
the  one  admitting  the  existence  of  certain  tribal  charac- 
teristics, founded  on  descent,  or  decided  and  inherited 
differences  of  families,  races,  etc.,  while  others  insist  that 
nature  has  made  the  same  provision  for  all,  and  that  all 
differences  are  due  to  accidental  environment.  But  they 
need  only  consider  the  nature  of  the  object,  in  order  to 
understand  that  it  is  far  too  deeply  hidden  for  both  of 
them  to  enable  them  to  speak  from  a real  insight  into  the 
nature  of  the  object.  It  is  nothing  but  the  twofold  inter- 
est of  reason,  one  party  cherishing  the  one,  another  party 
the  other,  or  pretending  to  do  so.  But  this  difference  of 
the  two  maxims  of  manifoldness  or  unity  in  nature  may 
easily  be  adjusted,  though  as  long  as  they  are  taken  for 
objective  knowledge  they  cause  not  only  disputes,  but 
actually  create  impediments  which  hinder  the  progress 
of  truth,  until  a means  is  found  of  reconciling  [p.  668] 
the  contradictory  interests,  and  thus  giving  satisfaction 
to  reason. 

The  same  applies  to  the  assertion  or  denial  of  the 
famous  law  of  the  continuous  scale  of  created  beings,  first 
advanced  by  Leibniz,  and  so  cleverly  trimmed  up  by 


1 Read  keiner  instead  of  keine. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


537 


Bonnet.  It  is  nothing  but  a carrying  out  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  affinity,  resting  on  the  interest  of  reason ; for 
neither  observation  nor  insight  into  the  constitution  of 
nature  could  ever  have  supplied  it  as  an  objective  asser- 
tion. The  steps  of  such  a ladder,  as  far  as  they  can  be 
supplied  by  experience,  are  too  far  apart  from  each  other, 
and  the  so-called  small  differences  are  often  in  nature 
itself  such  wide  gaps  that  no  value  can  be  attached  to 
such  observations  as  revealing  the  intentions  of  nature, 
particularly  as  it  must  always  be  easy  to  discover  in  the 
great  variety  of  things  certain  similarities  and  approxi- 
mations. The  method,  on  the  contrary,  of  looking  for 
order  in  nature,  according  to  such  a principle,  and  the 
maxim  of  admitting  such  order  (though  it  may  be  uncer- 
tain where  and  how  far)  as  existing  in  nature  in  general, 
form  certainly  a legitimate  and  excellent  regulative  prin- 
ciple of  reason,  only  that,  as  such,  it  goes  far  beyond 
where  experience  or  observation  could  follow  it.  It  only 
indicates  the  way  which  leads  to  systematical  unity,  but 
does  not  determine  anything  beyond. 


Of  the  Ultimate  Aim  of  the  Natural  Dialectic 

Human  Reason  [p.  669] 

The  ideas  of  pure  reason  can  never  be  dialectical  in 
themselves,  but  it  must  be  due  to  their  misemployment, 
if  a deceptive  illusion  arise  from  them.  They  are  given 
to  us  by  the  nature  of  our  reason,  and  this  highest  tribu- 
nal of  all  the  rights  and  claims  of  speculation  cannot 
possibly  itself  contain  original  fallacies  and  deceits.  We 
must  suppose,  therefore,  that  they  had  a good  and  legiti- 
mate intention  in  the  natural  disposition  of  our  reason. 


53s  Transcendental  Dialectic 

The  mob  of  sophists,  however,  cry  out  as  usual  about 
absurdities  and  contradictions,  and  blame  the  govern- 
ment the  secret  plans  of  which  they  cannot  even  under- 
stand, while  it  is  to  its  beneficent  influence  that  they  owe 
their  protection  and  that  amount  of  intelligence  which 
enables  them  to  blame  and  condemn  the  government. 

We  cannot  use  a concept  a priori  with  any  safety, 
without  having  first  established  its  transcendental  deduc- 
tion. It  is  true  the  ideas  of  pure  reason  do  not  allow 
of  a deduction  in  the  same  manner  as  the  categories ; 
but  if  they  are  to  claim  any,  though  only  an  undefined 
objective  validity,  and  are  not  to  represent  mere  fictions 
of  thought  only  ( entia  rationis  ratiocinantis),  a [p.  670] 
deduction  of  them  must  be  possible,  even  though  it  may 
differ  from  that  which  we  were  able  to  give  of  the  cate- 
gories. This  will  form  the  completion  of  the  critical 
task  of  pure  reason,  and  it  is  this  which  we  now  mean 
to  undertake. 

It  makes  a great  difference  whether  something  is  repre- 
sented to  our  reason  as  an  object  absolutely , or  merely  as 
an  object  in  the  idea.  In  the  former  case  my  concepts  are 
meant  to  determine  the  object,  in  the  latter  there  is  only 
a schema  to  which  no  object,  not  even  a hypothetical  one, 
corresponds  directly,  but  which  only  serves  to  represent  to 
ourselves  indirectly  other  objects  through  their  relation 
to  that  idea,  and  according  to  their  systematical  unity. 
Thus  I say  that  the  concept  of  a highest  intelligence  is  a 
mere  idea,  that  is,  that  its  objective  reality  is  not  to  con- 
sist in  its  referring  directly  to  any  object  (for  in  that  sense 
we  should  not  be  able  to  justify  its  objective  validity)  ; but 
that  it  is  only  a schema,  arranged  according  to  the  condi- 
tions of  the  highest  unity  of  reason,  of  the  concept  of  a 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


539 


thing  in  general,  serving  only  to  obtain  the  greatest  syste- 
matical unity  in  the  empirical  use  of  our  reason,  by  helping 
us,  as  it  were,  to  deduce  the  object  of  experience  from  the 
imagined  object  of  that  idea  as  its  ground  or  cause. 
Thus  we  are  led  to  say,  for  instance,  that  the  [p.  671] 
things  of  the  world  must  be  considered  as  if  they  owed 
their  existence  to  some  supreme  intelligence ; and  the 
idea  is  thus  a heuristic  only,  not  an  ostensive  concept, 
showing  us  not  how  an  object  is  really  constituted,  but 
how  we,  under  the  guidance  of  that  concept,  should  look 
for  the  constitution  and  connection  of  the  objects  of 
experience  in  general.  If,  then,  it  can  be  shown  that 
the  three  transcendental  ideas  (the  psychological,  cosmo- 
logical, and  theological),  although  they  cannot  be  used 
directly  to  determine  any  object  corresponding  to  them, 
yet  as  rules 1 of  the  empirical  use  of  reason  will  lead, 
under  the  presupposition  of  such  an  object  in  the  idea, 
to  a systematical  unity,  and  to  an  extension  of  our  em- 
pirical knowledge,  without  ever  running  counter  to  this 
knowledge,  it  becomes  a necessary  maxim  of  reason  to  act 
in  accordance  with  such  ideas.  And  this  is  really  the  tran- 
scendental deduction  of  all  ideas  of  speculative  reason, 
considered  not  as  co7istitutive  principles  for  extending 
our  knowledge  to  more  objects  than  can  be  given  by 
experience,  but  as  regulative  principles  for  the  systemat- 
ical unity  of  the  manifold  of  empirical  knowledge  in 
general,  which  knowledge,  within  its  own  limits,  can 
thus  be  better  arranged  and  improved  than  it  would 
be  possible  without  such  ideas,  and  by  the  mere  use  of 
the  principles  of  the  understanding. 


1 Instead  of  alle  read  als. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


C40 

I shall  try  to  make  this  clearer.  Following  [p.  672] 
these  ideas  as  principles,  we  shall  first  (in  psychology)  con- 
nect all  phenomena,  all  the  activity  and  receptivity  of  our 
mind,  according  to  our  internal  experience,  as  if  our  mind 
were  a simple  substance,  existing  permanently,  and  with 
personal  identity  (in  this  life  at  least),  while  its  states,  to 
which  those  of  the  body  belong  as  external  conditions,  are 
changing  continually.  Secondly  (in  cosmology),  we  are 
bound  to  follow  up  the  conditions  both  of  internal  and 
external  natural  phenomena  in  an  investigation  that  can 
never  become  complete,  looking  upon  this  investigation 
as  infinite,  and  without  any  first  or  supreme  member;  but 
we  ought  not  therefore  to  deny  the  purely  intelligible  first 
grounds  of  these  phenomena,  as  outside  of  them,  though 
not  allowed  to  bring  them  ever  into  connection  with  our 
explanations  of  nature,  for  the  simple  reason  that  we  do  not 
know  them.  Thirdly,  and  lastly  (in  theology),  we  must 
consider  everything  that  may  belong  to  the  whole  of  possi- 
ble experience  as  if  that  experience  formed  one  absolute 
but  thoroughly  dependent,  and  always,  within  the  world  of 
sense,  conditioned  unity  ; but,  at  the  same  time,  as  if  it, 
the  whole  of  phenomena  (the  world  of  sense  itself),  had 
one  supreme  and  all-sufficient  ground,  outside  its  sphere, 
namely,  an  independent,  original,  creative  reason,  in  refer- 
ence to  which  we  direct  all  empirical  use  of  our  [p.  673] 
reason  in  its  widest  extension  in  such  a way  as  if  the 
objects  themselves  had  sprung  from  that  archetype  of  all 
reason.  In  other  words,  we  ought  not  to  derive  the  in- 
ternal phenomena  of  the  soul  as  if  from  a simple  thinking 
substance,  but  derive  them  from  each  other,  according  to 
the  idea  of  a simple  being;  we  ought  not  to  derive  the 
order  and  systematical  unity  of  the  world  from  a supreme 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


541 


intelligence,  but  borrow  from  the  idea  of  a supremely  wise 
cause  the  rule  according  to  which  reason  may  best  be  used 
for  her  own  satisfaction  in  the  connection  of  causes  and 
effects  in  this  world. 

Now  there  is  nothing  that  could  in  the  least  prevent  us 
from  admitting  these  ideas  as  objective  and  hypostatical 
also,  except  in  the  case  of  the  cosmological  idea,  where 
reason,  when  trying  to  carry  it  out  objectively,  is  met  by 
an  antinomy.  There  is  no  such  antinomy  in  the  psycho- 
logical and  theological  ideas,  and  how  could  anybody  con- 
test their  objective  reality,  as  he  knows  as  little  how  to 
deny,  as  we  how  to  assert,  their  possibility  ? 

It  is  true  nevertheless  that,  in  order  to  admit  anything, 
it  is  not  enough  that  there  should  be  no  positive  impedi- 
ment to  it,  nor  are  we  allowed  to  introduce  fictions  of  our 
thoughts,  transcending  all  our  concepts,  though  contradict- 
ing none,  as  real  and  definite  objects,  on  the  mere  credit 
of  our  somewhat  perfunctory  speculative  reason,  [p.  674] 
They  should  not  therefore  be  admitted  as  real  in  them- 
selves, but  their  reality  should  only  be  considered  as  the 
reality  of  a schema  of  a regulative  principle  for  the  sys- 
tematical unity  of  all  natural  knowledge.  Hence  they  are 
to  be  admitted  as  analoga  only  of  real  things,  and  not  as 
real  things  in  themselves.  We  remove  from  the  object 
of  an  idea  the  conditions  which  limit  the  concepts  of  our 
understanding,  and  which  alone  enable  us  to  have  a definite 
concept  of  anything ; and  then  we  represent  to  ourselves 
a something  of  which  we  know  not  in  the  least  what  it  is 
by  itself,  but  which,  nevertheless,  we  represent  to  ourselves 
in  a relation  to  the  whole  of  phenomena,  analogous  to  that 
relation  which  phenomena  have  among  themselves. 

If  therefore  we  admit  such  ideal  beings,  we  do  not  really 


542 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


enlarge  our  knowledge  beyond  the  objects  of  possible 
experience,  but  only  the  empirical  unity  of  those  objects, 
by  means  of  that  systematical  unity  of  which  the  idea 
furnishes  us  the  schema,  and  which  therefore  cannot  claim 
to  be  a constitutive,  but  only  a regulative  principle.  For 
if  we  admit  a something,  or  a real  being,  corresponding  to 
the  idea,  we  do  not  intend  thereby  to  enlarge  our  know- 
ledge of  things  by  means  of  transcendental 1 concepts ; 
for  such  a being  is  admitted  in  the  idea  only,  and  not  by 
itself,  and  only  in  order  to  express  that  systematical  unity 
which  is  to  guide  the  empirical  use  of  our  reason,  [p.  675] 
without  stating  anything  as  to  what  is  the  ground  of  that 
unity  or  the  internal  nature  of  such  a being  on  which,  as 
its  cause,  that  unity  depends. 

Thus  the  transcendental  and  the  only  definite  concept 
which  purely  speculative  reason  gives  us  of  God  is  in  the 
strictest  sense  deistic  ; that  is,  reason  does  not  even  supply 
us  with  the  objective  validity  of  such  a concept,  but  only 
with  the  idea  of  something  on  which  the  highest  and  neces- 
sary unity  of  all  empirical  reality  is  founded,  and  which  we 
cannot  represent  to  ourselves  except  in  analogy  with  a 
real  substance,  being,  according  to  the  laws  of  nature,  the 
cause  of  all  things  ; always  supposing  that  we  undertake 
to  think  it  at  all  as  a particular  object,  and,  satisfied  with 
the  mere  idea  of  the  regulative  principle  of  reason,  do  not 
rather  put  aside  the  completion  of  all  the  conditions  of  our 
thought,  as  too  much  for  the  human  understanding,  which, 
however,  is  hardly  compatible  with  that  perfect  systemati- 

1 The  early  editions  read  transcendenten , instead  of  transcendentalen , which 
is  given  in  the  corrigenda  of  the  Fifth  Edition;  it  is  not  impossible,  however, 
that  Kant  may  have  meant  to  write  transcendentcn , in  order  to  indicate  the 
illegitimate  use  of  these  concepts. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


543 


cal  unity  of  our  knowledge  to  which  reason  at  least  imposes 
no  limits. 

Thus  it  happens  that,  if  we  admit  a Divine  Being,  we 
have  not  the  slightest  conception  either  of  the  internal 
possibility  of  its  supreme  perfection,  nor  of  the  [p.  676] 
necessity  of  its  existence,  but  are  able  at  least  thus  to 
satisfy  all  other  questions  relating  to  contingent  things, 
and  give  the  most  perfect  satisfaction  to  reason  with 
reference  to  that  highest  unity  in  its  empirical  applica- 
tion that  has  to  be  investigated,  but  not  in  reference  to 
that  hypothesis  itself.  This  proves  that  it  is  the  specu- 
lative interest  of  reason,  and  not  its  real  insight,  which 
justifies  it  in  starting  from  a point  so  far  above  its  proper 
sphere,  in  order  to  survey  from  thence  its  objects,  as  be- 
longing to  a complete  whole. 

Here  we  meet  with  a distinction  in  our  mode  of  thought, 
the  premisses  remaining  the  same,  a distinction  which  is 
somewhat  subtle,  but  of  great  importance  in  transcen- 
dental philosophy.  I may  have  sufficient  ground  for 
admitting  something  relatively  ( snppositio  relativa),  with- 
out having  a right  to  admit  it  absolutely  ( suppositio  abso- 
Inta).  This  distinction  comes  in  when  we  have  to  deal 
with  a regulative  principle,  of  which  we  know  the  neces- 
sity by  itself,  but  not  the  source  of  this  necessity,  and 
where  we  admit  a supreme  cause,  only  in  order  to  think 
the  universality  of  the  principle  with  greater  definiteness. 
Thus,  if  I think  of  a being  as  existing  which  corresponds 
to  a mere  idea,  and  to  a transcendental  one,  I ought  not 
to  admit  the  existence  of  such  a being  by  itself,  because 
no  concepts  through  which  I can  conceive  any  [p.  677] 
object  definitely,  can  reach  it,  and  the  conditions  of  the 
objective  validity  of  my  concepts  are  excluded  by  the  idea 


544 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


itself.  The  concepts  of  reality,  of  substance,  even  of 
causality,  and  those  of  necessity  in  existence,  have  no 
meaning  that  could  determine  any  object,  unless  they  are 
used  to  make  the  empirical  knowledge  of  an  object  pos- 
sible. They  may  be  used,  therefore,  to  explain  the  possi- 
bility of  things  in  the  world  of  sense,  but  not  to  explain 
the  possibility  of  a universe  itself \ because  such  an  hy- 
pothesis is  outside  the  world  and  could  never  be  an  object 
of  possible  experience.  I can,  however,  admit  perfectly 
well  such  an  inconceivable  Being,  being  the  object  of  a 
mere  idea,  relative  to  the  world  of  sense,  though  not  as 
existing  by  itself.  For  if  the  greatest  possible  empirical 
use  of  my  reason  depends  on  an  idea  (on  the  systemati- 
cally complete  unity  of  which  I shall  soon  speak  more  in 
detail),  which  by  itself  can  never  be  adequately  represented 
in  experience,  though  it  is  indispensably  necessary  in  order 
to  bring  the  empirical  unity  as  near  as  possible  to  the 
highest  perfection,  I shall  not  only  have  the  right,  but 
even  the  duty,  to  realise  such  an  idea,  that  is,  to  assign 
to  it  a real  object,  though  only  as  a something  in  general, 
which  by  itself  I do  not  know  at  all,  and  to  which,  as  the 
cause  of  that  systematical  unity,  I ascribe,  in  reference  to 
it,  such  qualities  as  are  analogous  to  the  concepts  [p.  678] 
employed  by  the  understanding  in  dealing  with  experi- 
ence. I shall,  therefore,  according  to  the  analogy  of 
realities  in  the  world,  of  substances,  of  causality,  and  of 
necessity,  conceive  a Being  possessing  all  these  in  the 
highest  perfection,  and,  as  this  idea  rests  on  my  reason 
only,  conceive  that  Being  as  self-subsistent  reason,  being, 
through  the  ideas  of  the  greatest  harmony  and  unity,  the 
cause  of  the  universe.  In  doing  this  I omit  all  conditions 
which  could  limit  the  idea,  simply  in  order  to  render,  with 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


545 


the  help  of  such  a fundamental  cause,  the  systematical  unity 
of  the  manifold  in  the  universe,  and,  through  it,  the  great- 
est possible  empirical  use  of  reason,  possible.  I then  look 
upon  all  connections  in  the  world  as  if  they  were  ordered 
by  a supreme  reason,  of  which  our  own  reason  is  but  a 
faint  copy,  and  I represent  to  myself  that  Supreme  Being 
through  concepts  which,  properly  speaking,  are  applicable 
to  the  world  of  sense  only.  As,  however,  I make  none 
but  a relative  use  of  that  transcendental  hypothesis,  as  the 
substratum  of  the  greatest  possible  unity  of  experience,  I 
may  perfectly  well  represent  a Being  which  I distinguish 
from  the  world,  by  qualities  which  belong  to  the  world  of 
sense  only.  For  I demand  by  no  means,  nor  am  I justi- 
fied in  demanding,  that  I should  know  that  object  of  my 
idea,  according  to  what  it  may  be  by  itself.  I have  no 
concepts  whatever  for  it,  and  even  the  concepts  [p.  679] 
of  reality,  substance,  causality,  ay,  of  the  necessity  in 
existence,  lose  all  their  meaning,  and  become  mere  titles 
of  concepts,  void  of  contents,  as  soon  as  I venture  with 
them  outside  the  field  of  the  senses.  I only  present  to 
myself  the  relation  of  a Being,  utterly  unknown  to  me  as 
existing  by  itself,  to  the  greatest  possible  systematical 
unity  of  the  universe,  in  order  to  use  it  as  a schema  of  the 
regulative  principle  of  the  greatest  possible  empirical  use 
of  my  reason. 

If  now  we  glance  at  the  transcendental  object  of  our 
idea,  we  find  that  we  cannot,  according  to  the  concepts 
of  reality,  substance,  causality,  etc.,  presuppose  its  reality 
by  itself \ because  such  concepts  are  altogether  inapplicable 
to  something  totally  distinct  from  the  world  of  sense. 
The  supposition,  therefore,  which  reason  makes  of  a Su- 
preme Being,  as  the  highest  cause,  is  relative  only,  devised 


546  Transcendental  Dialectic 

for  the  sake  of  the  systematical  unity  in  the  world  of 
sense,  and  a mere  Something  in  the  idea,  while  we  have 
no  concept  of  what  it  may  be  by  itself.  Thus  we  are  able 
to  understand  why  we  require  the  idea  of  an  original  Being, 
necessary  by  itself,  with  reference  to  all  that  is  given  to 
the  senses  as  existing,  but  can  never  have  the  slightest 
conception  of  it  and  of  its  absolute  necessity. 

At  this  point  we  are  able  to  place  the  results  of  the 
whole  transcendental  Dialectic  clearly  before  our  eyes, 
and  to  define  accurately  the  final  aim  of  the  ideas  [p.  680] 
of  pure  reason,  which  could  become  dialectical  through 
misapprehension  and  carelessness  only.  Pure  reason  is, 
in  fact,  concerned  with  nothing  but  itself,  nor  can  it  have 
any  other  occupation,  because  what  is  given  to  it  are  not 
the  objects  intended  for  the  unity  of  an  empirical  concept, 
but  the  knowledge  supplied  by  the  understanding  for  the 
unity  of  the  concept  of  reason,  that  is,  of  its  connection 
according  to  a principle.  The  unity  of  reason  is  the  unity 
of  a system,  and  that  systematical  unity  does  not  serve 
objectively  as  a principle  of  reason  to  extend  its  sway  over 
objects,  but  subjectively  as  a maxim  to  extend  its  sway 
over  all  possible  empirical  knowledge  of  objects.  Never- 
theless, the  systematical  connection  which  reason  can  im- 
part to  the  understanding  in  its  empirical  use  helps  not 
only  to  extend  that  use,  but  confirms  at  the  same  time  its 
correctness  ; nay,  the  principle  of  such  systematical  unity 
is  objective  also,  though  in  an  indefinite  manner  ( princi - 
pium  vagum),  not  as  a constitutive  principle,  determining 
something  in  its  direct  object,  but  only  as  a regulative 
principle  and  maxim,  advancing  and  strengthening  in- 
finitely (indefinitely),  the  empirical  use  of  reason  by  the 
opening  of  new  paths  unknown  to  the  understanding, 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


547 


without  ever  running  counter  to  the  laws  of  its  practical 
use. 

Reason,  however,  cannot  think  this  systemat-  [p.  68 1] 
ical  unity,  without  attributing  to  its  idea  an  object,  which, 
as  experience  has  never  given  an  example  of  complete 
systematical  unity,  can  never  be  given  in  any  experience. 
This  Being,  demanded  by  reason  ( ens  rationis  ratiocinatae), 
is  no  doubt  a mere  idea,  and  not  therefore  received  as 
something  absolutely  real  and  real  by  itself.  It  is  only 
admitted  problematically  (for  we  cannot  reach  it  by  any 
concepts  of  the  understanding),  in  order  to  enable  us  to 
look  upon  the  connection  of  things  in  the  world  of  sense, 
as  //"they  had  their  ground  in  that  being,  the  real  intention 
being  to  found  upon  it  that  systematical  unity  which  is 
indispensable  to  reason,  helpful  in  every  way  to  the  empir- 
ical knowledge  of  the  understanding,  and  never  a hin- 
drance to  it. 

We  misapprehend  at  once  the  true  meaning  of  that  idea, 
if  we  accept  it  as  the  assertion,  or  even  as  the  hypothesis 
of  a real  thing  to  which  the  ground  of  the  systematical 
construction  of  the  world  should  be  ascribed.  What  we 
ought  to  do  is  to  leave  it  entirely  uncertain,  what  that 
ground  which  escapes  all  our  concepts  may  be  by  itself, 
and  to  use  the  idea  only  as  a point  of  view  from  which 
alone  we  may  expand  that  unity  which  is  as  essential  to 
reason  as  beneficial  to  the  understanding.  In  one  word, 
that  transcendental  thing  is  only  the  schema  of  [p.  682] 
the  regulative  principle  with  which  reason  spreads  syste- 
matical unity,  as  far  as  possible,  over  all  experience. 

The  first  object  of  such  an  idea  is  the  ego,  considered 
merely  as  a thinking  nature  (soul).  Now  if  I want  to 
know  the  qualities  with  which  a thinking  being  exists  in 


548 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


itself,  I have  to  consult  experience  : but  of  all  the  cate- 
gories, I cannot  apply  a single  one  to  that  object,  unless  its 
schema  is  given  in  sensuous  intuition.  Thus,  however,  I 
can  never  arrive  at  a systematical  unity  of  all  the  phe- 
nomena of  the  internal  sense.  Reason,  therefore,  instead 
of  taking  from  experience  the  concept  of  that  which  the 
soul  is  in  reality,  which  would  not  lead  us  very  far,  prefers 
the  concept  of  the  empirical  unity  of  all  thought,  and  by 
representing  that  unity  as  unconditioned  and  original,  it 
changes  it  into  a concept  of  reason,  or  an  idea  of  a simple 
substance,  a substance  unchangeable  in  itself  (personally 
identical),  and  in  communication  with  other  real  things 
outside  it ; in  one  word,  into  a simple  self-subsistent  intel- 
ligence. In  doing  this,  its  object  is  merely  to  find  prin- 
ciples of  systematical  unity  for  the  explanation  of  the 
phenomena  of  the  soul,  so  that  all  determinations  may  be 
received  as  existing  in  one  subject,  all  powers,  as  much  as 
possible,  as  derived  from  one  fundamental  power,  and 
all  changes  as  belonging  to  the  states  of  one  and  the 
same  permanent  being,  while  all  phenomena  in  [p.  683] 
space  are  represented  as  totally  different  from  the  acts  of 
thought.  That  simplicity  of  substance,  etc.,  was  only 
meant  to  be  the  schema  of  this  regulative  principle  ; it  is 
not  assumed  to  be  the  real  ground  of  all  the  properties  of 
the  soul.  These  properties  may  rest  on  quite  different 
grounds,  of  which  we  know  nothing  ; nor  could  we  know 
the  soul  even  by  these  assumed  predicates  by  itself,  even 
if  we  regarded  them  as  absolutely  valid  with  regard  to  it, 
for  they  really  constitute  a mere  idea  which  cannot  be 
represented  in  concreto.  Nothing  but  good  can  spring  from 
such  a psychological  idea,  if  only  we  take  care  not  to  take 
it  for  more  than  an  idea,  that  is,  if  we  apply  it  only  in  re- 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


549 


,'ation  to  the  systematical  use  of  reason,  with  reference  to 
the  phenomena  of  our  soul.  For  in  that  case  no  empirical 
laws  of  corporeal  phenomena,  which  are  of  a totally 
different  kind,  are  mixed  up  with  the  explanation  of  what 
belongs  to  the  internal  sense ; and  no  windy  hypothesis 
of  generation,  extinction,  and  palingenesis  of  souls  are  ad- 
mitted. The  consideration  of  this  object  of  the  internal 
sense  remains  pure  and  unmixed  with  heterogeneous  mat- 
ters, while  reason  in  its  investigations  is  directed  towards 
tracing  all  the  grounds  of  explanation,  as  far  as  possible,  to 
one  single  principle ; and  this  can  best  be  achieved,  [p.  684] 
nay,  cannot  be  achieved  otherwise  but  by  such  a schema 
which  attributes  to  the  soul  hypothetically  the  character 
of  a real  being.  The  psychological  idea  cannot  be  any- 
thing but  such  a schema  of  a regulative  concept.  The 
very  question,  for  instance,  whether  the  soul  by  itself  be 
of  a spiritual  nature,  would  have  no  meaning,  because,  by 
such  a concept,  I should  take  away  not  only  corporeal,  but 
all  nature,  that  is,  all  predicates  of  any  possible  experience, 
and  therefore  all  the  conditions  under  which  the  object  of 
such  a concept  could  be  thought ; and,  in  that  case,  the 
concept  would  have  no  meaning  at  all. 

The  second  regulative  idea  of  speculative  reason  is  the 
concept  of  the  universe.  For  nature  is  really  the  only 
object  given  to  us  in  regard  to  which  reason  requires 
regulative  principles.  Nature,  however,  is  twofold,  either 
thinking  or  corporeal.  In  order  to  think  the  internal 
possibility  of  the  latter,  that  is,  in  order  to  determine  the 
application  of  the  categories  to  it,  we  require  no  idea,  that 
is,  no  representation  which  transcends  experience.  Nor 
is  such  an  idea  possible  in  regard  to  it,  because  we  are 
here  guided  by  sensuous  intuition  only,  different  from 


550 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


what  it  was  in  the  case  of  the  psychological  fundamental 
concept  of  the  I,  which  contains  a priori  a certain  form  of 
thought,  namely,  the  unity  of  the  I.  There  remains  there- 
fore for  pure  reason  nothing  to  deal  with  but  [p.  685] 
nature  in  general,  and  the  completeness  of  its  conditions 
according  to  some  principle.  The  absolute  totality  of  the 
series  of  these  conditions  determining  the  derivation  of  all 
their  members,  is  an  idea  which,  though  never  brought  to 
perfection  in  the  empirical  use  of  reason,  may  yet  become 
a rule,  telling  us  how  to  proceed  in  the  explanation  of 
given  phenomena  (whether  in  an  ascending  or  descending 
line),  namely,  as  if  the  series  were  in  themselves  infinite, 
that  is,  in  uidefiniturn  ; while,  when  reason  itself  is  con- 
sidered as  the  determining  cause  (in  freedom),  in  the  case 
of  practical  principles  therefore,  we  must  proceed  as  if  we 
had  to  deal,  not  with  an  object  of  the  senses,  but  with  one 
of  the  pure  understanding.  Here  the  conditions  are  no 
longer  placed  within  the  series  of  phenomena,  but  outside 
it,  and  the  series  of  states  considered,  as  if  it  had  an  ab- 
solute beginning  through  an  intelligible  cause.  All  this 
proves  that  cosmological  ideas  are  nothing  but  regulative 
principles,  and  by  no  means  constitutive,  as  establishing  a 
real  totality  of  such  series.  The  remainder  of  this  argu- 
ment may  be  seen  in  its  place,  namely,  in  the  chapter  on 
the  Antinomy  of  Pure  Reason. 

The  third  idea  of  pure  reason,  containing  a merely 
relative  hypothesis  of  a Being  which  is  the  only  and  all- 
sufficient  cause  of  all  cosmological  series,  is  the  idea  of 
God.  We  have  not  the  slightest  ground  to  [p.  686] 
admit  absolutely  the  object  of  that  idea  (to  suppose  it  in 
itself) ; for  what  could  enable,  or  even  justify  us  in  be- 
lieving or  asserting  a Being  of  the  highest  perfection,  and 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


55i 


absolutely  necessary  from  its  very  nature,  on  the  strength 
of  its  concept  only,  except  the  world  with  reference  to 
which  alone  such  an  hypothesis  may  be  called  necessary  ? 
We  then  perceive  that  the  idea  of  it,  like  all  speculative 
ideas,  means  no  more  than  that  reason  requires  us  to  con- 
sider all  connection  in  the  world  according  to  the  princi- 
ples of  a systematical  unity,  and,  therefore,  as  if  the  whole 
of  it  had  sprung  from  a single  all-embracing  Being,  as  its 
highest  and  all-sufficient  cause.  We  see,  therefore,  that 
reason  can  have  no  object  here  but  its  own  formal  rule  in 
the  extension  of  its  empirical  use,  but  can  never  aim  at 
extension  beyond  all  limits  of  its  empirical  application. 
This  idea,  therefore,  does  not  involve  a constitutive  princi- 
ple of  its  use  as  applied  to  possible  experience. 

The  highest  formal  unity,  which  is  based  on  concepts  of 
reason  alone,  is  the  systematical  and  purposeful  unity  of 
things,  and  it  is  the  speculative  interest  of  reason  which 
makes  it  necessary  to  regard  all  order  in  the  world  as  if 
it  had  originated  in  the  purpose  of  a supreme  wisdom. 
Such  a principle  opens  to  our  reason  in  the  field  of  experi- 
ence quite  new  views,  how  to  connect  the  things  [p.  687] 
of  the  world  according  to  teleological  laws,  and  thus  to 
arrive  at  their  greatest  systematical  unity.  The  admis- 
sion of  a highest  intelligence,  as  the  only  cause  of  the 
universe,  though  in  the  idea  only,  can  therefore  always 
benefit  reason,  and  yet  never  injure  it.  For  if,  with  re- 
gard to  the  figure  of  the  earth  (which  is  round,  though 
somewhat  flattened 1),  of  mountains,  and  seas,  etc.,  we 

1 The  advantage  which  arises  from  the  circular  shape  of  the  earth  is  well 
known;  but  few  only  know  that  its  flattening,  which  gives  it  the  form  of  a 
spheroid,  alone  prevents  the  elevations  of  continents,  or  even  of  smaller  vol- 
canically raised  mountains,  from  continuously  and,  within  no  very  great  space 


552 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


admit  at  once  nothing  but  wise  intentions  of  their  author, 
we  are  enabled  to  make  in  this  wise  a number  of  impor- 
tant discoveries.  If  we  keep  to  this  hypothesis  as  a purely 
regulative  principle,  even  error  cannot  hurt  us  much  ; for 
the  worst  that  could  happen  would  be  that,  when  we 
expected  a teleological  connection  ( nexus  Jinalis),  we  only 
find  a mechanical  or  physical  (nexus  cffcctivus),  in  which 
case  we  merely  lose  an  additional  unity,  but  we  [p.  688] 
do  not  destroy  the  unity  of  reason  in  its  empirical  applica- 
tion. And  even  this  failure  could  not  affect  the  law  itself, 
in  its  general  and  teleological  character.  For  although  an 
anatomist  may  be  convicted  of  error,  if  referring  any 
member  of  an  animal  body  to  a purpose  of  which  it  can 
clearly  be  shown  that  it  does  not  belong  to  it,  it  is 
entirely  impossible  in  any  given  case  to  prove  that  an 
arrangement  of  nature,  be  it  what  it  may,  has  no  purpose 
at  all.  Medical  physiology,  therefore,  enlarges  its  very 
limited  empirical  knowledge  of  the  purposes  of  the  mem- 
bers of  an  organic  body  by  a principle  inspired  by  pure 
reason  only,  so  far  as  to  admit  confidently,  and  with  the 
approbation  of  all  intelligent  persons,  that  everything  in 
an  animal  has  its  purpose  and  advantage.  Such  a suppo- 
sition, if  used  constitutively,  goes  far  beyond  where  our 
present  observation  would  justify  us  in  going,  which 
shows  that  it  is  nothing  but  a regulative  principle  of  rea- 
son, leading  us  on  to  the  highest  systematical  unity,  by 


of  time,  considerably  altering  the  axis  of  the  earth.  The  protuberance  of  the 
earth  at  the  equator  forms  however  so  considerable  a mountain,  that  the 
impetus  of  every  other  mountain  can  never  drive  it  perceptibly  out  of  its 
position  with  reference  to  the  axis  of  the  earth.  And  yet  people  do  not  hesi- 
tate to  explain  this  wise  arrangement  simply  from  the  equilibrium  of  the  once 
fluid  mass. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


553 


the  idea  of  an  intelligent  causality  in  the  supreme  cause  of 
the  world,  and  by  the  supposition  that  this,  as  the  highest 
intelligence,  is  the  cause  of  everything,  according  to  the 
wisest  design. 

But  if  we  remove  this  restriction  of  the  idea  [p.  68 9] 
to  a merely  regulative  use,  reason  is  led  away  in  many 
ways.  It  leaves  the  ground  of  experience,  which  ought 
always  to  show  the  vestiges  of  its  progress,  and  ventures 
beyond  it  to  what  is  inconceivable  and  unsearchable,  be- 
coming giddy  from  the  very  height  of  it,  and  from  seeing 
itself  on  that  high  standpoint  entirely  cut  off  from  its 
proper  work  in  agreement  with  experience. 

The  first  fault  which  arises  from  our  using  the  idea  of  a 
Supreme  Being,  not  regulatively  only,  but  (contrary  to  the 
nature  of  an  idea)  constitutively,  is  what  I call  the  indo- 
lence of  reason  ( ignava  ratio1).  We  may  so  term  every 
principle  which  causes  us  to  look  on  our  investigation  of 
nature,  wherever  it  may  be,  as  absolutely  complete,  so 
that  reason  may  rest  as  if  her  task  were  fully  [p.  690] 
accomplished.  Thus  the  task  of  reason  is  rendered  very 
easy  even  by  the  psychological  idea,  if  that  idea  is  used  as 
a constitutive  principle  for  the  explanation  of  the  phe- 
nomena of  our  soul,  and  afterwards  even  for  the  extension 
of  our  knowledge  of  this  subject  beyond  all  possible 
experience  (its  state  after  death)  ; but  the  natural  use  of 
reason,  under  the  guidance  of  experience,  is  thus  entirely 


1 This  was  a name  given  by  the  old  dialecticians  to  a sophistical  argument, 
which  ran  thus:  If  it  is  your  fate  that  you  should  recover  from  this  illness, 
you  will  recover,  whether  you  send  for  a doctor  or  not.  Cicero  says  that 
this  argument  was  called  ignava  ratio , because,  if  we  followed  it,  reason 
would  have  no  use  at  all  in  life.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  I apply  the  same 
name  to  this  sophistical  argument  of  pure  reason. 


554 


T?'a?iscendental  Dialectic 


ruined  and  destroyed.  The  dogmatical  spiritualist  finds 
no  difficulty  in  explaining  the  unchanging  unity  of  the 
person,  amidst  all  the  changes  of  condition,  from  the  unity 
of  the  thinking  substance,  which  he  imagines  he  perceives 
directly  in  the  I;  — or  the  interest  which  we  take  in 
things  that  are  to  happen  after  death,  from  the  conscious- 
ness of  the  immaterial  nature  of  our  thinking  subject,  and 
so  on.  He  dispenses  with  all  investigations  of  the  origin 
of  these  internal  phenomena  from  physical  causes,  passing 
by,  as  it  were,  by  a decree  of  transcendent  reason,  the 
immanent  sources  of  knowledge  given  by  experience. 
This  may  be  convenient  to  himself,  but  involves  a sacri- 
fice of  all  real  insight.  These  detrimental  consequences 
become  still  more  palpable  in  the  dogmatism  involved  in 
our  idea  of  a supreme  intelligence,  and  of  the  theological 
system  of  nature,  erroneously  based  on  it  (physico-theol- 
ogy).  For  here  all  the  aims  which  we  observe  [p.  691] 
in  nature,  many  of  which  we  only  imagined  ourselves, 
serve  to  make  the  investigation  of  causes  extremely  easy, 
if,  instead  of  looking  for  them  in  the  general  mechanical 
laws  of  matter,  we  appeal  directly  to  the  unsearchable 
counsel  of  the  supreme  wisdom,  imagining  the  efforts  of 
our  reason  as  ended,  when  we  have  really  dispensed  with 
its  employment,  which  nowhere  finds  its  proper  guidance, 
except  where  the  order  of  nature  and  the  succession  of 
changes,  according  to  their  own  internal  and  general  laws, 
supply  it.  This  error  may  be  avoided,  if  we  do  not  merely 
consider  certam  parts  of  nature,  such  as  the  distribution 
of  land,  its  structure,  the  constitution  and  direction  of 
certain  mountains,  or  even  the  organisation  of  plants  and 
animals,  from  the  standpoint  of  final  aims,  but  look  upon 
this  systematical  unity  of  nature  as  something  general,  in 


Transce7idental  Dialectic 


555 


relation  to  the  idea  of  a supreme  intelligence.  For,  in 
this  case,  we  look  upon  nature  as  founded  on  intelligent 
purposes,  according  to  general  laws,  no  particular  arrange- 
ment of  nature  being  exempt  from  them,  but  only  exhibit- 
ing them  more  or  less  distinctly.  We  have  then,  in  fact, 
a regulative  principle  of  the  systematical  unity  in  a teleo- 
logical connection,  though  we  do  not  determine  it  before- 
hand, but  only  look  forward  to  it  expectantly,  while  follow- 
ing up  the  physico-mechanical  connection  accord-  [p.  692] 
ing  to  general  laws.  In  this  way  alone  can  the  principle  of 
systematical  and  intelligent  unity  enlarge  the  use  of  rea- 
son with  reference  to  experience,  without  at  any  time 
being  prejudicial  to  it. 

The  second  error,  arising  from  the  misapprehension 
of  the  principle  of  systematical  unity,  is  that  of  per- 
verted reason  (; perversa  ratio,  varepov  nporepov  rationis). 
The  idea  of  systematic  unity  was  only  intended  as  a 
regulative  principle  for  discovering  that  unity,  accord- 
ing to  general  laws,  in  the  connection  of  things,  be- 
lieving that  we  have  approached  the  completeness  of 
its  use  by  exactly  so  much  as  we  have  discovered  of 
it  empirically,  though  never  able  to  reach  it  fully.  In- 
stead of  this,  the  procedure  is  reversed ; the  reality  of 
a principle  of  systematical  unity  is  at  once  admitted  and 
hypostasised,  the  concept  of  such  a supreme  intelligence, 
though  being  in  itself  entirely  inscrutable,  is  determined 
anthropomorphically,  and  aims  are  afterwards  imposed 
on  nature  violently  and  dictatorially,  instead  of  looking 
for  them  by  means  of  physical  investigation.  Thus 
teleology,  which  was  meant  to  supplement  the  unity  of 
nature  according  to  general  laws,  contributes  only  [693] 
to  destroy  it,  and  reason  deprives  itself  of  its  own  aim, 


556 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


namely,  that  of  proving  the  existence  of  such  an  intelli- 
gent supreme  cause  from  nature.  For,  if  we  may  not 
presuppose  a priori  the  most  perfect  design  in  nature 
as  belonging  to  its  very  essence,  what  should  direct 
us  to  look  for  it,  and  to  try  to  approach  by  degrees  to 
the  highest  perfection  of  an  author,  that  is,  to  an  abso- 
lutely necessary  and  a priori  intelligible  perfection  ? The 
regulative  principle  requires  us  to  admit  absolutely,  and 
as  following  from  the  very  nature  of  things,  systematical 
unity  as  an  unity  of  nature,  which  has  not  only  to  be 
known  empirically,  but  must  be  admitted  a priori,  though 
as  yet  in  an  indefinite  form  only.  But  if  I begin  with  a 
supreme  ordaining  Being,  as  the  ground  of  all  things,  the 
unity  of  nature  is  really  surrendered  as  being  quite 
foreign  to  the  nature  of  things,  purely  contingent,  and 
not  to  be  known  from  its  own  general  laws.  Thus 
arises  a vicious  circle  by  our  presupposing  what,  in  reality, 
ought  to  have  been  proved. 

To  mistake  the  regulative  principle  of  the  systemat- 
ical unity  of  nature  for  a constitutive  principle,  and  to  pre- 
suppose hypostatically  as  cause,  what  is  only  in  the  idea 
made  the  foundation  for  the  consistent  use  of  [p.  694] 
reason,  is  simply  to  confound  reason.  The  investigation 
of  nature  pursues  its  own  course,  guided  by  the  chain 
of  natural  causes  only,  according  to  general  laws.  It 
knows  the  idea  of  an  author,  but  not  in  order  to  derive 
from  it  that  system  of  purposes  which  it  tries  to  discover 
everywhere,  but  in  order  to  recognise  his  existence  from 
those  purposes,  which  are  sought  in  the  essence  of 
the  things  of  nature,  and,  if  possible,  also  in  the  essence 
of  all  things  in  general,  and  consequently  to  recognise  his 
existence  as  absolutely  necessary.  Whether  this  succeeds 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


557 


or  not,  the  idea  itself  remains  always  true,  as  well  as  its 
use,  if  only  it  is  restricted  to  the  conditions  of  a merely 
regulative  principle. 

Complete  unity  of  design  constitutes  perfection  (abso- 
lutely considered).  If  we  do  not  find  such  perfection 
in  the  nature  of  the  things  which  form  the  object  of  ex- 
perience, that  is,  of  all  our  objectively  valid  knowledge ; 
if  we  do  not  find  it  in  the  general  and  necessary  laws  of 
nature,  how  shall  we  thence  infer  the  idea  of  a supreme 
and  absolutely  necessary  perfection  of  an  original  Being, 
as  the  origin  of  all  causality  ? The  greatest  systematical 
and,  therefore,  well-planned  unity  teaches  us,  and  first 
enables  us,  to  make  the  widest  use  of  human  reason,  and 
that  idea  is,  therefore,  inseparably  connected  with  [p.  695] 
the  very  nature  of  our  reason.  That  idea  becomes,  in 
fact,  to  us  a law,  and  hence  it  is  very  natural  for  us 
to  assume  a corresponding  lawgiving  reason  ( intellectus 
archetypus)  from  which,  as  the  object  of  our  reason,  all 
systematical  unity  of  nature  should  be  derived. 

When  discussing  the  antinomy  of  pure  reason,  we 
remarked  that  all  questions  raised  by  pure  reason  must 
admit  of  an  answer,  and  that  the  excuse  derived  from  the 
natural  limits  of  our  knowledge,  which  in  many  ques- 
tions concerning  nature  is  as  inevitable  as  it  is  just,  can- 
not be  admitted  here,  because  questions  are  here  placed 
before  us  through  the  very  nature  of  our  reason,  refer- 
ring entirely  to  its  own  natural  constitution,  and  not  to 
the  nature  of  things.  We  have  now  an  opportunity  of 
confirming  this  assertion  of  ours,  which  at  first  sight  may 
have  appeared  rash,  with  regard  to  the  two  questions  in 
which  pure  reason  takes  the  greatest  interest,  and  of  thus 
bringing  to  perfection  our  considerations  on  the  Dialectic 
of  pure  reason. 


558 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


If,  then,  we  are  asked  the  question  (with  reference  to 
a transcendental  theology),1  First , whether  there  is  some- 
thing different  from  the  world,  containing  the  [p.  696] 
ground  of  the  order  of  the  world  and  of  its  connection 
according  to  general  laws?  our  answer  is,  Certainly  there 
is.  For  the  world  is  a sum  of  phenomena,  and  there 
must,  therefore,  be  some  transcendental  ground  of  it,  that 
is,  a ground  to  be  thought  by  the  pure  understanding 
only.  If,  secondly , we  are  asked  whether  that  Being  is 
a substance  of  the  greatest  reality,  necessary,  etc.  ? our 
answer  is,  that  such  a question  has  710  meanuig  at  all. 
For  all  the  categories  by  which  I can  try  to  frame  to  my- 
self a concept  of  such  an  object  admit  of  none  but  an 
empirical  use,  and  have  no  meaning  at  all,  unless  they 
are  applied  to  objects  of  possible  experience,  that  is,  to 
the  world  of  sense.  Outside  that  field  they  are  mere 
titles  of  concepts,  which  we  may  admit,  but  by  which  we 
can  understand  nothing.  If,  thirdly , the  question  is 
asked,  whether  we  may  not  at  least  conceive  this  Being, 
which  is  different  from  the  world,  in  aiialogy  with  the 
objects  of  experience?  our  answer  is,  Certamly  we  may , 
but  only  as  an  object  in  the  idea,  and  not  in  the 
reality,  that  is,  in  so  far  only  as  it  remains  a [p.  697] 
substratum,  unknown  to  us,  of  the  systematic  unity, 
order,  and  design  of  the  world,  which  reason  is  obliged 
to  adopt  as  a regulative  principle  in  the  investigation  of 

1 After  what  I have  said  before  about  the  psychological  idea,  and  its  proper 
destination  to  serve  as  a regulative  principle  only  for  the  use  of  reason,  there 
is  no  necessity  for  my  discussing  separately  and  in  full  detail  the  transcendental 
illusion  which  leads  us  to  represent  hypostatically  that  systematical  unity  of 
the  manifold  phenomena  of  the  internal  sense.  The  procedure  would  here  be 
very  similar  to  that  which  we  are  following  in  our  criticism  of  the  theological 
ideal. 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


559 


nature.  Nay,  more,  we  need  not  be  afraid  to  admit  cer- 
tain anthropomorphisms  in  that  idea,  which  favour  the 
regulative  principle  of  our  investigations.  For  it  always 
remains  an  idea  only,  which  is  never  referred  directly  to 
a Being,  different  from  the  world,  but  only  to  the  regu- 
lative principle  of  the  systematical  unity  of  the  world, 
and  this  by  some  schema  of  it,  namely,  that  of  a supreme 
intelligence,  being  the  author  of  it,  for  the  wisest  pur- 
poses. It  was  not  intended  that  by  it  we  should  try  to 
form  a conception  of  what  that  original  cause  of  the 
unity  of  the  world  may  be  by  itself ; it  was  only  meant 
to  teach  us  how  to  use  it,  or  rather  its  idea,  with  refer- 
ence to  the  systematical  use  of  reason,  applied  to  the 
things  of  the  world. 

But,  surely,  people  will  proceed  to  ask,  we  may,  accord- 
ing to  this,  admit  a wise  and  omnipotent  Author  of  the 
world  ? Certainly,  we  answer,  and  not  only  we  may,  but 
we  must.  In  that  case,  therefore,  we  surely  extend  our 
knowledge  beyond  the  field  of  possible  experience  ? By 
7io  7neans.  For  we  have  only  presupposed  a something 
of  which  we  have  no  conception  whatever  as  to  [p.  698] 
what  it  is  by  itself  (as  a purely  transcendental  object).  We 
have  only,  with  reference  to  the  systematical  and  well- 
designed  order  of  the  world,  which  we  must  presuppose, 
if  we  are  to  study  nature  at  all,  presented  to  ourselves 
that  unknown  Being  in  aiialogy  with  what  is  an  empirical 
concept,  namely,  an  intelligence  ; that  is,  we  have,  with 
reference  to  the  purposes  and  the  perfection  which  de- 
pend on  it,  attributed  to  it  those  very  qualities  on  which, 
according  to  the  conditions  of  our  reason,  such  a syste- 
matical unity  may  depend.  That  idea,  therefore,  is 
entirely  founded  on  the  eryiployynent  of  our  reason  in  the 


560 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


world,  and  if  we  were  to  attribute  to  it  absolute  and 
objective  validity,  we  should  be  forgetting  that  it  is  only 
a Being  in  the  idea  which  we  think  : and  as  we  should 
then  be  taking  our  start  from  a cause,  that  cannot  be 
determined  by  mundane  considerations,  we  should  no 
longer  be  able  to  employ  that  principle  in  accordance 
with  the  empirical  use  of  reason. 

But  people  will  go  on  to  ask,  May  we  not  then  in  this 
way  use  that  concept,  and  the  supposition  of  a Supreme 
Being  in  a rational  consideration  of  the  world  ? No  doubt 
we  may,  and  it  was  for  that  very  purpose  that  that  idea 
of  reason  was  established.  And  if  it  be  asked  whether 
we  may  look  upon  arrangements  in  nature  which  have 
all  the  appearance  of  design,  as  real  designs,  and  trace 
them  back  to  a divine  will,  though  with  the  [p.  699] 
intervention  of  certain  arrangements  in  the  world,  we 
answer  again,  Yes,  but  only  on  condition  that  it  be  the 
same  to  you  whether  we  say  that  the  divine  wisdom  has 
arranged  everything  for  the  highest  purposes,  or  whether 
we  take  the  idea  of  the  supreme  wisdom  as  our  rule  in 
the  investigation  of  nature,  and  as  the  principle  of  its 
systematical  and  well-planned  unity  according  to  general 
laws,  even  when  we  are  not  able  to  perceive  that  unity. 
In  other  words,  it  must  be  the  same  to  you,  when  you 
do  perceive  it,  whether  we  say,  God  has  wisely  willed  it 
so,  or  nature  has  wisely  arranged  it  so.  For  it  was  that 
greatest  systematical  and  well-planned  unity,  required  by 
your  reason  as  the  regulative  principle  of  all  investigation 
of  nature,  which  gave  you  the  right  to  admit  the  idea 
of  a supreme  intelligence  as  the  schema  of  that  regulative 
principle.  As  much  of  design,  therefore,  as  you  discover 
in  the  world,  according  to  that  principle,  so  much  of  con- 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


56i 

firmation  has  the  legitimacy  of  your  idea  received.  But 
as  that  principle  was  only  intended  for  finding  the  neces- 
sary and  greatest  possible  unity  in  nature,  we  shall,  no 
doubt,  owe  that  unity,  so  far  as  we  may  find  it,  to  our 
idea  of  a Supreme  Being ; but  we  cannot,  without  con- 
tradicting ourselves,  ignore  the  general  laws  of  nature 
for  which  that  idea  was  adopted,  or  look  upon  the 
designs  of  nature  as  contingent  and  hyper-  [p.  700] 
physical  in  their  origin.  For  we  were  not  justified  in 
admitting  a Being  endowed  with  those  qualities  as  above 
nature  (hyperphysical),  but  only  in  using  the  idea  of  it 
in  order  to  be  able  to  look  on  all  phenomena  1 as  being 
systematically  connected  among  themselves,  in  analogy 
with  a causal  determination. 

For  the  same  reason  we  are  justified,  not  only  in  repre- 
senting to  ourselves  the  cause  of  the  world  in  our  idea 
according  to  a subtle  kind  of  anthropomorphism  (without 
which  we  can  think  nothing  of  it),  as  a Being  endowed 
with  understanding,  the  feelings  of  pleasure  and  displeas- 
ure, and  accordingly  with  desire  and  will,  but  also  in  at- 
tributing to  it  infinite  perfection,  which  therefore  far 
transcends  any  perfection  known  to  us  from  the  empirical 
knowledge  of  the  order  of  the  world.  For  the  regulative 
law  of  systematical  unity  requires  that  we  should  study 
nature  as  if  there  existed  in  it  everywhere,  with  the 
greatest  possible  variety,  an  infinitely  systematical  and 
well-planned  unity.  And  although  we  can  discover  but 
little  of  that  perfection  of  the  world,  it  is  nevertheless  a 
law  of  our  reason,  always  to  look  for  it  and  to  expect  it ; 
and  it  must  be  beneficial,  and  can  never  be  hurtful,  to 

1 Instead  of  der  Erscheinungen  read  die  Erscheinungen. 


20 


562 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


carry  on  the  investigation  of  nature  according  to  this 
principle.  But  in  admitting  this  fundamental  [p.  701] 
idea  of  a Supreme  Author,  it  is  clear  that  I do  not  admit 
the  existence  and  knowledge  of  such  a Being,  but  its  idea 
only,  and  that  in  reality  I do  not  derive  anything  from 
that  Being,  but  only  from  the  idea  of  it,  that  is,  from  the 
nature  of  the  things  of  the  world,  according  to  such  an 
idea.  It  seems  also,  as  if  a certain,  though  undeveloped 
consciousness  of  the  true  use  of  this  concept  of  reason 
had  dictated  the  modest  and  reasonable  language  of  phi- 
losophers of  all  times,  when  they  use  such  expressions  as 
the  wisdom  and  providence  of  nature  as  synonymous  with 
divine  wisdom,  nay,  even  prefer  the  former  expression, 
when  dealing  with  speculative  reason  only,  as  avoiding 
the  pretension  of  a greater  assertion  than  we  are  entitled 
to  make,  and  at  the  same  time  restricting  reason  to  its 
proper  field,  namely,  nature. 

Thus  we  find  that  pure  reason,  which  at  first  seemed 
to  promise  nothing  less  than  extension  of  our  knowledge 
beyond  all  limits  of  experience,  contains,  if  properly  under- 
stood, nothing  but  regulative  principles,  which  indeed 
postulate  greater  unity  than  the  empirical  use  of  the 
understanding  can  ever  achieve,  but  which,  by  the  very 
fact  that  they  place  the  goal  which  has  to  be  reached  at 
so  great  a distance,  carry  the  agreement  of  the  under- 
standing with  itself  by  means  of  systematical  [p.  702] 
unity  to  the  highest  possible  degree  ; while,  if  they  are 
misunderstood  and  mistaken  for  constitutive  principles  of 
transcendent  knowledge,  they  produce,  by  a brilliant  but 
deceptive  illusion,  some  kind  of  persuasion  and  imaginary 
knowledge,  but,  at  the  same  time,  constant  contradictions 
and  disputes. 


Transcendental  Dialectic  563 

Thus  all  human  knowledge  begins  with  intuitions,  ad 
vances  to  concepts,  and  ends  with  ideas.  Although  with 
reference  to  every  one  of  these  three  elements,  it  pos- 
sesses a priori  sources  of  knowledge,  which  at  first  sight 
seemed  to  despise  the  limits  of  all  experience,  a perfect 
criticism  soon  convinces  us,  that  reason,  in  its  speculative 
use,  can  never  get  with  these  elements  beyond  the  field 
of  possible  experience,  and  that  it  is  the  true  destination 
of  that  highest  faculty  of  knowledge  to  use  all  methods 
and  principles  of  reason  with  one  object  only,  namely,  to 
follow  up  nature  into  her  deepest  recesses,  according  to 
every  principle  of  unity,  the  unity  of  design  being  the 
most  important,  but  never  to  soar  above  its  limits,  outside 
of  which  there  is  for  us  nothing  but  empty  space.  No 
doubt,  the  critical  examination  of  all  propositions  which 
seemed  to  be  able  to  enlarge  our  knowledge  [p.  703] 
beyond  real  experience,  as  given  in  the  transcendental 
Analytic,  has  fully  convinced  us  that  they  could  never 
lead  to  anything  more  than  to  a possible  experience  ; and, 
if  people  were  not  suspicious  even  of  the  clearest,  but 
abstract  and  general  doctrines,  and  charming  and  specious 
prospects  did  not  tempt  us  to  throw  off  the  restraint  of 
those  doctrines,  we  might  indeed  have  dispensed  with 
the  laborious  examination  of  all  the  dialectical  witnesses 
which  a transcendent  reason  brings  into  court  in  support 
of  her  pretensions.  We  knew  beforehand  with  perfect 
certainty  that  all  these  pretensions,  though  perhaps  hon- 
estly meant,  were  absolutely  untenable,  because  they  re- 
late to  a kind  of  knowledge  to  which  man  can  never 
attain.  But  we  know  that  there  is  no  end  of  talk,  unless 
the  true  cause  of  the  illusion,  by  which  even  the  wisest 
are  deceived,  has  been  clearly  exhibited.  We  also  know 


564 


Transcendental  Dialectic 


that  the  analysis  of  all  our  transcendent  knowledge  into 
its  elements  (as  a study  of  our  own  internal  nature)  has 
no  little  value  in  itself,  and  to  a philosopher  is  really  a 
matter  of  duty.  We  therefore  thought  that  it  was  not 
only  necessary  to  follow  up  the  whole  of  this  vain  treat- 
ment of  speculative  reason  to  its  first  sources,  but  con- 
sidered it  advisable  also,  as  the  dialectical  illusion  does 
here  not  only  deceive  the  judgment,  but,  owing  to  the 
interest  which  we  take  in  the  judgment,  possesses  and 
always  will  possess  a certain  natural  and  irresist-  [p.  704] 
ible  charm,  to  write  down  the  records  of  this  lawsuit  in 
full  detail,  and  to  deposit  them  in  the  archives  of  human 
reason,  to  prevent  for  the  future  all  errors  of  a similar 
kind. 


CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON 

[p-  70s] 


METHOD  OF  TRANSCENDENTALISM 


THE 


METHOD  OF  TRANSCENDENTALISM 

If  we  look  upon  the  whole  knowledge  of  pure  [p.  707] 
and  speculative  reason  as  an  edifice  of  which  we  possess 
at  least  the  idea  within  ourselves,  we  may  say  that  in  the 
Elements  of  Transcendentalism  we  made  an  estimate  of 
the  materials  and  determined  for  what  kind  of  edifice  and 
of  what  height  and  solidity  they  would  suffice.  We  found 
that  although  we  had  thought  of  a tower  that  would  reach 
to  the  sky,  the  supply  of  materials  would  suffice  for  a 
dwelling-house  only,  sufficiently  roomy  for  all  our  business 
on  the  level  plain  of  experience,  and  high  enough  to  enable 
us  to  survey  it  : and  that  the  original  bold  undertaking 
could  not  but  fail  for  want  of  materials,  not  to  mention 
the  confusion  of  tongues  which  inevitably  divided  the 
labourers  in  their  views  of  the  building,  and  scattered 
them  over  all  the  world,  where  each  tried  to  erect  his 
own  building  according  to  his  own  plan.  At  present, 
however,  we  are  concerned  not  so  much  with  the  material 
as  with  the  plan,  and  though  we  have  been  warned  not  to 
venture  blindly  on  a plan  which  may  be  beyond  our 
powers,  we  cannot  altogether  give  up  the  erection  of  a 
solid  dwelling,  but  have  to  make  the  plan  for  a building 
in  proportion  to  the  material  which  we  possess,  and  suf- 
ficient for  all  our  real  wants.  This  determination  of  the 
formal  conditions  of  a complete  system  of  pure  reason  I 

567 


568 


Method  of  Transcendentalism 


call  the  Method  of  Transcendentalism.  We  [p.  708] 
shall  here  have  to  treat  of  a discipline , a canon , an  archi- 
tectonic, and  lastly,  a history  of  pure  reason,  and  shall 
have  to  do,  from  a transcendental  point  of  view,  what 
the  schools  attempt,  but  fail  to  carry  out  properly,  with 
regard  to  the  use  of  the  understanding  in  general,  under 
the  name  of  practical  logic.  The  reason  of  this  failure  is 
that  general  logic  is  not  limited  to  any  particular  kind  of 
knowledge,  belonging  to  the  understanding  (not  for  in- 
stance to  its  pure  knowledge),  nor  to  certain  objects. 
It  cannot,  therefore,  without  borrowing  knowledge  from 
other  sciences,  do  more  than  produce  titles  of  possible 
methods  and  technical  terms  which  are  used  in  different 
sciences  in  reference  to  their  systematical  arrangement, 
so  that  the  pupil  becomes  acquainted  with  names  only, 
the  meaning  and  application  of  which  he  has  to  learn 
afterwards. 


METHOD  OF  TRANSCENDENTALISM 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  DISCIPLINE  OF  PURE  REASON 

Negative  judgments,  being  negative  not  only  in  their 
logical  form,  but  in  their  contents  also,  do  not  enjoy  a very 
high  reputation  among  persons  desirous  of  increasing 
human  knowledge.  They  are  even  looked  upon  as 
jealous  enemies  of  our  never-ceasing  desire  for  [p.  709] 
knowledge,  and  we  have  almost  to  produce  an  apology,  in 
order  to  secure  for  them  toleration,  or  favour  and  esteem. 

No  doubt,  all  propositions  may  logically  be  expressed 
as  negative  : but  when  we  come  to  the  question  whether 
the  contents  of  our  knowledge  are  enlarged  or  restricted 
by  a judgment,  we  find  that  the  proper  object  of  negative 
judgments  is  solely  to  prevent  error.  Hence  negative 
propositions,  intended  to  prevent  erroneous  knowledge 
in  cases  where  error  is  never  possible,  may  no  doubt  be 
very  true,  but  they  are  empty,  they  do  not  answer  any 
purpose,  and  sound  therefore  often  absurd ; like  the  well- 
known  utterance  of  a rhetorician,  that  Alexander  could  not 
have  conquered  any  countries  without  an  army. 

But  in  cases  where  the  limits  of  our  possible  knowledge 
are  very  narrow,  where  the  temptation  to  judge  is  great, 
the  illusion  which  presents  itself  very  deceptive,  and  the 
evil  consequences  of  error  very  considerable,  the  negative 

569 


S7o 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


element,  though  it  teaches  us  only  how  to  avoid  errors, 
has  even  more  value  than  much  of  that  positive  instruction 
which  adds  to  the  stock  of  our  knowledge.  The  restraint 
which  checks  our  constant  inclination  to  deviate  from 
certain  rules,  and  at  last  destroys  it,  is  called  discipline. 
It  is  different  from  culture,  which  is  intended  to  form  a 
certain  kind  of  skill,  without  destroying  another  kind 
which  is  already  present.  In  forming  a talent,  therefore, 
which  has  in  itself  an  impulse  to  manifest  itself,  [p.  710] 
discipline  will  contribute  a negative,1  culture  and  doctrine 
a positive,  influence. 

That  our  temperament  and  various  talents  which  like 
to  indulge  in  free  and  unchecked  exercise  (such  as  imag- 
ination and  wit)  require  some  kind  of  discipline,  will  easily 
be  allowed  by  everybody.  But  that  reason,  whose  proper 
duty  it  is  to  prescribe  a discipline  to  all  other  endeavours, 
should  itself  require  such  discipline,  may  seem  strange 
indeed.  It  has  in  fact  escaped  that  humiliation  hitherto, 
because,  considering  the  solemnity  and  thorough  self- 
possession  in  its  behaviour,  no  one  has  suspected  it  of 
thoughtlessly  putting  imaginations  in  the  place  of  concepts, 
and  words  in  the  place  of  things. 

In  its  empirical  use  reason  does  not  require  such 
criticism,  because  its  principles  are  constantly  subject 
to  the  test  of  experience.  Nor  is  such  criticism  [p.  7 n] 
required  in  mathematics,  where  the  concepts  of  reason 

1 I am  well  aware  that  in  the  language  of  the  schools,  discipline  is  used  as 
synonymous  with  instruction.  But  there  are  so  many  cases  in  which  the 
former  term,  in  the  sense  of  restraint , is  carefully  distinguished  from  the  latter 
in  the  sense  of  teaching , and  the  nature  of  things  makes  it  so  desirable  to  pre- 
serve the  only  suitable  expressions  for  that  distinction,  that  I hope  that  the 
former  term  may  never  be  allowed  to  be  used  in  any  but  a negative  meaning. 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


571 


must  at  once  be  represented  in  concreto  in  pure  intui- 
tion, so  that  everything  unfounded  and  arbitrary  is  at 
once  discovered.  But  when  neither  empirical  nor  pure 
intuition  keeps  reason  in  a straight  groove,  that  is,  when 
it  is  used  transcendently  and  according  to  mere  con- 
cepts, the  discipline  to  restrain  its  inclination  to  go  be- 
yond the  narrow  limits  of  possible  experience,  and  to 
keep  it  from  extravagance  and  error  is  so  necessary,  that 
the  whole  philosophy  of  pure  reason  is  really  concerned 
with  that  one  negative  discipline  only.  Single  errors 
may  be  corrected  by  censure , and  their  causes  removed 
by  criticism.  But  when,  as  in  pure  reason,  we  are  met 
by  a whole  system  of  illusions  and  fallacies,  well  connected 
among  themselves  and  united  by  common  principles, 
a separate  negative  code  seems  requisite,  which,  under 
the  name  of  a discipliiie,  should  erect  a system  of  caution 
and  self-examination,  founded  on  the  nature  of  reason 
and  of  the  objects  of  its  use,  before  which  no  false  sophis- 
tical illusion  could  stand,  but  should  at  once  betray  itself 
in  spite  of  all  excuses. 

It  should  be  well  borne  in  mind,  however,  [p.  712] 
that  in  this  second  division  of  the  transcendental  critique, 
I mean  to  direct  the  discipline  of  pure  reason  not  to  its 
contents,  but  only  to  the  method  of  its  knowledge.  The 
former  task  has  been  performed  in  the  Elements  of  Tran- 
scendentalism. There  is  so  much  similarity  in  the  use 
of  reason,  whatever  be  the  subject  to  which  it  is  applied, 
and  yet,  so  far  as  this  use  is  to  be  transcendental,  it 
is  so  essentially  different  from  every  other,  that,  with- 
out the  warning  voice  of  a discipline,  especially  devised 
for  that  purpose,  it  would  be  impossible  to  avoid  errors 
arising  necessarily  from  the  improper  application  of 


572 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reaso?i 


methods,  which  are  suitable  to  reason  in  other  spheres, 
only  not  quite  here. 

METHOD  OF  TRANSCENDENTALISM 
Section  I 

The  Discipline  of  Pure  Reason  in  its  Dogmatical  Use 

The  science  of  mathematics  presents  the  most  brill- 
iant example  of  how  pure  reason  may  successfully  enlarge 
its  domain  without  the  aid  of  experience.  Such  exam- 
ples are  always  contagious,  particularly  when  the  faculty 
is  the  same,  which  naturally  flatters  itself  that  it  will 
meet  with  the  same  success  in  other  cases  which  it  has 
had  in  one.  Thus  pure  reason  hopes  to  be  able  to  extend 
its  domain  as  successfully  and  as  thoroughly  [p.  713] 
in  its  transcendental  as  in  its  mathematical  employment ; 
particularly  if  it  there  follows  the  same  method  which 
has  proved  of  such  decided  advantage  elsewhere.  It  is, 
therefore,  of  great  consequence  for  us  to  know  whether 
the  method  of  arriving  at  apodictic  certainty,  which  in 
the  former  science  was  called  mathematical,  be  identical 
with  that  which  is  to  lead  us  to  the  same  certainty  in 
philosophy,  and  would  have  to  be  called  dogmatic. 

Philosophical  knowledge  is  that  which  reason  gains  from 
concepts,  mathematical,  that  which  it  gains  from  the  con- 
struction of  concepts.  By  constructing  a concept  I mean 
representing  a priori  the  intuition  corresponding  to  it. 
For  the  construction  of  a concept,  therefore,  a non-empiri- 
cal  intuition  is  required  which,  as  an  intuition,  is  a single 
object,  but  which,  nevertheless,  as  the  construction  of  a 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


573 


concept  (of  a general  representation)  must  express  in  the 
representation  something  that  is  generally  valid  for  all 
possible  intuitions  which  fall  under  the  same  concept. 
Thus  I construct  a triangle  by  representing  the  object 
corresponding  to  that  concept  either  by  mere  imagination, 
in  the  pure  intuition,  or,  afterwards  on  paper  also  in  the 
empirical  intuition,  and  in  both  cases  entirely  a priori 
without  having  borrowed  the  original  from  any  expe- 
rience. The  particular  figure  drawn  on  the  [p.  714] 
paper  is  empirical,  but  serves  nevertheless  to  express 
the  concept  without  any  detriment  to  its  generality,  be- 
cause, in  that  empirical  intuition,  we  consider  always 
the  act  of  the  construction  of  the  concept  only,  to  which 
many  determinations,  as,  for  instance,  the  magnitude  of 
the  sides  and  the  angles,  are  quite  indifferent,  these  differ- 
ences, which  do  not  change  the  concept  of  a triangle, 
being  entirely  ignored. 

Philosophical  knowledge,  therefore,  considers  the  par- 
ticular in  the  general  only,  mathematical,  the  general 
in  the  particular,  nay,  even  in  the  individual,  all  this, 
however,  a priori , and  by  means  of  reason  ; so  that,  as 
an  individual  figure  is  determined  by  certain  general  con- 
ditions of  construction,  the  object  of  the  concept,  of  which 
this  individual  figure  forms  only  the  schema,  must  be 
thought  of  as  universally  determined. 

The  essential  difference  between  these  two  modes 
of  the  knowledge  of  reason  consists,  therefore,  in  the 
form,  and  does  not  depend  on  any  difference  in  their 
matter  or  objects.  Those  who  thought  they  could  dis- 
tinguish philosophy  from  mathematics  by  saying  that 
the  former  was  concerned  with  quality  only,  the  latter 
with  quantity  only,  mistook  effect  for  cause.  It  is  owing 


574 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


to  the  form  of  mathematical  knowledge  that  it  can  refer 
o quanta  only,  because  it  is  only  the  concept  of  quanti- 
ties that  admits  of  construction,  that  is,  of  a priori  [p.  715] 
representation  in  intuition,  while  qualities  cannot  be  repre- 
sented in  any  but  empirical  intuition.  Hence  reason  can 
gain  a knowledge  of  qualities  by  concepts  only.  No  one 
can  take  an  intuition  corresponding  to  the  concept  of 
reality  from  anywhere  except  from  experience  ; we  can 
never  lay  hold  of  it  a priori  by  ourselves,  and  before  we 
have  had  an  empirical  consciousness  of  it.  We  can  form 
to  ourselves  an  intuition  of  a cone,  from  its  concept  alone, 
and  without  any  empirical  assistance,  but  the  colour  of 
this  cone  must  be  given  before,  in  some  experience  or 
other.  I cannot  represent  in  intuition  the  concept  of 
a cause  in  general  in  any  way  except  by  an  example 
supplied  by  experience,  etc.  Besides,  philosophy  treats  of 
quantities  quite  as  much  as  mathematics  ; for  instance, 
of  totality,  infinity,  etc.,  and  mathematics  treats  also  of 
the  difference  between  lines  and  planes,  as  spaces  of 
different  quality,  it  treats  further  of  the  continuity  of  ex- 
tension as  one  of  its  qualities.  But,  though  in  such 
cases  both  have  a common  object,  the  manner  in  which 
reason  treats  it  is  totally  different  in  philosophy  and 
mathematics.  The  former  is  concerned  with  general  con- 
cepts only,  the  other  can  do  nothing  with  the  pure  con- 
cept, but  proceeds  at  once  to  intuition,  in  which  it  looks 
upon  the  concept  in  concreto ; yet  not  in  an  [p.  716] 
empirical  intuition,  but  in  an  intuition  which  it  represents 
a priori,  that  is,  which  it  has  constructed  and  in  which, 
whatever  follows  from  the  general  conditions  of  the  con- 
struction, must  be  valid  in  general  of  the  object  of  the 
constructed  concept  also. 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason  575 

Let  us  give  to  a philosopher  the  concept  of  a triangle, 
and  let  him  find  out,  in  his  own  way,  what  relation  the 
sum  of  its  angles  bears  to  a right  angle.  Nothing  is 
given  him  but  the  concept  of  a figure,  enclosed  within 
three  straight  lines,  and  with  it  the  concept  of  as  many 
angles.  Now  he  may  ponder  on  that  concept  as  long 
as  he  likes,  he  will  never  discover  anything  new  in  it. 
He  may  analyse  the  concept  of  a straight  line  or  of  an 
angle,  or  of  the  number  three,  and  render  them  more 
clear,  but  he  will  never  arrive  at  other  qualities  which 
are  not  contained  in  those  concepts.  But  now  let  the 
geometrician  treat  the  same  question.  He  will  begin 
at  once  with  constructing  a triangle.  As  he  knows  that 
two  right  angles  are  equal  to  the  sum  of  all  the  contiguous 
angles  which  proceed  from  one  point  in  a straight  line, 
he  produces  one  side  of  his  triangle,  thus  forming  two 
adjacent  angles  which  together  are  equal  to  two  right 
angles.  He  then  divides  the  exterior  of  these  angles 
by  drawing  a line  parallel  with  the  opposite  side  of  the 
triangle,  and  sees  that  an  exterior  adjacent  angle  has 
been  formed,  which  is  equal  to  an  interior,  etc.  In  this 
way  he  arrives,  through  a chain  of  conclusions,  though 
always  guided  by  intuition,  at  a thoroughly  [p.  717] 
convincing  and  general  solution  of  the  question. 

In  mathematics,  however,  we  construct  not  only  quan- 
tities {quanta)  as  in  geometry,  but  also  mere  quantity 
(qjiantitas)  as  in  algebra,  where  the  quality  of  the  object, 
which  has  to  be  thought  according  to  this  quantitative 
concept,  is  entirely  ignored.  We  then  adopt  a certain 
notation  for  all  constructions  of  quantities  (numbers), 
such  as  addition,  subtraction,  extraction  of  roots,  etc., 
and,  after  having  denoted  also  the  general  concept  of 


576 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


quantities  according  to  their  different  relations,  we  rep- 
resent in  intuition  according  to  general  rules,  every  opera- 
tion which  is  produced  and  modified  by  quantity.  Thus 
when  one  quantity  is  to  be  divided  by  another,  we  place 
the  signs  of  both  together  according  to  the  form  denot- 
ing division,  etc.,  and  we  thus  arrive,  by  means  of  a sym- 
bolical construction  in  algebra,  quite  as  well  as  by  an 
ostensive  or  geometrical  construction  of  the  objects 
themselves  in  geometry,  at  results  which  our  discursive 
knowledge  could  never  have  reached  by  the  aid  of  mere 
conceptions. 

What  may  be  the  cause  of  this  difference  between  two 
persons,  the  philosopher  and  the  mathematician,  both 
practising  the  art  of  reason,  the  former  following  his 
path  according  to  concepts,  the  latter  according  to  in- 
tuitions, which  he  represents  a priori  according  to  con- 
cepts ? If  we  remember  what  has  been  said  [p.  718] 
before  in  the  Elements  of  Transcendentalism,  the  cause 
is  clear.  We  are  here  concerned  not  with  analytical 
propositions,  which  can  be  produced  by  a mere  analysis 
of  concepts  (here  the  philosopher  would  no  doubt  have 
an  advantage  over  the  mathematician),  but  with  syn- 
thetical propositions,  and  synthetical  propositions  that 
can  be  known  a priori.  We  are  not  intended  here  to 
consider  what  we  are  really  thinking  in  our  concept  of 
the  triangle  (this  would  be  a mere  definition),  but  we  are 
meant  to  go  beyond  that  concept,  in  order  to  arrive  at 
properties  which  are  not  contained  in  the  concept,  but 
nevertheless  belong  to  it.  This  is  impossible,  except  by 
our  determining  our  object  according  to  the  conditions 
either  of  empirical,  or  of  pure  intuition.  The  former 
would  give  us  an  empirical  proposition  only,  through 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason  577 

the  actual  measuring  of  the  three  angles.  Such  a propo- 
sition would  be  without  the  character  of  either  generality 
or  necessity,  and  does  not,  therefore,  concern  us  here  at 
all.  The  second  procedure  consists  in  the  mathematical 
and  here  the  geometrical  construction,  by  means  of  which 
I add  in  a pure  intuition,  just  as  I may  do  in  the  empirical 
intuition,  everything  that  belongs  to  the  schema  of  a tri- 
angle in  general  and,  therefore,  to  its  concept,  and  thus 
arrive  at  general  synthetical  propositions. 

I should  therefore  in  vain  philosophise,  that  is,  reflect 
discursively  on  the  triangle,  without  ever  getting  beyond 
the  mere  definition  with  which  I ought  to  have  begun. 
There  is  no  doubt  a transcendental  synthesis,  [p.  719] 
consisting  of  mere  concepts,  and  in  which  the  philosopher 
alone  can  hope  to  be  successful.  Such  a synthesis,  how- 
ever, never  relates  to  more  than  a thing  in  general,  and  to 
the  conditions  under  which  its  perception  could  be  a pos- 
sible experience.  In  the  mathematical  problems,  on  the 
contrary,  all  this,  together  with  the  question  of  existence, 
does  not  concern  us,  but  the  properties  of  objects  in  them- 
selves only  (without  any  reference  to  their  existence),  and 
those  properties  again  so  far  only  as  they  are  connected 
with  their  concept. 

We  have  tried  by  this  example  to  show  how  great  a 
difference  there  is  between  the  discursive  use  of  reason, 
according  to  concepts,  and  its  intuitive  use,  through  the 
construction  of  concepts.  The  question  now  arises  what 
can  be  the  cause  that  makes  this  twofold  use  of  reason 
necessary,  and  how  can  we  discover  whether  in  any  given 
argument  the  former  only,  or  the  latter  use  also,  takes 
place  ? 

All  our  knowledge  relates,  in  the  end,  to  possible  intui- 


578 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


tions,  for  it  is  by  them  alone  that  an  object  can  be  given. 
A concept  a priori  (or  a non-empirical  concept)  contains 
either  a pure  intuition,  in  which  case  it  can  be  con- 
structed, or  it  contains  nothing  but  the  synthesis  of 
possible  intuitions,  which  are  not  given  a priori , and  in 
that  case,  though  we  may  use  it  for  synthetical  [p.  720] 
and  a priori  judgments,  such  judgments  can  only  be 
discursive,  according  to  concepts,  and  never  intuitive, 
through  the  construction  of  the  concept. 

There  is  no  intuition  a priori  except  space  and  time, 
the  mere  forms  of  phenomena.  A concept  of  them,  as 
quanta , can  be  represented  a priori  in  intuition,  that  is, 
can  be  constructed  either  at  the  same  time  with  their 
quality  (figure),  or  as  quantity  only  (the  mere  synthesis 
of  the  manifold-homogeneous),  by  means  of  number. 
The  matter  of  phenomena,  however,  by  which  things 
are  given  us  in  space  and  time,  can  be  represented  in 
perception  only,  that  is  a posteriori.  The  one  concept 
which  a priori  represents  the  empirical  contents  of  phe- 
nomena is  the  concept  of  a thing  in  general,  and  the 
synthetical  knowledge  which  we  may  have  a priori  of  a 
thing  in  general,  can  give  us  nothing  but  the  mere  rule 
of  synthesis,  to  be  applied  to  what  perception  may  present 
to  us  a posteriori , but  never  an  a priori  intuition  of  a real 
object,  such  an  intuition  being  necessarily  empirical. 

Synthetical  propositions  with  regard  to  things  in  gen- 
eral, the  intuition  of  which  does  not  admit  of  being  given 
a priori,  are  called  transcendental.  Transcendental  prop- 
ositions, therefore,  can  never  be  given  through  a con- 
struction of  concepts,  but  only  according  to  concepts  a 
priori.  They  only  contain  the  rule,  according  to  which 
we  must  look  empirically  for  a certain  synthetical  unity 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


579 


of  what  cannot  be  represented  in  intuition  a [p.  72 
priori  (perceptions).  They  can  never  represent  any  one 
of  their  concepts  a priori , but  can  do  this  only  a poste- 
riori, that  is,  by  means  of  experience,  which  itself  be- 
comes' possible  according  to  those  synthetical  principles 
only/ 

If  we  are  to  form  a synthetical  judgment  of  any  con- 
cept, we  must  proceed  beyond  that  concept  to  the  intui- 
tion in  which  it  is  given.  For  if  we  kept  within  that 
which  is  given  in  the  concept,  the  judgment  could  only  be 
analytical  and  an  explanation  of  the  concept,  in  accord- 
ance with  what  we  have  conceived  in  it.  I may,  however, 
pass  from  the  conception  to  the  pure  or  empirical  intui- 
tion which  corresponds  to  it,  in  order  thus  to  consider 
it  in  concreto,  and  thus  to  discover  what  belongs  to  the 
object  of  the  concept,  whether  a priori  or  a posteriori. 
The  former  consists  in  rational  or  mathematical  know- 
ledge, arrived  at  by  the  construction  of  the  concept,  the 
latter  in  the  purely  empirical  (mechanical)  knowledge 
which  can  never  supply  us  with  necessary  and  apodictic 
propositions.  Thus  I might  analyse  my  empirical  con- 
cept of  gold,  without  gaining  anything  beyond  being 
able  to  enumerate  everything  that  I can  really  think  by 
this  word.  This  might  yield  a logical  improvement  of 
my  knowledge,  but  no  increase  or  addition.  If,  how- 
ever, I take  the  material  which  is  known  by  the  name 
of  gold,  I can  make  observations  on  it,  and  these  will 
yield  me  different  synthetical,  but  empirical  [p.  722] 
propositions.  Again,  I might  construct  the  mathemati- 
cal concept  of  a triangle,  that  is,  give  it  a priori  in  intui- 
tion, and  gain  in  this  manner  a synthetical  but  rational 
knowledge  of  it.  But  when  the  transcendental  concept 


580 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


of  a reality,  a substance,  a power,  etc.,  is  given  me,  that 
concept  denotes  neither  an  empirical  nor  a pure  intuition, 
but  merely  the  synthesis  of  empirical  intuitions,  which, 
being  empirical,  cannot  be  given  a priori.  No  determin- 
ing synthetical  proposition  therefore  can  spring  from  it, 
because  the  synthesis  cannot  a priori  pass  beyond  to  the 
intuition  that  corresponds  to  it,  but  only  a principle  of 
the  synthesis  1 of  possible  empirical  intuitions. 

A transcendental  proposition,  therefore,  is  synthetical 
knowledge  acquired  by  reason,  according  to  mere  con- 
cepts ; and  it  is  discursive,  because  through  it  alone 
synthetical  unity  of  empirical  knowledge  becomes  possi- 
ble, while  it  cannot  give  us  any  intuition  a priori. 

We  see,  therefore,  that  reason  is  used  in  two  [p.  723] 
ways  which,  though  they  share  in  common  the  generality 
of  their  knowledge  and  its  production  a priori,  yet  diverge 
considerably  afterwards,  because  in  each  phenomenon 
(and  no  object  can  be  given  us,  except  as  a phenomenon), 
there  are  two  elements,  the  form  of  intuition  (space  and 
time),  which  can  be  known  and  determined  entirely  a 
priori,  and  the  matter  (the  physical)  or  the  contents, 
something  which  exists  in  space  and  time,  and  therefore 
contains  an  existence  corresponding  to  sensation.  As 
regards  the  latter,  which  can  never  be  given  in  a defi- 
nite form  except  empirically,  we  can  have  nothing  a 
priori  except  indefinite  concepts  of  the  synthesis  of  pos- 

1 In  the  concept  of  cause  I really  pass  beyond  the  empirical  concept  of  an 
event,  but  not  to  the  intuition  which  represents  the  concept  of  cause  in  con- 
crcto,  but  to  the  conditions  of  time  in  general,  which  in  experience  might  be 
found  in  accordance  with  the  concept  of  cause.  I therefore  proceed  here, 
according  to  concepts  only,  but  cannot  proceed  by  means  of  the  construction 
of  concepts,  because  the  concept  is  only  a rule  for  the  synthesis  of  perceptions, 
which  are  not  pure  intuitions,  and  therefore  cannot  be  given  a priori. 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


581 


sible  sensations,  in  so  far  as  they  belong  to  the  unity  of 
apperception  (in  a possible  experience).  As  regards  the 
former,  we  can  determine  a priori  our  concepts  in  intui- 
tion, by  creating  to  ourselves  in  space  and  time,  through 
a uniform  synthesis,  the  objects  themselves,  considering 
them  simply  as  quanta.  The  former  is  called  the  use 
of  reason  according  to  concepts ; and  here  we  can  do 
nothing  more  than  to  bring  phenomena  under  concepts, 
according  to  their  real  contents,  which  therefore  can 
be  determined  empirically  only,  that  is  a posteriori 
(though  in  accordance  with  those  concepts  as  rules  of 
an  empirical  synthesis).  The  latter  is  the  use  [p.  724] 
of  reason  through  the  construction  of  concepts,  which, 
as  they  refer  to  an  intuition  a priori,  can  for  that  reason 
be  given  a priori , and  defined  in  pure  intuition,  without 
any  empirical  data.  To  consider  everything  which  exists 
(everything  in  space  or  time)  whether,  and  how  far,  it 
is  a quantum  or  not ; to  consider  that  we  must  repre- 
sent in  it  either  existence,  or  absence  of  existence ; to 
consider  how  far  this  something  which  fills  space  or 
time  is  a primary  substratum,  or  merely  determination 
of  it  ; to  consider  again  whether  its  existence  is  related 
to  something  else  as  cause  or  effect,  or  finally,  whether 
it  stands  isolated  or  in  reciprocal  dependence  on  others, 
with  reference  to  existence, — this  and  the  possibility, 
reality,  and  necessity  of  its  existence,  or  their  opposites, 
all  belong  to  that  knowledge  of  reason , derived  from 
concepts,  which  is  called  philosophical.  But  to  deter- 
mine a priori  an  intuition  in  space  (figure),  to  divide 
time  (duration),  or  merely  to  know  the  general  character 
of  the  synthesis  of  one  and  the  same  thing  in  time  and 
space,  and  the  quantity  of  an  intuition  in  general  which 


582 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


arises  from  it  (number),  all  this  is  the  work  of  reason  by 
means  of  the  construction  of  concepts,  and  is  called  mathe- 
matical. 

The  great  success  which  attends  reason  in  its  mathe- 
matical use  produces  naturally  the  expectation  that  it,  or 
rather  its  method,  would  have  the  same  success  outside 
the  field  of  quantities  also,  by  reducing  all  concepts  to 
intuitions  which  may  be  given  a priori , and  by  [p.  725] 
which  the  whole  of  nature  might  be  conquered,  while  pure 
philosophy,  with  its  discursive  concepts  a priori,  does 
nothing  but  bungle  in  every  part  of  nature,  without  being 
able  to  render  the  reality  of  those  concepts  intuitive  a 
priori,  and  thereby  legitimatised.  Nor  does  there  seem 
to  be  any  lack  of  confidence  on  the  part  of  those  who  are 
masters  in  the  art  of  mathematics,  or  of  high  expectations 
on  the  part  of  the  public  at  large,  as  to  their  ability  of 
achieving  success,  if  only  they  would  try  it.  For  as  they 
have  hardly  ever  philosophised  on  mathematics  (which  is 
indeed  no  easy  task),  they  never  think  of  the  specific  dif- 
ference between  the  two  uses  of  reason  which  we  have 
just  explained.  Current  and  empirical  rules,  borrowed 
from  the  ordinary  operations  of  reason,  are  then  accepted 
instead  of  axioms.  From  what  quarter  the  concepts  of 
space  and  time  with  which  alone  (as  the  original  quanta) 
they  have  to  deal,  may  have  come  to  them,  they  do  not 
care  to  enquire,  nor  do  they  see  any  use  in  investigating 
the  origin  of  the  pure  concepts  of  the  understanding,  and 
with  it  the  extent  of  their  validity,  being  satisfied  to  use 
them  as  they  are.  fn  all  this  no  blame  would  attach  to 
them,  if  only  they  did  not  overstep  their  proper  limits, 
namely,  those  of  nature.  But  as  it  is,  they  lose  them- 
selves, without  being  aware  of  it,  away  from  the  field  of 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


583 


sensibility  on  the  uncertain  ground  of  pure  and  ever, 
transcendental  concepts  ( instabilis  tellus , innabilis  undo) 
where  they  are  neither  able  to  stand  nor  to  [p.  726] 
swim,  taking  only  a few  hasty  steps,  the  vestiges  of  which 
are  soon  swept  away,  while  their  steps  in  mathematics 
become  a highway,  on  which  the  latest  posterity  may 
march  on  with  perfect  confidence. 

We  have  chosen  it  as  our  duty  to  determine  with 
accuracy  and  certainty  the  limits  of  pure  reason  in  its 
transcendental  use.  These  transcendental  efforts,  how- 
ever, have  this  peculiar  character  that,  in  spite  of  the 
strongest  and  clearest  warnings,  they  continue  to  inspire 
us  with  new  hopes,  before  the  attempt  is  entirely  surren- 
dered at  arriving  beyond  the  limits  of  experience  at  the 
charming  fields  of  an  intellectual  world.  It  is  necessary 
therefore  to  cut  away  the  last  anchor  of  that  fantastic 
hope,  and  to  show  that  the  employment  of  the  mathemati- 
cal method  cannot  be  of  the  slightest  use  for  this  kind  of 
knowledge,  unless  it  be  in  displaying  its  own  deficiencies  ; 
and  that  the  art  of  measuring  and  philosophy  are  two 
totally  different  things,  though  they  are  mutually  useful 
to  each  other  in  natural  science,  and  that  the  method  of 
the  one  can  never  be  imitated  by  the  other. 

The  exactness  of  mathematics  depends  on  definitions, 
axioms,  and  demonstrations.  I shall  content  myself  with 
showing  that  none  of  these  can  be  achieved  or  imitated  by 
the  philosopher  in  the  sense  in  which  they  are  understood 
by  the  mathematician.  I hope  to  show  at  the  [p.  727] 
same  time  that  the  art  of  measuring,  or  geometry,  will  by 
its  method  produce  nothing  in  philosophy  but  card-houses, 
while  the  philosopher  with  his  method  produces  in  mathe- 
matics nothing  but  vain  babble.  It  is  the  very  essence  of 


5^4 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


philosophy  to  teach  the  limits  of  knowledge,  and  even  the 
mathematician,  unless  his  talent  is  limited  already  by  nat- 
ure and  restricted  to  its  proper  work,  cannot  decline  the 
warnings  of  philosophy  or  altogether  defy  them. 

I.  Of  Definitions.  To  define , as  the  very  name  implies, 
means  only  to  represent  the  complete  concept  of  a thing 
within  its  limits  and  in  its  primary  character.1  From  this 
point  of  view,  an  empirical  concept  cannot  be  defined , but 
can  be  explained  only.  For,  as  we  have  in  an  empiri-  } 
cal  concept  some  predicates  only  belonging  to  a certain 
class  of  sensuous  objects,  we  are  never  certain  whether  by 
the  word  which  denotes  one  and  the  same  object,  we  do 
not  think  at  one  time  a greater,  at  another  a smaller  num- 
ber of  predicates.  Thus  one  man  may  by  the  [p.  728] 
concept  of  gold  think,  in  addition  to  weight,  colour,  mallea- 
bility, the  quality  of  its  not  rusting,  while  another  may 
know  nothing  of  the  last.  We  use  certain  predicates  so 
long  only  as  they  are  required  for  distinction.  New  obser- 
vations add  and  remove  certain  predicates,  so  that  the 
concept  never  stands  within  safe  limits.  And  of  what 
use  would  it  be  to  define  an  empirical  concept,  as  for  in- 
stance that  of  water,  because,  when  we  speak  of  water  and 
its  qualities,  we  do  not  care  much  what  is  thought  by  that 
word,  but  proceed  at  once  to  experiments  ? the  word  itself 
with  its  few  predicates  being  a designation  only  and  not  a 
concept,  so  that  a so-called  definition  would  be  no  more 

1 Completeness  means  clearness  and  sufficiency  of  predicates;  limits  mean 
precision,  no  more  predicates  being  given  than  belong  to  the  complete  con- 
cept; in  its  primary  character  means  that  the  determination  of  these  limits 
is  not  derived  from  anything  else,  and  therefore  in  need  of  any  proof,  because 
this  would  render  the  so-called  definition  incapable  of  standing  at  the  head  of 
all  the  judgments  regarding  its  object. 


Discipline  of  Pare  Reason 


585 


than  a determination  of  the  word.  Secondly,  if  we  rea- 
soned accurately,  no  a priori  given  concept  can  be  defined, 
such  as  substance,  cause,  right,  equity,  etc.  For  I can 
never  be  sure  that  the  clear  representation  of  a given  but 
still  confused  concept  has  been  completely  analysed,  unless 
I know  that  such  representation  is  adequate  to  the  object. 
As  its  concept,  however,  such  as  it  is  given,  may  contain 
many  obscure  representations  which  we  pass  by  in  our 
analysis,  although  we  use  them  always  in  the  practical 
application  of  the  concept,  the  completeness  of  the  analy- 
sis of  my  concept  must  always  remain  doubtful,  and  can 
only  be  rendered  probable  by  means  of  apt  examples,  al- 
though never  apodictically  certain.  I should  [p.  729] 
therefore  prefer  to  use  the  term  exposition  rather  than 
definition,  as  being  more  modest,  and  more  likely  to  be 
admitted  to  a certain  extent  by  a critic  who  reserves  his 
doubts  as  to  its  completeness.  As  therefore  it  is  impossi- 
ble to  define  either  empirically  or  a priori  given  concepts, 
there  remain  arbitrary  concepts  only  on  which  such  an 
experiment  may  be  tried.  In  such  a case  I can  always 
define  my  concept,  because  I ought  certainly  to  know 
what  I wish  to  think,  the  concept  being  made  intentionally 
by  myself,  and  not  given  to  me  either  by  the  nature  of  the 
understanding  or  by  experience.  But  I can  never  say 
that  I have  thus  defined  a real  object.  For  if  the  concept 
depends  on  empirical  conditions,  as,  for  instance,  a ship’s 
chronometer,  the  object  itself  and  its  possibility  are  not 
given  by  this  arbitrary  concept ; it  does  not  even  tell  us 
whether  there  is  an  object  corresponding  to  it,  so  that  my 
explanation  should  be  called  a declaration  (of  my  project) 
rather  than  a definition  of  an  object.  Thus  there  remain 
no  concepts  fit  for  definition  except  those  which  contain 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


5S6 


an  arbitrary  synthesis  that  can  be  constructed  a priori. 
It  follows,  therefore,  that  mathematics  only  can  possess 
definitions,  because  it  is  in  mathematics  alone  that  we 
represent  a priori  in  intuition  the  object  which  we  think, 
and  that  object  cannot  therefore  contain  either  more  or 
less  than  the  concept,  because  the  concept  of  [p.  730] 
the  object  was  given  by  the  definition  in  its  primary  char- 
acter, that  is,  without  deriving  the  definition  from  anything 
else.  The  German  language  has  but  the  one  word  Erkla- 
rung  (literally  clearing  up)  for  the  terms  exposition , explica- 
tion, declaration,  and  definition ; and  we  must  not  therefore 
be  too  strict  in  our  demands,  when  denying  to  the  different 
kinds  of  a philosophical  clearing  up  the  honourable  name 
of  definition.  What  we  really  insist  on  is  this,  that  philo- 
sophical definitions  are  possible  only  as  expositions  of 
given  concepts,  mathematical  definitions  as  constructions 
of  concepts,  originally  framed  by  ourselves,  the  former 
therefore  analytically  (where  completeness  is  never  apo- 
dictically  certain),  the  latter  synthetically.  Mathematical 
definitions  make  the  concept,  philosophical  definitions  ex- 
plain it  only.  Hence  it  follows, 

a.  That  we  must  not  try  in  philosophy  to  imitate  mathe- 
matics by  beginning  with  definitions,  except  it  be  by  way 
of  experiment.  For  as  they  are  meant  to  be  an  analysis 
of  given  concepts,  these  concepts  themselves,  although  as 
yet  confused  only,  must  come  first,  and  the  incomplete 
exposition  must  precede  the  complete  one,  so  that  we  are 


able  from  some  characteristics,  known  to  us  from  an,  as 
yet,  incomplete  analysis,  to  infer  many  things  before  we 


come  to  a complete  exposition,  that  is,  the  definition  of 


the  concept.  In  philosophy,  in  fact,  the  defini-  [p.  731 


tion 


in  its  complete  clearness  ought  to  conclude  rather 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


5 87 


than  begin  our  work ; 1 while  in  mathematics  we  really 
have  no  concept  antecedent  to  the  definition  by  which  the 
concept  itself  is  first  given,  so  that  in  mathematics  no 
other  beginning  is  necessary  or  possible. 

b.  Mathematical  definitions  can  never  be  erroneous, 
because,  as  the  concept  is  first  given  by  the  definition,  it 
contains  neither  more  nor  less  than  what  the  definition 
wishes  should  be  conceived  by  it.  But  although  there  can 
be  nothing  wrong  in  it,  so  far  as  its  contents  are  concerned, 
mistakes  may  sometimes,  though  rarely,  occur  in  the  form 
or  wording,  particularly  with  regard  to  perfect  precision. 
Thus  the  common  definition  of  a circle,  that  it  is  a curved 
line,  every  point  of  which  is  equally  distant  from  one  and 
the  same  point  (namely,  the  centre),  is  faulty,  [p.  732] 
because  the  determination  of  curved  is  introduced  un- 
necessarily. For  there  must  be  a particular  theorem, 
derived  from  the  definition,  and  easily  proved,  viz.  that 
every  line,  all  points  of  which  are  equidistant  from  one 
and  the  same  point,  must  be  curved  (no  part  of  it  being 
straight).  Analytical  definitions,  however,  may  be  erro- 
neous in  many  respects,  either  by  introducing  characteris- 
tics which  do  not  really  exist  in  the  concept,  or  by  lacking 
that  completeness  which  is  essential  to  a definition,  because 

1 Philosophy  swarms  with  faulty  definitions,  particularly  such  as  contain 
some  true  elements  of  a definition,  but  not  all.  If,  therefore,  it  were  impos- 
sible to  use  a concept  until  it  had  been  completely  defined,  philosophy  would 
fare  very  ill.  As,  however,  we  may  use  a definition  with  perfect  safety,  so 
far  at  least  as  the  elements  of  the  analysis  will  carry  us,  imperfect  definitions 
also,  that  is,  propositions  which  are  not  yet  properly  definitions,  but  are  yet 
true,  and,  therefore,  approximations  to  a definition,  may  be  used  with  great 
advantage.  In  mathematics  definitions  belong  ad  esse,  in  philosophy  ad  melius 
esse.  It  is  desirable,  but  it  is  extremely  difficult  to  construct  a proper  definition. 
Jurists  are  without  a definition  of  right  to  the  present  day. 


588 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


we  can  never  be  quite  certain  of  the  completeness  of  our 
analysis.  It  is  on  these  accounts  that  the  method  of 
mathematics  cannot  be  imitated  in  the  definitions  of  phi- 
losophy. 

II.  Of  Axioms.  These,  so  far  as  they  are  immediately 
certain,  are  synthetical  principles  a priori.  One  concept 
cannot,  however,  be  connected  synthetically  and  yet  im-  j 
mediately  with  another,  because,  if  we  wish  to  go  beyond 
a given  concept,  a third  connecting  knowledge  is  required; 
and,  as  philosophy  is  the  knowledge  of  reason  based  on 
concepts,  no  principle  can  be  found  in  it  deserving  the 
name  of  an  axiom.  Mathematics,  on  the  other  hand,  may 
well  possess  axioms,  because  here,  by  means  of  the  con- 
struction of  concepts  in  the  intuition  of  their  object,  the 
predicates  may  always  be  connected  a priori  and  immedi- 
ately ; for  instance,  that  three  points  always  lie  in  a plane. 

A synthetical  principle,  on  the  contrary,  made  up  of  con- 
cepts only,  can  never  be  immediately  certain,  [p.  733I 
as,  for  example,  the  proposition  that  everything  which 
happens  has  its  cause.  Here  I require  something  else, 
namely,  the  condition  of  the  determination  by  time  in  a 
given  experience,  it  being  impossible  for  me  to  know  such 
a principle,  directly  and  immediately,  from  the  concepts. 
Discursive  principles  are,  therefore,  something  quite  dif- 
ferent from  intuitive  principles  or  axioms.  The  former 
always  require,  in  addition,  a deduction,  not  at  all  required 
for  the  latter,  which,  on  that  very  account,  are  evident, 
while  philosophical  principles,  whatever  their  certainty 
may  be,  can  never  pretend  to  be  so.  Hence  it  is  very  far 
from  true  to  say  that  any  synthetical  proposition  of  pure 
and  transcendental  reason  is  so  evident  (as  people  some- 
times emphatically  maintain)  as  the  statement  that  twice 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


589 


two  are  four.  It  is  true  that  in  the  Analytic,  when  giving 
the  table  of  the  principles  of  the  pure  understanding,  I men- 
tioned also  certain  axioms  of  intuition  ; but  the  principle 
there  mentioned  was  itself  no  axiom,  but  served  only  to 
indicate  the  principle  of  the  possibility  of  axioms  in  gen- 
eral, being  itself  no  more  than  a principle  based  on  con- 
cepts. It  was  necessary  in  our  transcendental  philosophy 
to  show  the  possibility  even  of  mathematics.  Philosophy, 
therefore,  is  without  axioms,  and  can  never  put  forward 
its  principles  a priori  with  absolute  authority,  but  must 
first  consent  to  justify  its  claims  by  a thorough  deduc- 
tion. [p.  734] 

III.  Of  Demonstrations.  An  apodictic  proof  only,  so 
far  as  it  is  intuitive,  can  be  called  demonstration.  Experi- 
ence may  teach  us  what  is,  but  never  that  it  cannot  be 
otherwise.  Empirical  arguments,  therefore,  cannot  pro- 
duce an  apodictic  proof.  From  concepts  a priori,  how- 
ever (in  discursive  knowledge),  it  is  impossible  that  intui- 
tive certainty,  that  is,  evidence,  should  ever  arise,  however 
apodictically  certain  the  judgment  may  otherwise  seem  to 
be.  Demonstrations  we  get  in  mathematics  only,  because 
here  our  knowledge  is  derived  not  from  concepts,  but  from 
their  construction,  that  is,  from  intuition,  which  can  be 
given  a priori,  in  accordance  with  the  concepts.  Even 
the  proceeding  of  algebra,  with  its  equations,  from  which 
by  reduction  both  the  correct  result  and  its  proof  are 
produced,  is  a construction  by  characters,  though  not 
geometrical,  in  which,  by  means  of  signs,  the  concepts, 
particularly  those  of  the  relation  of  quantities,  are  repre- 
sented in  intuition,  and  (without  any  regard  to  the  heuris- 
tic method)  all  conclusions  are  secured  against  errors  by 
submitting  each  of  them  to  intuitive  evidence.  Philosoph- 


590 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


icai  knowledge  cannot  claim  this  advantage,  for  here  we 
must  always  consider  the  general  in  the  abstract  (by  con- 
cepts), while  in  mathematics  we  may  consider  the  gen- 
eral in  the  concrete,  in  each  single  intuition,  and  yet 
through  pure  representation  a priori , where  every  mistake 
becomes  at  once  manifest.  I should  prefer,  [p.  735] 
therefore,  to  call  the  former  acroamatic,  or  audible  (discur- 
sive) proofs,  because  they  can  be  carried  out  by  words 
only  (the  object  in  thought),  rather  than  demonstrations, 
which,  as  the  very  term  implies,  depend  on  the  intuition 
of  the  object. 

It  follows  from  all  this  that  it  is  not  in  accordance  with 
the  very  nature  of  philosophy  to  boast  of  its  dogmatical 
character,  particularly  in  the  field  of  pure  reason,  and  to 
deck  itself  with  the  titles  and  ribands  of  mathematics,  an 
order  to  which  it  can  never  belong,  though  it  may  well 
hope  for  co-operation  with  that  science.  All  those  at- 
tempts are  vain  pretensions  which  can  never  be  success- 
ful, nay,  which  can  only  prove  an  obstacle  in  the  discovery 
of  the  illusions  of  reason,  when  ignoring  its  own  limits, 
and  which  must  mar  our  success  in  calling  back,  by  means 
of  a sufficient  explanation  of  our  concepts,  the  conceit  of 
speculation  to  the  more  modest  and  thorough  work  of  self- 
knowledge.  Reason  ought  not,  therefore,  in  its  tran- 
scendental endeavours,  to  look  forward  with  such  confi- 
dence, as  if  the  path  which  it  has  traversed  must  lead 
straight  to  its  goal,  nor  depend  with  such  assurance  on 
its  premisses  as  to  consider  it  unnecessary  to  look  back 
from  time  to  time,  to  find  out  whether,  in  the  progress  of 
its  conclusions,  errors  may  come  to  light,  which  were  over- 
looked in  the  principles,  and  which  render  it  nec-  [p.  736] 
essary  either  to  determine  those  principles  more  accu- 
rately or  to  change  them  altogether. 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


591 


I divide  all  apodictic  propositions,  whether  demonstrable 
or  immediately  certain,  into  Dogmata  and  Mathemata.  A 
directly  synthetical  proposition,  based  on  concepts,  is  a 
Dogma;  a proposition  of  the  same  kind,  arrived  at  by 
the  construction  of  concepts,  is  a Mathema.  Analytical 
judgments  teach  us  really  no  more  of  an  object  than  what 
the  concept  which  we  have  of  it  contains  in  itself.  They 
cannot  enlarge  our  knowledge  beyond  the  concept,  but 
only  clear  it.  They  cannot,  therefore,  be  properly  called 
dogmas  (a  word  which  might  perhaps  best  be  translated 
by  precepts,  Lehrspriiche).  According  to  our  ordinary 
mode  of  speech,  we  could  apply  that  name  to  that  class 
only  of  the  two  above-mentioned  classes  of  synthetical 
propositions  a priori  which  refers  to  philosophical  know- 
ledge, and  no  one  would  feel  inclined  to  give  the  name  of 
Dogma  to  the  propositions  of  arithmetic  or  geometry.  In 
this  way  the  usage  of  language  confirms  our  explanation 
that  those  judgments  only  which  are  based  on  conceptions, 
and  not  those  which  are  arrived  at  by  the  construction  of 
concepts,  can  be  called  dogmatic. 

Now  in  the  whole  domain  of  pure  reason,  in  its  purely 
speculative  use,  there  does  not  exist  a single  directly 
synthetical  judgment  based  on  concepts.  We  have  shown 
that  reason,  by  means  of  ideas,  is  incapable  of  any  syn- 
thetical judgments  which  could  claim  objective  validity, 
while  by  means  of  the  concepts  of  our  understanding  it 
establishes  no  doubt  some  perfectly  certain  prin-  [p.  737] 
ciples,  but  not  directly  from  concepts,  but  indirectly  only, 
by  referring  such  concepts  to  something  purely  contingent, 
namely,  possible  experience.  When  such  experience  (any- 
thing as  an  object  of  possible  experience)  is  presupposed, 
these  principles  are,  no  doubt,  apodictically  certain,  but 


592  Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 

in  themselves  (directly)  they  cannot  even  be  known  a priori. 
Thus  the  proposition  that  everything  which  happens  has 
its  cause,  can  never  be  thoroughly  understood  by  means 
of  the  concepts  alone  which  are  contained  in  it ; hence  it 
is  no  dogma  in  itself,  although,  from  another  point  of  view, 
that  is,  in  the  only  field  of  its  possible  use,  namely,  in 
experience,  it  may  be  proved  apodictically.  It  should  be 
called,  therefore,  a principle , and  not  a precept  or  a dogma 
(though  it  is  necessary  that  it  should  itself  be  proved), 
because  it  has  this  peculiarity  that  it  first  renders  its  own 
proof,  namely,  experience,  possible,  and  has  always  to  be 
presupposed  for  the  sake  of  experience. 

If,  therefore,  there  are  no  dogmata  whatever  in  the 
speculative  use  of  pure  reason,  with  regard  to  their  con- 
tents also,  all  dogmatical  methods,  whether  borrowed  from 
mathematics  or  invented  on  purpose,  are  alike  inappropri- 
ate. They  only  serve  to  hide  mistakes  and  errors,  and 
thus  deceive  philosophy,  whose  true  object  is  to  shed  the 
clearest  light  on  every  step  which  reason  takes.  The 
method  may,  however,  well  be  systematical ; for  our  reason 
(subjectively)  is  itself  a system,  though  in  its  [p.  738] 
pure  use,  by  means  of  mere  concepts,  a system  intended 
for  investigation  only,  according  to  principles  of  unity,  to 
which  experience  alone  can  supply  the  material.  We  can- 
not, however,  dwell  here  on  the  method  of  transcendental 
philosophy,  because  all  we  have  to  do  at  present  is  to  take 
stock  in  order  to  find  out  whether  we  are  able  to  build  at 
all,  and  how  high  the  edifice  may  be  which  we  can  erect 
with  the  materials  at  our  command  (the  pure  concepts 
a priori). 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


593 


METHOD  OF  TRANSCENDENTALISM 
Section  II 

The  Discipline  of  Pure  Reason  in  its  Polemical  Use 

Reason  in  all  her  undertakings  must  submit  to  criticism, 
and  cannot  attempt  to  limit  the  free  exercise  of  such  crit- 
icism without  injury  to  herself,  and  without  exposing 
herself  to  dangerous  suspicion.  There  is  nothing  so 
important  with  reference  to  its  usefulness,  nothing  so 
sacred,  that  it  could  withdraw  itself  from  that  searching 
examination  which  has  no  respect  of  persons.  The  very 
existence  of  reason  depends  on  that  freedom  ; for  reason 
can  claim  no  dictatorial  authority,  but  its  decrees  are 
rather  like  the  votes  of  free  citizens,  every  one  of  whom 
may  freely  express,  not  only  his  doubts,  but  even  [p.  739] 
his  veto. 

But,  though  reason  can  never  refuse  to  submit  to  criti- 
cism, it  does  not  follow  that  she  need  always  be  afraid  of 
it,  while  pure  reason  in  her  dogmatical  (not  mathematical) 
use  is  not  so  thoroughly  conscious  of  having  herself 
obeyed  her  own  supreme  laws  as  not  to  appear  with  a 
certain  shyness,  nay,  without  any  of  her  assumed  dog- 
matical authority,  before  the  tribunal  of  a higher  judicial 
reason. 

The  case  is  totally  different  when  reason  has  to  deal, 
not  with  the  verdicts  of  a judge,  but  with  the  claims  of 
her  fellow-citizens,  and  has  to  defend  itself  only  against 
these  claims.  For  as  these  mean  to  be  as  dogmatical  in 
their  negations  as  reason  is  in  her  affirmations,  reason 
may  justify  herself  tear  avQpcoirov,  so  as  to  be  safe  against 

2 Q 


594 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


all  damages,  and  with  a good  title  to  her  own  property 
that  need  not  fear  any  foreign  claims,  although  /car’ 
aXrjdetav  it  could  not  itself  be  established  with  sufficient 
evidence. 

By  the  polemical  use  of  pure  reason  I mean  the  defence 
of  her  own  propositions  against  dogmatical  negations. 
Here  the  question  is  not,  whether  her  own  assertions  may 
not  themselves  be  false,  but  it  is  only  to  be  shown  that  no 
one  is  ever  able  to  prove  the  opposite  with  apodictic  cer- 
tainty, nay,  even  with  a higher  degree  of  plausibility. 
For  we  are  not  on  sufferance  in  our  possession,  [p.  740] 
when,  though  our  own  title  may  not  be  sufficient,  it  is 
nevertheless  quite  certain  that  no  one  can  ever  prove  its 
insufficiency. 

It  is  sad,  no  doubt,  and  discouraging,  that  there  should 
be  an  antithetic  of  pure  reason,  and  that  reason,  being  the 
highest  tribunal  for  all  conflicts,  should  be  in  conflict  with 
herself.  We  had  on  a former  occasion  to  treat  of  such  an 
apparent  antithetic,  but  we  saw  that  it  arose  from  a mis- 
understanding, phenomena,  according  to  the  common  prej- 
udice, being  taken  for  things  in  themselves,  and  an 
absolute  completeness  of  their  synthesis  being  demanded 
in  one  way  or  other  (being  equally  impossible  in  either 
way),  a demand  entirely  unreasonable  with  regard  to 
phenomena.  There  was,  therefore,  no  real  contradiction 
in  reason  herself  when  making  the  two  propositions,  first, 
that  the  series  of  phenomena  given  by  themselves  has  an 
absolutely  first  beginning;  and,  secondly , that  the  series  is 
absolutely  and  by  itself  without  any  beginning  ; for  both 
propositions  are  perfectly  consistent  with  each  other, 
because  phenomena , with  regard  to  their  existence  as 
phenomena,  are  by  themselves  nothing,  that  is,  something 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


595 


self-contradictory,  so  that  their  hypothesis  must  naturally 
lead  to  contradictory  inferences.  [p.  741] 

We  cannot,  however,  appeal  to  a similar  misunderstand- 
ing, in  order  to  remove  the  conflict  of  reason,  when  it  is 
said,  for  instance,  on  one  side,  theistically,  that  there  is  a 
Supreme  Being,  and  on  the  other,  atheistically,  that  there 
is  no  Supreme  Being ; or  if  in  psychology  it  is  main- 
tained that  everything  which  thinks  possesses  an  abso- 
lute and  permanent  unity  and  is  different,  therefore,  from 
all  perishable  material  unity,  while  others  maintain  that 
a soul  is  not  an  immaterial  unity,  and  not  exempt,  there- 
fore from  perishableness.  For  here  the  object  of  the 
question  is  free  from  anything  heterogeneous  or  contradic- 
tory to  its  own  nature,  and  our  understanding  has  to  deal 
with  things  by  themselves  only  and  not  with  phenomena. 
Here,  therefore,  we  should  have  a real  conflict,  if  only  on 
the  negative  side  pure  reason  could  advance  anything  like 
the  ground  of  an  assertion.  We  may  well  admit  the  criti- 
cism of  the  arguments  advanced  by  those  who  dogmati- 
cally assert,  without  therefore  having  to  surrender  these 
assertions,  which  are  supported  at  least  by  the  interest 
of  reason,  to  which  the  opposite  party  cannot  appeal. 

I cannot  share  the  opinion  so  frequently  expressed  by 
excellent  and  thoughtful  men  (for  instance  Sulzer)  who, 
being  fully  conscious  of  the  weakness  of  the  proofs  hitherto 
advanced,  indulge  in  a hope  that  the  future  would  supply 
us  with  evident  demonstrations  of  the  two  cardinal  prop- 
ositions of  pure  reason,  namely,  that  there  is  a God,  and 
that  there  is  a future  life.  I am  certain,  on  the  [p.  742] 
contrary,  that  this  will  never  be  the  case,  for  whence 
should  reason  take  the  grounds  for  such  synthetical  asser- 
tions, which  do  not  refer  to  objects  of  experience  and 


596 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


their  internal  possibility  ? But  there  is  the  same  apodictic 
certainty  that  no  man  will  ever  arise  to  assert  the  cotitrary 
with  the  smallest  plausibility,  much  less  dogmatically. 
For,  as  he  could  prove  it  by  means  of  pure  reason  only, 
he  would  have  to  prove  that  a Supreme  Being,  and  that 
a thinking  subject  within  us,  as  pure  intelligence,  is  im- 
possible. But  whence  will  he  take  the  knowledge  that 
would  justify  him  in  thus  judging  synthetically  on  things 
far  beyond  all  possible  experience  ? We  may,  therefore, 
rest  so  completely  assured  that  no  one  will  ever  really 
prove  the  opposite,  that  there  is  no  need  to  invent  any 
scholastic  arguments.  We  may  safely  accept  those  prop- 
ositions which  agree  so  well  with  the  speculative  inter- 
ests of  our  reason  in  its  empirical  use,  and  are  besides  the 
only  means  of  reconciling  them  with  our  practical  inter- 
ests. As  against  our  opponent,  who  must  not  be  consid- 
ered here  as  a critic  only,  we  are  always  ready  with  our 
Non  liquet.  This  must  inevitably  confound  our  adversary, 
while  we  need  not  mind  his  retort,  because  we  can  always 
fall  back  on  the  subjective  maxim  of  reason,  [p.  743] 
which  our  adversary  cannot,  and  can  thus,  protected 
by  it,  look  upon  all  his  vain  attacks  with  calmness  and 
indifference. 

Thus  we  see  that  there  is  really  no  antithetic  of  pure 
reason,  for  the  only  arena  for  it  would  be  the  field  of  pure 
theology  and  psychology,  and  on  that  field  it  is  not  able 
to  support  a champion  in  full  armour  and  with  weapons 
which  we  need  be  afraid  of.  He  can  only  use  ridicule 
and  boasting,  and  these  we  may  laugh  at  as  mere  child’s 
play.  This  ought  to  be  a real  comfort  and  inspire  reason 
with  new  courage  ; for  what  else  could  she  depend  on,  it 
she  herself,  who  is  called  upon  to  remove  all  errors,  were 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


597 


divided  against  herself,  without  any  hope  of  peace  and 
quiet  possession  ? 

Whatever  has  been  ordained  by  nature  is  good  for  some 
purpose  or  other.  Even  poisons  serve  to  counteract  other 
poisons  which  are  in  our  own  blood,  and  they  must  not 
be  absent  therefore  in  a complete  collection  of  medicines. 
The  objections  against  the  vain  persuasions  and  the  con- 
ceit of  our  own  purely  speculative  reason  are  inspired 
by  the  very  nature  of  that  reason,  and  must  therefore 
have  their  own  good  purpose,  which  must  not  be  lightly 
cast  aside.  Why  has  Providence  placed  certain  things, 
which  concern  our  highest  interests,  so  far  be-  [p.  744] 
yond  our  reach  that  we  are  only  able  to  apprehend  them 
very  indistinctly  and  dubiously,  and  our  enquiring  gaze  is 
more  excited  than  satisfied  by  them  ? It  is  very  doubtful 
whether  it  is  useful  to  venture  on  any  bold  answers  with 
regard  to  such  obscure  questions,  nay,  whether  it  may  not 
be  detrimental.  But  one  thing  is  quite  certain,  namely, 
that  it  is  useful  to  grant  to  reason  the  fullest  freedom, 
both  of  enquiry  and  of  criticism,  so  that  she  may  consult 
her  own  interest  without  let  or  hindrance.  And  this  is 
done  quite  as  much  by  limiting  her  insight  as  by  enlarg- 
ing it,  while  nothing  but  mischief  must  arise  from  any  for- 
eign interference  or  any  attempt  to  direct  reason,  against 
her  own  natural  inclination,  towards  objects  forced  upon 
her  from  without. 

Allow,  therefore,  your  adversary  to  speak  reason,  and 
combat  him  with  weapons  of  reason  only.  As  to  any 
practical  interests  you  need  not  be  afraid,  for  in  purely 
speculative  discussions  they  are  not  involved  at  all.  What 
comes  to  light  in  these  discussions  is  only  a certain  anti- 
nomy of  reason  which,  as  it  springs  from  the  very  nature 


598 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


of  reason,  must  needs  be  listened  to  and  examined.  Rea 
son  is  thus  improved  only  by  a consideration  of  both  sides 
of  her  subject.  Her  judgment  is  corrected  by  the  very 
limitations  imposed  upon  her.  What  people  may  differ 
about  is  not  the  matter  so  much  as  the  tone  and  manner 
of  these  discussions.  For,  though  you  have  to  surrender 
the  language  of  knozvledge,  it  is  perfectly  open  [p.  745] 
to  you  to  retain  the  language  of  the  firmest  faith,  which 
need  not  fear  the  severest  test  of  reason. 

If  we  could  ask  that  dispassionate  philosopher,  David 
Hume,  who  seemed  made  to  maintain  the  most  perfect 
equilibrium  of  judgment,  what  induced  him  to  undermine 
by  carefully  elaborated  arguments  the  persuasion,  so  use- 
ful and  so  full  of  comfort  for  mankind,  as  that  reason  is 
sufficient  to  assert  and  to  form  a definite  concept  of  a 
Supreme  Being,  he  would  answer,  Nothing  but  a wish  to 
advance  reason  in  self-knowledge,  and  at  the  same  time 
a certain  feeling  of  indignation  at  the  violence  which 
people  wish  to  inflict  on  reason  by  boasting  of  her  powers, 
and  yet  at  the  same  time  preventing  her  from  openly  con- 
fessing her  weakness  of  which  she  has  become  conscious 
by  her  own  self-examination.  If,  on  the  contrary,  you 
were  to  ask  Priestley,  who  was  guided  by  the  principles 
of  the  empirical  use  of  reason  only  and  opposed  to  all 
transcendental  speculation,  what  could  have  induced  him 
to  pull  down  two  such  pillars  of  religion  as  the  freedom 
and  immortality  of  our  soul  (for  the  hope  of  a future  life 
is  with  him  an  expectation  only  of  the  miracle  of  a resus- 
citation), he,  who  was  himself  so  pious  and  zealous  a 
teacher  of  religion,  could  answer  nothing  but  that  he  was 
concerned  for  reason,  which  must  suffer  if  certain  subjects 
are  withdrawn  from  the  laws  of  material  nature,  the  only 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


599 


laws  which  we  can  accurately  know  and  fix.  It  [p.  746] 
would  be  most  unjust  to  decry  the  latter,  who  was  able  to 
combine  his  paradoxical  assertions  with  the  interests  of 
religion,  and  to  inflict  pain  on  a well-intentioned  man, 
simply  because  he  could  not  find  his  way,  the  moment 
he  strayed  away  from  the  field  of  natural  science.  And 
the  same  favour  must  be  extended  to  the  equally  well- 
intentioned,  and  in  his  moral  character  quite  blameless, 
Hume,  who  could  not  and  would  not  leave  his  abstract 
speculations,  because  he  was  rightly  convinced  that  their 
object  lies  entirely  outside  the  limits  of  natural  science, 
and  within  the  sphere  of  pure  ideas. 

What  then  is  to  be  done,  especially  with  regard  to  the 
danger  which  is  believed  to  threaten  the  commonwealth 
from  such  speculations  ? Nothing  is  more  natural,  nothing 
more  fair  than  the  decision  which  you  have  to  come  to. 
Let  these  people  go  ! If  they  show  talent,  if  they  produce 
new  and  profound  investigations,  in  one  word,  if  they  show 
reason,  reason  can  only  gain.  If  you  have  recourse  to  any- 
thing else  but  untrammelled  reason,  if  you  raise  the  cry 
of  high  treason,  and  call  together  the  ignorant  mob  as 
it  were  to  extinguish  a conflagration  — you  simply  render 
yourself  ridiculous.  For  here  the  question  is  not  what 
may  be  useful  or  dangerous  to  the  commonwealth,  but 
merely  how  far  reason  may  advance  in  her  speculations, 
which  are  independent  of  all  practical  interests  ; [p.  747] 

in  fact,  whether  these  speculations  are  to  count  for  anything, 
or  are  to  be  surrendered  entirely  for  practical  considera- 
tions. Instead  of  rushing  in,  sword  in  hand,  it  is  far  wiser 
to  watch  the  struggle  from  the  safe  seat  of  the  critic.  That 
struggle  is  very  hard  for  the  combatants  themselves,  while 
to  you  it  need  not  be  anything  but  entertaining,  and,  as 


6oo 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


the  issue  is  sure  to  be  without  bloodshed,  it  may  become 
highly  improving  to  your  own  intellect.  For  it  is  ex- 
tremely absurd  to  expect  to  be  enlightened  by  reason,  and 
yet  to  prescribe  to  her  beforehand  on  which  side  she  must 
incline.  Besides,  reason  is  naturally  so  subdued  and 
checked  by  reason,  that  you  need  not  send  out  patrols  in 
order  to  bring  the  civil  law  to  bear  on  that  party  whose 
victory  you  fear.  In  this  dialectical  war  no  victory  is 
gained  that  need  disturb  your  peace  of  mind. 

Reason  really  stands  in  need  of  such  dialectical  strife, 
and  it  is  much  to  be  wished  that  it  had  taken  place  sooner, 
and  with  the  unlimited  sanction  of  the  public,  for,  in  that 
case,  criticism  would  sooner  have  reached  complete  ma- 
turity, and  disputes  would  have  come  to  an  end  by  each 
party  becoming  aware  of  the  illusions  and  prejudices  which 
caused  their  differences. 

There  is  in  human  nature  a certain  disingenuousness 
which,  however,  like  everything  that  springs  [p.748] 
from  nature,  must  contain  a useful  germ,  namely,  a ten- 
dency to  conceal  one’s  own  true  sentiments,  and  to  give 
expression  to  adopted  opinions  which  are  supposed  to  be 
good  and  creditable.  There  is  no  doubt  that  this  tendency 
to  conceal  oneself  and  to  assume  a favourable  appearance 
has  helped  towards  the  progress  of  civilisation,  nay,  to  a 
certain  extent,  of  morality,  because  others,  who  could  not 
see  through  the  varnish  of  respectability,  honesty,  and 
correctness,  were  led  to  improve  themselves  by  seeing 
everywhere  these  examples  of  goodness  which  they  be- 
lieved to  be  genuine.  This  tendency,  however,  to  show 
oneself  better  than  one  really  is,  and  to  utter  sentiments 
which  one  does  not  really  share,  can  only  serve  -pro- 
visionally to  rescue  men  from  a rude  state,  and  to  teach 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason  6or 

them  to  assume  at  least  the  appearance  of  what  they  know 
to  be  good.  Afterwards,  when  genuine  principles  have 
once  been  developed  and  become  part  of  our  nature,  that 
disingenuousness  must  be  gradually  conquered,  because  it 
will  otherwise  deprave  the  heart  and  not  allow  the  good 
seeds  of  honest  conviction  to  grow  up  among  the  tares  of 
fair  appearances. 

I am  sorry  to  observe  the  same  disingenuousness,  con- 
cealment, and  hypocrisy  even  in  the  utterances  of  specu- 
lative thought,  though  there  are  here  fewer  hindrances  in 
uttering  our  convictions  openly  and  freely  as  we  ought, 
and  no  advantage  whatever  in  our  not  doing  [p.  749] 
so.  For  what  can  be  more  mischievous  to  the  advance- 
ment of  knowledge  than  to  communicate  even  our  thoughts 
in  a falsified  form,  to  conceal  doubts  which  we  feel  in  our 
own  assertions,  and  to  impart  an  appearance  of  conclusive- 
ness to  arguments  which  we  know  ourselves  to  be  incon- 
clusive ? So  long  as  those  tricks  arise  from  personal 
vanity  only  (which  is  commonly  the  case  with  speculative 
arguments,  as  touching  no  particular  interests,  nor  easily 
capable  of  apodictic  certainty)  they  are  mostly  counter- 
acted by  the  vanity  of  others,  with  the  full  approval  of  the 
public  at  large,  and  thus  the  result  is  generally  the  same 
as  what  would  or  might  have  been  obtained  sooner  by 
means  of  pure  ingenuousness  and  honesty.  But  where 
the  public  has  once  persuaded  itself  that  certain  subtle 
speculators  aim  at  nothing  less  than  to  shake  the  very 
foundations  of  the  common  welfare  of  the  people,  it  is 
supposed  to  be  not  only  prudent,  but  even  advisable  and 
honourable,  to  come  to  the  succour  of  what  is  called  the 
good  cause,  by  sophistries,  rather  than  to  allow  to  our 
supposed  antagonists  the  satisfaction  of  having  lowered 


602 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


our  tone  to  that  of  a purely  practical  conviction,  and  hav- 
ing forced  us  to  confess  the  absence  of  all  speculative 
and  apodictic  certainty.  I cannot  believe  this,  nor  can  I 
admit  that  the  intention  of  serving  a good  cause  can  ever 
be  combined  with  trickery,  misrepresentation,  and  fraud. 
That  in  weighing  the  arguments  of  a speculative  discus- 
sion we  ought  to  be  honest,  seems  the  least  that  [p.  750J 
can  be  demanded  ; and  if  we  could  at  least  depend  on 
this  with  perfect  certainty,  the  conflict  of  speculative 
reason  with  regard  to  the  important  questions  of  God,  the 
immortality  of  the  soul,  and  freedom,  would  long  ago  have 
been  decided,  or  would  soon  be  brought  to  a conclusion. 
Thus  it  often  happens  that  the  purity  of  motives  and  senti- 
ments stands  in  an  inverse  ratio  to  the  goodness  of  the 
cause,  and  that  its  supposed  assailants  are  more  honest 
and  more  straightforward  than  its  defenders. 

Supposing  that  I am  addressing  readers  who  never  wish 
to  see  a just  cause  defended  by  unjust  means,  I may  say 
that,  according  to  our  principles  of  criticism,  and  looking 
not  at  what  commonly  happens,  but  at  what  in  all  common 
fairness  ought  to  happen,  there  ought  to  be  no  polemical 
use  of  reason  at  all.  For  how  can  two  persons  dispute  on 
a subject  the  reality  of  which  neither  of  them  can  present 
either  in  real,  or  even  in  possible  experience,  while  they 
brood  on  the  mere  idea  of  it  with  the  sole  intention  of 
eliciting  something  more  than  the  idea,  namely,  the  reality 
of  the  object  itself?  How  can  they  ever  arrive  at  the  end 
of  their  dispute,  as  neither  of  them  can  make  his  view 
comprehensible  and  certain,  or  do  more  than  attack  and 
refute  the  view  of  his  opponent?  For  this  is  the  fate  of 
all  assertions  of  pure  reason.  They  go  beyond  the  condi- 
tions of  all  possible  experience,  where  no  proof  [p.  751] 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason  603 

of  truth  is  to  be  found  anywhere,  but  they  have  to  follow, 
nevertheless,  the  laws  of  the  understanding,  which  are 
intended  for  empirical  use  only,  but  without  which  no  step 
can  be  made  in  synthetical  thought.  Thus  it  happens 
that  each  side  lays  open  its  own  weaknesses,  and  each  can 
avail  itself  of  the  weaknesses  of  the  other. 

The  critique  of  pure  reason  may  really  be  looked  upon 
as  the  true  tribunal  for  all  disputes  of  reason  ; for  it  is  not 
concerned  in  these  disputes  which  refer  to  objects  imme- 
diately, but  is  intended  to  fix  and  to  determine  the  rights 
of  reason  in  general,  according  to  the  principles  of  its 
original  institution. 

Without  such  a critique,  reason  may  be  said  to  be  in  a 
state  of  nature,  and  unable  to  establish  and  defend  its  as- 
sertions and  claims  except  by  war.  The  critique  of  pure 
reason,  on  the  contrary,  which  bases  all  its  decisions  on 
the  indisputable  principles  of  its  own  original  institution, 
secures  to  us  the  peace  of  a legal  status,  in  which  disputes 
are  not  to  be  carried  on  except  in  the  proper  form  of  a law- 
suit. In  the  former  state  such  disputes  generally  end  in 
both  parties  claiming  victory,  which  is  followed  by  an  un- 
certain peace,  maintained  chiefly  by  the  civil  power,  while 
in  the  latter  state  a sentence  is  pronounced  which,  [p.  752] 
as  it  goes  to  the  very  root  of  the  dispute,  must  secure  an 
eternal  peace.  These  never-ceasing  disputes  of  a purely 
dogmatical  reason  compel  people  at  last  to  seek  for  rest  and 
peace  in  some  criticism  of  reason  itself,  and  in  some  sort 
of  legislation  founded  upon  such  criticism.  Thus  Hobbes 
maintains  that  the  state  of  nature  is  a state  of  injustice 
and  violence,  and  that  we  must  needs  leave  it  and  submit 
ourselves  to  the  constraint  of  law,  which  alone  limits  our 
freedom  in  such  a way  that  it  may  consist  with  the  free- 
dom of  others  and  with  the  common  good. 


604  Discipline  of  Pure  Reaso?i 

It  is  part  of  that  freedom  that  we  should  be  allowed 
openly  to  state  our  thoughts  and  our  doubts  which  we 
cannot  solve  ourselves,  without  running  the  risk  of  being 
decried  on  that  account  as  turbulent  and  dangerous  citizens. 
This  follows  from  the  inherent  rights  of  reason,  which 
recognises  no  other  judge  but  universal  human  reason 
itself.  Here  everybody  has  a vote  ; and,  as  all  improve- 
ments of  which  our  state  is  capable  must  spring  from 
thence,  such  rights  are  sacred  and  must  never  be  minished. 
Nay,  it  would  really  be  foolish  to  proclaim  certain  bold 
assertions,  or  reckless  attacks  upon  assertions  which  en- 
joy the  approval  of  the  largest  and  best  portion  of  the 
commonwealth,  as  dangerous;  for  that  would  be  to  impart 
to  them  an  importance  which  they  do  not  pos-  [p.  753] 
sess.  Whenever  I hear  that  some  uncommon  genius  has 
demonstrated  away  the  freedom  of  the  human  will,  the 
hope  of  a future  life,  or  the  existence  of  God,  I am  always 
desirous  to  read  his  book,  for  I expect  that  his  talent  will 
help  me  to  improve  my  own  insight  into  these  problems. 
Of  one  thing  I feel  quite  certain,  even  without  having 
seen  his  book,  that  he  has  not  disproved  any  single  one  of 
these  doctrines ; not  because  I imagine  that  I am  myself 
in  possession  of  irrefragable  proofs  of  them,  but  because 
the  transcendental  critique,  by  revealing  to  me  the  whole 
apparatus  of  our  pure  reason,  has  completely  convinced 
me  that,  as  reason  is  insufficient  to  establish  affirmative 
propositions  in  this  sphere  of  thought,  it  is  equally,  nay, 
even  more  powerless  to  establish  the  negative  on  any  of 
these  points.  For  where  is  this  so-called  free-thinker  to 
take  the  knowledge  that,  for  instance,  there  exists  no 
Supreme  Being?  This  proposition  lies  outside  the  field 
of  possible  experience  and,  therefore,  outside  the  limits  of 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


605 


all  human  cognition.  The  dogmatical  defender  of  the 
good  cause  I should  not  read  at  all,  because  I know  before- 
hand that  he  will  attack  the  sophistries  of  the  other 
party  simply  in  order  to  recommend  his  own.  Besides,  a 
mere  defence  of  the  common  opinion  does  not  supply  so 
much  material  for  new  remarks  as  a strange  and  ingeniously 
contrived  theory.  The  opponent  of  religion,  himself 
dogmatical  in  his  own  way,  would  give  me  a [p.  754] 
valuable  opportunity  for  amending  here  and  there  the 
principles  of  my  own  critique  of  pure  reason,  while  I 
should  not  be  at  all  afraid  of  any  danger  arising  from  his 
theories. 

But  it  may  be  argued  that  the  youth  at  least,  entrusted 
to  our  academical  teaching,  should  be  warned  against  such 
writings,  and  kept  away  from  a too  early  knowledge  of 
such  dangerous  propositions,  before  their  faculty  of  judg- 
ment, or  we  should  rather  say,  before  the  doctrines  which 
we  wish  to  inculcate  on  them,  have  taken  root,  and  are 
able  to  withstand  all  persuasion  and  pressure,  from  what- 
ever quarter  it  may  proceed. 

Yes,  if  the  cause  of  pure  reason  is  always  to  be  pleaded 
dogmatically,  and  if  opponents  are  to  be  disposed  of 
polemically,  i.e.  simply  by  taking  up  arms  against  them 
and  attacking  them  by  means  of  proofs  of  opposite  opin- 
ions, nothing  might  seem  for  the  moment  more  advisable, 
but  nothing  would  prove  in  the  long  run  more  vain  and 
inefficient  than  to  keep  the  reason  of  youth  in  temporary 
tutelage,  and  to  guard  it  against  temptation  for  a time  at 
least.  If,  however,  curiosity  or  the  fashion  of  the  age 
should  afterwards  make  them  acquainted  with  such  writ- 
ings, will  their  youthful  persuasion  then  hold  good  ? He 
who  is  furnished  with  dogmatical  weapons  only  in  order  to 


6o6 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


resist  the  attacks  of  his  opponent,  and  is  not  able  to  ana- 
lyse that  hidden  dialectic  which  is  concealed  in  his  own 
breast  quite  as  much  as  in  that  of  his  opponent,  sees 
sophistries  which  at  all  events  have  the  charm  of  [p.  755] 
novelty,  opposed  to  other  sophistries  which  possess  that 
charm  no  longer,  and  excite  the  suspicion  of  having  im- 
posed on  the  natural  credulity  of  youth.  He  sees  no 
better  way  of  showing  that  he  is  no  longer  a child  than  by 
ignoring  all  well-meant  warnings,  and,  accustomed  as  he  is 
to  dogmatism,  he  swallows  the  poison  which  destroys  his 
principles  by  a new  dogmatism. 

The  very  opposite  of  this  is  the  right  course  for  aca- 
demical instruction,  provided  always  that  it  is  founded 
on  a thorough  training  in  the  principles  of  the  criti- 
cism of  pure  reason.  For,  in  order  to  practically  apply 
these  principles  as  soon  as  possible,  and  to  show  their 
sufficiency  even  when  faced  by  the  strongest  dialectical 
illusion,  it  is  absolutely  necessary  to  allow  the  attacks, 
which  seem  so  formidable  to  the  dogmatist,  to  be  directed 
against  the  young  mind  whose  reason,  though  weak  as 
yet,  has  been  enlightened  by  criticism,  so  as  to  let  him 
test  by  its  principles  the  groundless  assertions  of  his 
opponents  one  after  the  other.  He  cannot  find  it  very 
difficult  to  dissolve  them  all  into  mere  vapour,  and  thus 
alone  does  he  early  begin  to  feel  his  own  power  and 
is  able  to  secure  himself  against  all  dangerous  illusions 
which  in  the  end  lose  all  their  fascination  on  him.  It  is 
true,  the  same  blows  which  destroy  the  strong-  [p.  756] 
hold  of  his  opponent  must  prove  fatal  also  to  his  own 
speculative  structures,  if  he  should  wish  to  erect  such. 
But  this  need  not  disturb  him,  because  he  does  not  wish 
to  shelter  himself  beneath  them,  but  looks  out  for  the 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason  607 

fair  field  of  practical  philosophy,  where  he  may  hope 
to  find  firmer  ground  for  erecting  his  own  rational  and 
beneficial  system. 

There  is,  therefore,  no  room  for  real  polemic  in  the 
sphere  of  pure  reason.  Both  parties  beat  the  air  and 
fight  with  their  own  shadows,  because  they  go  beyond 
the  limits  of  nature,  where  there  is  nothing  that  they 
could  lay  hold  of  with  their  dogmatical  grasp.  They 
may  fight  to  their  hearts’  content,  the  shadows  which 
they  are  cleaving  grow  together  again  in  one  moment, 
like  the  heroes  in  Valhalla,  in  order  to  disport  themselves 
once  more  in  these  bloodless  contests. 

Nor  can  we  admit  a sceptical  use  of  pure  reason,  which 
might  be  called  the  principle  of  neutrality  in  all  its  dis- 
putes. Surely,  to  stir  up  reason  against  itself,  to  supply 
it  with  weapons  on  both  sides,  and  then  to  look  on 
quietly  and  scoffingly  while  the  fierce  battle  is  raging, 
does  not  look  well  from  a dogmatical  point  of  view, 
but  has  the  appearance  of  a mischievous  and  malevolent 
disposition.  If,  however,  we  consider  the  in-  [p.  757] 
vincible  obstinacy  and  the  boasting  of  the  dogmatical 
sophists,  who  are  deaf  to  all  the  warnings  of  criticism, 
there  really  seems  nothing  left  but  to  meet  the  boasting 
on  one  side  by  an  equally  justified  boasting  on  the  other, 
in  order  at  least  to  startle  reason  by  a display  of  opposi- 
tion, and  thus  to  shake  her  confidence  and  make  her 
willing  to  listen  to  the  voice  of  criticism.  But  to  stop 
at  this  point,  and  to  look  upon  the  conviction  and  con- 
fession of  ignorance,  not  only  as  a remedy  against  dog- 
matical conceit,  but  as  the  best  means  of  settling  the 
conflict  of  reason  with  herself,  is  a vain  attempt  that 
will  never  give  rest  and  peace  to  reason.  The  utmost 


6o8 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


it  can  do  is  to  rouse  reason  from  her  sweet  dogmatical 
dreams,  and  to  induce  her  to  examine  more  carefully  her 
own  position.  As,  however,  the  sceptical  manner  of  avoid- 
ing a troublesome  business  seems  to  be  the  shortest  way 
out  of  all  difficulties,  and  promises  to  lead  to  a permanent 
peace  in  philosophy,  or  is  chosen  at  least  as  the  highroad 
by  all  who,  under  the  pretence  of  a scornful  dislike  of  all 
investigations  of  this  kind,  try  to  give  themselves  the  air 
of  philosophers,  it  seems  necessary  to  exhibit  this  mode  of 
thought  in  its  true  light. 

The  Impossibility  of  a Sceptical  Satisfaction  of  [p.  758] 
Pure  Reason  in  Conflict  zvitli  itself 

The  consciousness  of  my  ignorance  (unless  we  recog- 
nise at  the  same  time  its  necessity)  ought,  instead  of 
forming  the  end  of  my  investigations,  to  serve,  on  the 
contrary,  as  their  strongest  impulse.  All  ignorance  is 
either  an  ignorance  of  things,  or  an  ignorance  of  the  limits 
of  our  cognition.  If  ignorance  is  accidental,  it  should 
incite  us,  in  the  former  case,  to  investigate  things  dog- 
matically, in  the  latter  to  investigate  the  limits  of  possible 
knowledge  critically.  That  my  ignorance  is  absolutely 
necessary  and  that  I am  absolved  from  the  duty  of  all 
further  investigation,  can  never  be  established  empirically 
by  mere  observation,  but  critically  only,  by  a thorough 
examination  of  the  first  sources  of  our  knowledge.  The 
determination  of  the  true  limits  of  our  reason,  therefore, 
can  be  made  on  a priori  grounds  only,  while  its  limitation, 
which  consists  in  a general  recognition  of  our  never  en- 
tirely removable  ignorance,  may  be  realised  a posteriori 
also,  by  seeing  how  much  remains  to  be  known  in  spite  of 


Discipline,  of  Pure  Reason  609 

all  that  can  be  known.  The  former  knowledge  of  our  igno- 
rance, possible  only  by  criticism  of  reason,  is  truly  scien- 
tific, the  latter  is  merely  matter  of  experience,  [p.  759] 
where  it  is  never  possible  to  say  how  far  the  inferences 
drawn  from  it  may  reach.  If  I regard  the  earth,  accord- 
ing to  the  evidence  of  my  senses,  as  a flat  surface,  I can- 
not tell  how  far  it  may  extend.  But  what  experience 
teaches  me  is,  that  wheresoever  I go,  I always  see  before 
me  a space  in  which  I can  proceed  further.  Thus  I am 
conscious  of  the  limits  of  my  actual  knowledge  of  the 
earth  at  any  given  moment,  but  not  of  the  limits  of  all 
possible  geography.  But  if  I have  got  so  far  as  to  know 
that  the  earth  is  a sphere  and  its  surface  spherical,  I am 
able  from  any  small  portion  of  it,  for  instance,  from  a 
degree,  to  know  definitely  and  according  to  principles  a 
priori,  the  diameter,  and  through  it,  the  complete  periph- 
ery of  the  earth  ; and,  though  I am  ignorant  with  regard 
to  the  objects  which  are  contained  in  that  surface,  I am 
not  so  with  regard  to  its  extent,  its  magnitude,  and  its 
limits. 

In  a similar  manner  the  whole  of  the  objects  of  our 
knowledge  appears  to  us  like  a level  surface,  with  its 
apparent  horizon  which  encircles  its  whole  extent,  and 
was  called  by  us  the  idea  of  unconditioned  totality.  To 
reach  this  limit  empirically  is  impossible,  and  all  attempts 
have  proved  vain  to  determine  it  a priori  according  to  a 
certain  principle.  Nevertheless,  all  questions  of  pure 
reason  refer  to  what  lies  outside  of  that  horizon,  or,  it 
may  be,  on  its  boundary  line.  [p.  760] 

The  celebrated  David  Hume  was  one  of  those  geogra- 
phers of  human  reason  who  supposed  that  all  those 
questions  were  sufficiently  disposed  of  by  being  relegated 


6io  Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 

outside  that  horizon,  which,  however,  he  was  not  able 
to  determine.  He  was  chiefly  occupied  with  the  princi- 
ple of  causality,  and  remarked  quite  rightly,  that  the 
truth  of  this  principle  (and  even  the  objective  validity  of 
the  concept  of  an  efficient  cause  in  general)  was  based 
on  no  knowledge,  i.e.  on  no  cognition  a priori,  and  that 
its  authority  rested  by  no  means  on  the  necessity  of  such 
a law,  but  merely  on  its  general  usefulness  in  experience, 
and  on  a kind  of  subjective  necessity  arising  from  thence, 
which  he  called  habit.  From  the  inability  of  reason  to 
employ  this  principle  beyond  the  limits  of  experience  he 
inferred  the  nullity  of  all  the  pretensions  of  reason  in  her 
attempts  to  pass  beyond  what  is  empirical. 

This  procedure  of  subjecting  the  facts  of  reason  to 
examination,  and,  if  necessary,  to  blame,  may  be  termed 
the  censorship  of  reason.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that 
such  a censorship  must  inevitably  lead  to  doubts  [p.  761] 
against  all  the  transcendental  employment  of  such  princi- 
ples. But  this  is  only  the  second  and  by  no  means  the  last 
step  in  our  enquiry.  The  first  step  in  matters  of  pure  reason, 
which  marks  its  infancy,  is  dogmatism.  The  second,  which 
we  have  just  described,  is  scepticism,  and  marks  the  stage 
of  caution  on  the  part  of  reason,  when  rendered  wiser  by 
experience.  But  a third  step  is  necessary,  that  of  the 
maturity  and  manhood  of  judgment,  based  on  firm  and 
universally  applicable  maxims,  when  not  the  facts  of 
reason,  but  reason  itself  in  its  whole  power  and  fitness 
for  pure  knowledge  a priori  comes  to  be  examined.  This 
is  not  the  censura  merely,  but  the  true  criticism  of  reason, 
by  which  not  the  barrier  only,  but  the  fixed  frontiers  of 
reason,  not  ignorance  only  on  this  or  that  point,  but 
ignorance  with  reference  to  all  possible  questions  of 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason  6ll 

a certain  kind,  must  be  proved  from  principles,  instead  of 
being  merely  guessed  at.  Thus  scepticism  is  a resting- 
place  of  reason,  where  it  may  reflect  for  a time  on  its 
dogmatical  wanderings  and  gain  a survey  of  the  region 
where  it  happens  to  be,  in  order  to  choose  its  way  with 
greater  certainty  for  the  future : but  it  can  never  be  its 
permanent  dwelling-place.  That  can  only  be  found  in 
perfect  certainty,  whether  of  our  knowledge  of  the  objects 
themselves  or  of  the  limits  within  which  all  our  knowledge 
of  objects  is  enclosed.  [p.  762] 

Our  reason  is  not  to  be  considered  as  an  indefinitely 
extended  plain,  the  limits  of  which  are  known  in  a general 
way  only,  but  ought  rather  to  be  compared  to  a sphere 
the  radius  of  which  may  be  determined  from  the  curva- 
ture of  the  arc  of  its  surface  (corresponding  to  the  nature 
of  synthetical  propositions  a priori ),  which  enables  us 
likewise  to  fix  the  extent  and  periphery  of  it  with  perfect 
certainty.  Outside  that  sphere  (the  field  of  experience) 
nothing  can  become  an  object  to  our  reason,  nay,  ques- 
tions even  on  such  imaginary  objects  relate  to  the  sub- 
jective principles  only  for  a complete  determination  of 
all  the  relations  which  may  exist  between  the  concepts 
of  the  understanding  within  that  sphere. 

It  is  a fact  that  we  are  in  possession  of  different 
kinds  of  synthetical  knowledge  a priori , as  shown  by 
the  principles  of  the  understanding  which  anticipate 
experience.  If  anybody  finds  it  quite  impossible  to  under- 
stand the  possibility  of  such  principles,  he  may  at  first 
have  some  doubts  as  to  whether  they  really  dwell  within 
us  a priori ; but  he  cannot  thus,  by  the  mere  powers 
of  the  understanding,  prove  their  impossibility,  and 
declare  all  the  steps  which  reason  takes  under  their 


012 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


guidance  as  null  and  void.  All  he  can  say  is  that,  it 
we  could  understand  their  origin  and  genuineness,  we 
should  be  able  to  determine  the  extent  and  limits  of 
our  reason,  and  that,  until  that  is  done,  all  the  [p.  763] 
assertions  of  reason  are  made  at  random.  And  in  this 
way  a complete  scepticism  with  regard  to  all  dogmatical 
philosophy,  which  is  not  guided  by  a criticism  of  reason, 
is  well  grounded,  though  we  could  not  therefore  deny  to 
reason  such  further  advance,  after  the  way  has  once  been 
prepared  and  secured  on  firmer  ground.  For  all  these 
concepts,  nay,  all  the  questions  which  pure  reason  places 
before  us,  have  their  origin,  not  in  experience,  but  in 
reason  itself,  and  must'  therefore  be  capable  of  being 
solved  and  tested  as  to  their  validity  or  invalidity.  Nor 
are  we  justified,  while  pretending  that  the  solution  of  these 
problems  is  really  to  be  found  in  the  nature  of  things, 
to  decline  their  consideration  and  further  investigation, 
under  the  pretext  of  our  weakness,  for  reason  alone 
begets  all  these  ideas  by  itself,  and  is  bound  therefore  to 
give  an  account  of  their  validity  or  their  dialectical  vanity. 

All  sceptical  polemic  should  properly  be  directed  against 
the  dogmatist  only  who,  without  any  misgivings  about 
his  own  fundamental  objective  principles,  that  is,  without 
criticism,  continues  his  course  with  undisturbed  gravity, 
and  should  be  intended  only  to  unsettle  his  brief  and  to 
bring  him  thus  to  a proper  self-knowledge.  With  regard 
to  what  we  know  or  what  we  cannot  know,  that  polemic  is 
of  no  consequence  whatever.  All  the  unsuccessful  dogmat- 
ical attempts  of  reason  are  facta,  and  it  is  always  [p.  764] 
useful  to  submit  them  to  the  censura  of  the  sceptic.  But 
this  can  decide  nothing  as  to  the  expectations  of  reason  in 
her  hopes  and  claims  of  a better  success  in  future  attempts; 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reaso?i  613 

and  no  mere  censura  can  put  an  end  to  the  disputes 
regarding  the  rights  of  human  reason. 

Hume  is,  perhaps,  the  most  ingenious  of  all  sceptics, 
and  without  doubt  the  most  important  with  regard  to 
the  influence  which  the  sceptical  method  may  exercise 
in  awakening  reason  to  a thorough  examination  of  its 
rights.  It  will  therefore  be  worth  our  while  to  make 
clear  to  ourselves  the  course  of  his  reasoning  and  the 
errors  of  an  intelligent  and  estimable  man,  who  at  the 
outset  of  his  enquiries  was  certainly  on  the  right  track  of 
truth. 

Hume  was  probably  aware,  though  he  never  made  it 
quite  clear  to  himself,  that  in  judgments  of  a certain  kind 
we  pass  beyond  our  concept  of  the  object.  I have  called 
this  class  of  judgments  synthetical.  There  is  no  difficulty 
as  to  how  I may,  by  means  of  experience,  pass  beyond  the 
concept  which  I have  hitherto  had.  Experience  is  itself 
such  a synthesis  of  perceptions  through  which  a concept, 
which  I have  by  means  of  one  perception,  is  increased  by 
means  of  other  perceptions.  But  we  imagine  that  we  are 
able  also  a priori  to  pass  beyond  our  concept  [p.  765] 
and  thus  to  enlarge  our  knowledge.  This  we  attempt  to  do 
either  by  the  pure  understanding,  in  relation  to  that  which 
can  at  least  be  an  object  of  experience,  or  even  by  means 
of  pure  reason,  in  relation  to  such  qualities  of  things,  or 
even  the  existence  of  such  things,  as  can  never  occur  in 
experience.  Hume  in  his  scepticism  did  not  distinguish 
between  these  two  kinds  of  judgments  as  he  ought  to  have 
done,  but  regarded  this  augmentation  of  concepts  by 
themselves,  and,  so  to  say,  the  spontaneous  generation  of 
our  understanding  (and  of  our  reason),  without  being  im- 
pregnated by  experience,  as  perfectly  impossible.  Con- 


614  Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 

sidering  all  principles  a priori  as  imaginary,  he  arrived  at 
the  conclusion  that  they  were  nothing  but  a habit  arising 
from  experience  and  its  laws  ; that  they  were  therefore 
merely  empirical,  that  is,  in  themselves,  contingent  rules 
to  which  we  wrongly  ascribe  necessity  and  universality. 
In  order  to  establish  this  strange  proposition,  he  appealed 
to  the  generally  admitted  principle  of  the  relation  between 
cause  and  effect.  For  as  no  faculty  of  the  understanding 
could  lead  us  from  the  concept  of  a thing  to  the  existence 
of  something  else  that  should  follow  from  it  universally 
and  necessarily,  he  thought  himself  justified  in  concluding 
that,  without  experience,  we  have  nothing  that  could 
augment  our  concept  and  give  us  a right  to  form  a judg- 
ment that  extends  itself  a priori.  That  the  light  of  the 
sun  which  shines  on  the  wax  should  melt  the  wax  and  at 
the  same  time  harden  the  clay,  no  understand-  [p.  766] 
ing,  he  maintained,  could  guess  from  the  concepts  which 
we  had  before  of  these  things,  much  less  infer,  according 
to  a law,  experience  only  being  able  to  teach  us  such  a law. 
We  have  seen,  on  the  contrary,  in  the  transcendental  logic 
that,  though  we  can  never  pass  immediately  beyond  the 
content  of  a concept  that  is  given  us,  we  are  nevertheless 
able,  entirely  a priori , but  yet  in  reference  to  something 
else,  namely,  possible  experience,  to  know  the  law  of  its 
connection  with  other  things.  If,  therefore,  wax,  which 
was  formerly  hard,  melts,  I can  know  a priori  that  some- 
thing else  must  have  preceded  (for  instance  the  heat  of 
the  sun)  upon  which  this  melting  has  followed  according 
to  a permanent  law,  although  without  experience  I could 
never  know  a priori  definitely  either  from  the  effect  the 
cause,  or  from  the  cause  the  effect.  Hume  was  therefore 
wrong  in  inferring  from  the  mere  contingency  of  our 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason  615 

being  determined  according  to  the  law  of  causality,  the 
contingency  of  that  law  itself,  and  he  mistook  our  passing 
beyond  the  concept  of  a thing  to  some  possible  experience 
(which  is  entirely  a priori  and  constitutes  the  objective 
reality  of  it)  for  the  synthesis  of  the  objects  of  real  expe- 
rience which,  no  doubt,  is  always  empirical.  He  thus 
changed  a principle  of  affinity  which  resides  in  the  under- 
standing and  predicates  necessary  connection,  into  a rule 
of  association  residing  in  the  imitative  faculty  of  imagina- 
tion, which  can  only  represent  contingent,  but  [p.  767] 
never  objective  connections. 

The  sceptical  errors  of  that  otherwise  singularly  acute 
thinker  arose  chiefly  from  a defect,  which  he  shared,  how- 
ever, in  common  with  all  dogmatists,  namely,  of  not  having 
surveyed  systematically  all  kinds  of  synthesis  a priori  of 
the  understanding.  For  in  doing  this  he  would,  without 
mentioning  others,  have  discovered,  for  instance,  the  prin- 
ciple of  permanency  as  one  which,  like  causality,  anticipates 
experience.  He  would  thus  have  been  able  also  to  fix 
definite  limits  to  the  understanding  in  its  attempts  at 
expansion  a priori  and  to  pure  reason.  He  only  narrows 
the  sphere  of  our  understanding,  without  definitely  limit- 
ing it,  and  produces  a general  mistrust,  but  no  definite 
knowledge  of  that  ignorance  which  to  us  is  inevitable. 
He  only  subjects  certain  principles  of  the  understanding 
to  his  censura , but  does  not  place  the  understanding,  with 
reference  to  all  its  faculties,  on  the  balance  of  criticism. 
He  is  not  satisfied  with  denying  to  the  understanding 
what  in  reality  it  does  not  possess,  but  goes  on  to  deny  to 
it  all  power  of  expanding  a priori , though  he  has  never 
really  tested  all  its  powers.  For  this  reason,  what  always 
defeats  scepticism  has  happened  to  Hume  also,  namely, 


6i6 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


that  he  himself  becomes  subject  to  scepticism,  because  his 
objections  rest  on  facts  only  which  are  contingent,  and  not 
on  principles  which  alone  can  force  a surrender  of  the 
right  of  dogmatical  assertion.  [p.  768] 

As,  besides  this,  he  does  not  sufficiently  distinguish 
between  the  well-grounded  claims  of  the  understanding 
and  the  dialectical  pretensions  of  reason,  against  which, 
however,  his  attacks  are  chiefly  directed,  it  so  happens 
that  reason,  the  peculiar  tendency  of  which  has  not  in  the 
least  been  destroyed,  but  only  checked,  does  not  at  all 
consider  itself  shut  out  from  its  attempts  at  expansion, 
and  can  never  be  entirely  turned  away  from  them,  al- 
though it  may  be  punished  now  and  then.  Mere  attacks 
only  provoke  counter  attacks,  and  make  us  more  obstinate 
in  enforcing  our  own  views.  But  a complete  survey  of  all 
that  is  really  our  own,  and  the  conviction  of  a certain 
though  a small  possession,  make  us  perceive  the  vanity  of 
higher  claims,  and  induce  us,  after  surrendering  all  dis- 
putes, to  live  contentedly  and  peacefully  within  our  own 
limited,  but  undisputed  domain. 

These  sceptical  attacks  are  not  only  dangerous,  but 
even  destructive  to  the  uncritical  dogmatist  who  has  not 
measured  the  sphere  of  his  understanding,  and  has  not, 
therefore,  determined,  according  to  principles,  the  limits 
of  his  own  possible  knowledge,  and  does  not  know  before- 
hand how  much  he  is  really  able  to  achieve,  but  thinks 
that  he  is  able  to  find  all  this  out  by  a purely  tentative 
method.  For  if  he  has  been  found  out  in  one  single 
assertion  of  his,  which  he  cannot  justify,  or  the  fallacy 
of  which  he  cannot  evolve  according  to  prin-  [p.  769] 
ciples,  suspicion  falls  on  all  his  assertions,  however  plausi- 
ble they  may  appear. 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


617 


And  thus  the  sceptic  is  the  true  schoolmaster  to  lead 
the  dogmatic  speculator  towards  a sound  criticism  of  the 
understanding  and  of  reason.  When  he  has  once  been 
brought  there,  he  need  fear  no  further  attacks,  for  he 
has  learnt  to  distinguish  his  own  possession  from  that 
which  lies  completely  beyond  it,  and  on  which  he  can 
lay  no  claim,  nor  become  involved  in  any  disputes  regard- 
ing it.  Thus  the  sceptical  method,  though  it  cannot  in 
itself  satisfy  with  regard  to  the  problems  of  reason,  is 
nevertheless  an  excellent  preparation  in  order  to  awaken 
its  circumspection,  and  to  indicate  the  true  means  whereby 
the  legitimate  possessions  of  reason  may  be  secured  against 
all  attacks. 


DISCIPLINE  OF  PURE  REASON 
Section  III 

The  Discipline  of  Pure  Reason  with  Regard  to  Hypotheses 

As  then  the  criticism  of  our  reason  has  at  last  taught 
us  so  much  at  least,  that  with  its  pure  and  speculative 
use  we  can  arrive  at  no  knowledge  at  all,  would  not  this 
seem  to  open  a wide  field  for  hypotheses , as,  where  we 
cannot  assert  with  certainty,  we  are  at  all  events  at 
liberty  to  form  guesses  and  opinions  ? 

If  the  faculty  of  imagination  is  not  simply  to  [p.  770] 
indulge  in  dreams,  but  to  invent  and  compose  under  the 
strict  surveillance  of  reason,  it  is  necessary  that  there 
should  always  be  something  perfectly  certain,  and  not 
only  invented  or  resting  on  opinion,  and  that  is  the  possi- 
bility of  the  object  itself.  If  that  is  once  given,  it  is 


6i8  Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 

then  allowable,  so  far  as  its  reality  is  concerned,  to  have 
recourse  to  opinion,  which  opinion,  however,  if  it  is  not  to 
be  utterly  groundless,  must  be  brought  in  connection  with 
what  is  really  given  and  therefore  certain,  as  its  ground 
of  explanation.  In  that  case,  and  in  that  case  only,  can 
we  speak  of  an  hypothesis. 

As  we  cannot  form  the  least  conception  of  the  possi- 
bility of  a dynamical  connection  a priori , and  as  the 
categories  of  the  pure  understanding  are  not  intended 
to  invent  any  such  connection,  but  only,  when  it  is  given 
in  experience,  to  understand  it,  we  cannot  by  means  of 
these  categories  invent  one  single  object  as  endowed 
with  a new  quality  not  found  in  experience,  or  base  any 
permissible  hypothesis  on  such  a quality  ; otherwise  we 
should  be  supplying  our  reason  with  empty  chimeras,  and 
not  with  concepts  of  things.  Thus  it  is  not  permissible 
to  invent  any  new  and  original  powers,  as,  for  instance, 
an  understanding  capable  of  perceiving  objects  without 
the  aid  of  the  senses  ; or  a force  of  attraction  without 
any  contact  ; a new  kind  of  substances  that  should  exist, 
for  instance,  in  space,  without  being  impenetrable,  and 
consequently,  also,  any  connection  of  substances,  differ- 
ent from  that  which  is  supplied  by  experience  ; [p.  771] 

no  presence,  except  in  space,  no  duration,  except  in  time. 
In  one  word,  our  reason  can  only  use  the  conditions  of 
possible  experience  as  the  conditions  of  the  possibility 
of  things  ; it  cannot  invent  them  independently,  because 
such  concepts,  although  not  self-contradictory,  would 
always  be  without  an  object. 

The  concepts  of  reason,  as  was  said  before,  are  mere 
ideas,  and  it  is  true  that  they  have  no  object  correspond- 
ing to  them  in  experience  ; but  they  do  not,  for  all  that, 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason  619 

refer  to  purely  imaginary  objects,  which  are  supposed  to 
be  possible.  They  are  purely  problematical,  in  order 
to  supply  (as  heuristic  fictions)  regulative  principles  for 
the  systematical  employment  of  the  understanding  in  the 
sphere  of  experience.  If  they  are  not  that,  they  would 
become  mere  fictions  the  possibility  of  which  is  quite 
indemonstrable,  and  which,  therefore,  can  never  be  em- 
ployed as  hypotheses  for  the  explanation  of  real  phe- 
nomena. It  is  quite  permissible  to  represent  the  soul 
to  ourselves  as  simple,  in  order,  according  to  this  idea, 
to  use  the  complete  and  necessary  unity  of  all  the  facul- 
ties of  the  soul,  although  we  cannot  understand  it  in 
concreto,  as  the  principle  of  all  our  enquiries  into  its 
internal  phenomena.  But  to  assume  the  soul  as  a simple 
substance  (which  is  a transcendent  concept)  would  be 
a proposition,  not  only  indemonstrable  (this  is  the  case 
with  several  physical  hypotheses),  but  purely  [p.  772] 
arbitrary  and  rash  : because  the  simple  can  never  occur 
in  any  experience,  and  if  by  substance  we  understand 
the  permanent  object  of  sensuous  intuition,  the  very 
possibility  of  a simple  phenomenon  is  perfectly  incon- 
ceivable. Reason  has  no  right  whatever  to  assume,  as 
an  opinion,  purely  intelligible  beings,  or  purely  intelligible 
qualities  of  the  objects  of  the  senses  ; although,  on  the 
other  side,  as  we  have  no  concepts  whatever,  either  of 
their  possibility  or  impossibility,  we  cannot  claim  any 
truer  insight  enabling  us  to  deny  dogmatically  their  pos- 
sibility. 

In  order  to  explain  given  phenomena,  no  other  things  or 
reasons  can  be  adduced  but  those  which,  according  to  the 
already  known  laws  of  phenomena,  have  been  put  in  con- 
nection with  them.  A transcendental  hypothesis,  adduc- 


620  Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 

,:ng  a mere  idea  of  reason  for  the  explanation  of  natural 
things,  would  therefore  be  no  explanation  at  all,  because 
it  would  really  be  an  attempt  at  explaining  what,  accord- 
ing to  known  empirical  principles,  we  do  not  understand 
sufficiently  by  something  which  we  do  not  understand 
at  all.  Nor  would  the  principle  of  such  an  hypothesis 
serve  to  help  the  understanding  with  regard  to  its  objects, 
but  only  to  satisfy  our  reason.  Order  and  design  in 
nature  must  themselves  be  explained  on  natural  grounds 
and  according  to  natural  laws ; and  for  this  [p.  773] 
purpose  even  the  wildest  hypotheses,  if  only  they  are 
physical,  are  more  tolerable  than  a hyperphysical  one, 
— that  is,  the  appeal  to  the  Divine  Author,  who  is 
called  in  for  that  very  purpose.  This  would  be  a prin- 
ciple of  ratio  ignava,  to  pass  by  all  causes  the  objective 
reality  of  which,  in  their  possibility  at  least,  may  be 
known  by  continued  experience,  in  order  to  rest  on  a 
mere  idea,  which  no  doubt  is  very  agreeable  to  our 
reason.  With  regard  to  the  absolute  totality  of  the 
ground  of  explanation  in  the  series  of  causes,  there  can 
be  no  difficulty,  considering  that  all  mundane  objects 
are  nothing  hut  phenomena,  in  which  we  can  never  hope 
to  find  absolute  completeness  in  the  synthesis  of  the 
series  of  conditions. 

It  is  impossible  to  allow  transcendental  hypotheses  in 
the  speculative  use  of  reason,  or  the  use  of  hyperphysical 
instead  of  physical  explanations ; partly,  because  reason 
is  not  in  the  least  advanced  in  that  way,  but,  on  the  con- 
trary, cut  off  from  its  own  proper  employment,  partly 
because  such  a licence  would  in  the  end  deprive  reason 
of  all  the  fruits  that  spring  from  the  cultivation  of  its  own 
proper  soil,  namely,  experience.  It  is  true,  no  doubt,  that 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


621 


whenever  the  explanation  of  nature  seems  difficult  to  us, 
we  should  thus  always  have  a transcendent  explanation 
ready  to  hand,  which  relieves  us  of  all  investigation  ; but 
in  that  case  we  are  led  in  the  end,  not  to  an  [p.  774] 
understanding,  but  to  a complete  incomprehensibility  of 
the  principle  which,  from  the  very  beginning,  was  so 
designed  that  it  must  contain  the  concept  of  something 
which  is  the  absolutely  First. 

What  is,  secondly,  required  in  order  to  render  an  hy- 
pothesis acceptable,  is  its  adequacy  for  determining  a 
priori,  by  means  of  it,  all  the  consequences  that  are  given. 
If,  for  that  purpose,  we  have  to  call  in  the  aid  of  supple- 
mentary hypotheses,  they  rouse  the  suspicion  of  a mere 
fiction,  because  each  of  them  requires  for  itself  the  same 
justification  as  the  fundamental  idea,  and  cannot  serve 
therefore  as  a sufficient  witness.  No  doubt,  if  we  once 
admit  an  absolutely  perfect  cause,  there  is  no  difficulty  in 
accounting  for  all  the  order,  magnitude,  and  design  which 
are  seen  in  the  world.  But  if  we  consider  what  seem  to 
us  at  least  deviations  and  evils  in  nature,  new  hypotheses 
will  be  required  in  order  to  save  the  first  hypothesis  from 
the  objections  which  it  has  to  encounter.  In  the  same 
manner,  whenever  the  simple  independence  of  the  human 
soul,  which  has  been  admitted  in  order  to  account  for  all 
its  phenomena,  is  called  into  question  on  account  of  the 
difficulties  arising  from  phenomena  similar  to  the  changes 
of  matter  (growth  and  decay),  new  hypotheses  have  to  be 
called  in,  which  may  seem  plausible,  but  possess  no  au- 
thority, except  what  they  derive  from  the  opinion  [p.  775] 
which  was  to  yield  the  chief  explanation,  and  which  they 
themselves  were  called  upon  to  defend. 

If  the  two  hypotheses  which  we  have  just  mentioned 


622 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


as  examples  of  the  assertions  of  reason  (the  incorporea\ 
unity  of  the  soul,  and  the  existence  of  a Supreme  Being) 
are  to  be  accepted,  not  as  hypotheses,  but  as  dogmas 
proved  a priori , we  have  nothing  to  say  to  them.  Great 
care,  however,  should  be  taken  in  that  case  that  they 
should  be  proved  with  the  apodictic  certainty  of  a demon- 
stration. It  would  be  as  absurd  to  try  to  make  the  reality 
of  such  ideas  plausible  only,  as  to  try  to  make  a geomet- 
rical proposition  plausible.  Reason,  independent  of  all 
experience,  knows  everything  either  a priori,  and  as  neces- 
sary, or  not  at  all.  Its  judgment,  therefore,  is  never 
opinion,  but  either  an  abstaining  from  all  judgments,  or 
apodictic  certainty.  Opinions  and  guesses  as  to  what 
belongs  to  things  can  be  admitted  in  explanation  only  of 
what  is  really  given,  or  as  resulting,  according  to  empirical 
laws,  from  something  that  is  really  given.  They  belong, 
therefore,  to  the  series  of  the  objects  of  experience  only. 
Outside  that  field  to  opine  is  the  same  as  to  play  with 
thoughts,  unless  we  suppose  that  even  a doubtful  and  un- 
certain way  of  judging  might  lead  us  perhaps  on  to  the 
truth. 

But  although,  when  dealing  with  the  purely  [p.  776] 
speculative  questions  of  pure  reason,  no  hypotheses  are 
admissible  in  order  to  found  on  them  any  propositions, 
they  are  perfectly  admissible  in  order,  if  possible,  to  defend 
them  ; that  is  to  say,  they  may  be  used  for  polemical,  but 
not  for  dogmatical  purposes.  Nor  do  I understand  by 
defending  the  strengthening  of  the  proofs  in  support  of 
our  assertions,  but  only  the  refutation  of  the  dialectical 
arguments  of  the  opponent  which  are  intended  to  invali- 
date our  assertions.  All  synthetical  propositions  of  pure 
reason  have  this  peculiarity  that,  although  the  philosopher 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


6 23 


who  maintains  the  reality  of  certain  ideas  never  possesses 
sufficient  knowledge  in  order  to  render  his  own  proposi- 
tions certain,  his  opponent  is  equally  unable  to  prove  the 
opposite.  It  is  true,  no  doubt,  that  this  equality  of  fort- 
une, which  is  peculiar  to  human  reason,  favours  neither 
of  the  two  parties  with  regard  to  their  speculative  know- 
ledge, and  hence  the  never-ending  feuds  in  this  arena. 
But  we  shall  see  nevertheless  that,  in  relation  to  its  practi- 
cal employment,  reason  has  the  right  of  admitting  what, 
in  the  sphere  of  pure  speculation,  it  would  not  be  allowed 
to  admit  without  sufficient  proof.  Such  admissions,  no 
doubt,  detract  from  the  perfection  of  speculation,  but 
practical  interests  take  no  account  of  this.  Here,  there- 
fore, reason  is  in  possession,  without  having  to  prove  the 
legitimacy  of  its  title,  which,  indeed,  it  would  be  [p.  777] 
difficult  to  do.  The  burden  of  proof  rests,  therefore,  on 
the  opponent ; and  as  he  knows  as  little  of  the  point  in 
question,  to  enable  him  to  prove  its  non-existence,  as  the 
other  who  maintains  its  reality,  it  is  evident  that  there  is 
an  advantage  on  the  side  of  him  who  maintains  something 
as  a practically  necessary  supposition  {melior  est  conditio 
possidentis).  He  is  clearly  entitled,  as  it  were  in  self- 
defence,  to  use  the  same  weapons  in  support  of  his  own 
good  cause,  which  the  opponent  uses  against  it,  that  is,  to 
employ  hypotheses,  which  are  not  intended  to  strengthen 
the  arguments  in  favour  of  his  own  view,  but  only  to  show 
that  the  opponent  knows  far  too  little  of  the  subject  under 
discussion  to  flatter  himself  that  he  possesses  any  advan- 
tage over  us,  so  far  as  speculative  insight  is  concerned. 

In  the  field  of  pure  reason,  therefore,  hypotheses  are 
admitted  as  weapons  of  defence  only,  not  in  order  to 
establish  a right,  but  simply  in  order  to  defend  it ; and  it 


624  Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 

is  our  duty  at  all  times  to  look  for  a real  opponent  within 
ourselves.  Speculative  reason  in  its  transcendental  em- 
ployment is  by  its  very  nature  dialectical.  The  objections 
which  we  have  to  fear  lie  in  ourselves.  We  must  look  for 
them  as  we  look  for  old,  but  never  superannuated  claims, 
if  we  wish  to  destroy  them,  and  thus  to  establish  a per- 
manent peace.  External  tranquillity  is  a mere  illusion.  It 
is  necessary  to  root  up  the  very  germ  of  these  objections 
which  lies  in  the  nature  of  human  reason ; and  how  can 
we  root  it  up,  unless  we  allow  it  freedom,  nay,  [p.  778] 
offer  it  nourishment,  so  that  it  may  send  out  shoots,  and 
thus  discover  itself  to  our  eyes,  so  that  we  may  afterwards 
destroy  it  with  its  very  root  ? Try  yourselves  therefore 
to  discover  objections  of  which  no  opponent  has  ever 
thought ; nay,  lend  him  your  weapons,  and  grant  him  the 
most  favourable  position  which  he  could  wish  for.  You 
have  nothing  to  fear  in  all  this,  but  much  to  hope  for, 
namely,  that  you  may  gain  a possession  which  no  one  will 
ever  again  venture  to  contest. 

In  order  to  be  completely  equipped  you  require  the 
hypotheses  of  pure  reason  also,  which,  although  but  leaden 
weapons  (because  not  steeled  by  any  law  of  experience), 
are  yet  quite  as  strong  as  those  which  any  opponent  is 
likely  to  use  against  you.  If,  therefore  (for  any  not  specu- 
lative reason),  you  have  admitted  the  immaterial  nature  of 
the  soul,  which  is  not  subject  to  any  corporeal  changes, 
and  you  are  met  by  the  difficulty  that  nevertheless  experi- 
ence seems  to  prove  both  the  elevation  and  the  decay  of 
our  mental  faculties  as  different  modifications  of  our  organs, 
you  can  weaken  the  force  of  this  objection  by  saying  that 
you  look  upon  the  body  as  a fundamental  phenomenon 
only,  which,  in  our  present  state  (in  this  life),  forms  the 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


625 


condition  of  all  the  faculties  of  our  sensibility,  and  henee 
of  our  thought.  In  that  case  the  separation  from  the  body 
would  be  the  end  of  the  sensuous  employment  and  the 
beginning  of  the  intelligible  employment  of  our  faculty  of 
knowledge.  The  body  would  thus  have  to  be  [p.  779] 
considered,  not  as  the  cause  of  our  thinking,  but  only  as  a 
restrictive  condition  of  it,  and,  therefore,  if  on  one  side  as 
a support  of  our  sensuous  and  animal  life,  on  the  other,  all 
the  more,  as  an  impediment  of  our  pure  and  spiritual  life, 
so  that  the  dependence  of  the  animal  life  on  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  body  would  in  no  wise  prove  the  dependence 
of  our  whole  life  on  the  state  of  our  organs.  You  may  go 
even  further  and  discover  new  doubts  which  have  either 
not  been  raised  at  all  before,  or  at  all  events  have  not 
been  carried  far  enough. 

Generation  in  the  human  race,  as  well  as  among  irra- 
tional creatures,  depends  on  so  many  accidents,  on  occasion, 
on  sufficient  sustenance,  on  the  views  and  whims  of  govern- 
ment, nay,  even  on  vice,  that  it  is  difficult  to  believe  in 
the  eternal  existence  of  a being  whose  life  has  first  begun 
under  circumstances  so  trivial,  and  so  entirely  dependent 
on  our  own  choice.  As  regards  the  continuance  (here  on 
earth)  of  the  whole  race,  there  is  less  difficulty,  because 
the  accidents  in  individual  cases  are  subject  nevertheless 
to  a rule  with  regard  to  the  whole.  With  regard  to  each 
individual,  however,  to  expect  so  important  an  effect  from 
such  insignificant  causes  seems  very  strange.  But  even 
against  this  you  may  adduce  the  following  transcendental 
hypothesis,  namely,  that  all  life  is  really  intelligible  only, 
not  subject  to  the  changes  of  time,  and  neither  [p.  780] 
beginning  in  birth,  nor  ending  in  death.  You  may  say 
that  this  life  is  phenomenal  only,  that  is,  a sensuous  repre- 


626 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


sentation  of  the  pure  spiritual  life,  and  that  the  whole 
world  of  sense  is  but  an  image  passing  before  our  present 
mode  of  knowledge,  but,  like  a dream,  without  any  objec- 
tive reality  in  itself ; nay,  that  if  we  could  see  ourselves 
and  other  objects  also  as  they  really  are,  we  should  see 
ourselves  in  a world  of  spiritual  natures,  our  community 
with  which  did  neither  begin  at  our  birth  nor  will  end  with 
the  death  of  the  body,  both  being  purely  phenomenal. 

Although  it  is  true  that  we  do  not  know  anything  about 
what  we  have  here  been  pleading  hypothetically  against 
our  opponents,  and  that  we  ourselves  do  not  even  seriously 
maintain  it,  it  being  simply  an  idea  invented  for  self- 
defence  and  hot  even  an  idea  of  reason,  yet  we  are  acting 
throughout  quite  rationally.  In  answer  to  our  opponent 
who  imagines  that  he  has  exhausted  all  possibilities,  and 
who  wrongly  represents  the  absence  of  empirical  conditions 
as  a proof  of  the  total  impossibility  of  our  own  belief,  we 
are  simply  showing  him  that  he  can  no  more,  by  mere  laws 
of  experience,  comprehend  the  whole  field  of  possible 
things  by  themselves  than  we  are  able,  outside  of  experi- 
ence, to  establish  anything  for  our  reason  on  a really  secure 
foundation.  Because  we  bring  forward  such  hypothetical 
defences  against  the  pretensions  of  our  boldly  denying 
opponent,  we  must  not  be  supposed  to  have  [p.  781] 
adopted  these  opinions  as  our  own.  We  abandon  them  so 
soon  as  we  have  disposed  of  the  dogmatical  conceit  of  our 
opponent.  It  seems  no  doubt  very  modest  and  moderate 
to  maintain  a simple  negative  position  with  regard  to  the 
assertions  of  other  people ; but  to  attempt  to  represent 
objections  as  proofs  of  the  opposite  opinion  is  quite  as 
arrogant  as  to  assume  the  position  of  the  affirming  party 
and  its  opinions. 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason  627 

It  is  easy  to  see,  therefore,  that  in  the  speculative  em 
ployment  of  reason  hypotheses  are  of  no  value  by  them- 
selves, but  relatively  only,  as  opposed  to  the  transcendental 
pretensions  of  the  opposite  party.  For  to  extend  the  prin- 
ciples of  possible  experience  to  the  possibility  of  things  in 
general  is  quite  as  transcendent  as  to  ascribe  objective 
reality  to  concepts  which  cannot  have  an  object  except 
outside  the  limits  of  all  possible  experience.  The  asser- 
tory judgments  of  pure  reason  must  (like  everything  known 
by  reason)  be  either  necessary  or  nothing  at  all.  Reason, 
in  fact,  knows  of  no  opinions.  The  hypotheses,  however, 
which  we  have  just  been  discussing  are  problematical 
judgments  only,  which,  at  least,  cannot  be  refuted,  though 
they  can  neither  be  proved  by  anything.  They  are  noth- 
ing but  private  1 opinions,  but  (for  our  own  satis-  [p.  782] 
faction)  we  cannot  well  do  without  them  to  counteract 
misgivings  that  may  arise  in  our  minds.  In  this  character 
they  should  be  maintained,  but  we  must  take  great  care 
less  they  should  assume  independent  authority  and  a cer- 
tain absolute  validity,  and  drown  our  reason  beneath  fic- 
tions and  phantoms. 

THE  DISCIPLINE  OF  PURE  REASON 
Section  IV 

The  Discipline  of  Pure  Reason  with  Regard  to  its  Proofs 

What  distinguishes  the  proofs  of  transcendental  and  syn- 
thetical propositions  from  all  other  proofs  of  a syntheti- 
cal knowledge  a priori  is  this,  that  reason  is  not  allowed 
here  to  apply  itself  directly  to  an  object  through  its  con- 


1 Read  reittt  instead  of  keine. 


628 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


cepts,  but  has  first  to  prove  the  objective  validity  of  those 
concepts  and  the  possibility  of  their  synthesis  a priori. 
This  rule  is  not  suggested  by  prudence  only,  but  refers  to 
the  very  nature  and  the  possibility  of  such  proofs.  If  I 
am  to  go  beyond  the  concejDt  of  an  object  a priori , this  is 
impossible  without  some  special  guidance  coming  to  me 
from  without  that  concept.  In  mathematics  it  is  intuition 
a priori  which  thus  guides  my  synthesis,  so  that  all  our 
conclusions  may  be  drawn  immediately  from  pure  intui- 
tion. In  transcendental  knowledge  the  same  [p.  783] 
guidance,  so  long  as  we  are  dealing  with  concepts  of  the 
understanding  only,  is  to  be  found  in  possible  experience. 
For  here  the  proof  does  not  show  that  the  given  concept 
(for  instance,  the  concept  of  that  which  happens)  leads 
directly  to  another  concept  (that  of  a cause).  This  would 
be  a saltus  which  nothing  could  justify.  What  our  proof 
really  shows  is,  that  experience  itself  and  therefore  the 
object  of  experience  would  be  impossible  without  such  a 
(causal)  connection.  The  proof,  therefore,  had  at  the 
same  time  to  indicate  the  possibility  of  arriving  syntheti- 
cally and  a priori  at  a certain  knowledge  of  things  which 
was  not  contained  in  our  concept  of  them.  Unless  we 
attend  to  this  point,  our  proofs,  like  streams  which  have 
broken  their  banks,  run  wildly  across  the  fields  wherever 
the  inclination  of  some  hidden  association  may  chance  to 
lead  them.  The  semblance  of  a conviction,  based  on  sub- 
jective causes  of  association  and  mistaken  for  the  percep- 
tion of  a natural  affinity,  cannot  balance  the  misgivings 
which  are  justly  roused  by  such  bold  proceedings.  Hence 
all  attempts  at  proving  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason 
have,  according  to  the  universal  admission  of  all  competent 
judges,  been  vain  ; and  before  the  appearance  of  transcen- 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason  629 

dental  criticism  it  was  thought  better,  as  that  principle 
could  never  be  surrendered,  to  make  a sturdy  appeal  to  the 
common  sense  of  mankind  (an  expedient  which  [p.  784] 
always  shows  that  the  cause  of  reason  is  desperate)  than 
to  attempt  new  dogmatical  proofs  of  it. 

But,  if  the  proposition  that  has  to  be  proved  is  an 
assertion  of  pure  reason,  and  if  I even  intend  by  means  of 
pure  ideas  to  go  beyond  my  empirical  concepts,  it  would 
be  all  the  more  necessary  that  the  proof  should  contain 
the  justification  of  such  a step  of  synthesis  (if  it  were 
possible)  as  a necessary  condition  of  its  own  validity. 
The  so-called  proof  of  the  simple  nature  of  our  thinking 
substance  (soul),  derived  from  the  unity  of  apperception, 
seems  very  plausible ; but  it  is  confronted  by  an  inevi- 
table difficulty,  because,  as  the  absolute  unity  is  not  a 
concept  that  can  be  immediately  referred  to  a perception, 
but,  as  an  idea,  can  only  be  inferred,  it  is  difficult  to 
understand  how  the  mere  consciousness  which  is,  or  at 
least  may  be,  contained  in  all  thought , though  it  may  be 
so  far  a simple  representation,  can  lead  me  on  to  the 
consciousness  and  the  knowledge  of  a thing,  in  which 
thought  alone  is  contained.  For  if  I represent  to  myself 
the  power  of  my  body,  as  in  motion,  it  is  then  to  me 
an  absolute  unity,  and  my  representation  of  it  is  a simple 
one.  I can,  therefore,  very  well  express  this  representa- 
tion by  the  motion  of  a point ; because  the  volume  of  the 
body  is  here  of  no  consequence,  and  can,  without  any 
diminution  of  its  power,  be  conceived  as  small  as  one 
likes,  and,  therefore,  even  as  existing  in  one  point.  But 
I should  never  conclude  from  this  that,  if  noth-  [p.  785] 
ing  is  given  to  me  but  the  motive  power  of  a body,  that 
body  can  be  conceived  as  a simple  substance,  because  its 


630  Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 

representation  is  independent  of  the  quantity  of  its  vol 
ume,  and,  therefore,  simple.  I thus  detect  a paralogism, 
because  the  simple  in  the  abstract  is  totally  different  from 
the  simple  as  an  object,  and  the  ego  which,  conceived  in 
the  abstract,  contains  nothing  manifold,  can,  as  an  object, 
when  signifying  the  soul,  become  a very  complex  concept, 
comprehending  and  implying  many  things.  In  order  to 
be  prepared  for  such  a paralogism  (for  unless  we  suspected 
it,  the  proof  might  excite  no  suspicion),  it  is  absolutely 
necessary  to  be  always  in  possession  of  a criterion  of  such 
synthetical  propositions,  which  are  meant  to  prove  more 
than  experience  can  ever  supply.  This  criterion  consists 
in  our  demanding  that  the  proof  should  not  be  carried 
directly  to  the  predicate  in  question,  but  that,  first,  the 
principle  of  the  possibility  of  expanding  our  given  concept 
a priori  into  ideas  and  realising  them,  should  be  estab- 
lished. If  we  always  exercised  this  caution,  and,  before 
attempting  any  such  proof,  wisely  considered  ourselves, 
how,  and  with  what  degree  of  confidence,  we  might  expect 
such  an  expansion  through  pure  reason,  and  whence  we 
might  take,  in  such  cases,  knowledge  which  cannot  be 
evolved  from  concepts  nor  anticipated  with  ref-  [p.  786] 
erence  to  possible  experience,  we  might  spare  ourselves 
many  difficult,  and  yet  fruitless  endeavours,  by  not  asking 
of  reason  what  evidently  is  beyond  its  power,  or  rather,  by 
subjecting  reason,  which  when  once  under  the  influence  of 
this  passion  for  speculative  conquest,  is  not  easily  checked, 
to  a thorough  discipline  of  moderation. 

The  first  rule,  therefore,  is  to  attempt  no  transcendental 
proofs  before  having  first  considered  from  whence  we 
should  take  the  principles  on  which  such  proofs  are  to  be 
based,  and  by  what  right  we  may  expect  our  conclusions 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason  631 

to  be  successful.  If  they  are  principles  of  the  understand- 
ing (for  instance  of  causality),  it  is  useless  to  attempt  to 
arrive,  by  means  of  them,  at  ideas  of  pure  reason  ; because 
they  are  valid  only  with  regard  to  objects  of  experience. 
If  they  are  principles  of  pure  reason,  it  is  again  labour 
lost,  because,  though  reason  possesses  such  principles, 
they  are  all,  as  objective  principles,  dialectical  and  cannot 
be  valid,  except  perhaps  as  regulative  principles,  for  the 
empirical  use  of  reason,  in  order  to  make  it  systematically 
coherent.  If  such  so-called  proofs  exist  already,  we  ought 
to  meet  their  deceptive  pleadings  with  the  non  liquet  of  a 
mature  judgment ; and  although  we  may  be  unable  to 
expose  their  sophisms,  we  have  a perfect  right  [p.  787] 
to  demand  a deduction  of  the  principles  employed,  which, 
if  these  principles  are  to  have  their  origin  in  reason  alone, 
will  never  be  forthcoming.  You  may  thus  dispense  with 
the  analysis  and  refutation  of  every  one  of  these  sophisms, 
and  dispose  in  a lump  of  the  endless  fallacies  of  Dialectic, 
by  appealing  to  the  tribunal  of  critical  reason,  which 
insists  on  laws. 

The  second  peculiarity  of  transcendental  proofs  is  this, 
that  for  every  transcendental  proposition  one  proof  only 
can  be  found.  If  I have  to  draw  conclusions,  not  from 
concepts,  but  from  the  intuition  which  corresponds  to  a 
concept,  whether  it  be  pure  intuition,  as  in  mathematics, 
or  empirical,  as  in  physical  science,  the  intuition  on  which 
my  conclusions  are  to  rest  supplies  me  with  manifold 
material  for  synthetical  propositions,  which  I may  connect 
in  more  than  one  way,  so  that,  by  starting  from  different 
points,  I can  arrive  at  the  same  conclusion  by  different 
paths. 

Every  transcendental  proposition,  on  the  contrary,  starts 


632  Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 

from  one  concept  only,  and  predicates  the  synthetical  cor. 
dition  of  the  possibility  of  the  object,  according  to  that 
concept.  There  can  therefore  be  but  one  proof,  because 
beside  that  concept  there  is  nothing  else  whereby  that  ob- 
ject could  be  determined.  The  proof  therefore  [p.  788] 
can  contain  nothing  more  but  the  determination  of  an 
object  in  general  according  to  that  concept,  which  is  itself 
one  only.  In  the  transcendental  Analytic,  for  instance, 
we  had  deduced  the  principle,  that  everything  which 
happens  has  a cause,  from  the  single  condition  of  the 
objective  possibility  of  the  concept  of  an  event  in  general, 
namely,  that  the  determination  of  any  event  in  time,  and 
therefore  the  event  itself  also,  as  belonging  to  experience, 
would  be  impossible,  unless  it  were  subject  to  such  a dy- 
namical rule.  This  is  therefore  the  only  possible  proof ; 
for  the  event  which  we  represent  to  ourselves  has  objec- 
tive validity,  that  is,  truth,  on  this  condition  only,  that 
an  object  is  determined  as  belonging  to  that  concept  by 
means  of  the  law  of  causality.  It  is  true  that  other  argu- 
ments in  support  of  this  proposition  have  been  attempted, 
for  instance,  one  derived  from  contingency  ; but  if  that 
argument  is  examined  more  carefully,  we  can  discover  no 
characteristic  sign  of  contingency,  except  the  happening, 
that  is,  existence  preceded  by  the  non-existence  of  the 
object,  which  leads  us  back  to  the  same  argument  as  be- 
fore. If  the  proposition  has  to  be  proved  that  everything 
which  thinks  is  simple,  no  attention  is  paid  to  what  is 
manifold  in  thought,  and  the  concept  of  the  ego  only  is 
kept  in  view,  which  is  simple,  and  to  which  all  thinking 
is  referred.  The  same  applies  to  the  transcendental  proof 
of  the  existence  of  God,  which  rests  entirely  on  the  re- 
ciprocability  of  the  two  concepts  of  a most  real  [p.  789] 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason  633 

and  a necessary  Being,  and  cannot  be  found  anywhere 
else. 

By  this  caution  the  criticism  of  the  assertions  of  reason 
is  much  simplified.  Wherever  reason  operates  with  con- 
cepts only,  only  one  proof  is  possible,  if  any.  If  therefore 
we  see  the  dogmatist  advance  with  his  ten  proofs,  we  may 
be  sure  that  he  has  none.  For  if  he  had  one  which  (as 
it  ought  to  be  in  all  matters  of  pure  reason)  had  apodictic 
power,  what  need  would  he  have  of  others?  His  object 
can  only  be  the  same  as  that  of  the  parliamentary  lawyer 
who  has  one  argument  for  one  person,  and  another  for 
another.  He  wants  to  take  advantage  of  the  weakness 
of  the  judges,  who,  without  enquiring  more  deeply,  and 
in  order  to  get  away  as  soon  as  possible,  lay  hold  of  the 
first  argument  that  catches  their  attention,  and  decide 
accordingly. 

The  third  peculiar  rule  of  pure  reason,  if  it  is  once  sub- 
jected to  a proper  discipline  with  regard  to  transcendental 
proofs,  is  this,  that  such  proofs  must  never  be  apagogical 
or  circumstantial,  but  always  ostensive  or  direct.  The 
direct  or  ostensive  proof  combines,  with  regard  to  every 
kind  of  knowledge,  a conviction  of  its  truth  with  an  in- 
sight into  its  sources  ; the  apagogical  proof,  on  the  con- 
trary, though  it  may  produce  certainty,  cannot  help  us  to 
comprehend  the  truth  in  its  connection  with  the  grounds 
of  its  possibility.  It  is  therefore  a mere  ex-  [p.  790] 
pedient,  and  cannot  satisfy  all  the  requirements  of  reason. 
The  apagogical  proofs  have,  however,  this  advantage  with 
regard  to  their  evidence  over  direct  proofs,  that  contradic- 
tion always  carries  with  it  more  clearness  in  the  repre- 
sentation than  the  best  combination,  and  thus  approaches 
more  to  the  intuitional  character  of  a demonstration. 


634 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


The  real  reason  why  apagogical  proofs  are  so  much 
employed  in  different  sciences,  seems  to  be  this.  If  the 
grounds  from  which  some  knowledge  is  to  be  derived  are 
too  numerous  or  too  deeply  hidden,  one  tries  whether 
they  may  not  be  reached  through  their  consequences. 
Now  it  is  quite  true  that  this  modus  ponens , that  is,  this 
inferring  of  the  truth  of  some  knowledge  from  the  truth 
of  its  consequences,  is  only  permitted,  if  all  possible  con- 
sequences flowing  from  it  are  true.  In  that  case  they 
have  only  one  possible  ground,  which  therefore  is  also 
the  true  one.  This  procedure,  however,  is  impracticable, 
because  to  discover  all  possible  consequences  of  any  given 
proposition  exceeds  our  powers.  Nevertheless,  this  mode 
of  arguing  is  employed,  though  under  a certain  indul- 
gence, whenever  something  is  to  be  established  as  a hy- 
pothesis only,  in  which  case  a conclusion,  according  to 
analogy,  is  admitted,  namely,  that  if  as  many  consequences 
as  one  has  tested  agree  with  an  assumed  ground,  all  others 
will  also  agree  with  it.  To  change  in  this  way  a hypothe- 
sis into  a demonstrated  truth,  is  clearly  impossi-  [p.  791] 
ble.  The  modus  tollens  of  reasoning,  from  consequences 
to  their  grounds,  is  not  only  perfectly  strict,  but  also 
extremely  easy.  For  if  one  single  false  consequence 
only  can  be  drawn  from  a proposition,  that  proposition  is 
wrong.  Instead,  therefore,  of  examining,  for  the  sake  of 
an  ostensive  proof,  the  whole  series  of  grounds  that  may 
lead  us  to  the  truth  of  a cognition  by  means  of  a perfect 
insight  into  its  possibility,  we  have  only  to  prove  that  one 
single  consequence,  resulting  from  the  opposite,  is  false, 
in  order  to  show  that  the  opposite  itself  is  false,  and 
therefore  the  cognition,  which  we  had  to  prove,  true. 

This  apagogical  method  of  proof,  however,  is  admissible 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


635 


in  those  sciences  only  where  it  is  impossible  to  foist  the 
subjective  elements  of  our  representations  into  the  place 
of  what  is  objective,  namely,  the  knowledge  of  that  which 
exists  in  the  object.  When  this  is  not  impossible,  it  must 
often  happen  that  the  opposite  of  any  proposition  contra- 
dicts the  subjective  conditions  of  thought  only,  but  not 
the  object  itself,  or,  that  both  propositions  contradict  each 
other  under  a subjective  condition,  which  is  mistaken  as 
objective,  so  that,  as  the  condition  is  false,  both  may  be 
false,  without  our  being  justified  in  inferring  the  truth  of 
the  one  from  the  falseness  of  the  other. 

In  mathematics  such  subreptions  are  impos-  [p.  792] 
sible  ; and  it  is  true,  therefore,  that  the  apagogical  proof 
has  its  true  place  there.  In  natural  science,  in  which 
everything  is  based  on  empirical  intuitions,  that  kind  of 
subreption  can  generally  be  guarded  against  by  a repeated 
comparison  of  observations  ; but  even  thus,  this  mode  of 
proof  is  of  little  value  there.  The  transcendental  endeav- 
ours of  pure  reason,  however,  are  all  made  within  the 
very  sphere  of  dialectical  illusion,  where  what  is  subjective 
presents  itself,  nay,  forces  itself  upon  reason  in  its  pre- 
misses as  objective.  Here,  therefore,  it  can  never  be 
allowed,  with  reference  to  synthetical  propositions,  to  jus- 
tify one’s  assertions  by  refuting  their  opposite.  For,  either 
this  refutation  may  be  nothing  but  the  mere  representa- 
tion of  the  conflict  of  the  opposite  opinion  with  the  sub- 
jective conditions  under  which  our  reason  could  alone 
comprehend  it,  and  this  would  be  of  no  avail  for  rejecting 
the  proposition  itself,  — (thus  we  see,  for  instance,  that 
the  unconditioned  necessity  of  the  existence  of  a Being 
cannot  possibly  be  comprehended  by  us,  which  subjectively 
bars  every  speculative  proof  of  a necessary  Supreme  Being 


636 


Discipliiie  of  Pure  Reason 


but  by  no  means,  the  possibility  of  such  a Being  by  itself ), 
— or,  on  the  other  hand,  it  may  be  that  both  the  affirma- 
tive and  the  negative  party  have  been  deceived  by  the 
transcendental  illusion,  and  base  their  arguments  on  an 
impossible  concept  of  an  object.  In  that  case  the  rule 
applies,  non  entis  nulla  su?it  praedicata,  that  is,  [p.  793] 
everything  that  has  been  asserted  with  regard  to  an  ob- 
ject, whether  affirmatively  or  negatively,  is  wrong,  and  we 
cannot  therefore  arrive  apagogically  at  the  knowledge  of 
truth  by  the  refutation  of  its  opposite.  If,  for  example, 
we  assume  that  the  world  of  sense  is  given  by  itself  in  its 
totality,  it  is  wrong  to  conclude  that  it  must  be  either 
infinite  in  space,  or  finite  and  limited  ; for  either  is  wrong, 
because  phenomena  (as  mere  representations)  which  never- 
theless are  to  be  things  by  themselves  (as  objects)  are 
something  impossible,  and  the  infinitude  of  this  imaginary 
whole,  though  it  might  be  unconditioned,  would  (because 
everything  in  phenomena  is  conditioned)  contradict  that 
very  unconditioned  quantity  which  is  presupposed  in  its 
concept. 

The  apagogical  mode  of  proof  is  also  the  blind  by  which 
the  admirers  of  our  dogmatical  philosophy  have  always 
been  deceived.  It  may  be  compared  to  a prizefighter  who 
is  willing  to  prove  the  honour  and  the  incontestable  rights 
of  his  adopted  party  by  offering  battle  to  all  and  every 
one  who  should  dare  to  doubt  them.  Such  brawling,  how- 
ever, settles  nothing,  but  only  shows  the  respective 
strength  of  the  two  parties,  and  even  this  on  the  part  of 
those  only  who  take  the  offensive.  The  spectators,  seeing 
that  each  party  is  alternately  conqueror  and  con-  [p.  794] 
quered,  are  often  led  to  regard  the  very  object  of  the  dis- 
pute with  a certain  amount  of  scepticism.  In  this,  how- 


Discipline  of  Pure  Reason 


637 


ever,  they  are  wrong,  and  it  is  sufficient  to  remind  them 
of  non  defensoribus  istis  tempus  eget.  It  is  absolutely 
necessary  that  every  one  should  plead  his  cause  directly 
by  means  of  a legitimate  proof  based  on  a transcendental 
deduction  of  the  grounds  of  proof.  Thus  only  can  we  see 
what  he  may  have  to  say  himself  in  favour  of  his  own 
claims  of  reason.  If  his  opponent  relies  on  subjective 
grounds  only,  it  is  easy,  no  doubt,  to  refute  him  ; but  this 
does  not  benefit  the  dogmatist,  who  generally  depends 
quite  as  much  on  the  subjective  grounds  of  his  judgment, 
and  can  be  quite  as  easily  driven  into  a corner  by  his 
opponent.  If,  on  the  contrary,  both  parties  employ  only 
the  direct  mode  of  proof,  they  will  either  themselves  per- 
ceive the  difficulty,  nay,  the  impossibility  of  finding  any 
title  for  their  assertions,  and  appeal  in  the  end  to  pre- 
scription only,  or,  our  criticism  will  easily  discover  the 
dogmatical  illusion,  and  compel  pure  reason  to  surrender 
its  exaggerated  pretensions  in  the  sphere  of  speculative 
thought,  and  to  retreat  within  the  limits  of  its  own  domain, 
— that  of  practical  principles. 


METHOD  OF  TRANSCENDENTALISM 

[P-  795] 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  CANO-N  OF  PURE  REASON 

It  is  humiliating,  no  doubt,  for  human  reason  that  it  can 
achieve  nothing  by  itself,  nay,  that  it  stands  in  need  of  a 
discipline  to  check  its  vagaries,  and  to  guard  against  the 
illusions  arising  from  them.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  it 
elevates  reason  and  gives  it  self-confidence,  that  it  can 
and  must  exercise  that  discipline  itself,  and  allows  no 
censorship  to  any  one  else.  The  bounds,  moreover,  which 
it  is  obliged  to  set  to  its  own  speculative  use  check  at  the 
same  time  the  sophistical  pretensions  of  all  its  opponents, 
and  thus  secure  everything  that  remains  of  its  formed 
exaggerated  pretensions  against  every  possible  attack. 
The  greatest  and  perhaps  the  only  advantage  of  all  philos- 
ophy of  pure  reason  seems  therefore  to  be  negative  only ; 
because  it  serves,  not  as  an  organon  for  the  extension, 
but  as  a discipline  for  the  limitation  of  its  domain,  and 
instead  of  discovering  truth,  it  only  claims  the  modest 
merit  of  preventing  error. 

Nevertheless,  there  must  be  somewhere  a source  of 
positive  cognitions  which  belong  to  the  domain  of  pure 
reason,  and  which  perhaps,  owing  to  some  misunderstand- 

638 


Canon  of  Pure  Reason 


63  9 


ing  only,  may  lead  to  error,  while  they  form  in  [p.  796] 
reality  the  true  goal  of  all  the  efforts  of  reason.  How  else 
could  we  account  for  that  inextinguishable  desire  to  gain 
a footing  by  any  means  somewhere  beyond  the  limits  of 
experience  ? Reason  has  a presentiment  of  objects  which 
possess  a great  interest  for  it.  It  enters  upon  the  path  of 
pure  speculation  in  order  to  approach  them,  but  they  fly 
before  it.  May  we  not  suppose  that  on  the  only  path 
which  is  still  open  to  it,  namely,  that  of  its  practical  em- 
ployments, reason  may  hope  to  meet  with  better  success  ? 

I understand  by  a canon  a system  of  principles  a priori 
for  the  proper  employment  of  certain  faculties  of  know- 
ledge in  general.  Thus  general  logic,  in  its  analytical 
portion,  is  a canon  for  the  understanding  and  reason  in 
general,  but  only  so  far  as  the  form  is  concerned,  for  it 
takes  no  account  of  any  contents.  Thus  we  saw  that  the 
transcendental  analytic  is  the  canon  of  the  pure  under- 
standing, and  that  it  alone  is  capable  of  true  synthetical 
knowledge  a priori.  When  no  correct  use  of  a faculty  of 
knowledge  is  possible,  there  is  no  canon,  and  as  all  syn- 
thetical knowledge  of  pure  reason  in  its  speculative  em- 
ployment is,  according  to  all  that  has  been  hitherto  said, 
totally  impossible,  there  exists  no  canon  of  the  speculative 
employment  of  reason  (for  that  employment  is  entirely 
dialectical),  but  all  transcendental  logic  is,  in  this  respect, 
disciplinary  only.  Consequently,  if  there  exists  [p.  797] 
any  correct  use  of  pure  reason  at  all,  and,  therefore,  a 
canon  relating  to  it,  that  canon  will  refer  not  to  the  specu- 
lative, but  to  the  practical  use  of  reason , which  we  shall 
now  proceed  to  investigate. 


640 


Canon  of  Pure  Reason 


THE  CANON  OF  PURE  REASON 
First  Section 

Of  the  Ultimate  Aim  of  the  Pure  Use  of  our  Reason 

Reason  is  impelled  by  a tendency  of  its  nature  to  go 
beyond  the  field  of  experience,  and  to  venture  in  its  pure 
employment  and  by  means  of  mere  ideas  to  the  utmost 
limits  of  all  knowledge  ; nay,  it  finds  no  rest  until  it  has 
fulfilled  its  course  and  established  an  independent  and  sys- 
tematic whole  of  all  knowledge.  The  question  is,  whether 
this  endeavour  rests  on  the  speculative,  or  rather,  exclu- 
sively on  the  practical  interests  of  reason  ? 

I shall  say  nothing  at  present  of  the  success  which  has 
attended  pure  reason  in  its  speculative  endeavours,  and 
only  ask  which  are  the  problems,  the  solution  of  which 
forms  its  ultimate  aim  (whether  that  object  be  really 
reached  or  not),  and  in  relation  to  which  all  other  prob- 
lems are  only  means  to  an  end.  These  highest  aims  must 
again,  according  to  the  nature  of  reason,  possess  [p.  798] 
a certain  unity  in  order  to  advance  by  their  union  that 
interest  of  humanity  which  is  second  to  no  other. 

The  highest  aim  to  which  the  speculation  of  reason  in 
its  transcendental  employment  is  directed  comprehends 
three  objects  : the  freedom  of  the  will,  the  immortality  of 
the  soul,  and  the  existence  of  God.  The  purely  specu- 
lative interest  of  reason  in  every  one  of  these  three 
questions  is  very  small,  and,  for  its  sake  alone,  this 
fatiguing  and  ceaseless  labour  of  transcendental  investi- 
gation would  hardly  have  been  undertaken,  because  what- 
ever discoveries  may  be  made,  they  could  never  be  used 


L anon  of  Pure  Reason  641 

in  a way  that  would  be  advantageous  in  concreto , that  is, 
in  the  investigation  of  nature. 

Our  will  may  be  free,  but  this  would  only  refer  to  the 
intelligible  cause  of  our  volition.  With  regard  to  the 
phenomena  in  which  that  will  manifests  itself,  that  is,  our 
actions,  we  have  to  account  for  them  (according  to  an 
inviolable  maxim  without  which  reason  could  not  be  em- 
ployed for  empirical  purposes  at  all),  in  no  other  way  than 
for  all  other  phenomena  of  nature,  that  is,  according  to 
her  unchangeable  laws. 

Secondly,  the  spiritual  nature  of  the  soul,  and  with  it 
its  immortality,  may  be  understood  by  us,  yet  we  could  not 
base  upon  this  any  explanation,  either  with  regard  to  the 
phenomena  of  this  life,  or  the  peculiar  nature  of  a [p.  799] 
future  state,  because  our  concept  of  an  incorporeal  nature 
is  purely  negative  and  does  not  expand  our  knowledge  in 
the  least,  nor  does  it  offer  any  fit  material  for  drawing 
consequences,  except  such  as  are  purely  fictitious,  and 
could  never  be  countenanced  by  philosophy. 

Thirdly,  even  admitting  that  the  existence  of  a highest 
intelligence  had  been  proved,  we  might,  no  doubt,  use  it 
in  order  to  make  the  design  in  the  constitution  of  the 
world  and  its  order  in  general  intelligible,  but  we  should 
never  be  justified  in  deriving  from  it  any  particular  ar- 
rangement, or  disposition,  or  in  boldly  inferring  it  where 
it  cannot  be  perceived.  For  it  is  a necessary  rule  for  the 
speculative  employment  of  reason,  never  to  pass  by  natural 
causes,  and,  abandoning  what  we  may  learn  from  experi- 
ence, to  derive  something  which  we  know,  from  something 
which  entirely  transcends  all  our  knowledge. 

In  one  word,  these  three  propositions  remain  always 
transcendent  for  speculative  reason,  and  admit  of  no 


642 


Canon  of  Pure  Reason 


immanent  employment,  that  is,  an  employment  admissible 
for  objects  of  experience,  and  therefore  of  some  real  utility 
to  ourselves,  but  are  by  themselves  entirely  valueless  and 
yet  extremely  difficult  exertions  of  our  reason. 

If,  therefore,  these  three  cardinal  propositions  are  of  no 
use  to  us,  so  far  as  knoivledge  is  concerned,  and  are  yet  so 
strongly  recommended  to  us  by  our  reason,  their  true 
value  will  probably  be  connected  with  our  [p.  800] 
practical  interests  only. 

I call  practical  whatever  is  possible  through  freedom. 
When  the  conditions  of  the  exercise  of  our  free-will  are 
empirical,  reason  can  have  no  other  but  a regulative  use, 
serving  only  to  bring  about  the  unity  of  empirical  laws. 
Thus,  for  instance,  in  the  teaching  of  prudence,  the  whole 
business  of  reason  consists  in  concentrating  all  the  objects 
of  our  desires  in  one,  namely,  happiness , and  in  co-ordinat- 
ing the  means  for  obtaining  it.  Reason,  therefore,  can 
give  us  none  but  pragmatic  laws  of  free  action  for  the  at- 
tainment of  the  objects  recommended  to  us  by  the  senses, 
and  never  pure  laws,  determined  entirely  a priori.  Pure 
practical  laws,  on  the  contrary,  the  object  of  which  is  given 
by  reason  entirely  a priori , and  which  convey  commands, 
not  under  empirical  conditions,  but  absolutely,  would  be 
products  of  pure  reason.  Such  are  the  moral  laws,  and 
these  alone,  therefore,  belong  to  the  sphere  of  the  practical 
use  of  reason,  and  admit  of  a canon. 

All  the  preparations  of  reason,  therefore,  in  what  may 
be  called  pure  philosophy,  are  in  reality  directed  to  those 
three  problems  only.  These  themselves,  however,  have  a 
still  further  object,  namely,  to  know  what  ought  to  be  done, 
if  the  will  is  free,  if  there  is  a God,  and  if  there  is  a future 
world.  As  this  concerns  our  actions  with  reference  to  the 


Canon  of  Pure  Reason 


643 


hignest  aim  of  life,  we  see  that  the  last  intention  [p.  801] 
of  nature  in  her  wise  provision  was  really,  in  the  constitu- 
tion of  our  reason,  directed  to  moral  interests  only. 

We  must  be  careful,  however,  lest,  as  we  are  now  con- 
sidering a subject  which  is  foreign  to  transcendental 
philosophy,1  we  should  lose  ourselves  in  episodes,  and 
injure  the  unity  of  the  system,  while  on  the  other  side,  if 
we  say  too  little  of  this  new  matter,  there  might  be  a lack 
of  clearness  and  persuasion.  I hope  to  avoid  both  dangers 
by  keeping  as  close  as  possible  to  what  is  transcendental, 
and  by  leaving  entirely  aside  what  may  be  psychological, 
that  is,  empirical  in  it. 

I have,  therefore,  first  to  remark  that  for  the  present 
I shall  use  the  concept  of  freedom  in  its  practical  meaning 
only,  taking  no  account  of  the  other  concept  of  freedom 
in  its  transcendental  meaning,  which  cannot  be  presup- 
posed empirically  as  an  explanation  of  phenomena,  but  is 
itself  a problem  of  reason  and  has  been  disposed  [p.  802] 
of  before.  \ A will  is  purely  animal  ( arbitrimn  brutum)  when 
it  is  determined  by  nothing  but  sensuous  impulses,  that  is, 
pathologically.  A will,  on  the  contrary,  which  is  indepen- 
dent of  sensuous  impulses,  and  can  be  determined  therefore 
by  motives  presented  by  reason  alone,  is  called  Free-will 
( arbitrium  liberum ),  and  everything  connected  with  this, 
whether  as  cause  or  effect,  is  called  practical.  Practical 
freedom  can  be  proved  by  experience.  For  human  will  is 

1 All  practical  concepts  relate  to  objects  of  pleasure  or  displeasure,  that  is, 
of  joy  or  pain,  and,  therefore,  at  least  indirectly,  to  objects  of  our  feelings. 
But,  as  feeling  is  not  a faculty  of  representing  things,  but  lies  outside  the  whole 
field  of  our  powers  of  cognition,  the  elements  of  our  judgments,  so  far  as  they 
relate  to  pleasure  or  pain,  that  is,  the  elements  of  practical  judgments,  do  not 
belong  to  transcendental  philosophy,  which  is  concerned  exclusively  with  pure 
cognitions  a priori. 


644 


Canon  of  Pure  Reason 


not  determined  by  that  only  which  excites,  that  is,  im 
mediately  affects  the  senses  ; but  we  possess  the  power  to 
overcome  the  impressions  made  on  the  faculty  of  our  sen- 
suous desires,  by  representing  to  ourselves  what,  in  a more 
distant  way,  may  be  useful  or  hurtful.  These  considera- 
tions of  what  is  desirable  with  regard  to  our  whole  state, 
that  is,  of  what  is  good  and  useful,  are  based  entirely  on 
reason.  Reason,  therefore,  gives  laws  which  are  im- 
peratives, that  is,  objective  laws  of  freedom , and  tell  us 
what  ought  to  take  place , though  perhaps  it  never  does  take 
place,  differing  therein  from  the  laws  of  nature , which 
relate  only  to  what  does  take  place.  These  laws  of  free- 
dom, therefore,  are  called  practical  laws. 

Whether  reason  in  prescribing  these  laws  is  [p.  803] 
not  itself  determined  by  other  influences,  and  whether 
what,  in  relation  to  sensuous  impulses,  is  called  freedom, 
may  not,  with  regard  to  higher  and  more  remote  causes, 
be  nature  again,  does  not  concern  us  while  engaged  in 
these  practical  questions,  and  while  demanding  from  reason 
nothing  but  the  ride  of  our  conduct.  It  is  a purely  specula- 
tive question  which,  while  we  are  only  concerned  with  what 
we  ought  or  ought  not  to  do,  may  well  be  left  aside.  We 
know  practical  freedom  by  experience  as  one  of  the  natural 
causes,  namely,  as  a causality  of  reason  in  determining  the 
will,  while  transcendental  freedom  demands  the  indepen- 
dence of  reason  itself  (with  reference  to  its  causality  in  be- 
ginning a series  of  phenomena)  from  all  determining  causes 
in  the  world  of  sense,  thus  running  counter,  as  it  would 
seem,  to  the  law  of  nature  and  therefore  to  all  possible 
experience,  and  remaining  a problem.  Reason,  however, 
in  its  practical  employment  has  nothing  to  do  with  this 
problem,  so  that  there  remain  but  two  questions  in  a 


Canon  of  Pure  Reason 


645 


canon  of  pure  reason  which  concern  the  practical  interest 
of  pure  reason,  and  with  regard  to  which  a canon  of  their 
employment  must  be  possible,  namely  : Is  there  a God  ? 
Is  there  a future  life  ? The  question  of  transcendental 
freedom  refers  to  speculative  knowledge  only,  and  may  be 
safely  left  aside  as  quite  indifferent  when  we  are  concerned 
with  practical  interests.  A sufficient  discussion  [p.  804] 
of  it  may  be  found  in  the  antinomy  of  pure  reason. 

CANON  OF  PURE  REASON 
Section  II 

Of  the  Ideal  of  the  Summnm  Bonum  as  determining  the 
Ultimate  Aim  of  Pure  Reason 

Reason,  in  its  speculative  employment,  conducted  us 
through  the  field  of  experience,  and,  as  it  could  find  no 
perfect  satisfaction  there,  from  thence  to  speculative  ideas 
which,  however,  in  the  end  conducted  us  back  again  to 
experience,  and  thus  fulfilled  their  purpose  in  a manner 
which,  though  useful,  was  not  at  all  in  accordance  with 
our  expectation.  We  may  now  have  one  more  trial, 
namely,  to  see  whether  pure  reason  may  be  met  with  in 
practical  use  also,  and  whether  thus  it  may  lead  to  ideas 
which  realise  the  highest  aims  of  pure  reason  as  we  have 
just  stated  them,  and  whether  therefore  from  the  point  of 
view  of  its  practical  interest,  reason  may  not  be  able  to 
grant  us  what  it  entirely  refused  to  do  with  regard  to  its 
speculative  interest. 

The  whole  interest  of  my  reason,  whether  speculative  or 
practical,  is  concentrated  in  the  three  following  ques- 
tions : — [p.  805] 


646 


Canon  of  Pure  Reason 


1.  What  can  I know? 

2.  What  should  I do  ? 

3.  What  may  I hope  ? 

The  first  question  is  purely  speculative.  We  have,  as  1 
flatter  myself,  exhausted  all  possible  answers,  and  found, 
at  last,  that  with  which  no  doubt  reason  must  be  satisfied, 
and,  except  with  regard  to  the  practical,  has  just  cause  to 
be  satisfied.  We  remained,  however,  as  far  removed  from 
the  two  great  ends  to  which  the  whole  endeavour  of  pure 
reason  was  really  directed  as  if  we  had  consulted  our  ease 
and  declined  the  whole  task  from  the  very  beginning.  So 
far  then  as  knowledge  is  concerned,  so  much  is  certain  and 
clear  that,  with  regard  to  these  two  problems,  knowledge 
can  never  fall  to  our  lot. 

The  second  question  is  purely  practical.  As  such  it 
may  come  within  the  cognisance  of  pure  reason,  but  Is, 
even  then,  not  transcendental,  but  moral,  and  cannot,  con- 
sequently, occupy  our  criticism  by  itself. 

The  third  question,  namely,  what  may  I hope  for,  if  I 
do  what  I ought  to  do  ? is  at  the  same  time  practical  and 
theoretical,  the  practical  serving  as  a guidance  to  the  an- 
swer to  the  theoretical  and,  in  its  highest  form,  specula- 
tive question  ; for  all  hoping  is  directed  towards  happiness 
and  is,  with  regard  to  practical  interests  and  the  law  of 
morality,  the  same  as  knowing  and  the  law  of  nature,  with 
regard  to  the  theoretical  cognition  of  things.  The  former 
arrives  at  last  at  a conclusion  that  something  is  [p.  806] 
(which  determines  the  last  possible  aim)  because  some- 
thing ought  to  take  place ; the  latter,  that  something  is 
(which  operates  as  the  highest  cause)  because  something 
does  take  place. 


Canon  of  Pure  Reason 


647 


Happiness  is  the  satisfaction  of  all  our  desires,  exten- 
sively, in  regard  to  their  manifoldness,  intensively,  in  re- 
gard to  their  degree,  and  protensively,  in  regard  to  their 
duration.  The  practical  law,  derived  from  the  motive  of 
happiness,  I call  pragmatical  (rule  of  prudence) ; but  the 
law,  if  there  is  such  a law,  which  has  no  other  motive  but 
to  deserve  to  be  happy,  I call  moral  (law  of  morality).  The 
former  advises  us  what  we  have  to  do,  if  we  wish  to  pos- 
sess happiness ; the  latter  dictates  how  we  ought  to  con- 
duct ourselves  in  order  to  deserve  happiness.  The  former 
is  founded  on  empirical  principles,  for  I cannot  know, 
except  by  experience,  what  desires  there  are  which  are  to 
be  satisfied,  nor  what  are  the  natural  means  of  satisfying 
them.  The  second  takes  no  account  of  desires  and  the 
natural  means  of  satisfying  them,  and  regards  only  the 
freedom  of  any  rational  being  and  the  necessary  conditions 
under  which  alone  it  can  harmonise  with  the  distribution 
of  happiness  according  to  principles.  It  can  therefore  be 
based  on  mere  ideas  of  pure  reason,  and  known  a priori. 
I assume  that  there  really  exist  pure  moral  laws  [p.  807] 
which  entirely  a priori  (without  regard  to  empirical 
motives,  that  is,  happiness)  determine  the  use  of  the 
freedom  of  any  rational  being,  both  with  regard  to  what 
has  to  be  done  and  what  has  not  to  be  done,  and  that 
these  laws  are  imperative  absolutely  (not  hypothetically 
only  on  the  supposition  of  other  empirical  ends),  and 
therefore  in  every  respect  necessary.  I feel  justified  in 
assuming  this,  by  appealing,  not  only  to  the  arguments  of 
the  most  enlightened  moralists,  but  also  to  the  moral 
judgment  of  every  man,  if  he  only  tries  to  conceive  such 
a law  clearly. 

Pure  reason,  therefore,  contains  not  indeed  in  its  specu- 


648 


Canon  of  Pure  Reason 


Native,  yet  in  its  practical,  or,  more  accurately,  its  moral 
employment,  principles  of  the  possibility  of  experience , 
namely,  of  such  actions  as  might  be  met  with  in  the  his- 
tory of  man  according  to  moral  precepts.  For  as  reason 
commands  that  such  actions  should  take  place,  they  must 
be  possible,  and  a certain  kind  of  systematical  unity  also, 
namely,  the  moral,  must  be  possible ; while  it  was  impossi- 
ble to  prove  the  systematical  unity  of  nature  accordmg  to 
the  speculative  principles  of  reason.  For  reason,  no  doubt, 
possesses  causality  with  respect  to  freedom  in  general, 
but  not  with  respect  to  the  whole  of  nature,  and  moral 
principles  of  reason  may  indeed  produce  free  actions,  but 
not  laws  of  nature.  Consequently,  the  principles  of  pure 
reason  possess  objective  reality  in  their  practi-  [p.  808J 
cal  and  more  particularly  in  their  moral  employment. 

I call  the  world,  in  so  far  as  it  may  be  in  accordance 
with  all  moral  laws  which,  by  virtue  of  the  freedom  of 
rational  beings  it  may,  and  according  to  the  necessary 
laws  of  morality  it  ought  to  be,  a moral  world.  As  here 
we  take  no  account  of  all  conditions  (aims)  and  even  of 
all  impediments  to  morality  (the  weakness  or  depravity  of 
human  nature),  this  world  is  conceived  as  an  intelligible 
world  only.  It  is,  therefore,  so  far  a mere  idea,  though  a 
practical  idea,  which  can  and  ought  really  to  exercise  its 
influence  on  the  sensible  world  in  order  to  bring  it,  as 
far  as  possible,  into  conformity  with  that  idea.  The  idea 
of  a moral  world  has  therefore  objective  reality,  not  as 
referring  to  an  object  of  intelligible  intuition  (which  we 
cannot  even  conceive),  but  as  referring  to  the  sensible 
world,  conceived  as  an  object  of  pure  reason  in  its  prac- 
tical employment,  and  as  a corpus  mysticum  of  rational 
beings  dwelling  in  it,  so  far  as  their  free-will,  placed  under 


Canon  of  Pure  Reason  649 

moral  laws,  possesses  a thorough  systematical  unity  both 
with  itself  and  with  the  freedom  of  everybody  else. 

The  answer,  therefore,  of  the  first  of  the  two  questions 
of  pure  reason  with  reference  to  practical  in-  [p.  809] 
terests,  is  this,  ‘ do  that  which  will  render  thee  deserving 
of  happiness .’  The  second  question  asks,  how  then,  if  I 
conduct  myself  so  as  to  be  deserving  of  happiness,  may 
I hope  thereby  to  obtain  happiness  ? The  answer  to  this 
question  depends  on  this,  whether  the  principles  of  pure 
reason  which  a priori  prescribe  the  law,  necessarily  also 
connect  this  hope  with  it  ? 

I say,  then,  that  just  as  the  moral  principles  are  neces- 
sary according  to  reason  in  its  practical  employment,  it  is 
equally  necessary  according  to  reason  in  its  theoretic  em- 
ployment to  assume  that  everybody  has  reason  to  hope 
to  obtain  happiness  in  the  same  measure  in  which  he  has 
rendered  himself  deserving  of  it  in  his  conduct ; and  that, 
therefore,  the  system  of  morality  is  inseparably,  though 
only  in  the  idea  of  pure  reason,  connected  with  that  of 
happiness. 

In  an  intelligible,  that  is,  in  a moral  world,  in  conceiv- 
ing which  we  take  no  account  of  any  of  the  impediments 
to  morality  (desires,  etc.),  such  a system,  in  which  happi- 
ness is  proportioned  to  morality,  may  even  be  considered 
as  necessary,  because  freedom,  as  repelled  or  restrained 
by  the  moral  law,  is  itself  the  cause  of  general  happiness, 
and  rational  beings  therefore  themselves,  under  the  guid- 
ance of  such  principles,  the  authors  of  the  permanent 
well-being  of  themselves,  and  at  the  same  time  of  others. 
But  such  a system  of  self-rewarding  morality  is  [p.  810] 
an  idea  only,  the  realisation  of  which  depends  on  every- 
body doing  what  he  ought  to  do,  that  is,  on  all  actions  of 


650 


Cation  of  Pure  Reason 


reasonable  beings  being  so  performed  as  if  they  sprang 
from  one  supreme  will,  comprehending  within  itself  or 
under  itself  all  private  wills.  But,  as  the  moral  law  re- 
mains binding  upon  every  one  in  the  use  of  his  freedom, 
even  if  others  do  not  conform  to  that  law,  it  is  impossible 
that  either  the  nature  of  things  in  the  world,  or  the  causal- 
ity of  the  actions  themselves,  or  their  relation  to  morality, 
should  determine  in  what  relation  the  consequences  of 
such  actions  should  stand  to  happiness.  If,  therefore, 
we  take  our  stand  on  nature  only,  the  necessary  connec- 
tion of  a hope  of  happiness  with  the  unceasing  endeavour 
of  rendering  oneself  deserving  of  happiness,  cannot  be 
known  by  reason,  but  can  only  be  hoped  for,  if  a highest 
reason,  which  rules  according  to  moral  laws,  is  accepted 
at  the  same  time  as  the  cause  of  nature. 

I call  the  idea  of  such  an  intelligence  in  which  the  most 
perfect  moral  will,  united  with  the  highest  blessedness,  is 
the  cause  of  all  happiness  in  the  world,  so  far  as  it  corre- 
sponds exactly  with  morality,  that  is,  the  being  worthy 
of  happiness,  the  ideal  of  the  supreme  good.  It  is,  there- 
fore, in  the  ideal  only  of  the  supreme  original  good  that 
pure  reason  can  find  the  ground  of  the  practically  neces- 
sary connection  of  both  elements  of  the  highest  [p.  81 1] 
derivative  good,  namely,  of  an  intelligible,  that  is,  moral 
world.  As  we  are  bound  by  reason  to  conceive  ourselves 
as  belonging  necessarily  to  such  a world,  though  the 
senses  present  us  with  nothing  but  a world  of  phenomena, 
we  shall  have  to  accept  the  other  world  as  the  result  oi 
our  conduct  in  this  world  of  sense  (in  which  we  see  nc 
such  connection  between  goodness  and  happiness),  anc, 
therefore  as  to  us  a future  world.  Hence  it  follows  that 
God  and  a future  life  are  two  suppositions  which,  accord- 


Canon  of  Pure  Reason  651 

ing  to  the  principles  of  pure  reason,  cannot  be  separated 
from  the  obligation  which  that  very  reason  imposes  on  us. 

Morality,  by  itself,  constitutes  a system,  but  not  so 
happiness,  unless  it  is  distributed  in  exact  proportion  to 
morality.  This,  however,  is  possible  in  an  intelligible 
world  only  under  a wise  author  and  ruler.  Such  a ruler, 
together  with  life  in  such  a world,  which  we  must  con- 
sider as  future,  reason  compels  us  to  admit,  unless  all 
moral  laws  are  to  be  considered  as  idle  dreams,  because, 
without  that  supposition,  the  necessary  consequences, 
which  the  same  reason  connects  with  these  laws,  would 
be  absent.  Hence  everybody  looks  upon  moral  laws  as 
commands,  which  they  could  not  be  if  they  did  not  con- 
nect a priori  adequate  consequences  with  their  rules,  and 
carried  with  them  both  promises  and  threats.  Nor  could 
they  do  this  unless  they  rested  on  a necessary  Being,  as 
the  supreme  good,  which  alone  can  render  the  [p.  812] 
unity  of  such  a design  possible. 

Leibniz  called  the  world,  if  we  have  regard  only  to  the 
rational  beings  in  it,  and  their  mutual  relations  according 
to  moral  laws  and  under  the  government  of  the  supreme 
good,  the  kingdom  of  grace,  distinguishing  it  from  the 
kingdom  of  nature,  in  which  these  beings,  though  stand- 
ing under  moral  laws,  expect  no  other  consequences  from 
their  conduct  but  such  as  follow  according  to  the  course 
of  nature  of  our  sensible  world.  To  view  ourselves  as 
belonging  to  the  kingdom  of  grace,  in  which  all  happiness 
awaits  us,  except  in  so  far  as  we  have  diminished  our 
share  in  it  through  our  unworthiness  of  being  happy,  is 
a practically  necessary  idea  of  reason. 

Practical  laws,  in  so  far  as  they  become  at  the  same 
time  subjective  grounds  of  actions,  that  is,  subjective 


652 


Canon  of  Pure  Reason 


principles,  are  called  maxims.  The  criticism  of  morality, 
with  regard  to  its  purity  and  its  results,  takes  place  ac-  I 
cording  to  ideas , the  practical  observance  of  its  laws,  accord- 
ing to  maxims. 

It  is  necessary  that  the  whole  course  of  our  life  should 
be  subject  to  moral  maxims  ; but  this  is  impossible,  unless 
reason  connects  with  the  moral  law,  which  is  a mere  idea, 
an  efficient  cause,  which  assigns  to  all  conduct,  in  accord-  1 
ance  with  the  moral  law,  an  issue  accurately  corresponding 
to  our  highest  aims,  whether  in  this  or  in  another  [p.  813] 
life.  Thus  without  a God  and  without  a world,  not 
visible  to  us  now,  but  hoped  for,  the  glorious  ideas  of 
morality  are  indeed  objects  of  applause  and  admiration, 
but  not  springs  of  purpose  and  action,  because  they  fail 
to  fulfil  all  the  aims  which  are  natural  to  every  rational 
being,  and  which  are  determined  a priori  by  the  same 
pure  reason,  and  therefore  necessary. 

Our  reason  does  by  no  means  consider  happiness  alone 
as  the  perfect  good.  It  does  not  approve  of  it  (however 
much  inclination  may  desire  it),  except  as  united  with 
desert,  that  is,  with  perfect  moral  conduct.  Nor  is 
morality  alone,  and  with  it  mere  desert  of  being  happy, 
the  perfect  good.  To  make  it  perfect,  he  who  has  con- 
ducted himself  as  not  unworthy  of  happiness,  must  be 
able  to  hope  to  participate  in  it.  Even  if  freed  from  all 
private  views  and  interests  reason,  were  it  to  put  itself  in 
the  place  of  a being  that  had  to  distribute  all  happiness 
to  others,  could  not  judge  otherwise ; because  in  the 
practical  idea  both  elements  are  essentially  connected, 
though  in  such  a way  that  our  participation  in  happiness 
should  be  rendered  possible  by  the  moral  character  as  a 
condition,  and  not  conversely  the  moral  character  by  the 


Canon  of  Pure  Reason 


653 


prospect  of  happiness.  For,  in  the  latter  case,  the  [p.  814] 
character  would  not  be  moral,  nor  worthy  therefore  of 
complete  happiness ; a happiness  which,  in  the  eyes  of 
reason,  admits  of  no  limitation  but  such  as  arises  from 
our  own  immoral  conduct. 

Happiness,  therefore,  in  exact  proportion  with  the 
morality  of  rational  beings  who  are  made  worthy  of  happi- 
ness by  it,  constitutes  alone  the  supreme  good  of  a world 
into  which  we  must  necessarily  place  ourselves  according 
to  the  commands  of  pure  but  practical  reason.  But  this 
is  an  intelligible  world  only,  and  a sensible  world  never 
promises  us  such  a systematical  unity  of  ends  as  arising 
from  the  nature  of  things.  Nor  is  the  reality  of  this  unity 
founded  on  anything  but  the  admission  of  a supreme 
original  good,  so  that  independent  reason,  equipped  with 
all  the  requirements  of  a supreme  cause,  founds,  main- 
tains, and  completes,  according  to  the  most  perfect 
design,  the  universal  order  of  things  which,  in  the  world 
of  sense,  is  almost  completely  hidden  from  our  sight. 

This  moral  theology  has  this  peculiar  advantage  over 
speculative  theology,  that  it  leads  inevitably  to  the  con- 
cept of  a sole,  most  perfect,  and  rational  first  Being,  to 
which  speculative  theology  does  not  even  lead  us  on, 
on  objective  grounds,  much  less  give  us  a conviction  of 
it.  For  neither  in  transcendental  nor  in  natural  theology, 
however  far  reason  may  carry  us  on,  do  we  find  any  real 
ground  for  admitting  even  one  sole  being  which  we  should 
be  warranted  in  placing  before  all  natural  causes  [p.  815] 
and  on  which  we  might  make  them  in  all  respects  to 
depend.  On  the  other  hand,  if,  from  the  point  of  view 
of  moral  unity  as  a necessary  law  of  the  universe,  we 
consider  what  cause  alone  could  give  to  it  its  adequate 


654 


Canon  of  Pure  Reason 


effect,  and  therefore  its  binding  force  with  regard  to 
ourselves,  we  find  that  it  must  be  one  sole  supreme  will 
which  comprehends  all  these  laws  within  itself.  For 
how  with  different  wills  should  we  find  complete  unity 
of  ends  ? That  will  must  be  omnipotent,  in  order  that  the 
whole  of  nature  and  its  relation  to  morality  and  the  world 
may  be  subject  to  it ; omniscient,  that  it  may  know  the 
most  secret  springs  of  our  sentiments  and  their  moral 
worth  ; omnipresent,  that  it  may  be  near  for  supplying 
immediately  all  that  is  required  by  the  highest  interests 
of  the  world  ; eternal,  that  this  harmony  of  nature  and 
freedom  may  never  fail,  and  so  on. 

But  this  systematical  unity  of  ends  in  this  world  of 
intelligences  which,  if  looked  upon  as  mere  nature,  may 
be  called  a sensible  world  only,  but  which,  if  considered 
as  a system  of  freedom,  may  be  called  an  intelligible, 
that  is,  a moral  world  (regnum  gratiae),  leads  inevitably 
also  to  the  admission  of  a unity  of  design  in  all  things 
which  constitute  this  great  universe  according  to  general 
natural  laws,  just  as  the  former  (unity)  was  according  to 
general  and  necessary  laws  of  morality.  In  this  way  prac- 
tical and  speculative  reason  become  united.  The  world 
must  be  represented  as  having  originated  from  an  idea, 
if  it  is  to  harmonise  with  that  employment  of  reason 
without  which  we  should  consider  ourselves  [p.  816] 
unworthy  of  reason,  namely,  with  its  moral  employment, 
which  is  founded  entirely  on  the  idea  of  the  supreme 
good.  In  this  way  the  study  of  nature  tends  to  assume 
the  form  of  a teleological  system,  and  becomes  in  its 
widest  extension  physico-theology.  And  this,  as  it  starts 
from  the  moral  order  as  a unity  founded  on  the  essence 
of  freedom,  and  not  accidentally  brought  about  by  ex- 


Canon  of  Pure  Reason 


655 


ternal  commands,  traces  the  design  of  nature  to  grounds 
which  must  be  inseparably  connected  a priori  with  the 

I internal  possibility  of  things,  and  leads  thus  to  a tran- 
scendental theology,  which  takes  the  ideal  of  the  highest 
ontological  perfection  as  the  principle  of  systematical 
unity  which  connects  all  things  according  to  general  and 
necessary  laws  of  nature,  because  they  all  have  their 
origin  in  the  absolute  necessity  of  the  one  original  Being. 

What  use  can  we  make  of  our  understanding,  even 
in  respect  to  experience,  if  we  have  not  aims  before 
-USl?  The  highest  aims,  however,  are  those  of  morality, 
and  these  we  can  only  know  by  means  of  pure  reason. 
Even  with  their  help  and  guidance,  however,  we  could 
make  no  proper  use  of  the  knowledge  of  nature,  unless 
nature  itself  had  established  a unity  of  design  : for  with- 
out this  we  should  ourselves  have  no  reason,  [p.  817] 
because  there  would  be  no  school  for  it,  nor  any  culture 
derived  from  objects  which  supply  the  material  for  such 
concepts.  This  unity  of  design  is  necessary  and  founded 
on  the  essence  of  free-will,  which  must,  therefore,  as  con- 
taining the  condition  of  its  application  in  concreto,  be  so 
likewise;  so  that,  in  reality,  the  transcendental  develop- 
ment of  the  knowledge  obtained  by  our  reason  would  be, 
not  the  cause,  but  only  the  effect  of  that  practical  order 
and  design  which  pure  reason  imposes  upon  us. 

We  find  therefore  in  the  history  of  human  reason  also 
that,  before  the  moral  concepts  were  sufficiently  purified 
and  refined,  and  before  the  systematical  unity  of  the  ends 
was  clearly  understood,  according  to  such  concepts  and  in 
accordance  with  necessary  principles,  the  then  existing 
knowledge  of  nature  and  even  a considerable  amount  of 
the  culture  of  reason  in  many  other  branches  of  science 


656 


Canon  of  Pure  Reason 


could  only  produce  crude  and  vague  conceptions  of  the 
Deity,  or  allow  of  an  astonishing  indifference  with  regard 
to  that  question.  A greater  cultivation  of  moral  ideas, 
which  became  necessary  through  the  extremely  pure  moral 
law  of  our  religion,  directed  our  reason  to  that  object 
through  the  interest  which  it  forced  us  to  take  in  it, 
and  without  the  help  either  of  a more  extended  know- 
ledge of  nature,  or  of  more  correct  and  trustworthy  tran- 
scendental views  (which  have  been  wanting  in  all  ages). 
A concept  of  the  Divine  Being  was  elaborated  [p.  8 1 8] 
which  we  now  hold  to  be  correct,  not  because  speculative 
reason  has  convinced  us  of  its  correctness,  but  because  it 
fully  agrees  with  the  moral  principles  of  reason.  And 
thus,  after  all,  it  is  pure  reason  only,  but  pure  reason  in 
its  practical  employment,  which  may  claim  the  merit  of 
connecting  with  our  highest  interest  that  knowledge 
which  pure  speculation  could  only  guess  at  without 
being  able  to  establish  its  validity,  and  of  having  made 
it,  not  indeed  a demonstrated  dogma,  but  a supposition 
absolutely  necessary  to  the  most  essential  ends  of  reason. 

But  after  practical  reason  has  reached  this  high  point, 
namely,  the  concept  of  a sole  original  Being  as  the 
supreme  good,  it  must  not  imagine  that  it  has  raised 
itself  above  all  empirical  traditions  of  its  application  and 
soared  up  to  an  immediate  knowledge  of  new  objects,  and 
thus  venture  to  start  from  that  concept  and  to  deduce 
from  it  the  moral  laws  themselves.  For  it  was  these  very 
laws  the  internal  practical  necessity  of  which  led  us  to  the 
admission  of  an  independent  cause,  or  of  a wise  ruler  of 
the  world  that  should  give  effect  to  them.  We  ought  not, 
therefore,  to  consider  them  afterwards  again  as  accidental 
and  derived  from  the  mere  will  of  the  ruler,  particularly  as 


Canon  of  Pure  Reason 


65  7 


we  could  have  no  concept  of  such  a will,  if  we  had  not 
formed  it  in  accordance  with  those  laws.  So  [_P-  819] 
far  as  practical  reason  is  entitled  to  lead  us  we  shall 
not  look  upon  actions  as  obligatory  because  they  are  the 
commands  of  God,  but  look  upon  them  as  divine  com- 
mands because  we  feel  an  inner  obligation  to  follow 
them.  We  shall  study  freedom  according  to  the  unity 
of  design  determined  by  the  principles  of  reason,  and 

I lwe  shall  believe  ourselves  to  be  acting  in  accordance 
with  the  Divine  will  in  so  far  only  as  we  hold  sacred 
the  moral  law  which  reason  teaches  us  from  the  nature 
of  actions  themselves.  We  shall  believe  ourselves  to  be 
serving  Him  only  by  promoting  everything  that  is  best 
in  the  world,  both  in  ourselves  and  in  others.  Moral 
theology  is,  therefore,  of  immanent  use  only,  teaching 
us  to  fulfil  our  destiny  here  in  the  world  by  adapting 
ourselves  to  the  general  system  of  ends,  without  either 
fanatically  or  even  criminally  abandoning  the  guidance 
of  reason  and  her  moral  laws  for  our  proper  conduct  in 
life,  in  order  to  connect  it  directly  with  the  idea  of  the 
Supreme  Being.  This  would  be  a transcendent  use  of 
moral  theology  which,  like  a transcendent  use  of  mere 
speculation,  must  inevitably  pervert  and  frustrate  the 
ultimate  aims  of  reason. 

CANON  OF  PURE  REASON  [p.  820] 

Section  III 

Of  Trowing , Knowing , and  Believing 

The  holding  a thing  to  be  true  is  an  event  in  our  under- 
standing which,  though  it  may  rest  on  objective  grounds, 
2 u 


658 


Canon  of  Pure  Reason 


requires  also  subjective  causes  in  the  mind  of  the  person 
who  is  to  judge.  If  the  judgment  is  valid  for  everybody, 
if  only  he  is  possessed  of  reason,  then  the  ground  of  it 
is  objectively  sufficient,  and  the  holding  it  to  be  true  is 
called  conviction.  If,  on  the  contrary,  it  has  its  ground 
in  the  peculiar  character  of  the  subject  only,  it  is  called 
persuasion. 

Persuasion  is  a mere  illusion,  the  ground  of  the  judg- 
ment, though  it  lies  solely  in  the  subject,  being  regarded 
as  objective.  Such  a judgment  has,  therefore,  private 
validity  only,  and  the  holding  it  to  be  true  cannot  be 
communicated  to  others.  Truth,  however,  depends  on 
agreement  with  the  object,  and,  with  regard  to  it,  the 
judgments  of  every  understanding  must  agree  with  each 
other  ( consentientia  uni  tertio  consentiunt  inter  se,  etc.). 
An  external  criterion,  therefore,  as  to  whether  our  hold- 
ing a thing  to  be  true  be  conviction  or  only  persuasion, 
consists  in  the  possibility  of  communicating  it,  and  finding 
its  truth  to  be  valid  for  the  reason  of  every  man.  For, 
in  that  case,  there  is  at  least  a presumption  that  the 
ground  of  the  agreement  of  all  judgments,  in  [p.  821] 
spite  of  the  diversity  of  the  subjects,  rests  upon  the 
common  ground,  namely,  on  the  object  with  which  they 
all  agree,  and  thus  prove  the  truth  of  the  judgment. 

Persuasion,  therefore,  cannot  be  distinguished  from  con- 
viction, subjectively,  so  long  as  the  subject  views  its 
judgment  as  a phenomenon  of  his  own  mind  only;  the 
experiment,  however,  which  we  make  with  the  grounds 
that  seem  valid  to  us,  by  trying  to  find  out  whether 
they  will  produce  the  same  effect  on  the  reason  of  others, 
is  a means,  though  only  a subjective  means,  not  indeed 
of  producing  conviction,  but  of  detecting  the  merely 


Canon  of  Pure  Reason  659 

private  validity  of  the  judgment,  that  is,  of  discovering 
in  it  what  is  merely  persuasion. 

If  we  are  able  besides  to  analyse  the  subjective  causes 
of  our  judgment,  which  we  have  taken  for  its  objective 
grounds , and  thus  explain  the  deceptive  judgment  as  a 
phenomenon  in  our  mind,  without  having  recourse  to  the 
object  itself,  we  expose  the  illusion  and  are  no  longer 
deceived  by  it,  although  we  may  continue  to  be  tempted 
by  it,  in  a certain  degree,  if,  namely,  the  subjective  cause 
of  the  illusion  is  inherent  in  our  nature. 

I cannot  maintain  anything,  that  is,  affirm  it  as  a judg- 
ment necessarily  valid  for  everybody,  except  it  work  con- 
viction. Persuasion  I may  keep  for  myself,  if  it  [p.  822] 
is  agreeable  to  me,  but  I cannot,  and  ought  not  to  attempt 
to  make  it  binding  on  any  but  myself. 

The  holding  anything  to  be  true,  or  the  subjective  valid- 
ity of  a judgment  admits,  with  reference  to  the  conviction 
which  is  at  the  same  time  valid  objectively,  of  the  three 
following  degrees,  trowing,  believing,  knowing.  Trowing  is 
to  hold  true,  with  the  consciousness  that  it  is  insufficient 
both  subjectively  and  objectively.  If  the  holding  true  is 
sufficient  subjectively,  but  is  held  to  be  insufficient  objec- 
tively, it  is  called  believing ; while,  if  it  is  sufficient  both 
subjectively  and  objectively,  it  is  called  knowing.  Subjec- 
tive sufficiency  is  called  conviction  (for  myself),  objective 
sufficiency  is  called  certainty  (for  everybody).  I shall  not 
dwell  any  longer  on  the  explanation  of  such  easy  concepts. 

I must  never  venture  to  trow,  or  to  be  of  opinion,  with- 
out knowing  at  least  something  by  means  of  which  a judg- 
ment, problematical  by  itself,  is  connected  with  truth, 
which  connection,  though  it  involves  not  a complete  truth, 
is  yet  attended  with  more  than  arbitrary  fiction.  More- 


66o 


Canon  of  Pure  Reason 


over,  the  law  of  such  a connection  must  be  certain.  For 
if,  even  with  regard  to  this  law,  I should  have  nothing  but 
an  opinion,  all  would  become  a mere  play  of  the  imagina- 
tion, without  the  least  relation  to  truth. 

In  the  judgments  of  pure  reason  opinion  is  not  per- 
mitted. For,  as  they  are  not  based  on  empirical  grounds, 
but  everything  has  to  be  known  a priori,  and  [p.  823] 
everything  therefore  must  be  necessary,  the  principle  of 
connection  in  them  requires  universality  and  necessity, 
and  consequently  perfect  certainty,  without  which  there 
would  be  nothing  to  lead  us  on  to  truth.  Hence  it  is 
absurd  to  have  an  opinion  in  pure  mathematics  ; here  one 
must  either  know,  or  abstain  from  pronouncing  any  judg- 
ment. The  same  applies  to  the  principles  of  morality, 
because  one  must  not  hazard  an  action  on  the  mere  opinion 
that  it  is  allowed,  but  must  know  it  to  be  so. 

In  the  transcendental  employment  of  reason,  on  the 
contrary,  mere  opinion,  no  doubt,  would  be  too  little,  but 
knowledge  too  much.  Speculatively,  therefore,  we  cannot 
here  form  any  judgment  at  all,  because  the  subjective 
grounds  on  which  we  hold  a thing  to  be  true,  as  for  in- 
stance those  which  may  very  well  produce  belief,  are  not 
approved  of  in  speculative  questions,  as  they  cannot  be 
held  without  empirical  support,  nor,  if  communicated  to 
others,  can  produce  the  same  effect  on  them. 

Nor  can  the  theoretically  insufficient  acceptance  of  truth 
be  called  belief,  except  from  a practical  point  of  view.  And 
this  practical  view  refers  either  to  skill  or  to  morality,  the 
former  being  concerned  with  any  contingent  and  casual 
ends  and  objects  whatsoever,  the  latter  with  absolutely 
necessary  ends  only. 

If  we  have  once  proposed  an  object  or  end  to  ourselves, 


Canon  of  Pure  Reason  66 1 

the  conditions  of  attaining  it  are  hypothetically  necessary. 
This  necessity  is  subjective,  and  yet  but  rela-  [p.  824] 
tively  sufficient,  if  I know  of  no  other  conditions  under 
which  the  end  can  be  attained  : it  is  sufficient  absolutely 
and  for  every  one,  if  I am  convinced  that  no  one  can  know 
of  other  conditions,  leading  to  the  attainment  of  our  end. 
In  the  former  case  my  assuming  and  holding  certain  condi- 
tions as  true  is  merely  an  accidental  belief,  while  in  the 
latter  case  it  is  a necessary  belief.  Thus  a physician,  for 
instance,  may  feel  that  he  must  do  something  for  a patient, 
who  is  in  danger.  But  as  he  does  not  know  the  nature  of 
the  illness,  he  observes  the  symptoms,  and  arrives  at  the 
conclusion,  as  he  knows  nothing  else,  that  it  is  phthisis. 
His  belief,  according  to  his  own  judgment,  is  contingent 
only,  and  he  knows  that  another  might  form  a better  judg- 
ment. It  is  this  kind  of  contingent  belief  which,  neverthe- 
less, supplies  a ground  for  the  actual  employment  of  means 
to  certain  actions,  which  I call  pragmatic  belief. 

The  usual  test,  whether  something  that  is  maintained 
be  merely  persuasion,  or  a subjective  conviction  at  least, 
that  is,  firm  belief,  is  betting.  People  often  pronounce 
their  views  with  such  bold  and  uncompromising  assurance 
that  they  seem  to  have  abandoned  all  fear  of  error.  A bet 
startles  them.  Sometimes  it  turns  out  that  a man  has 
persuasion  sufficient  to  be  valued  at  one  ducat,  but  not  at 
ten  ; he  is  ready  to  venture  the  first  ducat,  but  [p.  825] 
with  ten,  he  becomes  aware  for  the  first  time  that,  after 
all,  it  might  be  possible  that  he  should  be  mistaken.  If 
we  imagine  that  we  have  to  stake  the  happiness  of  our 
whole  life,  the  triumphant  air  of  our  judgment  drops  con- 
siderably ; we  become  extremely  shy,  and  suddenly  discover 
that  our  belief  does  not  reach  so  far.  Thus  pragmatic 


662 


Canon  of  Pure  Reason 


belief  admits  of  degrees  which,  according  to  the  difference 
of  the  interests  at  stake,  may  be  large  or  small. 

Now  it  is  true,  no  doubt,  that,  though  with  reference  to 
an  object  of  our  belief,  we  can  do  nothing,  and  our  opinion 
is,  therefore,  purely  theoretical,  yet  in  many  cases  we  can 
represent  and  imagine  to  ourselves  an  undertaking  foi 
which  we  might  think  that  we  had  sufficient  inducements, 
if  any  means  existed  of  ascertaining  the  truth  of  the  mat- 
ter. Thus,  even  in  purely  theoretical  judgments,  there  is 
an  analogon  of  practical  judgments  to  which  the  word 
belief  may  be  applied,  and  which  we  shall  therefore  call 
doctrinal  belief.  If  it  were  possible  to  apply  any  test  of 
experience,  I should  be  ready  to  stake  the  whole  of  my 
earthly  goods  on  my  belief  that  at  least  one  of  the  planets 
which  we  see  is  inhabited.  Hence  I say  that  it  is  not  only 
an  opinion,  but  a strong  belief,  on  the  truth  of  which  I 
should  risk  even  many  advantages  of  life,  that  there  are 
inhabitants  in  other  worlds. 

Now  we  must  admit  that  the  doctrine  of  the  [p.  826] 
existence  of  God  belongs  to  doctrinal  belief.  For  although, 
with  reference  to  my  theoretical  knowledge  of  the  world, 
I can  produce  nothing  which  would  make  this  thought  a 
necessary  supposition  as  a condition  of  my  being  able  to 
explain  the  phenomena  of  the  world,  but  on  the  contrary 
am  bound  to  use  my  reason  as  if  everything  were  mere 
nature,  nevertheless,  the  unity  of  design  is  so  important 
a condition  of  the  application  of  reason  to  nature  that  I 
cannot  ignore  it,  especially  as  experience  supplies  so  many 
examples  of  it.  Of  that  unity  of  design,  however,  I know 
no  other  condition,  which  would  make  it  a guidance  in 
my  study  of  nature,  but  the  supposition  that  a supreme 
intelligence  has  ordered  all  things  according  to  the  wisest 


Canon  of  Pure  Reason 


66  3 


ends.  As  a condition,  therefore,  of,  it  may  be,  a contin- 
gent, but  not  unimportant  end,  namely,  in  order  to  have  a 
guidance  in  the  investigation  of  nature,  it  is  necessary  to 
admit  a wise  author  of  the  world.  The  result  of  my  ex- 
periment confirms  the  usefulness  of  this  supposition  so 
many  times,  while  nothing  decisive  can  be  adduced  against 
it,  that  I am  really  saying  far  too  little,  if  I call  my  accep- 
tation of  it  a mere  opinion,  and  it  may  be  said,  even  with 
regard  to  these  theoretical  matters,  that  I firmly  believe  in 
God.  Still,  if  we  use  our  words  strictly,  this  belief  must 
always  be  called  doctrinal,  and  not  practical,  such  as  the 
theology  of  nature  (physical  theology)  must  al-  [p.  827] 
ways  and  necessarily  produce.  In  the  same  wisdom,  and 
in  the  prominent  endowments  of  human  nature,  combined 
with  the  inadequate  shortness  of  life,  another  sufficient 
ground  may  be  found  for  the  doctrinal  belief  in  the  future 
life  of  the  human  soul. 

The  expression  of  belief  is  in  such  cases  an  expression 
of  modesty  from  the  objective  point  of  view,  and  yet,  at 
the  same  time,  a firm  confidence  from  a subjective.  If 
even  I were  to  call  this  purely  theoretical  acceptance  an 
hypothesis  only,  which  I am  entitled  to  assume,  I should 
profess  to  be  in  possession  of  a more  complete  concept  of 
the  nature  of  a cause  of  the  world,  and  of  another  world, 
than  I really  can  produce.  If  I accept  anything,  even  as 
an  hypothesis  only,  I must  know  it  at  least  so  much  ac- 
cording to  its  properties,  that  I need  not  imagine  its  con- 
cepts, but  its  existence  only.  But  the  word  belief  refers 
only  to  the  guidance  which  an  idea  gives  me,  and  to  its 
subjective  influence  on  the  conduct  of  my  reason,  which 
makes  me  hold  it  fast,  though  I may  not  be  able  to  give 
an  account  of  it  from  a speculative  point  of  view. 


664 


Canon  of  Pure  Reaso?i 


Purely  doctrinal  belief,  however,  has  always  a somewhat 
unstable  character.  Speculative  difficulties  often  make 
us  lose  hold  of  it,  though  in  the  end  we  always  [p.  828] 
return  to  it. 

It  is  quite  different  with  moral  belief.  For  here  action 
is  absolutely  necessary,  that  is,  I must  obey  the  moral  law 
on  all  points.  The  end  is  here  firmly  established,  and, 
according  to  all  we  know,  one  only  condition  is  possible 
under  which  that  end  could  agree  with  all  other  ends,  and 
thus  acquire  practical  validity,  namely,  the  existence  of  a 
God  and  of  a future  world.  I also  know  it  for  certain  that 
no  one  is  cognisant  of  other  conditions  which  could  lead 
to  the  same  unity  of  ends  under  the  moral  law.  As,  then, 
the  moral  precept  is  at  the  same  time  my  maxim,  reason 
commanding  that  it  should  be  so,  I shall  inevitably  believe 
in  the  existence  of  God,  and  in  a future  life,  and  I feel 
certain  that  nothing  can  shake  this  belief,  because  all  my 
moral  principles  would  be  overthrown  at  the  same  time, 
and  I cannot  surrender  them  without  becoming  hateful  in 
my  own  eyes. 

We  see,  therefore,  that,  even  after  the  failure  of  all  the 
ambitious  schemes  of  reason  to  pass  beyond  the  limits  of 
all  experience,  enough  remains  to  make  us  satisfied  for 
practical  purposes.  No  one,  no  doubt,  will  be  able  to 
boast  again  that  he  knows  that  there  is  a God  and  a future 
life.  For  a man  who  knows  that,  is  the  very  man  [p.  829] 
whom  I have  been  so  long  in  search  of.  As  all  knowledge, 
if  it  refers  to  an  object  of  pure  reason,  can  be  communi- 
cated, I might  hope  that,  through  his  teaching,  my  own 
knowledge  would  be  increased  in  the  most  wonderful  way. 
No,  that  conviction  is  not  a logical,  but  a moral  certainty; 
and,  as  it  rests  on  subjective  grounds  (of  the  moral  senti- 


Canon  of  Pitre  Reason 


665 


ment),  I must  not  even  say  that  it  is  morally  certain  that 
there  is  a God,  etc.,  but  that  I am  morally  certain,  etc. 
What  I really  mean  is,  that  the  belief  in  a God  and  in 
another  world  is  so  interwoven  with  my  moral  sentiment, 
that  as  there  is  little  danger  of  my  losing  the  latter,  there 
is  quite  as  little  fear  lest  I should  ever  be  deprived  of  the 
former. 

The  only  point  that  may  rouse  misgivings  is  that  this 
rational  belief  is  based  on  the  supposition  of  moral  senti- 
ments. If  we  surrender  this,  and  take  a man  who  is  en- 
tirely indifferent  with  regard  to  moral  laws,  the  question 
proposed  by  reason  becomes  merely  a problem  for  specula- 
tion, and  may  in  that  case  be  still  supported  with  strong 
grounds  from  analogy,  but  not  such  to  which  the  most 
obstinate  scepticism  has  to  submit.1 

No  man,  however,  is  with  regard  to  these  ques-  [p.  830] 
tions  free  from  all  interest.  For  although  in  the  absence 
of  good  sentiments  he  may  be  rid  of  all  moral  interest, 
enough  remains  even  thus  to  make  him  fear  the  existence 
of  God  and  a future  life.  For  nothing  is  required  for  this 
but  his  inability  to  plead  certainty  with  regard  to  the  non- 
existence of  such  a being  and  of  a future  life.  As  this 
would  have  to  be  proved  by  mere  reason,  and  therefore 
apodictically,  he  would  have  to  establish  the  impossibility 
of  both,  which  I feel  certain  no  rational  being  would  vent- 
ure to  do.  This  would  be  a negative  belief  which,  though 

1 The  interest  which  the  human  mind  takes  in  morality  (an  interest  which, 
as  I believe,  is  necessary  to  every  rational  being)  is  natural,  though  it  is  not 
undivided,  and  always  practically  preponderant.  If  you  strengthen  and  in- 
crease that  interest,  you  will  find  reason  very  docile,  and  even  more  enlight- 
ened, so  as  to  be  able  to  join  the  speculative  with  the  practical  interests.  If 
you  do  not  take  care  that  you  first  make  men  at  least  moderately  good,  you 
will  never  make  them  honest  believers. 


666 


Canon  of  Pare  Reason 


it  could  not  produce  morality  and  good  sentiments,  would 
still  produce  something  analogous,  namely,  a check  on 
the  outbreak  of  evil. 

But,  it  will  be  said,  is  this  really  all  that  pure  reason 
can  achieve  in  opening  prospects  beyond  the  limits  of 
experience  ? Nothing  more  than  two  articles  of  faith  ? 
Surely  even  the  ordinary  understanding  could  have 
achieved  as  much  without  taking  counsel  of  [p.  831] 
philosophers  ! 

I shall  not  here  dwell  on  the  benefits  which,  by  the 
laborious  efforts  of  its  criticism,  philosophy  has  conferred 
on  human  reason,  granting  even  that  in  the  end  they 
should  turn  out  to  be  merely  negative.  On  this  point 
something  will  have  to  be  said  in  the  next  section.  But 
I ask,  do  you  really  require  that  knowledge,  which  con- 
cerns all  men,  should  go  beyond  the  common  understand- 
ing, and  should  be  revealed  to  you  by  philosophers  only  ? 
The  very  thing  which  you  find  fault  with,  is  the  best  con- 
firmation of  the  correctness  of  our  previous  assertions, 
since  it  reveals  to  us  what  we  could  not  have  grasped 
before,  namely,  that  in  matters  which  concern  all  men 
without  distinction,  nature  cannot  be  accused  of  any 
partial  distribution  of  her  gifts ; and  that  with  regard  to 
the  essential  interests  of  human  nature,  the  highest  phi- 
losophy can  achieve  no  more  than  that  guidance  which  nat- 
ure has  vouchsafed  even  to  the  meanest  understanding. 


METHOD  OF  TRANSCENDENTALISM 

[p-  832] 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  ARCHITECTONIC  OF  PURE  REASON 

By  architectonic  I understand  the  art  of  constructing 
systems.  As  systematical  unity  is  that  which  raises  com- 
mon knowledge  to  the  dignity  of  a science,  that  is,  changes 
a mere  aggregate  of  knowledge  into  a system,  it  is  easy 
to  see  that  architectonic  is  the  doctrine  of  what  is  really 
scientific  in  our  knowledge,  and  forms  therefore  a neces- 
sary part  of  the  doctrine  of  method. 

Under  the  sway  of  reason  our  knowledge  must  not 
remain  a rhapsody,  but  must  become  a system,  because 
thus  alone  can  the  essential  objects  of  reason  be  supported 
and  advanced.  By  system  I mean  the  unity  of  various 
kinds  of  knowledge  under  one  idea.  This  is  the  concept 
given  by  reason  of  the  form  of  the  whole,  in  which  concept 
both  the  extent  of  its  manifold  contents  and  the  place 
belonging  to  each  part  are  determined  a priori.  This 
scientific  concept  of  reason  contains,  therefore,  the  end 
and  also  the  form  of  the  whole  which  is  congruent  with  it. 
The  unity  of  the  end  to  which  all  parts  relate  and  through 
the  idea  of  which  they  are  related  to  each  other,  enables 
us  to  miss  any  part,  if  we  possess  a knowledge  of  the  rest, 
and  prevents  any  arbitrary  addition  or  vagueness  of  per- 

667 


668  Architectonic  of  Pure  Reason 

fection  of  which  the  limits  could  not  be  determined  a 
priori.  Thus  the  whole  is  articulated  ( articulatio ),  [p.  833] 

not  aggregated  ( coacenmtio ).  It  may  grow  internally  ( per 
uitussusceptionem) , but  not  externally  ( per  appositionem), 
like  an  animal  body,  the  growth  of  which  does  not  add 
any  new  member,  but,  without  changing  their  proportion, 
renders  each  stronger  and  more  efficient  for  its  purposes. 

The  idea  requires  for  its  realisation  a schema,  that  is 
an  essential  variety,  and  an  order  of  its  parts,  which 
are  determined  a priori,  according  to  the  principles  inher- 
ent in  its  aim.  A schema,  which  is  not  designed  accord- 
ing to  an  idea,  that  is,  according  to  the  principal  aim  of 
reason,  but  empirically  only,  in  accordance  with  accidental 
aims  (the  number  of  which  cannot  be  determined  before- 
hand) gives  tecJmical  unity  ; but  the  schema  which  origi- 
nates from  an  idea  only  (where  reason  dictates  the  aims 
a priori  and  does  not  wait  for  them  in  experience)  supplies 
architectonical  unity.  Now  what  we  call  a science,  the 
schema  of  which  must  have  its  outline  ( monogramma ) and 
the  division  of  the  whole  into  parts  devised  according  to 
the  idea,  that  is,  a priori , and  keep  it  perfectly  distinct 
from  everything  else  according  to  principles,  cannot  be 
produced  technically  according  to  the  similarity  of  its 
various  parts  or  the  accidental  use  of  knowledge  in  con- 
creto  for  this  or  that  external  purpose,  but  architectoni- 
cally only,  as  based  on  the  affinity  of  its  parts  and  their 
dependence  on  one  supreme  and  internal  aim  through 
which  alone  the  whole  becomes  possible.  [p.  834] 

No  one  attempts  to  construct  a science  unless  he  can 
base  it  on  some  idea ; but  in  the  elaboration  of  it  the 
schema,  nay,  even  the  definition,  which  he  gives  in  the 
beginning  of  his  science,  corresponds  very  seldom  to  his 


Architectonic  of  Pure  Reason 


669 


idea  which,  like  a germ,  lies  hidden  in  reason,  and  all  the 
parts  of  which  are  still  enveloped  and  hardly  distinguish- 
able even  under  microscopical  observation.  It  is  neces- 
sary, therefore,  to  explain  and  determine  all  sciences, 
considering  that  they  are  contrived  from  the  point  of  view 
of  a certain  general  interest,  not  according  to  the  descrip- 
tion given  by  their  author,  but  according  to  the  idea  which, 
from  the  natural  unity  of  its  constituent  parts,  we  may 
discover  as  founded  in  reason  itself.  We  shall  often  find 
that  the  originator  of  a science,  and  even  his  latest  suc- 
cessors are  moving  vaguely  round  an  idea  which  they  have 
not  been  able  to  perceive  clearly,  failing  in  consequence 
to  determine  rightly  the  proper  contents,  the  articulation 
(systematical  unity),  and  the  limits  of  their  science. 

It  is  a misfortune  that  only  after  having  collected  for  a 
long  time  at  haphazard,  under  the  influence  of  an  idea  that 
lies  hidden  in  us,  materials  belonging  to  a science,  nay, 
after  having  for  a long  time  fitted  them  together  [p.  835] 
technically,  a time  arrives  when  we  are  able  to  see  its 
idea  in  a clearer  light,  and  to  devise  architectonically  a 
whole  system  according  to  the  aims  of  reason.  Systems 
seem  to  develope  like  worms  through  a kind  of  generatio 
aequivoca,  by  the  mere  aggregration  of  numerous  concepts, 
at  first  imperfect,  and  gradually  attaining  to  perfection, 
though  in  reality  they  all  had  their  schema,  as  their  origi- 
nal germ,  in  reason  which  was  itself  being  developed. 
Hence,  not  only  is  each  of  them  articulated  according  to 
an  idea,  but  all  may  be  properly  combined  with  each  other 
in  a system  of  human  knowledge,  as  members  of  one 
whole,  admitting  of  an  architectonic  of  all  human  know- 
ledge which  in  our  time,  when  so  much  material  has  been 
collected  or  may  be  taken  over  from  the  ruins  of  old 


670  Architectonic  of  Pure  Reason 

systems,  is  not  only  possible,  but  not  even  very  difficult. 
We  shall  confine  ourselves  here  to  the  completion  of  our 
proper  business,  namely,  to  sketch  the  architectonic  of  all 
knowledge  arising  from  pure  reason,  beginning  only  at  the 
point  where  the  common  root  of  our  knowledge  divides 
into  two  stems,  one  of  which  is  reason.  By  reason,  how- 
ever, I understand  here  the  whole  higher  faculty  of  know- 
ledge, and  I distinguish  therein  rational  from  empirical 
knowledge. 

If  I take  no  account  of  the  contents  of  knowledge,  ob- 
jectively considered,  all  knowledge  is,  from  a subjective 
point  of  view,  either  historical  or  rational.  His-  [p.  836] 
torical  knowledge  is  cognitio  ex  datis,  rational  knowledge 
cognitio  ex  principiis.  Whatever  may  be  the  first  origin 
of  some  branch  of  knowledge,  it  is  always  historical,  if  he 
who  possesses  it  knows  only  so  much  of  it  as  has  been 
given  to  him  from  outside,  whether  through  immediate 
experience,  or  through  narration,  or  by  instruction  also 
(in  general  knowledge).  Hence  a person  who,  in  the 
usual  sense,  has  learnt  a system  of  philosophy,  for  in- 
stance the  Wolfian,  though  he  may  carry  in  his  head  all 
the  principles,  definitions,  and  proofs,  as  well  as  the  divis- 
ion of  the  whole  system,  and  have  it  all  at  his  fingers’ 
ends,  possesses  yet  none  but  a complete  historical  know- 
ledge of  the  Wolfian  philosophy.  His  knowledge  and 
judgments  are  no  more  than  what  has  been  given  him. 
If  you  dispute  any  definition,  he  does  not  know  whence 
to  take  another,  because  he  formed  his  own  on  the  reason 
of  another.  But  the  imitative  is  not  the  productive  fac- 
ulty, that  is,  knowledge  in  his  case  did  not  come  from 
reason,  and  though  objectively  it  is  rational  knowledge, 
subjectively  it  is  historical  only.  He  has  taken  and  kept, 


Architectonic  of  Pure  Reason 


671 


that  is,  he  has  well  learned  and  has  become  a plaster  cast 
of  a living  man.  Knowledge,  which  is  rational  objectively 
(that  is,  which  can  arise  originally  from  a man’s  own  rea- 
son only),  can  then  only  be  so  called  subjectively  also, 
when  they  have  been  drawn  from  the  general  resources 
of  reason,  that  is,  from  principles  from  which  [p.  837] 
also  criticism,  nay,  even  the  rejection  of  what  has  been 
learnt,  may  arise. 

All  knowledge  of  reason  is  again  either  based  on  con- 
cepts or  on  the  construction  of  concepts ; the  former 
being  called  philosophical,  the  latter  mathematical.  Of 
their  essential  difference  I have  treated  in  the  first  chap- 
ter. Knowledge,  as  we  saw,  may  be  objectively  philo- 
sophical, and  yet  subjectively  historical,  as  is  the  case 
with  most  apprentices,  and  with  all  who  never  look  be- 
yond their  school  and  remain  in  a state  of  pupilage  all 
their  life.  But  it  is  strange  that  mathematical  knowledge, 
as  soon  as  it  has  been  acquired,  may  be  considered,  sub- 
jectively also,  as  knowledge  of  reason,  there  being  no  such 
distinction  here  as  in  the  case  of  philosophical  knowledge. 
The  reason  is  that  the  sources  from  which  alone  the  math- 
ematical teacher  can  take  his  knowledge  lie  nowhere  but 
in  the  essential  and  genuine  principles  of  reason,  and  can- 
not be  taken  by  the  pupil  from  anywhere  else,  nor  ever  be 
disputed,  for  the  simple  ground  that  the  employment  of 
reason  takes  place  here  in  concreto  only,  although  a priori, 
namely,  in  the  pure  and  therefore  faultless  intuition,  thus 
excluding  all  illusion  and  error.  Of  all  the  sciences  of 
reason  ( a priori ),  therefore,  mathematics  alone  can  be 
learnt,  but  philosophy  (unless  it  be  historically)  never ; 
with  regard  to  reason  we  can  at  most  learn  to  philosophise. 

The  system  of  all  philosophical  knowledge  [p.  838] 


67 2 Architectonic  of  Pure  Reason 

is  called  philosophy.  It  must  be  taken  objectively,  if  we 
understand  by  it  the  type  of  criticising  all  philosophical 
attempts,  which  is  to  serve  for  the  criticism  of  every  sub- 
jective philosophy,  however  various  and  changeable  the 
systems  may  be.  In  this  manner  philosophy  is  a mere 
idea  of  a possible  science  which  exists  nowhere  in  con- 
creto,  but  which  we  may  try  to  approach  on  different 
paths,  until  in  the  end  the  only  true  path,  though  over- 
grown and  hidden  by  sensibility,  has  been  discovered,  and 
the  image,  which  has  so  often  proved  a failure,  has  become 
as  like  the  original  type  as  human  power  can  ever  make  it. 
Till  then  we  cannot  learn  philosophy ; for  where  is  it, 
who  possesses  it,  and  how  shall  we  know  it  ? We  can 
only  learn  to  philosophise,  that  is,  to  exercise  the  talent 
of  reason,  according  to  its  general  principles,  on  certain 
given  attempts  always,  however,  with  the  reservation  of 
the  right  of  reason  of  investigating  the  sources  of  these 
principles  themselves,  and  of  either  accepting  or  rejecting 
them. 

So  far  the  concept  of  philosophy  is  only  scholastic , as  of 
a system  of  knowledge  which  is  sought  and  valued  as  a 
science,  without  aiming  at  more  than  a systematical  unity 
of  that  knowledge,  and  therefore  the  logical  perfection  of 
it.  But  there  is  also  a universal,  or,  if  we  may  say  so,  a 
cosmical  concept  (conceptus  cosmicus ) of  philosophy,  which 
always  formed  the  real  foundation  of  that  name,  [p.  839] 
particularly  when  it  had,  as  it  were,  to  be  personified  and 
represented  in  the  ideal  of  the  philosopher,  as  the  original 
type.  In  this  sense  philosophy  is  the  science  of  the  rela- 
tion of  all  knowledge  to  the  essential  aims  of  human 
reason  ( teleologia  rationis  humanae),  and  the  philosopher 
stands  before  us,  not  as  an  artist,  but  as  the  lawgiver  of 


Architectonic  of  Pure  Reason 


673 


numan  reason.  In  that  sense  it  would  be  very  boastful  to 
call  oneself  a philosopher,  and  to  pretend  to  have  equalled 
the  type  which  exists  in  the  idea  only. 

The  mathematician,  the  student  of  nature,  and  the 
logician,  however  far  the  two  former  may  have  advanced 
in  rational,  and  the  last,  particularly,  in  philosophical 
knowledge,  are  merely  artists  of  reason.  There  is  be- 
sides, an  ideal  teacher,  who  controls  them  all,  and  uses 
them  as  instruments  for  the  advancement  of  the  essential 
aims  of  human  reason.  Him  alone  we  ought  to  call  phi- 
losopher: but  as  he  exists  nowhere,  while  the  idea  of  his 
legislation  exists  everywhere  in  the  reason  of  every  human 
being,  we  shall  keep  entirely  to  that  idea,  and  determine 
more  accurately  what  kind  of  systematical  unity  philoso- 
phy, in  this  cosmical  concept,1  demands  from  the  stand- 
point of  its  aims.  [p.  840] 

Essential  ends  are  not  as  yet  the  highest  ends  ; in  fact, 
there  can  be  but  one  highest  end,  if  the  perfect  systemati- 
cal unity  of  reason  has  been  reached.  We  must  distin- 
guish, therefore,  between  the  ultimate  end  and  subordinate 
ends,  which  necessarily  belong,  as  means,  to  the  former. 
The  former  is  nothing  but  the  whole  destination  of  man, 
and  the  philosophy  which  relates  to  it  is  called  moral 
philosophy.  O account  of  this  excellence  which  distin- 
guishes moral  philosophy  from  all  other  operations  of 
reason,  the  ancients  always  understood  under  the  name  of 
philosopher  the  moralist  principally : and  even  at  present 
the  external  appearance  of  self-control  by  means  of  reason 

1 Cosmical  concept  is  meant  here  for  a concept  relating  to  what  must  be  of 
interest  to  everybody : while  I determine  the  character  of  a science,  according 
to  scholastic  concepts , if  I look  upon  it  only  as  one  of  many  crafts  intended  foi 
certain  objects. 

3X 


674  Architectonic  of  Pure  Reason 

leads  us,  through  a certain  analogy,  to  call  a man  a phi- 
losopher, however  limited  his  knowledge  may  be.  The 
legislation  of  human  reason  (philosophy)  has  two  objects 
only,  nature  and  freedom,  and  contains  therefore  both  the 
law  of  nature  and  the  law  of  morals,  at  first  in  two  sepa- 
rate systems,  but  combined,  at  last,  in  one  great  system 
of  philosophy.  The  philosophy  of  nature  relates  to  all 
that  is ; that  of  morals  to  that  only  that  ought  to  be. 

All  philosophy  is  either  knowledge  derived  from  pure 
reason,  or  knowledge  of  reason  derived  from  empirical 
principles.  The  former  is  called  pure,  the  latter  empirical 
philosophy. 

The  philosophy  of  pure  reason  is  either  fro-  [p.  841] 
paedeutic  (preparation),  enquiring  into  the  faculties  of  rea- 
son, with  regard  to  all  pure  knowledge  a priori , and  called 
critic,  or,  secondly,  the  system  of  pure  reason  (science), 
comprehending  in  systematical  connection  the  whole  (both 
true  and  illusory)  of  philosophical  knowledge,  derived  from 
pure  reason,  and  called  metaphysic,  — although  this  name 
of  metaphysic  may  be  given  also  to  the  whole  of  pure  phi- 
losophy, inclusive  of  the  critic,  in  order  thus  to  compre- 
hend both  the  investigation  of  all  that  can  ever  be  known 
a priori  and  the  representation  of  all  that  constitutes  a 
system  of  pure  philosophical  knowledge  of  that  kind, 
excluding  all  that  belongs  to  the  empirical  and  the  mathe- 
matical employment  of  reason. 

Metaphysic  is  divided  into  that  of  the  speadative  and 
that  of  the  practical  use  of  pure  reason,  and  is,  therefore, 
either  metaphysic  of  nature  or  metaphysic  of  morals.  The 
former  contains  all  the  pure  principles  of  reason,  derived 
from  concepts  only  (excluding  therefore  mathematics),  of 
the  theoretical  knowledge  of  all  things,  the  latter,  the  prin- 


Architectonic  of  Pure  Reason  675 

ciples  which  determine  a priori  and  necessitate  all  doing 
and  not  doing.  Morality  is  the  only  legality  of  actions 
that  can  be  derived  from  principles  entirely  a priori. 
Hence  the  metaphysic  of  morals  is  really  pure  moral  phi- 
losophy, in  which  no  account  is  taken  of  anthropology  or 
any  empirical  conditions.  Metaphysic  of  specu-  [p.  842] 
lative  reason  has  commonly  been  called  metap/iysic,  in  the 
more  limited  sense  ; as  however  pure  moral  philosophy 
belongs  likewise  to  this  branch  of  human  and  philosophi- 
cal knowledge,  derived  from  pure  reason,  we  shall  allow  it 
to  retain  that  name,  although  we  leave  it  aside  for  the 
present  as  not  belonging  to  our  immediate  object. 

It  is  of  the  highest  importance  to  isolate  various  sorts 
of  knowledge,  which  in  kind  and  origin  are  different  from 
others,  and  to  take  great  care  lest  they  be  mixed  up  with 
those  others  with  which,  for  practical  purposes,  they  are 
generally  united.  What  is  done  by  the  chemist  in  the 
analysis  of  substances,  and  by  the  mathematician  in  pure 
mathematics,  is  far  more  incumbent  on  the  philosopher, 
in  order  to  enable  him  to  define  clearly  the  part  which, 
in  the  promiscuous  employment  of  the  understanding,  be- 
longs to  a special  kind  of  knowledge,  as  well  as  its  peculiar 
value  and  influence.  Human  reason,  therefore,  since  it 
first  began  to  think,  or  rather  to  reflect,  has  never  been 
able  to  do  without  a metaphysic,  but  it  has  never  kept 
it  sufficiently  free  from  all  foreign  admixture.  The  idea 
of  a science  of  this  kind  is  as  old  as  speculation  itself, 
and  what  human  reason  does  not  speculate,  whether  in  a 
scholastic  or  a popular  manner  ? It  must  be  admitted, 
however,  that  even  thinkers  by  profession  did  [p.  843] 
not  clearly  distinguish  between  the  two  elements  of  our 
knowledge,  the  one  being  in  our  possession  completely  a 


6y6 


Architectonic  of  Pure  Reason 


priori , the  other  deducible  a posteriori  only  from  experi 
ence,  and  did  not  succeed  therefore  in  fixing  the  limits 
of  a special  kind  of  knowledge,  nor  in  realising  the  true 
idea  of  a science  which  had  so  long  and  so  deeply  en- 
gaged the  interest  of  human  reason.  When  it  was  said 
that  metaphysic  is  the  science  of  the  first  principles  of 
human  knowledge,  this  did  not  mark  out  any  special 
kind  of  knowledge,  but  only  a certain  rank  or  degree, 
with  regard  to  its  character  of  generality,  which  was 
not  sufficient  to  distinguish  it  clearly  from  empirical 
knowledge.  For  among  empirical  principles  also,  some 
are  more  general,  and  therefore  higher  than  others ; and 
in  such  a series  of  subordinated  principles  (where  that 
which  is  entirely  a priori  is  not  distinguished  from  that 
which  is  known  a posteriori  only),  where  should  one  draw 
the  line  to  separate  the  first  part  from  the  last,  and  the 
higher  members  from  the  lower  ? What  should  we  say 
if  chronology  should  distinguish  the  epochs  of  history 
no  better  than  by  dividing  it  into  the  first  centuries  and 
the  subsequent  centuries  ? We  should  ask,  no  doubt, 
whether  the  fifth  or  the  tenth  belongs  to  the  first  centu- 
ries ? and  I ask  in  the  same  way  whether  the  concept  of 
what  is  extended  belongs  to  metaphysic  ? If  you  say, 
yes ! I ask,  what  about  the  concept  of  a body  ? and  of 
a liquid  body  ? You  then  hesitate,  for  you  [p.  844] 
begin  to  see,  that  if  I continue  in  this  strain,  every- 
thing would  belong  to  metaphysic.  It  thus  becomes 
clear  that  the  mere  degree  of  subordination  of  the 
special  under  the  general  cannot  determine  the  limits 
of  a science ; but,  in  our  case,  only  the  complete  differ- 
ence in  kind  and  origin.  The  fundamental  idea  of 
metaphysic  was  obscured  on  another  side  because,  as 


Architectonic  of  Pure  Reason  677 

knowledge  a priori,  it  showed  a certain  similarity  in  kind 
with  mathematics.  The  two  are,  no  doubt,  related  with 
regard  to  their  origin  a priori,  but,  if  we  consider  how, 
in  metaphysic,  knowledge  is  derived  from  concepts,  while 
in  mathematics  we  can  only  form  judgments  through  the 
construction  of  concepts  a priori,  we  discover,  in  com- 
paring philosophical  with  mathematical  knowledge,  the 
most  decided  difference  in  kind,  which  was  no  doubt 
always  felt,  but  never  determined  by  clear  criteria.  Thus 
it  has  happened  that,  as  philosophers  themselves  blun- 
dered in  developing  the  idea  of  their  science,  its  elabora- 
tion could  have  no  definite  aim,  and  no  certain  guidance ; 
and  we  may  well  understand  how  metaphysical  science 
was  brought  into  contempt  in  the  outside  world,  and  at 
Jast  among  philosophers  themselves,  considering  how 
arbitrarily  it  had  been  designed,  and  how  constantly 
those  very  philosophers,  ignorant  as  to  the  path  which 
they  ought  to  take,  were  disputing  among  themselves 
about  the  discoveries  which  each  asserted  he  had  made 
on  his  own  peculiar  path.  [p.  845] 

All  pure  knowledge  a priori  constitutes,  therefore,  ac- 
cording to  the  special  faculty  of  knowledge  in  which  alone 
it  can  originate,  a definite  unity ; and  metaphysic  is  that 
philosophy  which  is  meant  to  represent  that  knowledge 
in  its  systematical  unity.  Its  speculative  part,  which 
has  especially  appropriated  that  name,  namely,  what  we 
call  metaphysic  of  nature,  in  which  everything  is  con- 
sidered from  concepts  a priori,  so  far  as  it  is  (not  so  far 
as  it  ought  to  be),  will  have  to  be  divided  in  the  following 
manner. 

Metaphysic,  in  the  more  limited  sense  of  the  word, 
consists  of  transcendental  philosophy  and  the  physiology 


678 


Architectonic  of  Pure  Reason 


of  pure  reason.  The  former  treats  only  of  understand 
ing  and  reason  themselves,  in  a system  of  all  concepts 
and  principles  which  have  reference  to  objects  in  general, 
without  taking  account  of  objects  that  may  be  givezi 
(ontologia) : the  latter  treats  of  nature , that  is,  the  sum 
of  given  objects  (whether  given  to  the  senses,  or,  if  you 
like,  to  some  other  kind  of  intuition)  and  is  therefore 
physiology , . although  7-ationalis  only.  The  employment 
of  reason  in  this  rational  study  of  nature  is  either  physi- 
cal or  hyperphysical,  or,  more  accurately  speaking,  im- 
manent or  transcetidefit.  The  former  refers  to  nature, 
in  so  far  as  its  knowledge  can  take  place  in  experience 
(in  concreto) ; the  latter  to  that  connection  of  objects  of 
experience  which  transcends  all  experience.  This  tran- 
scendent physiology  has  for  its  object  either  an  [p.  846] 
internal  or  an  external  connection,  both  transcending 
every  possible  experience  ; the  former  is  the  physiology 
of  nature  as  a whole,  or  transcendental  knowledge  of  the 
world,  the  latter  refers  to  the  connection  of  the  whole 
of  nature  with  a Being  above  nature,  and  is  therefore 
transcendental  knozvledge  of  God. 

Immanent  physiology,  on  the  contrary,  considers  nature 
as  the  sum  total  of  all  objects  of  the  senses,  such,  there- 
fore, as  it  is  given  us,  but  only  according  to  conditions 
a priori,  under  which  alone  it  can  be  given  us.  It  has 
two  kinds  of  objects  only;  first,  those  of  the  external 
senses,  which  constitute  together  corporeal  nature ; sec- 
ondly, the  object  of  the  internal  sense,  the  soul,  and 
what,  according  to  its  fundamental  principles  in  general, 
may  be  called  thinking  nature.  The  metaphysic  of  cor- 
poreal nature  is  called  physic,  or,  because  it  must  contain 
the  principles  of  an  a priori  knowledge  of  nature  only, 


Architectonic  of  Pure  Reason 


679 


rational  physic.  Metaphysic  of  the  thinking  nature  is 
called  psychology , and  for  the  same  reason,  is  here  to  be 
understood  as  the  rational  knowledge  only  of  that  nature. 

Thus  the  whole  system  of  metaphysic  consists  of  four 
principal  parts.  1.  Ontology , 2.  Rational  Physiology , 
3.  Rational  Cosmology,  4.  Rational  Theology.  The  second 
part,  the  physiology  of  pure  reason,  contains  two  divisions, 
namely,  physica  rationalist  and  phychologia  [p.  847] 
rationalis. 

The  fundamental  idea  of  a philosophy  of  pure  reason  pre- 
scribes itself  this  division.  It  is  therefore  architectonical, 
adequate  to  its  essential  aims,  and  not  technical  only,  con- 
trived according  to  any  observed  similarities,  and,  as  it 
were,  at  haphazard.  For  that  very  reason  such  a division 
is  unchangeable  and  of  legislative  authority.  There  are, 
however,  a few  points  which  might  cause  misgivings,  and 
weaken  our  conviction  of  its  legitimate  character. 

First  of  all,  how  can  I expect  knowledge  a priori,  that 
is  metaphysic,  of  objects  so  far  as  they  are  given  to  our 
senses,  that  is  a posteriori ? and  how  is  it  possible  to 
know  the  nature  of  things  according  to  principles  a priori, 
and  thus  to  arrive  at  a rational  physiology  ? Our  [p.  848] 
answer  is,  that  we  take  nothing  from  experience  beyond 
what  is  necessary  to  give  us  an  object,  either  of  the  exter- 

1 It  must  not  be  supposed  that  I mean  by  this  what  is  commonly  called 
physica  generalis,  and  which  is  rather  mathematics,  than  a philosophy  of 
nature.  For  the  metaphysic  of  nature  is  entirely  separate  from  mathematics, 
and  does  not  enlarge  our  knowledge  as  much  as  mathematics;  but  it  is,  never- 
theless, very  important,  as  supplying  a criticism  of  the  pure  knowledge  of  the 
understanding  that  should  be  applied  to  nature.  For  want  of  its  guidance, 
even  mathematicians,  given  to  certain  common  concepts  which  in  reality  are 
metaphysical,  have  unconsciously  encumbered  physical  science  with  hypotheses 
which  vanish  under  a criticism  of  those  principles,  without  however  causing 
the  least  detriment  to  the  necessary  employment  of  mathematics  in  this  field. 


68o 


Architectonic  of  Pure  Reason 


nal  or  of  the  internal  sense.  The  former  is  done  by  the 
mere  concept  of  matter  (impermeable,  lifeless  extension), 
the  latter  through  the  concept  of  a thinking  being  (in  the 
empirical  internal  representation,  I think).  For  the  rest, 
we  ought  in  the  whole  metaphysical  treatment  of  these  ob- 
jects to  abstain  from  all  empirical  principles,  which  to  the 
concept  of  matter  might  add  any  kind  of  experience  for 
the  purpose  of  forming  any  judgments  on  these  objects. 

Secondly.  What  becomes  of  empirical  psychology , which 
has  always  maintained  its  place  in  metaphysic  and  from 
which,  in  our  time,  such  great  things  were  expected  for 
throwing  light  on  metaphysic,  after  all  hope  had  been 
surrendered  of  achieving  anything  useful  a priori  ? I 
answer,  it  has  its  place  where  the  proper  (empirical)  study 
of  nature  must  be  placed,  namely,  by  the  side  of  applied 
philosophy,  to  which  pure  philosophy  supplies  the  principles 
a priori ; thus  being  connected,  but  not  to  be  confounded 
with  it.  Empirical  psychology,  therefore,  must  be  entirely 
banished  from  metaphysic,  and  is  excluded  from  it  by  its 
very  idea.  According  to  the  tradition  of  the  schools,  how- 
ever, we  shall  probably  have  to  allow  to  it  (though  as  an  ep- 
isode only)  a small  corner  in  metaphysic,  and  this  [p.  849] 
from  economical  motives,  because,  as  yet,  it  is  not  so  rich 
as  to  constitute  a study  by  itself,  and  yet  too  important 
to  be  banished  entirely  and  to  be  settled  in  a place  where  it 
would  find  still  less  affinity  than  in  metaphysic.  It  is, 
therefore,  a stranger  only,  who  has  been  received  for  a long 
time  and  whom  one  allows  to  stay  a little  longer,  until  he 
can  take  up  his  own  abode  in  a complete  system  of  anthro- 
pology, the  pendant  to  the  empirical  doctrine  of  nature. 

This  then  is  the  general  idea  of  metaphysic  which,  as 
in  the  beginning  more  was  expected  of  it  than  could  justly 


Architectonic  of  Pure  Reason  68 1 

be  demanded,  fell  into  general  disrepute  after  these  pleas- 
ant expectations  had  proved  fallacious.  The  whole  course 
of  our  critique  must  have  convinced  us  sufficiently  that, 
although  metaphysic  cannot  supply  the  foundation  of 
religion,  it  must  always  remain  its  bulwark,  and  that 
human  reason,  being  dialectical  by  its  very  nature,  cannot 
do  without  a science  which  curbs  it  and,  by  means  of  a sci- 
entific and  perfectly  clear  self-knowledge,  prevents  the  rav- 
ages which  otherwise  this  lawless  speculative  reason  would 
certainly  commit  both  in  morals  and  religion.  We  may 
be  sure,  therefore,  that,  in  spite  of  the  coy  or  contemptu- 
ous airs  assumed  by  those  who  judge  a science,  not  accord- 
ing to  its  nature,  but  according  to  its  accidental  [p.  850] 
effects,  we  shall  always  return  to  it  as  to  a beloved  one 
with  whom  we  have  quarrelled,  because  reason,  as  essential 
interests  are  here  at  stake,  cannot  rest  till  it  has  either 
established  correct  views  or  destroyed  those  which  already 
exist. 

Metaphysic,  therefore,  that  of  nature  as  well  as  that  of 
morals,  and  particularly  the  criticism  of  our  adventurous 
reason,  which  forms  the  introduction  and  preparation  of 
it,  constitute  together  what  may  be  termed  philosophy 
in  the  true  sense  of  the  word.  Its  only  goal  is  wisdom, 
and  the  path  to  it  science,  the  only  path  which,  if  once 
opened,  is  never  grown  over  again,  and  can  never  mis- 
lead. Mathematics,  natural  science,  even  the  empirical 
knowledge  of  men,  have,  no  doubt,  a high  value,  as  means 
for  the  most  part  to  accidental,  but  yet  in  the  end  neces- 
sary and  essential  aims  of  mankind.  But  they  have  that 
value  only  by  means  of  that  knowledge  of  reason  based  on 
pure  concepts  which,  call  it  as  you  may,  is  in  reality 
nothing  but  metaphysic. 


682 


Architectonic  of  Pure  Reason 


For  the  same  reason  metaphysic  is  also  the  completion 
of  the  whole  culture  of  human  reason,  which  is  indispen- 
sable, although  one  may  discard  its  influence  as  a science 
with  regard  to  certain  objects.  For  it  enquires  [p.  851] 
into  reason  according  to  its  elements  and  highest  maxims, 
which  must  form  the  very  foundation  of  the  possibility  of 
some  sciences,  and  of  the  use  of  all.  That,  as  mere  spec- 
ulation, it  serves  rather  to  keep  off  error  than  to  extend 
knowledge  does  not  detract  from  its  value,  but,  on  the 
contrary,  confers  upon  it  dignity  and  authority  by  that 
censorship  which  secures  general  order  and  harmony,  ay, 
the  well-being  of  the  scientific  commonwealth,  and  pre- 
vents its  persevering  and  successful  labourers  from  losing 
sight  of  the  highest  aim,  the  general  happiness  of  all 
mankind. 


METHOD  OF  TRANSCENDENTALISM 

[p.  852] 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  HISTORY  OF  PURE  REASON 

This  title  stands  here  only  in  order  to  indicate  the 
place  in  the  system  which  remains  empty  for  the  present 
and  has  to  be  filled  hereafter.  I content  myself  with 
casting  a cursory  glance,  from  a purely  transcendental 
point  of  view,  namely,  that  of  the  nature  of  pure  reason, 
on  the  labours  of  former  philosophers,  which  presents  to 
my  eyes  many  structures,  but  in  ruins  only. 

It  is  very  remarkable,  though  naturally  it  could  not  well 
have  been  otherwise,  that  in  the  very  infancy  of  philoso- 
phy men  began  where  we  should  like  to  end,  namely,  with 
studying  the  knowledge  of  God  and  the  hope  or  even  the 
nature  of  a future  world.  However  crude  the  religious 
concepts  might  be  which  owed  their  origin  to  the  old  cus- 
toms, as  remnants  of  the  savage  state  of  humanity,  this 
did  not  prevent  the  more  enlightened  classes  from  devot- 
ing themselves  to  free  investigations  of  these  matters,  and 
they  soon  perceived  that  there  could  be  no  better  and 
surer  way  of  pleasing  that  invisible  power  which  governs 
the  world,  in  order  to  be  happy  at  least  in  another  world, 
than  good  conduct.  Thus  theology  and  morals  [p.  853] 
became  the  two  springs,  or  rather  the  points  of  attraction 
for  all  abstract  enquiries  of  reason  in  later  times,  though 

683 


684 


History  of  Pure  Reason 


it  was  chiefly  the  former  which  gradually  drew  speculative 
reason  into  those  labours  which  afterwards  became  so 
celebrated  under  the  name  of  metaphysic. 

I shall  not  attempt  at  present  to  distinguish  the  periods 
of  history  in  which  this  or  that  change  of  metaphysic  took 
place,  but  only  draw  a rapid  sketch  of  the  difference  of 
the  ideas  which  caused  the  principal  revolutions  in  meta- 
physic. And  here  I find  three  aims  with  which  the  most 
important  changes  on  this  arena  were  brought  about. 

1.  With  reference  to  the  object  of  all  knowledge  of  our 
reason,  some  philosophers  were  mere  sensualists , others 
mere  intellectualists.  Epicurus  may  be  regarded  as  the 
first  among  the  former,  Plato  as  the  first  among  the  latter. 
The  distinction  of  these  two  schools,  subtle  as  it  is,  dates 
from  the  earliest  days,  and  has  long  been  maintained. 
Those  who  belong  to  the  former  school  maintained  that 
reality  exists  in  the  objects  of  the  senses  alone,  everything 
else  being  imagination  ; those  of  the  second  school,  on  the 
contrary,  maintained,  that  in  the  senses  there  is  nothing 
but  illusion,  and  that  the  true  is  known  by  the  [p.  854] 
understanding  only.  The  former  did  not,  therefore,  deny 
all  reality  to  the  concepts  of  the  understanding,  but  that 
reality  was  with  them  logical  only,  with  the  others  it  was 
mystical.  The  former  admitted  intellectual  concepts,  but 
accepted  sensible  objects  only.  The  latter  required  that 
true  objects  should  be  intelligible  only,  and  maintained  an 
intuition  peculiar  to  the  understanding,  separated  from  the 
senses  which,  in  their  opinion,  could  only  confuse  it. 

2.  With  reference  to  the  origiit  of  the  pure  concepts  of 
reason,  and  whether  they  are  derived  from  experience,  or 
have  their  origin  independent  of  experience,  in  reason. 
Aristotle  may  be  considered  as  the  head  of  the  empiricists , 


History  of  Pure  Reason 


685 


Plato  as  that  of  the  noologists.  Locke,  who  in  modern 
times  followed  Aristotle,  and  Leibnis,  who  followed  Plato 
(though  at  a sufficient  distance  from  his  mystical  system), 
have  not  been  able  to  bring  this  dispute  to  any  conclusion. 
Epicurus  at  least  was  far  more  consistent  in  his  sensual 
system  (for  he  never  allowed  his  syllogisms  to  go  beyond 
the  limits  of  experience)  than  Aristotle  and  Locke,  more 
particularly  the  latter,  who,  after  having  derived  all  con- 
cepts and  principles  from  experience,  goes  so  far  in  their 
application  as  to  maintain  that  the  existence  of  God  and 
the  immortality  of  the  soul  (though  both  lie  entirely  out- 
side the  limits  of  all  possible  experience)  could  [p.  855] 
be  proved  with  the  same  evidence  as  any  mathematical 
proposition. 

3.  With  reference  to  method.  If  anything  is  to  be  called 
method,  it  must  be  a procedure  according  to  principles. 
The  method  at  present  prevailing  in  this  field  of  enquiry 
may  be  divided  into  the  naturalistic  and  the  scientific. 
The  naturalist  of  pure  reason  lays  it  down  as  his  principle 
that,  with  reference  to  the  highest  questions  which  form 
the  problems  of  metaphysic,  more  can  be  achieved  by 
means  of  common  reason  without  science  (which  he  calls 
sound  reason),  than  through  speculation.  This  is  the 
same  as  if  we  should  maintain  that  the  magnitude  and 
distance  of  the  moon  can  be  better  determined  by  the 
naked  eye  than  by  roundabout  mathematical  calculations. 
This  is  pure  misology  reduced  to  principles,  and,  what  is 
the  most  absurd,  the  neglect  of  all  artificial  means  is 
recommended  as  the  best  way  of  enlarging  our  knowledge. 
As  regards  those  who  are  naturalists  because  they  know 
no  better,  they  are  really  not  to  be  blamed.  They  simply 
follow  ordinary  reason,  but  they  do  not  boast  of  their 


686 


History  of  Pure  Reason 


ignorance,  as  the  method  which  contains  the  secret  how 
we  are  to  fetch  the  truth  from  the  bottom  of  the  well  of 
Democritus.  lQuod  sapio  satis  est  mihi,  non  ego  euro,  esse 
quod  Arcesilas  aeruninosique  So/ones’  (Pers.),  is  the  motto 
with  which  they  may  lead  a happy  and  honoured  life,  with- 
out meddling  with  science  or  muddling  it.  [p.  856] 

As  regards  those  who  follow  a scientific  method,  they 
have  the  choice  to  proceed  either  dogmatically  or  scepti- 
cally, but  at  all  events,  systematically.  When  I have 
mentioned  in  relation  to  the  former  the  celebrated  Wolf, 
and  in  relation  to  the  other  David  Hume,  I may  for  my 
present  purpose  leave  all  the  rest  unnamed. 

The  only  path  that  is  still  open  is  the  critical.  If  the 
reader  has  been  kind  and  patient  enough  to  follow  me  to 
the  end  along  this  path,  he  may  judge  for  himself  whether, 
if  he  will  help,  as  far  as  in  him  lies,  towards  making  this 
footpath  a highroad,  it  may  not  be  possible  to  achieve, 
even  before  the  close  of  the  present  century,  what  so 
many  centuries  have  not  been  able  to  achieve,  namely, 
to  give  complete  satisfaction  to  human  reason  with  regard 
to  those  questions  which  have  in  all  ages  exercised  its 
desire  for  knowledge,  though  hitherto  in  vain. 


SUPPLEMENT  I 


MOTTO  TO  SECOND  EDITION 
Baco  de  Verulamio 
Instauratio  magna : Praefatio 

De  nobis  ipsis  silemus  : de  re  autem,  quae  agitur,  petimus,  ut 
homines  earn  non  opinionem,  sed  opus  esse  cogitent ; ac  pro 
certo  habeant,  non  sectae  nos  alicujus  aut  placiti,  sed  utilitatis  et 
amplitudinis  humanae  fundamenta  moliri.  Deinde  ut  suis  com- 
modis  aequi  ...  in  commune  consulant,  . . . et  ipsi  in  partem 
veniant.  Praeterea,  ut  bene  sperent,  neque  Instaurationem  nos- 
tram  ut  quiddam  infinitum  et  ultra  mortale  fingant,  et  animo  con- 
cipiant ; quum  revera  sit  infiniti  erroris  finis  et  terminus  legitimus. 


687 


SUPPLEMENT  II 


Preface  to  the  Second  Edition.  1787.  [p.  vii] 

Whether  the  treatment  of  that  class  of  knowledge  with  which 
reason  is  occupied  follows  the  secure  method  of  a science  or  not, 
can  easily  be  determined  by  the  result.  If,  after  repeated  prep- 
arations, it  comes  to  a standstill,  as  soon  as  its  real  goal  is  ap- 
proached, or  is  obliged,  in  order  to  reach  it,  to  retrace  its  steps 
again  and  again,  and  strike  into  fresh  paths  ; again,  if  it  is  impos- 
sible to  produce  unanimity  among  those  who  are  engaged  in  the 
same  work,  as  to  the  manner  in  which  their  common  object 
should  be  obtained,  we  may  be  convinced  that  such  a study  is  far 
from  having  attained  to  the  secure  method  of  a science,  but  is 
groping  only  in  the  dark.  In  that  case  we  are  conferring  a great 
benefit  on  reason,  if  we  only  find  out  the  right  method,  though 
many  things  should  have  to  be  surrendered  as  useless,  which  were 
comprehended  in  the  original  aim  that  had  been  chosen  without 
sufficient  reflection. 

That  Logic,  from  the  earliest  times,  has  followed  that  [p.  viii] 
secure  method,  may  be  seen  from  the  fact  that  since  Aristotle  it 
has  not  had  to  retrace  a single  step,  unless  we  choose  to  consider 
as  improvements  the  removal  of  some  unnecessary  subtleties,  or 
the  clearer  definition  of  its  matter,  both  of  which  refer  to  the 
elegance  rather  than  to  the  solidity  of  the  science.  It  is  remark- 
able also,  that  to  the  present  day,  it  has  not  been  able  to  make 
one  step  in  advance,  so  that,  to  all  appearance,  it  may  be  con- 
sidered as  completed  and  perfect.  If  some  modern  philosophers 
thought  to  enlarge  it,  by  introducing  psychological  chapters  on  the 
different  faculties  of  knowledge  (faculty  of  imagination,  wit,  etc.), 
or  metaphysical  chapters  on  the  origin  of  knowledge,  or  the  dif- 

688 


Supplement  II 


689 


ferent  degrees  of  certainty  according  to  the  difference  of  objects 
(idealism,  scepticism,  etc.),  or  lastly,  anthropological  chapters  on 
prejudices,  their  causes  and  remedies,  this  could  only  arise  from 
their  ignorance  of  the  peculiar  nature  of  logical  science.  We  do 
not  enlarge,  but  we  only  disfigure  the  sciences,  if  we  allow  their 
respective  limits  to  be  confounded  : and  the  limits  of  logic  are 
definitely  fixed  by  the  fact,  that  it  is  a science  which  has  nothing 
to  do  but  fully  to  exhibit  and  strictly  to  prove  all  formal  [p.  ix] 
rules  of  thought  (whether  it  be  a priori  or  empirical,  whatever  be 
its  origin  or  its  object,  and  whatever  be  the  impediments,  acci- 
dental or  natural,  which  it  has  to  encounter  in  the  human  mind). 

That  logic  should  in  this  respect  have  been  so  successful,  is  due 
entirely  to  its  limitation,  whereby  it  has  not  only  the  right,  but  the 
duty,  to  make  abstraction  of  all  the  objects  of  knowledge  and 
their  differences,  so  that  the  understanding  has  to  deal  with 
nothing  beyond  itself  and  its  own  forms.  It  was,  of  course,  far 
more  difficult  for  reason  to  enter  on  the  secure  method  of  science, 
when  it  has  to  deal  not  with  itself  only,  but  also  with  objects. 
Logic,  therefore,  as  a kind  of  preparation  ( propaedeutic ) forms,  as 
it  were,  the  vestibule  of  the  sciences  only,  and  where  real  know- 
ledge is  concerned,  is  presupposed  for  critical  purposes  only,  while 
the  acquisition  of  knowledge  must  be  sought  for  in  the  sciences 
themselves,  properly  and  objectively  so  called. 

If  there  is  to  be  in  those  sciences  an  element  of  reason,  some- 
thing in  them  must  be  known  a priori , and  knowledge  may  stand 
in  a twofold  relation  to  its  object,  by  either  simply  deter-  [p.  x] 
mining  it  and  its  concept  (which  must  be  supplied  from  else- 
where), or  by  making  it  real  also.  The  former  is  theoretical,  the 
latter  practical  knowledge  of  reason.  In  both  the  pure  part, 
namely,  that  in  which  reason  determines  its  object  entirely  a 
priori  (whether  it  contain  much  or  little),  must  be  treated  first, 
without  mixing  up  with  it  what  comes  from  other  sources  ; for  it  is 
bad  economy  to  spend  blindly  whatever  comes  in,  and  not  to  be  able 
to  determine,  when  there  is  a stoppage,  which  part  of  the  income 
can  bear  the  expenditure,  and  where  reductions  must  be  made. 

Mathematics  and  physics  are  the  two  theoretical  sciences  of 
reason,  which  have  to  determine  their  objects  a priori;  the 


690 


Supplement  IT 


former  quite  purely,  the  latter  partially  so,  and  partially  from  other 
sources  of  knowledge  besides  reason. 

Mathematics,  from  the  earliest  times  to  which  the  history  of 
human  reason  can  reach,  has  followed,  among  that  wonderful  peo- 
ple of  the  Greeks,  the  safe  way  of  a science.  But  it  must  not  be 
supposed  that  it  was  as  easy  for  mathematics  as  for  logic,  in 
which  reason  is  concerned  with  itself  alone,  to  find,  or  rather  to 
make  for  itself  that  royal  road.  I believe,  on  the  contrary, 
that  there  was  a long  period  of  tentative  work  (chiefly  [p.  xi] 
still  among  the  Egyptians),  and  that  the  change  is  to  be  as- 
cribed to  a revolution,  produced  by  the  happy  thought  of  a 
single  man,  whose  experiment  pointed  unmistakably  to  the  path 
that  had  to  be  followed,  and  opened  and  traced  out  for  the 
most  distant  times  the  safe  way  of  a science.  The  history  of 
that  intellectual  revolution,  which  was  far  more  important  than 
the  discovery  of  the  passage  round  the  celebrated  Cape  of  Good 
Hope,  and  the  name  of  its  fortunate  author,  have  not  been  pre- 
served to  us.  But  the  story  preserved  by  Diogenes  Laertius,  who 
names  the  reputed  author  of  the  smallest  elements  of  ordinary 
geometrical  demonstration,  even  of  such  as,  according  to  general 
opinion,  do  not  require  to  be  proved,  shows,  at  all  events,  that  the 
memory  of  the  revolution,  produced  by  the  very  first  traces  of 
the  discovery  of  a new  method,  appeared  extremely  important  to 
the  mathematicians,  and  thus  remained  unforgotten.  A new  light 
flashed  on  the  first  man  who  demonstrated  the  properties  of  the 
isosceles  triangle1  (whether  his  name  was  Thales  or  any  other 
name),  for  he  found  that  he  had  not  to  investigate  what  [p.  xii] 
he  saw  in  the  figure,  or  the  mere  concept  of  that  figure,  and  thus 
to  learn  its  properties ; but  that  he  had  to  produce  (by  construc- 
tion) what  he  had  himself,  according  to  concepts  a priori,  placed 
into  that  figure  and  represented  in  it,  so  that,  in  order  to  know 
anything  with  certainty  a priori,  he  must  not  attribute  to  that 

1 Kant  himself  in  a letter  to  Schiitz  (Darstellung  seines  Lebens  von  seinem 
Sohn,  Halle,  1835,  Band.  II.  S.  208)  pointed  out  the  mistake  which  appears 
in  the  preface  to  the  2nd  edition,  namely,  gleichseitig  (equilateral),  instead  of 
gleichschenkelig  (isosceles). 


Supplement  II  691 

figure  anything  beyond  what  necessarily  follows  from  what  he  has 
himself  placed  into  it,  in  accordance  with  the  concept. 

It  took  a much  longer  time  before  physics  entered  on  the  high 
way  of  science  : for  no  more  than  a century  and  a half  has  elapsed, 
since  Bacon’s  ingenious  proposal  partly  initiated  that  discovery, 
partly,  as  others  were  already  on  the  right  track,  gave  a new 
impetus  to  it,  — a discovery  which,  like  the  former,  can  only  be 
explained  by  a rapid  intellectual  revolution.  In  what  I have  to 
say,  I shall  confine  myself  to  natural  science,  so  far  as  it  is  founded 
on  empirical  principles. 

When  Galilei  let  balls  of  a particular  weight,  which  he  had 
determined  himself,  roll  down  an  inclined  plain,  or  Torricelli 
made  the  air  carry  a weight,  which  he  had  previously  determined 
to  be  equal  to  that  of  a definite  volume  of  water;  or  when,  in 
later  times,  Stahl1  changed  metal  into  lime,  and  lime  again  into 
metals,  by  withdrawing  and  restoring  something,  a new  [p.  xiii] 
light  flashed  on  all  students  of  nature.  They  comprehended  that 
reason  has  insight  into  that  only,  which  she  herself  produces  on 
her  own  plan,  and  that  she  must  move  forward  with  the  principles 
of  her  judgments,  according  to  fixed  law,  and  compel  nature  to 
answer  her  questions,  but  not  let  herself  be  led  by  nature,  as  it 
were  in  leading  strings,  because  otherwise  accidental  observations, 
made  on  no  previously  fixed  plan,  will  never  converge  towards  a 
necessary  law,  which  is  the  only  thing  that  reason  seeks  and 
requires.  Reason,  holding  in  one  hand  its  principles,  according 
to  which  concordant  phenomena  alone  can  be  admitted  as  laws 
of  nature,  and  in  the  other  hand  the  experiment,  which  it  has 
devised  according  to  those  principles,  must  approach  nature,  in 
order  to  be  taught  by  it : but  not  in  the  character  of  a pupil,  who 
agrees  to  everything  the  master  likes,  but  as  an  appointed  judge, 
who  compels  the  witnesses  to  answer  the  questions  which  he 
himself  proposes.  Therefore  even  the  science  of  physics  entirely 
owes  the  beneficial  revolution  in  its  character  to  the  happy 
thought,  that  we  ought  to  seek  in  nature  (and  not  [p.  xiv] 

1 I am  not  closely  following  here  the  course  of  the  history  of  the  experimental 
method,  nor  are  the  first  beginnings  of  it  very  well  known. 


692 


Supplement  II 


import  into  it  by  means  of  fiction)  whatever  reason  must  learn 
from  nature,  and  could  not  know  by  itself,  and  that  we  must 
do  this  in  accordance  with  what  reason  itself  has  originally 
placed  into  nature.  Thus  only  has  the  study  of  nature  entered 
on  the  secure  method  of  a science,  after  having  for  many  centuries 
done  nothing  but  grope  in  the  dark. 

Metaphysic,  a completely  isolated  and  speculative  science  of 
reason,  which  declines  all  teaching  of  experience,  and  rests  on 
concepts  only  (not  on  their  application  to  intuition,  as  mathe- 
matics), in  which  reason  therefore  is  meant  to  be  her  own  pupil, 
has  hitherto  not  been  so  fortunate  as  to  enter  on  the  secure  path 
of  a science,  although  it  is  older  than  all  other  sciences,  and 
would  remain,  even  if  all  the  rest  were  swallowed  up  in  the  abyss 
of  an  all-destroying  barbarism.  In  metaphysic,  reason,  even  if  it 
tries  only  to  understand  a priori  (as  it  pretends  to  do)  those  laws 
which  are  confirmed  by  the  commonest  experience,  is  constantly 
brought  to  a standstill,  and  we  are  obliged  again  and  again  to  re- 
trace our  steps,  because  they  do  not  lead  us  where  we  want  to  go  ; 
while  as  to  any  unanimity  among  those  who  are  engaged  [p.  xv] 
in  the  same  work,  there  is  so  little  of  it  in  metaphysic,  that  it  has 
rather  become  an  arena,  specially  destined,  it  would  seem,  for 
those  who  wish  to  exercise  themselves  in  mock  fights,  and  where  no 
combatant  has,  as  yet,  succeeded  in  gaining  an  inch  of  ground  that 
he  could  call  permanently  his  own.  It  cannot  be  denied,  therefore, 
that  the  method  of  metaphysic  has  hitherto  consisted  in  groping 
only,  and,  what  is  the  worst,  in  groping  among  mere  concepts. 

What  then  can  be  the  cause  that  hitherto  no  secure  method  of 
science  has  been  discovered?  Shall  we  say  that  it  is  impossible? 
Then  why  should  nature  have  visited  our  reason  with  restless 
aspiration  to  look  for  it,  as  if  it  were  its  most  important  concern  ? 
Nay  more,  how  little  should  we  be  justified  in  trusting  our  reason 
if,  with  regard  to  one  of  the  most  important  objects  we  wish  to 
know,  it  not  only  abandons  us,  but  lures  us  on  by  vain  hopes,  and 
in  the  end  betrays  us  ! Or,  if  hitherto  we  have  only  failed  to 
meet  with  the  right  path,  what  indications  are  there  to  make  us 
hope  that,  if  we  renew  our  researches,  we  shall  be  more  successful 
than  others  before  us? 


Supplement  II 


693 


The  examples  of  mathematics  and  natural  science,  which  by 
one  revolution  have  become  what  they  now  are,  seem  [p.  xvi] 
to  me  sufficiently  remarkable  to  induce  us  to  consider,  what  may 
have  been  the  essential  element  in  that  intellectual  revolution 
which  has  proved  so  beneficial  to  them,  and  to  make  the  experi- 
ment, at  least,  so  far  as  the  analogy  between  them,  as  sciences  of 
reason,  with  metaphysic  allows  it,  of  imitating  them.  Hitherto  it 
has  been  supposed  that  all  our  knowledge  must  conform  to  the 
objects  : but,  under  that  supposition,  all  attempts  to  establish 
anything  about  them  a priori , by  means  of  concepts,  and  thus  to 
enlarge  our  knowledge,  have  come  to  nothing.  The  experiment 
therefore  ought  to  be  made,  whether  we  should  not  succeed  better 
with  the  problems  of  metaphysic,  by  assuming  that  the  objects 
must  conform  to  our  mode  of  cognition,  for  this  would  better 
agree  with  the  demanded  possibility  of  an  a priori  knowledge  of 
them,  which  is  to  settle  something  about  objects,  before  they  are 
given  us.  We  have  here  the  same  case  as  with  the  first  thought 
of  Copernicus,  who,  not  being  able  to  get  on  in  the  explanation 
of  the  movements  of  the  heavenly  bodies,  as  long  as  he  assumed 
that  all  the  stars  turned  round  the  spectator,  tried,  whether  he 
could  not  succeed  better,  by  assuming  the  spectator  to  be  turning 
round,  and  the  stars  to  be  at  rest.  A similar  experiment  may  be 
tried  in  metaphysic,  so  far  as  the  intuition  of  objects  is  [p.  xvii] 
concerned.  If  the  intuition  had  to  conform  to  the  constitution  of 
objects,  I do  not  see  how  we  could  know  anything  of  it  a priori ; 
but  if  the  object  (as  an  object  of  the  senses)  conforms  to  the 
constitution  of  our  faculty  of  intuition,  I can  very  well  conceive 
such  a possibility.  As,  however,  I cannot  rest  in  these  intuitions, 
if  they  are  to  become  knowledge,  but  have  to  refer  them,  as  repre- 
sentations, to  something  as  their  object,  and  must  determine  that 
object  by  them,  I have  the  choice  of  admitting,  either  that  the 
concepts,  by  which  I carry  out  that  determination,  conform  to  the 
object,  being  then  again  in  the  same  perplexity  on  account  of 
the  manner  how  I can  know  anything  about  it  a priori ; or  that 
the  objects,  or  what  is  the  same,  the  experience  in  which  alone 
they  are  known  (as  given  objects),  must  conform  to  those  con- 
cepts. In  the  latter  case,  the  solution  becomes  more  easy, 


694 


Supplement  II 


because  experience,  as  a kind  of  knowledge,  requires  under 
standing,  and  I must  therefore,  even  before  objects  are  given  to 
me,  presuppose  the  rules  of  the  understanding  as  existing  within 
me  a priori , these  rules  being  expressed  in  concepts  a priori , to 
which  all  objects  of  experience  must  necessarily  conform,  and 
with  which  they  must  agree.  With  regard  to  objects,  [p.  xviii] 
so  far  as  they  are  conceived  by  reason  only,  and  conceived  as 
necessary,  and  which  can  never  be  given  in  experience,  at  least 
in  that  form  in  which  they  are  conceived  by  reason,  we  shall  find 
that  the  attempts  at  conceiving  them  (for  they  must  admit  of 
being  conceived)  will  furnish  afterwards  an  excellent  test  of  our 
new  method  of  thought,  according  to  which  we  do  not  know  of 
things  anything  a priori  except  what  we  ourselves  put  into 
them.1 

This  experiment  succeeds  as  well  as  we  could  desire,  and 
promises  to  metaphysic,  in  its  first  part,  which  deals  with  con- 
cepts a priori,  of  which  the  corresponding  objects  may  be  given 
in  experience,  the  secure  method  of  a science.  For  by  [p.  xix] 
thus  changing  our  point  of  view,  the  possibility  of  knowledge 
a priori  can  well  be  explained,  and,  what  is  still  more,  the  laws 
which  a priori  lie  at  the  foundation  of  nature,  as  the  sum  total 
of  the  objects  of  experience,  may  be  supplied  with  satisfactory 
proofs,  neither  of  which  was  possible  with  the  procedure  hitherto 

1 This  method,  borrowed  from  the  student  of  nature,  consists  in  our  looking 
for  the  elements  of  pure  reason  in  that  which  can  be  confirmed  or  refuted  by 
experiment.  Now  it  is  impossible,  in  order  to  test  the  propositions  of  pure 
reason,  particularly  if  they  venture  beyond  all  the  limits  of  possible  experience, 
to  make  any  experiment  with  their  objects  (as  in  natural  science)  ; we  can 
therefore  only  try  with  concepts  and  propositions  which  we  admit  a priori,  by 
so  contriving  that  the  same  objects  may  be  considered  on  one  side  as  objects 
of  the  senses  and  of  the  understanding  in  experience,  and,  on  the  other,  as 
objects  which  are  only  thought,  intended,  it  may  be,  for  the  isolated  reason 
which  strives  to  go  beyond  all  the  limits  of  experience.  This  gives  us  two 
different  sides  to  be  looked  at ; and  if  we  find  that,  by  looking  on  things  from 
that  twofold  point  of  view,  there  is  an  agreement  with  the  principle  of  pure 
reason,  while  by  admitting  one  point  of  view  only,  there  arises  an  inevitable 
conflict  with  reason,  then  the  experiment  decides  in  favour  of  the  correctness 
of  that  distinction. 


Supplement  II 


695 


adopted.  But  there  arises  from  this  deduction  of  our  faculty  of 
knowing  a priori,  as  given  in  the  first  part  of  metaphysic,  a some 
what  startling  result,  apparently  most  detrimental  to  the  objects 
of  metaphysic  that  have  to  be  treated  in  the  second  part,  namely, 
the  impossibility  of  going  with  it  beyond  the  frontier  of  possible 
experience,  which  is  precisely  the  most  essential  purpose  [p.  xx] 
of  metaphysical  science.  But  here  we  have  exactly  the  experi- 
ment which,  by  disproving  the  opposite,  establishes  the  truth  of 
our  first  estimate  of  the  knowledge  of  reason  a priori,  namely, 
that  it  can  refer  to  phenomena  only,  but  must  leave  the  thing 
by  itself  as  unknown  to  us,  though  as  existing  by  itself.  For  that 
which  impels  us  by  necessity  to  go  beyond  the  limits  of  experience 
and  of  all  phenomena,  is  the  unconditioned,  which  reason  postu- 
lates in  all  things  by  themselves,  by  necessity  and  by  right,  for 
everything  conditioned,  so  that  the  series  of  conditions  should 
thus  become  complete.  If  then  we  find  that,  under  the  supposi- 
tion of  our  experience  conforming  to  the  objects  as  things  by 
themselves,  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  the  unconditioned  without 
contradiction,  while,  under  the  supposition  of  our  representation 
of  things,  as  they  are  given  to  us,  not  conforming  to  them  as 
things  by  themselves,  but,  on  the  contrary,  of  the  objects  con- 
forming to  our  mode  of  representation,  that  contradiction  van- 
ishes, and  that  therefore  the  unconditioned  must  not  be  looked 
for  in  things,  so  far  as  we  know  them  (so  far  as  they  are  given 
to  us),  but  only  so  far  as  we  do  not  know  them  (as  things  by 
themselves),  we  clearly  perceive  that,  what  we  at  first  assumed 
tentatively  only,  is  fully  confirmed.1  But,  after  all  [p.  xxi] 
progress  in  the  field  of  the  supersensuous  has  thus  been  denied 

1 This  experiment  of  pure  reason  has  a great  similarity  with  that  of  the  chem- 
ists, which  they  sometimes  call  the  experiment  of  reduction,  or  the  synthetical 
process  in  general.  The  analysis  of  the  metaphysician  divided  pure  know- 
ledge a priori  into  two  very  heterogeneous  elements,  namely,  the  knowledge 
of  things  as  phenomena  and  of  things  by  themselves.  Dialectic  combines 
these  two  again,  to  bring  them  into  harmony  with  the  necessary  idea  of  the 
unconditioned,  demanded  by  reason,  and  then  finds  that  this  harmony  can 
never  be  obtained,  except  through  the  above  distinction,  which  therefore  must 
De  supposed  to  be  true. 


6g6 


Supplement  II 


to  speculative  reason,  it  is  still  open  to  us  to  see,  whether  in  the 
practical  knowledge  of  reason  data  may  not  be  found  which 
enable  us  to  determine  that  transcendent  concept  of  the  uncon- 
ditioned which  is  demanded  by  reason,  in  order  thus,  according 
to  the  wish  of  metaphysic,  to  get  beyond  the  limits  of  all  possible 
experience,  by  means  of  our  knowledge  a priori,  which  is  possible 
to  us  for  practical  purposes  only.  In  this  case,  speculative  reason 
has  at  least  gained  for  us  room  for  such  an  extension  of  know- 
ledge, though  it  had  to  leave  it  empty,  so  that  we  are  not  only 
at  liberty,  but  are  really  called  upon  to  fill  it  up,  if  we  are  able, 
by  practical  data  of  reason.1  [p.  xxii] 

The  very  object  of  the  critique  of  pure  speculative  reason 
consists  in  this  attempt  at  changing  the  old  procedure  of  meta- 
physic, and  imparting  to  it  the  secure  method  of  a science,  after 
having  completely  revolutionised  it,  following  the  example  of 
geometry  and  physical  science.  That  critique  is  a treatise  on 
the  method  ( Traite  de  la  methode),  not  a system  of  the  science 
itself ; but  it  marks  out  nevertheless  the  whole  plan  of  that 
science,  both  with  regard  to  its  limits,  and  to  its  internal  organi- 
sation. For  pure  speculative  reason  has  this  peculiar  [p.  xxiii] 
advantage  that  it  is  able,  nay,  bound  to  measure  its  own  powers, 
according  to  the  different  ways  in  which  it  chooses  its  own  objects, 
and  to  completely  enumerate  the  different  ways  of  choosing  prob- 
lems ; thus  tracing  a complete  outline  of  a system  of  metaphysic. 

1 In  the  same  manner  the  laws  of  gravity,  determining  the  movements  of 
the  heavenly  bodies,  imparted  the  character  of  established  certainty  to  what 
Copernicus  had  assumed  at  first  as  an  hypothesis  only,  and  proved  at  the  same 
time  the  invisible  force  (the  Newtonian  attraction)  which  holds  the  universe 
together,  which  would  have  remained  for  ever  undiscovered,  if  Copernicus  had 
not  dared,  by  an  hypothesis,  which,  though  contradicting  the  senses,  was  yet 
true,  to  seek  the  observed  movements,  not  in  the  heavenly  bodies,  but  in  the 
spectator.  I also  propose  in  this  preface  my  own  view  of  metaphysics,  which 
has  so  many  analogies  with  the  Copernican  hypothesis,  as  an  hypothesis  only, 
though,  in  the  Critique  itself,  it  is  proved  by  means  of  our  representations  of 
space  and  time,  and  the  elementary  concepts  of  the  understanding,  not  hypo- 
thetically, but  apodictically;  for  I wish  that  people  should  observe  the  -first 
attempts  at  such  a change,  which  must  always  be  hypothetical. 


Supplement  II 


697 


This  is  due  to  the  fact  that,  with  regard  to  the  first  point,  nothing 
can  be  attributed  to  objects  in  knowledge  a priori,  except  what 
the  thinking  subject  takes  from  within  itself ; while,  with  regard 
to  the  second  point,  reason,  so  far  as  its  principles  of  cognition 
are  concerned,  forms  a separate  and  independent  unity,  in  which, 
as  in  an  organic  body,  every  member  exists  for  the  sake  of  all 
others,  and  all  others  exist  for  the  sake  of  the  one,  so  that  no 
principle  can  be  safely  applied  in  one  relation,  unless  it  has  been 
carefully  examined  in  all  its  relations,  to  the  whole  employment 
of  pure  reason.  Hence,  too,  metaphysic  has  this  singular  advan- 
tage, an  advantage  which  cannot  be  shared  by  any  other  science, 
in  which  reason  has  to  deal  with  objects  (for  Logie  deals  only 
with  the  form  of  thought  in  general)  that,  if  it  has  once  attained, 
by  means  of  this  critique,  to  the  secure  method  of  a science,  it 
can  completely  comprehend  the  whole  field  of  know-  [p.  xxiv] 
ledge  pertaining  to  it,  and  thus  finish  its  work  and  leave  it  to 
posterity,  as  a capital  that  can  never  be  added  to,  because  it 
has  only  to  deal  with  principles  and  the  limits  of  their  employ- 
ment, which  are  fixed  by  those  principles  themselves.  And  this 
completeness  becomes  indeed  an  obligation,  if  it  is  to  be  a 
fundamental  science,  of  which  we  must  be  able  to  say,  ‘ nil  actum 
reputans , si  quid  superesset  agendum.' 

But  it  will  be  asked,  what  kind  of  treasure  is  it  which  we  mean 
to  bequeath  to  posterity  in  this  metaphysic  of  ours,  after  it  has 
been  purified  by  criticism,  and  thereby  brought  to  a permanent 
condition  ? After  a superficial  view  of  this  work,  it  may  seem  that 
its  advantage  is  negative  only,  warning  us  against  venturing  with 
speculative  reason  beyond  the  limits  of  experience.  Such  is  no 
doubt  its  primary  use  : but  it  becomes  positive , when  we  perceive 
that  the  principles  with  which  speculative  reason  ventures  beyond 
its  limits,  lead  inevitably,  not  to  an  extension,  but,  if  carefully  con- 
sidered, to  a narrowing  of  the  employment  of  reason,  because,  by 
indefinitely  extending  the  limits  of  sensibility,  to  which  [p.  xxv] 
they  properly  belong,  they  threaten  entirely  to  supplant  the  pure 
(practical)  employment  of  reason.  Hence  our  critique,  by  limit- 
ing sensibility  to  its  proper  sphere,  is  no  doubt  negative ; but  by 
thus  removing  an  impediment,  which  threatened  to  narrow,  or 


6g8 


Supplement  II 


even  entirely  to  destroy  its  practical  employment,  it  is  in  reality 
of  positive,  and  of  very  important  use,  if  only  we  are  convinced 
that  there  is  an  absolutely  necessary  practical  use  of  pure  reason 
(the  moral  use),  in  which  reason  must  inevitably  go  beyond  the 
limits  of  sensibility,  and  though  not  requiring  for  this  purpose  the 
assistance  of  speculative  reason,  must  at  all  events  be  assured 
against  its  opposition,  lest  it  be  brought  in  conflict  with  itself. 
To  deny  that  this  service,  which  is  rendered  by  criticism,  is  a 
positive  advantage,  would  be  the  same  as  to  deny  that  the  police 
confers  upon  us  any  positive  advantage,  its  principal  occupation 
being  to  prevent  violence,  which  citizens  have  to  apprehend  from 
citizens,  so  that  each  may  pursue  his  vocation  in  peace  and  secu- 
rity. We  had  established  in  the  analytical  part  of  our  critique  the 
following  points  : — First,  that  space  and  time  are  only  forms  of 
sensuous  intuition,  therefore  conditions  of  the  existence  of  things, 
as  phenomena  only  ; Secondly,  that  we  have  no  concepts  of  the 
understanding,  and  therefore  nothing  whereby  we  can  arrive  at 
the  knowledge  of  things,  except  in  so  far  as  an  intuition  [p.  xxvi] 
corresponding  to  these  concepts  can  be  given,  and  consequently 
that  we  cannot  have  knowledge  of  any  object,  as  a thing  by  itself, 
but  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  an  object  of  sensuous  intuition,  that  is,  a 
phenomenon.  This  proves  no  doubt  that  all  speculative  know- 
ledge of  reason  is  limited  to  objects  of  experience ; but  it  should 
be  carefully  borne  in  mind,  that  this  leaves  it  perfectly  open  to  us, 
to  think  the  same  objects  as  things  by  themselves,  though  we  can- 
not know  them.1  For  otherwise  we  should  arrive  at  the  absurd 
conclusion,  that  there  is  phenomenal  appearance  with-  [p.  xxvii] 

1 In  order  to  know  an  object,  I must  be  able  to  prove  its  possibility,  either 
from  its  reality,  as  attested  by  experience,  or  a priori  by  means  of  reason. 
But  I can  think  whatever  I please,  provided  only  I do  not  contradict  my- 
self, that  is,  provided  my  conception  is  a possible  thought,  though  I may 
be  unable  to  answer  for  the  existence  of  a corresponding  object  in  the  sum 
total  of  all  possibilities.  Before  I can  attribute  to  such  a concept  objective 
reality  (real  possibility,  as  distinguished  from  the  former,  which  is  purely  logi- 
cal), something  more  is  required.  This  something  more,  however,  need  not 
be  sought  for  in  the  sources  of  theoretical  knowledge,  for  it  may  be  found  in 
those  of  practical  knowledge  also. 


Supplement  II 


6 99 


out  something  that  appears.  Let  us  suppose  that  the  necessary 
distinction,  established  in  our  critique,  between  things  as  objects 
of  experience  and  the  same  things  by  themselves,  had  not  been 
made.  In  that  case,  the  principle  of  causality,  and  with  it  the 
mechanism  of  nature,  as  determined  by  it,  would  apply  to  all 
things  in  general,  as  efficient  causes.  I should  then  not  be  able 
to  say  of  one  and  the  same  being,  for  instance  the  human  soul, 
that  its  will  is  free,  and,  at  the  same  time,  subject  to  the  necessity 
of  nature,  that  is,  not  free,  without  involving  myself  in  a palpable 
contradiction  : and  this  because  I had  taken  the  soul,  in  both  prop- 
ositions, in  one  and  the  same  sense,  namely,  as  a thing  in  general 
(as  something  by  itself) , as,  without  previous  criticism,  I could 
not  but  take  it.  If,  however,  our  criticism  was  true,  in  teaching 
us  to  take  an  object  in  two  senses,  namely,  either  as  a phenom- 
enon, or  as  a thing  by  itself,  and  if  the  deduction  of  our  concepts 
of  the  understanding  was  correct,  and  the  principle  of  causality 
applies  to  things  only,  if  taken  in  the  first  sense,  namely,  so  far  as 
they  are  objects  of  experience,  but  not  to  things,  if  taken  in  their 
second  sense,  we  can,  without  any  contradiction,  think  the  same 
will  when  phenomenal  (in  visible  actions)  as  necessarily  [p.  xxviii] 
conforming  to  the  law  of  nature,  and  so  far,  not  free,  and  yet,  on 
the  other  hand,  when  belonging  to  a thing  by  itself,  as  not  subject 
to  that  law  of  nature,  and  therefore  free.  Now  it  is  quite  true 
that  I may  not  know  my  soul,  as  a thing  by  itself,  by  means  of 
speculative  reason  (still  less  through  empirical  observation),  and 
consequently  may  not  know  freedom  either,  as  the  quality  of  a be- 
ing to  which  I attribute  effects  in  the  world  of  sense,  because,  in 
order  to  do  this,  I should  have  to  know  such  a being  as  determined 
in  its  existence,  and  yet  as  not  determined  in  time  (which,  as  I 
cannot  provide  my  concept  with  any  intuition,  is  impossible). 
This,  however,  does  not  prevent  me  from  thinking  freedom  ; that 
is,  my  representation  of  it  contains  at  least  no  contradiction 
within  itself,  if  only  our  critical  distinction  of  the  two  modes  of 
representation  (the  sensible  and  the  intelligible),  and  the  conse- 
quent limitation  of  the  concepts  of  the  pure  understanding,  and  of 
the  principles  based  on  them,  has  been  properly  carried  out.  If, 
then,  morality  necessarily  presupposed  freedom  (in  the  strictest 


/OO 


Supplement  II 


sense)  as  a property  of  our  will,  producing,  as  a priori  data  of  it, 
practical  principles,  belonging  originally  to  our  reason,  which,  with- 
out freedom,  would  be  absolutely  impossible,  while  speculative 
reason  had  proved  that  such  a freedom  cannot  even  [p.  xxix] 
be  thought,  the  former  supposition,  namely,  the  moral  one,  would 
necessarily  have  to  yield  to  another,  the  opposite  of  which  in- 
volves a palpable  contradiction,  so  that  freedom,  and  with  it 
morality  (for  its  opposite  contains  no  contradiction,  unless  free- 
dom is  presupposed),  would  have  to  make  room  for  the  mechan- 
ism of  nature.  Now,  however,  as  morality  requires  nothing  but 
that  freedom  should  only  not  contradict  itself,  and  that,  though 
unable  to  understand,  we  should  at  least  be  able  to  think  it,  there 
being  no  reason  why  freedom  should  interfere  with  the  natural 
mechanism  of  the  same  act  (if  only  taken  in  a different  sense), 
the  doctrine  of  morality  may  well  hold  its  place,  and  the  doctrine 
of  nature  may  hold  its  place  too,  which  would  have  been  impossi- 
ble, if  our  critique  had  not  previously  taught  us  our  inevitable 
ignorance  with  regard  to  things  by  themselves,  and  limited  every- 
thing, which  we  are  able  to  know  theoretically,  to  mere  phenom- 
ena. The  same  discussion  as  to  the  positive  advantage  to  be 
derived  from  the  critical  principles  of  pure  reason  might  be  re- 
peated with  regard  to  the  concept  of  God,  and  of  the  simple  nature 
of  our  soul ; but,  for  the  sake  of  brevity,  I shall  pass  this  by.  I 
am  not  allowed  therefore  even  to  assume,  for  the  sake  [p.  xxx] 
of  the  necessary  practical  employment  of  my  reason,  God,  freedom, 
and  immortality,  if  I cannot  deprive  speculative  reason  of  its  pre- 
tensions to  transcendent  insights,  because  reason,  in  order  to 
arrive  at  these,  must  use  principles  which  are  intended  originally 
for  objects  of  possible  experience  only,  and  which,  if  in  spite  of 
this,  they  are  applied  to  what  cannot  be  an  object  of  experience, 
really  changes  this  into  a phenomenon,  thus  rendering  all  practical 
extension  of  pure  reason  impossible.  I had  therefore  to  remove 
knowledge,  in  order  to  make  room  for  belief.  For  the  dogmatism 
of  metaphysic,  that  is,  the  presumption  that  it  is  possible  to 
achieve  anything  in  metaphysic  without  a previous  criticism  of 
pure  reason,  is  the  source  of  all  that  unbelief,  which  is  always  very 
dogmatical,  and  wars  against  all  morality. 


Supplement  II 


701 


If,  then,  it  may  not  be  too  difficult  to  leave  a bequest  to  pos- 
terity, in  the  shape  of  a systematical  metaphysic,  carried  out 
according  to  the  critique  of  pure  reason,  such  a bequest  is  not  to 
be  considered  therefore  as  of  little  value,  whether  we  regard  the 
improvement  which  reason  receives  through  the  secure  method 
of  a science,  in  place  of  its  groundless  groping  and  uncritical 
vagaries,  or  whether  we  look  to  the  better  employment  [p.  xxxi] 
of  the  time  of  our  enquiring  youth,  who,  if  brought  up  in  the 
ordinary  dogmatism,  are  early  encouraged  to  indulge  in  easy 
speculations  on  things  of  which  they  know  nothing,  and  of  which 
they,  as  little  as  anybody  else,  will  ever  understand  anything ; 
neglecting  the  acquirement  of  sound  knowledge,  while  bent  on 
the  discovery  of  new  metaphysical  thoughts  and  opinions.  The 
greatest  benefit  however  will  be,  that  such  a work  will  enable  us 
to  put  an  end  for  ever  to  all  objections  to  morality  and  religion, 
according  to  the  Socratic  method,  namely,  by  the  clearest  proof 
of  the  ignorance  of  our  opponents.  Some  kind  of  metaphysic  has 
always  existed,  and  will  always  exist,  and  with  it  a dialectic  of  pure 
reason,  as  being  natural  to  it.  It  is  therefore  the  first  and  most 
important  task  of  philosophy  to  deprive  metaphysic,  once  for  all, 
of  its  pernicious  influence,  by  closing  up  the  sources  of  its  errors. 

In  spite  of  these  important  changes  in  the  whole  field  of  science, 
and  of  the  losses  which  speculative  reason  must  suffer  in  its  fancied 
possessions,  all  general  human  interests,  and  all  the  [p.  xxxii] 
advantages  which  the  world  hitherto  derived  from  the  teachings 
of  pure  reason,  remain  just  the  same  as  before.  The  loss,  if  any, 
affects  only  the  monopoly  of  the  schools,  and  by  no  means  the 
interests  of  humanity.  I appeal  to  the  staunchest  dogmatist, 
whether  the  proof  of  the  continued  existence  of  our  soul  after 
death,  derived  from  the  simplicity  of  the  substance,  or  that  of  the 
freedom  of  the  will,  as  opposed  to  the  general  mechanism  of  nat- 
ure, derived  from  the  subtle,  but  inefficient,  distinction  between 
subjective  and  objective  practical  necessity,  or  that  of  the  existence 
of  God,  derived  from  the  concept  of  an  Ens  realissimum  (the  con- 
tingency of  the  changeable,  and  the  necessity  of  a prime  mover), 
have  ever,  after  they  had  been  started  by  the  schools,  penetrated 
the  public  mind,  or  exercised  the  slightest  influence  on  its  con- 


702 


Supplement  II 


victions  ? If  this  has  not  been,  and  in  fact  could  not  be  so,  on 
account  of  the  unfitness  of  the  ordinary  understanding  for  such 
subtle  speculations ; and  if,  on  the  contrary,  with  regard  to  the 
first  point,  the  hope  of  a future  life  has  chiefly  rested  on  that 
peculiar  character  of  human  nature,  never  to  be  satisfied  by  what 
is  merely  temporal  (and  insufficient,  therefore,  for  the  character 
of  its  whole  destination)  ; if  with  regard  to  the  second,  the  clear 
consciousness  of  freedom  was  produced  only  by  the  [p.  xxxiii] 
clear  exhibition  of  duties  in  opposition  to  all  the  claims  of  sensu- 
ous desires  ; and  if,  lastly,  with  regard  to  the  third,  the  belief  in  a 
great  and  wise  Author  of  the  world  has  been  supported  entirely 
by  the  wonderful  beauty,  order,  and  providence,  everywhere  dis- 
played in  nature,  then  this  possession  remains  not  only  undis- 
turbed, but  acquires  even  greater  authority,  because  the  schools 
have  now  been  taught,  not  to  claim  for  themselves  any  higher  or 
fuller  insight  on  a point  which  concerns  general  human  interests, 
than  what  is  equally  within  the  reach  of  the  great  mass  of  men, 
and  to  confine  themselves  to  the  elaboration  of  these  universally 
comprehensible,  and,  for  moral  purposes,  quite  sufficient  proofs. 
The  change  therefore  affects  the  arrogant  pretensions  of  the 
schools  only,  which  would  fain  be  considered  as  the  only  judges 
and  depositaries  of  such  truth  (as  they  are,  no  doubt,  with  regard 
to  many  other  subjects),  allowing  to  the  public  its  use  only,  and 
trying  to  keep  the  key  to  themselves,  quod  mecum  nescit,  solus 
vult  scire  videri.  At  the  same  time  full  satisfaction  is  given  to 
the  more  moderate  claims  of  speculative  philosophers,  [p.  xxxiv] 
They  still  remain  the  exclusive  depositors  of  a science  which  bene- 
fits the  masses  without  their  knowing  it,  namely,  the  critique  of 
reason.  That  critique  can  never  become  popular,  nor  does  it  need 
to  be  so,  because,  if  on  the  one  side  the  public  has  no  understanding 
for  the  fine-drawn  arguments  in  support  of  useful  truths,  it  is  not 
troubled  on  the  other  by  the  equally  subtle  objections.  It  is  dif- 
ferent with  the  schools  which,  in  the  same  way  as  every  man  who  has 
once  risen  to  the  height  of  speculation,  must  know  both  the  pro’s 
and  the  con’s  and  are  bound,  by  means  of  a careful  investigation 
of  the  rights  of  speculative  reason,  to  prevent,  once  for  all,  the 
scandal  which,  sooner  or  later,  is  sure  to  be  caused  even  to  the 


Supplement  II 


703 


masses,  by  the  quarrels  in  which  metaphysicians  (and  as  such, 
theologians  also)  become  involved,  if  ignorant  of  our  critique,  and 
by  which  their  doctrine  becomes  in  the  end  entirely  perverted. 
Thus,  and  thus  alone,  can  the  very  root  be  cut  off  of  materialis?n, 
fatalism,  a theism , free-  thinking,  unbelief,  fa?iaticism,  and  supersti- 
tion, which  may  become  universally  injurious,  and  finally  of  ideal- 
ism and  scepticism  also,  which  are  dangerous  rather  to  the  schools, 
and  can  scarcely  ever  penetrate  into  the  public.  If  [p.  xxxv] 
governments  think  proper  ever  to  interfere  with  the  affairs  of  the 
learned,  it  would  be  far  more  consistent  with  their  wise  regard  for 
science  as  well  as  for  society,  to  favour  the  freedom  of  such  a criti- 
cism by  which  alone  the  labours  of  reason  can  be  established  on 
a firm  footing,  than  to  support  the  ridiculous  despotism  of  the 
schools,  which  raise  a loud  clamour  of  public  danger,  whenever 
the  cobwebs  are  swept  away  of  which  the  public  has  never  taken 
the  slightest  notice,  and  the  loss  of  which  it  can  therefore  never 
perceive. 

Our  critique  is  not  opposed  to  the  dogmatical  procedure  of 
reason,  as  a science  of  pure  knowledge  (for  this  must  always  be 
dogmatical,  that  is,  derive  its  proof  from  sure  principles  a priori ), 
but  to  dogmatism  only,  that  is,  to  the  presumption  that  it  is  possi- 
ble to  make  any  progress  with  pure  (philosophical)  knowledge, 
consisting  of  concepts,  and  guided  by  principles,  such  as  reason 
has  long  been  in  the  habit  of  employing,  without  first  enquiring 
in  what  way,  and  by  what  right,  it  has  come  possessed  of  them. 
Dogmatism  is  therefore  the  dogmatical  procedure  of  pure  reason, 
without  a previous  criticism  of  its  own  powers  ; and  our  opposition 
to  this  is  not  intended  to  defend  either  that  loquacious  [p.  xxxvi] 
shallowness  which  arrogates  to  itself  the  good  name  of  popularity, 
much  less  that  scepticism  which  makes  short  work  with  the  whole 
of  metaphysic.  On  the  contrary,  our  critique  is  meant  to  form  a 
necessary  preparation  in  support  of  a thoroughly  scientific  system 
of  metaphysic,  which  must  necessarily  be  carried  out  dogmatically 
and  strictly  systematically,  so  as  to  satisfy  all  the  demands,  not  so 
much  of  the  public  at  large,  as  of  the  schools,  this  being  an  indis- 
pensable condition,  as  it  has  undertaken  to  carry  out  its  work 
entirely  a priori,  and  thus  to  the  complete  satisfaction  of  specula- 


704 


Supplement  II 


tive  reason.  In  the  execution  of  this  plan,  as  traced  out  by  the 
critique,  that  is,  in  a future  system  of  metaphysic,  we  shall  have 
to  follow  in  the  strict  method  of  the  celebrated  Wolf,  the  greatest 
of  all  dogmatic  philosophers,  who  first  showed  (and  by  his  example 
called  forth,  in  Germany,  that  spirit  of  thoroughness,  which  is  not 
yet  extinct)  how  the  secure  method  of  a science  could  be  attained 
only  by  a legitimate  establishment  of  principles,  a clear  definition 
of  concepts,  an  attempt  at  strictness  of  proof,  and  an  avoidance 
of  all  bold  combinations  in  concluding.  He  was  therefore  most 
eminently  qualified  to  raise  metaphysics  to  the  dignity  of  a science, 
if  it  had  only  occurred  to  him,  by  criticism  of  the  organum,  namely, 
of  pure  reason  itself,  first  to  prepare  his  field,- — -an  omission  to  be 
ascribed,  not  so  much  to  himself  as  to  the  dogmatical  [p.  xxxvii] 
spirit  of  his  age,  and  with  regard  to  which  the  philosophers  of  his 
own,  as  well  as  of  all  previous  times,  have  no  right  to  reproach 
each  other.  Those  who  reject,  at  the  same  time,  the  method  of 
Wolf,  and  the  procedure  of  the  critique  of  pure  reason,  can  have 
no  other  aim  but  to  shake  off  the  fetters  of  science  altogether,  and 
thus  to  change  work  into  play,  conviction  into  opinion,  and  phi- 
losophy into  philodoxy. 


With  regard  to  this  second  edition,  I have  tried,  as  was  but 
fair,  to  do  all  I could  in  order  to  remove,  as  far  as  possible,  the 
difficulties  and  obscurities  which,  not  perhaps  without  my  fault, 
have  misled  even  acute  thinkers  in  judging  of  my  book.  In  the 
propositions  themselves,  and  their  proofs,  likewise  in  the  form  and 
completeness  of  the  whole  plan,  I have  found  nothing  to  alter, 
which  is  due  partly  to  the  long-continued  examination  to  which 
I had  subjected  them,  before  submitting  them  to  the  public,  and 
partly  to  the  nature  of  the  subject  itself.  For  pure  speculative 
reason  is  so  constituted  that  it  forms  a true  organism,  in  which 
everything  is  organic,  the  whole  being  there  for  the  [p.  xxxviii] 
sake  of  every  part,  and  every  part  for  the  sake  of  the  whole,  so 
that  the  smallest  imperfection,  whether  a fault  or  a deficiency, 
must  inevitably  betray  itself  in  use.  I venture  to  hope  that  this 


Supplement  II 


705 


system  will  maintain  itself  unchanged  for  the  future  also.  It  is 
not  self-conceit  which  justifies  me  in  this  confidence,  but  the 
experimental  evidence  produced  by  the  identity  of  the  result, 
whether  we  proceed  progressively  from  the  smallest  elements  to 
the  whole  of  pure  reason,  or  retrogressively  from  the  whole  (for 
this  also  is  given  by  the  practical  objects  of  reason)  to  every 
single  part ; the  fact  being,  that  an  attempt  at  altering  even  the 
smallest  item  produces  at  once  contradictions,  not  only  in  the 
system,  but  in  human  reason  in  general.  With  regard  to  the  style, 
however,  much  remains  to  be  done  ; and  for  that  purpose,  I have 
endeavoured  to  introduce  several  improvements  into  this  second 
edition,  which  are  intended  to  remove,  first,  misapprehensions  in 
the  ^Esthetic,  especially  with  regard  to  the  concept  of  time  : 
secondly,  obscurities  in  the  deduction  of  the  concepts  of  the 
understanding  : thirdly,  a supposed  want  of  sufficient  evidence,  in 
proving  the  propositions  of  the  pure  understanding  : fourthly,  the 
false  interpretation  put  on  the  paralogisms  with  which  we  charged 
rational  psychology.  To  this  point  (only  to  the  end  of  the  first 
chapter  of  transcendental  Dialectic)  do  the  changes  [p.  xxxix] 
of  style  and  representation  1 extend,  and  no  further.  Time  was 

1 The  only  thing  which  might  be  called  an  addition,  though  in  the  method 
of  proof  only,  is  the  new  refutation  of  psychological  idealism,  and  the  strict 
(and  as  I believe  the  only  possible)  proof  of  the  objective  reality  of  external 
phenomena  on  p.  275  (Suppl.  XXI).  That  idealism  may  be  considered  entirely 
innocent  with  respect  to  the  essential  aims  of  metaphysic  (though  it  is  not  so  in 
reality),  yet  it  remains  a scandal  to  philosophy,  and  to  human  reason  in  general, 
that  we  should  have  to  accept  the  existence  of  things  without  us  (from  which 
we  derive  the  whole  material  of  knowledge  for  our  own  internal  sense)  on  faith 
only,  unable  to  meet  with  any  satisfactory  proof  an  opponent,  who  is  pleased 
to  doubt  it.  (See  p.  476.)  It  will  probably  be  urged  against  this  proof 
that,  after  all,  I am  immediately  conscious  of  that  only  which  is  within  me, 
that  is,  of  my  representation  of  external  things,  and  that  consequently  it  must 
still  remain  uncertain  whether  there  be  outside  me  anything  corresponding  to  it 
or  not.  But  by  internal  experience  I am  conscious  of  my  existence  in  [p.  xl] 
time  (consequently  also,  of  its  determinability  in  time);  and  this  is  more  than 
to  be  conscious  of  my  representation  only,  and  yet  identical  with  the  empirical 
consciousness  of  my  existence , which  can  be  itself  determined  only  by  something 
connected  with  my  existence,  yet  outside  me.  This  consciousness  of  my  exist- 
ence in  time  is  therefore  connected  as  identical  with  the  consciousness  of  relation 


7 o6 


Supplement  II 


too  short  for  doing  more,  nor  did  I,  with  regard  to  the  [p.  xl] 
rest,  meet  with  any  misapprehensions  on  the  part  of  [p.  xli] 
competent  and  impartial  judges.  These,  even  though  I must  not 
name  them  with  that  praise  which  is  due  to  them,  will  easily  per- 
ceive in  the  proper  place,  that  I have  paid  careful  attention  to 
their  remarks.  [p.  xlii] 

to  something  outside  me;  so  that  it  is  experience,  and  not  fiction,  sense,  and 
not  imagination,  which  indissolubly  connects  the  external  with  my  internal  sense. 
The  external  sense  is  by  itself  a relation  of  intuition  to  something  real  outside 
me;  and  its  real,  in  contradistinction  to  a purely  imaginary  character,  rests 
entirely  on  its  being  indissolubly  connected  with  internal  experience,  as  being 
the  condition  of  its  possibility.  This  is  what  happens  here.  If  with  the  intel- 
lectual consciousness  of  my  existence  in  the  representation,  I am,  which  accom- 
panies all  my  judgments  and  all  acts  of  my  understanding,  I could  at  the  same 
time  connect  a determination  of  that  existence  of  mine  by  means  of  intellectual 
intuition , then  that  determination  would  not  require  the  consciousness  of  rela- 
tion to  something  outside  me.  But  although  that  intellectual  consciousness 
comes  first,  the  inner  intuition,  in  which  alone  any  existence  can  be  determined, 
is  sensuous  and  dependent  on  the  condition  of  time;  and  that  determination 
again,  and  therefore  internal  experience  itself,  depends  on  something  perma- 
nent which  is  not  within  me,  consequently  on  something  outside  me  only,  to 
which  I must  consider  myself  as  standing  in  a certain  relation.  Hence  the 
reality  of  the  external  sense  is  necessarily  connected,  in  order  to  make  experi- 
ence possible  at  all,  with  the  reality  of  the  internal  sense;  that  is,  I am  con- 
scious, with  the  same  certainty,  that  there  are  things  outside  me  which  have  a 
reference  to  my  sense,  as  that  I exist  myself  in  time.  In  order  to  ascertain  to 
what  given  intuitions  objects  outside  me  really  correspond  (these  intuitions 
belonging  to  the  external  sense,  and  not  to  the  faculty  of  imagination),  we  must 
in  each  single  case  apply  the  rules  according  to  which  experience  in  general 
(even  internal)  is  distinguished  from  imaginations,  the  proposition  that  there 
really  is  an  external  experience  being  always  taken  for  granted.  It  may  be  well 
to  add  here  the  remark  that  the  representation  of  something  permanent  in  exist- 
ence is  not  the  same  as  a permanent  representation ; for  this  (the  representation 
of  something  permanent  in  existence)  can  change  and  alternate,  as  all  our  rep- 
resentations, even  those  of  matter,  and  may  yet  refer  to  something  permanent, 
which  must  therefore  be  something  external,  and  different  from  all  my  rep- 
resentations, the  existence  of  which  is  necessarily  involved  in  the  determination 
of  my  own  existence,  and  constitutes  with  it  but  one  experience,  which  could 
never  take  place  internally,  unless  (in  part)  it  were  external  also.  The  how 
admits  here  of  as  little  explanation  as  the  permanent  in  time  in  general,  the 
co-existence  of  which  with  the  variable  produces  the  concept  of  change. 


Supplement  II 


707 


These  improvements,  however,  entail  a small  loss  to  the  reader. 
It  was  inevitable,  without  making  the  book  too  voluminous,  to 
leave  out  or  abridge  several  passages  which,  though  not  essential 
to  the  completeness  of  the  whole,  may  yet,  as  useful  for  other  pur- 
poses, be  missed  by  some  readers.  Thus  only  could  I gain  room 
for  my  new  and  more  intelligible  representation  of  the  subject 
which,  though  it  changes  absolutely  nothing  with  regard  to  propo- 
sitions, and  even  to  proofs,  yet  deviates  so  considerably  from  the 
former,  in  the  method  of  the  treatment  here  and  there,  that  mere 
additions  and  interpolations  would  not  have  been  sufficient.  This 
small  loss,  which  every  reader  may  easily  supply  by  reference  to 
the  first  edition,  will  I hope  be  more  than  compensated  for  by  the 
greater  clearness  of  the  present. 

I have  observed  with  pleasure  and  thankfulness  in  various  pub- 
lications (containing  either  reviews  or  separate  essays)  that  the 
spirit  of  thoroughness  is  not  yet  dead  in  Germany,  but  has  only 
been  silenced  for  a short  time  by  the  clamour  of  a fashionable 
and  pretentious  licence  of  thought,  and  that  the  difficul-  [p.  xliii] 
ties  which  beset  the  thorny  path  of  my  critique,  which  is  to  lead 
to  a truly  scientific  and,  as  such,  permanent,  and  therefore  most 
necessary,  science  of  pure  reason,  have  not  discouraged  bold  and 
clear  heads  from  mastering  my  book.  To  these  excellent  men, 
who  so  happily  blend  thorough  knowledge  with  a talent  for  lucid 
exposition  (to  which  I can  lay  no  claim),  I leave  the  task  of  bring- 
ing my,  in  that  respect  far  from  perfect,  work  to  greater  perfec- 
tion. There  is  no  danger  of  its  being  refuted,  though  there  is  of 
its  being  misunderstood.  For  my  own  part,  I cannot  henceforth 
enter  on  controversies,  though  I shall  carefully  attend  to  all  hints, 
whether  from  friends  or  opponents,  in  order  to  utilise  them  in  a 
future  elaboration  of  the  whole  system,  according  to  the  plan 
traced  out  in  this  propaedeutic.  As  during  these  labours  I have 
advanced  pretty  far  in  years  (this  very  month,  into  my  sixty-fourth 
year) , I must  be  careful  in  spending  my  time,  if  I am  to  carry  out 
my  plan,  of  furnishing  a metaphysic  of  nature,  and  a metaphysic 
of  morals,  in  confirmation  of  the  truth  of  my  critique  both  of  spec- 
ulative and  of  practical  reason,  and  must  leave  the  elucidation 
of  such  obscurities  as  could  at  first  be  hardly  avoided  [p.  xliv] 


708 


Supplement  IT 


in  such  a work,  and  likewise  the  defence  of  the  whole,  to  those 
excellent  men  who  have  made  it  their  own.  At  single  points 
every  philosophical  treatise  may  be  pricked  (for  it  cannot  be 
armed  at  all  points,  like  a mathematical  one),  while  yet  the 
organic  structure  of  the  system,  considered  as  a whole,  has  not 
therefore  to  apprehend  the  slightest  danger.  Few  only  have  that 
pliability  of  intellect  to  take  in  the  whole  of  a system,  if  it  is  new ; 
still  fewer  have  an  inclination  for  it,  because  they  dislike  every 
innovation.  If  we  take  single  passages  out  of  their  connection, 
and  contrast  them  with  each  other,  it  is  easy  to  pick  out  apparent 
contradictions,  particularly  in  a work  written  with  all  the  freedom 
of  a running  speech.  In  the  eyes  of  those  who  rely  on  the  judg- 
ment of  others,  such  contradictions  may  throw  an  unfavourable 
light  on  any  work  ; but  they  are  easily  removed,  if  we  ourselves 
have  once  grasped  the  idea  of  the  whole.  And,  if  a theory  pos- 
sesses stability  in  itself,  then  this  action  and  reaction  of  praise 
and  blame,  which  at  first  seemed  so  dangerous,  serve  only  in  time 
to  rub  off  its  superficial  inequalities  : nay,  secure  to  it,  in  a short 
time,  the  requisite  elegance  also,  if  only  men  of  insight,  impar- 
tiality, and  true  popularity  will  devote  themselves  to  its  study. 

Konigsberg,  April,  1787. 


SUPPLEMENT  III 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

of  the  Second  Edition  (1787),  with  the  paging  of  that 

EDITION 


PAGE 

Introduction  ..........  1-30 

I.  Of  the  difference  between  pure  and  empirical  know- 
ledge   1 

II.  We  are  in  possession  of  certain  cognitions  a priori,  and 
even  the  ordinary  understanding  is  never  without 
them  ..........  3 

III.  Philosophy  requires  a science,  to  determine  the  possi- 

bility, the  principles,  and  the  extent  of  all  cognitions 
a priori  .........  6 

IV.  Of  the  difference  between  analytical  and  synthetical 

judgments  .........  10 

V.  In  all  theoretical  sciences  of  reason  synthetical  judg- 
ments a priori  are  contained  as  principles  . . . 14 

VI.  The  general  problem  of  pure  reason  ....  19 

VII.  Idea  and  division  of  an  independent  science  under  the 

name  of  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  ....  24 

I.  ELEMENTS  OF  TRANSCENDENTALISM  . . 31-732 

First  Part.  Transcendental  Esthetic  ....  33—73 

Introduction.  § 1 ........  33 

First  Section.  Of  Space.  § 2,  3 37 

Second  Section.  Of  Time.  § 4-7  ......  46 

General  Observations  on  transcendental  /Esthetic.  § 8 -59 

Conclusion  of  transcendental  .Esthetic 73 

709 


7io 


Supplement  III 


PAGE 

Second  Part.  Transcendental  Logic 74-732 

Introduction.  The  idea  of  a transcendental  Logic  . 74-88 

I.  Of  Logic  in  general  .......  74 

II.  Of  transcendental  Logic  ......  79 

III.  Of  the  division  of  general  Logic  into  analytical  and 

dialectical  82 

IV.  Of  the  division  of  transcendental  Logic  into  transcen- 

dental Analytic  and  Dialectic  ....  87 

First  Division.  Transcendental  Analytic  . . . 89-349 

First  Book.  Analytic  of  concepts  ....  90-169 

First  Chapter.  Method  of  discovering  all  pure  con- 
cepts of  the  understanding  .....  91 

First  Section.  Of  the  logical  use  of  the  understand- 
ing in  general  .......  92 

Second  Section.  Of  the  logical  function  of  the  under- 
standing in  judgments . §9  . . . -95 

Third  Section.  Of  the  pure  concepts  of  the  under- 
standing, or  of  the  Categories.  § 10-12  . . 102 

Second  Chapter.  Of  the  deduction  of  the  pure  con- 
cepts of  the  understanding  . . . . .116 

First  Section.  Of  the  principles  of  a transcendental 
deduction  in  general.  § 13  . . . .116 

Transition  to  a transcendental  deduction  of  the 

Categories.  § 14 .124 

Second  Section.  Transcendental  deduction  of  the 
pure  concepts  of  the  understanding.  § 15-27  . 129 

Second  Book.  Analytic  of  principles  (transcendental  doc- 
trine of  the  faculty  of  judgment)  . . . 169-349 

Introduction.  Of  the  transcendental  faculty  of  judg- 
ment in  general  . . . . . . -171 

First  Chapter.  Of  the  schematism  of  the  pure  con- 
cepts of  the  understanding  176 

Second  Chapter.  System  of  all  principles  of  the  pure 

understanding  .......  187 

First  Section.  Of  the  highest  principle  of  all  ana- 
lytical judgments  ......  189 

Second  Section.  Of  the  highest  principle  of  all 
synthetical  judgments  . . . . 193 

Third  Section.  Systematical  representation  of  all  syn- 
thetical principles  of  the  pure  understanding  197-294 


Supplement  III 


7 ii 


1 . Axioms  of  intuition 

2.  Anticipations  of  perception  .... 

3.  Analogies  of  experience  .... 

First  Analogy.  Principle  of  the  perma- 
nence of  substance  ..... 

Second  Analogy.  Principle  of  the  succes- 
sion of  time,  according  to  the  law  of 
causality  ....... 

Third  Analogy.  Principle  of  coexistence, 
according  to  the  law  of  reciprocity  . 

4.  Postulates  of  empirical  thought  in  general 
General  note  on  the  system  of  the  prin- 
ciples ....... 

Third  Chapter.  On  the  ground  of  distinction  of  all 
subjects  into  phenomena  and  noumena 
Appendix.  On  the  amphiboly  of  reflective  concepts 
owing  to  the  confusion  of  the  empirical  with  the  tran- 
scendental use  of  the  understanding 
Second  Division.  Transcendental  Dialectic 

Introduction  ....... 

I.  Of  transcendental  illusion 

II.  Of  pure  reason  as  the  seat  of  transcendental 
sion  ....... 

A.  Of  reason  in  general  . 

B.  Of  the  logical  use  of  reason 

C.  Of  the  pure  use  of  reason  . 

First  Book.  Of  the  concepts  of  pure  reason 

First  Section . Of  ideas  in  general 
Second  Section.  Of  transcendental  ideas 
Third  Section.  System  of  transcendental  ideas 
Second  Book.  Of  the  dialectical  conclusions  of  pure 

reason  ........  396-732 

First  Chapter.  Of  the  Paralogisms  of  pure  reason  . 399 

General  note  on  the  transition  from  rational  psychology 
to  cosmology  ...... 

Second  Chapter.  The  Antinomy  of  pure  reason 
First  Section.  System  of  cosmological  ideas 
Second  Section.  Antithetic  of  pure  reason 
First  Antinomy  ..... 

Second  Antinomy  .... 


207 

218 

224 


232 

256 

265 

288 

294 


316 

349-732 

349-366 

• 349 
illu- 

355 
355 
359 
362 
366 
368 
377 
39° 


428 

432 

435 

448 

454 

462 


7 12 


Supplement  III 


PAGE 


Third  Antinomy  ......  472 

Fourth  Antinomy  ......  480 

Third  Section.  Of  the  interest  of  reason  in  these 
conflicts  ........  490 

Fourth  Section.  Of  the  transcendental  problems  of 
pure  reason  and  the  absolute  necessity  of  their 
solution  ........  504 

Fifth  Section.  Sceptical  representation  of  the  cos- 
mological questions  in  the  four  transcendental 

ideas  . . 513 

Sixth  Section.  Transcendental  idealism  as  the  key 
to  the  solution  of  cosmological  Dialectic  . . 518 

Seventh  Section.  Critical  decision  of  the  cosmolog- 
ical conflict  of  reason  with  itself  ....  525 

Eighth  Section.  The  regulative  principle  of  pure 
reason  with  regard  to  the  cosmological  ideas  . 536 

Ninth  Section.  Of  the  empirical  use  of  the  regula- 
tive principle  of  reason  with  regard  to  all  cosmo- 
logical ideas  . 543 

I.  Solution  of  the  cosmological  idea  of  the 
totality  of  the  composition  of  phenomena 
of  an  universe  ......  545 

II.  Solution  of  the  cosmological  idea  of  the 
totality  of  the  division  of  a whole  given  in 
intuition  . 551 


Concluding  remarks  on  the  solution  of  the 
transcendental  mathematical  ideas,  and 
preliminary  remarks  for  the  solution  of  the 


transcendental  dynamical  ideas  . 556 

III.  Solution  of  the  cosmological  ideas  of  the 
totality  of  the  derivation  of  cosmical  events 
from  their  causes  .....  560 

Possibility  of  causality  through  freedom  . 566 

Explanation  of  the  cosmological  idea  of 
freedom  in  connection  with  the  general 
necessity  of  nature  .....  570 

IV.  Solution  of  the  cosmological  idea  of  the  to- 
tality of  the  dependence  of  phenomena 
with  regard  to  their  existence  in  gen- 
eral   587 


Supplement  III  713 

PAGE 

Concluding  remarks  on  the  whole  antinomy 
of  pure  reason  ......  593 

Third  Chapter.  The  ideal  of  pure  reason  . . . 595 

First  Section.  Of  the  ideal  in  general  . . . 595 

Second  Section.  Of  the  transcendental  ideal  . . 599 

Third  Section.  Of  the  arguments  of  speculative 
reason  in  proof  of  the  existence  of  a Supreme 

Being 61 1 

Fourth  Section.  Of  the  impossibility  of  an  onto- 
logical proof  of  the  existence  of  God  . . . 620 

Fifth  Section  Of  the  impossibility  of  a cosmolog- 
ical proof  of  the  existence  of  God  . . .631 

Discovery  and  explanation  of  the  dialectical  illusion 
in  all  transcendental  proofs  of  the  existence  of  a 
necessary  Being  .......  642 

Sixth  Section.  Of  the  impossibility  of  the  physico- 

theological  proof 648 

Seventh  Section.  Criticism  of  all  theology  based  on 
speculative  principles  of  reason  ....  659 

Appendix  to  the  transcendental  Dialectic  . . 670 

Of  the  regulative  use  of  the  ideas  of  pure 

reason  670 

Of  the  ultimate  aim  of  the  natural  Dialectic  of 
human  reason  ......  697 

II.  TRANSCENDENTAL  DOCTRINE  OF  METHOD  733-884 

Introduction  735 

First  Chapter.  The  discipline  of  pure  reason  . 736-823 

First  Section.  The  discipline  of  pure  reason  in  its 
dogmatical  use  .......  740 

Second  Section.  The  discipline  of  pure  reason  in  its 

polemical  use  766 

Of  the  impossibility  of  a sceptical  satisfaction  of  pure 
reason  in  conflict  with  itself  ....  786 

Third  Section.  The  discipline  of  pure  reason  with 
regard  to  the  hypotheses  .....  797 

Fourth  Section.  The  discipline  of  pure  reason  with 
regard  to  its  proofs  . . . . . .810 

Second  Chapter.  The  canon  of  pure  reason  . 823-884 

First  Section.  Of  the  ultimate  aim  of  the  pure  use 
of  our  reason 825 


Supplement  III 


7*4 


PAGE 


Second  Section.  Of  the  ideal  of  the  Summum 
Bonum , as  determining  the  ultimate  aim  of  Pure 
Reason  ........  832 

Third  Section.  Of  trowing,  knowing,  and  be- 
lieving   848 

Third  Chapter.  The  architectonic  of  pure  reason  . 860 

Fourth  Chapter.  The  history  of  pure  reason  . . 880 


SUPPLEMENT  IV 

[See  page  i] 


INTRODUCTION 

I 

Of  the  Difference  between  Pure  and  Empirical  Knowledge 

That  all  our  knowledge  begins  with  experience  there  can  be 
no  doubt.  For  how  should  the  faculty  of  knowledge  be  called 
into  activity,  if  not  by  objects  which  affect  our  senses,  and  which 
either  produce  representations  by  themselves,  or  rouse  the  activity 
of  our  understanding  to  compare,  to  connect,  or  to  separate  them  ; 
and  thus  to  convert  the  raw  material  of  our  sensuous  impressions 
into  a knowledge  of  objects,  which  we  call  experience?  In  re- 
spect of  time,  therefore,  no  knowledge  within  us  is  antecedent 
to  experience,  but  all  knowledge  begins  with  it. 

But  although  all  our  knowledge  begins  with  experience,  it  does 
not  follow  that  it  arises  from  experience.  For  it  is  quite  possible 
that  even  our  empirical  experience  is  a compound  of  that  which 
we  receive  through  impressions,  and  of  that  which  our  own  faculty 
of  knowledge  (incited  only  by  sensuous  impressions),  supplies  from 
itself,  a supplement  which  we  do  not  distinguish  from  that  raw 
material,  until  long  practice  has  roused  our  attention  and  rendered 
us  capable  of  separating  one  from  the  other. 

It  is  therefore  a question  which  deserves  at  least  closer  investi- 
gation, and  cannot  be  disposed  of  at  first  sight,  whether  there 
exists  a knowledge  independent  of  experience,  and  even  of  all 
impressions  of  the  senses?  Such  knowledge  is  called  a priori, 
and  distinguished  from  empirical  knowledge,  which  has  its  sources 
a posteriori , that  is,  in  experience. 

7iS 


7 16 


Supplement  IV 


This  term  a priori , however,  is  not  yet  definite  enough  to  indi- 
cate the  full  meaning  of  our  question.  For  people  are  wont  to 
say,  even  with  regard  to  knowledge  derived  from  experience,  that 
we  have  it,  or  might  have  it,  a priori , because  we  derive  it  from 
experience,  not  immediately , but  from  a general  rule,  which,  how- 
ever, has  itself  been  derived  from  experience.  Thus  one  would 
say  of  a person  who  undermines  the  foundations  of  his  house, 
that  he  might  have  known  a priori  that  it  would  tumble  down, 
that  is,  that  he  need  not  wait  for  the  experience  of  its  really 
tumbling  down.  But  still  he  could  not  know  this  entirely  a priori , 
because  he  had  first  to  learn  from  experience  that  bodies  are 
heavy,  and  will  fall  when  their  supports  are  taken  away. 

We  shall  therefore,  in  what  follows,  understand  by  knowledge 
a priori  knowledge  which  is  absolutely  independent  of  all  experi- 
ence, and  not  of  this  or  that  experience  only.  Opposed  to  this 
is  empirical  knowledge,  or  such  as  is  possible  a posteriori  only,  t 
that  is,  by  experience.  Knowledge  a priori , if  mixed  up  with 
nothing  empirical,  is  called  pure.  Thus  the  proposition,  for  ex- 
ample, that  every  change  has  its  cause,  is  a proposition  a priori , 
but  not  pure  : because  change  is  a concept  which  can  only  be 
derived  from  experience. 


We  are  in  Possession  of  Certain  Cognitions  a priori,  and  even  the 
Ordinary  Understanding  is  never  without  them 

All  depends  here  on  a criterion,  by  which  we  may  safely  dis- 
tinguish between  pure  and  empirical  knowledge.  Now  experi- 
ence teaches  us,  no  doubt,  that  something  is  so  or  so,  but  not 
that  it  cannot  be  different.  First,  then,  if  we  have  a proposition, 
which  is  thought,  together  with  its  necessity,  we  have  a judgment 
a priori ; and  if,  besides,  it  is  not  derived  from  any  proposition, 
except  such  as  is  itself  again  considered  as  necessary,  we  have  an 
absolutely  a priori  judgment.  Secondly,  experience  never  imparts 
to  its  judgments  true  or  strict,  but  only  assumed  or  relative  uni- 
versality (by  means  of  induction),  so  that  we  ought  always  to  say, 
so  far  as  we  have  observed  hitherto,  there  is  no  exception  to  this 


Supplement  IV 


717 


I 

or  that  rule.  If,  therefore,  a judgment  is  thought  with  strict  uni- 
versality, so  that  no  exception  is  admitted  as  possible,  it  is  not 
derived  from  experience,  but  valid  absolutely  a priori.  Empirical 
universality,  therefore,  is  only  an  arbitrary  extension  of  a validity 
which  applies  to  most  cases,  to  one  that  applies  to  all : as,  for 
instance,  in  the  proposition,  all  bodies  are  heavy.  If,  on  the  con- 
trary, strict  universality  is  essential  to  a judgment,  this  always 
points  to  a special  source  of  knowledge,  namely,  a faculty  of 
knowledge  a priori.  Necessity,  therefore,  and  strict  universality 
are  safe  criteria  of  knowledge  a priori,  and  are  inseparable  one 
from  the  other.  As,  however,  in  the  use  of  these  criteria,  it  is 
sometimes  easier  to  show  the  contingency  than  the  empirical  lim- 
itation 1 of  judgments,  and  as  it  is  sometimes  more  convincing  to 
prove  the  unlimited  universality  which  we  attribute  to  a judgment 
than  its  necessity,  it  is  advisable  to  use  both  criteria  separately, 
each  being  by  itself  infallible. 

That  there  really  exist  in  our  knowledge  such  necessary,  and 
in  the  strictest  sense  universal,  and  therefore  pure  judgments 
a priori,  is  easy  to  show.  If  we  want  a scientific  example,  we 
have  only  to  look  to  any  of  the  propositions  of  mathematics ; if 
we  want  one  from  the  sphere  of  the  ordinary  understanding,  such 
a proposition  as  that  each  change  must  have  a cause,  will  answer 
the  purpose ; nay,  in  the  latter  case,  even  the  concept  of  cause 
contains  so  clearly  the  concept  of  the  necessity  of  its  connection 
with  an  effect,  and  of  the  strict  universality  of  the  rule,  that  it 
would  be  destroyed  altogether  if  we  attempted  to  derive  it,  as 
Hume  does,  from  the  frequent  concomitancy  of  that  which 
happens  with  that  which  precedes,  and  from  a habit  arising 
thence  (therefore  from  a purely  subjective  necessity),  of  con- 
necting representations.  It  is  possible  even,  without  having 
recourse  to  such  examples  in  proof  of  the  reality  of  pure  proposi- 
tions a priori  within  our  knowledge,  to  prove  their  indispensa- 
bility for  the  possibility  of  experience  itself,  thus  proving  it  a 
priori.  For  whence  should  experience  take  its  certainty,  if  all 
the  rules  which  it  follows  were  always  again  and  again  empirical, 


According  to  an  emendation  adopted  both  by  Vaihinger  and  Adickes. 


Supplement  IV 


718 

and  therefore  contingent  and  hardly  fit  to  serve  as  first  princi- 
ples? For  the  present,  however,  we  may  be  satisfied  for  having 
shown  the  pure  employment  of  the  faculty  of  our  knowledge  as 
a matter  of  fact,  with  the  criteria  of  it. 

Not  only  in  judgments,  however,  but  even  in  certain  concepts, 
can  we  show  their  origin  a priori.  Take  away,  for  example,  from 
the  concept  of  a body,  as  supplied  by  experience,  everything  that 
is  empirical,  one  by  one ; such  as  colour,  hardness  or  softness, 
weight,  and  even  impenetrability,  and  there  still  remains  the 
space  which  the  body  (now  entirely  vanished)  occupied  : that 
you  cannot  take  away.  And  in  the  same  manner,  if  you  remove 
from  your  empirical  concept  of  any  object,  corporeal  or  incorpo- 
real, all  properties  which  experience  has  taught  you,  you  cannot 
take  away  from  it  that  property  by  which  you  conceive  it  as  a 
substance,  or  inherent  in  a substance  (although  such  a concept 
contains  more  determinations  than  that  of  an  object  in  general). 
Convinced,  therefore,  by  the  necessity  with  which  that  concept 
forces  itself  upon  you,  you  will  have  to  admit  that  it  has  its  seat 
in  your  faculty  of  knowledge  a priori. 


SUPPLEMENT  V 

[See  page  6] 


Empirical  judgments,  as  such,  are  all  synthetical ; for  it  would 
be  absurd  to  found  an  analytical  judgment  on  experience,  because, 
in  order  to  form  such  a judgment,  I need  not  at  all  step  out  of 
my  concept,  or  appeal  to  the  testimony  of  experience.  That  a 
body  is  extended,  is  a proposition  perfectly  certain  a priori , and 
not  an  empirical  judgment.  For,  before  I call  in  experience,  I 
am  already  in  possession  of  all  the  conditions  of  my  judgment 
in  the  concept  of  body  itself.  I have  only  to  draw  out  from  it, 
according  to  the  principle  of  contradiction,  the  required  predi- 
cate, and  I thus  become  conscious,  at  the  same  time,  of  the 
necessity  of  the  judgment,  which  experience  could  never  teach 
me.  But,  though  I do  not  include  the  predicate  of  gravity  in 
the  general  concept  of  body,  that  concept,  nevertheless,  indicates 
an  object  of  experience  through  one  of  its  parts  : so  that  I may 
add  other  parts  also  of  the  same  experience,  besides  those  which 
belonged  to  the  former  concept.  I may,  first,  by  an  analytical 
process,  realise  the  concept  of  body,  through  the  predicates  of 
extension,  impermeability,  form,  etc.,  all  of  which  are  contained 
in  it.  Afterwards  I expand  my  knowledge,  and  looking  back  to 
the  experience  from  which  my  concept  of  body  was  abstracted,  I 
find  gravity  always  connected  with  the  before-mentioned  predi" 
cates,  and  therefore  I add  it  synthetically  to  that  concept  as  a 
predicate.  It  is,  therefore,  experience  on  which  the  possibility 
of  the  synthesis  of  the  predicate  of  gravity  with  the  concept  of 
body  is  founded  : because  both  concepts,  though  neither  of  them 
is  contained  in  the  other,  belong  to  each  other,  though  acci- 
dentally only,  as  parts  of  a whole,  namely,  of  experience,  which 
is  itself  a synthetical  connection  of  intuitions. 

719 


SUPPLEMENT  VI 

[See  page  8] 


V 

In  all  Theoretical  Sciences  of  Reason  Synthetical  Judgments  a priori 
are  contained  as  Principles 

i . All  mathematical  judgments  are  synthetical.  This  proposi- 
tion, though  incontestably  certain,  and  very  important  to  us  for 
the  future,  seems  to  have  hitherto  escaped  the  observation  of  those 
who  are  engaged  in  the  anatomy  of  human  reason  : nay,  to  be 
directly  opposed  to  all  their  conjectures.  For  as  it  was  found 
that  all  mathematical  conclusions  proceed  according  to  the  prin- 
ciple of  contradiction  (which  is  required  by  the  nature  of  all 
apodictic  certainty),  it  was  supposed  that  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciples of  mathematics  also  rested  on  the  authority  of  the  same 
principle  of  contradiction.  This,  however,  was  a mistake  : for 
though  a synthetical  proposition  may  be  understood  according 
to  the  principle  of  contradiction,  this  can  only  be  if  another  syn- 
thetical proposition  is  presupposed,  from  which  the  latter  is 
deduced,  but  never  by  itself.  First  of  all,  we  ought  to  observe, 
that  mathematical  propositions,  properly  so  called,  are  always 
judgments  a priori , and  not  empirical,  because  they  carry  along 
with  them  necessity,  which  can  never  be  deduced  from  experi- 
ence. If  people  should  object  to  this,  I am  quite  willing  to  con- 
fine my  statement  to  pure  mathematics,  the  very  concept  of  which 
implies  that  it  does  not  contain  empirical,  but  only  pure  know- 
ledge a priori. 

At  first  sight  one  might  suppose  indeed  that  the  proposition 
7 + 5 = 12  is  merely  analytical,  following,  according  to  the  prin- 
ciple of  contradiction,  from  the  concept  of  a sum  of  7 and  5. 

720 


Supplement  VI 


721 


But,  if  we  look  more  closely,  we  shall  find  that  the  concept  of  the 
sum  of  7 and  5 contains  nothing  beyond  the  union  of  both  sums 
into  one,  whereby  nothing  is  told  us  as  to  what  this  single  number 
may  be  which  combines  both.  We  by  no  means  arrive  at  a con- 
cept of  Twelve,  by  thinking  that  union  of  Seven  and  Five  ; and 
we  may  analyse  our  concept  of  such  a possible  sum  as  long  as  we 
will,  still  we  shall  never  discover  in  it  the  concept  of  Twelve.  We 
must  go  beyond  these  concepts,  and  call  in  the  assistance  of  the 
intuition  corresponding  to  one  of  the  two,  for  instance,  our  five 
fingers,  or,  as  Segner  does  in  his  arithmetic,  five  points,  and  so  by 
degrees  add  the  units  of  the  Five,  given  in  intuition,  to  the  con- 
cept of  the  Seven.  For  I first  take  the  number  7,  and  taking  the 
intuition  of  the  fingers  of  my  hand,  in  order  to  form  with  it  the 
concept  of  the  5,  I gradually  add  the  units,  which  I before  took 
together,  to  make  up  the  number  5,  by  means  of  the  image  of  my 
hand,  to  the  number  7,  and  I thus  see  the  number  12  arising 
before  me.  That  5 should  be  added  to  7 was  no  doubt  implied 
in  my  concept  of  a sum  7 + 5,  but  not  that  that  sum  should  be 
equal  to  12.  An  arithmetical  proposition  is,  therefore,  always 
synthetical,  which  is  seen  more  easily  still  by  taking  larger  num- 
bers, where  we  clearly  perceive  that,  turn  and  twist  our  concep- 
tions as  we  may,  we  could  never,  by  means  of  the  mere  analysis 
of  our  concepts  and  without  the  help  of  intuition,  arrive  at  the 
sum  that  is  wanted. 

Nor  is  any  proposition  of  pure  geometry  analytical.  That  the 
straight  line  between  two  points  is  the  shortest,  is  a synthetical 
proposition.  For  my  concept  of  straight  contains  nothing  of 
magnitude  (quantity),  but  a quality  only.  The  concept  of  the 
shortest  is,  therefore,  purely  adventitious,  and  cannot  be  deduced 
from  the  concept  of  the  straight  line  by  any  analysis  whatsoever. 
The  aid  of  intuition,  therefore,  must  be  called  in,  by  which  alone 
the  synthesis  is  possible. 

[It  is  true  that  some  few  propositions,  presupposed  by  the 
geometrician,  are  really  analytical,  and  depend  on  the  principle 
of  contradiction  : but  then  they  serve  only,  like  identical  proposi- 
tions, to  form  the  chain  of  the  method,  and  not  as  principles. 
Such  are  the  propositions,  a=a,  the  whole  is  equal  to  itself,  or 
3 a 


722 


Supplement  VI 


(a  + b')  > a,  that  the  whole  is  greater  than  its  part.  And  even 
these,  though  they  are  valid  according  to  mere  concepts,  are  only 
admitted  in  mathematics,  because  they  can  be  represented  in 
intuition.1]  What  often  makes  us  believe  that  the  predicate  of 
such  apodictic  judgments  is  contained  in  our  concept,  and  the 
judgment  therefore  analytical,  is  merely  the  ambiguous  character 
of  the  expression.  We  are  told  that  we  ought  to  join  in  thought 
a certain  predicate  to  a given  concept,  and  this  necessity  is  inhe- 
rent in  the  concepts  themselves.  But  the  question  is  not  what  we 
ought  to  join  to  the  given  concept,  but  what  we  really  think  in  it, 
though  confusedly  only,  and  then  it  becomes  clear  that  the  predi- 
cate is  no  doubt  inherent  in  those  concepts  by  necessity,  not, 
however,  as  thought  in  the  concept  itself,  but  by  means  of  an 
intuition,  which  must  be  added  to  the  concept. 

2.  Natural  science  {physical)  contains  synthetical  judgments 
a priori  as  principles.  I shall  adduce,  as  examples,  a few  prop- 
ositions only,  such  as,  that  in  all  changes  of  the  material  world 
the  quantity  of  matter  always  remains  unchanged  : or  that  in  all 
communication  of  motion,  action  and  reaction  must  always  equal 
each  other.  It  is  clear  not  only  that  both  convey  necessity,  and 
that,  therefore,  their  origin  is  a priori,  but  also  that  they  are  syn- 
thetical propositions.  For  in  the  concept  of  matter  I do  not  con- 
ceive its  permanency,  but  only  its  presence  in  the  space  which  it 
fills.  I therefore  go  beyond  the  concept  of  matter  in  order  to 
join  something  to  it  a priori,  which  I did  not  before  conceive  in 
it.  The  proposition  is,  therefore,  not  analytical,  but  synthetical, 
and  yet  a priori,  and  the  same  applies  to  the  other  propositions 
of  the  pure  part  of  natural  science. 

3.  Metaphysic,  even  if  we  look  upon  it  as  hitherto  a tentative 
science  only,  which,  however,  is  indispensable  to  us,  owing  to  the 
very  nature  of  human  reason,  is  meant  to  contain  synthetical 
kno7v ledge  a priori.  Its  object  is  not  at  all  merely  to  analyse  such 
concepts  as  we  make  to  ourselves  of  things  a priori,  and  thus  to 
explain  them  analytically,  but  to  expand  our  knowledge  a priori. 

1 This  paragraph  from  It  is  true  to  intuition  seems  to  have  been  a margi- 
nal note,  as  shown  by  Dr.  Vaihinger.  See  Translator’s  Preface,  p.  lii. 


Supplement  VI 


72  3 


This  we  can  only  do  by  means  of  concepts  which  add  something 
to  a given  concept  that  was  not  contained  in  it ; nay,  we  even 
attempt,  by  means  of  synthetical  judgments  a priori,  to  go  so  far 
beyond  a given  concept  that  experience  itself  cannot  follow  us  : 
as,  for  instance,  in  the  proposition  that  the  world  must  have  a 
first  beginning.  Thus,  according  at  least  to  its  intentions,  meta- 
physic consists  merely  of  synthetical  propositions  a priori. 


VI 

The  General  Problem  of  Pure  Reason 

Much  is  gained  if  we  are  able  to  bring  a number  of  investi- 
gations under  the  formula  of  one  single  problem.  For  we  thus 
not  only  facilitate  our  own  work  by  defining  it  accurately,  but  en- 
able also  everybody  else  who  likes  to  examine  it  to  form  a judg- 
ment, whether  we  have  really  done  justice  to  our  purpose  or  not. 
Now  the  real  problem  of  pure  reason  is  contained  in  the  question, 
How  are  synthetical  judgments  a priori  possible  ? 

That  metaphysic  has  hitherto  remained  in  so  vacillating  a state 
of  ignorance  and  contradiction  is  entirely  due  to  people  not 
having  thought  sooner  of  this  problem,  or  perhaps  even  of  a dis- 
tinction between  analytical  and  synthetical  judgments.  The  solu- 
tion of  this  problem,  or  a sufficient  proof  that  a possibility  which 
is  to  be  explained  does  in  reality  not  exist  at  all,  is  the  question 
of  life  or  death  to  metaphysic.  David  Hume,  who  among  all 
philosophers  approached  nearest  to  that  problem,  though  he  was 
far  from  conceiving  it  with  sufficient  definiteness  and  universality, 
confining  his  attention  only  to  the  synthetical  proposition  of  the 
connection  of  an  effect  with  its  causes  ( principium  causalitatis) , 
arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  such  a proposition  a priori  is 
entirely  impossible.  According  to  his  conclusions,  everything 
which  we  call  metaphysic  would  turn  out  to  be  a mere  delusion 
of  reason,  fancying  that  it  knows  by  itself  what  in  reality  is  only 
borrowed  from  experience,  and  has  assumed  by  mere  habit  the 
appearance  of  necessity.  If  he  had  grasped  our  problem  in  all 
its  universality,  he  would  never  have  thought  of  an  assertion  which 


724 


Supplement  VI 


destroys  all  pure  philosophy,  because  he  would  have  perceived 
that,  according  to  his  argument,  no  pure  mathematical  science 
was  possible  either,  on  account  of  its  certainly  containing  syn- 
thetical propositions  a priori;  and  from  such  an  assertion  his 
good  sense  would  probably  have  saved  him. 

On  the  solution  of  our  problem  depends,  at  the  same  time,  the 
possibility  of  the  pure  employment  of  reason,  in  establishing  and 
carrying  out  all  sciences  which  contain  a theoretical  knowledge 
a priori  of  objects,  i.e.  the  answer  to  the  questions 

How  is  pure  mathematical  science  possible  ? 

How  is  pure  natural  science  possible  ? 

As  these  sciences  really  exist,  it  is  quite  proper  to  ask,  How 
they  are  possible?  for  that  they  must  be  possible,  is  proved  by 
their  reality.1 

But  as  to  metaphysic,  the  bad  progress  which  it  has  hitherto 
made,  and  the  impossibility  of  asserting  of  any  of  the  metaphysical 
systems  yet  brought  forward  that  it  really  exists,  so  far  as  its  essen- 
tial aim  is  concerned,  must  fill  every  one  with  doubts  as  to  its 
possibility. 

Yet,  in  a certain  sense,  this  kind  of  knowledge  also  must  be 
looked  upon  as  given,  and  though  not  as  a science,  yet  as  a nat- 
ural disposition  ( metaphysica  naturalis ) metaphysic  is  real.  For 
human  reason,  without  being  moved  merely  by  the  conceit  of 
omniscience,  advances  irresistibly,  and  urged  on  by  its  own  need, 
to  questions  such  as  cannot  be  answered  by  any  empirical  employ- 
ment of  reason,  or  by  principles  thence  derived,  so  that  we  may 
really  say,  that  all  men,  as  soon  as  their  reason  became  ripe  for 
speculation,  have  at  all  times  possessed  some  kind  of  metaphysic, 
and  will  always  continue  to  possess  it.  And  now  it  will  also  have 
to  answer  the  question 

1 One  might  doubt  this  with  regard  to  pure  natural  science;  but  one  has 
only  to  consider  the  different  propositions  which  stand  at  the  beginning  of  real 
(empirical)  physical  science,  those,  for  example,  relating  to  the  permanence  of 
the  same  quantity  of  matter  to  the  vis  inertiae,  the  equality  of  action  and  reac- 
tion, etc.,  in  order  to  become  convinced  that  they  constitute  a physica  pura,  or 
rationalis , which  well  deserves  to  stand  by  itself  as  an  independent  science,  in 
its  whole  extent,  whether  narrow  or  wide. 


Supplement  VI 


72  5 


How  is  metaphysic  possible , as  a natural  disposition  ? that  is 
how  does  the  nature  of  universal  human  reason  give  rise  to  ques 
tions  which  pure  reason  proposes  to  itself,  and  which  it  is  urged 
on  by  its  own  need  to  answer  as  well  as  it  can  ? 

As,  however,  all  attempts  which  have  hitherto  been  made  at 
answering  these  natural  questions  (for  instance,  whether  the  world 
has  a beginning,  or  exists  from  all  eternity)  have  always  led  to 
inevitable  contradictions,  we  cannot  rest  satisfied  with  the  mere 
natural  disposition  to  metaphysic,  that  is,  with  the  pure  faculty 
of  reason  itself,  from  which  some  kind  of  metaphysic  (whatever  it 
may  be)  always  arises  ; but  it  must  be  possible  to  arrive  with  it 
at  some  certainty  as  to  our  either  knowing  or  not  knowing  its 
objects  ; that  is,  we  must  either  decide  that  we  can  judge  of  the 
objects  of  these  questions,  or  of  the  power  or  want  of  power  of 
reason,  in  deciding  anything  upon  them,  — therefore  that  we  can 
either  enlarge  our  pure  reason  with  certainty,  or  that  we  have 
to  impose  on  it  fixed  and  firm  limits.  This  last  question,  which 
arises  out  of  the  former  more  general  problem,  would  properly 
assume  this  form, 

How  is  metaphysic  possible,  as  a science  ? 

The  critique  of  reason  leads,  therefore,  necessarily,  to  true  sci- 
ence, while  its  dogmatical  use,  without  criticism,  lands  us  in  ground- 
less assertions,  to  which  others,  equally  specious,  can  always  be 
opposed,  that  is,  in  scepticism. 

Nor  need  this  science  be  very  formidable  by  its  great  prolixity, 
for  it  has  not  to  deal  with  the  objects  of  reason,  the  variety  of 
which  is  infinite,  but  with  reason  only,  and  with  problems,  sug- 
gested by  reason  and  placed  before  it,  not  by  the  nature  of  things, 
which  are  different  from  it,  but  by  its  own  nature  ; so  that,  if  rea- 
son has  only  first  completely  understood  its  own  power,  with  refer- 
ence to  objects  given  to  it  in  experience,  it  will  have  no  difficulty 
in  determining  completely  and  safely  the  extent  and  limits  of  its 
attempted  application  beyond  the  limits  of  all  experience. 

We  may  and  must  therefore  regard  all  attempts  which  have 
hitherto  been  made  at  building  up  a metaphysic  dogmatically,  as 
non-avenu.  For  the  mere  analysis  of  the  concepts  that  dwell  in 
our  reason  a priori , which  has  been  attempted  in  one  or  other 


726 


Supplement  VI 


of  those  metaphysical  systems,  is  by  no  means  the  aim,  but  only 
a preparation  for  true  metaphysic,  namely,  the  answer  to  the  ques- 
tion, how  we  can  enlarge  our  knowledge  a priori  synthetically ; 
nay,  it  is  utterly  useless  for  that  purpose,  because  it  only  shows 
what  is  contained  in  those  concepts,  but  not  by  what  process 
a priori  we  arrive  at  them,  in  order  thus  to  determine  the  validity 
of  their  employment  with  reference  to  all  objects  of  knowledge 
in  general.  Nor  does  it  require  much  self-denial  to  give  up  these 
pretensions,  considering  that  the  undeniable  and,  in  the  dogmatic 
procedure,  inevitable  contradictions  of  reason  with  itself,  have  long 
deprived  every  system  of  metaphysic  of  all  authority.  More  firm- 
ness will  be  required  in  order  not  to  be  deterred  by  difficulties 
from  within  and  resistance  from  without,  from  trying  to  advance 
a science,  indispensable  to  human  reason  (a  science  of  which  we 
may  lop  off  every  branch,  but  will  never  be  able  to  destroy  the 
root),  by  a treatment  entirely  opposed  to  all  former  treatments, 
which  promises,  at  last,  to  ensure  the  successful  and  fruitful  growth 
of  metaphysical  science. 


SUPPLEMENT  VII 

[See  page  io] 


Still  less  ought  we  to  except  here  a criticism  on  the  books  and 
systems  treating  of  pure  reason,  but  only  on  the  faculty  of  pure 
reason  itself.  It  is  only  if  we  are  in  possession  of  this,  that  we 
possess  a safe  criterion  for  estimating  the  philosophical  value  of 
old  and  new  works  on  this  subject.  Otherwise,  an  unqualified 
historian  and  judge  does  nothing  but  criticise  the  groundless 
assertions  of  others  by  means  of  his  own,  which  are  equally 
groundless. 


727 


SUPPLEMENT  VIII 

[See  page  20] 


4.  Space  is  represented  as  an  infinite  given  quantity.  Now 
it  is  quite  true  that  every  concept  is  to  be  thought  as  a repre- 
sentation, which  is  contained  in  an  infinite  number  of  different 
possible  representations  (as  their  common  characteristic),  and 
therefore  comprehends  them  : but  no  concept,  as  such,  can  be 
thought  as  if  it  contained  in  itself  an  infinite  number  of  represen- 
tations. Nevertheless,  space  is  so  thought  (for  all  parts  of  in- 
finite space  exist  simultaneously).  Consequently,  the  original 
representation  of  space  is  an  intuition  a priori,  and  not  a concept. 

§3 

Transcendental  Exposition  of  the  Concept  of  Space 

I understand  by  transcendental  exposition  ( Erorterung ),  the 
explanation  of  a concept,  as  of  a principle  by  which  the  possibility 
of  other  synthetical  cognitions  a priori  can  be  understood.  For 
this  purpose  it  is  necessary,  1.  That  such  cognitions  really  do 
flow  from  the  given  concept.  2.  That  they  are  possible  only 
under  the  presupposition  of  a given  mode  of  explanation  of  such 
concept. 

Geometry  is  a science  which  determines  the  properties  of  space 
synthetically,  and  yet  a priori.  What  then  must  be  the  repre- 
sentation of  space,  to  render  such  a knowledge  of  it  possible? 
It  must  be  originally  intuitive ; for  it  is  impossible  from  a mere 
concept  to  deduce  propositions  which  go  beyond  that  concept, 
as  we  do  in  geometry  (Introduction  V.  See  Suppl.  VI).  That 
intuition,  however,  must  be  a priori,  that  is,  it  must  exist  within 
us  before  any  perception  of  the  object,  and  must  therefore  be 

728 


Supplement  VIII 


7 29 


pure,  not  empirical  intuition.  For  all  geometrical  propositions 
are  apodictic,  that  is,  connected  with  the  consciousness  of  their 
necessity,  as  for  instance  the  proposition,  that  space  has  only 
three  dimensions  ; and  such  propositions  cannot  be  empirical 
judgments,  nor  conclusions  from  them  (Introduction  II.  See 
Suppl.  IV.  11). 

How  then  can  an  external  intuition  dwell  in  the  mind  anterior 
to  the  objects  themselves,  and  in  which  the  concept  of  objects 
can  be  determined  a priori  ? Evidently  not  otherwise  than  so 
far  as  it  has  its  seat  in  the  subject  only,  as  the  formal  condition 
under  which  the  subject  is  affected  by  the  objects  and  thereby  is 
receiving  an  immediate  representation,  that  is,  intuition  of  them ; 
therefore  as  a form  of  the  external  sense  in  general. 

It  is  therefore  by  our  explanation  only  that  the  possibility  of 
geometry  as  a synthetical  science  a priori  becomes  intelligible. 
Every  other  explanation,  which  fails  to  account  for  this  possibility, 
can  best  be  distinguished  from  our  own  by  that  criterion,  although 
it  may  seem  to  have  some  similarity  with  it. 


SUPPLEMENT  IX 


[See  page  22] 


With  the  exception  of  space  there  is  no  other  subjective  repre- 
sentation, referring  to  something  external,  that  could  be  called 
a priori  objective.  For  from  none  of  them  can  we  derive  syn- 
thetical propositions  a priori,  as  we  can  from  the  intuition  in 
space  § 3.  (See  Suppl.  VIII.)  Strictly  speaking,  therefore, 
they  can  claim  no  ideality  at  all,  though  they  agree  with  the  repre- 
sentation of  space  in  this,  that  they  belong  only  to  the  subjective 
nature  of  sensibility,  for  instance,  of  sight,  of  hearing,  and  feeling, 
through  the  sensations  of  colours,  sounds,  and  heat.  All  these, 
however,  being  sensations  only,  and  not  intuitions,  do  not  help 
us  by  themselves  to  know  any  object,  least  of  all  a priori. 


73° 


SUPPLEMENT  X 

[See  page  26] 


§ 5 


Transcendental  Exposition  of  the  Concept  of  Time 


I can  here  refer  to  No.  hi.  p.  27,  where,  for  the  sake  of 
brevity,  I have  placed  what  is  properly  transcendental  under  the 
head  of  metaphysical  exposition.  Here  I only  add  that  the  con- 
cept of  change,  and  with  it  the  concept  of  motion  (as  change  of 
place),  is  possible  only  through  and  in  the  representation  of  time  ; 
and  that,  if  this  representation  were  not  intuitive  (internal)  a 
priori , no  concept,  whatever  it  be,  could  make  us  understand 
the  possibility  of  a change,  that  is,  of  a connection  of  contradic- 
torily opposed  predicates  (for  instance,  the  being  and  not-being 
of  one  and  the  same  thing  in  one  and  the  same  place)  in  one 
and  the  same  object.  It  is  only  in  time  that  both  contradictorily 
opposed  determinations  can  be  met  with  in  the  same  object,  that 
is,  one  after  the  other.  Our  concept  of  time,  therefore,  exhibits 
the  possibility  of  as  many  synthetical  cognitions  a priori  as  are 
found  in  the  general  doctrine  of  motion,  which  is  very  rich  in 
them. 


73i 


SUPPLEMENT  XI 

[See  page  39] 


II.  As  a confirmation  of  this  theory  of  the  ideality  both  of  the 
external  and  of  the  internal  sense,  and  therefore  of  all  objects  of 
the  senses  as  mere  phenomena,  we  may  particularly  remark,  that 
everything  in  our  knowledge  which  belongs  to  intuition  (exclud- 
ing therefore  the  feelings  of  pain  and  pleasure,  and  the  will, 
which  are  no  knowledge  at  all)  contains  nothing  but  mere  rela- 
tions, namely,  of  the  places  in  an  intuition  (extension),  change 
of  places  (motion),  and  laws,  according  to  which  that  change  is 
determined  (moving  forces).  Nothing  is  told  us  thereby  as  to 
what  is  present  in  the  place,  or  what,  besides  the  change  of 
place,  is  active  in  the  things.  A thing  by  itself,  however,  cannot 
be  known  by  mere  relations,  and  we  may,  therefore,  fairly  con- 
clude that,  as  the  external  sense  gives  us  nothing  but  representa- 
tions of  relations,  that  sense  can  contain  in  its  representation  only 
the  relation  of  an  object  to  the  subject,  and  not  what  is  inside  the 
object  by  itself.  The  same  applies  to  internal  intuition.  Not 
only  do  the  representations  of  the  external  senses  constitute  its 
proper  material  with  which  we  fill  our  mind,  but  time,  in  which 
these  representations  are  placed,  and  which  precedes  even  our 
consciousness  of  them  in  experience,  nay,  forms  the  formal  condi- 
tion of  the  manner  in  which  we  place  them  in  the  mind,  contains 
itself  relations  of  succession,  coexistence,  and  that  which  must  be 
coexistent  with  succession,  namely,  the  permanent.  Now  that 
which,  as  a representation,  can  precede  every  act  of  thinking 
something,  is  the  intuition  : and,  if  it  contains  nothing  but  rela- 
tions, then  the  form  of  intuition.  As  this  represents  nothing 
except  what  is  being  placed  in  the  mind,  it  can  itself  be  the 
manner  only  in  which  the  mind,  through  its  own  activity,  that  is, 

732 


Supplement  XI 


733 


Dy  this  placing  of  its  representation,  is  affected  by  itself,  in  other 
words,  an  internal  sense  with  respect  to  its  form.  Whatever  is 
represented  by  a sense  is  so  far  always  phenomenal,  and  we  should 
therefore  have  either  to  admit  no  internal  sense  at  all,  or  the  sub- 
ject, which  is  its  object,  could  be  represented  by  it  as  phenomenal 
only,  and  not,  as  it  might  judge  of  itself,  if  its  intuition  were  spon- 
taneous only,  that  is,  if  it  were  intellectual.  The  difficulty  here 
lies  wholly  in  this,  how  a subject  can  have  an  internal  intuition  of 
itself : but  this  difficulty  is  common  to  every  theory.  The  con- 
sciousness of  self  (apperception)  is  the  simple  representation  of 
the  ego,  and  if  by  it  alone  all  the  manifold  (representations)  in 
the  subject  were  given  spontaneously,  the  inner  intuition  would  be 
intellectual.  In  man  this  consciousness  requires  internal  percep- 
tion of  the  manifold,  which  is  previously  given  in  the  subject,  and 
the  manner  in  which  this  is  given  in  the  mind  without  spontaneity, 
must,  on  account  of  this  difference,  be  called  sensibility.  If  the 
faculty  of  self-consciousness  is  to  seek  for,  that  is,  to  apprehend, 
what  lies  in  the  mind,  it  must  affect  the  mind,  and  can  thus  only 
produce  an  intuition  of  itself.  The  form  of  this,  which  lay  ante- 
cedently in  the  mind,  determines  the  manner  in  which  the  mani- 
fold exists  together  in  the  mind,  namely,  in  the  representation  of 
time.  The  intuition  of  self,  therefore,  is  not,  as  if  it  could  repre- 
sent itself  immediately  and  as  spontaneously  and  independently 
active,  but  according  to  the  manner  in  which  it  is  internally 
affected,  consequently  as  it  appears  to  itself,  not  as  it  is. 

III.  If  I say  that  the  intuition  of  external  objects  and  the  self- 
intuition of  the  mind,  represent  both  (viz.  the  objects  and  the 
mind)  in  space  and  time,  as  they  affect  our  senses,  that  is,  as 
they  appear,  I do  not  mean,  that  these  objects  are  mere  illusion. 
For  the  objects,  as  phenomena,  nay,  even  the  properties  which 
we  ascribe  to  them,  are  always  looked  upon  as  something  really 
given  : and  all  we  do  is,  that,  as  their  quality  depends  only  on 
the  manner  of  intuition  on  the  part  of  the  subject  in  relation  to  a 
given  object,  we  distinguish  the  object,  as  phenomenon,  from  itself, 
as  an  object  by  itself.  Thus,  if  I assert  that  the  quality  of  space 
and  time,  according  to  which,  as  a condition  of  their  existence,  I 
accept  both  external  objects  and  my  own  soul,  lies  in  my  manner 


734 


Supplement  Xf 


of  intuition  and  not  in  these  objects  by  themselves,  I do  not  mean 
to  say  that  bodies  seem  only  to  exist  outside  me,  or  that  my  soul 
seems  only  to  be  given  in  my  self-consciousness.  It  would  be  my 
own  fault,  if  I changed  that,  which  I ought  to  count  as  phenome- 
nal, into  mere  illusion.1 

This  cannot  happen,  however,  according  to  our  principle  of  the 
ideality  of  all  sensuous  intuitions ; on  the  contrary,  it  is  only  when 
we  attribute  objective  reality  to  those  forms  of  intuition  that  every- 
thing is  changed  inevitably  into  mere  illusion.  For  if  we  take 
space  and  time  as  properties  that  ought  to  exist  as  possible  in 
things  by  themselves,  and  then  survey  the  absurdities  in  which  we 
should  be  involved  in  having  to  admit  that  two  infinite  things, 
which  are  not  substances,  nor  something  inherent  in  substances, 
but  nevertheless  must  be  something  existing,  nay,  the  necessary 
condition  of  the  existence  of  all  things,  would  remain,  even  if  all 
existing  things  were  removed,  we  really  cannot  blame  the  good 
Bishop  Berkeley  for  degrading  bodies  to  mere  illusion.  Nay,  it 
would  follow  that  even  our  own  existence,  which  would  thus  be 
made  dependent  on  the  independent  reality  of  such  a non-entity 
as  time,  must  become  a mere  illusion,  an  absurdity  which  hitherto 
no  one  has  been  guilty  of. 

IV.  In  natural  theology,  where  we  think  of  an  object  which 
not  only  can  never  be  an  object  of  intuition  to  us,  but  which  even 
to  itself  can  never  be  an  object  of  sensuous  intuition,  great  care  is 
taken  to  remove  all  conditions  of  space  and  time  from  its  intui- 

1 Phenomenal  predicates  can  be  attributed  to  the  object  in  its  relation  to 
our  sense  : as  for  instance  to  the  rose  its  red  colour,  and  its  scent.  But  what 
is  merely  illusion  can  never  be  attributed  to  an  object  as  a predicate,  for  the 
simple  reason  that  the  illusion  attributes  to  the  object  by  itself  something 
which  belongs  to  it  only  in  its  relation  to  the  senses,  or  to  a subject  in  general : 
as  for  instance  the  two  handles,  which  were  formerly  attributed  to  Saturn. 
That  which  is  never  to  be  found  in  the  object  itself,  but  always  in  its  relation 
to  a subject,  and  is  inseparable  from  its  representation  by  a subject,  is  phenom- 
enal, and  the  predicates  of  space  and  time  are  therefore  rightly  attributed  to 
objects  of  the  senses,  as  such.  In  this  there  is  no  illusion.  If,  on  the  contrary, 
1 were  to  attribute  to  the  rose  by  itself  redness,  handles  to  Saturn,  and  extension 
to  all  external  objects,  without  restricting  my  judgment  to  the  relation  of  these 
objects  to  a subject,  we  should  have  illusion. 


Supplement  XI 


735 


tion  (for  all  its  knowledge  must  be  intuitive,  and  not  thought, 
which  always  involves  limitation).  But  how  are  we  justified  in 
doing  this,  when  we  have  first  made  space  and  time  forms  of 
things  by  themselves,  such  as  would  remain  as  conditions  of  the 
existence  of  things  a priori,  even  if  the  things  themselves  had 
been  removed  ? If  conditions  of  all  existence,  they  would  also  be 
conditions  of  the  existence  of  God.  If  we  do  not  wish  to  change 
space  and  time  into  objective  forms  of  all  things,  nothing  remains 
but  to  accept  them  as  subjective  forms  of  our  external  as  well  as 
internal  intuition,  which  is  called  sensuous,  for  the  very  reason 
that  it  is  not  originally  spontaneous,  that  is  such,  that  it  could  itself 
give  us  the  existence  of  the  objects  of  intuition  (such  an  intuition, 
so  far  as  we  can  understand,  can  belong  to  the  First  Being  only), 
but  dependent  on  the  existence  of  objects,  and  therefore  possible 
only,  if  the  faculty  of  representation  in  the  subject  is  affected  by 
them. 

It  is  not  necessary,  moreover,  that  we  should  limit  this  intuition 
in  space  and  time  to  the  sensibility  of  man  ; it  is  quite  possible 
that  all  finite  thinking  beings  must  necessarily  agree  with  us  on 
this  point  (though  we  cannot  decide  this).  On  account  of  this 
universal  character,  however,  it  does  not  cease  to  be  sensibility, 
for  it  always  is,  and  remains  derivative  ( intuitus  derivativus),  not 
original  ( intuitus  originarius ) , and  therefore  not  intellectual  intui- 
tion. For  the  reason  mentioned  before,  the  latter  intuition  seems 
only  to  belong  to  the  First  Being,  and  never  to  one  which  is 
dependent,  both  in  its  existence  and  its  intuition  (which  intuition 
determines  its  existence  with  reference  to  given  objects).  This 
latter  remark,  however,  must  only  be  taken  as  an  illustration  of 
our  aesthetic  theory,  and  not  as  a proof. 


Conclusion  of  the  Transcendental  Esthetic 

Here,  then,  we  have  one  of  the  requisites  for  the  solution  of 
the  general  problem  of  transcendental  philosophy,  How  are  syn- 
thetical propositions  a priori  possible  ? namely,  pure  intuitions  a 
priori,  space  and  time.  In  them  we  find,  if  in  a judgment  a priori 


736 


Supplement  XI 


we  want  to  go  beyond  a given  concept,  that  which  can  be  discov- 
ered a priori,  not  in  the  concept,  but  in  the  intuition  correspond- 
ing to  it,  and  can  be  connected  with  it  synthetically.  For  this 
very  reason,  however,  such  judgments  can  never  go  beyond  the 
objects  of  the  senses,  but  are  valid  only  for  objects  of  possible 
experience. 


SUPPLEMENT  XII 

[See  page  69] 


§ " 

This  table  of  categories  suggests  some  interesting  considera- 
tions, which  possibly  may  have  important  consequences  with  re- 
gard to  the  scientific  form  of  all  knowledge  of  reason.  For  it  is 
clear  that  such  a table  will  be  extremely  useful,  nay,  indispensable, 
in  the  theoretical  part  of  philosophy,  in  order  to  trace  the  com- 
plete plan  of  a whole  science,  so  far  as  it  rests  on  concepts  a priori, 
and  to  divide  it  systematically  according  to  fixed  principles,  because 
that  table  contains  all  elementary  concepts  of  the  understanding 
in  their  completeness,  nay,  even  the  form  of  a system  of  them  in 
the  human  understanding,  and  indicates  therefore  all  the  momenta 
of  a projected  speculative  science,  nay,  even  their  order.  Of  this 
I have  given  an  example  elsewhere.1  Here  follow  some  of  the 
considerations. 

The  first  is,  that  this  table,  which  contains  four  classes  of  the 
concepts  of  the  understanding,  may,  in  the  first  instance,  be 
divided  into  two  sections,  the  former  of  which  refers  to  objects  of 
intuition  (pure,  as  well  as  empirical),  the  latter  to  the  existence 
of  those  objects  (either  in  their  relation  to  each  other,  or  to  the 
understanding). 

The  first  section  I shall  call  that  of  the  mathematical,  the 
second,  that  of  the  dynamical  categories.  The  first  section  has 
no  correlates,  which  are  met  with  in  the  second  section  only. 
Must  not  this  difference  have  some  ground  in  the  nature  of  the 
understanding? 

Our  second  remark  is,  that  in  every  class  there  is  the  same 
number  of  categories,  namely  three,  which  again  makes  us  ponder, 

1 Metaphysical  Elements  of  Natural  Science. 

3 B 737 


738 


Supplement  X II 


because  generally  all  division  a priori  by  means  of  concepts  must 
be  dichotomy.  It  should  be  remarked  also,  that  the  third  cate- 
gory always  arises  from  the  combination  of  the  second  with  the 
lirst.  Thus  totality  is  nothing  but  plurality  considered  as  unity ; 
litnitation  nothing  but  reality  connected  with  negation  ; community 
is  the  casuality  of  a substance  as  determining  another  reciprocally  ; 
lastly,  necessity,  the  existence  which  is  given  by  possibility  itself. 
It  must  not  be  supposed,  however,  that  therefore  the  third  cate- 
gory is  only  a derivative,  and  not  a primary  concept  of  the  pure 
understanding.  For  the  joining  of  the  first  and  second  concepts, 
in  order  to  produce  the  third,  requires  an  independent  act  of  the 
understanding,  which  is  not  identical  with  the  act  that  produces 
the  first  and  second  concepts.  Thus  the  concept  of  a number 
(which  belongs  to  the  category  of  totality)  is  not  always  possible 
when  we  have  the  concepts  of  plurality  and  unity  (for  instance, 
in  the  concept  of  the  infinite)  ; nor  can  we  understand  by  simply 
combining  the  concept  of  a cause  and  that  of  a substance,  the 
influence,  that  is,  how  a substance  can  become  the  cause  of  some- 
thing in  another  substance.  This  shows  that  a separate  act  of  the 
understanding  is  here  required,  and  the  same  applies  to  all  the 
rest. 

Third  observation.  With  regard  to  one  category,  namely,  that 
of  community,  which  is  found  in  the  third  class,  its  accordance  with 
the  form  of  a disjunctive  judgment,  which  corresponds  to  it  in  the 
table  of  logical  functions,  is  not  so  evident  as  elsewhere. 

In  order  to  become  quite  certain  of  that  accordance,  we  must 
remark  that  in  all  disjunctive  judgments  their  sphere  (that  is,  all 
that  is  contained  in  them)  is  represented  as  a whole,  divided  into 
parts  (the  subordinate  concepts),  and  that,  as  one  of  them  cannot 
be  contained  under  the  other,  they  are  conceived  as  co-ordinate, 
not  as  subordinate,  determining  each  other,  not  in  one  direction 
only,  as  in  a series,  but  reciprocally,  as  in  an  aggregate  (if  one 
member  of  the  division  is  given,  all  the  rest  are  excluded,  and 
vice  versa). 

A similar  connection  is  conceived  in  a whole  of  things,  in  which 
one,  as  effect,  is  not  subordinated  to  another  as  the  cause  of  its 
existence,  but  is  co-ordinated  with  it,  simultaneously  and  recipro- 


Supplement  XII 


7 39 


cally,  as  cause  of  the  determination  of  the  other  (as,  for  instance, 
in  a body  of  which  the  parts  reciprocally  attract  and  repel  each 
other).  This  is  a kind  of  connection  totally  different  from  that 
which  exists  in  a mere  relation  of  cause  to  effect  (of  ground  to 
consequence),  for  here  the  consequence  does  not  reciprocally 
determine  the  ground  again,  nor  (as  in  the  case  of  the  Creator 
and  the  creation)  constitute  with  it  a whole.  The  process  of  the 
understanding,  in  representing  to  itself  the  sphere  of  a divided 
concept,  is  the  same  as  that  by  which  it  thinks  a thing  as  divisible  : 
and  in  the  same  manner  in  which,  in  the  former,  the  members  of 
a division  exclude  each  other,  and  are  yet  connected  in  one 
sphere,  the  understanding  represents  to  itself  the  parts  of  the 
latter  as  existing  (as  substances),  each  independent  of  the  rest, 
and  yet  united  in  a whole. 


§ 12 

In  the  transcendental  philosophy  of  the  ancients  there  is  another 
chapter  containing  concepts  of  the  understanding  which,  though 
they  are  not  counted  among  the  categories,  are  yet  considered  by 
them  as  concepts  a priori  of  objects.  If  so,  they  would  increase 
the  number  of  the  categories,  which  cannot  be.  They  are  set 
forth  in  the  famous  proposition  of  the  Schoolmen,  ‘ quodlibet  ens 
est  unum,  verum,  donum.'  Now,  although  the  inferences  to  be 
drawn  from  this  principle  (yielding  nothing  but  tautological  propo- 
sitions) were  very  meagre,  so  that  modem  metaphysicians  mention 
it  almost  by  courtesy  only,  a thought  which  has  maintained  itself 
so  long,  however  empty  it  may  seem,  deserves  an  investigation 
with  regard  to  its  origin,  nay,  leads  us  to  suspect  that  it  may  have 
its  foundation  in  some  rule  of  the  understanding  which,  as  often 
happens,  has  only  been  wrongly  interpreted.  What  are  supposed 
to  be  transcendental  predicates  of  things  are  nothing  but  logical 
requirements  and  criteria  of  all  knowledge  of  things  in  general, 
whereby  that  knowledge  is  founded  on  the  categories  of  quantity, 
namely,  unity,  plurality,  and  totality.  Only,  instead  of  taking  them 
as  materially  belonging  to  the  possibility  of  things  by  themselves^ 


740 


Supplement  XII 


they  (the  predicates,  or  rather  those  who  employed  them)  used 
them,  in  fact,  in  their  formal  meaning  only,  as  forming  a logical 
requisite  for  every  kind  of  knowledge,  and  yet  incautiously  made 
these  criteria  of  thought  to  be  properties  of  the  things  by  them- 
selves. In  every  cognition  of  an  object  there  is  unity  of  concept, 
which  may  be  called  qualitative  unity,  so  far  as  we  think  by  it  only 
the  unity  in  the  comprehension  of  the  manifold  material  of  our 
knowledge  : as,  for  instance,  the  unity  of  the  subject  in  a play,  or 
a speech,  or  a fable.  Secondly,  there  is  truth,  in  respect  to  the 
deductions  from  it.  The  more  true  deductions  can  be  made  from 
a given  concept,  the  more  criteria  are  there  of  its  objective  reality. 
This  might  be  called  the  qualitative  plurality  of  criteria,  which 
belong  to  a concept  as  their  common  ground  (but  are  not  con- 
ceived in  it,  as  quantity).  Thirdly,  there  is  completeness,  which 
consists  in  this,  that  the  plurality  together  leads  back  to  the  unity 
of  the  concept,  according  completely  with  this  and  with  no  other 
concept,  which  may  be  called  the  qualitative  completeness  (totality). 
This  shows  that  these  logical  criteria  of  the  possibility  of  know- 
ledge in  general  do  nothing  but  change  the  three  categories  of 
quantity,  in  which  the  unity  in  the  production  of  the  quantum 
must  throughout  be  taken  as  homogeneous,  for  the  purpose  of 
connecting  heterogeneous  elements  of  knowledge  also  in  one  con- 
sciousness, by  means  of  the  quality  of  the  cognition  as  the  princi- 
ple of  the  connection.  Thus  the  criterion  of  the  possibility  of  a 
concept  (but  not  of  its  object)  is  the  definition  of  it,  in  which  the 
unity  of  the  concept,  the  truth  of  all  that  may  be  immediately  de- 
duced from  it,  and  lastly,  the  completeness  of  what  has  been  deduced 
from  it,  supply  all  that  is  necessary  for  the  constitution  of  the 
whole  concept.  In  the  same  manner  the  criterion  of  an  hypothesis 
consists,  first,  in  the  intelligibility  of  the  ground  which  has  been 
admitted  for  the  sake  of  explanation,  or  of  its  unity  (without  any 
auxiliary  hypothesis)  ; secondly,  in  the  truth  of  the  consequences 
to  be  deduced  from  it  (their  accordance  with  themselves  and  with 
experience)  ; and  lastly,  in  the  completeness  of  the  ground  admitted 
for  the  explanation  of  these  consequences,  which  point  back  to 
neither  more  nor  less  than  what  was  admitted  in  the  hypothesis, 
and  agree  in  giving  us  again,  analytically  a posteriori,  what  had 


Supplement  XII 


741 


been  thought  synthetically  a priori.  The  concepts  of  unity,  truth, 
and  perfection,  therefore,  do  not  supplement  the  transcendental 
table  of  the  categories,  as  if  it  were  imperfect,  but  they  serve  only, 
after  the  relation  of  these  concepts  to  objects  has  been  entirely 
set  aside,  to  bring  their  employment  under  general  logical  rules, 
for  the  agreement  of  knowledge  with  itself. 


SUPPLEMENT  XIII 

[See  page  79] 


Locke,  for  want  of  this  reflection,  and  because  he  met  with 
pure  concepts  of  the  understanding  in  experience,  derived  them 
also  from  experience,  and  yet  acted  so  inconsistently  that  he  at- 
tempted to  use  them  for  knowledge  which  far  exceeds  all  limits 
of  experience.  David  Hume  saw  that,  in  order  to  be  able  to  do 
this,  these  concepts  ought  to  have  their  origin  a priori ; but  as 
he  could  not  explain  how  it  was  possible  that  the  understanding 
should  be  constrained  to  think  concepts,  which  by  themselves  are 
not  united  in  the  understanding,  as  necessarily  united  in  the  object, 
and  never  thought  that  possibly  the  understanding  might  itself, 
through  these  concepts,  be  the  author  of  that  experience  in  which 
its  objects  are  found,  he  was  driven  by  necessity  to  derive  them 
from  experience  (namely,  from  a subjective  necessity,  produced 
by  frequent  association  in  experience,  which  at  last  is  wrongly 
supposed  to  be  objective,  that  is,  from  habit) . He  acted,  however, 
very  consistently,  by  declaring  it  to  be  impossible  to  go  with  these 
concepts,  and  with  the  principles  arising  from  them,  beyond  the 
limits  of  experience.  This  empirical  deduction,  which  was  adopted 
by  both  philosophers,  cannot  be  reconciled  with  the  reality  of  our 
scientific  knowledge  a priori,  namely,  pure  mathematics  and  general 
natural  science,  and  is  therefore  refuted  by  facts.  The  former  of 
these  two  celebrated  men  opened  a wide  door  to  fantastic  extrava- 
gance, because  reason,  if  it  has  once  established  such  pretensions, 
can  no  longer  be  checked  by  vague  praises  of  moderation ; the 
other,  thinking  that  he  had  once  discovered  so  general  an  illusion 
of  our  faculty  of  knowledge,  which  had  formerly  been  accepted  as 
reason,  gave  himself  over  entirely  to  scepticism.  We  now  intend 
to  make  the  experiment  whether  it  is  not  possible  to  conduct 

742 


Supplement  XIII 


743 


reason  safely  between  these  two  rocks,  to  assign  to  her  definite 
limits,  and  yet  to  keep  open  for  her  the  proper  field  for  all  her 
activities  ? 

I shall  merely  premise  an  explanation  of  what  I mean  by  the 
categories.  They  are  concepts  of  an  object  in  general  by  which 
its  intuition  is  regarded  as  determined  with  reference  to  one  of  the 
logical functions  in  judgments.  Thus  the  function  of  the  categorical 
judgment  was  that  of  the  relation  of  the  subject  to  the  predicate ; 
for  instance,  all  bodies  are  divisible.  Here,  however,  with  refer- 
ence to  the  pure  logical  employment  of  the  understanding,  it  re- 
mained undetermined  to  which  of  the  two  concepts  the  function 
of  the  subject,  or  the  predicate,  was  to  be  assigned.  For  we  could 
also  say,  some  divisible  is  body.  But  by  bringing  the  concept  of 
body  under  the  category  of  substance,  it  is  determined  that  its 
empirical  intuition  in  experience  must  always  be  considered  as 
subject  and  never  as  predicate  only.  The  same  applies  to  all 
other  categories. 


SUPPLEMENT  XIV 

[See  page  79] 


OF  THE  DEDUCTION  OF  THE  PURE  CONCEPTS  OF 
THE  UNDERSTANDING 

Second  Section 


Transcendental  Deduction  of  the  Pure  Coticepts  of  the  Understanding 


§ 15 


Of  the  Possibility  of  Connecting  (conjunctio)  in  General 

The  manifold  of  representations  may  be  given  in  an  intuition 
which  is  purely  sensuous,  that  is,  nothing  but  receptivity,  and  the 
form  of  that  intuition  may  lie  a priori  in  our  faculty  of  representa- 
tion, without  being  anything  but  the  manner  in  which  a subject  is 
affected.  But  the  connection  ( conjunctio ) of  anything  manifold 
can  never  enter  into  us  through  the  senses,  and  cannot  be  con- 
tained, therefore,  already  in  the  pure  form  of  sensuous  intuition, 
for  it  is  a spontaneous  act  of  the  power  of  representation  ; and  as, 
in  order  to  distinguish  this  from  sensibility,  we  must  call  it  under- 
standing, we  see  that  all  connecting,  whether  we  are  conscious  of 
it  or  not,  and  whether  we  connect  the  manifold  of  intuition  or 
several  concepts  together,  and  again,  whether  that  intuition  be 
sensuous  or  not  sensuous,  is  an  act  of  the  understanding.  This 
act  we  shall  call  by  the  general  name  of  synthesis,  in  order  to 
show  that  we  cannot  represent  to  ourselves  anything  as  connected 
in  the  object,  without  having  previously  connected  it  ourselves, 
and  that  of  all  representations  connection  is  the  only  one  which 
cannot  be  given  through  the  objects,  but  must  be  carried  out  by 

744 


Stipplement  XI  V 


745 


the  subject  itself,  because  it  is  an  act  of  its  spontaneity.  It  can 
be  easily  perceived  that  this  act  must  be  originally  one  and  the 
same  for  every  kind  of  connection,  and  that  its  dissolution,  that  is, 
the  analysis,  which  seems  to  be  its  opposite,  does  always  presup- 
pose it.  For  where  the  understanding  has  not  previously  con- 
nected, there  is  nothing  for  it  to  disconnect,  because,  as  connected, 
it  could  only  be  given  by  the  understanding  to  the  faculty  of 
representation. 

But  the  concept  of  connection  includes,  besides  the  concept  of 
the  manifold  and  the  synthesis  of  it,  the  concept  of  the  unity  of 
the  manifold  also.  Connection  is  representation  of  the  synthetical 
unity  of  the  manifold.1 

The  representation  of  that  unity  cannot  therefore  be  the  result 
of  the  connection  ; on  the  contrary,  the  concept  of  the  connection 
becomes  first  possible  by  the  representation  of  unity  being  added 
to  the  representation  of  the  manifold.  And  this  unity,  which  pre- 
cedes a priori  all  concepts  of  connection,  must  not  be  mistaken  for 
that  category  of  unity  of  which  we  spoke  on  p.  68  • for  all  cate- 
gories depend  on  logical  functions  in  judgments,  and  in  these  we 
have  already  connection,  and  therefore  unity  of  given  concepts. 
The  category,  therefore,  presupposes  connection,  and  we  must  con- 
sequently look  still  higher  for  this  unity  as  qualitative  (see  Suppl. 
XII.  § 12),  in  that,  namely,  which  itself  contains  the  ground  for 
the  unity  of  different  concepts  in  judgments,  that  is,  the  ground 
for  the  very  possibility  of  the  understanding,  even  in  its  logical 
employment. 

§ 16 

The  Original  Synthetical  Unity  of  Apperception 

It  must  be  possible  that  the  I think  should  accompany  all  my 
representations  : for  otherwise  something  would  be  represented 

1 Whether  the  representations  themselves  are  identical,  and  whether  there- 
fore one  can  be  thought  analytically  by  the  other,  is  a matter  of  no  consequence 
here.  The  consciousness  of  the  one  has  always  to  be  distinguished  from  the 
consciousness  of  the  other,  so  far  as  the  manifold  is  concerned  ; and  everything 
here  depends  on  the  synthesis  only  of  this  (possible)  consciousness. 


746 


Supplement  XIV 


within  me  that  could  not  be  thought,  in  other  words,  the  repre- 
sentation would  either  be  impossible  or  nothing,  at  least  so  far  as 
1 am  concerned.  That  representation  which  can  be  given  before 
all  thought,  is  called  intuition , and  all  the  manifold  of  intuition 
has  therefore  a necessary  relation  to  the  I think  in  the  same  sub- 
ject in  which  that  manifold  of  intuition  is  found.  That  representa- 
tion, however  (that  I think),  is  an  act  of  spontaneity,  that  is,  it 
cannot  be  considered  as  belonging  to  sensibility.  I call  it  pure 
apperception,  in  order  to  distinguish  it  from  empirical  appercep- 
tion, or  original  apperception  also,  because  it  is  that  self-conscious- 
ness which  by  producing  the  representation,  I think  (which  must 
accompany  all  others,  and  is  one  and  the  same  in  every  act  of 
consciousness),  cannot  itself  be  accompanied  by  any  other.  I 
also  call  the  unity  of  it  the  transcendental  unity  of  self-conscious- 
ness, in  order  to  indicate  that  it  contains  the  possibility  of  know- 
ledge a priori. 

For  the  manifold  representations  given  in  any  intuition  would 
not  all  be  my  representations,  if  they  did  not  all  belong  to  one 
self-consciousness.  What  I mean  is  that,  as  my  representations 
(even  though  1 am  not  conscious  of  them  as  such),  they  must 
be  in  accordance  with  that  condition,  under  which  alone  they 
can  stand  together  in  one  common  self-consciousness,  because 
otherwise  they  would  not  all  belong  to  me.  From  this  orig- 
inal connection  the  following  important  conclusions  can  be 
deduced. 

The  unbroken  identity  of  apperception  of  the  manifold  that  is 
given  in  intuition  contains  a synthesis  of  representations,  and  is 
possible  only  through  the  consciousness  of  that  synthesis.  The 
empirical  consciousness,  which  accompanies  various  representa- 
tions, is  itself  various  and  disunited,  and  without  reference  to  the 
identity  of  the  subject.  Such  a relation  takes  place,  not  by  my 
simply  accompanying  every  relation  with  consciousness,  but  by 
my  adding  one  to  the  other  and  being  conscious  of  that  act  of 
adding,  that  is,  of  that  synthesis.  Only  because  I am  able  to  con- 
nect the  manifold  of  given  representations  in  one  consciousness,  is 
it  possible  for  me  to  represent  to  myself  the  identity  of  the  con- 
sciousness in  these  representations,  that  is,  only  under  the  supposi- 


Supplement  XIV 


747 


tion  of  some  synthetical  unity  of  apperception  does  the  analytical 
unity  of  apperception  become  possible.1 

The  thought  that  the  representations  given  in  intuition  belong 
all  of  them  to  me,  is  therefore  the  same  as  that  I connect  them  in 
one  self-consciousness,  or  am  able  at  least  to  do  so ; and  though 
this  is  not  yet  the  consciousness  of  the  synthesis  of  representations, 
it  nevertheless  presupposes  the  possibility  of  this  synthesis.  In 
other  words,  it  is  only  because  I am  able  to  comprehend  the 
manifold  of  representations  in  one  consciousness,  that  I call  them 
altogether  my  representations,  for  otherwise,  I should  have  as 
manifold  and  various  a self  as  I have  representations  of  which  I 
am  conscious.  The  synthetical  unity  of  the  manifold  of  intuitions 
as  given  a priori  is  therefore  the  ground  also  of  the  identity  of  that 
apperception  itself  which  precedes  a priori  all  definite  thought. 
Connection,  however,  does  never  lie  in  the  objects,  and  cannot  be 
borrowed  from  them  by  perception,  and  thus  be  taken  into  the 
understanding,  but  it  is  always  an  act  of  the  understanding,  which 
itself  is  nothing  but  a faculty  of  connecting  a priori,  and  of  bring- 
ing the  manifold  of  given  representations  under  the  unity  of  apper- 
ception, which  is,  in  fact,  the  highest  principle  of  all  human 
knowledge. 

It  is  true,  no  doubt,  that  this  principle  of  the  necessary  unity  of 
apperception  is  itself  identical,  and  therefore  an  analytical  proposi- 
tion ; but  it  shows,  nevertheless,  the  necessity  of  a synthesis  of  the 

1 This  analytical  unity  of  consciousness  belongs  to  all  general  concepts,  as 
such.  If,  for  instance,  I think  red  in  general,  I represent  to  myself  a property, 
which  (as  a characteristic  mark)  may  be  found  in  something,  or  can  be  con- 
nected with  other  representations  ; that  is  to  say,  only  under  a presupposed 
possible  synthetical  unity  can  I represent  to  myself  the  analytical.  A repre- 
sentation which  is  to  be  thought  as  common  to  different  representations,  is 
looked  upon  as  belonging  to  such  as  possess,  besides  it,  something  differe7it. 
It  must  therefore  have  been  thought  in  synthetical  unity  with  other  (though 
only  possible)  representations,  before  I can  think  in  it  that  analytical  unity  of 
consciousness  which  makes  it  a conceptus  communis.  The  synthetical  unity 
of  apperception  is,  therefore,  the  highest  point  with  which  all  employment  of 
the  understanding,  and  even  the  whole  of  logic,  and  afterwards  the  whole  of 
transcendental  philosophy,  must  be  connected;  ay,  that  faculty  is  the  under- 
standing itself. 


748 


Supplement  XIV 


manifold  which  is  given  in  intuition,  without  which  synthesis  it 
would  be  impossible  to  think  the  unbroken  identity  of  self-con- 
sciousness. For  through  the  Ego,  as  a simple  representation, 
nothing  manifold  is  given ; in  the  intuition,  which  is  different  from 
that,  it  can  be  given  only,  and  then,  by  connection,  be  thought  in 
one  consciousness.  An  understanding  in  which,  by  its  self-con- 
sciousness, all  the  manifold  would  be  given  at  the  same  time,  would 
possess  intuition;  our  understanding  can  do  nothing  but  think, 
and  must  seek  for  its  intuition  in  the  senses.  I am  conscious, 
therefore,  of  the  identical  self  with  respect  to  the  manifold  of  the 
representations,  which  are  given  to  me  in  an  intuition,  because 
I call  them,  altogether,  my  representations,  as  constituting  one. 
This  means,  that  I am  conscious  of  a necessary  synthesis  of  them 
a priori,  which  is  called  the  original  synthetical  unity  of  appercep- 
tion under  which  all  representations  given  to  me  must  stand,  but 
have  to  be  brought  there,  first,  by  means  of  a synthesis. 


§ *7 

The  Principle  of  the  Synthetical  Unity  of  Apperception  is  the 

Highest  Principle  of  all  Employment  of  the  Understanding 

The  highest  principle  of  the  possibility  of  all  intuition,  in  rela- 
tion to  sensibility,  was,  according  to  the  transcendental  ^Esthetic, 
that  all  the  manifold  in  it  should  be  subject  to  the  formal  condi- 
tions of  space  and  time.  The  highest  principle  of  the  same  possi- 
bility in  relation  to  the  understanding  is,  that  all  the  manifold  in 
intuition  must  be  subject  to  the  conditions  of  the  original  syn- 
thetical unity  of  apperception.1 

All  the  manifold  representations  of  intuition,  so  far  as  they 

1 Space  and  time,  and  all  portions  thereof,  are  intuitions,  and  consequently 
single  representations  with  the  manifold  of  their  content.  (See  the  transcen- 
dental /Esthetic.)  They  are  not,  therefore,  mere  concepts,  through  which  the 
same  consciousness,  as  existing  in  many  representations,  but  intuitions  through 
which  many  representations  are  brought  to  us,  as  contained  in  one  and  in  its 
consciousness;  this  latter,  therefore,  is  compounded,  and  these  intuitions  repre- 
sent the  unity  of  consciousness  as  synthetical,  but  yet  as  primitive.  This  char- 
acter of  singleness  in  them  is  practically  of  great  importance  (see  § 25). 


Supplement  XIV 


749 


are  given  us,  are  subject  to  the  former,  so  far  as  they  must  admit 
of  being  connected  in  one  consciousness,  to  the  latter  ; and  with- 
out that  nothing  can  be  thought  or  known  by  them,  because  the 
given  representations  would  not  share  the  act  of  apperception  (I 
think)  in  common,  and  could  not  be  comprehended  in  one  self- 
consciousness. 

The  understanding  in  its  most  general  sense  is  the  faculty  of 
cognitions.  These  consist  in  a definite  relation  of  given  repre- 
sentations to  an  object ; and  an  object  is  that  in  the  concept  of 
which  the  manifold  of  a given  intuition  is  connected.  All  such 
connection  of  representations  requires  of  course  the  unity  of  the 
consciousness  in  their  synthesis  : consequently,  the  unity  of  con- 
sciousness is  that  which  alone  constitutes  the  relation  of  repre- 
sentations to  an  object,  that  is,  their  objective  validity,  and 
consequently  their  becoming  cognitions,  so  that  the  very  possi- 
bility of  the  understanding  depends  on  it. 

The  first  pure  cognition  of  the  understanding,  therefore,  on 
which  all  the  rest  of  its  employment  is  founded,  and  which  at  the 
same  time  is  entirely  independent  of  all  conditions  of  sensuous 
intuition,  is  this  very  principle  of  the  original  synthetical  unity 
of  apperception.  Space,  the  mere  form  of  external  sensuous 
intuition,  is  not  yet  cognition  : it  only  supplies  the  manifold  of 
intuition  a priori  for  a possible  cognition.  In  order  to  know 
anything  in  space,  for  instance,  a line,  I must  draw  it,  and  pro- 
duce synthetically  a certain  connection  of  the  manifold  that  is 
given,  so  that  the  unity  of  that  act  is  at  the  same  time  the  unity 
of  the  consciousness  (in  the  concept  of  a line),  and  (so  that)  an 
object  (a  determinate  space)  is  then  only  known  for  the  first 
time.  The  synthetical  unity  of  consciousness  is,  therefore,  an  ob- 
jective condition  of  all  knowledge  ; a condition,  not  necessary  for 
myself  only,  in  order  to  know  an  object,  but  one  to  which  each 
intuition  must  be  subject,  in  order  to  become  an  object  for  me, 
because  the  manifold  could  not  become  connected  in  one  con- 
sciousness in  any  other  way,  and  without  such  a synthesis. 

No  doubt,  that  proposition,  as  I said  before,  is  itself  analytical, 
though  it  makes  synthetical  unity  a condition  of  all  thought,  for  it 
really  says  no  more  than  that  all  my  representations  in  any  given 


750 


Supplement  XIV 


intuition  must  be  subject  to  the  condition  under  which  alone  I 
can  ascribe  them,  as  my  representations,  to  the  identical  self,  and 
therefore  comprehend  them,  as  synthetically  connected,  in  one 
apperception  through  the  general  expression,  I think. 

And  yet  this  need  not  be  a principle  for  every  possible  under- 
standing, but  only  for  that  which  gives  nothing  manifold  through 
its  pure  apperception  in  the  representation,  I am.  An  under- 
standing which  through  its  self-consciousness  could  give  the  mani- 
fold of  intuition,  and  by  whose  representation  the  objects  of  that 
representation  should  at  the  same  time  exist,  would  not  require  a 
special  act  of  the  synthesis  of  the  manifold  for  the  unity  of  its  con- 
sciousness, while  the  human  understanding,  which  possesses  the 
power  of  thought  only,  but  not  of  intuition,  requires  such  an  act. 
To  the  human  understanding  that  first  principle  is  so  indispen- 
sable that  it  really  cannot  form  the  least  concept  of  any  other  pos- 
sible understanding,  whether  it  be  intuitive  by  itself,  or  possessed 
of  a sensuous  intuition,  different  from  that  in  space  and  time. 

§ 18 

What  is  the  Objective  Unity  of  Self-consciousness  ? 

The  transcendental  unity  of  apperception  connects  all  the  mani- 
fold given  in  an  intuition  into  a concept  of  an  object.  It  is  there- 
fore called  objective,  and  must  be  distinguished  from  the  subjective 
unity  of  consciousness,  which  is  a form  of  the  internal  sense,  by 
which  the  manifold  of  intuition  is  empirically  given,  to  be  thus 
connected.  Whether  I can  become  empirically  conscious  of  the 
manifold,  as  either  simultaneous  or  successive,  depends  on  cir- 
cumstances, or  empirical  conditions.  The  empirical  unity  of  con- 
sciousness, therefore,  through  the  association  of  representations, 
is  itself  phenomenal  and  wholly  contingent,  while  the  pure  form  of 
intuition  in  time,  merely  as  general  intuition  containing  the  mani- 
fold that  is  given,  is  subject  to  the  original  unity  of  the  conscious- 
ness, through  the  necessary  relation  only  of  the  manifold  of  intui- 
tion to  the  one,  I think,  — that  is,  through  the  pure  synthesis  of 
the  understanding,  which  forms  the  a priori  ground  of  the  empiri- 


Supplement  XI V 


751 


cal  synthesis.  That  unity  alone  is,  therefore,  valid  objectively ; 
the  empirical  unity  of  apperception,  which  we  do  not  consider 
here,  and  which  is  only  derived  from  the  former,  under  given 
conditions  in  concreto,  has  subjective  validity  only.  One  man 
connects  the  representation  of  a word  with  one  thing,  another  with 
another,  and  the  unity  of  consciousness,  with  regard  to  what  is 
empirical,  is  not  necessary  nor  universally  valid  with  reference  to 
that  which  is  given. 


§ 19 

The  Logical  Form  of  all  Judgments  consists  in  the  Objective  Unity 
of  Apperception  of  the  Concepts  contained  therein 

I could  never  feel  satisfied  with  the  definition  of  a judgment  in 
general,  given  by  our  logicians,  who  say  that  it  is  the  representation 
of  a relation  between  two  concepts.  Without  disputing  with  them 
in  this  place  as  to  the  defect  of  that  explanation,  that  it  may  pos- 
sibly apply  to  categorical,  but  not  to  hypothetical  and  disjunctive 
judgments  (the  latter  containing,  not  a relation  of  concepts,  but 
of  judgments  themselves),  — though  many  tedious  consequences 
have  arisen  from  this  mistake  of  logicians,  — I must  at  least  make 
this  observation,  that  we  are  not  told  in  what  that  relation  con- 
sists.1 

But,  if  I examine  more  closely  the  relation  of  given  cognitions 
in  every  judgment,  and  distinguish  it,  as  belonging  to  the  under- 
standing, from  the  relation  according  to  the  rules  of  reproductive 
imagination  (which  has  subjective  validity  only),  I find  that  a 
judgment  is  nothing  but  the  mode  of  bringing  given  cognitions 

1 The  lengthy  doctrine  of  the  four  syllogistic  figures  concerns  categorical 
syllogisms  only,  and  though  it  is  really  nothing  but  a trick  for  obtaining  the 
appearance  of  more  modes  of  concluding  than  that  of  the  first  figure,  by 
secretly  introducing  immediate  conclusions  ( consequentiae  immediatae ) among 
the  premisses  of  a pure  syllogism,  this  would  hardly  have  secured  its  great 
success,  had  not  its  authors  succeeded,  at  the  same  time,  in  establishing  the 
exclusive  authority  of  categorical  judgments,  as  those  to  which  all  others  must 
be  referred.  This  as  we  showed  in  § 9,  p.  62,  is  wrong. 


752 


Supplement  XIV 


into  the  objective  unity  of  apperception.  This  is  what  is  intended 
by  the  copula  is,  which  is  meant  to  distinguish  the  objective  unity 
of  given  representations  from  the  subjective.  It  (the  copula  is) 
indicates  their  relation  to  the  original  apperception,  and  their 
necessary  unity,  even  though  the  judgment  itself  be  empirical,  and 
therefore  contingent ; as,  for  instance,  bodies  are  heavy.  By  this 
I do  not  mean  to  say  that  these  representations  belong  necessarily 
to  each  other,  in  the  empirical  intuition,  but  that  they  belong  to 
each  other  by  means  of  the  necessary  unity  of  apperception  in  the 
synthesis  of  intuitions,  that  is,  according  to  the  principles  of  the 
objective  determination  of  all  representations,  so  far  as  any  cogni- 
tion is  to  arise  from  them,  these  principles  being  all  derived  from 
the  principle  of  the  transcendental  unity  of  apperception.  Thus, 
and  thus  alone,  does  the  relation  become  a judgment , that  is,  a 
relation  that  is  valid  objectively,  and  can  thus  be  kept  sufficiently 
distinct  from  the  relation  of  the  same  representations,  if  it  has 
subjective  validity  only,  for  instance,  according  to  the  laws  of 
association.  In  the  latter  case,  I could  only  say,  that  if  I carry  a 
body  I feel  the  pressure  of  its  weight,  but  not,  that  it,  the  body,  is 
heavy,  which  is  meant  to  say  that  these  two  representations  are 
connected  together  in  the  object,  whatever  the  state  of  the  sub- 
ject may  be,  and  not  only  associated  or  conjoined  in  the  percep- 
tion, however  often  it  may  be  repeated. 

§ 20 

All  Sensuous  Intuitions  are  subject  to  the  Categories  as  to  Condi- 
tions under  which  alone  their  Manifold  Contetits  can  come 
together  in  one  Consciousness 

The  manifold  which  is  given  us  in  a sensuous  intuition  is 
necessarily  subject  to  the  original  synthetical  unity  of  appercep- 
tion, because  by  it  alone  the  unity  of  intuition  becomes  possible 
■(§  7).  That  act  of  the  understanding,  further,  by  which  the 
manifold  of  given  representations  (whether  intuitions  or  concepts) 
is  brought  under  one  apperception  in  general,  is  the  logical  func- 
tion of  a judgment  (§  19).  The  manifold,  therefore,  so  far  as  it 


Supplement  XIV 


7 53 


is  given  in  an  empirical  intuition,  is  determined  with  regard  to 
one  of  the  logical  functions  of  judgment,  by  which,  indeed,  it  is 
brought  to  consciousness  in  general.  The  categories , however,  are 
nothing  but  these  functions  of  judgment,  so  far  as  the  manifold  of 
a given  intuition  is  determined  with  respect  to  them  (§  13,  see 
p.  84).  Therefore  the  manifold  in  any  given  intuition  is  naturally 
subject  to  the  categories. 


§ 21 

Note 

The  manifold,  contained  in  an  intuition  which  I call  my  own, 
is  represented  through  the  synthesis  of  the  understanding,  as  be- 
longing to  the  necessary  unity  of  self-consciousness,  and  this  takes 
place  through  the  category.1 

This  category  indicates,  therefore,  that  the  empirical  conscious- 
ness of  the  manifold,  given  in  any  intuition,  is  subject  to  a pure 
self-consciousness  a priori,  in  the  same  manner  as  the  empirical 
intuition  is  subject  to  a pure  sensuous  intuition  which  likewise 
takes  place  a priori. 

In  the  above  proposition  a beginning  is  made  of  a deduction 
of  the  pure  concepts  of  the  understanding.  In  this  deduction, 
as  the  categories  arise  in  the  understanding  only,  independent  op 
all  sensibility,  I ought  not  yet  to  take  any  account  of  the  manner 
in  which  the  manifold  is  given  for  an  empirical  intuition,  but  attend 
exclusively  to  the  unity  which,  by  means  of  the  category,  enters 
into  the  intuition  through  the  understanding.  In  what  follows 
(§  26)  we  shall  show,  from  the  manner  in  which  the  empirical 
intuition  is  given  in  sensibility,  that  its  unity  is  no  other  than  that 
which  is  prescribed  by  the  category  (according  to  § 20)  to  the 
manifold  of  any  given  intuition.  Thus  only,  that  is,  by  showing 
their  validity  a priori  with  respect  to  all  objects  of  our  senses,  the 
purpose  of  our  deduction  will  be  fully  attained. 

1 The  proof  of  this  rests  on  the  represented  unity  of  intuition,  by  which  an 
object  is  given,  and  which  always  includes  a synthesis  of  the  manifold  which  is 
given  for  an  intuition,  and  contains  the  relation  of  the  latter  to  the  unity  of 
apperception. 

3C 


754 


Supplement  XIV 


There  is  one  thing,  however,  of  which,  in  the  above  demonstra 
tion,  I could  not  make  abstraction  : namely,  that  the  manifold  for 
an  intuition  must  be  given  antecedently  to  the  synthesis  of  the 
understanding,  and  independently  of  it ; — how,  remains  uncer- 
tain. For  if  I were  to  imagine  an  understanding,  itself  intuitive 
(for  instance,  a divine  understanding,  which  should  not  represent 
to  itself  given  objects,  but  produce  them  at  once  by  his  repre- 
sentation), the  categories  would  have  no  meaning  with  respect  to 
such  cognition.  They  are  merely  rules  for  an  understanding  whose 
whole  power  consists  in  thinking,  that  is,  in  the  act  of  bringing  the 
synthesis  of  the  manifold,  which  is  given  to  it  in  intuition  from 
elsewhere,  to  the  unity  of  apperception  ; an  understanding  which 
therefore  knows  nothing  by  itself,  but  connects  only  and  arranges 
the  material  for  cognition,  that  is,  the  intuition  which  must  be 
given  to  it  by  the  object.  This  peculiarity  of  our  understanding 
of  producing  unity  of  apperception  a priori  by  means  of  the  cate- 
gories only,  and  again  by  such  and  so  many,  cannot  be  further 
explained,  any  more  than  why  we  have  these  and  no  other  func- 
tions of  judgment,  and  why  time  and  space  are  the  only  forms  of 
a possible  intuition  for  us. 

§ 22 

The  Category  admits  of  no  other  Employment  for  the  Cognition  of 
Things , but  its  Application  to  Objects  of  Experience 
We  have  seen  that  to  think  an  object  is  not  the  same  as  to 
know  an  object.  In  order  to  know  an  object,  we  must  have  the 
concept  by  which  any  object  is  thought  (the  category),  and  like- 
wise the  intuition  by  which  it  is  given.  If  no  corresponding  in- 
tuition could  be  given  to  a concept,  it  would  still  be  a thought, 
so  far  as  its  form  is  concerned  : but  it  would  be  without  an  object, 
and  no  knowledge  of  anything  would  be  possible  by  it,  because, 
so  far  as  I know,  there  would  be  nothing,  and  there  could  be 
nothing,  to  which  my  thought  could  be  referred.  Now  the  only 
possible  intuition  for  us  is  sensuous  (see  .Esthetic)  ; the  thought 
of  any  object,  therefore,  by  means  of  a pure  concept  of  the  under- 
standing, can  with  us  become  knowledge  only,  if  it  is  referred  to 


Supplement  XIV 


755 


objects  of  the  senses.  Sensuous  intuition  is  either  pure  (spac 
and  time),  or  empirical,  i.e.  if  it  is  an  intuition  of  that  which  ... 
represented  in  space  and  time,  through  sensation  as  immediateh 
real.  By  means  of  pure  intuition  we  can  gain  knowledge  a prioi  i 
of  things  as  phenomena  (in  mathematics),  but  only  so  far  as  their 
form  is  concerned ; but  whether  there  are  things  which  must  be 
perceived,  according  to  that  form,  remains  unsettled.  Mathe- 
matical concepts,  by  themselves,  therefore,  are  not  yet  knowledge, 
except  under  the  supposition  that  there  are  things  which  admit  of 
being  represented  by  us,  according  to  the  form  of  that  pure  sensu- 
ous intuition  only.  Consequently,  as  things  in  space  and  time  are 
only  given  as  perceptions  (as  representations  accompanied  by  sen- 
sations), that  is,  through  empirical  representations,  the  pure  con- 
cepts of  the  understanding,  even  if  applied  to  intuitions  a priori , 
as  in  mathematics,  give  us  knowledge  in  so  far  only  as  these  pure 
intuitions,  and  therefore  through  them  the  concepts  of  the  under- 
standing also,  can  be  applied  to  empirical  intuitions.  Conse- 
quently the  categories,  by  means  of  intuition,  do  not  give  us  any 
knowledge  of  things,  except  under  the  supposition  of  their  possi- 
ble application  to  empirical  intuition;  they  serve,  in  short,  for  the 
possibility  of  empirical  knowledge  only,  which  is  called  experience. 
From  this  it  follows  that  the  categories  admit  of  no  other  employ- 
ment for  the  cognition  of  things,  except  so  far  only  as  these  are 
taken  as  objects  of  possible  experience. 

§ 23 

The  foregoing  proposition  is  of  the  greatest  importance,  for  it 
determines  the  limits  of  the  employment  of  the  pure  concepts 
of  the  understanding  with  reference  to  objects,  in  the  same  man- 
ner as  the  transcendental  TEsthetic  determined  the  limits  of  the 
employment  of  the  pure  form  of  our  sensuous  intuition.  Space 
and  time  are  conditions  of  the  possibility  of  how  objects  can  be 
given  to  us,  so  far  only  as  objects  of  the  senses,  therefore  of 
experience,  are  concerned.  Beyond  these  limits  they  represent 
nothing,  for  they  belong  only  to  the  senses,  and  have  no  reality 
beyond  them.  Pure  concepts  of  the  understanding  are  free  from 


756 


Supplement  XIV 


this  limitation,  and  extend  to  objects  of  intuition  in  general, 
whether  that  intuition  be  like  our  own  or  not,  if  only  it  is  sensu- 
ous and  not  intellectual.  This  further  extension,  however,  of  con- 
cepts beyond  our  sensuous  intuition,  is  of  no  avail  to  us ; for  they 
are  in  that  case  empty  concepts  of  objects,  and  the  concepts  do 
not  even  enable  us  to  say,  whether  such  objects  be  possible  or  not. 
They  are  mere  forms  of  thought,  without  objective  reality  : because 
we  have  no  intuition  at  hand  to  which  the  synthetical  unity  of  apper- 
ception, which  is  contained  in  the  concepts  alone,  could  be  applied, 
so  that  they  might  determine  an  object.  Nothing  can  give  them 
sense  and  meaning,  except  our  sensuous  and  empirical  intuition. 

If,  therefore,  we  assume  an  object  of  a non-sensuous  intuition 
as  given,  we  may,  no  doubt,  determine  it  through  all  the  predi- 
cates, which  follow  from  the  supposition  that  nothing  belonging 
to  sensuous  intuition  belongs  to  it,  that,  therefore,  it  is  not  extended, 
or  not  in  space,  that  its  duration  is  not  time,  that  no  change 
(succession  of  determinations  in  time)  is  to  be  met  in  it,  etc. 
But  we  can  hardly  call  this  knowledge,  if  we  only  indicate  how 
the  intuition  of  an  object  is  not,  without  being  able  to  say  what  is 
contained  in  it,  for,  in  that  case,  I have  not  represented  the  possi- 
bility of  an  object,  corresponding  to  my  pure  concept  of  the 
understanding,  because  I could  give  no  intuition  corresponding 
to  it,  but  could  only  say  that  our  intuition  did  not  apply  to  it. 
But  what  is  the  most  important  is  this,  that  not  even  a single 
category  could  be  applied  to  such  a thing  ; as,  for  instance,  the 
concept  of  substance,  that  is,  of  something  that  can  exist  as  a 
subject  only,  but  never  as  a mere  predicate.  For  I do  not  know 
whether  there  can  be  anything  corresponding  to  such  a determi- 
nation of  thought,  unless  empirical  intuition  supplies  the  case  for 
its  application.  Of  this  more  hereafter. 

§ 24 

Of  the  Applicatio?i  of  the  Categories  to  Objects  of  the  Senses  in 

General 

The  pure  concepts  of  the  understanding  refer,  through  the  mere 
understanding,  to  objects  of  intuition,  whether  it  be  our  own,  or  any 


Supplement  XIV 


757 


other,  if  only  sensuous  intuition,  but  they  are,  for  that  very  reason, 
mere  forms  of  thought,  by  which  no  definite  object  can  be  known. 
The  synthesis,  or  connection  of  the  manifold  in  them,  referred 
only  to  the  unity  of  apperception,  and  became  thus  the  ground 
of  the  possibility  of  knowledge  a priori,  so  far  as  it  rests  on  the 
understanding,  and  is  therefore  not  only  transcendental,  but  also 
purely  intellectual.  Now  as  there  exists  in  us  a certain  form  of 
sensuous  intuition  a priori,  which  rests  on  the  receptivity  of  the 
faculty  of  representation  (sensibility),  the  understanding,  as 
spontaneity,  is  able  to  determine  the  internal  sense  through  the 
manifold  of  given  representations,  according  to  the  synthetical 
unity  of  apperception,  and  can  thus  think  synthetical  unity  of 
the  apperception  of  the  manifold  of  sensuous  intuition  a priori,  as 
the  condition  to  which  all  objects  of  our  (human)  intuition  must 
necessarily  be  subject.  Thus  the  categories,  though  pure  forms  of 
thought,  receive  objective  reality,  that  is,  application  to  objects 
which  can  be  given  to  us  in  intuition,  but  as  phenomena  only  ; for 
it  is  with  reference  to  them  alone  that  we  are  capable  of  intuition 
a priori. 

This  synthesis  of  the  manifold  of  sensuous  intuition,  which  is 
possible  and  necessary  a priori,  may  be  called  figurative  {synthe- 
sis speeiosa),  in  order  to  distinguish  it  from  that  which  is  thought 
in  the  mere  category,  with  reference  to  the  manifold  of  an  intui- 
tion in  general,  and  is  called  intellectual  synthesis  ( synthesis 
intellectualis).  Both  are  transcendental,  not  only  because  they 
themselves  are  carried  out  a priori,  but  because  they  establish 
also  the  possibility  of  other  knowledge  a priori. 

But  this  figurative  synthesis,  if  it  refers  to  the  original  syntheti- 
cal unity  of  apperception  only,  that  is,  to  that  transcendental 
unity  which  is  thought  in  the  categories,  must  be  called  the  tran- 
scendental synthesis  of  the  faculty  of  imagination,  in  order  thus 
to  distinguish  it  from  the  purely  intellectual  synthesis.  Imagina- 
tion is  the  faculty  of  representing  an  object  even  without  its  pres- 
ence in  intuition.  As  all  our  intuition  is  sensuous,  the  faculty  of 
imagination  belongs,  on  account  of  the  subjective  condition  under 
which  alone  it  can  give  a corresponding  intuition  to  the  concepts 
of  the  understanding,  to  our  sensibility.  As,  however,  its  synthesis 


758 


Supplement  XIV 


is  an  act  of  spontaneity,  determining,  and  not,  like  the  senses, 
determinable  only,  and  therefore  able  to  determine  a priori  the 
senses,  so  far  as  their  form  is  concerned,  according  to  the  unity 
of  apperception,  the  faculty  of  imagination  is,  so  far,  a faculty  of 
determining  our  sensibility  a priori , so  that  the  synthesis  of  the 
intuitions,  according  to  the  categories,  must  be  the  transcendental 
synthesis  of  the  faculty  of  imagination.  This  is  an  effect,  produced 
by  the  understanding  on  our  sensibility,  and  the  first  application 
of  it  (and  at  the  same  time  the  ground  of  all  others)  to  objects 
of  the  intuition  which  is  only  possible  to  us.  As  figurative,  it  is 
distinguished  from  the  intellectual  synthesis,  which  takes  place  by 
the  understanding  only,  without  the  aid  of  the  faculty  of  imagina- 
tion. In  so  far  as  imagination  is  spontaneity,  I call  it  occasionally 
productive  imagination : distinguishing  it  from  the  reproductive, 
which  in  its  synthesis  is  subject  to  empirical  laws  only,  namely, 
those  of  association,  and  which  is  of  no  help  for  the  explanation 
of  the  possibility  of  knowledge  a priori,  belonging,  therefore,  to 
psychology,  and  not  to  transcendental  philosophy. 

This  is  the  proper  place  for  trying  to  account  for  the  paradox, 
which  must  have  struck  everybody  in  our  exposition  of  the  form 
of  the  internal  sense  (§  6,  see  p.  28)  ; namely,  how  that  sense 
represents  to  the  consciousness  even  ourselves,  not  as  we  are  by 
ourselves,  but  as  we  appear  to  ourselves,  because  we  perceive 
ourselves  only  as  we  are  affected  internally.  This  seems  to  be 
contradictory,  because  we  should  thus  be  in  a passive  relation  to 
ourselves  ; and  for  this  reason  the  founders  of  the  systems  of 
psychology  have  preferred  to  represent  the  internal  sense  as 
identical  with  the  faculty  of  apperception,  while  we  have  carefully 
distinguished  the  two. 

What  determines  the  internal  sense  is  the  understanding,  and 
its  original  power  of  connecting  the  manifold  of  intuition,  that  is, 
of  bringing  it  under  one  apperception,  this  being  the  very  ground 
of  the  possibility  of  the  understanding.  As  in  us  men  the  under- 
standing is  not  itself  an  intuitive  faculty,  and  could  not,  even  if 
intuitions  were  given  in  our  sensibility,  take  them  into  itself,  in 
order  to  connect,  as  it  were,  the  manifold  of  its  otun  intuition,  the 


Supplement  XIV 


759 


synthesis  of  the  understanding,  if  considered  by  itself  alone,  is 
nothing  but  the  unity  of  action,  of  which  it  is  conscious  without 
sensibility  also,  but  through  which  the  understanding  is  able  to 
determine  that  sensibility  internally,  with  respect  to  the  manifold 
which  may  be  given  to  it  (the  understanding)  according  to  the 
form  of  its  intuition.  The  understanding,  therefore,  exercises  its 
activity,  under  the  name  of  a transcendental  synthesis  of  the  faculty 
of  imagination,  on  the  passive  subject  to  which  it  belongs  as  a 
faculty,  and  we  are  right  in  saying  that  the  internal  sense  is 
affected  by  that  activity.  The  apperception  with  its  synthetical 
unity  is  so  far  from  being  identical  with  the  internal  sense,  that,  as 
the  source  of  all  synthesis,  it  rather  applies,  under  the  name  of 
the  categories,  to  the  manifold  of  intuitions  in  general,  that  is,  to 
objects  in  general  before  all  sensuous  intuition  ; while  the  internal 
sense,  on  the  contrary,  contains  the  mere  form  of  intuition,  but 
without  any  connection  of  the  manifold  in  it,  and  therefore,  as 
yet,  no  definite  intuition,  which  becomes  possible  only  through  the 
consciousness  of  the  determination  of  the  internal  sense  by  the 
transcendental  act  of  the  faculty  of  imagination  (the  synthetical 
influence  of  the  understanding  on  the  internal  sense)  which  I have 
called  the  figurative  synthesis. 

This  we  can  always  perceive  in  ourselves.  We  cannot  think  a 
line  without  drawing  it  in  thought ; we  cannot  think  a circle  with- 
out describing  it ; we  cannot  represent,  at  all,  the  three  dimen- 
sions of  space,  without  placing,  from  the  same  point,  three  lines 
perpendicularly  on  each  other  ; nay,  we  cannot  even  represent 
time,  except  by  attending,  during  our  drawing  a straight  line 
(which  is  meant  to  be  the  external  figurative  representation  of 
time)  to  the  act  of  the  synthesis  of  the  manifold  only  by  which 
we  successively  determine  the  internal  sense,  and  thereby  to  the 
succession  of  that  determination  in  it.  It  is  really  motion,  as  the 
act  of  the  subject  (not  as  the  determination  of  an  object1),  there- 

1 Motion  of  an  object  in  space  does  not  belong  to  a pure  science,  con- 
sequently not  to  geometry,  because  the  fact  that  a thing  is  moveable  cannot 
be  known  a priori,  but  from  experience  only.  Motion,  however,  considered 
as  describing  a space,  is  a pure  act  of  successive  synthesis  of  the  manifold  in 


y6o 


Supplement  XI V 


fore  the  synthesis  of  the  manifold  in  space  (abstraction  being 
made  of  space,  and  our  attention  fixed  on  the  act  only  by  which 
we  determine  the  internal  sense,  according  to  its  form),  which 
first  produces  the  very  concept  of  succession.  The  understanding 
does  not,  therefore,  fijid  in  the  internal  sense  such  a connection 
of  the  manifold,  but  produces  it  by  affecting  the  internal  sense.  It 
may  seem  difficult  to  understand  how  the  thinking  ego  can  be 
different  from  the  ego  which  sees  or  perceives  itself  (other  modes 
of  intuition  being  at  least  conceivable),  and  yet  identical  with 
the  latter  as  the  same  subject,  and  how,  therefore,  I can  say  : I, 
as  intelligence  and  thinking  subject,  know  myself  as  an  object 
thought  so  far  as  being  given  to  myself  in  intuition  also,  but  like 
other  phenomena,  not  as  I am  to  the  understanding,  but  only  as 
I appear  to  myself.  In  reality,  however,  this  is  neither  more  nor 
less  difficult  than  how  I can  be,  to  myself,  an  object,  and,  more 
especially,  an  object  of  intuition  and  of  internal  perceptions.  But 
that  this  must  really  be  so,  can  clearly  be  shown  — if  only  we 
admit  space  to  be  merely  a pure  form  of  the  phenomena  of  the 
external  senses  — by  the  fact  that  we  cannot  represent  to  our- 
selves time,  which  is  no  object  of  external  intuition,  in  any  other 
way  than  under  the  image  of  a line  which  we  draw,  a mode  of 
representation  without  which  we  could  not  realise  the  unity  of  its 
dimension  ; or  again  by  this  other  fact  that  we  must  always  derive 
the  determination  of  the  length  of  time,  or  of  points  of  time  for 
all  our  internal  perceptions,  from  that  which  is  represented  to  us 
as  changeable  by  external  things,  and  have  therefore  to  arrange 
the  determinations  of  the  internal  sense  as  phenomena  in  time,  in 
exactly  the  same  way  in  which  we  arrange  the  determinations  of 
the  external  senses  in  space.  If,  then,  with  regard  to  the  latter, 
we  admit  that  by  them  we  know  objects  so  far  only  as  we  are 
affected  externally,  we  must  also  admit,  with  regard  to  the  in- 
ternal sense,  that  by  it  we  only  are,  or  perceive  ourselves,  as  we 
are  internally  affected  by  ourselves,  in  other  words,  that  with 


external  intuition  in  general  by  means  of  productive  imagination,  and  belongs 
therefore,  by  right,  not  only  to  geometry,  but  even  to  transcendental  philos- 
ophy. 


Supplement  XIV  761 

regard  to  internal  intuition  we  know  our  own  self  as  a phenome- 
non only,  and  not  as  it  is  by  itself.1 

§ 25 

In  the  transcendental  synthesis,  however,  of  the  manifold  of 
representations  in  general,  and  therefore  in  the  original  syntheti- 
cal unity  of  apperception,  I am  conscious  of  myself,  neither  as  I 
appear  to  myself,  nor  as  1 am  by  myself,  but  only  that  I am. 
This  representation  is  an  act  of  thought,  not  of  intuition.  Now, 
in  order  to  know  ourselves,  we  require,  besides  the  act  of  think- 
ing, which  brings  the  manifold  of  every  possible  intuition  to  the 
unity  of  apperception,  a definite  kind  of  intuition  also  by  which 
that  manifold  is  given,  and  thus,  though  my  own  existence  is  not 
phenomenal  (much  less  a mere  illusion),  yet  the  determination 
of  my  existence2  can  only  take  place  according  to  the  form  of 
the  internal  sense,  and  in  that  special  manner  in  which  the  mani- 
fold, which  I connect,  is  given  in  the  internal  intuition.  This 
shows  that  I have  no  knowledge  of  myself  as  I am,  but  only  as  I 

1 I do  not  see  how  so  much  difficulty  should  be  found  in  admitting  that  the 
internal  sense  is  affected  by  ourselves.  Every  act  of  attention  gives  us  an  in- 
stance of  it.  In  such  an  act  the  understanding  always  determines  the  internal 
sense,  according  to  the  connection  which  it  thinks,  to  such  an  internal  intuition 
as  corresponds  to  the  manifold  in  the  synthesis  of  the  understanding.  How 
much  the  mind  is  commonly  affected  thereby  anybody  will  be  able  to  perceive 
in  himself. 

2 The  I think  expresses  the  act  of  determining  my  own  existence.  What 
,s  thus  given  is  the  existence,  but  what  is  not  yet  given,  is  the  manner  in 
which  I am  to  determine  it,  that  is,  in  which  I am  to  place  within  me  the 
manifold  belonging  to  it.  For  that  purpose  self-intuition  is  required,  which 
depends  on  an  a priori  form,  that  is,  on  time,  which  is  sensuous,  and  belongs 
to  our  receptivity  of  what  is  given  to  us  as  determinable.  If,  then,  I have  not 
another  self-intuition  which,  likewise  before  the  act  of  determination,  gives  the 
determining  within  me,  of  the  spontaneity  of  which  I am  conscious  only,  as 
time  gives  the  determinable,  I cannot  determine  my  existence  as  that  of  a 
spontaneously  acting  being,  but  I only  represent  to  myself  the  spontaneity  of 
my  thinking,  that  is,  of  the  act  of  determination,  my  existence  remaining  sen- 
suous only,  that  is,  determinable,  as  the  existence  of  a phenomenon.  It  is, 
however,  on  account  of  this  spontaneity  that  I call  myself  an  intelligence. 


762 


Supplement  XIV 


xopear  to  myself.  The  consciousness  of  oneself  is  therefore  very 
far  from  being  a knowledge  of  oneself,  in  spite  of  all  the  cate- 
gories which  constitute  the  thinking  of  an  object  in  general,  by 
means  of  the  connection  of  the  manifold  in  an  apperception.  As 
for  the  knowledge  of  an  object  different  from  myself  I require, 
besides  the  thinking  of  an  object  in  general  (in  a category),  an 
intuition  also,  to  determine  that  general  concept,  I require  for  the 
knowledge  of  my  own  self,  besides  consciousness,  or  besides  my 
thinking  myself,  an  intuition  also  of  the  manifold  in  me,  to  deter- 
mine that  thought.  I exist,  therefore,  as  such  an  intelligence, 
which  is  simply  conscious  of  its  power  of  connection,  but  with 
respect  to  the  manifold  that  has  to  be  connected,  is  subject  to  a 
limiting  condition  which  is  called  the  internal  sense,  according  to 
which  that  connection  can  only  become  perceptible  in  relations  of 
time,  which  lie  entirely  outside  the  concepts  of  the  understanding. 
Such  an  intelligence,  therefore,  can  only  know  itself  as  it  appears 
to  itself  in  an  intuition  (which  cannot  be  intellectual  and  given 
by  the  understanding  itself) , and  not  as  it  would  know  itself,  if  its 
intuition  were  intellectual. 


§ 26 

Transcendental  Deduction  of  the  Universally  Possible  Employment 
of  the  Pure  Concepts  of  the  Understanding  in  Experience 

In  the  metaphysical  deduction  of  the  categories  their  a priori 
origin  was  proved  by  their  complete  accordance  with  the  general 
logical  functions  of  thought,  while  in  their  transcendental  deduc- 
tion we  established  their  possibility  as  knowledge  a priori  of 
objects  of  an  intuition  in  general  (§  20,  21).  Now  we  have  to 
explain  the  possibility  of  our  knowing  a priori,  by  means  of  the 
categories,  whatever  objects  may  come  before  our  senses,  and  this 
not  according  to  the  form  of  their  intuition,  but  according  to  the 
laws  of  their  connection,  and  of  our  thus,  as  it  were,  prescribing 
laws  to  nature,  nay,  making  nature  possible.  Unless  they  were 
adequate  to  that  purpose,  we  could  not  understand  how  every- 
thing that  may  come  before  our  senses  must  be  subject  to  laws 
which  have  their  origin  a priori  in  the  understanding  alone. 


Supplement  XIV 


763 


First  of  all,  I observe  that  by  the  synthesis  of  apprehension  I 
understand  the  connection  of  the  manifold  in  an  empirical  intub 
tion,  by  which  perception,  that  is,  empirical  consciousness  of  it 
(as  phenomenal),  becomes  possible. 

We  have  forms  of  the  external  as  well  as  the  internal  intuition 
a priori,  in  our  representations  of  space  and  time  : and  to  these 
the  synthesis  of  the  apprehension  of  the  manifold  in  phenomena 
must  always  conform,  because  it  can  take  place  according  to  that 
form  only.  Time  and  space,  however,  are  represented  a priori, 
not  only  as  forms  of  sensuous  intuition,  but  as  intuitions  them- 
selves (containing  a manifold),  and  therefore  with  the  determina- 
tion of  the  unity  of  that  manifold  in  them  (see  transcendental 
^Esthetic1).  Therefore  unity  of  the  synthesis  of  the  manifold 
without  or  within  us,  and  consequently  a connection  to  which 
everything  that  is  to  be  represented  as  determined  in  space  and 
time  must  conform,  is  given  a priori  as  the  condition  of  the 
synthesis  of  all  apprehension  simultaneously  with  the  intuitions, 
not  in  them,  and  that  synthetical  unity  can  be  no  other  but  that 
of  the  connection  of  the  manifold  of  any  intuition  whatsoever  in 
an  original  consciousness,  according  to  the  categories,  only  ap- 
plied to  our  sensuous  intuition.  Consequently,  all  synthesis, 
without  which  even  perception  would  be  impossible,  is  subject 
to  the  categories ; and  as  experience  consists  of  knowledge  by 
means  of  connected  perceptions,  the  categories  are  conditions  of 
the  possibility  of  experience,  and  valid  therefore  a priori  also  for 
all  objects  of  experience. 

*■**♦**»* 

1 Space,  represented  as  an  object  (as  required  in  geometry),  contains  more 
than  the  mere  form  of  intuition,  namely,  the  comprehension  of  the  n anifold, 
which  is  given  according  to  the  form  of  sensibility,  into  a perceptible  (intui- 
table)  representation,  so  that  the  form  of  intuition  gives  the  manifold  only, 
while  the  formal  intuition  gives  unity  of  representation.  In  the  Esthetic  I 
had  simply  ascribed  this  unity  to  sensibility,  in  order  to  show  that  it  precedes 
all  concepts,  though  it  presupposes  a synthesis  not  belonging  to  the  senses, 
and  by  which  all  concepts  of  space  and  time  become  first  possible.  For  as  by 
that  synthesis  (the  understanding  determining  the  sensibility)  space  and  time 
are  first  given  as  intuitions,  the  unity  of  that  intuition  a priori  belongs  to  space 
and  time,  and  not  to  the  concept  of  the  understanding.  (See  § 24.) 


764 


Supplement  XIV 


If,  for  instance,  I raise  the  empirical  intuition  of  a house, 
through  the  apprehension  of  the  manifold  contained  therein,  into 
a perception,  the  necessary  unity  of  space  and  of  external  sensuous 
intuition  in  general  is  presupposed,  and  I draw,  as  it  were,  the 
shape  of  the  house  according  to  that  synthetical  unity  of  the  mani- 
fold in  space.  But  this  very  synthetical  unity,  if  I make  abstrac- 
tion of  the  form  of  space,  has  its  seat  in  the  understanding,  and 
is  in  fact  the  category  of  the  synthesis  of  the  homogeneous  in  intui- 
tion in  general : that  is,  the  category  of  quantity,  to  which  that 
synthesis  of  apprehension,  that  is,  the  perception,  must  always 
conform.1 

Or  if,  to  take  another  example,  I perceive  the  freezing  of  water, 
I apprehend  two  states  (that  of  fluidity  and  that  of  solidity),  and 
these  as  standing  to  each  other  in  a relation  of  time.  But  in  the 
time,  which  as  internal  intuition  I make  the  foundation  of  the 
phenomenon,  I represent  to  myself  necessarily  synthetical  unity 
of  the  manifold,  without  which  that  relation  could  not  be  given  as 
determined  in  an  intuition  (with  reference  to  the  succession  of 
time).  That  synthetical  unity,  however,  as  a condition  a priori, 
under  which  I connect  the  manifold  of  any  intuition,  turns  out  to 
be,  if  I make  abstraction  of  the  permanent  form  of  my  intuition, 
namely,  of  time,  the  category  of  cause,  through  which,  if  I apply 
it  to  my  sensibility,  I determine  everything  that  happens,  according 
to  its  relation  in  time.  Thus  the  apprehension  in  such  an  event, 
and  that  event  itself  considered  as  a possible  perception,  is  subject 
to  the  concept  of  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect.  The  same 
applies  to  all  other  cases. 

******** 

Categories  are  concepts  which  a priori  prescribe  laws  to  all 
phenomena,  and  therefore  to  nature  as  the  sum  total  of  all  phe- 
nomena {natura  materialiter  spectata).  The  question  therefore 

1 In  this  manner  it  is  proved  that  the  synthesis  of  apprehension,  which  is 
empirical,  must  necessarily  conform  to  the  synthesis  of  apperception,  which 
is  intellectual,  and  contained  in  the  category  entirely  a priori.  It  is  one  and 
the  same  spontaneity,  which  there,  under  the  name  of  imagination,  and  here, 
under  the  name  of  understanding,  brings  connection  into  the  manifold  of 
intuition. 


Supplement  XIV 


765 


arises,  as  these  laws  are  not  derived  from  nature,  nor  conform  to 
it  as  their  model  (in  which  case  they  would  be  empirical  only), 
how  we  can  understand  that  nature  should  conform  to  them,  that 
is,  how  they  can  determine  a priori  the  connection  of  the  manifold 
in  nature,  without  taking  that  connection  from  nature.  The  solu- 
tion of  that  riddle  is  this. 

It  is  no  more  surprising  that  the  laws  of  phenomena  in  nature 
must  agree  with  the  understanding  and  its  form  a priori , that  is, 
with  its  power  of  connecting  the  manifold  in  general,  than  that  the 
phenomena  themselves  must  agree  with  the  form  of  sensuous  intui- 
tion a priori.  For  laws  exist  as  little  in  phenomena  themselves, 
but  relatively  only,  with  respect  to  the  subject  to  which,  so  far  as 
it  has  understanding,  the  phenomena  belong,  as  phenomena  exist 
by  themselves,  but  relatively  only,  with  respect  to  the  same  being 
so  far  as  it  has  senses.  Things  by  themselves  would  necessarily 
possess  their  conformity  to  the  law,  independent  also  of  any  under- 
standing by  which  they  are  known.  But  phenomena  are  only 
representations  of  things,  unknown  as  to  what  they  may  be  by 
themselves.  As  mere  representations  they  are  subject  to  no  law 
of  connection,  except  that  which  is  prescribed  by  the  connecting 
faculty.  Now  that  which  connects  the  manifold  of  sensuous  intui- 
tion is  the  faculty  of  imagination,  which  receives  from  the  under- 
standing the  unity  of  its  intellectual  synthesis,  and  from  sensibility 
the  manifoldness  of  apprehension.  Thus,  as  all  possible  percep- 
tions depend  on  the  synthesis  of  apprehension,  and  that  synthesis 
itself,  that  empirical  synthesis,  depends  on  the  transcendental,  and, 
therefore,  on  the  categories,  it  follows  that  all  possible  perceptions, 
everything  in  fact  that  can  come  to  the  empirical  consciousness, 
that  is,  all  phenomena  of  nature,  must,  so  far  as  their  connection 
is  concerned,  be  subject  to  the  categories.  On  these  categories, 
therefore,  nature  (considered  as  nature  in  general)  depends,  as  on 
the  original  ground  of  its  necessary  conformity  to  law  (as  natura 
formaliter  spectata).  Beyond  the  laws,  on  which  nature  hi  gen- 
eral, as  a lawful  order  of  phenomena  in  space  and  time  depends, 
the  pure  faculty  of  the  understanding  is  incapable  of  prescribing 
a priori,  by  means  of  mere  categories,  laws  to  phenomena.  Special 
laws,  therefore,  as  they  refer  to  phenomena  which  are  empirically 


766 


Supplement  XIV 


determined,  cannot  be  completely  derived  from  the  categories, 
although  they  are  all  subject  to  them.  Experience  must  be  super- 
added  in  order  to  know  such  special  laws  : while  those  other  a 
priori  laws  inform  us  only  with  regard  to  experience  in  general, 
and  what  can  be  known  as  an  object  of  it. 

§ 27 

Results  of  this  Deduction  of  the  Concepts  of  the  Understanding 

We  cannot  think  any  object  except  by  means  of  the  categories  ; 
we  cannot  know  any  subject  that  has  been  thought,  except  by 
means  of  intuitions,  corresponding  to  those  concepts.  Now  all 
our  intuitions  are  sensuous,  and  this  knowledge,  so  far  as  its  object 
is  given,  is  empirical.  But  empirical  knowledge  is  experience,  and 
therefore  no  knowledge  a priori  is  possible  to  us,  except  of  objects 
of  possible  experience  only.1 

This  knowledge,  however,  though  limited  to  objects  of  expe- 
rience, is  not,  therefore,  entirely  derived  from  experience,  for  both 
the  pure  intuitions  and  the  pure  concepts  of  the  understanding  are 
elements  of  knowledge  which  exist  in  us  a priori.  Now  there  are 
only  two  ways  in  which  a necessary  harmony  of  experience  with 
the  concepts  of  its  objects  can  be  conceived  ; either  experience 
makes  these  concepts  possible,  or  these  concepts  make  experience 
possible.  The  former  will  not  hold  good  with  respect  to  the 
categories  (nor  with  pure  sensuous  intuition),  for  they  are  con- 
cepts a priori,  and  therefore  independent  of  experience.  To 
ascribe  to  them  an  empirical  origin,  would  be  to  admit  a kind 

1 Lest  anybody  should  be  unnecessarily  frightened  by  the  dangerous  con- 
sequences of  this  proposition,  I shall  only  remark  that  the  categories  are  not 
limited  for  the  purpose  of  thought  by  the  conditions  of  our  sensuous  intuition, 
but  have  really  an  unlimited  field.  It  is  only  the  knowledge  of  that  which  we 
think,  the  determining  of  an  object,  that  requires  intuition,  and  even  in  the 
absence  of  intuition,  the  thought  of  the  object  may  still  have  its  true  and  use- 
ful consequences,  so  far  as  the  subjective  use  of  reason  is  concerned.  That  use 
of  reason,  however,  as  it  is  not  always  directed  to  the  determination  of  the 
object,  that  is,  to  knowledge,  but  also  to  the  determination  of  the  subject,  and 
its  volition,  cannot  be  treated  of  in  this  place. 


Supplement  XIV 


767 


of  generatio  aequivoca.  There  remains,  therefore,  the  second  alter- 
native only  (a  kind  of  system  of  the  epigenesis  of  pure  reason), 
namely,  that  the  categories,  on  the  part  of  the  understanding,  con- 
tain the  grounds  of  the  possibility  of  all  experience  in  general. 
How  they  render  experience  possible,  and  what  principles  of  the 
possibility  of  experience  they  supply  in  their  employment  on  phe- 
nomena, will  be  shown  more  fully  in  the  following  chapter  on  the 
transcendental  employment  of  the  faculty  of  judgment. 

Some  one  might  propose  to  adopt  a middle  way  between  the 
two,  namely,  that  the  categories  are  neither  self-produced  first 
principles  a priori  of  our  knowledge,  nor  derived  from  experience, 
but  subjective  dispositions  of  thought,  implanted  in  us  with  our 
existence,  and  so  arranged  by  our  Creator  that  their  employment 
should  accurately  agree  with  the  laws  of  nature,  which  determine 
experience  (a  kind  of  system  of  preformation  of  pure  reason). 
But,  in  that  case,  not  only  would  there  be  no  end  of  such  an 
hypothesis,  so  that  no  one  could  know  how  far  the  supposition  of 
predetermined  dispositions  to  future  judgments  might  be  carried, 
but  there  is  this  decided  objection  against  that  middle  course 
that,  by  adopting  it,  the  categories  would  lose  that  necessity 
which  is  essential  to  them.  Thus  the  concept  of  cause,  which 
asserts,  under  a presupposed  condition,  the  necessity  of  an  effect, 
would  become  false,  if  it  rested  only  on  some  subjective  neces- 
sity implanted  in  us  of  connecting  certain  empirical  representations 
according  to  the  rule  of  causal  relation.  I should  not  be  able  to 
say  that  the  effect  is  connected  with  the  cause  in  the  object  (that 
is,  by  necessity),  but  only,  I am  so  constituted  that  I cannot 
think  these  representations  as  connected  in  any  other  way. 
This  is  exactly  what  the  sceptic  most  desires,  for  in  that  case  all 
our  knowledge,  resting  on  the  supposed  objective  validity  of  our 
judgments,  is  nothing  but  mere  illusion,  nor  would  there  be  want- 
ing people  to  say  they  know  nothing  of  such  subjective  necessity 
(which  can  only  be  felt)  ; and  at  all  events  we  could  not  quarrel 
with  anybody  about  what  depends  only  on  the  manner  in  which 
his  own  subject  is  organised. 


768 


Supplement  X IV 


Comprehensive  View  of  this  Deduction 

The  deduction  of  the  pure  concepts  of  the  understanding  (and 
with  them  of  all  theoretical  knowledge  a priori ) consists  in  repre- 
senting them  as  principles  of  the  possibility  of  experience,  and  in 
representing  experience  as  the  deter77iination  of  phenomena  in 
space  and  time,  — and,  lastly,  in  representing  that  determination 
as  depending  on  the  principle  of  the  origmal  synthetical  unity  of 
apperception,  as  the  form  of  the  understanding,  applied  to  space 
and  time,  as  the  original  forms  of  sensibility.1 

1 Kant  does  not  carry  the  division  into  paragraphs  in  his  second  edition 
further,  because,  as  he  says,  he  has  to  treat  no  more  of  elementary  concepts, 
and  prefers,  in  representing  their  employment,  to  adopt  a continuous  treat- 
ment, without  paragraphs. 


SUPPLEMENT  XV 

[See  page  132] 


All  conjunction  ( conjunctio ) is  either  composition  ( compositio ) 
or  connection  ( nexus ).  The  former  is  the  synthesis  of  a manifold 
the  parts  of  which  do  not  belong  to  each  other  necessarily.  The 
two  triangles,  for  instance,  into  which  a square  is  divided  by  a 
diagonal,  do  by  themselves  not  necessarily  belong  to  each  other. 
Such  is  also  the  synthesis  of  the  homogeneous , in  everything  that 
can  be  considered  mathematically , and  that  synthesis  can  be 
divided  again  into  aggregation , and  coalition,  the  former  referring 
to  extensive,  the  latter  to  i?itensive  qualities.  The  latter  conjunc- 
tion (nexus)  is  the  synthesis  of  a manifold,  in  so  far  as  its  ele- 
ments belong  to  each  other  necessarily.  Thus  the  accident 
belonging  to  a substance,  or  the  effect  belonging  to  a cause, 
though  heterogeneous,  are  yet  represented  as  a priori  connected, 
which  connection,  as  it  is  not  arbitrary,  I call  dynamical,  because 
it  concerns  the  connection  of  the  existence  of  the  manifold.  This 
may  again  be  divided  into  the  physical  connection  of  phenomena 
among  each  other,  and  their  metaphysical  connection  in  the 
faculty  of  cognition  a priori.  (This  forms  a note  in  the  2nd 
Edition.) 

3D 


769 


SUPPLEMENT  XVI  a 

[See  page  133]  - 


In  the  2nd  Edition  the  title  is 


I 

Axioms  of  Intuition 

Their  principle  is  : All  intuitions  are  extensive  quantities. 

Proof 

All  phenomena  contain,  so  far  as  their  form  is  concerned,  an 
intuition  in  space  and  time,  which  forms  the  a priori  foundation 
of  all  of  them.  They  cannot,  therefore,  be  apprehended,  that  is, 
received  into  empirical  consciousness,  except  through  the  synthe- 
sis of  the  manifold,  by  which  the  representations  of  a definite 
space  or  time  are  produced,  i.e.  through  the  synthesis  of  the 
homogeneous,  and  the  consciousness  of  the  synthetical  unity  of 
that  manifold  (homogeneous).  Now  the  consciousness  of  the 
manifold  and  homogeneous  in  intuition,  so  far  as  by  it  the  repre- 
sentation of  an  object  is  first  rendered  possible,  is  the  concept  of 
quantity  (quantum).  Therefore  even  the  perception  of  an  object 
as  a phenomenon  is  possible  only  through  the  same  synthetical 
unity  of  the  manifold  of  the  given  sensuous  intuition,  by  which 
the  unity  of  the  composition  of  the  manifold  and  homogeneous  is 
conceived  in  the  concept  of  a quantity ; that  is,  phenomena  are 
always  quantities,  and  extensive  quantities ; because  as  intuitions 
in  space  and  time,  they  must  be  represented  through  the  same 
synthesis  through  which  space  and  time  in  general  are  determined. 


770 


SUPPLEMENT  XVI  b 

[See  page  136] 


II 

Anticipations  of  Perception 

Their  principle  is  : In  all  phenomena  the  Real,  which  is  the  object 
of  a sensation,  has  intensive  quantity,  that  is,  a degree. 

Proof 

Perception  is  empirical  consciousness,  that  is,  a consciousness 
in  which  there  is  at  the  same  time  sensation.  Phenomena,  as 
objects  of  perception,  are  not  pure  (merely  formal)  intuitions, 
like  space  and  time  (for  space  and  time  can  never  be  perceived 
by  themselves).  They  contain,  therefore,  over  and  above  the 
intuition,  the  material  for  some  one  object  in  general  (through 
which  something  existing  in  space  and  time  is  represented) ; that 
is,  they  contain  the  real  of  sensation,  as  a merely  subjective  repre- 
sentation, which  gives  us  only  the  consciousness  that  the  subject 
is  affected,  and  which  is  referred  to  some  object  in  general.  Now 
there  is  a gradual  transition  possible  from  empirical  to  pure  con- 
sciousness, till  the  real  of  it  vanishes  completely  and  there  remains 
a merely  formal  consciousness  (a  priori)  of  the  manifold  in  space 
and  time ; and,  therefore,  a synthesis  also  is  possible  in  the  pro- 
duction of  the  quantity  of  a sensation,  from  its  beginning,  that  is, 
from  the  pure  intuition  =0,  onwards  to  any  quantity  of  it.  As 
sensation  by  itself  is  no  objective  representation,  and  as  in  it  the 
intuition  of  neither  space  nor  time  can  be  found,  it  follows  that 
though  not  an  extensive,  yet  some  kind  of  quantity  must  belong 
to  it  (and  this  through  the  apprehension  of  it,  in  which  the  em- 
pirical consciousness  may  grow  in  a certain  time  from  nothing  = o 
to  any  amount).  That  quantity  must  be  intensive,  and  corre- 
sponding to  it,  an  intensive  quantity,  i.e.  a degree  of  influence 
upon  the  senses,  must  be  attributed  to  all  objects  of  perception, 
so  far  as  it  contains  sensation. 


771 


SUPPLEMENT  XVII 

[See  page  144] 


III 

Analogies  of  Experience 

Their  principle  is : Experience  is  possible  only  through  the 
representation  of  a necessary  connection  of  perceptions. 

Proof 

Experience  is  empirical  knowledge,  that  is,  knowledge  which 
determines  an  object  by  means  of  perceptions.  It  is,  therefore, 
a synthesis  of  perceptions,  which  synthesis  itself  is  not  contained 
in  the  perception,  but  contains  the  synthetical  unity  of  the  mani- 
fold of  the  perceptions  in  a consciousness,  that  unity  constituting 
the  essential  of  our  knowledge  of  the  objects  of  the  senses,  i.e.  of 
experience  (not  only  of  intuition  or  of  sensation  of  the  senses). 
In  experience  perceptions  come  together  contingently  only,  so 
that  no  necessity  of  their  connection  could  be  discovered  in  the 
perceptions  themselves,  apprehension  being  only  a composition  of 
the  manifold  of  empirical  intuition,  but  containing  no  representa- 
tion of  the  necessity  of  the  connected  existence,  in  space  and  time, 
of  the  phenomena  which  it  places  together.  Experience,  on  the 
contrary,  is  a knowledge  of  objects  by  perceptions,  in  which  there- 
fore the  relation  in  the  existence  of  the  manifold  is  to  be  repre- 
sented, not  as  it  is  put  together  in  time,  but  as  it  is  in  time, 
objectively.  Now,  as  time  itself  cannot  be  perceived,  the  deter- 
mination of  the  existence  of  objects  in  time  can  take  place  only 
by  their  connection  in  time  in  general,  that  is,  through  concepts 
connecting  them  a priori.  As  these  concepts  always  imply  neces- 
sity, we  are  justified  in  saying  that  experience  is  possible  only 
through  a representation  of  the  necessary  connection  of  percep- 
tions. 


772 


SUPPLEMENT  XVIII 

[See  page  149] 


A.  First  Analogy 

Principle  of  the  Permanence  of  Substance 

In  all  changes  of  phenomena  the  substance  is  permanent,  and  its 
quantum  is  neither  increased  nor  diminished  in  nature. 

Proof 

All  phenomena  exist  in  time,  and  in  it  alone,  as  the  substratum 
(as  permanent  form  of  the  internal  intuition),  can  siniultaneousness 
as  well  as  succession  be  represented.  Time,  therefore,  in  which 
all  change  of  phenomena  is  to  be  thought,  does  not  change,  for  it 
is  that  in  which  simultaneousness  and  succession  can  be  repre- 
sented only  as  determinations  of  it.  As  time  by  itself  cannot  be 
perceived,  it  follows  that  the  substratum  which  represents  time  in 
general,  and  in  which  all  change  or  simultaneousness  can  be  per- 
ceived in  apprehension,  through  the  relation  of  phenomena  to  it, 
must  exist  in  the  objects  of  perception,  that  is,  in  the  phenomena. 
Now  the  substratum  of  all  that  is  real,  that  is,  of  all  that  belongs  to 
the  existence  of  things,  is  the  substance,  and  all  that  belongs  to 
existence  can  be  conceived  only  as  a determination  of  it.  Con- 
sequently the  permanent,  in  reference  to  which  alone  all  temporal 
relations  of  phenomena  can  be  determined,  is  the  substance  in 
phenomena,  that  is,  what  is  real  in  them,  and,  as  the  substratum  of 
all  change,  remains  always  the  same.  As  therefore  substance  can- 
not change  in  existence,  we  were  justified  in  saying  that  its  quan- 
tum can  neither  be  increased  nor  diminished  in  nature. 


773 


SUPPLEMENT  XIX 

[See  page  155] 


B.  Second  Analogy 

Principle  of  the  Succession  of  Time,  according  to  the  Law  of 

Causality 

All  changes  take  place  according  to  the  law  of  connection  between 
cause  and  effect. 

Proof 

(It  has  been  shown  by  the  preceding  principle,  that  all  phenom- 
ena in  the  succession  of  time  are  changes  only,  i.e.  a successive 
being  and  not-being  of  the  determinations  of  the  substance,  which 
is  permanent,  and  consequently  that  the  being  of  the  substance 
itself,  which  follows  upon  its  not-being,  and  its  not-being,  which 
follows  on  its  being,  — in  other  words,  that  an  arising  or  perish- 
ing of  the  substance  itself  is  inadmissible.  The  same  principle 
might  also  have  been  expressed  thus  : all  change  ( succession ) of 
phenomena  consists  in  modification  only,  for  arising  and  perishing 
are  no  modifications  of  the  substance,  because  the  concept  of 
modification  presupposes  the  same  subject  as  existing  with  two 
opposite  determinations,  and  therefore  as  permanent.  After  this 
preliminary  remark,  we  shall  proceed  to  the  proof.) 

I perceive  that  phenomena  succeed  each  other,  that  is,  that 
there  is  a state  of  things  at  one  time  the  opposite  of  which  existed 
at  a previous  time.  I am  therefore  really  connecting  two  percep- 
tions in  time.  That  connection  is  not  a work  of  the  senses  only 
and  of  intuition,  but  is  here  the  product  of  a synthetical  power 
of  the  faculty  of  imagination,  which  determines  the  internal  sense 

774 


Supplement  XIX 


775 


with  reference  to  relation  in  time.  Imagination,  however,  can 
connect  those  two  states  in  two  ways,  so  that  either  the  one  or 
the  other  precedes  in  time  : for  time  cannot  be  perceived  by 
itself,  nor  can  we  determine  in  the  object  empirically  and  with 
reference  to  time,  what  precedes  and  what  follows.  I am,  there- 
fore, conscious  only  that  my  imagination  places  the  one  before, 
the  other  after,  and  not,  that  in  the  object  the  one  state  comes 
before  the  other.  In  other  words,  the  objective  relation  of  phe- 
nomena following  upon  each  other  remains  undetermined  by  mere 
perception.  In  order  that  this  may  be  known  as  determined,  it 
is  necessary  to  conceive  the  relation  between  the  two  states  in  such 
a way  that  it  should  be  determined  thereby  with  necessity,  which 
of  the  two  should  be  taken  as  coming  first,  and  which  as  second, 
and  not  conversely.  Such  a concept,  involving  a necessity  of 
synthetical  unity,  can  be  a pure  concept  of  the  understanding  only, 
which  is  not  supplied  by  experience,  and  this  is,  in  this  case,  the 
concept  of  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect,  the  former  determining 
the  latter  in  time  as  the  consequence,  the  cause  not  being  some- 
thing that  might  be  antecedent  in  imagination  only,  or  might  not 
be  perceived  at  all.  Experience  itself,  therefore,  that  is,  an  em- 
pirical knowledge  of  phenomena,  is  possible  only  by  our  subject- 
ing the  succession  of  phenomena,  and  with  it  all  change,  to  the 
law  of  causality,  and  phenomena  themselves,  as  objects  of  experi- 
ence, are  consequently  possible  according  to  the  same  law  only. 


SUPPLEMENT  XX 

[See  page  172] 


C.  Third  Analogy 

Principle  of  Coexistence,  according  to  the  Law  of  Reciprocity  or 

Community 

All  substances,  so  far  as  they  can  be  perceived  as  coexistent  in 
space,  are  always  affecting  each  other  reciprocally. 

Proof 

Things  are  coexistent  when,  in  empirical  intuition,  the  percep- 
tion of  the  one  can  follow  upon  the  perception  of  the  other,  and 
vice  versa,  which,  as  was  shown  in  the  second  principle,  is  impos- 
sible in  the  temporal  succession  of  phenomena.  Thus  I may  first 
observe  the  moon  and  afterwards  the  earth,  or,  conversely  also, 
first  the  earth  and  afterwards  the  moon,  and  because  the  percep- 
tions of  these  objects  can  follow  each  other  in  both  ways,  I say 
that  they  are  coexistent.  Now  coexistence  is  the  existence  of 
the  manifold  in  the  same  time.  Time  itself,  however,  cannot  be 
perceived,  so  that  we  might  learn  from  the  fact  that  things  exist 
in  the  same  time  that  their  perceptions  can  follow  each  other 
reciprocally.  The  synthesis  of  imagination  in  apprehension  would, 
therefore,  give  us  each  of  these  perceptions  as  existing  in  the  sub- 
ject, when  the  other  is  absent,  and  vice  versa  : it  would  never  tell 
us  that  the  objects  are  coexistent,  that  is,  that  if  the  one  is  there, 
the  other  also  must  be  there  in  the  same  time,  and  this  by  neces- 
sity, so  that  the  perceptions  may  follow  each  other  reciprocally. 
Hence  we  require  a concept  of  understanding  of  the  reciprocal 
sequence  of  determinations  of  things  existing  at  the  same  time, 

776 


Supplement  XX 


777 


but  outside  each  other,  in  order  to  be  able  to  say,  that  the  recip- 
rocal sequence  of  the  perceptions  is  founded  in  the  object,  and 
thus  to  represent  their  coexistence  as  objective.  The  relation 
of  substances,  however,  of  which  the  first  has  determinations  the 
ground  of  which  is  contained  in  the  other,  is  the  relation  of  in- 
fluence, and  if,  conversely  also,  the  first  contains  the  ground  of 
determinations  in  the  latter,  the  relation  is  that  of  community 
or  reciprocity.  Hence  the  coexistence  of  substances  in  space  can- 
not be  known  in  experience  otherwise  but  under  the  supposition 
of  reciprocal  action  : and  this  is  therefore  the  condition  also  of 
the  possibility  of  things  themselves  as  objects  of  experience. 


SUPPLEMENT  XXI 

[See  page  184] 


An  important  protest,  however,  against  these  rules  for  proving 
existence  mediately  is  brought  forward  by  Idealism , and  this  is 
therefore  the  proper  place  for  its  refutation. 

******** 

Refutation  of  Idealism 

Idealism  (I  mean  material  idealism)  is  the  theory  which  de- 
clares the  existence  of  objects  in  space,  without  us,  as  either 
doubtful  only  and  not  demonstrable,  or  as  false  and  impossible. 
The  former  is  the  probletnatical  idealism  of  Descartes,  who  de- 
clares one  empirical  assertion  only  to  be  undoubted,  namely,  that 
of  I am  ; the  latter  is  the  dogmatical  idealism  of  Berkeley,  who 
declares  space  and  all  things  to  which  it  belongs  as  an  inseparable 
condition,  as  something  impossible  in  itself,  and,  therefore,  the 
things  in  space  as  mere  imaginations.  Dogmatic  idealism  is  in- 
evitable, if  we  look  upon  space  as  a property  belonging  to  things 
by  themselves,  for  in  that  case  space  and  all  of  which  it  is  a con- 
dition, would  be  a non-entity.  The  ground  on  which  that  idealism 
rests  has  been  removed  by  us  in  the  transcendental  yEstheiic. 
Problematical  idealism,  which  asserts  nothing,  but  only  pleads  our 
inability  of  proving  any  existence  except  our  own  by  means  of 
immediate  experience,  is  reasonable  and  in  accordance  with  a 
sound  philosophical  mode  of  thought,  which  allows  of  no  decisive 
judgment,  before  a sufficient  proof  has  been  found.  The  required 
proof  will  have  to  demonstrate  that  we  may  have  not  only  an  im- 
agination, but  also  an  experience  of  external  things,  and  this  it 
seems  can  hardly  be  effected  in  any  other  way  except  by  proving 
that  even  our  interna'  experience,  which  Descartes  considers  as 

778 


Supplement  XXI  779 

andoubted,  is  possible  only  under  the  supposition  of  external 
experience. 

Theorem 

The  simple,  but  empirically  determined  Consciousness  of  my  own 
existence , proves  the  Existence  of  objects  in  space  outside 
myself. 

Proof 

I am  conscious  of  my  own  existence  as  determined  in  time, 
and  all  determination  in  time  presupposes  something  permanent 
in  the  perception.1  That  permanent,  however,  cannot  be  an  intui- 
tion within  me,  because  all  the  causes  which  determine  my  exist- 
ence, so  far  as  they  can  be  found  within  me.  are  representations, 
and  as  such  require  themselves  something  permanent,  different 
from  them,  in  reference  to  which  their  change,  and  therefore  my 
existence  in  time  in  which  they  change,  may  be  determined.  The 
perception  of  this  permanent,  therefore,  is  possible  only  through 
a thing  outside  me,  and  not  through  the  mere  representation  of  a 
thing  outside  me,  and  the  determination  of  my  existence  in  time 
is,  consequently,  possible  only  by  the  existence  of  real  things, 
which  I perceive  outside  me.  Now,  as  the  consciousness  in  time 
is  necessarily  connected  with  the  consciousness  of  the  possibility 
of  that  determination  of  time,  it  is  also  necessarily  connected  with 
the  existence  of  things  outside  me,  as  the  condition  of  the  deter- 
mination of  time.  In  other  words,  the  consciousness  of  my  own 
existence  is,  at  the  same  time,  an  immediate  consciousness  of  the 
existence  of  other  things. 

Note  i.  — It  will  have  been  perceived  that  in  the  foregoing 
proof  the  trick  played  by  idealism  has  been  turned  against  it, 
and  with  greater  justice.  Idealism  assumed  that  the  only  im- 
mediate experience  is  the  internal,  and  that  from  it  we  can  no 
more  than  infer  external  things,  though  in  an  untrustworthy  man- 
ner only,  as  always  happens  if  from  given  effects  we  infer  definite 

1 This  passage  has  been  translated  as  amended  by  Kant  himself  in  the 
Preface  to  the  Second  Edition  (p.  386). 


y8o 


Supplement  XXI 


causes  : it  being  quite  possible  that  the  cause  of  the  representa- 
tions, which  are  ascribed  by  us,  it  may  be  wrongly,  to  external 
things,  may  lie  within  ourselves.  We,  however,  have  proved  that 
external  experience  is  really  immediate,1  and  that  only  by  means 
of  it,  though  not  the  consciousness  of  our  own  existence,  yet  its 
determination  in  time,  that  is,  internal  experience,  becomes  pos- 
sible. No  doubt  the  representation  of  I am,  which  expresses  the 
consciousness  that  can  accompany  all  thought,  is  that  which  im 
mediately  includes  the  existence  of  a subject : but  it  does  not  yet 
include  a knowledge  of  it,  and  therefore  no  empirical  knowledge, 
that  is,  experience.  For  that  we  require,  besides  the  thought  of 
something  existing,  intuition  also,  and  in  this  case  internal  intuition 
in  respect  to  which,  that  is,  to  time,  the  subject  must  be  deter- 
mined. For  that  purpose  external  objects  are  absolutely  neces- 
sary, so  that  internal  experience  itself  is  possible,  mediately  only, 
and  through  external  experience. 

Note  2.  — This  view  is  fully  confirmed  by  the  empirical  use  of 
our  faculty  of  knowledge,  as  applied  to  the  determination  of  time. 
Not  only  are  we  unable  to  perceive  any  determination  of  time, 
except  through  a change  in  external  relations  (motion)  with 
reference  to  what  is  permanent  in  space  (for  instance,  the 
movement  of  the  sun  with  respect  to  terrestrial  objects),  but  we 
really  have  nothing  permanent  to  which  we  could  refer  the  con- 
cept of  a substance,  as  an  intuition,  except  matter  only  : and 
even  its  permanence  is  not  derived  from  external  experience,  but 


1 The  immediate  consciousness  of  the  existence  of  external  things  is  not 
simply  assumed  in  the  preceding  theorem,  but  proved,  whether  we  can  under- 
stand the  possibility  of  this  consciousness  or  not.  The  question  with  regard  to 
that  possibility  would  come  to  this,  whether  we  have  an  internal  sense  only, 
and  no  external  sense,  but  merely  an  external  imagination.  It  is  clear,  how- 
ever, that,  even  in  order  to  imagine  only  something  as  external,  that  is,  to 
represent  it  to  the  senses  in  intuition,  we  must  have  an  external  sense,  and 
thus  distinguish  immediately  the  mere  receptivity  of  an  external  intuition  from 
that  spontaneity  which  characterizes  every  act  of  imagination.  For  merely  to 
imagine  an  external  sense  would  really  be  to  destroy  the  faculty  of  intuition, 
which  is  to  be  determined  by  the  faculty  of  imagination. 


Supplement  XXI 


781 


presupposed  a priori  as  a necessary  condition  of  all  determination 
of  time,  and  therefore  also  of1  the  determination  of  the  internal 
sense  with  respect  to  our  own  existence  through  the  existence  of 
external  things.  The  consciousness  of  myself,  in  the  represen- 
tation of  the  ego,  is  not  an  intuition,  but  a merely  intellectual 
representation  of  the  spontaneity  of  a thinking  subject.  Hence 
that  ego  has  not  the  slightest  predicate  derived  from  intuition, 
which  predicate,  as  permanent,  might  serve  as  the  correlate  of 
the  determination  of  time  in  the  internal  sense  : such  as  is,  for 
instance,  impermeability  in  matter,  as  an  empirical  intuition. 

Note  3.  — Because  the  existence  of  external  objects  is  re- 
quired for  the  possibility  of  a definite  consciousness  of  ourselves, 
it  does  not  follow  that  every  intuitional  representation  of  external 
things  involves,  at  the  same  time,  their  existence  ; for  such  a rep- 
resentation may  well  be  the  mere  effect  of  the  faculty  of  imagi- 
nation (in  dreams  as  well  as  in  madness);  but  it  can  be  such  an 
effect  only  through  the  reproduction  of  former  external  percep- 
tions, which,  as  we  have  shown,  is  impossible  without  the  reality 
of  external  objects.  What  we  wanted  to  prove  here  was  only 
that  internal  experience  in  general  is  possible  only  through  exter- 
nal experience  in  general.  Whether  this  or  that  supposed  expe- 
rience be  purely  imaginary,  must  be  settled  according  to  its 
own  particular  determinations,  and  through  a comparison  with 
the  criteria  of  all  real  experience. 


1 Read  der  instead  of  alt. 


SUPPLEMENT  XXII 

[See  page  191] 


******** 

General  Note  on  the  System  of  the  Principles 

It  is  something  very  remarkable  that  we  cannot  understand  the 
possibility  of  anything  from  the  category  alone,  but  must  always 
have  an  intuition  in  order  to  exhibit  by  it  the  objective  reality  of 
the  pure  concept  of  the  understanding.  Let  us  take,  for  instance, 
the  categories  of  relation.  It  is  impossible  to  understand,  from 
mere  concepts  alone  : — 

First,  how  something  can  exist  as  subject  only,  and  not  as 
a mere  determination  of  other  things,  that  is,  how  it  can  be  a sub- 
stance : or, 

Secondly,  how,  because  something  is,  something  else  must  be, 
that  is,  how  something  can  ever  be  a cause  : or, 

Thirdly,  how,  when  there  are  several  things,  something  could 
follow  from  the  existence  of  one  of  them  as  affecting  the  rest,  and 
vice  versa,  so  that  there  should  exist,  in  this  way,  a certain  com- 
munity of  substances.  The  same  applies  to  the  other  categories, 
as,  for  instance,  how  a thing  could  be  of  the  same  kind  as  many 
others,  and  thus  be  a quantity.  So  long  as  there  is  no  intuition, 
we  do  not  know  whether  by  the  categories  we  conceive  an  object, 
nay,  whether  any  object  can  at  all  belong  to  them  : and  thus  we 
see  again  that  by  themselves  the  categories  are  not  knowledge, 
but  mere  forms  of  thought,  by  which  given  intuitions  are  turned 
into  knowledge. 

It  likewise  follows  from  this,  that  no  synthetical  proposition  can 
be  made  out  of  mere  categories,  as,  for  instance,  if  it  is  said  that 
in  everything  existing  there  is  substance,  i.e.  something  that  can 

782 


Supplement  XXII 


78  3 


exist  as  subject  only,  and  not  as  a mere  predicate ; or,  everything 
is  a quantum,  etc.  Here  we  have  really  nothing  whatever  which 
would  enable  us  to  go  beyond  a given  concept,  and  to  connect 
with  it  another.  Hence  no  one  has  ever  succeeded  in  proving 
a synthetical  proposition  by  pure  concepts  of  the  understanding 
only : as,  for  instance,  the  proposition  that  everything  which  exists 
contingently,  has  a cause.  All  that  could  be  proved  was,  that, 
without  such  a relation,  we  could  not  conceive  the  existence  of 
what  is  contingent,  that  is,  that  we  could  not  know  a priori 
through  the  understanding  the  existence  of  such  a thing ; from 
which  it  does  not  follow  in  the  least  that  the  same  condition 
applies  to  the  possibility  of  things  themselves.  If  the  reader  will 
go  back  to  our  proof  of  the  principle  of  causality,  he  will  per- 
ceive that  we  could  prove  it  of  objects  of  possible  experience 
only,  by  saying  that  everything  which  happens  (every  event)  pre- 
supposes a cause.  We  could  prove  it  only  as  the  principle  of  the 
possibility  of  experience,  that  is,  of  the  knowledge  of  an  object, 
given  in  empirical  intuition , but  not  by  means  of  mere  concepts. 
It  is  perfectly  true,  that  nevertheless  this  proposition,  that  every- 
thing contingent  must  have  a cause,  carries  conviction  to  every- 
body from  mere  concepts  : but  it  should  be  observed,  that  in  this 
case  the  concept  of  the  contingent  contains  no  longer  the  cate- 
gory of  modality  (as  something  the  non-existence  of  which  can 
be  conceived),  but  that  of  relation  (as  something  which  can  only 
exist  as  the  consequence  of  something  else).  It  thus  becomes 
in  reality  an  identical  proposition,  namely,  that  that  which  can 
exist  as  a consequence  only  has  its  cause.  And  thus,  when  we 
have  to  give  examples  of  contingent  existence,  we  have  always 
recourse  to  changes , and  not  only  to  the  possibility  of  conceiving 
the  opposite } Change,  however,  is  an  event  which,  as  such,  is 

1 It  is  easy  enough  to  conceive  the  non-existence  of  matter,  but  the  ancients 
did  not  infer  from  this  its  contingency.  Not  even  the  change  of  being  and  not- 
being  of  any  given  state  of  a thing,  which  constitutes  all  change,  can  prove  the 
contingency  of  that  state,  as  if  from  the  reality  of  its  opposite.  The  rest  of  a 
body,  for  instance,  following  on  its  motion,  does  not  yet  prove  the  contingency 
of  that  motion,  because  the  former  is  the  opposite  of  the  latter.  The  opposite 
here  is  opposed  to  the  other,  not  realiter,  but  logically  only.  In  order  to  prove 


7 84 


Supplement  XXII 


possible  through  a cause  only,  and  the  non-existence  of  which 
is  therefore  possible  in  itself.  We  thus  mean  by  contingency,  that 
something  can  exist  as  the  effect  of  a cause  only ; and  if  there- 
fore a thing  is  assumed  to  be  contingent,  it  becomes  a merely 
analytical  proposition  to  say  that  it  has  a cause. 

It  is  still  more  remarkable,  however,  that,  in  order  to  under- 
stand the  possibility  of  things  according  to  the  categories,  and 
thus  to  establish  the  objective  reality  of  the  latter,  we  require  not 
only  intuitions,  but  always  external  intuitions.  Thus,  if  we  take, 
for  instance,  the  pure  concepts  of  relation,  we  find  that : - — 

First,  in  order  to  give  something  permanent  in  intuition,  cor- 
responding to  the  concept  of  substance  (and  thus  to  show  the 
objective  reality  of  that  concept),  we  require  an  intuition  in  space 
(of  matter),  because  space  alone  can  determine  anything  as  per- 
manent, while  time,  and  therefore  everything  that  exists  in  the 
internal  sense,  is  in  a constant  flux. 

Secondly,  that  in  order  to  exhibit  change,  as  the  intuition  corre- 
sponding to  the  concept  of  causality,  we  must  use  motion  as  change 
in  space  for  our  example,  nay,  can  thus  only  gain  an  intuition  of 
changes  the  possibility  of  which  no  pure  understanding  can  ever 
conceive.  Change  is  the  connection  of  contradictory  opposites 
in  the  existence  of  one  and  the  same  thing.  Now,  how  it  is 
possible  that  from  a given  state  another  state,  opposed  to  it, 
should  arise  in  the  same  tiling,  no  reason  can  comprehend  with- 
out an  example;  nay,  without  an  intuition,  cannot  even  render 
it  intelligible  to  itself.  That  intuition,  however,  is  that  of  the 
motion  of  a point  in  space,  the  presence  of  which  in  different 
places  (as  a consequence  of  opposite  determinations)  gives  us, 
for  the  first  time,  an  intuition  of  change  : so  that,  in  order  to 
make  even  internal  changes  afterwards  conceivable  to  ourselves, 
we  must  make  time,  as  the  form  of  the  internal  sense,  figuratively 
comprehensible  to  ourselves  by  means  of  a line,  and  the  internal 

the  contingency  of  the  motion  of  a body,  we  should  have  to  prove  that  instead 
of  the  motion  at  the  antecedent  point  of  time,  it  would  have  been  possible  for 
the  body  to  have  been  at  rest  at  that  very  time,  not  that  it  is  at  rest  afterwards  ; 
for  in  this  case  both  opposites  are  quite  consistent  with  each  other. 


Supplement  XXII 


785 


change  by  means  of  the  drawing  of  that  line  (motion):  in  other 
words,  the  successive  existence  of  ourselves  in  different  states,  by 
means  of  an  external  intuition.  The  real  reason  of  this  lies  in  the 
fact  that  all  change  presupposes  something  permanent  in  intuition, 
in  order  that  it  may  itself  be  perceived  as  change,  while  no  per- 
manent intuition  is  to  be  found  in  the  internal  sense. 

Thirdly,  and  lastly,  the  category  of  community  cannot,  so  far  as 
its  possibility  is  concerned,  be  conceived  by  mere  reason  alone  : 
and  the  objective  reality  of  that  concept  cannot  therefore  be 
possibly  understood  without  intuition,  and  without  external  in- 
tuition in  space.  For  how  should  we  conceive  the  possibility 
that,  when  several  substances  exist,  something  (as  an  effect) 
could  follow  from  the  existence  of  one  of  them  as  affecting 
reciprocally  the  existence  of  the  other,  and  that,  therefore, 
because  there  is  something  in  the  former,  something  must  also 
be  in  the  latter,  which,  from  the  existence  of  the  latter  alone, 
could  not  be  understood?  For  this  is  necessary  to  establish 
community,  though  it  is  utterly  inconceivable  among  things, 
each  of  which  completely  isolates  itself  through  its  substantiality. 
Leibniz,  therefore,  as  he  attributed  community  to  the  substances 
of  the  world,  as  conceived  by  the  understanding  alone,  required 
the  interference  of  a Deity;  because,  as  he  justly  perceived,  such 
community  would  have  been  inconceivable  from  the  existence  of 
such  substances  only.  We,  on  the  contrary,  can  render  the  possi- 
bility of  such  a communion  (of  substances  as  phenomena)  per- 
fectly conceivable  to  ourselves,  if  we  represent  them  to  ourselves 
in  space,  that  is,  in  external  intuition.  For  space  contains,  even 
a priori,  formal  external  relations,  as  conditions  of  the  possibility 
of  the  real  relations  of  action  and  reaction,  that  is,  of  community. 

It  is  easy  to  show,  in  the  same  manner,  that  the  possibility  of 
things  as  quanta,  and  therefore,  the  objective  reality  of  the  cate- 
gory of  quantity,  can  be  exhibited  in  external  intuition  only,  and, 
by  means  of  it  alone,  be  afterwards  applied  to  the  internal  sense. 
But,  in  order  to  avoid  prolixity,  I must  leave  it  to  the  reflection 
of  the  reader  to  find  the  examples  of  this. 

The  whole  of  these  notes  is  of  great  importance,  not  only  as 
confirming  our  previous  refutation  of  idealism,  but  even  more, 


786 


Supplement  XXII 


when  we  come  to  treat  of  self-knowledge  by  mere  internal  con- 
sciousness, and  the  determination  of  our  own  nature,  without  the 
help  of  external  empirical  intuitions,  in  order  to  show  us  the 
limits  of  the  possibility  of  such  knowledge. 

The  last  result  of  the  whole  of  this  section  is  therefore  this : 
All  principles  of  the  pure  understanding  are  nothing  more  than 
a priori  principles  of  the  possibility  of  experience  ; and  to  ex- 
perience alone  do  all  synthetical  propositions  a priori  relate  : 
nay,  their  possibility  itself  rests  entirely  on  that  relation. 


SUPPLEMENT  XXIII 

[See  page  199] 


In  one  word,  none  of  these  concepts  admit  of  being  authenti- 
cated, nor  can  their  real  possibility  be  proved,  if  all  sensuous 
intuition  (the  only  one  which  we  possess)  is  removed,  and  there 
remains  in  that  case  a logical  possibility  only,  that  is,  that  a con- 
cept (a  thought)  is  possible.  This,  however,  does  not  concern 
us  here,  but  only  whether  the  concept  refers  to  an  object  and 
does  therefore  signify  anything. 


787 


SUPPLEMENT  XXIV 

[See  page  203] 


We  are  met  here  by  an  illusion  which  is  difficult  to  avoid.  The 
categories  do  not  depend  in  their  origin  on  sensibility,  like  the 
forms  of  intuition,  space,  and  time,  and  seem,  therefore,  to  admit 
of  an  application  extending  beyond  the  objects  of  the  senses. 
But,  on  the  other  side,  they  are  nothing  but  forms  of  thought,  con- 
taining the  logical  faculty  only  of  comprehending  a priori  in  one 
consciousness  the  manifold  that  is  given  in  intuition,  and  they 
would  therefore,  if  we  take  away  the  only  intuition  which  is  possi- 
ble to  us,  have  still  less  significance  than  those  pure  sensuous 
forms  by  which  at  least  an  object  is  given,  while  a peculiar  mode 
of  our  understanding  of  connecting  the  manifold  (unless  that 
intuition,  in  which  the  manifold  alone  can  be  given,  is  added), 
signifies  nothing  at  all. 

Nevertheless,  it  seems  to  follow  from  our  very  concept,  if  we 
call  certain  objects,  as  phenomena,  beings  of  the  senses,  by  dis- 
tinguishing between  the  mode  of  our  intuition  and  the  nature  of 
those  objects  by  themselves,  that  we  may  take  either  the  same 
objects  in  that  latter  capacity,  though  they  cannot  as  such  come 
before  our  intuition,  or  other  possible  things,  which  are  not 
objects  of  our  senses  at  all,  and  place  them,  as  objects  thought 
only  by  the  understanding,  in  opposition  to  the  former,  calling 
them  beings  of  the  understanding  ( noumena ).  The  question 
then  arises,  whether  .our  pure  concepts  of  the  understanding  do 
not  possess  some  significance  with  regard  to  these  so-called  beings 
of  the  understanding,  and  constitute  a mode  of  knowing  them  ? 

At  the  very  outset,  however,  we  meet  with  an  ambiguity  which 
may  cause  great  misapprehension.  The  understanding,  by  calling 

788 


Supplement  ■ XXI V 


789 


an  object  in  one  aspect  a phenomenon  only,  makes  to  itself,  apaT 
from  that  aspect,  another  representation  of  an  object  by  itself , and 
imagines  itself  able  to  form  coiicepts  of  such  an  object.  As,  then, 
the  understanding  yields  no  other  concepts  but  the  categories,  it 
supposes  that  the  object  in  the  latter  aspect  can  be  thought  at 
least  by  those  pure  concepts  of  the  understanding,  and  is  thus 
induced  to  take  the  entirely  indefinite  concept  of  a being  of  the 
understanding,  as  of  a something  in  general  outside  our  sensibil- 
ity, as  a definite  concept  of  a being  which  we  might  know  to  a 
certain  extent  through  the  understanding. 

If  by  noumenon  we  mean  a thing  so  far  as  it  is  not  an  object 
of  our  sensuous  intuition,  and  make  abstraction  of  our  mode  of 
intuition,  it  may  be  called  a noumenon  in  a negative  sense.  If, 
however,  we  mean  by  it  an  object  of  a non-sensuous  intuition,  we 
admit  thereby  a peculiar  mode  of  intuition,  namely,  the  intellect- 
ual, which,  however,  is  not  our  own,  nor  one  of  which  we  can 
understand  even  the  possibility.  This  would  be  the  noumenon  in 
a positive  sense. 

The  doctrine  of  sensibility  is  at  the  same  time  the  doctrine  of 
noumena  in  their  negative  sense  ; that  is,  of  things  which  the 
understanding  must  think  without  reference  to  our  mode  of  intui- 
tion, and  therefore,  not  as  phenomena  only,  but  as  things  by 
themselves,  but  to  which,  after  it  has  thus  separated  them,  the 
understanding  knows  that  it  must  not,  in  this  new  aspect,  apply 
its  categories ; because  these  categories  have  significance  only 
with  reference  to  the  unity  of  intuitions  in  space  and  time,  and 
can  therefore  a priori  determine  that  unity,  on  account  of  the 
mere  ideality  of  space  and  time  only,  by  means  of  general  con- 
necting concepts.  Where  that  unity  in  time  cannot  be  found, 
i.e  in  the  noumenon,  the  whole  use,  nay,  the  whole  significance 
of  categories  comes  to  an  end  : because  even  the  possibility  of 
things  that  should  correspond  to  the  categories,  would  be  unin- 
telligible. On  this  point  I may  refer  the  reader  to  what  I have 
said  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  general  note  to  the  previous 
chapter  (Suppl.  XXII).  The  possibility  of  a thing  can  never  be 
proved  from  the  fact  that  its  concept  is  not  self-contradictory,  but 
only  by  being  authenticated  by  an  intuition  corresponding  to  it. 


7 90 


Supplement  XXIV 


If,  therefore,  we  attempted  to  apply  the  categories  to  objects 
which  are  not  considered  as  phenomena,  we  should  have  to  admit 
an  intuition  other  than  the  sensuous,  and  thus  the  object  would 
become  a noumenon  in  a positive  sense.  As,  however,  such  an 
intuition,  namely,  an  intellectual  one,  is  entirely  beyond  our 
faculty  of  knowledge,  the  use  of  the  categories  also  can  never 
reach  beyond  the  limits  of  the  objects  of  experience.  Beings  of 
the  understanding  correspond  no  doubt  to  beings  of  the  senses, 
and  there  may  be  beings  of  the  understanding  to  which  our  faculty 
of  sensuous  intuition  has  no  relation  at  all ; but  our  concepts  of 
the  understanding,  being  forms  of  thought  for  our  sensuous  intui- 
tion only,  do  not  reach  so  far,  and  what  is  called  by  us  a noume- 
non must  be  understood  as  such  in  a negative  sense  only. 


SUPPLEMENT  XXV 

[See  page  209] 


We  must  not  speak,  as  is  often  done,  of  an  intellectual  world, 
for  intellectual  and  sensitive  apply  to  knowledge  only.  That,  how- 
ever, to  which  the  one  or  the  other  mode  of  intuition  applies, 
that  is,  the  objects  themselves,  must,  however  harsh  it  may  sound, 
be  called  intelligible  or  sensible. 


791 


SUPPLEMENT  XXVI 

[See  page  274] 


Metaphysic  has  for  the  real  object  of  its  investigations  three 
ideas  only,  God , Freedom,  and  Immortality ; the  second  concept 
connected  with  the  first  leading  by  necessity  to  the  third  as 
conclusion.  Everything  else  treated  by  that  science  is  a means 
only  in  order  to  establish  those  ideas  and  their  reality.  Meta- 
physic does  not  require  these  ideas  for  the  sake  of  natural 
science  ; but  in  order  to  go  beyond  nature.  A right  insight  into 
them  would  make  theology,  morality,  and,  by  the  union  of  both, 
religion  also,  therefore  the  highest  objects  of  our  existence,  depend- 
ent on  the  speculative  faculty  of  reason  only,  and  on  nothing 
else.  In  a systematical  arrangement  of  those  ideas  the  above 
order,  being  synthetical,  would  be  the  most  appropriate  ; but  in 
their  elaboration,  which  must  necessarily  come  first,  the  analytical 
or  inverse  order  is  more  practical,  enabling  us,  by  starting  from 
what  is  given  us  by  experience,  namely,  the  study  of  the  soul 
(psychology),  and  proceeding  thence  to  the  study  of  the  world 
(cosmology),  and  lastly,  to  a knowledge  of  God  (theology),  to 
carry  out  the  whole  of  our  great  plan  in  its  entirety. 


792 


SUPPLEMENT  XXVII 

[See  page  284] 


We  shall  therefore  follow  it  with  a critical  eye  through  all  the 
predicaments  of  pure  psychology ; but  we  shall,  for  the  sake  ol 
brevity,  let  their  examination  proceed  uninterruptedly. 

The  following  general  remark  may  at  the  very  outset  make  us 
more  attentive  to  this  mode  of  syllogism.  I do  not  know  any 
object  by  merely  thinking,  but  only  by  determining  a given  intui- 
tion with  respect  to  that  unity  of  consciousness  in  which  all  thought 
consists ; therefore,  I do  not  know  myself  by  being  conscious  of 
myself,  as  thinking,  but  only  if  I am  conscious  of  the  intuition 
of  myself  as  determined  with  respect  to  the  function  of  thought. 
All  modes  of  self-consciousness  in  thought  are  therefore  by  them- 
selves not  yet  concepts  of  understanding  of  objects  (categories), 
but  mere  logical  functions,  which  present  no  object  to  our  thought 
to  be  known,  and  therefore  do  not  present  myself  either  as  an 
object.  It  is  not  a consciousness  of  the  determining,  but  only 
that  of  the  determinable  self,  that  is,  of  my  internal  intuition  (so 
far  as  the  manifold  in  it  can  be  connected  in  accordance  with  the 
general  condition  of  the  unity  of  apperception  in  thought)  which 
forms  the  object. 

1.  In  all  judgments  I am  always  the  determining  subject  only 
of  the  relation  which  constitutes  the  judgment.  That  I,  who 
think,  can  be  considered  in  thinking  as  subject  only,  and  as  some- 
thing not  simply  inherent  in  the  thinking,  as  predicate,  is  an 
apodictical  and  even  identical  proposition  ; but  it  does  not  mean 
that,  as  an  object,  I am  a self-dependent  being  or  a substance. 
The  latter  would  be  saying  a great  deal,  and  requires  for  its  sup- 
port data  which  are  not  found  in  the  thinking,  perhaps  (so  far  as 

793 


794  Supplement  XXVII 

I consider  only  the  thinking  subject  as  such)  more  than  I shah 
ever  find  in  it. 

2.  That  the  Ego  of  apperception,  and  therefore  the  Ego  in 
every  act  of  thought,  is  a singular  which  cannot  be  dissolved  into 
a plurality  of  subjects,  and  that  it  therefore  signifies  a logically 
simple  subject,  follows  from  the  very  concept  of  thinking,  and  is 
consequently  an  analytical  proposition.  But  this  does  not  mean 
that  a thinking  Ego  is  a simple  substance,  which  would  indeed  be 
a synthetical  proposition.  The  concept  of  substance  always  re- 
lates to  intuitions  which,  with  me,  cannot  be  other  but  sensuous, 
and  which  therefore  lie  completely  outside  the  field  of  the  under- 
standing and  its  thinking,  which  alone  is  intended  here,  when  we 
say  that  the  Ego,  in  thinking,  is  simple.  It  would  indeed  be 
strange,  if  what  elsewhere  requires  so  great  an  effort,  namely,  to 
distinguish  in  what  is  given  by  intuition  what  is  substance,  and 
still  more,  whether  that  substance  can  be  simple  (as  in  the  case 
of  the  component  parts  of  matter) , should  in  our  case  be  given 
to  us  so  readily  in  what  is  really  the  poorest  of  all  representations, 
and,  as  it  were,  by  an  act  of  revelation. 

3.  The  proposition  of  the  identity  of  myself  amidst  the  mani- 
fold of  which  I am  conscious,  likewise  follows  from  the  concepts 
themselves,  and  is  therefore  analytical ; but  the  identity  of  the 
subject  of  which,  in  all  its  representations,  I may  become  con- 
scious, does  not  refer  to  the  intuition  by  which  it  is  given  as  an 
object,  and  cannot  therefore  signify  the  identity  of  the  person, 
by  which  is  understood  the  consciousness  of  the  identity  of  one’s 
own  substance,  as  a thinking  being,  in  all  the  changes  of  circum- 
stances. In  order  to  prove  this,  the  mere  analysis  of  the  propo- 
sition, I think,  would  avail  nothing : but  different  synthetical 
judgments  would  be  required,  which  are  based  on  the  given 
intuition. 

4.  To  say  that  I distinguish  my  own  existence,  as  that  of  a 
thinking  being,  from  other  things  outside  me  (one  of  them  being 
my  body)  is  likewise  an  analytical  proposition  ; for  other  things 
are  things  which  I conceive  as  different  from  myself.  But,  whether 
such  a consciousness  of  myself  is  even  possible  without  things 
outside  me,  whereby  representations  are  given  to  me,  and  whether 


Supplement  XXVII  795 

I could  exist  merely  as  a thinking  being  (without  being  a man), 
I do  not  know  at  all  by  that  proposition. 

Nothing  therefore  is  gained  by  the  analysis  of  the  conscious- 
ness of  myself,  in  thought  in  general,  towards  the  knowledge  of 
myself  as  an  object.  The  logical  analysis  of  thinking  in  general 
is  simply  mistaken  for  a metaphysical  determination  of  the 
object. 

It  would  be  a great,  nay,  even  the  only  objection  to  the  whole 
of  our  critique,  if  there  were  a possibility  of  proving  a priori  that 
all  thinking  beings  are  by  themselves  simple  substances,  that  as 
such  (as  a consequence  of  the  same  argument)  personality  is  in- 
separable from  them,  and  that  they  are  conscious  of  their  exist- 
ence as  distinct  from  all  matter.  For  we  should  thus  have  made 
a step  beyond  the  world  of  sense  and  entered  into  the  field  of 
noumena,  and  after  that  no  one  could  dare  to  question  our  right 
of  advancing  further,  of  settling  in  it,  and,  as  each  of  us  is 
favoured  by  luck,  taking  possession  of  it.  The  proposition  that 
every  thinking  being  is,  as  such,  a simple  substance,  is  synthetical 
a priori , because,  first,  it  goes  beyond  the  concept  on  which  it  rests, 
and  adds  to  act  of  thinking  in  general  the  mode  of  existence ; and 
secondly,  because  it  adds  to  that  concept  a predicate  (simplicity) 
which  cannot  be  given  in  any  experience.  Hence  synthetical 
propositions  a priori  would  be  not  only  admissible,  as  we  main- 
tained, in  reference  to  objects  of  possible  experience,  and  then 
only  as  principles  of  the  possibility  of  that  experience,  but  could 
be  extended  to  things  in  general  and  to  things  by  themselves,  a 
result  which  would  put  an  end  to  the  whole  of  our  critique,  and 
bid  us  to  leave  everything  as  we  found  it.  However,  the  danger 
is  not  so  great,  if  only  we  look  more  closely  into  the  matter. 

In  this  process  of  rational  psychology,  there  lurks  a paralogism, 
which  may  be  represented  by  the  following  syllogism. 

That  which  cannot  be  conceived  otherwise  than  as  a subject, 
does  not  exist  otherwise  than  as  a subject,  and  is  therefore  a 
substance. 

A thinking  being,  considered  as  such,  cannot  be  conceived 
otherwise  than  as  a subject. 

Therefore  it  exists  also  as  such  only,  that  is,  as  a substance. 


796 


Supplement  XXVII 


In  the  major  they  speak  of  a being  that  can  be  thought  hi 
every  respect,  and  therefore  also  as  it  may  be  given  in  intuition. 
In  the  minor,  however,  they  speak  of  it  only  so  far  as  it  considers 
itself,  as  subject,  with  respect  to  the  thinking  and  the  unity  of 
consciousness  only,  but  not  at  the  same  time  in  respect  to  the 
intuition  whereby  this  unity  is  given  as  an  object  of  thinking 
The  conclusion,  therefore,  has  been  drawn  by  a sophism,  and  more 
especially  by  sophisma  figurae  dictionis } 

That  we  are  perfectly  right  in  thus  resolving  that  famous  argu- 
ment into  a paralogism,  will  be  clearly  seen  by  referring  to  the 
general  note  on  the  systematical  representation  of  the  principles, 
and  to  the  section  on  the  noumena,  for  it  has  been  proved  there 
that  the  concept  of  a thing,  which  can  exist  by  itself  as  a subject, 
and  not  as  a mere  predicate,  carries  as  yet  no  objective  reality, 
that  is,  that  we  cannot  know  whether  any  object  at  all  belongs  to 
it,  it  being  impossible  for  us  to  understand  the  possibility  of  such 
a mode  of  existence.  It  yields  us  therefore  no  knowledge  at  all. 
If  such  a concept  is  to  indicate,  under  the  name  of  a substance,  an 
object  that  can  be  given,  and  thus  become  knowledge,  it  must  be 
made  to  rest  on  a permanent  intuition,  as  the  indispensable  condi- 
tion of  the  objective  reality  of  a concept,  that  is,  as  that  by  which 
alone  the  object  can  be  given.  In  internal  intuition,  however,  we 
have  nothing  permanent,  for  the  Ego  is  only  the  consciousness  of 
my  thinking ; and  if  we  do  not  go  beyond  this  thinking,  we  are 
without  the  necessary  condition  for  applying  the  concept  of  sub- 

1 The  thinking  is  taken  in  each  of  the  two  premisses  in  a totally  different 
meaning : — in  the  major,  as  it  refers  to  an  object  in  general  (and  therefore 
also  as  it  may  be  given  in  intuition),  but  in  the  minor,  only  as  it  exists  in  its 
relation  to  self-consciousness,  where  no  object  is  thought  of,  but  where  we 
only  represent  the  relation  to  the  self  as  the  subject  (as  the  form  of  thought). 
In  the  former,  things  are  spoken  of  that  cannot  be  conceived  otherwise  than 
as  subjects;  while  in  the  second  we  do  not  speak  of  things,  but  of  the  thinking 
(abstraction  being  made  of  all  objects),  wherein  the  Ego  always  serves  as  the 
subject  of  consciousness.  The  conclusion,  therefore,  ought  not  to  be  that  I 
cannot  exist  otherwise  than  as  a subject,  but  only,  that  in  thinking  my  existence 
I can  use  myself  as  the  subject  of  a judgment  only.  This  is  an  identical 
proposition,  and  teaches  us  nothing  whatever  as  to  the  mode  of  our  existence. 


Supplement  XX  VII 


797 


stance,  that  is,  of  an  independent  subject,  to  the  self,  as  a thinking 
being.  Thus  the  simplicity  of  the  substance  entirely  disappears 
with  the  objective  reality  of  the  concept : and  is  changed  into 
a purely  logical  qualitative  unity  of  self-consciousness  in  thinking 
in  general,  whether  the  subject  be  composite  or  not. 

Refutation  of  Mendelssohn's  Proof  of  the  Permanence  of  the  Soui 

This  acute  philosopher  perceived  very  quickly  how  the  ordinary 
argument  that  the  soul  (if  it  is  once  admitted  to  be  a simple 
being)  cannot  cease  to  exist  by  decomposition,  was  insufficient  to 
prove  its  necessary  continuance,  because  it  might  cease  to  exist 
by  simply  vanishing.  He  therefore  tried,  in  his  Phaedon,  to  prove 
that  the  soul  was  not  liable  to  that  kind  of  perishing  which  would 
be  a real  annihilation,  by  endeavouring  to  show  that  a simple 
being  cannot  cease  to  exist,  because  as  it  could  not  be  diminished, 
and  thus  gradually  lose  something  of  its  existence,  and  be  changed, 
by  little  and  little,  into  nothing  (it  having  no  parts,  and  therefore 
no  plurality  in  itself),  there  could  be  no  time  between  the  one 
moment  in  which  it  exists,  and  the  other  in  which  it  exists  no 
longer;  and  this  would  be  impossible. 

He  did  not  consider,  however,  that,  though  we  might  allow  to 
the  soul  this  simple  nature,  namely,  that  it  contains  nothing  mani- 
fold, nothing  by  the  side  of  each  other,  and  therefore  no  extensive 
quantity,  yet  we  could  not  deny  to  it,  as  little  as  to  any  other 
existing  thing,  intensive  quantity,  i.e.  a degree  of  reality  with 
respect  to  all  its  faculties,  nay,  to  all  which  constitutes  its  exist- 
ence. Such  a degree  of  reality  might  diminish  by  an  infinite 
number  of  smaller  degrees,  and  thus  the  supposed  substance  (the 
thing,  the  permanence  of  which  has  not  yet  been  established), 
might  be  changed  into  nothing,  not  indeed  through  decomposi- 
tion, but  through  a gradual  remission  of  its  powers,  or,  if  I may 
say  so,  through  elanguescence.  For  even  consciousness  has  always 
a degree,  which  admits  of  being  diminished,1  and  therefore  also 

1 Clearness  is  not,  as  the  logicians  maintain,  the  consciousness  of  a repre- 
sentation; for  a certain  degree  of  consciousness,  though  insufficient  for  recol- 


yg8  Supplement  XX  VII 

the  faculty  of  being  conscious  of  oneself,  as  well  as  all  other 
faculties. 

The  permanence  of  the  soul,  therefore,  considered  merely  as 
an  object  of  the  internal  sense,  remains  undemonstrated  and  un- 
demonstrable,  though  its  permanence  in  life,  while  the  thinking 
being  (as  man)  is  at  the  same  time  to  itself  an  object  of  the 
external  senses,  is  clear  by  itself.  But  this  does  not  satisfy  the 
rational  psychologist,  who  undertakes  to  prove,  from  mere  con- 
cepts, the  absolute  permanence  of  the  soul,  even  beyond  this 
life.1 

lection,  must  exist,  even  in  many  dark  representations,  because  without  all 
consciousness  we  should  make  no  distinction  in  the  connection  of  dark  repre- 
sentations, which  yet  we  are  able  to  do  with  the  notae  of  many  concepts  (such 
as  those  of  right  and  justice,  or  as  the  musician  does  who  in  improvising 
strikes  several  keys  at  once).  A representation  is  clear  in  which  the  con- 
sciousness is  sufficient  for  a consciousness  of  its  difference  from  others.  If  the 
consciousness  is  sufficient  for  distinguishing,  but  not  for  a consciousness  of  the 
difference,  the  representation  would  still  have  to  be  called  dark.  There  is, 
therefore,  an  infinite  number  of  degrees  of  consciousness,  down  to  its  com- 
plete vanishing. 

1 Those  who,  in  establishing  the  possibility  of  a new  theory,  imagine  that 
they  have  done  enough  if  they  can  show  triumphantly  that  no  one  can  show 
a contradiction  in  their  premisses  (as  do  those  who  believe  that  they  under- 
stand the  possibility  of  thinking,  of  which  they  have  an  example  in  the  empiri- 
cal intuitions  of  human  life  only,  even  after  the  cessation  of  life)  can  be  greatly 
embarrassed  by  other  possible  theories,  which  are  not  a whit  bolder  than  their 
own.  Such  is,  for  instance,  the  possibility  of  a division  of  simple  substance  into 
several,  or  of  the  coalition  of  several  substances  into  one  simple  substance. 
For  although  divisibility  presupposes  a composite,  it  does  not  necessarily  re- 
quire a composite  of  substances,  but  of  degrees  only  (of  the  manifold  faculties) 
of  one  and  the  same  substance.  As,  then,  we  may  conceive  all  powers  and 
faculties  of  the  soul,  even  that  of  consciousness,  as  diminished  by  one-half,  the 
substance  still  remaining,  we  may  also  represent  to  ourselves,  without  any  con- 
tradiction, that  extinguished  half  as  preserved,  though  not  within  it,  but  outside 
it,  so  that  as  the  whole  of  what  is  real  in  it  and  has  a degree,  and  therefore 
the  whole  existence  of  it,  without  any  rest,  has  been  halved,  another  separate 
substance  would  arise  apart  from  it.  For  the  plurality,  which  has  been 
divided,  existed  before,  though  not  as  a plurality  of  substances,  yet  of  every 
reality  as  a quantum  of  existence  in  it,  and  the  unity  of  substance  was  only  a 
mode  of  existence,  which  by  mere  division  has  been  changed  into  a plurality 


Supplement  XXVII 


799 


If  now  we  take  the  above  propositions  in  synthetical  connection, 
as  indeed  they  must  be  taken,  as  valid  for  all  thinking  beings,  in 
a system  of  rational  psychology,  and  proceed  from  the  category  of 
relation,  with  the  proposition,  all  thinking  beings,  as  such,  are 
substances,  backwards  through  the  series  till  the  circle  is  com- 
pleted, we  arrive  in  the  end  at  their  existence,  and  this,  according 
to  that  system,  they  are  not  only  conscious  of,  independently  of 
external  things,  but  are  supposed  to  be  able  to  determine  it  even 
of  themselves  (with  respect  to  that  permanence  which  necessarily 
belongs  to  the  character  of  substance).  Hence  it  follows,  that  in 
this  rationalistic  system  idealism  is  inevitable,  at  least  problematical 
idealism,  because,  if  the  existence  of  external  things  is  not  required 
at  all  for  the  determination  of  one’s  own  existence  in  time,  their 
existence  is  really  a gratuitous  assumption  of  which  no  proof  can 
ever  be  given. 

If,  on  the  contrary,  we  proceed  analytically,  taking  the  proposi- 
tion, I think,  which  involves  existence  (according  to  the  category 

of  substantiality.  In  the  same  manner  several  simple  substances  might  coalesce 
again  into  one,  nothing  being  lost  thereby,  but  merely  the  plurality  of  substan- 
tiality; so  that  one  substance  would  contain  in  itself  the  degree  of  reality  of 
all  former  substances  together.  We  might  suppose  that  the  simple  substances 
which  give  us  matter  as  a phenomenon  (not  indeed  through  a mechanical  or 
chemical  influence  upon  each  other,  but  yet,  it  may  be,  by  some  unknown 
influence,  of  which  the  former  is  only  a manifestation),  produce  by  such  a 
dynamical  division  of  parental  souls,  taken  as  intensive  quantities,  what  may 
be  called  child-souls,  while  they  themselves  repair  their  loss  again  through  a 
coalition  with  new  matter  of  the  same  kind.  I am  far  from  allowing  the 
slightest  value  of  validity  to  such  vague  speculations,  and  I hope  that  the 
principles  of  our  Analytic  have  given  a sufficient  warning  against  using 
the  categories  (as,  for  instance,  that  of  substance)  for  any  but  empirical  pur- 
poses. But  if  the  rationalist  is  bold  enough  to  create  an  independent  being 
out  of  the  mere  faculty  of  thought,  without  any  permanent  intuition,  by  which 
an  object  can  be  given,  simply  because  the  unity  of  apperception  in  thought 
does  not  allow  him  to  explain  it  as  something  composite,  instead  of  simply 
confessing  that  he  cannot  explain  the  possibility  of  a thinking  nature,  why 
should  not  a materialist,  though  he  can  as  little  appeal  to  experience  in 
support  of  his  theories,  be  entitled  to  use  the  same  boldness,  and  use  his 
principle  for  the  opposite  purpose,  though  retaining  the  formal  unity  on 
which  his  opponent  relied  ? 


8oo 


Supplement  XXVII 


of  modality')  as  given,  and  analyse  it,  in  order  to  find  our  whether, 
and  how,  the  Ego  determines  its  existence  in  space  and  time  by 
it  alone,  the  propositions  of  rational  psychology  would  not  start 
from  the  concept  of  a thinking  being,  in  general,  but  from  a reality, 
and  the  inference  would  consist  in  determining  from  the  manner 
in  which  that  reality  is  thought,  after  everything  that  is  empirical 
in  it  has  been  removed,  what  belongs  to  a thinking  being  in  gen- 
eral. This  may  be  shown  by  the  following  Table. 

i. 

I think, 

2.  3. 

as  Subject,  as  simple  Subject, 

4- 

as  identical  Subject, 
in  every  state  of  my  thought. 

As  it  has  not  been  determined  in  the  second  proposition,  whether 
I can  exist  and  be  conceived  to  exist  as  a subject  only,  and  not 
also  as  a predicate  of  something  else,  the  concept  of  subject  is 
here  taken  as  logical  only,  and  it  remains  undetermined  whether 
we  are  to  understand  by  it  a substance  or  not.  In  the  third 
proposition,  however,  the  absolute  unity  of  apperception,  the 
simple  I,  being  the  representation  to  which  all  connection  or 
separation  (which  constitute  thought)  relate,  assumes  its  own 
importance,  although  nothing  is  determined  as  yet  with  regard 
to  the  nature  of  the  subject,  or  its  subsistence.  The  appercep- 
tion is  something  real,  and  it  is  only  possible,  if  it  is  simple.  In 
space,  however,  there  is  nothing  real  that  is  simple,  for  points 
(the  only  simple  in  space)  are  limits  only,  and  not  themselves 
something  which,  as  a part,  serves  to  constitute  space.  From 
this  follows  the  impossibility  of  explaining  the  nature  of  myself, 
as  merely  a thinking  subject,  from  the  materialistic  point  of  view. 
As,  however,  in  the  first  proposition,  my  existence  is  taken  for 
granted,  for  it  is  not  said  in  it  that  every  thinking  being  exists 
(this  would  predicate  too  much,  namely,  absolute  necessity  of 
them),  but  only,  I exist,  as  thinking,  the  proposition  itself  is 
empirical,  and  contains  only  the  determinability  of  my  existence, 


Supplement  XXVII 


8oi 


in  reference  to  my  representations  in  time.  But  as  for  that  pur- 
pose again  I require,  first  of  all,  something  permanent,  such  as 
is  not  given  to  me  at  all  in  internal  intuition,  so  far  as  I think 
myself,  it  is  really  impossible  by  that  simple  self-consciousness  to 
determine  the  manner  in  which  I exist,  whether  as  a substance 
or  as  an  accident.  Thus,  if  materialism  was  inadequate  to  ex- 
plain my  existence,  spiritualism  is  equally  insufficient  for  that 
purpose,  and  the  conclusion  is,  that,  in  no  way  whatsoever  can 
we  know  anything  of  the  nature  of  our  soul,  so  far  as  the  possi- 
bility of  its  separate  existence  is  concerned. 

And  how  indeed  should  it  be  possible  by  means  of  that  unity 
of  consciousness  which  we  only  know  because  it  is  indispensable 
to  us  for  the  very  possibility  of  experience,  to  get  beyond  expe- 
rience (our  existence  in  life),  and  even  to  extend  our  knowledge 
to  the  nature  of  all  thinking  beings  in  general,  by  the  empirical, 
but,  with  reference  to  every  kind  of  intuition,  undetermined 
proposition,  I think. 

There  is,  therefore,  no  rational  psychology,  as  a doctrine , fur- 
nishing any  addition  to  our  self-knowledge,  but  only  as  a discipline , 
fixing  unpassable  limits  to  speculative  reason  in  this  field,  partly 
to  keep  us  from  throwing  ourselves  into  the  arms  of  a soulless 
materialism,  partly  to  warn  us  against  losing  ourselves  in  a vague, 
and,  with  regard  to  practical  life,  baseless  spiritualism.  It  reminds 
us  at  the  same  time  to  look  upon  this  refusal  of  our  reason  to 
give  a satisfactory  answer  to  such  curious  questions,  which  reach 
beyond  the  limits  of  this  life,  as  a hint  to  turn  our  self-knowledge 
away  from  fruitless  speculations  to  a fruitful  practical  use  — a use 
which,  though  directed  always  to  objects  of  experience  only, 
derives  its  principle  from  a higher  source,  and  so  regulates  our 
conduct,  as  if  our  destination  reached  far  beyond  experience, 
and  therefore  far  beyond  this  life. 

We  see  from  all  this,  that  rational  psychology  owes  its  origin 
to  a mere  misunderstanding.  The  unity  of  consciousness,  on 
which  the.  categories  are  founded,  is  mistaken  for  an  intuition 
of  the  subject  as  object,  and  the  category  of  substance  applied 
to  it.  But  that  unity  is  only  the  unity  in  thought,  by  which  alone 
no  object  is  given,  and  to  which,  therefore,  the  category  of  sub- 
3^ 


802 


Supplement  XXVII 


stance,  which  always  presupposes  a given  intuition,  cannot  be 
applied,  and  therefore  the  subject  cannot  be  known.  The  sub- 
ject of  the  categories,  therefore,  cannot,  by  thinking  them,  receive 
a concept  of  itself,  as  an  object  of  the  categories  ; for  in  order  to 
think  the  categories,  it  must  presuppose  its  pure  self-conscious- 
ness, the  very  thing  that  had  to  be  explained.  In  like  manner 
the  subject,  in  which  the  representation  of  time  has  its  original 
source,  cannot  determine  by  it  its  own  existence  in  time ; and  if 
the  latter  is  impossible,  the  former,  as  a determination  of  oneself 
(as  of  a thinking  being  in  general)  by  means  of  the  categories, 
is  equally  so.1 

******** 

Thus  vanishes,  as  an  idle  dream,  that  knowledge  which  was  to 
go  beyond  the  limits  of  possible  experience,  and  was  connected 
no  doubt  with  the  highest  interests  of  humanity,  so  far  at  least 

1 The  ‘ I think  ’ is,  as  has  been  stated,  an  empirical  proposition,  and  con- 
tains within  itself  the  proposition,  I exist.  I cannot  say,  however,  everything 
which  thinks  exists;  for  in  that  case  the  property  of  thinking  would  make  all 
beings  which  possess  it  necessary  beings.  Therefore,  my  existence  cannot,  as 
Descartes  supposed,  be  considered  as  derived  from  the  proposition,  I think 
(for  in  that  case  the  major,  everything  that  thinks  exists,  ought  to  have  pre- 
ceded), but  is  identical  with  it.  It  expresses  an  indefinite  empirical  intuition, 
that  is,  a perception  (and  proves,  therefore,  that  this  proposition,  asserting 
existence,  is  itself  based  on  sensation,  which  belongs  to  sensibility),  but  it 
precedes  experience,  which  is  meant  to  determine  the  object  of  perception 
through  the  categories  in  respect  to  time.  Existence,  therefore,  is  here  not 
yet  a category,  which  never  refers  to  an  indefinitely  given  object,  but  only  to 
one  of  which  we  have  a concept,  and  of  which  we  wish  to  know  whether  it 
exists  also  apart  from  that  conception  or  no.  An  indefinite  perception  sig- 
nifies here  something  real  only  that  has  been  given  merely  for  thinking  in 
general,  not  therefore  as  a phenomenon,  nor  as  a thing  by  itself  (noumenon), 
but  as  something  that  really  exists  and  is  designated  as  such  in  the  proposition, 
I think.  For  it  must  be  observed,  that  if  I have  called  the  proposition,  I 
think,  an  empirical  proposition,  I did  not  mean  to  say  thereby,  that  the  ego  in 
that  proposition  is  an  empirical  representation;  it  is  rather  purely  intellectual, 
because  it  belongs  to  thought  in  general.  Without  some  empirical  represen- 
tation, however,  which  supplies  the  matter  for  thought,  the  act,  I think, 
would  not  take  place,  and  the  empirical  is  only  the  condition  of  the  applica- 
tion or  of  the  use  of  the  pure  intellectual  faculty. 


Supplement  XXVII 


803 


as  speculative  philosophy  was  to  supply  it.  Yet  no  unimportant 
service  has  thus  been  rendered  to  reason  by  the  severity  of  our 
criticism,  in  proving,  at  the  same  time,  the  impossibility  of  settling 
anything  dogmatically  with  reference  to  an  object  of  experience, 
beyond  the  limits  of  experience,  and  thus  securing  it  against  all 
possible  assertions  to  the  contrary.  This  can  only  be  done  in 
two  ways,  either  by  proving  one’s  own  proposition  apodictically, 
or,  if  that  does  not  succeed,  by  trying  to  discover  the  causes  of 
that  failure,  which,  if  they  lie  in  the  necessary  limits  of  our  reason, 
must  force  every  opponent  to  submit  to  exactly  the  same  law  of 
renunciation  with  reference  to  any  claims  to  dogmatic  assertion. 

Nothing  is  lost,  however,  by  this  with  regard  to  the  right,  nay, 
the  necessity  of  admitting  a future  life,  according  to  the  princi- 
ples of  practical,  as  connected  with  the  speculative  employment 
of  reason.  It  is  known  besides,  that  a purely  speculative  proof 
has  never  been  able  to  exercise  any  influence  on  the  ordinary 
reason  of  men.  It  stands  so  entirely  upon  the  point  of  a hair, 
that  even  the  schools  can  only  keep  it  from  falling  so  long  as 
they  keep  it  constantly  spinning  round  like  a top,  so  that,  even 
in  their  own  eyes,  it  yields  no  permanent  foundation  upon  which 
anything  could  be  built.  The  proofs  which  are  useful  for  the 
world  at  large  retain  their  value  undiminished,  nay,  they  gain  in 
clearness  and  natural  power,  by  the  surrender  of  those  dogmatical 
pretensions,  placing  reason  in  its  own  peculiar  domain,  namely, 
the  system  of  ends,  which  is,  however,  at  the  same  time  the 
system  of  nature ; so  that  reason,  as  a practical  faculty  by  itself, 
without  being  limited  by  the  conditions  of  nature,  becomes  justi- 
fied in  extending  the  system  of  ends,  and  with  it,  our  own  exist- 
ence, beyond  the  limits  of  experience  and  of  life.  According  to 
the  analogy  with  the  nature  of  living  beings  in  this  world,  in 
which  reason  must  necessarily  admit  the  principle  that  no  organ, 
no  faculty,  no  impulse,  can  be  found,  as  being  either  superfluous 
or  disproportionate  to  its  use,  and  therefore  purposeless,  but  that 
everything  is  adequate  to  its  destination  in  life,  man,  who  alone 
can  contain  in  himself  the  highest  end  of  all  this,  would  be  the 
only  creature  excepted  from  it.  For,  his  natural  dispositions,  not 
only  so  far  as  he  uses  them  according  to  his  talents  and  impulses, 


804 


Supplement  XXVII 


but  more  especially  the  moral  law  within  him,  go  so  far  beyond 
all  that  is  useful  and  advantageous  in  this  life,  that  he  is-  taught 
thereby,  in  the  absence  of  all  advantages,  even  of  the  shadowy 
hope  of  posthumous  fame,  to  esteem  the  mere  consciousness  of 
righteousness  beyond  everything  else,  feeling  an  inner  call,  by 
his  conduct  in  this  world  and  a surrender  of  many  advantages, 
to  render  himself  fit  to  become  the  citizen  of  a better  world,  which 
exists  in  his  idea  only.  This  powerful  and  incontrovertible  proof, 
accompanied  by  our  constantly  increasing  recognition  of  a design 
pervading  all  that  we  see  around  us,  and  by  a contemplation  of 
the  immensity  of  creation,  and  therefore  also  by  the  consciousness 
of  an  unlimited  possibility  in  the  extension  of  our  knowledge,  and 
a desire  commensurate  therewith,  all  this  remains  and  always  will 
remain,  although  we  must  surrender  the  hope  of  ever  being  able 
to  understand,  from  the  mere  theoretical  knowledge  of  ourselves, 
the  necessary  continuance  of  our  existence. 

Conclusion  of  the  Solution  of  the  Psychological  Paralogism 

The  dialectical  illusion  in  rational  psychology  arises  from  our 
confounding  an  idea  of  reason  (that  of  a pure  intelligence)  with 
the  altogether  indefinite  concept  of  a thinking  being  in  general. 
What  we  are  doing  is,  that  we  conceive  ourselves  for  the  sake  of 
a possible  experience,  taking  no  account,  as  yet,  of  any  real  ex- 
perience, and  thence  conclude  that  we  are  able  to  become  con- 
scious of  our  existence,  independently  of  experience  and  of  its 
empirical  conditions.  We  are,  therefore,  confounding  the  possible 
abstraction  of  our  own  empirically  determined  existence  with  the 
imagined  consciousness  of  a possible  separate  existence  of  our 
thinking  self,  and  we  bring  ourselves  to  believe  that  we  know  the 
substantial  within  us  as  the  transcendental  subject,  while  what  we 
have  in  our  thoughts  is  only  the  unity  of  consciousness,  on  which, 
as  on  the  mere  form  of  knowledge,  all  determination  is  based. 

The  task  of  explaining  the  community  of  the  soul  with  the 
body  does  not  properly  fall  within  the  province  of  that  psychology 
of  which  we  are  here  speaking,  because  that  psychology  tries  to 
prove  the  personality  of  the  soul,  apart  also  from  that  community 


Supplement  XX  VII 


805 


(after  death),  being  therefore  transcendent,  in  the  proper  sense  of 
that  word,  inasmuch  as,  though  dealing  with  an  object  of  experi- 
ence, it  deals  with  it  only  so  far  as  it  has  ceased  to  be  an  object 
of  experience.  According  to  our  doctrine,  however,  a sufficient 
answer  may  be  returned  to  that  question  also.  The  difficulty  of 
the  task  consists,  as  is  well  known,  in  the  assumed  heterogeneous- 
ness of  the  object  of  the  internal  sense  (the  soul),  and  the  objects 
of  the  external  senses,  the  formal  condition  of  the  intuition  with 
regard  to  the  former  being  time  only,  with  regard  to  the  latter, 
time  and  space.  If  we  consider,  however,  that  both  kinds  of 
objects  thus  differ  from  each  other,  not  internally,  but  so  far  only 
as  the  one  appears  externally  to  the  other,  and  that  possibly  what 
is  at  the  bottom  of  phenomenal  matter,  as  a thing  by  itself,  may 
not  be  so  heterogeneous  after  all  as  we  imagine,  that  difficulty 
vanishes,  and  there  remains  that  one  difficulty  only,  how  a com- 
munity of  substances  is  possible  at  all ; a difficulty  which  it  is  not 
the  business  of  psychology  to  solve,  and  which,  as  the  reader  will 
easily  understand,  after  what  has  been  said  in  the  Analytic  of 
fundamental  powers  and  faculties,  lies  undoubtedly  beyond  the 
limits  of  all  human  knowledge. 

General  Note  on  the  Transition  from  Rational  Psychology  to 
Cosmology 

The  proposition,  I think,  or,  I exist  thinking,  is  an  empirical 
proposition.  Such  a proposition  is  based  on  an  empirical  intuition, 
and  its  object  is  phenomenal : so  that  it  might  seem  as  if,  accord- 
ing to  our  theory,  the  soul  was  changed  altogether,  even  in  think- 
ing, into  something  phenomenal,  and  our  consciousness  itself,  as 
merely  phenomenal,  would  thus  indeed  refer  to  nothing. 

Thinking,  taken  by  itself,  is  a logical  function  only,  and  there- 
fore pure  spontaneity,  in  connecting  the  manifold  of  a merely 
possible  intuition.  It  does  not  represent  the  subject  of  conscious- 
ness, as  phenomenal,  for  the  simple  reason,  that  it  takes  no  account 
whatsoever  of  the  manner  of  intuition,  whether  it  be  sensuous  or 
intellectual.  I do  not  thereby  represent  myself  to  myself,  either 
as  I am,  or  as  I appear  to  myself,  but  I only  conceive  of  myself, 


8o  6 


Supplement  XXVII 


as  of  any  other  object,  without  taking  account  of  the  manner  ol 
intuition.  If  thereby  I represent  myself  as  the  subject  of  my 
thoughts,  or  as  the  ground  of  thinking,  these  modes  of  representa- 
tion are  not  the  categories  of  substance  or  cause,  because  these 
are  functions  of  thought  (judgment)  as  applied  already  to  our 
sensuous  intuition,  such  sensuous  intuition  being  necessary,  if  I 
wish  to  know  myself.  But  I only  wish  to  become  conscious  of 
myself  as  thinking,  and  as  I take  no  account  of  what  my  own  self 
may  be  as  a phenomenon,  it  is  quite  possible  that  it  might  be  a 
phenomenon  only  to  me,  who  thinks,  but  not  to  me,  so  far  as  I am 
thinking.  In  the  consciousness  of  myself  in  mere  thinking  I am 
the  substance  itself,  but  of  that  substance  nothing  is  thus  given 
me  for  thinking. 

The  proposition  I think,  if  it  means  / exist  thinking,  is  not 
merely  logical  function,  but  determines  the  subject  (which  then 
is  at  the  same  time  object)  with  reference  to  its  existence,  and  is 
impossible  without  the  internal  sense,  the  intuition  of  which  always 
supplies  the  object,  not  as  a thing  by  itself,  but  as  phenomenal 
only.  Here,  therefore,  we  have  no  longer  mere  spontaneity  of 
thinking,  but  also  receptivity  of  intuition,  that  is,  the  thinking  of 
myself  applied  to  the  empirical  intuition  of  the  same  subject.  In 
that  empirical  intuition  the  thinking  self  would  have  to  look  for 
the  conditions  under  which  its  logical  functions  can  be  employed 
as  categories  of  substance,  cause,  etc.,  in  order  not  only  to  dis- 
tinguish itself  as  an  object  by  itself,  through  the  Ego,  but  to  deter- 
mine the  mode  of  its  existence  also,  that  is,  to  know  itself  as  a 
noumenon.  This,  as  we  know,  is  impossible,  because  the  internal 
empirical  intuition  is  sensuous,  and  supplies  us  with  phenomenal 
data  only,  which  furnish  nothing  to  the  object  of  the  pure  con- 
sciousness for  the  knowledge  of  its  own  separate  existence,  but 
can  serve  the  purpose  of  experience  only. 

Supposing,  however,  that  we  should  hereafter  discover,  not  in- 
deed in  experience,  but  in  certain  (not  only  logical  rules,  but)  a 
priori  established  laws  of  pure  reason,  concerning  our  existence, 
some  ground  for  admitting  ourselves,  entirely  a priori,  as  deter- 
mining and  ruling  our  own  existence,  there  would  then  be  a spon- 
taneity by  which  our  reality  would  be  determinable  without  the 


Supplement  XXVII 


807 


conditions  of  empirical  intuition,  and  we  should  then  perceive 
that  in  the  consciousness  of  our  existing  there  is  contained  a 
priori  something  which  may  serve  to  determine  with  respect  to 
some  inner  faculty,  our  existence,  which  otherwise  can  be  deter- 
mined sensuously  only  with  reference  to  an  intelligible,  though,  of 
course,  an  ideal  world  only. 

This,  however,  would  not  in  the  least  benefit  the  attempts  of 
rational  psychology.  For  though  through  that  wonderful  faculty, 
which  becomes  first  revealed  to  myself  by  the  consciousness  of 
a moral  law,  I should  have  a principle,  purely  intellectual,  for  a 
determination  of  my  existence,  what  would  be  its  determining 
predicates  ? No  other  but  those  which  must  be  given  to  me  in 
sensuous  intuition  ; and  I should  therefore  find  myself  again  in 
the  same  situation  where  I was  before  in  rational  psychology,  re- 
quiring sensuous  intuitions  in  order  to  give  significance  to  the 
concepts  of  my  understanding,  such  as  substance,  cause,  etc.,  by 
which  alone  I can  gain  a knowledge  of  myself ; and  these  in- 
tuitions can  never  carry  me  beyond  the  field  of  experience.  Nev- 
ertheless, for  practical  purposes,  which  always  concern  objects  of 
experience,  I should  be  justified  in  applying  these  concepts,  in 
analogy  with  their  theoretical  employment,  to  liberty  also  and  to 
the  subject  of  liberty,  by  taking  them  only  as  logical  functions  of 
subject  and  predicate,1  of  cause  and  effect.  According  to  them, 
acts  or  effects,  as  following  those  (moral)  laws,  would  be  so  deter- 
mined that  they  may  together  with  the  laws  of  nature  be  explained 
in  accordance  with  the  categories  of  substance  and  cause  ; though 
arising  in  reality  from  a totally  different  principle.  All  this  is 
only  meant  to  prevent  a misunderstanding  to  which  our  doctrine, 
which  represents  self-intuition  as  purely  phenomenal,  might  easily 
be  exposed.  In  what  follows  we  shall  have  occasion  to  make 
good  use  of  it. 


1 It  is  necessary  to  put  a comma  after  Pradicats. 


SUPPLEMENT  XXVIII 

[See  page  400] 


I have  sometimes  called  it  formal  idealism  also,  in  order  to  dis- 
tinguish it  from  the  material  or  common  idealism,  which  doubts 
or  denies  the  very  existence  of  external  things.  In  some  cases  it 
seems  advisable  to  use  these  terms  rather  than  those  in  the  text, 
in  order  to  prevent  all  misunderstanding.  (This  is  an  additional 
note  in  the  Second  Edition.) 

808 


Printed  in  the  United  States  of  America. 


TRANS.  FROM  Pi- 

1993 


